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THE OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MEDIEVAL WARFARE AND MILITARY TECHNOLOGY

Clifford J. Rogers
EDITOR IN CHIEF

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East Central Europe: Narrative (500–1000)—Ménfő, Battle of

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Common Abbreviations Used in This Work

b.	born; ibn (in Arab names)
B.C.E.	before the common era (= B.C.)
c.	*circa*, about, approximately
C.E.	common era (= A.D.)
cf	*confer*, compare
d.	died
diss.	dissertation
ed.	editor (pl., eds.), edition
f.	and following (pl., ff.)
fl.	*floruit*, flourished
HRE	Holy Roman Empire
l.	line (pl., ll.)
n.	note
n.d.	no date
no.	number
n.p.	no place
n.s.	new series
p.	page (pl., pp.)
pt.	part
rev.	revised
ser.	series
supp.	supplement
vol.	volume (pl., vols.)

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East Central Europe

[*This entry contains three subentries, an overview of East Central European military history from 500–1000, from 1000–1300, and from 1300–1500.*]

Narrative (500–1000)

The period from 500 to 1000 witnessed the rise and fall of several mostly nomadic empires that dominated the vast empty zone between the eastern border of the Frankish (after 843 East Frankish) Empire and Byzantium, with its center in the Carpathian basin, an ecological and cultural transition zone between the settled and nomadic worlds.

The Avars first appeared under Khagan Bayan (c. 562–601) in a Byzantine alliance. They defeated the Gepids (567), made the Langobards move to North Italy (568), and laid the foundation of a multiethnic empire that contained the territories from the Alps to the Don River and lasted for centuries. The Avars challenged the Byzantine defense system several times, including the capture of Sirmium (modern Sremska Mitrovica) (579–582) and Singidunum (modern Belgrade) (582), and the unsuccessful sieges of Saloniki (617) and Constantinople (626). They also raided western territories, for example, in 561–562 as far as Magdeburg, or Istria (602), Friuli and Cividale (611), and gathered fantastic amounts of tribute and booty on both fronts. They opened up the way for the Slavs to enter the Balkans, but gradually lost their control over them (e.g., the Vends became independent by the 620s; the originally Turkish-speaking Bulgars and the Slavs of Dalmatia by the 630s). They continued a nomadic way of life, with their central seat (*hring*) between the Duna and Tisza rivers in present-day Hungary, and their territory was reduced to the Carpathian basin, which as a whole was conquered by them for the first time.

Avar warfare was characterized by the use of a relatively small body of Persian-type heavy cavalry (utilizing the armor-piercing stabbing lance, the long, double-edged sword, mail and lamellar armor, metal helmet, and horse armor), estimated at a few thousand within the approximately twenty to thirty thousand Avar cavalry, combined with a much larger body using reflex composite bows, three-edged arrowheads, battle axes, etc. The use of the iron stirrup, pelham bit, and treed saddles were among the first in Europe, although scholarly debate over their significance ("the stirrup controversy") is still going on, and it is almost certain that the Avars did not charge with lances couched under the arm, so western use of that technique can't have been copied directly from them. Their disciplined cavalry tactics described in the *Strategikon* (11.210)—battles fought at long range, ambushes, encircling, feigned retreats with

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sudden returns, wedge-shaped formations in scattered groups, the use of reserve troops)—influenced the contemporary warfare. They had a number of allied people and auxiliaries, such as the Slavic and Gepid infantry, and after the 670s the light cavalry of the Bulgars. After the failed siege of Constantinople in 626 the Avars gradually lost their former political and military dynamics and were forced to make compromises with the Byzantines, until finally the Bulgarian principality (First Bulgarian Empire until 1018) of Asparukh c. 680–681 closed their way to the southeast. They had to give up their plundering raids, transforming their nomadic way of life as well, and partly adopted a Frankish type of armament. The *khagan* had to share his power with other dignitaries, like the *jugurrus* and *tudun*, and also had to fight civil wars with them. Having crushed the Slavic buffer principality of Samo (660), they pushed their western border as far as the Enns River. They were attacked by the Franks in a spectacular campaign in 791, where by making use of the remains of Roman infrastructure the Franks marched as far as the city of Savaria (modern Szombathely), destroyed the Avar strongholds in lower Austria, and opened the way for smaller-scale Frankish raids thereafter. The Avars emptied their fortresses and withdrew successfully, and the weather conditions along with an equine epidemic in Charlemagne's army saved them for a while, until 803 when the Franks sacked the *khagan*'s treasury, pacified the Transdanubian territories, and compelled the Avar leaders hit by civil wars to accept Christianity.

The remnant Avar principalities survived in the West until the 820s, when Pannonia was reorganized into counties and Slavic vassal principalities, at first led by dignitaries of the former Avar empire. The Moravian principality (Great Moravian Empire) became the most important of them, centered in today's Moravia and Slovakia (controlling also Bohemia). It engaged in constant struggle with the East Frankish-Bavarian forces, on occasion gaining great victories over them, as Prince Svatopluk did in 872. During the wars of 892 and 893 a large royal army with Hungarian auxiliaries compelled the Moravians to accept German overlordship, and lost Bohemia, which soon became a German vassal state. After the battle of Bratislava in 907 the Hungarians occupied their southern territory.

East of the Avars the Khazars established their empire in the seventh century centered on Etil on the Volga River from the 630s on, which contained Bulgars, Hungarians, Slavs, Alans, and later Jews and a large number of other ethnicities, and dominated territories from the Kama River to the Caucasian Mountains, from the Urals to the Dnieper River. They fought heavily with the Arabs led by Marvan, for example, in the years 736 and 737, but regained their power in spite of their defeat and temporary Islamization. A key factor to the Khazars long supremacy lay in their alliance with Byzantium, which helped them to build a series of fortresses such as Sarkel, against the attacking nomads from the Don region to the Crimean Peninsula. They encouraged the Varangians who traveled along the rivers to attack the Arab borderland, until the year 913 when they destroyed the Varangian fleet and refused them permission to enter Khazar territory. The dual structure of their kingship influenced the warfare, as the army was led by the *hakan-bek* and not the *khagan*, the sacral leader. The army was divided into units of ten thousand, the so-called *tumens*, a permanent Persian-type heavy cavalry; the light cavalry was recruited from the common people. The bodyguard of the *khagan* was formed by ten thousand mercenaries, recruited mostly from Muslim Turks and Horezmiens. Their tax and military system influenced most of the eastern peoples, like the Hungarians (where the word *tumen* is still in use), as the *khagan* title survived in Kiev for a long time.

From the middle of the ninth century the different components revolted one after another. The Kabars joined the newly independent Hungarian tribal confederation; later the Bulgars left the Khazar empire. Finally they were not able to resist the rising power of the Kievan Rus' that formed an alliance against them with the Byzantines. It was Prince Svyatoslav I who defeated them militarily (965), conquered their fortified cities, and made them Slavic auxiliaries. By the end of the tenth century a new state

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system consolidated itself with the German empire, the Hungarian kingdom, the Kievan Rus', and the revived Byzantine Empire (controlling again the Adriatic coast and the Balkans), which absorbed not only the remnants of the former nomadic tribes and ethnicities, but resisted the newcomers from the east as well.

[*See also* Avars; Bratislava, Battle of; Byzantine Empire, *subentry on* Narrative (500–900); Franks, Carolingian, *subentry on* Narrative (751–899); Franks, Merovingian, *subentry on* Narrative (482–751); *and* Slavic Lands, *subentry on* Narrative (500–1000).]

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László Veszprémy

Narrative (1000–1300)

The new political centers of East Central Europe evolved where the Christian missions were successful in the last third of the tenth century: Prague, Poznań, Esztergom, and Kiev. Four dynasties emerged: the Přemyslides in Prague, the Piasts in Poznań, the Árpáds in Esztergom, and the Rurikids in Kiev. Their power had its roots in tribal organization and was transformed by the ceremony of coronation into a new sort of Christian rulership. For the new dynasties the coronation meant both international acceptance and also, within their own lands, their acquisition of a new level of status, a step above their rivals. The representatives of the new dynasties turned to one of the Christian emperors or the pope (or both) for a crown. Although because of their tax payments and participation at the Reichstag the Piasts had close connections with the Holy Roman Empire, they were not regarded by the emperors as equal partners. For the Přemyslid princes the crown was an acknowledgment by the emperors, but only *ad personam* and not on a hereditary basis. The title of king was achieved by Přemysl Otakar I in the late twelfth century, which increased his prestige within the empire. In Hungary the first coronation, in 1000, was accepted by both the German emperor and the pope. The sovereigns of the Árpád dynasty made use of the proximity of the other Christian empire. If the western emperor did not acknowledge them, they gained such acknowledgment from the Byzantine emperor. The rulers of the Rus', not being threatened by Byzantine expansion, could maintain their sovereignty even without this special symbol of authority.

The political centers that were developing in the late tenth century can by no means be identified with the territories of the later evolving countries. The rule of the Přemyslid dynasty was first limited to a part of the Bohemian basin with Prague as its center, that of the Piasts to the region around Gniezno and Poznań, that of the Árpáds to the western half of the Carpathian Basin, and that of the Rurikids to the water route between Novgorod and Kiev. After the new dynasties consolidated their rule in these areas, they engaged in territorial expansions, a unique expansion to organize the state. During the course of this, the new political centers often came into conflicts with each other, the frontiers being uncertain and subject to change. The uncertainties of organization of the centers under the rule of these dynasties invited the intervention of neighboring powers. The Holy Roman emperors brought the Bohemian center completely under its direction and made the Polish princes their tributaries, but their dominance did not reach Kiev. Hungary was successful in its assaults against the Holy Roman Empire and Byzantium, and it also pushed back the nomadic attacks from the steppe. The Rus' was

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subject to serious attacks only from the steppe, but before the Mongols the grand princes could organize the defense of the southern borders. In the case of the western Slavs, the Bohemian and Moravian territories became increasingly consolidated. In Poland the question of Silesia and expansion to the Baltic area was the issue. The question of Silesia was a lasting problem in relations between Bohemia and Poland, as was the question of Halych and Volhynia in relations between Poland and Kiev.

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The independence of the centers, and the extent of the independence, depended on how effectively they could resist the secular expansion and church mission from the empires. In the secular respect, the features of the military played a decisive role. As early as the tribal period the entire Slavonic population organized its defense system based on fortifications. These centers, generally constructed as dynastic "capitals," were earth strongholds fortified with wooden structures. Around these fortified centers lived the free agricultural population. This stratum of the free people served as the warriors for both offensive and defensive military activity. In the central settlement (*grad*, *hrad*, *grod*, or *gorod*), the leader of the dynasty or tribe lived with his escort (*druzhina*). Neither the number of free commoners nor that of the escort can have been very high. Thus the need for complementary forces emerged, something that is referred to in the chronicles as "asking for auxiliary forces." In the case of Hungarians, the past on the steppe lived on in their military organization. The characteristics of a mobile society—its readiness for war and military skills—were reflected in the Hungarians' military campaigns. As on the steppe, Hungarians retained the use of military auxiliary peoples, who received privileges and, in return, had to fight. These peoples were self-maintaining and did not need the financial support of the ruler. This certainly meant an always-ready warrior force that was cheaper and more numerous than the escort. In the case of the Kievan Rus', alongside the Slavonic defense system, Varangians and warriors from the steppe appeared as military elements. The Varangians were members of the princes' escorts. The warriors from the steppe were both the principal enemies and also frequent auxiliaries of the Kievan grand princes. For the defense from the steppe, fortifications were constructed: mounds between the rivers, similar to traditional fortress-building technology. In the twelfth century, persons of nomadic origin, such as Cumans and Volga-Bulgarians, may be found in the princes' escorts.

In the thirteenth century when the crusaders occupied Constantinople, the Byzantine Empire lost its imperial role. In ecclesiastic matters the influence of the pope became pronounced, and the western church made efforts aiming at the reunification of Christianity—pushing back Greek Orthodoxy and forcing a union with Rome. On the frontiers of East Central Europe and eastern Europe, this goal was supported by Polish and Hungarian expansionary efforts. The Hungarians tried to expand into the Balkans, where the territorial losses of Byzantium led to the emergence of Bulgarian and Serbian dynastic centers. These internal struggles were exploited by papal policy. In the northern parts of East Central Europe, a similar role was played by the country of the Teutonic Knights. They converted the pagan Prussians and Lithuanians to Christianity and tried to expand in the direction of the eastern Slavonic Novgorod, but they suffered a defeat in the battle at Lake Chud in 1242. This activity of the Teutonic Knights is sometimes referred to as a crusade.

By the thirteenth century Hungary had evolved as the only independent kingdom of East Central Europe. Bohemia was an integral part of the Holy Roman Empire and gained increasing significance with the weakening of the emperor's power. In Poland after the death of Bolesław III Wrymouth in 1138, disintegration began and had reached its peak by the early thirteenth century: the formerly unified provinces (Little and Great Poland, Mazovia, Kujavia, and Silesia) disintegrated into further partial principalities, which resulted in a complete decentralization of power and continuous internal fights. This recalled the situation of the Kievan Rus', with the difference that on the peripheries of the Rus' a certain level of new integration had begun by the thirteenth century (Vladimir-Suzdal, Halych-Volhynia, Novgorod, and Chernigov).

The Mongol invasion of 1237–1242 totally overwhelmed eastern Europe and had a severe impact on Hungarian and Polish territories, too. On 11 April 1241 at Muhi in Hungary and on 9 April at Legnica in Silesia, the Mongols achieved devastating victories. In eastern Europe their presence continued, and they attacked Poland several times in the second half of the thirteenth century. Backing the wars against the Mongols, the pope promised crowns to a number of eastern European princes. Mindaugas of

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Lithuania and Danylo of Halych accepted these. In the case of the Lithuanians, this did not have serious consequences. Danylo of Halych received support for anti-Mongol conflicts, but these encounters lasted for only a short period. On the territory of Halych, Polish influence had become strong by the late thirteenth century, and the coronation of a Polish king in 1295 (Přemysl II) was the start of the rolling back of the process of disintegration, during the course of which some parts of Halych came under Polish rule in the fourteenth century.

In the western half of East Central Europe the struggle for the Austrian Babenberg inheritance began: both the Bohemian and the Hungarian kings wanted to gain the territory for themselves. The Přemyslid Otakar II proved victorious and made peace with Béla IV in 1262. At the time of the great German interregnum, Otakar's efforts to gain the imperial title remained fruitless. At the battle of Dürnkrut in 1278, Rudolf of Habsburg defeated him in alliance with another Hungarian king, Ladislas (László) IV. In the early fourteenth century the Bohemian Přemyslid dynasty became extinct as well. In this same century, under the rule of a new dynasty, the Luxemburgs, Bohemia became the center of the empire. In Hungary a similarly new dynasty, that of the Angevins, put an end to the anarchy. In Poland the kingship of the Piasts started the process of integration. Eastern Europe, which came under Mongol rule, was dependent on them, leading to increasing differentiation from Central Europe. This makes it relevant to consider 1300 as a real division in time.

[*See also* Auxiliary Peoples, Military; Baltics; Béla IV; Cumans; *Druzhina*; Dürnkrut, Battle of; Hungary, *subentry on* Narrative (1000–1300); Kroissenbrunn, Battle of; Legnica, Battle of; Mongols; Muhi, Battle of; Přemysl Otakar II; Slavic Lands, *subentry on* Narrative (1000–1300); *and* Varangian Guard.]

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Márta Font

Narrative (1300–1500)

The military history of East Central Europe in the later medieval period is marked by the advance of the Ottomans in the Balkans and the efforts of Christians against their superior military machinery as well as the outstanding successes of the Hussites in Bohemia. The reforms of the Hussite war leader, Jan Žižka (c. 1370–1424) and the innovations of the Hungarians János Hunyadi (c. 1407–1453) and his son, King Mátyás Hunyadi (r. 1458-1490), as well as the Albanian George (Gjergj) Kastrioti ("Skanderbeg", 1405–1468) in army composition, battle formation, tactics, and encampment methods brought forth a decisive change in military history.

The Ottoman Conquest. The Ottomans acquired their first foothold on the European Continent in 1354 (at Gallipoli [Gelibolu], Turkey) and started their expansion in the Balkans. The advance was eased by dissolution and civil war in Byzantium, and the prolonged internal conflict between Bulgaria and Serbia. Sultan Murad I (1326–1389) occupied the Byzantine metropolis Adrianople in 1365 and crushed the military machinery of the Serbs at the battles of Črnomen (26 September 1371) and Kosovo Polje (15 June 1389). The Ottomans also captured the heartlands of Serbia (Niš in 1386) and Bulgaria (Sofia in 1385). The defeated principalities were soon

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forced to accept vassal status, pay regular tribute, and supply auxiliary troops.

Sultan Bayezid I (r. 1389–1402) initiated a systematic conquest: his troops overran Walachia, Thessaly, Northern Albania, took Skopje and Tirnovo, and laid siege to Constantinople. The southern border regions of Hungary were hit by frequent raiding attacks. Sigismund of Luxemburg, king of Hungary (r. 1387–1437) organized a crusade in an attempt to roll back the Turkish advance, but was defeated at the battle of Nicopolis (25 September 1396). Hungary had to adopt a defensive policy, in the respite provided by the defeat of Bayezid at the battle of Ankara (1402) by Timur Lenk (Tamerlane). By the 1420s the Turks had reorganized themselves; they continued to harass Hungary and re-established their overlordship in Bosnia, Northern Serbia, and Walachia. In response, the rulers of Hungary launched a fortification-building program along the southern border. They formed military zones (*confinia*) of standing garrisons, logistical bases, and supply lines, based on a double fortification line from the Southern Carpathians (Bran, Romania) and the Lower Danube (Turnu Severin, Romania) to the coastline of the Adriatic (Senj, Croatia).

By the 1440s western Christendom was alarmed at having the Ottomans as an immediate neighbor across the Danube. The Turkish advance was stopped by the military genius of a Hungarian commander, János (John) Hunyadi, who, penetrating deep into the Balkans and shifting the theatre of war onto Ottoman territory, inflicted crushing defeats on the Turks in a series of battles from 1439 to 1444. In 1442 he routed marauders near Alba Iulia, then annihilated the main Rumelian forces (i.e. of the Ottomans' European provinces) along the valley of River Ialomiţa in Walachia. During the winter campaign of 1443–1444 Hunyadi tenaciously selected his targets to gain control of strategic routes (the Balkan Mountains passes, for example) and advanced deeply into Ottoman territory, capturing Niš and Sofia. He was stopped at the Zlatitsa Pass by severe weather conditions, and was only forced to turn back after vanquishing a pursuing Turkish force at the Dragoman Pass, near Kunovica (2 January 1444). In Albania, George (Gjergj) Kastrioti organized a league, revolted against the Ottomans, and recaptured most of the places the Turks had garrisoned. Sultan Murad II (r. 1421–1451) launched a punitive expedition but was utterly defeated at the battle of Torviolli (Torvioll) in June 1444.

By 1444 preparations had been made for a great crusade. The expedition to drive the Ottomans from the Continent failed because the Polish-Hungarian-Walachian forces were defeated at the battle of Varna (10 November 1444). Kastrioti and Hunyadi's cooperation was prevented by the Serbian despot George Branković. The catastrophe signaled that there was no real chance to halt the Ottomans in the traditional way; the crusade would now mean border warfare along the Danube. The defeat of Hunyadi at the second battle of Kosovo Polje in October 1448 showed that even an army of 30,000–35,000 was not a match for the numerical superiority of the Turks in a pitched open-field battle.

Mehmed II "the Conqueror" (r. 1444–1446, 1451–1481) began a large-scale conquest and took Constantinople in 1453. Although Hunyadi inflicted a severe blow to him at the siege of Nándorfehérvár (Belgrade) in 1456, the threat did not cease. By the early 1460s the Turks had overrun Serbia and most of Bosnia, and taken the key Hungarian strongholds along the Danube (Golubac and Smederevo). King Mátyás Hunyadi moved the frontier zone forward in northern Bosnia (to the towns of Jajce, Šabac, and Srebrenik). Hungary initiated a new policy towards its neighbors from Bosnia to Moldavia, aiming to unite an anti-Ottoman alliance. However, it rarely worked well: only a few rulers, like Mircea cel Bătrân, voivode of Walachia (r. 1386–1418) and Ştefan III cel Mare "the Great" of Moldavia (r. 1457–1504) cooperated. King Mátyás Hunyadi got into a conflict with the Walachian Vlad III (Ţepeş "the Impaler" or Dracula, r. 1448, 1456–1462, 1476–1477), and although the voivode achieved great successes against the Ottomans, Hunyadi had him imprisoned for more than a decade, thus creating a leak in the defense system. Ştefan united the forces of the two Romanian principalities: in 1473 he removed a submissive collaborator from Walachia, and pushed the

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Ottomans back. Backed up by Hungarian auxiliaries, he defeated the whole Rumelian force at the battle of Vaslui (17 January 1475). The following year Mehmed annihilated the Moldavians at the battle of Valea Albă (26 July 1476), though a Hungarian auxiliary force, which defeated the rearguard afterwards, moved over to Walachia, reinstating Vlad III on the throne. The Ottomans who invaded Transylvania were crushed by the Hungarian commanders Pál Kinizsi and István Bátori at the battle of Câmpul Pâinii (13 October 1479), which resulted in Mátyás agreeing to peace with the Ottomans, saving Hungary from devastation until the 1520s. The border defense system held out until the fall of Belgrade in 1521 and the catastrophic defeat of the Hungarians at the battle of Mohács (29 August 1526). By the end of the fifteenth century Walachia had submitted to the sultan.

Ştefan cel Mare lost the two key Pontic strongholds (Cetatea Albă [Maurocastron or Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyy] and Chilia-Nouă [Kiliya]) in 1484. Thereafter Moldavia faced recurrent Turkish onslaughts and from 1503 paid an annual tax. In Albania George Kastrioti fought for decades and achieved significant victories. Although he suffered a defeat at the siege of Berat in 1455, he reorganized the resistance and in 1461 he repulsed a three-pronged attack, forcing a ten-year armistice. Disappointed by the failure of the crusading schemes of Pope Pius II, Kastrioti went on fighting alone and preserved his country from Ottoman conquest. After his death in 1468, resistance continued and it was not until 1479, when the Turks captured Shkodër (Scutari), that Albania was fully subjected to Turkish rule.

The Hussite Wars (1420–1434). The Taborites—the radical wing of the Hussites or followers of Jan Hus (who was executed at the Council of Constance in 1415)— broke into armed revolt when Sigismund of Luxemburg (king of Bohemia, 1420–1437) was unwilling to negotiate over their demands for religious reforms. Pope Martin V declared a crusade. Sigismund's crusading army managed to break through to Prague but was defeated by the Taborites led by Jan Žižka at Vitkov Hill (14 July 1420) and Vyšehrad (1 November 1420). Žižka "summoned all the people" and ordered that "everyone capable of swinging a club and throwing a stone should be armed." Almost all of Bohemia fell into the hands of the Hussites. The crusading ventures of the 1420s suffered catastrophic defeats, failing to do anything against the Hussites' superior military technology and tactics. At the battle of Žatec (2 November 1421) the Taborites resoundingly defeated two crusading armies. The Hussites normally adopted defensive positions and drew their opponents into attacking their *Wagenburg* forts (wagon fortresses). At the battle of Kutná Horá (21 December 1421), however, Žižka took the offensive with his wagons and broke through the enemy lines. At Malešov (7 June 1424) Žižka deployed his forces on high ground and had "ballast" wagons filled with large stones pushed down the hill onto the enemy center, assisted by firing from the wagons behind. When civil war broke out between the Taborites and the more moderate Utraquists, the latter were overwhelmed at the siege of Karlstein (1422). Although Žižka died in 1424, his troops, led by Prokop the Bald, halted the great imperial ventures of 1426–1431 at Ústi nad Labem (16 June 1426), Tachov (1427), and Domažlice (August 1431). However, Sigismund ultimately found a political resolution to the crisis: he came to terms with the more moderate Hussite Utraquists, who had annihilated Prokop's forces at the battle of Lipany (30 May 1434).

Military Organization and Administration. The nobilities in Hungary and Poland throughout the period resisted service and insisted that the crown compensate them for service beyond the frontiers. In fourteenth-century Hungary, *banderia* were to be set up by the holders of honor dignities, consisting of their own retinues and the people of their administrative district. The general noble levy was regularly summoned in Angevin Hungary (1301–1387), although like in Poland, it proved relatively ineffective. Facing the Ottoman threat the general levy was reorganized: the great landowners had to muster and serve with all their retainers whether they had an honor or not. Lesser noblemen fought in the county contingents. A quota system of recruitment in accordance with the number of tenant holdings,

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the *militia portalis*, was introduced. Similarly, the Jagiellonian crown defined the nobles' obligation according to the size of their properties. Later the crown raised a mercenary army by quotas assigned to noblemen (cavalry *banners* and infantry *rota*). The nobles were to raise *poczet*s of 50–100 retainers, and were allowed to impose war subsidies to secure reimbursement for equipment and supplies. As magnate retinues had only limited military value, the crown levied heavy extraordinary subsidies. King Mátyás Hunyadi created a paid, regularly structured, and tightly disciplined aggregate-contract army (the Black Army) of 6,000–8,000 men supplemented with thousands of horse- and infantrymen hired for shorter periods as well as a standing garrison force. At the end of the fifteenth century, however, the nobility forced the crown to return to traditional methods. The greatest landowners (*domini banderiati*) were authorized to raise contingents of their own and collect war taxes themselves. In Bohemia, the Polish nobles avoided military service by hiring mercenaries; Hungarian aristocratic retinues were filled with a greater number of military *servitors*, lesser nobles serving for pay or allowances. The Thirteen Years' War (1454–1466) in Poland was fought largely by paid troops. The Romanian boyars resisted the princes' attempts to raise cavalrymen in numbers proportionate to the size of their estates. Ştefan cel Mare reorganized the Moldavian army: he recruited free peasants, and tied their freedom to military service. Vlad III also ignored the boyars and relied on free peasants.

Leadership. The period saw the rise of a new type of military leader of modest descent: a trained professional soldier (examples include Jan Žižka, János Hunyadi, and Pál Kinizsi). Although of aristocratic origin, George (Gjergj) Kastrioti (Skanderbeg) also somewhat fits this pattern: he was taken as a young hostage to Istanbul, where he attended military school, and after ascending the Ottoman army's ranks became a formidable leader. This imaginative "self-made" commander developed a personal charisma, fighting alongside the rank and file. Hunyadi, Kastrioti, and Romanian princes mobilized their peoples in a wide anti-Ottoman front.

National sentiment and religious fervor played a part in the stand the Poles and Hungarians took against the Ottomans as the "bulwark of Christendom." The Taborites also had had a deep commitment to their leaders, Žižka—addressed as a priestly figure, "Brother"—and Prokop the Bald, a priest himself, which affected the discipline and command of Hussite armies. In his military rule, Žižka insisted on regular and methodical drill and absolute obedience. He stipulated that "they shall march taking due care to protect the van, the rear and the flanks as ordered by their superiors" and "no one ride on ahead without the order of his superior." In other armies, the lack of absolute authority and unified command sometimes resulted in catastrophic defeats (for example, the battle of Nicopolis in 1396). János Hunyadi, Kastrioti, and the Hussite captains were resourceful, inventive, dynamic leaders, acting as the situation demanded. With a mobile core force they were always galloping to and fro, as a "common aid for all," reinforcing the hard-pressed wings, by swiftly deploying troops from the reserve when necessary, relying on field communications. They personally conducted reconnaissance to observe the position of their foes, watchfully selecting the terrain themselves. They utilized cover and occupied dominant ground.

Composition. The rulers found it necessary to employ companies of high-quality mercenaries, mostly mounted men-at-arms of Czech and German origin. The development of the infantry was under Swiss-German influences. From the late fifteenth century light infantrymen, the forefathers of the *Landsknechte*, were employed in Hungarian and Czech armies. They were equipped with pikes and swords, then carbines and arquebuses, applied in offensive actions at the front of the main body. Serving mostly on a permanent basis, they fought strictly in formation, in companies. The armies also employed lightly armored, maneuverable Swiss infantry units (*Haufe*)—pikemen and halberdiers—moving in independent echelon formations. The infantry had sufficient operational mobility to keep up with the cavalry, form a square, and take up an offensive position, fighting even the Janissaries. In Hungary, Bohemia, and Poland crossbowmen

Bahan dengan hak cipta

(*Strzelcy*) and arquebusiers equipped with large standing shields (*pavises*) accompanied the light infantry. Following the German-Swiss-Czech tradition, the infantry were generally divided into banners of 300–500 soldiers (*banda* or *Fahne*) and squads of six to ten men (*Rotte*).

Cavalry forces also became better-structured, divided into battalions, companies, and units of twenty-five men (*turmae*). After the Mongol invasion the influx of the steppe nomads (Cumans and Ias in Hungary; Tatars in Poland-Lithuania, the Romanian principalities, and Bulgaria) significantly influenced East-Central European military organization. Light cavalry were not only employed as auxiliaries on the flanks or to harass the enemy during the operational advance but were organically attached to the main body for tactical purposes (for example, swift maneuvers to and from the wings, or detachments sent against the enemy rear or reserves). The Cumans and the Ias, equipped with mail or lamellar armor, iron helmets, sabers, and twelve-spike maces, fought in close combat, as a complementary force of heavy cavalry. Light horse auxiliaries—Cumans and the Serbian-origin hussars ("gusari")—took up service in noblemen's retinues, thus bringing about a similarly amalgamated composition. The hussar became a superb close-quarters fighter in Hungary and Poland in the fifteenth century. At first these southern Slav irregulars were employed in Hungary on a temporary basis, to pillage Ottoman territory; then several thousand served as a regularly paid force in the frontier fortification districts. The hussars' style of warfare and equipment may have been influenced by the Ottomans since a great number of Slavs took up service with the Turks as supplementary semi-regular (*azap* volunteers and *timariots* drawn from fief-holding nobilities of Byzantine origin) and irregular troops (light mounted *akinçis*) in return for tax exemption. In Hungary and the Romanian principalities, thousands of Serbian refugees—light infantry spearmen or *voyniks*—were exempted from tax-paying in return for military service as supplementary troops, partly under the influence of the Turkish irregular peasant infantry *yayas*.

Formation. The reformers of the period successfully brought together complementary military skills. In Hungary, Moldavia, and Albania, a well-ordered, coordinated force was forged out of seemingly disparate elements. János Hunyadi placed a greater stress on the synergy of different branches of arms: heavy cavalry; horse archers (*Székelyek*); light Serbo-Hungarian hussars; mounted carabineers; light and heavy infantry. They were arrayed in a quadratic battle formation, with a hierarchical division of battalions and squadrons, marching in columns. The Romanian, Albanian, and Hungarian light horsemen at the front of the wings were used to break up the Ottoman cavalry, isolating them from the main body of the Janissaries with whom they were not to engage in close combat. The mobile light cavalry were to exhaust the Turkish infantry and outflank them with recurrent onslaughts. It was essential that the main body keep its array and not leave positions. The Hussites' military rule insisted on the maintenance of a cohesive formation: "All people should fall in proper formation under their banner. . . . Once they have been assigned to a particular battalion, [they] shall not mingle with one another." The crossbowmen and gunners were to stand in rows, reforming after shooting in orderly fashion. If encircled, they fought their way out by a coordinated assault of firearms.

Weaponry. The importance and effectiveness of artillery slowly increased over this period. János Hunyadi and the Ottomans both deployed guns on the battlefields starting in the 1440s: at Kosovo Polje in 1448 cannons were used throughout the night. The Czech arms manufacturers put their know-how and skill at the disposal of the Hussites, providing small arms and ammunition. Beyond the war wagons, equipped with small arms and cannons, the Hussites, the Jagiellonians, and Hunyadi also mounted artillery on rolling carriages in the spaces between wagons. Czech artillerymen laid emphasis on the precise calculation of distances, missile concentration, and density of fire. For hand-to-hand weapons, the Hussites converted agricultural tools to pole arms (for example, flails and scythes). In close-quarter infantry warfare, arquebusiers and

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crossbowmen built a "solid wall" of their *pavises*. The hussars were noted as "fighting in Turkish style and dress" (pointed Oriental *szyszak* or *Zischägge* helmets; circular or asymmetrical wooden shields; and *hajdana* mail of large rings). They were equipped with sabers of longer blade and partly bows.

Tactics and Strategy. János and Mátyás Hunyadi and Kastrioti coordinated the activities of field armies and fortification-based forces: launching offensives from behind a line of strongholds using garrison manpower as well. They did not treat castles only as defensive posts or ammunition depots, but also had them integrated as an organic element in field administration. In addition, the Hussites assigned an active role to their hill-top encampments and relocation centers (the city of Tabor being one such example) that provided territorial control in support of field campaigns and covered withdrawal. In support of castle and land forces, Mátyás established a standing flotilla, manned by regularly paid, lightly armed boatmen.

The leaders did not let their foes wage war in their own style, but seizing the initiative, took the field where the terrain and when the circumstances were ideal. As an aggressive battle-seeking strategist, Hunyadi forced battles far away from the border. János Hunyadi, the Hussites, the Albanians, and Vlad III led small-scale "Kleinkrieg" raids, counter-incursions into Ottoman territory, claiming booty and living off the land. They staged preventive assaults to cut supply lines, took strongholds and re-garrisoned them, and tenaciously selected their targets to gain control of strategic routes, for instance, the Balkan passes in the winter campaign of 1443–1444. Kastrioti fought a guerilla war using the mountainous terrain to his advantage. It was essential not to engage in combat with the Janissaries or crusader knights but to retreat to safe bases, when necessary, biding time. Kastrioti, Hunyadi, and Ştefan cel Mare's tactics were to let the Ottoman army spread out and seek for the enemy in a large territory, then to destroy the main body before any additional forces could come to its relief. Ştefan cel Mare's peasant army was badly equipped and his tactics were based on preventing a pitched battle and applying the scorched earth policy, but he launched his assaults at night when his lightly armed but mobile infantry could infiltrate the enemy camps in guerilla fashion. Vlad III also resorted to guerilla warfare, constantly organizing small attacks and ambushes on the Turks. He frequently employed night skirmishes (for example, the 1462 "Night Attack"). Small detachments harassed outer Ottoman patrols. Hunyadi, Kastrioti, Vlad III, and Ştefan cel Mare continuously harassed the Ottoman camps and attacked supply caravans.

The Jagiellonians aimed at preventing the unified frontal attack of the Teutons, but deployed their troops in mountainous terrain and tried to break up the main body into disjointed, smaller groups with the charges of their light cavalry. However, Kastrioti also won in open-field pitched battles. The battle of Ujebardha (2 September 1457) was a successful combination of guerilla warfare and disinformation. After a few minor clashes, Kastrioti withdrew to the mountains, then, in the style of Hunyadi's "Blitzkrieg," suddenly went on the offensive and surprised the main Ottoman army with an attack.

The hussars and Cumans gave armies flexibility in developing battle tactics. The hussars charged at full gallop in three to four ranks. When outnumbered, the leaders also used deep formations of light cavalry on their wings, by which they were able to purposefully enter an enemy's encirclement and break straight through. The light cavalry were skilled in all kinds of tactical tricks, from the feigned retreat to ambushes.

The Hussite *Wagenburg* (wagon fortress, a mobile fort of wooden walls with holes for guns) was also used in the armies of the Hunyadis and the Habsburgs. The Hunyadis' wagon forts were able to outflank the Ottoman wings and fire on them from the rear. Žižka treated infantry, cavalry, and artillery as one tactical body. The square-formation encampment of wagons provided refuge but was still able to maneuver and was used in battle as a mobile artillery base. The *Wagenburg* not only blocked the approach of foes but also sometimes was used to outflank their wings, driving them out of a position and disrupting their formation. Whenever the wagons had to

Éléments sous droits d'auteur

face bombardment from heavy cannons, they could be withdrawn rapidly and rearrayed for a counterattack in a terrain unsuitable for the movement of heavy artillery. There was a clear division of function for the crew of each: crossbowmen, handgunners, and soldiers equipped with pikes or flails. The Ottomans also deployed field fortifications of chained wagons, backed up by handgunners.

[*See also Banderium*; Black Army of Hungary; Boyars; Câmpul Pâinii, Battle of; Constantinople, *subentry on* Siege of (1453); Črnomen, Battle of; Cumans; Honor; Hungarian Defense System; Hungary, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1526); Hunyadi, János; Hunyadi, Mátyás; Hussars; Karlstein, Siege of; Kastrioti, George; Kinizsi, Pál; Kosovo Polje, Battle of (1389); Kosovo Polje, Battle of (1448); Kunovica, Battle near; *Militia Portalis*; Mohács, Battle of; Nándorfehérvár (Belgrade), Siege of; Nicopolis, Battle of; Prokop the Bald; Sigismund of Luxemburg; Slavic Lands, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1500); Ştefan cel Mare; Torviolli, Battle of; Ujebardha, Battle of; Varna, Battle of; Vaslui, Battle of; Vlad Ţepeş; Žatec, Siege of; *and* Žižka, Jan.]

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Attila Bárány

ÉCORCHEURS

Literally "flayers" or "skinners," *Écorcheurs* was the term generally applied to the French mercenary companies that proliferated during the latter part of the Hundred Years' War, particularly during the 1430s. They were notorious for their depredations on the local civilian populations and were so called because they would, allegedly, strip their victims of everything except their shirts. They were, nevertheless, often highly organized and effective fighting forces. They arose primarily in the aftermath of the Treaty of Arras in 1435 and the settlement between Philip the Good, Duke of Burgundy, and the king of France, Charles VII. Charles, despite the ostensible peace, remained a determined enemy of Burgundy and preferred to keep his captains in arms without paying them; he thus encouraged the *Écorcheurs* to ravage Burgundian territory. By the end of 1437 several *Écorcheur* bands were operating in the duchy of Burgundy proper, close to Dijon. It was not until September 1438, when they had succeeded in weakening the duke's authority within Burgundy, that the king ordered them to leave. However, although some *Écorcheurs* fought in the name of Charles VII, they were independent of royal control.

The most infamous of the *Écorcheur* captains was the Spaniard, Rodrigue de Villandrando, who earned the sobriquet "Emperor of Pillagers." The groups' activities could not be contained, and by 1440 bands of *Écorcheurs* were operating throughout France and also in Alsace, Lorraine, and Savoy. The 1444 Anglo-French truce of Tours gave Charles his opportunity to tackle the *Écorcheur* menace. Some joined the dauphin Louis and served as allies of Frederick III of Habsburg against the Swiss, and later that year many were mustered into the newly established compagnies d'ordonnance. On the whole the captains of these new companies were men of noble blood, and many of the more unsavory characters among the *Écorcheurs* were cashiered. To ensure that the new companies never reverted to the methods of the *Écorcheurs*, their pay was met by the royal government from the *taille* or royal taxation.

[*See also* Compagnies d'Ordonnance; France, *sub-entry on* Narrative (1328–1483); Hundred Years' War; *and* Plunder, Division of.]

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David Grummitt

EDINGTON, BATTLE OF

By the summer of 877, Alfred, King of Wessex, and at least one of his brothers had managed to contain the threat of the Viking forces, which ravaged the eastern seaboard, the Channel coast, and farther afield. The Scandinavians had correctly surmised that Alfred would be difficult to deal with and took advantage of Christmas festivities to try to surprise the king and his court in his winter quarters at Chippenham, Wiltshire. Alfred got word of the attack in the nick of time and escaped into the Somerset Levels, an expanse of marsh and floodplain that he knew well. The king established a stronghold at Athelney (*æðelinga eg*, "the princes' island") from which he was able to muster his forces and plan counterattacks. In the spring of 878, Alfred summoned all those who were still loyal to him to meet at "Egbert's stone," probably a menhir or prominent standing stone on the Ashdown ridge.

Unfortunately, nothing specific is known of the tactics used at the subsequent battle fought at Edington, in May of 878, between the forces of Wessex under Alfred and the Scandinavian invaders under Guþrum (Guthrum). However, the Anglo-Saxon victory was complete, and it was followed by a twenty-mile pursuit back to the

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Viking camp. It was to have far-reaching consequences for northern Europe. The Wessex victory offered a respite from invasion to the Anglo-Saxons, established Alfred as an able commander, and broke the momentum of the Scandinavian advance across England. Edington was a great morale-boosting victory for the English. The remaining Danes were besieged in Chippenham and ultimately survived only by converting to Christianity and accepting Alfred as their sponsor, with implications of his overlordship.

[*See also* Alfred the Great; Britain, *subentry on* Narrative (500–1000); *and* Vikings.]

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EDWARD I OF ENGLAND

(1239–1307), King of England (1272–1307), Lord of Ireland, and Duke of Aquitaine. Edward I's considerable military reputation is based on his wars in Wales and Scotland and on claims that he transformed English armies by the use of pay and by the effective use of archers. In addition, he constructed a magnificent chain of castles in Wales.

Edward's early military experience came in the civil war of the 1260s, when he learned a hard lesson at the battle of Lewes in 1264, but with the aid of the earl of Gloucester he triumphed at Evesham in the following year. He set out on crusade in 1270, but his forces were too small to make a significant impact in the East, and he returned to England in 1274. The conquest of Wales was completed in two campaigns, in 1277 and 1282–1283. A major rebellion was put down in 1294–1295. War against France, 1294–1297, achieved little. The Scottish war began in 1296, and although conquest appeared to have been completed by 1304, Robert Bruce's seizure of the Scottish throne in 1306 showed how fragile Edward's achievement was.

Edward's strategies in both Wales and Scotland were straightforward. In Wales, large armies were marched along or near the northern coast, while forces under marcher lords put pressure on the Welsh in central and southern Wales. The Isle of Anglesey in North Wales was important for its grain production, and in both 1277 and 1282 forces were sent by sea to secure the island. The campaigns of 1282–1283 and 1294–1295 were remarkable for continuing over the winter, putting immense pressure on the Welsh. In Scotland, Edward again employed large armies, but without the same success. The only direct indication of his ideas comes from letters sent to the exchequer in 1301 in which he suggested that if only he could cross the Firth of Forth he would be able to achieve a major triumph over the Scots. His forces normally advanced from Berwick in the east, but in 1300 he conducted a campaign in Galloway during which his army reached Ayr. In 1301 he attempted an ambitious strategy, with his own forces marching north from Berwick and another army under the nominal command of his son advancing from Carlisle into southwestern Scotland.

Ambitious plans also characterized his war with France (1294–1297). An impressive coalition of allies from the Low Countries, Germany, and Burgundy was constructed, but it proved impossible to coordinate operations effectively. More fighting took place between Edward's troops and his Flemish allies than against the French.

Though it has been argued that Edward transformed English military tactics by using cavalry and archers in effective combination, the evidence for this is limited. At the battle of Maes Moydog in 1295 the earl of Warwick was said to have interspersed crossbowmen among his cavalry; the chronicler may have meant archers, but it is difficult to see this battle as a precedent for the tactics of using dismounted men-at-arms flanked by archers that was to be so successful under his grandson Edward III (r. 1327–1377). There is no good evidence that novel tactics were employed at the one battle in which

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Edward commanded as king, that of Falkirk in 1298. Edward made no attempts to provide his infantry forces with bows, in contrast to Edward III during the Hundred Years' War. The sole exception was during the long siege of Stirling Castle in 1304. Edward did, however, recruit infantry troops in unprecedented numbers. At Falkirk he had about 25,700 infantry, probably the largest such single force raised in England in the medieval period.

It has also been argued that Edward transformed the English army by the use of pay. In fact, traditional feudal summonses continued to be used throughout the reign, though not for every campaign. The forces of the royal household and some of the other cavalry were paid, but the earls and major magnates were reluctant to accept the subordination that pay involved.

As a builder of castles, Edward stands supreme. A building program followed each Welsh campaign. For expertise, Edward turned to Savoy, and in particular to the master mason James of St. George. The castles were characterized by concentric defenses, great twin-towered gatehouses, and sheer size. The castle at Caernarfon (Carnarvon), which is still largely intact, employed the symbolism of ancient Rome, with dark bands of masonry and turrets topped with eagles, in a manner that could be read as indicating imperial ambitions on the part of the English king. It is not possible to document the king's personal involvement in the building program, but it is improbable that a construction on this scale could have been undertaken without his involvement in the design and planning.

There is little indication of Edward's personal qualities as a commander. One story is to his credit. In January 1295 he was virtually besieged in Conwy (Conway) castle in North Wales. Supplies of wine had run out; there was one barrel left, reserved for the king himself. Edward, however, ordered the wine to be divided up among his men. At Falkirk he displayed an obstinate courage when he is said to have declared, upon being told that his Welsh troops were not prepared to take part in the fighting, that both they and the Scots were his enemies, and he would defeat them both.

Edward was able to deploy resources in support of his wars on a wholly new scale. Taxation, both direct and indirect, and a system whereby money was borrowed from Italian merchants, provided the necessary financing. Elaborate mechanisms ensured that food supplies were sufficient; sheriffs and their officials had unpopular but effective powers of seizure. Royal victualing bases were set up at Chester for Wales and at Berwick and Carlisle for Scotland. Fleets were assembled to take the supplies further. By the last years of his reign the systems were under considerable strain, but Edward and his officials had shown that it was possible to wage war on an entirely new scale.

[*See also* Armies, *subentry on* Organization; Castles, *subentry on* 1150–1350; Edward III of England; Robert I (the Bruce); *and* Welsh Castles of Edward I.]

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Michael Prestwich

EDWARD III OF ENGLAND

(1312–1377), King of England from 1327 to his death, and Lord of Ireland and Duke of Aquitaine. Even by his enemies, Edward III was recognized as "the most valiant man in Christendom" and "the shrewdest and wisest warrior in the world." To his admirers he was "King Arthur come again." Under his father, Edward II, it had been reckoned that "two Englishmen were hardly a match for one debilitated Scot"; under him, it was said that a hundred Frenchmen hardly dared face twenty Englishmen.

Edward was very much a soldier's king. He was a great patron of chivalry, a skilled and brave fighter, and blessed with tremendous personal charisma. At fourteen he won praise for his fortitude and for the fair speech he made to his army during the

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Edward III. The "noble" was the first widely circulated gold coin issued by the English crown. The image on the obverse, along with the Latin motto "But Jesus passing through their midst went His way," commemorates Edward III's victory at Sluys in 1340. Cabinet des Medailles, Paris.

1327 campaign against the Scots. During the bitter winter of 1334–1335, "he much comforted his army . . . by words, deeds, and gifts, saying that everyone was drinking out of the same cup." His boldness during the 1336 campaign into Scotland, when he led small forces deep into enemy territory, brought tears to his men's eyes. Before Crécy he circulated among his troops, "making brave men of cowards."

The king's popularity also arose from his generosity, which sometimes crossed over to extravagance, and arose even more from the success of his military campaigns. His operations sometimes foundered when, as in 1334 and in 1338–1340, the contributions of his subjects or allies failed to meet his expectations, but he never met outright defeat, and because he usually seized substantial plunder, in 1359 many foreign soldiers volunteered, unsummoned, to serve in his army without pay so that they could share in the glory and riches they expected him to win. He could, however, be hardhearted, as when he ordered the execution of all prisoners after the battle of Halidon Hill.

Edward's greatest triumph was the 1360 Treaty of Brétigny, which won him a free hand in Scotland, a huge ransom for the French king John II (captured at Poitiers in 1356), and a full third of the territory of France. Edward had won this astounding result against a kingdom with triple his realm's population and wealth in part by his excellence as a tactician, demonstrated at his great victories at Halidon Hill (1333) and Crécy (1346), where he chose ground that not only was strong, but also was stronger than it appeared. Equally important, however, were his knack for developing an extraordinary team of subordinate commanders and administrators, his ability to rally domestic support for his war effort, and his tremendous skill as a strategist. He normally aimed at luring his enemies into attacking his army, whether by using a besieged city as bait (e.g., Berwick, Calais) or by launching devastating *chevauchées* that challenged the enemy's legitimacy and threatened to wreck its economy. He was happy to fight against odds of even three to one, for he appreciated the quality of his troops (including his superb longbowmen), the strength of the tactical defensive, and the relative unimportance of numbers, and he truly believed that God would aid his just cause—as shown most clearly before he defeated a French fleet in the largest Atlantic naval battle of the Middle Ages, at Sluys in 1340.

[*See also* Berwick, Sieges of; Britain, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1500); Calais, Siege of (1346–1347); Crécy, Battle of; Halidon Hill, Battle of; Hundred Years' War: Poitiers, Battle of (1356); *and* Sluys, Naval Battle of.]

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EDWARD IV OF ENGLAND

(1442–1483): King of England and Lord of Ireland from 1461 to October 1470 and from April 1471 to 1483. Born to be a soldier, Edward learned his craft from a young age. By seventeen he was already fighting for his father, Richard, Duke of York, in the Wars of the Roses (1455–1485), the struggle between the Houses of York and Lancaster. Bold and decisive, and standing six feet three inches tall, he struck an impressive figure in battle; one contemporary admiringly wrote of the king courageously vanquishing his enemies: "manly, vigorously and valiantly [he] assailed them; with great violence, he beat and bore down before him all that stood in his way." In combat, such inspirational leadership was of great military value, as at the battle of Losecote (also known as the battle of Empingham) in March 1470, when Edward led a successful, decisive charge against a much larger Lancastrian force.

His intelligent, energetic, and no-nonsense approach to warfare made him a skilled and highly respected general, but not a merciful one. Immediately on becoming king in March 1461 he led his troops at the battle of Towton. Here Edward's customary determination saved his Yorkist troops from impending defeat through a counteroffensive that broke the Lancastrian lines and led to an immense slaughter of the defeated forces: Towton is the bloodiest battle ever fought on British soil. Edward's leadership style marked the brutal nature of the Wars of the Roses and the limited role of chivalry. The contemporary chronicler Philippe de Commynes reports that after a victorious battle Edward would mount his horse and order his men to spare the enemy soldiers; instead they should kill the lords. Thus at his victory at Tewkesbury in 1471, the Yorkists deliberately sought out and killed Prince Edward of Lancaster and other leaders, not allowing any to surrender. Others who had fled to the sanctuary of Tewkesbury Abbey were initially pardoned, only to be dragged out and executed en masse. By such acts, Edward was consolidating military successes with political ones: he was removing any political focus of opposition to his rule. In the same way, he did not balk at having King Henry VI murdered while in his captivity. Edward's efficient ruthlessness was a major contributor to his success.

Edward's determination and tenacity in adversity were witnessed in September 1470 when he was forced to flee to France, only to return six months later and reclaim his crown. At the ensuing battle of Barnet (April 1471), as at Towton, Edward managed to recover from a precarious position and save the day. This time he was greatly assisted by another essential attribute of a good general: luck. Confusion caused by fog saw the Lancastrians buckle under "friendly fire" as they were attacked by reinforcements. Edward's clear abilities as a commander are reflected in his record of remaining unbeaten in all his battles. He was occasionally indolent; his invasion of France in 1475 was not so emphatic: he withdrew when, upon signing the Treaty of Picquigny, the French agreed to pay him £15,000 immediately and a respectable sum of £10,000 per year. His early and unexpected death in April 1483, the year after he recaptured Berwick, saved Scotland from his military plans.

[*See also* Britain, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1500) *and* Roses, Wars of the.]

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EDWARD BRUCE

(c. 1276–1318), Earl of Carrick and titular King of Ireland from 1315 to 1318. Probably born in the later 1270s, Edward Bruce was the second son of the Countess of (Gaelic) Carrick and was fostered for a time in Ulster. His older brother, Robert, was later king of Scotland from 1306 to 1329. Only service in 1304 with Edward, Prince of Wales, interrupted

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Edward's Gaelic links. Supporting his brother in 1308 with Islay men in (Gaelic) Galloway, Edward helped defeat English cavalry and Galwegian infantry at the Dee on 29 June, and in about September the two of them drove a relieving company (the chronicler John Barbour says of twelve hundred men) from the Cree to Buittle castle. Edward plundered, blackmailed, and razed castles and emerged in 1309 as "lord of Galloway." He took Rutherglen peel (1308) and besieged Dundee (1312), reaching agreement for its surrender.

Earl of Carrick from 1313, Edward pillaged Cumbria in April 1314 and then joined the siege of Stirling Castle, where he made the "unwise" agreement for its surrender unless relieved. The army mustered to impede Edward II in the battle of Bannockburn, where Bruce's division of spearmen held its ground.

In April 1315 an assembly at Ayr recognized Edward Bruce as heir to the Scottish kingship before the King Robert's daughter, calling him "a vigorous man most highly skilled in warfare for the defence of . . . the kingdom." To Barbour, Edward "had no moderation in his deeds," and several sources report that Robert and Edward now found Scotland too small to hold them both (e.g., Barbour, *Bruce*, book 14, lines 4–5).

But in May 1315, encouraged by Domhnall Ó Néill, Edward sailed to Ireland to become its king and expel the English. He hoped to divert English resources, including Irish levies, from Scotland, so King Robert lent Edward his best general, the Earl of Moray. Building a Celtic alliance of two kingdoms surely influenced Edward, for in late 1316 he wrote to Welsh magnates as kin of the Scots, offering to free them from subjection to the English and asking for the lordship previously held by the Prince of Wales: Edward could envisage a future in which he might become King of Scotland and Ireland and Prince of Wales.

The force that he initially took to Ireland, supposedly six thousand men, defeated a local force, took Carrickfergus, and then with ferocious slaughter took Dundalk on 29 June 1315. A month later, from its farthest advance near Louth, the force retreated to Coleraine, crossed the Bann, and followed the Earl of Ulster and his force to defeat them at Connor in early September 1315. Moray brought five hundred reinforcements from Scotland, and in November the army again advanced, defeating an Anglo-Irish army at Kells in early December. Ignoring Dublin, Edward turned west and then south to county Kildare, then north. Near Ardscoll his weary force fought a larger Anglo-Irish army—which lost five men, the Scots seventy—but Edward kept possession of the field ("the Skerries," 26 January 1316). Ravaging and avoiding government forces, he retreated to Antrim in a country impoverished by the dreadful harvest of 1315.

In 1316 the surrender of Carrickfergus castle assured Edward's links with Scotland, which he visited twice, securing Robert's presence and further reinforcements—supposedly thirty thousand. The enlarged force hastened past Dublin and its terrified inhabitants, down the river Barrow, then west by Cashel to Limerick, almost certainly hoping to recruit the Irish of Thomond. Facing an enemy of (reliably) about a thousand men, however, Edward and his force withdrew to Ulster, Robert to Scotland. The purpose of all three expeditions was probably to secure significant Irish support, which existed among the disaffected, but the Irish would not serve with permanence and discipline.

For eighteen months Edward bided his time, until in October 1318, again assured of Robert's support, he went south with an army supposedly of three thousand, including Hebridean gallowglasses. King Robert had not reached them when on 14 October they were attacked by local levies strengthened by more distant retinues, at Faughart near Dundalk. Edward was killed and his forces broke; his body was quartered and his head presented to Edward II.

Edward Bruce's reputation had made government leaders reluctant to engage him, and until Faughart, he had always kept the field. His vision of a Celtic empire was pie in the sky, but he was a skilled general who, despite bringing to famine-struck Ireland three years of war and pillage, still enjoyed a measure of shaky support among disaffected Irish, as their remonstrance to the pope bears witness.

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[*See also* Bannockburn, Battle of; Carrickfergus, Siege of; Celtic Styles of Warfare; *and* Robert I (the Bruce).]

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A. A. M. Duncan

EDWARD THE BLACK PRINCE

(1330–1376), Earl of Chester, Duke of Cornwall, Prince of Wales, and Prince of Aquitaine. Edward of Woodstock, the eldest son of Edward III and the father of Richard II, was a central figure in the early phases of the Hundred Years' War. He famously won his spurs at age sixteen in the vanguard at the battle of Crécy in 1346, commanded the victorious Anglo-Gascon army at Poitiers in 1356, and defeated the Franco-Trastamaran forces at the battle of Nájera in 1367, thereby restoring Pedro I, "the Cruel," to the throne of Castile.

The prince has long been considered a chivalric icon and was regarded as such by Jean Froissart in his chronicles and by Chandos Herald in his verse biography of the prince's life. This reputation rested largely on the prince's military successes, and it grew when the English war effort began to fail just as the prince's health deteriorated after 1369. Thomas Walsingham noted that on the prince's death "the hopes of the English utterly perished."

The prince was well versed in all aspects of warfare: in addition to his battlefield victories, he fought at sea (Winchelsea, 1350), participated in sieges (Calais, 1346–1347; Reims, 1359–1360; and Limoges, 1370), and launched devastating raids, most notably the *grande chevauchée* of 1355 when he led an

Edward the Black Prince. King Edward III (1312–1377) granting the Black Prince the principality of Aquitaine. PRIVATE COLLECTION/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

Anglo-Gascon force from Bordeaux on the Atlantic coast to Narbonne on the Mediterranean and back. In the course of this expedition he is said to have destroyed some five hundred castles, villages, towns, and other settlements.

As a key (though younger) member of Edward III's military entourage, the prince adopted the strategy and battlefield tactics—combining infantry and archers—that the English had used to such good effect in battles with the Scots and French and that he observed firsthand at Crécy. The Crécy battle also provided the prince with the foundations for his military retinue that was to prove so effective in future expeditions. A number of the retinue—men such as Sir John Chandos and Sir James Audley—were, like the prince, founding members of the Order of the Garter, and the skill and experience at the prince's disposal proved vital ten years later at Poitiers when

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the capture of King John II (Jean le Bon) changed the political balance of the Hundred Years' War.

Poitiers proved to be a closer-run affair than Crécy, and although there is no doubt that the prince was a capable tactician, it is likely that his particular skill was in personal, inspirational leadership. The conduct of the Nájera campaign, which in many ways was badly conceived, particularly raises questions about the prince's strategic ability. He was fortunate that for political reasons Enrique of Trastamara felt compelled to engage in battle.

During the Castilian campaign the prince succumbed to an illness from which he never fully recovered. A revolt in his principality of Aquitaine in 1368–1369 led to the reopening of the Hundred Years' War and to the prince's final and most notorious military action, the siege of Limoges (1370). It is likely that the massacre described by Froissart was of the garrison rather than of the general population, but there is no doubt that the prince was a ruthless and highly capable soldier and that such an action did not contravene the chivalric ethic that so enhanced his military reputation.

[*See also* Britain, *subentry* Narrative (1300–1500); Calais, Siege of (1346–1347); Chivalry; Crécy, Battle of; Edward III of England; Hundred Years' War; Limoges, Siege of; Nájera, Battle of; *and* Poitiers, Battle of (1356).]

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EINHARD

(c. 770–840), biographer of Charlemagne. Einhard wrote a *Life of Charlemagne* that is one of the most widely read biographies of all time. Its continuing popularity can be explained by two main circumstances: Einhard was a distinguished writer, and he was a well-placed member of the Carolingian court. The latter factor, which meant he had excellent access to information about Charlemagne (whom he knew well), is also a great problem for the interpretation of this *Vita*, which is by no means simply an objective report. When Einhard was writing his biography (probably in the twenties of the ninth century) he had become a strong critic of Louis I, "the Pious," who had succeeded his father on the Carolingian throne in 814. One has always to keep in mind that Einhard tends to exaggerate the performance of Louis's father: with the exception of the defeat at Roncesvalles (778), all Charlemagne's wars are depicted as brilliant successes. Also, Einhard never misses an opportunity to emphasize the never-ending perseverance of Charlemagne, for which he uses the Latin words *perseverantia, labor, strenuitas*—some of the key words in his biography.

Einhard modeled his biography on the work of the Roman author Suetonius (c. 69–after 122). Therefore, after his introduction, he begins with an enumeration of all the wars that were fought successfully by Charlemagne, starting with the wars Charlemagne inherited from his father, Pépin the Short, and finished himself personally. The wars in Aquitaine (768), in Italy against the Lombards (773–774), and in Germania against the Saxons (772–804) follow. Modern historians accept Einhard's famous interpretation of the Saxon war as the longest, most atrocious, and most strenuous war Charlemagne ever led. Next Einhard briefly describes the war fought in Spain against the Saracens (778). This ended unhappily for the Carolingian rear guard, and Einhard tries to explain the reasons for the disaster. Because of the seriousness of the defeat he is obliged for the first time to give up his declared intent not to write about the details of the wars (*modus bellorum*) fought by Charlemagne. Einhard ends this section of the biography by informing us about the war against Charlemagne's cousin Tassilo of Bavaria; the highly successful war against the Avars (791–803), which enriched the Franks enormously; and last,

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the war against King Godfred of Denmark (808–810). Scanty as Einhard's descriptions of warfare are, they are important to military historians because of the dearth of other sources dealing with Charlemagne's epochal conquests.

[*See also* Charlemagne; Godfred; Pépin the Short; *and* Roncesvalles, Battle of.]

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EL CID

See Díaz de Vivar, Rodrigo.

ELSTER, BATTLE OF

The battle of Elster, also known as the battle of Hohen-Molsen, was the final battle in the war between the German king Henry IV and the anti-king Rudolf, Duke of Swabia. Rudolf won the battle but was mortally wounded and Henry recovered his position.

After Pope Gregory excommunicated Henry a second time in 1080, the emperor mustered political and ecclesiastical support, deposed Gregory, and proclaimed an antipope, Clement III. Henry then led an army from western and southern Germany through Thuringia and Saxony to join with pro-imperial contingents from Bohemia and Meissen. The rebels moved to block him, but Henry drew them off with a feint toward Goslar. Continuing eastward, Henry encountered local opposition, and the rebels finally caught his army west of the Elster, between Hohen-Molsen and Zeitz.

Henry opened in a strong defensive position, with marshes covering one flank. The rebels divided their forces: While Rudolf attacked Henry's front, Otto von Northeim led the infantry and some dismounted knights across the wetlands. Henry had one unit, under Henry von Laach, advance against Rudolf, but had to withdraw after Otto seized the imperial camp. The rebels could not pursue because Rudolf, who had been fighting in the forefront, was mortally wounded; the imperial army crossed the Elster (despite losses due to drowning) and joined with the Bohemians, thus achieving Henry's operational objective.

Both armies demonstrated significant mastery of time and space. Henry executed a campaign that required coordinated movements across hundreds of miles, while the rebels took advantage of interior lines in order to block him and used forced marches to recover from his feint toward Goslar. The battle itself took place on fronts extended over several miles; historians who argue for one or another specific location ignore the fluid nature of this battle. Likewise, both sides demonstrated significant combat discipline and command control. Otto von Northeim executed a difficult advance across challenging terrain and kept his victorious force in formation and able to fight despite the plunder in the imperial camp, while Henry von Laach managed to halt his advancing contingent and allow the imperial army to break contact and escape. Tactically, Henry deserves credit for not being fooled by a sophisticated rebel battle plan that had Rudolf making a controlled retreat until Otto could hammer the imperial flank and rear. Only Rudolf's role as a front-line combatant seems out of place, yet he had to maintain the morale of units asked to retreat in the face of the enemy as well as restore his reputation after having left the field at Mellrichstadt. As always, numbers and casualties are problematic, though the nature of the campaign argues for somewhat smaller forces (around ten thousand) on either side—Henry led the expeditionary forces of just two regions (Bavaria and his Salian lands), while

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the rebel army likely was somewhat depleted after forced marches. The result—the rebels held the day but were unable to stop Henry from achieving his objective and suffered a devastating loss in Rudolf's death—demonstrates why medieval military commanders preferred to avoid battle unless political or strategic considerations, such as Henry's excommunication, made it absolutely necessary.

[*See also* Henry IV.]

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ENGINEERS AND ARCHITECTS

Fortification played a crucial role in wars of the High Middle Ages (eleventh to thirteen centuries). During this period the many castle-building campaigns and siege assaults led to the genesis of a new social class.

Although the word "architect" did appear in the context of Gothic architecture, the military architect is generally named in the sources as *magister carpentarius* (master carpenter) or *magister cementarius* (master mason). Titles such as *murator* (wall maker), *geometricus* or *mensurator* (surveyor), *hurdator* (hoard maker), or *fossator* (expert in digging moats and ditches) began to be fairly common at the end of the twelfth century.

The word "engineer" means a specialist in building and repairing siege engines. It may first have appeared in the Domesday Book and was frequently used by Anglo-Norman chroniclers, such as Wace in his *Roman de Rou* from the 1160s. In this period Henry II (r. 1154–1189) developed and modernized his army, recruiting a great number of engineers.

In Old French and in many medieval poems, *engin* also means "trick, stratagem, device, ruse," and the Devil is sometimes depicted as the supreme *engineour*. During a siege an engineer was in charge of offensive engines—an *ingeniator* or *machinator*—but could also be an expert in defense, an *attiliator* or *artillator*. During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, when gunpowder artillery progressively replaced mechanical artillery, the artilleryman was still different from the gunner, responsible for all the artillery (*artillaria* or *atilharie*—crossbows, ballistae, bows, and ammunition) in a castle or a city.

Itineraries and Social Position. Engineers were recruited by kings, sultans, and cities to build and repair urban walls, strongholds, and forts, as well as to besiege these structures; these are interrelated skills. From the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries, prosopographies and biographies of military technicians offer a relatively large amount of social and economic information about the technicians' status. Usually these experts were recruited only by wealthy patrons such as kings, earls, dukes, or cities. Small lords or knights could not afford them.

The technicians were granted high salaries, lands, and sometimes houses and even small manors. Some of them were knighted, as were Urric, master engineer of the kings of England Richard I (r. 1189–1199) and John (r. 1199–1216); Bertram, master engineer of Henry III of England (r. 1216–1272) in Gascony; and Pierre of Agincourt, master mason of Charles of Anjou (d. 1285), king of Naples and Sicily. They probably lacked the time to enjoy their privileges, however, considering their busy itineraries on numerous travels throughout Europe and the Mediterranean.

Regarding recruitment and contracts of work, military architects and engineers cannot be compared with urban craftsmen or fellows of fourteenth-century guilds. The architects and engineers rarely belonged to any corporate body. They were named "masters" by princes and generally were recruited for the period of a military or building campaign. By the end of the twelfth century some experts became "king's engineers" or "master carpenters in

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

Medieval Building Procedures. Construction of the Tower of Babel. The procedures probably mirror medieval practices closely. Two laborers stand on wooden scaffolding with beams inserted into the walls through putt holes. The workers hoist bricks and stone to the upper levels using a pulley system (*right*). Illustration from the Velislav Bible, MS 23 C 124, fol. 3, c. 1340. NATIONAL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY, PRAGUE, CZECH REPUBLIC/LAUROS/GIRAUDON/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

the king's service." In the mid-thirteenth century, Henry III and Louis IX (r. 1226–1270) both organized their offices of works, nominating a general master carpenter and a general master mason. This centralization allowed for better control and productivity and settled these experts "without frontiers" close to the prince. Indeed, patrons did not always appreciate the mobility of their brilliant technicians. To prevent them from leaving and offering their skills to the enemy, kings might go so far as to enslave their technicians. Master Calamandrinus of Navarre, engineer of Frederick II of Hohenstaufen (Holy Roman Emperor 1220–1250), was literally tied to his post when he was put in shackles by his own patron during the war against the pope and the Italian Guelphs. Charles of Anjou also chained all of his masons to the scaffoldings of the building site of the Palace of Naples.

Borrowings and Innovations: The Legacy of the Crusades. Nevertheless, such practices could not prevent the mobility of technicians. Their mobility was a major method for the transmission of this technology in the crusading East, the Middle East, and the Western world. The mobility of technicians and the exploitation of prisoners of war on construction and siege sites had a major effect on the circulation of techniques and armaments, as well as on the dissemination of architectural formulas throughout the Mediterranean area. The legacy of classical technology was very great in the Middle Ages, but the part played by Mediterranean borrowings—hybrid and counterweight trebuchets, hoardings and machicolations, concentric plans, complex niches with double or triple arrow slits, mines and countermines, galleries inside parapets, barbicans, siege machinery—during the Crusades needs a reassessment. Although few modern studies have addressed the subject of architects and engineers during the Crusades, these experts played a significant part in the emergence, borrowing, and spreading of innovative technologies from the twelfth century to the Renaissance.

For example, the terminology and expressions used both for siege engines and for ships were very similar—as, for example, winches and pulleys (*guindas, lof, capstan*)—demonstrating interconnections among techniques. Naval and military carpentry often merged: for example, when crusaders demolished their galleys to recover long beams to make siege engines or siege towers. The expertise of shipbuilders was easily transferred to the construction of rams and siege machinery. Furthermore, the carpenters of Italian cities such as Genoa, Pisa, and Venice and of Levant harbors undoubtedly mastered caulking, using cranes and winches, and constructing siege towers just as well as the engineers of their time did. The fame of this mastery lasted long beyond the Crusades. The vessels the carpenters

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built were really floating fortresses, equipped with *antiennes* (giant ladders and platforms), as at the siege of Constantinople in 1202. It may be that improvements in the forecastles and quarterdecks of warships during the twelfth century were influenced by improvements in the hoardings and bartizans of castles, and vice versa.

The competitiveness and progress in military architectural technology directly influenced religious architecture and civil engineering. Considering the treatises and experiences of Roger Bacon (c. 1220–1292), al-Jazari (1135–1206), Villard de Honnecourt (c. 1225–c. 1250), Pierre de Maricourt (fl. 1269), and Taccola (1382–1453), it is obvious that many innovations often attributed to the engineers of the Renaissance were already well known to their medieval predecessors. As early as the mid-thirteenth century, engineers, blacksmiths, carpenters, and architects—stimulated by military or civil techniques in the East and West, and encouraged by the discoveries and experiments at sea, on building sites, in great palaces, in mines, and at forges and mills—led a revival of knowledge of mechanical energy.

Artillery, architecture, and the mechanical arts were always tools of prestige and symbols of modernity and power. The interdependence among technical expertise, geographical origin, and recruitment calls into question the conformist view of the king's entourage. Bidding for the best engineers occurred most when the need for state-of-the-art poliorcetics and fortification was crucial, and it made the hunt for expertise a pricey and ruthless one.

[*See also* Fortifications *and* Siege Warfare, *subentry on* Tactics and Technology.]

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Nicolas Prouteau

ENRIQUE II

(c. 1333–1379), known as "the Bastard" and "the Gift Giver," King of Castile from 1369 to his death. Enrique II was an aggressive warrior who engaged in or courted battle on a number of occasions. His largely successful military career was marred by his suffering one of the worst defeats of the fourteenth century at Nájera in 1367.

Born in Seville, Enrique was the eldest surviving son (albeit illegitimate) of the Castilian king Alfonso XI and his mistress, Leonor de Guzmán. Made Count of Trastamara during Alfonso's lifetime, at about age eighteen Enrique participated in the ill-fated Gibraltar expedition of 1350 that ended in his father's death from plague. Enrique and his legitimate half-brother, Pedro I, who succeeded to the Castilian throne, became bitter enemies. As a result Enrique spent much of Pedro's reign in exile, in either France or Aragon, where he was a principal

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ally of the king Pedro IV, "the Ceremonious," in the conflict between Aragon and Castile known as the War of the Two Pedros (1356–1366).

Increasing opposition in Castile to Pedro I's rule found a focal point around which to coalesce in this bastard son of the former monarch, and by the mid-1360s the band of exiles attached to Enrique's cause numbered several thousand, including many of the realm's great lords. Enrique used his growing support to launch raids into his homeland that became the most serious offensive actions undertaken by Aragon in what was primarily a defensive war. By 1363 at the latest Enrique decided to challenge Pedro I for the throne, a venture for which he received promises of Aragonese aid by the secret Treaty of Monzón (March 1363). In 1366 he shared with Bertrand du Guesclin and Hugh Calveley command of the expedition against Castile conducted by the Free Companies, Aragonese volunteers, and his own supporters. Proclaimed king in Pedro's stead, he was crowned at Burgos, after which he pursued the deposed monarch southward, a pursuit that Pedro eluded only by fleeing into Portugal.

In 1367 when Pedro I returned to Castile with his English ally Edward the Black Prince, Enrique and Du Guesclin at first successfully blocked their way, but eventually they were routed at Nájera (April 1367). Although Aragon now withdrew its backing, with French aid Enrique reentered Castile later that year and initiated a civil war that lasted until the spring of 1369 when he won the battle of Montiel, capturing and killing his rival in the aftermath.

Despite this victory, Enrique still had to face an array of enemies, including not only Pedro's unreconciled supporters but also the neighboring kingdoms of Portugal, Aragon, Navarre, and Granada, all of which were seeking to profit at the expense of their war-weary neighbor. Years of conflict followed—during which Enrique's armies crushed internal revolts and invaded neighboring realms—before the new king was finally able to impose his authority on Castile. Meanwhile he brought the kingdom into the Hundred Years' War on the French side, supplying to France much-needed naval forces. In 1371 his navy smashed an English fleet at the battle of La Rochelle, setting the stage for England's loss of that important port city. Despite a continuing threat that England might again invade Castile, Enrique lived out his last several years in relative peace, firmly establishing the Trastamaran dynasty that continued to rule the kingdom into the sixteenth century.

[*See also* Guesclin, Bertrand du; Iberia, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1500); La Rochelle, Naval Battle of; Montiel, Battle of; Nájera, Battle of; Pedro I; *and* Pedro IV.]

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Epic Poetry

Poems intended for oral performance in which the deeds of a great hero are narrated in elevated style have existed since antiquity, and they were particularly popular during the Middle Ages. Examples of epic poetry exist in many languages: *Beowulf*, *The Battle of Maldon*, the Scandinavian sagas, the *Nibelungenlied*, the *Táin*, and the *Poema de mío Cid* are some of the most notable examples. The genre was prominent in France in the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries, with the composition of a

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large number of *chansons de geste* (or "songs of deeds"), which typify many of the characteristics of epic poetry.

Realism. A number of the features of war that are described in medieval epic poems reflect the reality of warfare in the period: the action takes place in a recognizable geographical, topographical, and social milieu and is carried out by men from identifiable social groups; fortifications and methods of attacking and defending them may be realistically described; and the armor and weapons used by combatants are based on what was actually in use at the time of composition, employed in an authentic manner.

These realistic depictions served to attract the interest of the (knightly) audience, but one of the most distinctive features of epic poetry is the way in which texts move away from this realism by shifting the balance between different types of warfare and combatants, and by structuring war in such a way as to provide a frame for one particular group and its view of its own activities. Each poem has one character that may be described as the "hero," and that character is a knight: each event is designed to show him off to the greatest advantage, even when this results in episodes that may appear contrived to the modern reader. The aim of each work may therefore be said to be to foreground the activities of knights, and of the knightly hero in particular. This is true regardless of the setting of the combat, where such diverse settings as sieges, battles, and single combats have some distinct generic similarities.

Sieges, Battles, and Single Combats. Sieges feature more frequently in epic poetry than might be expected: however, narrators are presumably aware that a knightly audience would not find it interesting to listen to tales of miners, engineers, and the like, so instead they satisfy their listeners by depicting heroic knights winning the day through hand-to-hand combat. There are also frequent depictions of pitched battles in epic poems; these are sometimes viewed as being banal and stereotypical, but in fact, many battle scenes in epic poetry employ complex techniques. By choosing his words carefully in order to manipulate the focus of his narrative, the narrator can alter his audience's perception of the battle by, for example, making a conscious effort to evoke the confusion of the melee, or by fixing attention on one particular combatant.

The knights depicted in epic poems also engage in single combat, and here also there are discernible narrative strategies. For example, an opponent who is not deemed worthy of the hero's attention will be defeated quickly and easily, while a combat involving the protagonist's principal foe will contain more detail. Epics may also feature judicial single combats where the hero fights on behalf of someone else; one of the genre's features is that, unlike romance where a knight might be fighting as part of a quest for self-fulfilment, he is more often fighting on behalf of a group, be it his family, clan, or religion.

Status. The narrators of epic poetry are typically concerned about status, and are careful to make a distinction between who is a knight and who is not. Knights are the most frequently depicted type of character, with all seeming to revolve around them. Their status is emphasized and prized but has little to do with conduct and all to do with martial skill: the epic hero may mistreat commoners, women, or defeated opponents, as long as the primary goal of victory in combat is achieved. Common soldiers tend to make fewer appearances on the field, and even where they do exist, their personal destinies are not important: they are simply adjunct to the hero and will normally be referred to by function rather than by name, as, for example, "the crossbowman." Female characters are treated differently in different texts, with their role being marginalized to a greater or lesser extent. In the French *Chanson de Roland* (c. 1100), for example, only two female characters appear, and they play very little part; in other texts there may be wives, mothers, or queens who help, advise, and encourage menfolk to go out and fight for their cause. These more active female characters are likely to appear in works where the conflict is centered on family rather than religion.

Literary Techniques. Symbolism is important in epic poetry, and this symbolism may take a number of forms. An oft-noted feature of texts is the "epic exaggeration" of numbers, particularly when applied

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to the number of men in an army, or the number of foes slain by the hero. These figures are not meant to be taken literally but are meant to imply that an opponent's army was large or that the hero and his companions were fighting against insuperable odds. Armor and weapons are also frequent subjects of symbolism, with swords in particular being given names or being inherited from an ancient hero of the past.

Scenes of combat in medieval epic poetry display a wide variety of descriptive techniques. A certain realism is present in terms of protagonists, equipment, and locations, but texts are more broadly characterized by the subordination of mimetic realism to other concerns such as literary convention and the social functions of the genre. Epic poetry served as a form of self-validation for the aristocratic classes by emphasizing the preeminence of the knight, both militarily and socially. The knights depicted in texts are not shown as landowners dependent on agriculture, nor as dispensers of justice (other than the most arbitrary kind where it relates to a personal cause); they are warriors, purely and simply.

[*See also Chanson de Roland; Romancero* Tradition; *and* Romances.]

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ERASMO DA NARNI

(c. 1370–1443), "Il Gattamelata," condottiere. Erasmo da Narni was born in Narni in southern Umbria around 1370 of relatively humble parentage: his father was a baker. His contemporary nickname, "Gattamelata," translated as "Honey Cat," is often understood as suggesting a mixture of charm and cunning. But cats and honey play no part in his personal heraldry, and more plausibly "Gattamelata" may have been a play on his mother's name, Melania Gattelli.

Gattamelata's military apprenticeship began in the service of an experienced military captain, Cecchino Broglia da Chieri, and he then graduated to the company of Braccio da Montone. After Montone's defeat at L'Aquila in 1424, Gattamelata served Florence and the Papacy; his arrears of pay with the Papacy made the offer of Venetian service in 1434 acceptable. These transfers were between allies, and Venice agreed to settle what the papacy owed him. Consistency between Gattamelata and his employers—and his fellow captains—was a striking characteristic of his career.

In Venetian service, Gattamelata was engaged in a series of tough encounters with Visconti forces in Emilia-Romagna, focused on the control of Bologna. From 1437 this conflict intensified. In December, Gattamelata was given command of the republic's armies; this followed the defection of Gianfrancesco Gonzaga, Marquis of Mantua, to the Visconti, turning the Venetian flank as the Venetians also had to face the accomplished Visconti general Niccolò Piccinino to the west.

Gattamelata was involved in engagements—often of an amphibious nature—to defend the strategically important Venetian-held cities of Brescia and Verona, as well as to defend the republic's control of the rivers Adige and Mincio and Lake Garda in their vicinity. Particularly significant was the skillful withdrawal of his army from Brescia to Verona, through difficult and largely hostile territory, in September 1438, and his participation in a daring operation that recovered Verona from Piccinino on 20 November 1439.

In January 1440, Gattamelata suffered a stroke, and from then on he appears to have been out of active service, dying on 16 January 1443. But in sickness, and even in death, Gattamelata can be seen as epitomizing the relations that Venice was trying to build up with its condottieri as it created a standing army. Michael Mallett has argued that the

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Erasmo da Narni. Bronze sculpture of Erasmo da Narni, known as Gattamelata, by Donatello, 1447–1453. PHOTOGRAPH BY MARCO TARDIOLA

republic was anxious to establish a cadre of able and reliable commanders, and this is well illustrated by Gattamelata's career from 1434.

Gattamelata was consistently employed by Venice. When the republic and its allies hired Francesco Sforza to command the campaign against Visconti forces in 1439, Gattamelata was retained as Venice's captain general. He was granted honorary Venetian nobility and a palace. Even as a sick man he remained in the republic's pay. On his death Venice contributed to his funeral expenses, and the Venetian noble Lauro Querini delivered an oration. Gattamelata's company, the "Gatteschi," was retained under the command of his son Gianantonio and a relation by marriage, Gentile da Leonessa.

Most famously, the republic gave his family permission to commission from Donatello a bronze equestrian statue of the condottiere. This magnificent, classically inspired monument, created in 1447–1453, stands outside the basilica of San Antonio in Padua; Gattamelata and his son were buried in chapels of the church.

[*See also* Braccio da Montone and the Bracceschi; Condottieri; *and* Piccinino, Niccolò.]

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ESQUIRE, ARMIGER, ESCUYER, SQUIRE

The esquire (*armiger* in Latin; *escuyer* in Old French; *squire* in Middle English) was originally a knight's servant, responsible for the care of his lord's horses and arms. The esquire fulfilled a number of roles: carrying the knight's shield, armor, and sword; dressing the knight for battle; rescuing the captured

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knight from the enemy; securing prisoners; carrying the knight's banner; and protecting the knight if required.

These esquires, who were trainee or apprentice knights, were to learn about chivalry, heraldry, and horsemanship, and practice the use of weapons and the skills required of knights. They should also participate in the social life of their lord's court and castle, and learn courtly etiquette, tourneying, music, and dancing. Sometimes knighthood was conferred as the reward for battlefield bravery. Esquires could act as combatants, some being shot by arrows and killed.

By the early twelfth century knights were accompanied by at least one esquire. In addition to his practical role he helped maintained his lord's status. The Warwickshire knight Osbert de Arden and the young William Marshal (later the first earl of Pembroke) were each served by one assistant. At the end of the thirteenth century English knights were served by increasingly larger retinues of mounted servants and footmen. The Statute of Arms of 1292 strove to regulate the role of esquires at tournaments. It also addressed the problem of companies of armed esquires, heralds, and grooms creating a nuisance both on the road and in lodgings. Knights were restricted to traveling to tournaments with three esquires, while esquires were banned from using sharpened weapons and maces. In 1303 Aymer de Valence, Earl of Pembroke, took it for granted that the knights of his tournament household would each be accompanied by two or three esquires. Literary references of this kind appear in *L'Histoire de Guillaume le Maréchal*, which tells of Marshal's esquire, Eustace de Bertrimont, while *Jehan et Blonde* introduces Jehan's follower Robinet. In the *Squire's Tale* of the *Canterbury Tales*, the esquire is the knight's son, a trainee fighter of limited experience, while Thomas Malory's fifteenth-century work *Le Morte d'Arthur* has the young King Arthur serving Sir Kay.

The term "squire" changed in meaning between the eleventh and fifteenth centuries. In 1307 Humphrey de Bohun VIII, earl of Hereford, employed "our good friend and esquire" William de Stapleton. Such men would never gain knightly status but should be identified more with the "new social class" of esquires. Multiple generations of the Cheshire family of Warburton served in royal and noble retinues, during the English wars of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, as knights and esquires. Sir Geoffrey Warburton was indentured by Edward, Prince of Wales ("the Black Prince") with two other esquires in 1365 for peace and war; his son, another Geoffrey, was retained for life by Henry, Prince of Wales, in 1407; and a contract was reached between Sir William Stanley and Piers Warburton, esquire, in 1461 for the term of the latter's life in time of peace and war, paying him five marks per annum.

The arms and armor of esquires reflected a growing trend in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries for lighter equipment more appropriate for troops of lesser status to the knight. An 1181 assize of Henry II, king of England, defined the weaponry of landholding free men and urban citizens so that they could serve the crown as effective knights. All free men holding property worth over ten marks were expected to possess a *haubergeon* (a lighter, tunic-shaped *hauberk*), an iron helmet, and a lance. Chivalric literature of the period reflects the use of military equipment by esquires. In Philippe de Rémi's poem *Jehan and Blonde*, Robinet, the esquire of Jehan, wears a padded tunic (*purpoint*) and an iron cap (*capelier*), and is armed with a long knife.

The 1292 statute defined the arms and armor deemed fitting for an esquire in a similar fashion. Those esquires attending knights should be equipped with a padded jacket, shoulder plates, mail cuisses (thigh protection), and a bascinet, an open-faced military helmet, typically fitted with an aventail and hinged visor. By the 1290s these esquires seem to have fallen behind their French counterparts, who were increasingly adopting knightly armor and weapons. The early-thirteenth-century treatise on tournaments by Henry de Laon ("verses on heralds") indicates that esquires were better equipped than most knights, and rode and fought alongside them. During the reign of Edward II, king of England (1307–1327), English esquires began to adopt heraldic seals and equip themselves as knights.

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[*See also* Knighthood and Knights; Training *and* Youth, *subentries on* Before 1000 *and* After 1000.]

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ESZTERGOM, SIEGE OF

In January 1242, the Mongol invaders in Hungary sacked Esztergom, one of the royal seats and center of the Hungarian Church. The city was fortified with ditches, wooden walls, and towers. The Mongols had their captives build a wall of faggots on the edge of the moat, behind which they erected thirty siege engines, unhindered since the presumptuous inhabitants "thought they could resist the world." The Mongols battered the walls "with all their might" and "day and night" with arrows and stones, and they then filled up the moat, hurling into it sacks filled with earth. The Hungarians set fire to the *suburbia* and wooden houses, retreated to the palaces, and buried or burnt their valuables. The Mongols blockaded the city with wooden palisades and occupied the palaces "without effort." Many townspeople—knights and nobles alike—had taken shelter in the unique well-fortified inner stronghold, which the Mongols failed to capture due to the steadfastness of the many *balistarii* of the Aragonese-origin *ispán* Simon. Although *balistarii* might be interpreted as operators of *ballistae*, it is likely that they were crossbowmen, since the sources use the term *machina* for siege engines, and there are numerous other contemporary instances of "ballista" used for "crossbow."

The slaughter was considerable, although the statement that only fifteen souls survived is doubtful. Quite a number must have survived in the citadel. Batu Khan was enraged at not having gained any profits, since all the wealth was carried to the "high upper castle." Thus, he ordered three hundred noblewomen slaughtered. He accepted defeat and broke off the siege. The role of fortified castles is highlighted by the letter written by Hungarian ecclesiastics assembled in Fehérvár to the Pope on Candlemas 1242: "we had taken refuge, well-armed in the castles of . . . Esztergom and other similarly fortified places."

[*See also* Hungary, *subentries on* Sources (1000–1300) *and* Narrative (1000–1300); *and* Mongols.]

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EVESHAM, BATTLE OF

After the battle of Lewes in 1264, Simon de Montfort, Earl of Leicester, held captive King Henry III of England, Richard of Cornwall, and Prince Edward. Fortune quickly abandoned the great baron, however. On 28 May 1265, Edward made a daring escape from his captors and immediately raised a royalist army. Within six weeks he exacted his revenge at Evesham.

Evesham may be considered the culmination of a battle that had begun two days before at the baronial stronghold of Kenilworth. The fight spans two battles because Edward opted to defeat the two halves of the Montfortian host before they could unite against him. He found initial success by defending the line of the Severn River, but by 1 August only thirty miles (forty-five kilometers) separated Simon from his son, also named Simon. Deciding first to deprive the earl of his reinforcements, Edward swept against his unsuspecting foe at daybreak, capturing or slaying most of the host. Young Simon fled, according to tradition, without his pants.

Two days later Edward advanced on the elder Simon's army encamped in a horseshoe bend of the Avon River. The earl had not yet heard of his son's defeat, so Edward advanced flying Montfortian banners in the vanguard. The ruse enabled him to close the trap, which he again sprang at daybreak. Two other royal divisions, under Roger Mortimer and Thomas de Clare, who had previously fought under Simon at Lewes, approached from the west and northwest, respectively. Clare blocked the Alcester Road, and Mortimer advanced against the rebels' rear. Simon famously exclaimed: "May God have mercy on our souls, for our bodies are in the enemy's power." Though many encouraged him to flee with his cavalry, Simon would not desert his infantrymen, who included a few thousand Welshmen recently gained in a treaty with Llywelyn, Prince of Wales.

Facing a force at least three times the size of his own, the earl led his horsemen in a wedge formation to the top of Greenhill, from which he could see Edward approach. Howard de Bohun, leading the infantry, followed the cavalry as far as the priory. Simon led a charge, attempting a breakout. The prince's men wavered but held. Unable to penetrate the royalist line, Simon suddenly found himself surrounded. His men drew into a tight circle, trying to defend against the onslaught. The rebel infantry, having not participated in the charge, now fled, many attempting to swim across the Avon.

The royal army took no prisoners. Dressed in Montfortian armor, Henry III himself was attacked and reportedly pleaded, "I am Henry of Winchester your king. Do not kill me." Simon, his horse killed under him, fought dismounted against several knights before being seized and stabbed to death. His body was dismembered and horribly mutilated. Guy de Montfort and a few others were taken captive, but the rest of the baronial army was killed in the rout. At least thirty knights and as many as seven thousand infantrymen were killed, many hunted down far from the battlefield.

Though the rebellion continued for another two years, with Simon dead Henry resumed control of the kingdom. He immediately abandoned the Provisions of Oxford. Edward, however, in addition to gaining tremendous military experience in the war, embraced many of the barons' political reforms when he took the throne in 1272 as Edward I.

[*See also* Britain, *subentry on* Narrative (1000–1300); Edward I of England; Lewes, Battle of; *and* Montfort, Simon (V) de.]

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EZZELINO III DA ROMANO

(1194–1259), a member of a leading aristocratic family with holdings in the territories of Vicenza and Treviso and subsequently overlord of several cities in northeastern Italy. He acquired a reputation, in his lifetime and after it, for brutality and ruthlessness. Born on 25 April 1194, he spent the period between 1223, when he succeeded his father as master of his lands, and 1230, wresting control of Verona from his brother-in-law, Rizzardo di Sambonifacio. At this stage, he was a supporter of the pro-papal and anti-imperial Lombard League; but when this coalition of communes arranged a reconciliation between this ousted ruler and his enemies in 1232, Ezzelino changed sides in order to be able to retain power in the town he had seized with the blessing of the emperor, Frederick II, whose faithful adherant he henceforth became. When the emperor's army entered northern Italy and took Vicenza in 1236, Ezzelino was duly rewarded by having the city handed over to him. In the following year, he himself captured Padua and, in 1241, Trent, which lay on the route giving him and his imperial patron access to Germany.

These acquisitions made Ezzelino lord of a band of towns and of the districts around them, stretching from close to the Brenner Pass almost to the Adriatic. His hold over them was, however, precarious and depended on the favor he enjoyed with Frederick II and, after that sovereign's death in 1250, on alliances with other powerful figures, such as Oberto Pelavicino, until a breach with that despot in 1259. Even before his position was undermined by defections of his former confederates, he had experienced difficulty in retaining control over his possessions. In 1255, for instance, his troops were driven out of Trent and, in 1256, he had Padua taken from him. Although he made up for these losses by seizing Brescia in 1258 when his reconciliation with his brother Alberico, then lord of Treviso, also brought the latter city into his hands, his alienation of his former allies soon rendered him militarily vulnerable. When he attempted unsuccessfully to gain control of Milan, he was defeated in two skirmishes, wounded and eventually captured. Taken to Soncino, he died there of his injuries on 1 October 1259.

Because in his heyday between 1241 and 1255, he ruled a large swathe of territories, Ezzelino has been compared to the regional despots of the following century. It would be more accurate, however, to see him as one of a group of great landed nobles who schemed, in his lifetime, to gain authority over the communes in their zone of influence. His ability to exploit factional conflicts enabled him to go further than the other aristocrats of his time by achieving dominance over not one, but several towns. The consolidation of his transient power over them through a policy of terror would lead him to be portrayed as a monster of cruelty in the influential writings of the Paduan chronicler, Rolandino, who was his contemporary and later by the pre-humanist, Albertino Mussato, who devoted to him a short tragedy entitled *Ecerinis*.

[*See also* Frederick II *and* Italy, *subentry on* Narrative (1000–1300).]

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Louis Green

Bahan dengan hak cipta

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Faenza, Siege of

Conducted by Frederick II in 1240, the siege of Faenza was part of the struggle between Pope Gregory IX and Emperor Frederick II.

At the end of 1239, Frederick marched with his army to end the rebellion in the north of Italy. Starting from Romagna he moved to Lombardy, approaching Milan. But the Milanese, led by the papal legate Gregory of Monte Lungo, forced the imperial troops to retreat behind the river Ticino. So Frederick moved to Tuscany, receiving the submission of Siena; then, having collected a new army, he invaded the Papal States beginning in February 1240. Several cities of Umbria surrendered to him. Approaching Rome, Frederick called on the people of Rome to turn in his favor, and he might well have succeeded if the pope had not made a great procession from the Lateran to the Vatican, including a display of the skulls of Saints Peter and Paul, to urge the Romans to protect the liberty of the church.

Short of men and money, Frederick returned to the kingdom of Sicily to gather a large army to face the rebel communes as soon as possible. After a Guelph (papal) siege, Ferrara was forced to capitulate and—contrary to the terms of surrender—was sacked by papal troops. Frederick's loyal but aged ally Salinguerra Torelli, the ruler of Ferrara, was imprisoned in chains in Venice. After this loss Frederick marched north with his troops to restore his domination, reinforced by Ghibellines from Tuscany and Romagna. His first efforts were directed against the city of Ravenna, which fell after a week of siege on 22 August 1240.

Faenza, however, was defended by formidable fortifications, a stubborn people, and strong leaders—including the Venetian podesta Michele Morosini and Count Guido Guerra—and put up a valiant resistance for eight months. The city was continuously supplied by its allies Bologna and Venice, and Frederick was forced to waste an enormous amount of energy continuing the siege through the harsh Romagna winter. Supplies for the imperial army began to run low, and in the absence of cash Frederick was forced to mint augustals (coins) on circles of leather instead of on precious metal, promising to redeem them after the fall of the city. At last exhausted by hunger, the people of Faenza tried to send out the old men, women, and children, but these noncombatants were driven back by the imperials. The people then offered to surrender on condition that Frederick spare their lives. Frederick insisted upon an unconditional surrender, and they finally granted this on 14 April. The emperor did not abuse his victory: he spared the lives of the defenders and did not force them to leave the city.

Writing to his faithful ally Ezzelino da Romano of Verona, Frederick described himself as an

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enlightened ruler willing to forgive rather than to punish, and he attributed the surrender of Faenza to his lenient policies. The submission of Faenza followed that of Cesena and Benevento, however, where Frederick had been forced to dismantle the walls and disarm the citizens.

[*See also* Frederick II; Germany, *subentry on* Narrative (1125–1250); Italy, *subentry on* Narrative (1000–1300); *and* Siege Warfare, *subentry on* Tactics and Technology.]

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Federico Canaccini

FALKIRK, BATTLE OF

Edward I of England, determined to reverse his defeat at Stirling Bridge in 1297, invaded Scotland about midsummer 1298 with a force of some twenty-five thousand infantry, almost half of them Welsh, and three thousand cavalry. The best English account of the campaign is probably that of the chronicler Walter of Guisborough, evidently based on a detailed newsletter. The army took several castles, but as supplies ran out, discipline broke down and the loyalty of the Welsh became doubtful. A spy revealed the existence of a Scottish army at Falkirk, so Edward took the English army westward. Camping near Linlithgow he had a narrow escape, trodden on by his restive horse.

According to Guisborough, when they advanced the next day the English saw Scots drawing up for battle on the upper slope of a small hill in four divisions "in the manner of round circles," composed of pikemen with raised pikes, each joined to his neighbor. Archers were between the circles, and "on the flank behind" were cavalry. Between the armies was a little stream, inadequate protection should the hungry English army make camp to eat; so instead an immediate attack was ordered. A contingent under two earls was diverted westward because of a muddy loch; a contingent under the bishop of Durham rode eastward, and the two attacked the first Scottish circle simultaneously. Most of the Scottish cavalry fled, but the survivors drew up circles of infantry "called schiltrons." One knight was killed in the circle of archers that he had formed. The English then turned on the pikemen standing "like a thick wood," almost unbreakable by cavalry. Infantry, archers, and stone throwers broke the front line, and the inner ranks, in confusion, fell more readily to English cavalry. Edward I won.

Scottish sources tell us that the Scottish leader was William Wallace, who escaped, that the Comyns fled, that the Scots' ranks could not be broken until attacked from the rear by the bishop of Durham's men, and that the contingents of Bute and Fife lost heavily. The Lanercost Chronicler has the Scots' pikemen in their first line, routed on both flanks by English cavalry. Guisborough's detail is one-sided. It is not credible that the waiting Scots were ranked in circles with spears pointing in all directions; scarcely credible that approaching from opposite directions, English forces arrived at the first circle; striking that the result of this attack is not told, but that the Scots' cavalry then fled; and noteworthy that regrouping into circles belatedly produces the technical term "schiltron." The description of the waiting army is to be discounted—a construct from the later regrouping. Initially the Scots were an infantry mass, pikemen with archers probably behind them, and cavalry on the flanks. The earls' and the bishop's forces were clearly horsed and drove off two Scottish cavalry contingents before the main battle, in which English cavalry and infantry broke up the Scots into groups surrounded in circles or schiltrons, where

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they suffered heavy losses. Edward I won the battle but had little time to exploit his victory.

[*See also* Britain, *subentry on* Narrative (1000–1300); Edward I of England; Stirling Bridge, Battle of; *and* Wallace, William.]

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FAMILIA REGIS

An understanding of the critical importance of the *familia regis* (the royal military household) in the success of the Anglo-Norman and Angevin kings of England developed in the second half of the twentieth century. The first hints of its role came as historians such as J. O. Prestwich and Marjorie Chibnall examined the household's potential to harbor a corps of loyal soldiers and yet to expand dramatically in times of crisis to give the English kings unmatched manpower in the field. One of the other chief results of this understanding has been a parallel appreciation of the role that daily maintenance (that is, wages) played in the military strength of these supposedly most feudal of monarchs. Finally, although the *familia regis* institutionally covered several centuries and was the locus of the "household knights," under the earlier post-Conquest kings it encompassed a good many other military personnel and functions.

Paraphrasing Saint Anselm's famed allegory of how secular service mirrored spiritual service, Chibnall highlighted Anselm's point that men typically fought for a lord out of several motives: duty, wages, or the hope of recovering some patrimony which that lord could restore. These impulses were hardly mutually exclusive. For some in the *familia regis*, like Henry I's Odo Borleng, honor, wages, and the right to eat their lord's bread were all part of the overall package. Although it is hard to avoid a term like "mercenary" for many who joined the English king's *familia*, especially when a William Rufus or Stephen so clearly opened the royal coffers wide to recruit footloose soldiers, there were many for whom military service in the royal household was part of a normal apprenticeship. William Marshal's career in the retinues of Eleanor and then the Young King showcase this scenario.

Before Henry II, it is difficult to know the composition of the *familia regis*; the Treaty of Dover in 1101 showed its remarkable capacity to bring in significant new numbers—up to one thousand knights—and integrate them with existing structures, garrisons, and assignments. A dedicated group of officers guaranteed continuity and smooth operations. Moreover, the military household held more than just knights: archers appeared regularly, sometimes with mounts, while many fell under the wide designation of sergeants, and growing ever more prominent were "engineers" who built both defenses and the siege weapons to bring them down. By the reign of Henry II, one might possibly count the oft-maligned Brabançon infantry as a part of his extended *familia*. Including these, Henry could then rely on as many as six thousand troops loyal to his bidding. By John's reign, the "bachelors" in his retinue clearly fulfilled much the same role.

The *familia regis* proved so powerful in part because it rested on the twin foundations of friendship and money, in Stephen Morillo's phrase. By an effective mix of promised reward and tenuous future, combined with its permanent staffing and officers, the *familia* gave the English kings a core group of exceptionally disciplined and usually loyal troops, which could in turn leaven new recruits with their experience and ethos.

[*See also Comitatus and* Household Knights]

مادة محمية بموجب حقوق النشر

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FAMILIARITAS

As a legal term for a particular Hungarian form of the relationship between a noble and his lord, *familiaritas* dates from the late twelfth or thirteenth century when the Hungarian nobility was taking shape. Originating from the notion of being a serving member (*familiaris*) of the household (*familia*) of another, wealthier, lord, *familiaritas* defined a large part of the vertical bonds that structured relationships among the nobility.

With the decay of the archaic institutions of kindred and the decline of strong royal power, nobles sought new forms of legal, economic, and even physical protection and self-assertion, and at the same time they also organized their own retinues. Throughout the Middle Ages, Hungarian nobles remained members of the king's "family" and retained their direct and personal (though mostly putative) bond with the king, who remained the sole source of legal land donations. Consequently a hierarchical system of tenure remained impossible, and even in cases of land donations, the lords retained the rights to the properties and had only a limited jurisdictional authority over their *familiares*.

Theoretically a contractual relation with oaths of loyalty existed between the *familiares* (mostly but not necessarily nobles) and their lords, resting upon notions of fidelity and mutual obligation, though usually determined by custom and social convention rather than precisely described. A minority of the *familiares* served in the courts, achieving the status of *aulici* (household knights); others took subordinate positions in their lords' administrative apparatus—serving as vice voivodes, vice ispans, castellans, and so forth—and sometimes faithfully followed their lords when the lords were appointed to new offices. The rewards for the service of *familiares* took the form of stipends, portions of the revenues of office, clothing, or simply political influence. Of the tens of thousands of *familiares*, some made brilliant careers: János Hunyadi, for instance, became governor of the kingdom from his service to the Újlaki family, and he made a king of his son, Mátyás.

The system of the *familiaritas* was not designed specifically for military matters, though the essential goal of the social reforms that began in the fifteenth century was improvement of the military potential of the country against the attacking Ottomans. The *familiares* were obliged to serve under the lord's standard in internal disputes and in response to royal martial summons. From the thirteenth century all but the poorest nobles followed their lords in their *armata familia* in war, forming a valuable part of the royal army. As a result of these reforms, the battalions (*banderia*) made up the skeleton of the king's army. In the battalions of the high public and ecclesiastical dignitaries, the *familiares* formed the officers' corps. This system was gradually combined with elements of a mercenary system, with extra stipends paid for burdens, especially from the time of King Sigismund (r. 1387–1437). In the fourteenth century, Hungarian mercenary troops regularly appeared in Italy; these were originally raised and organized by a lord and his *familiares* in the same way that royal troops were.

The term *familiaritas* was first conceptualized in modern Hungarian historiography by Gyula Szekfű in 1912, and it was developed further by many others. For a long time *familiaritas* was basically characterized as a distinctive Hungarian legal institution, one that had long-lasting negative effects on the

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development of Hungarian society: an equivalent, but corrupted and embryonic, of the Western feudo-vassalic (*commendatio-beneficium*) system. Recently, however, Martyn Rady has expressed a more lenient view of *familiaritas*, emphasizing its similarities to so-called bastard feudalism, *fiefes-rentes*, and clientage in western Europe. He also points out as a reason for its appearance in Hungary that western European civil law remained relatively unknown in the kingdom; otherwise that law should have offered an intellectual background to the development of a Western-style "law of fiefs."

[*See also Banderium*; Feudalism, Bastard; Hungary; *and* Hunyadi, János.]

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FATIMIDS

The Fatimid caliphate of Egypt was Shiite, of North African origin, and established in opposition to the Sunni or orthodox caliphate of Baghdad. This fundamental division within Islam was one of the reasons that the First Crusade enjoyed such success. A host of factors shaped the military history of the Fatimid state (909–1171). The most important was the socio-military composition of the army, which was partly an outcome of deliberate policies of the regime, partly a consequence of local conditions, and partly a reflection of wider Islamic practices. During the Tunisian period of Fatimid history (909–969), the Fatimids relied mostly on the Berbers of Kutama and black slaves. The Kutama were the first adherents of the Fatimids and had helped bring them to power in 909 in Tunisia. They were free-born tribal nomads and semi nomads who fought as cavalry. Their armament and fighting methods are little attested to, but we can assume that they were familiar with swords and lances, although their protective gear must have been basic.

The employment of black slaves (*'abid*) by the Fatimids in Tunisia may be considered as a military heritage of the deposed Aghlabid regime and a reflection of local conditions. Black slaves were abundantly available in the markets of Tunisia, and the Aghlabids were apparently the first Muslim dynasty to create black slave regiments. The *'abid* fought as infantry, but what kind of weapons they wielded and what fighting tactics they used remain vague. In any case, during the Tunisian period of Fatimid history, the main characteristic features of the Fatimid military organization had already become apparent: it was a multiethnic army with a marked congruence of military specialization and ethnic origin.

Following the conquest of Egypt and the transfer of the Fatimid state from Tunisia to Egypt (969–973), the Kutama slowly lost their central role in the Fatimid army. The Fatimid regime found it difficult to recruit fresh Kutama tribesmen from their homeland in the Lesser Kabilya mountains in Algeria. Furthermore, Fatimid expansion into Syria (Damascus) confronted them with armies built on the Abbasid model, in which Turkish cavalry and archers played a crucial role. The Kutama warriors proved no match for such troops, and the Fatimids had great difficulty conquering Damascus and consolidating their domination of the city (970–990).

The response of the Fatimid regime to the military challenges caused by the expansion into Syria was twofold: incorporation of Turkish elements into the Fatimid army and the expansion of the *'abid* component in the army. The inclusion of free and enslaved Turks in the Fatimid army took place during the reign of al-'Aziz (975–996). It was met with opposition within the court and brought about the alienation of the Kutama. How many Turkish troops were in the Fatimid army by the end of al-'Aziz's rule is unknown, and their impact on the fighting capabilities of the army is difficult to assess. Al-Hakim's reign (996–1021) brought a vast

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expansion in the numbers of the *'abid*. This caused friction between the *'abid* and the civilian population of Fustat-Cairo.

In the long run, however, the decline of the Kutama was inevitable, and the Turks and *'abid* came to dominate the Fatimid army. The *'abid* had evolved into an imperial guard, and they were stationed mostly in Cairo and in several quarters outside the city's walls. Their numbers are estimated at between 36,000 and 40,000 troops. They were finally eliminated as a fighting force after 1171 by Saladin, who preferred to use his resources to support a smaller, all-cavalry force.

The Fatimids initially seem to have seen the First Crusade as a Byzantine expedition, and in February 1098 they entered into friendly relations with its leaders. This in part explains why they failed to respond to the military challenge posed by the First Crusade and the Frankish expansion in Palestine during the first half of the twelfth century. They suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of the Franks at the battle of Ascalon on 12 August 1099. Their army was caught off guard and suffered about ten thousand casualties, most of them *'abid*. No less disastrous for the Fatimids was the battle of Ibelin on 29 May 1123. The Fatimid cavalry fled the battlefield, and the infantry was massacred, effectively ending Fatimid involvement in the Crusades.

The Fatimids always maintained a navy. In Tunisia, their navy was involved in wars with the Spanish Umayyads and Byzantines and in raiding Italy. Although the navy played no role in the Fatimid conquest of Egypt in 969, it was very involved in the wars of the Crusades. The navy performed better than the army, especially at Jaffa in 1105 and 1123 and at Ascalon in 1153. But the navy on its own, without the effective support of ground forces, achieved little.

[*See also* Ascalon, Battle of; Crusades, *subentries on* Sources (1095–1183), Narrative (1095–1183), *and* Historiography (1095–1183); *and* Saladin.]

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Yaacov Lev

FEDERICO DA MONTEFELTRO

(1422–1482), condottiere and Duke of Urbino. The illegitimate son of Guidantonio da Montefeltro, Count of Urbino, Federico, born in Gubbio, passed his youth far from his father's court, where the legitimate heirs lived, and wandered among courts and cities—attending, however, first-rate schools. In 1437 an unforeseen event facilitated his start in the military. His brother-in-law Bernardino Ubaldini della Carda, who served Filippo Maria Visconti, Duke of Milan, died, and Federico found himself leading a military company of eight hundred horsemen that was already well formed and trained. This was a considerable inheritance and a formidable opportunity for a young lord who had to make his own way in the world.

Soon enough the young Federico developed in the military art the same excellent qualities that he had demonstrated in his studies and in the practices of the courts along the Po River, profiting also from the instruction of Niccolò Piccinino, whom he served. Federico fought in 1438–1440 against the army of Venice, led by Gattamelata (Erasmo da Narni), and because the counts of Urbino were in constant territorial competition with the Malatestas of Rimini and Cesena, on more than one occasion he rushed to aid his father with his military forces. His biographers celebrate his qualities as a commander and his physical appearance, but certainly just as important was his personal determination: not having an assured status, he had to make the most of his military successes. For example, in his capture of San Leo in October 1441, he stripped the Malatestas of a castle situated on a rock outcropping.

In 1444, Federico's half brother Oddantonio, recently given the title Duke of Urbino by the pope,

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was assassinated in the course of an ambush. It is quite likely that Federico was involved in the conspiracy, set in motion by several dissident nobles, that led to this. In any event the assassination happened, and Federico became lord of Urbino, a territorially limited dominion subject to papal authority and made up of small castle lordships and organized communities that owed obedience based on various pacts. Under his leadership the dominion of the Montefeltro family was extended and enriched, encompassing various lines of locally powerful lords, not to mention the renowned cultural and artistic developments and patronage for which Federico became famous. The prince-condottiere's military activity was also a remedy to the small state's lack of resources: the funds that flowed to him from the larger states of the peninsula saved him from having to resort, like other lords, to unpopular and harsh forms of fiscal policy. Moreover, the county (and later duchy) of Urbino was an important area for military recruitment, and thus the fate of an entire population came to coincide with the successes and fortunes of the prince-condottiere. In particular Federico surrounded himself with ruling families of castles, such as the Gabrielli, the Ubaldini, and the Brancaleone, all of whom brought notable military experience and were accustomed to the battlefield.

With the passing of time Federico became increasingly well-regarded for his military and political skills, which permitted him to move about within Italian diplomatic circles and deal with the unstable situation of the papal territories. In the crucial years of his career he secured alliances with the Sforza of Milan and the Aragonese of Naples, garnered support from the pope against the Malatestas, permitted Pesaro to transfer to a minor branch of the Sforzas, and acquired other lands.

Thanks to Federico's constant diplomatic activity and his military interventionism (a series of events that it would be impossible to provide full account of), he became a protagonist of the interstate competition in the period of so-called equilibrium among the Italian powers. He was not lacking in a certain ruthlessness and ability to direct and manipulate his companions. In 1469 he secured the succession of Rimini for his son-in-law Roberto Malatesta, against the will of the pope. In 1472 he besieged, conquered, and sacked Volterra, which was in rebellion against the Medici. Later his relations with the Medici of Florence soured, and Montefeltro, like Pope Sixtus IV, was suspected of participating in the Pazzi Conspiracy and in the failed attempt on the life of Lorenzo de' Medici. In 1479, after having taken up arms against Florence and besieged Colle di Val d'Elsa, he was able to reestablish relations with Florence without neglecting his relations with the other Italian powers.

As always, incessant diplomatic involvement and several ruthless military operations assured the fortunes of the small state of Urbino, situated among much larger and war-prone powers. The evidence of the success of the prince-condottiere is in the results and the numbers. By the end of his career Federico had consolidated and extended his state and could count on an annual income of forty-five thousand gold ducats in times of war and twenty-five thousand ducats in times of peace, amounts that at times reached still higher sums. Regardless of his physical condition—which was compromised by various incidents that resulted in the loss of an eye and the loss of the functioning of a leg—Federico conducted the military operations of his final years with great spirit. During the war of Ferrara, in which he fought with the Estes and Sforza against Venice, he fell ill with a malarial fever. He died on 10 September 1482.

[*See also* Condottieri; Malatesta, Sigismondo Pandolfo, and the Malatesta Clan; *and* Piccinino, Niccolò.]

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Nadia Covini

Translated from the Italian by Joe Jackson

FERDINAND I OF ARAGON

See Fernando de Antequera.

FERDINAND III OF CASTILE AND LEÓN

See Fernando III

FERNÁNDEZ DE CÓRDOBA, GONZALO

(1453–1515), duke of Santangelo, Terranova, and Sessa; viceroy of Naples. Known as El Gran Capitán (the Great Captain), Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba was born into a noble family from Andalusia. He gained his military training while in the service of the Catholic Monarchs during the war of Granada, though his great fame came as commanding officer of the Spanish army intervening in the Italian conflicts with the French monarchy beginning in 1495.

The military expertise he gained while on Italian soil led him later to introduce significant reforms in the Spanish army. These modifications allowed its transformation from a medieval and antiquated force in comparison with contemporary Italian and French troops into a truly modern army. His main contribution was to substitute the traditional light cavalry used in the Spanish army of the Middle Ages for an infantry corps comprised of men armed with long and short lances, firearms (*arcabuces* and *espingardas*, two types of muskets), and crossbows. These infantry soldiers were professional, disciplined, and in permanent service, and were supported by cavalry and artillery.

This innovation was part of a new type of military organization, based on large units called *coronelías* (regiments), grouped into infantry companies (which had become the predominant and decisive forces), heavy and light cavalry, and field artillery. These reforms sowed the seeds that would eventually become the renowned Spanish *tercios*, which garnered Fernández de Córdoba his recognition as a military genius.

His victories in Italy against the French between 1495 and 1497 (Laino and Atella, 1496; Ostia, 1497), against the Turks (Zankle and Cefalonia, 1500), and once again in Italy against the French between 1501 and 1504 (Cerignola, 1503; Garigliano, 1504) guaranteed the fame of his long and successful military career. As a commander Gonzalo demonstrated competent, prudent, and pragmatic leadership. He learned from bad experiences to introduce changes in his army that would improve their performance in battle. He knew when to hasten or to delay the attack, adjusting tactics to circumstances, biding his time or relying on agility and mobility, as needed, to obtain maximum benefit from his decisions. Gonzalo also knew the value of terrain and the benefit of using it to advantage. His troops were on the receiving end of his generosity, as he promoted his most worthy subordinates, which kept morale high. Vanquished enemies also benefited from his magnanimity.

[*See also* Catholic Monarchs, The; Granada, Siege of; Iberia, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1500); Setenil, Sieges of; Toro, Battle of; *and* Zahara, Sieges of.]

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Translated from the Spanish by Daniella Sforza

FERNANDO III

(*El Santo* [the Saint], c. 1201–1252), King of Castile (1217–1252) and León (1230–1252). Fernando was the son of Berenguela of Castile and Alfonso IX of León (r. 1188–1230) and grandson of Alfonso VIII of Castile (r. 1158–1214). His mother's political acumen positioned Fernando to benefit from Alfonso VIII's victory at Las Navas de Tolosa (1212) and the subsequent disintegration of the Almohades. Owing in

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part to Berenguela's organizational skills, Fernando's reign marked the first major southern expansion of Castile since the capture of Toledo in 1085. Fernando became king of Castile when Berenguela ceded the throne to him after the death of his uncle Enrique I (r. 1214–1217). Despite papal demands for a new crusade, Berenguela insisted that the treaty enacted between Castile and the Almohades after the battle of Las Navas remain unbroken. Her son, however, was eager to prove himself, and the death of Caliph al-Mustansir (r. 1213–1224) provided an opportunity. Following al-Mustansir's death, the governor of Murcia proclaimed himself caliph. This initiated the disintegration of Almohad authority in Spain. The governors of Baeza and Valencia pledged homage to Fernando and campaigned with the king against Jaén and Granada in 1225. Fernando took possession of Baeza when its governor was assassinated in 1226.

Owing in part to Berenguela's diplomacy, Fernando inherited the throne of León when Alfonso IX died in 1230. His new kingdom provided him with more military resources, and for three years Fernando consolidated his authority there. Meanwhile, the *taifa* leader Ibn Hud challenged Almohad authority in al-Andalus, soliciting and receiving recognition from the Abbasid caliph of Baghdad in 1229. Ibn Hud captured most of southeastern Spain except for Valencia, which resisted conquest. As resistance to Ibn Hud solidified within Muslim Spain, Fernando saw an opportunity to expand his realms. He led an expedition in 1233 that concluded with the capture of Córdoba in 1236. Much of the Córdoban hinterland submitted to Fernando, and Castile's frontier moved to the Guadalquivir River. Fernando demanded tribute from Ibn Hud, who was assassinated in 1238. The king of Granada, Ibn al-Ahmar (r. 1232–1273), emerged as the new leader of al-Andalus as he tried to regain Andújar and Martos. Fernando began a campaign against Jaén, a well-fortified and strategically positioned city that he had attempted to capture before. Realizing that al-Ahmar would not aid it, Jaén surrendered.

Jaén's fall left the way open to Seville, a wealthy seaport that already paid tribute to Castile. The relationship deteriorated when Castilian troops started taking towns and fortresses around the city in 1246. The siege of Seville itself began in July 1247. The army contained contingents led by Fernando's son Alfonso, Ibn al-Ahmar (who became Fernando's vassal after the fall of Jaén), as well as ecclesiastical, noble, and urban troops. Since Seville was still supplied by water, the Castilian army, for the first time, hired a fleet to blockade a city. Isolated, Seville surrendered on 23 November 1248.

According to his son, Fernando measured his worth as a king in the number of lands he conquered. Fernando imposed Christian rule over the cities he captured. He established new dioceses, converted the mosques to cathedrals, and redistributed lands and properties among his followers. In Jaén and Córdoba he permitted the inhabitants to practice their religion; in Seville he permitted the inhabitants to leave with their moveable goods and a safe conduct to Jerez or Ceuta. He was buried in Seville, and was canonized in 1671.

[*See also* Córdoba, Siege of; Iberia, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1500); Jaen, Sieges of; *and* Seville, Siege of.]

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FERNANDO V OF CASTILE

See Catholic Monarchs, The.

FERNANDO DE ANTEQUERA

(1379–1416), King of Aragon (r. 1412–1416). When Enrique III (r. 1390–1406) died, Fernando, a member of the Castilian royal family, assumed the regency for the infant Juan II (r. 1406–1454) along with Catherine of Lancaster. He inherited the conflict with Granada that had halted with the king's death. The Cortes at

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Toledo (1406) had granted a large *servicio* (grant) of 45 million maravedíes for the conflict. These monies were earmarked to assemble a fleet of over thirty galleys to operate on Granadan shores and to recruit an army of fifty-five hundred cavalry, over fifty thousand infantry, and artillery. Fernando had waited until September 1407 to get under way. During the next three years he displayed considerable military ability and foresight.

After the Castilian fleet impeded Moroccan interference, Fernando led his army toward Ronda in western Granada, choosing Zahara as his first target. One of his military innovations, the efficient combination of traditional siege techniques with advanced gunpowder artillery, was fully in play. His forces carried three large bombards and several smaller guns. To transport and operate them, he required a corps of over 300 men for the bombards, 80 for the gunpowder, 150 to shape the stone projectiles, 30 to ensure charcoal supplies, and an indefinite number for transport. Despite strong Muslim resistance, the constant bombardment and the fact that their defenses were geared toward traditional siege weaponry forced the Zaharans to surrender. The Castilians then besieged Setenil, but it held out. Fernando, who wanted to remain, was forced to lift the siege and return to Seville. The Granadans launched a series of retaliatory raids, but a truce was signed establishing an uneasy peace until 1410.

During the next two years Fernando prepared his next campaign, aimed at Antequera. In April 1410 the Castilians set up five encampments surrounding the city and blocking all access routes. Yusuf III of Granada (r. 1408–1417) sent a relief force, which was repelled at the battle of Boca del Asno. Fernando's siege strategy again combined traditional methods—catapults, a movable tower, large balistas, and an enormous scaling ladder—with newer cannons. Even so, it was not gunpowder artillery that carried the day but an all-out attack on 16 September, during which some Christians managed to scale the walls. The Muslims surrendered under the condition that they would be allowed to leave. With this victory, Fernando earned the moniker *El de Antequera* (He of Antequera) and became the most important reconquest figure between Alfonso XI (r. 1312–1350) and the Catholic kings. Antequera was transformed into a strategic outpost, allowing the Castilians to impede the Nasrids from entering their western regions. This was the very same strategy followed by Fernando and Isabel during their final conquest of Granada.

Two years later Fernando became king of Aragon under the Compromiso de Caspe (1412). There, he quelled antimonarchical rebellions in Aragon and Valencia, continued to strengthen his kingdom's position in the Mediterranean, and worked to put an end to the Great Schism. His significant military contributions, however, remained his conquests between 1407 and 1410.

[*See also* Iberia, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1500), *and* Setenil, Sieges of.]

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FEUDALISM, BASTARD

"Bastard feudalism" was a term coined by Reverend Charles Plummer in 1885 to denote late medieval lords' payments to those who served them made in cash rather than with grants of land. Plummer and his contemporaries thought that bastard feudalism was a degenerate form of the more honorable classic feudalism. Retainer was less than permanent and sometimes for particular occasions only. This enabled lords to enlist gangs of retainers committed to them, and was associated with the evils of livery (uniformed gangs) and maintenance (supporting other people's lawsuits). Manpower raised by bastard feudalism made possible the private and civil wars and perversions of justice characteristic of late medieval England. Fortunately, the practice was suppressed by Henry VII (r. 1485–1509).

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A more sympathetic and realistic interpretation of bastard feudalism was initiated in 1944 by K. B. McFarlane, who defined it in terms of indentures of retainer. Indentures were formal contracts by which lords bound retainers for lifelong service in peace and war, in return for an annual fee and the lord's backing (good lordship) in a retainer's just cause. These were voluntary agreements for mutual advantage and were sometimes terminated when no longer desired. The earliest indentures of the late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries often required bachelors (household knights) to reside with the lord, and stressed military service with clauses about wages and spoils of war, replacement of horses, and the men that retainers brought with them. Thereafter, specific short-term contracts (indentures of war) were made for wartime service. Kings from Edward III to Henry VIII recruited garrisons and armies for particular campaigns principally through indentures of war, with captains who raised the numbers specified by subcontracts, very few of which survive. Pay replaced obsolete feudal military service. While indentures were sometimes made with civil strife in mind, as by Richard, Duke of York, in 1460, fifteenth-century examples almost invariably excluded service against the king. Service in peacetime—in households for display, for escort duty, and in local politics—also mattered and most probably became increasingly important.

To McFarlane, bastard feudalism was morally neutral, indeed part of the fabric and cement of society; but for others, from Helen Cam to Robin Storey, John Bellamy, and Peter Coss, it was an abuse that should have been abolished. More recent historians have traced bastard feudalism farther back, to Anglo-Saxon huscarles and twelfth-century mercenaries, and forward into the seventeenth and even later centuries. Indentures of retainer were always unusual: few lords could afford many annuities. Indentures extended a lord's sway beyond his household, tenants, and estate administrators, who perhaps mattered more. It was certainly they who constituted most of the manpower in private and civil wars. Bastard feudalism has been defined as "the set of relationships that provided the English aristocracy with the manpower they required." Good lordship did not commit lords to their retainers' quarrels regardless, for example, against other lords, but could involve them in brokering agreements, arbitrating, and imposing settlements. Bastard feudal abuses were steadily restricted by the law: lords and retainers operated generally within the law.

[*See also* Feudalism in Europe *and* Household Knights.]

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Michael Hicks

FEUDALISM IN EUROPE

Feudalism is a modern term of analysis not found in medieval sources. The concept has several dimensions of meaning, regarding political, administrative, economic, and military aspects. For some researchers like Marc Bloch feudalism is even a sort of all-pervading social principle that formed a "feudal society."

Theoretical Approaches. This article focuses on feudalism in a narrower sense, more appropriate to military history: the personal relationship of two or more individuals formed and connected by fiefs, traditions, rituals, and last but not least feudal law. Before the thirteenth century there is almost no feudal legislation or feudal theory verifiable in the sources, so it is not possible to analyze the feudal practice as it appeared in chronicles or diplomas. However, there is much controversy

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among historians regarding the best theoretical approaches to this subject.

The approaches of the "classical theory" were formed particularly by the works of François Louis Ganshof, Heinrich Mitteis, and Marc Bloch. In brief, the classical theory states that from the early ninth century the concrete element, the fief, and the personal element, the oaths of homage and fealty, combined to create the Carolingian feudal system. The idealized model was as follows: a free man, the feudal lord, gave another free man, the vassal (*vassus, fidelis, homo, miles*), a fief (*beneficium, feudum*), which could be a piece of land, a post, or any other asset. The vassal in return committed himself to be obedient and loyal. There were several ritual elements accompanying the enfeoffment: the commendation or homage (the vassal clasped his hands together between the hands of his lord, meaning that he gave his whole person to the lord), the oath of fealty (*fidelitas*), the kiss, and the investiture with some symbol representing the fief (e.g., a banner, a branch). It was the oath in particular that gave the new relationship a religious dimension.

The vassal had to fulfill certain obligations summarized as *auxilium* (help) and *consilium* (counsel). The *auxilium* meant above all mounted military service. There were several forms of military service, ranging from real warfare to raids to guard duty; some of the vassals had to report for duty fully equipped, others only partially; some had to assemble with their vassals, others to serve only on their own. The regulations tended to become more precise and fixed over time. In 1076 the Count of Hainaut, for example, had to support the Bishop of Liège with all his forces, while around 1100 the Count of Flanders had to join the King of France with only twenty knights. Besides this military service, vassals also had to contribute financially—an obligation that gained more and more importance from the twelfth century.

The obligation of fulfilling the *consilium* consisted mainly of the duty to visit the feudal lord's court once or several times a year to give advice, to witness documents, to judge in the feudal court, and to enlarge the splendor of the lord's court. On the other hand, the feudal lord had certain obligations, too: he owed his vassal support (e.g., by granting a fief) and protection (if necessary by force of arms accepting the risk of war, but mainly legally defending his vassal, for example, in the royal court). These obligations of the lord seem to have been the most important incentive for a free man to accept a feudal relationship.

The legal relationship between lord and vassal was concluded for life and could be dissolved (with all economic implications) only for a limited number of reasons. One possible way was a special legal and ritual procedure in the feudal court in which all vassals of a lord judged an offense (e.g., treason or disloyalty) of a single vassal against the lord or vice versa. But the relationship was in another sense strictly personal, too: if the feudal lord or the vassal died, the connection had to be replaced. On the other hand these face-to-face ties were weakened by subinfeudation: a vassal could grant part of his fief to a vassal of his own, and so there could emerge a whole hierarchy based on feudal ties. One central problem of the feudal system—taking fiefs from different lords and so multiplying and weakening loyalties—was solved in twelfth-century France and England by introducing the *ligesse*: the vassal had to be loyal to a certain feudal lord (his liege lord) in a special way and, if necessary, against all other feudal lords.

In 1994 the approaches of the "classical theory" were criticized by Susan Reynolds, building on the earlier work of Elizabeth A. R. Brown. Reynolds challenged the systematic character and close connection of feudalism, fiefs, and vassals. According to Reynolds, manifold real economic and personal interrelations were simplified and systematized by jurists in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries in order to create a theoretical construct that was set forth in the Lombard collection of feudal law, the *libri feudorum*. Reynolds argued that modern historians have naively applied this theoretical construct to earlier times. Even if some points of her work have been criticized, Reynolds certainly marked important weak spots of the "classical theory." First, she noticed that the formulations supposed to indicate feudal institutions were ambiguous: *se commendare*

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(to hand over oneself) and *fidelitas* (loyalty), for example, are quite colorless and vague terms and need not necessarily be interpreted in the sense of feudalism. In particular, the term *beneficium* can also mean simply a prebend. Second, Reynolds emphasized that a fief was only one form of ownership among others and not necessarily connected to the status of being a vassal; rather than feudal property, the standard property law of the Middle Ages was based on freehold property (*allodium*).

Besides these discussions about the legal interpretation of feudal regulations, recent scholarship has emphasized two points. First, feudalism was a manifold phenomenon not restricted to the legal or military dimension, but also molding the economic sphere. Second, wider social aspects of the "system" have to be underlined: feudalism also meant the possibility of multiplying personal relationships, establishing loyalty and confidence (along with other social modes like kinship or friendship), and building up a rank-based, visible order appropriate to the noble mentality. Third, feudal structures sometimes facilitated compromise solutions to end wars for territory, with the weaker power surrendering the disputed land to the stronger, but receiving it back as a fief.

It is uncertain how effective and efficient feudal institutions were in military respects. This question concerns above all the extent of military specialization with respect to professionalization and loyalty. Certainly there is almost no exact data. But from the twelfth century there are some documents that specify the service owed by the vassals (such as the *Catalogus Baronum* of southern Italy). On the other hand, the number of sources reporting the use of professional soldiers was increasing (such as the Brabançons or the Catalan Company in the fourteenth century). These findings correspond to each other: because most of the vassals had to serve only for certain obligations and only for a fixed number of days (for example, forty or sixty), campaigns had to be short or generals—kings or princes—had to rely on mercenaries. The loyalty of these soldiers lasted as long as they were paid. Hence, the warring parties had to mobilize great revenues that also brought forth the shift in vassalage from military service to taxes. Therefore, intensified fiscalism (along with changing weapons technology) might have led to the end of "classical" feudalism in the Late Middle Ages.

Historical Development. It is uncertain if one can speak of feudal institutions in the Carolingian era. Earlier scholarship assumed such a Carolingian feudal system because of the need of Pépin II and Charles Martel to arm and equip heavy cavalry units. The *precaria* system in the eighth century, whereby the Carolingian rulers required the church to provide benefices to their vassals, who then held the usufruct of the estates and rendered nominal rents for them, seems to have been developed as a way to provide warriors with the means to support and equip themselves for military service. The number of *vassi* seems to have grown, especially in the area between the Loire and Rhine rivers, following from the fact that one lord's vassals became lords of other vassals. One result of this development was the gradual weakening of the relationship between king and subjects in favor of the loyalty of the vassal to his lord.

The sources that enable us to examine a feudal system in the tenth and eleventh centuries are few. On the one hand it is not certain how strong the continuity from Carolingian feudalism was, but the break seems to have been fundamental. On the other hand, feudal terminology spread out from France, Germany, Burgundy, and Italy (being the center of the old Carolingian empire) to England, Spain, Palestine, Greece, and also the Slavic countries. In Germany there seems to have been an intensification of feudal thought that possibly resulted from the investiture controversy: the bishops and abbots of the imperial churches became the first "real" vassals of the king; their military service was now based on feudal law.

There was a lively debate over the extent to which the feudalism brought to England by the Normans was essentially different from the lord-man relations of Anglo-Saxon England. Some researchers, like John Round and Frank Stenton, stated—based on a significant change in the ways in which land

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was allocated between 1066 and 1100—the thesis of a "Norman feudal flooding." Furthermore they largely negate the existence of feudal relations in Anglo-Saxon England. As Round points out, the origin of English feudalism might lie in the quotas of the tenants-in-chief demanded by William I, "the Conqueror." In contrast to the "flooding" thesis, other scholars, such as Frederic Maitland and Eric John, underline the continuity of feudal structures from Anglo-Saxon to Norman times, for example, the survival of certain demesnes assigned to vassals, or the king's key position in calling up the population for war. Furthermore there seem to have been some feudal elements in Anglo-Saxon England, such as the military service of the king's thegns and of the great landowners. This service's connection to the assignment of land fiefs and the idea of fealty, however, does not appear as strong as the classical theory of feudalism states.

Feudalism played an especially important role in the Holy Roman Empire. Three developments can be traced. First, "normal" fiefs, but also counties and duchies, seem to have become increasingly hereditary, and so the feudal lord was restricted in many ways and was not as free as formerly to reward his favorites. Second, there seems to have been a stronger social stratification: direct vassals of the king became some sort of an elite circle, as, for example, the so-called Reichsfürstenstand. Third, some of the most famous bodies of feudal law were written down—for example, the Sachsenspiegel, along with the model of the Heerschildordnung (a rank-based hierarchy of lords and vassals).

In the Late Middle Ages feudalism was characterized by the formation of territorial states. Apparently there were two conflicting tendencies: the princes intended to consolidate their position in their lands by concentrating several legal titles in their own hands, while the main principle of feudalism seems to have been the issuing of possessions and rights to others. But strengthening feudal institutions did not necessarily mean a weakening of state order or kingship. Personal relations based on loyalty formed a sort of a network covering and pervading administration and military affairs. Perhaps there may have been some sort of symbiosis: until the end of the nineteenth century feudal law remained one of the main social structures.

[*See also* Brabançons *and* Catalan Company.]

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FEUDALISM IN THE LEVANT

The recovery of much of the Levant by the western armies of the First Crusade was arguably the greatest military achievement of feudal Europe. Ironically, as the newly created states sought to defend themselves, the extent of this success served to highlight the military limitations of feudalism and made inevitable the use of a wide range of expedients.

It is not surprising that a feudal structure was adopted in the Frankish states of Outremer (the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, the County of Tripoli, the Principality of Antioch, and the County of Edessa), given the nature of the societies from which the crusaders came. The military service owed to the Kingdom of Jerusalem, as set out by John of Ibelin, certainly paints a picture of "conventional" feudal obligation. The number of knights owed to a particular jurisdiction was as follows:

- Barony of the Count of Jaffa and Ascalon: 100
- Barony of the Prince of Galilee: 100
- Barony of Sidon: 100
- Seigneury of Kerak, Montreal, and Hebron: 60
- Seigneury of Count Joscelyn: 24
- Bishopric of Saint George of Lydda: 10
- Archbishopric of Nazareth: 6

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- Seigneury of Toron and Maron: 18
- City of Jerusalem: 41
- City of Nablus: 85
- City of Acre: 80
- City of Tyre: 28
- City of Daron: 2
- Seigneury of Beirut: 21

Religious institutions and the cities of the Latin Kingdom were likewise obliged to provide differing numbers of sergeants (ranging from the five hundred sergeants each owed by the Patriarch of Jerusalem and the Chapter of the Holy Sepulchre, to the twenty-five sergeants owed by Sir Gerin). Altogether (taking into account different textual variants and omissions), the lists would suggest a total service obligation in the order of approximately seven hundred knights and five thousand sergeants.

However, despite "conventional" appearances, it quickly became apparent that the military, economic, and demographic stresses of the new situation were far more demanding than those for which European feudal structures had developed. Demographically, the European populations of the new states found themselves vastly outnumbered, and manpower would always be at a premium. Geographically, the new feudal states found themselves surrounded by much larger, hostile Islamic states. There was always a shortage of land (and hence a lack of landed fiefs to distribute). Above all, the sheer intensity, longevity, and magnitude of the task of defending the crusader states was far beyond the normal demands placed on a feudal military system. Warfare in the Levant was endemic; there were no periods of peace, only interludes of "truce" between times of active conflict. The limitations of the transplanted feudal structures, as well as the need for increased military professionalism and a standing army (or at least a rapid way of mobilizing effective forces that could be maintained in the field for extended periods of time) became apparent almost immediately.

On a strategic level, the foremost of these limitations were the enormous difficulties that a fractured feudal footprint placed on the possibility of creating a unified command structure for the Frankish forces in the newly created crusader states. The states of Edessa, Tripoli, and Antioch were only loosely bound together in feudal service to the leadership of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, and a coordinated response to the Muslim threat was the exception rather than the norm. Even within the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, the king's scope for clear leadership was severely curtailed by limited resources and the need to contend with a fractious feudal nobility that often viewed him as little more than *primus inter pares*.

Tactically, many expedients became necessary to help overcome the perennial lack of manpower inherent in the feudal structure of the crusader states. Western, Frankish, mercenaries were employed from the very earliest days and were sometimes integrated, as far as possible, within the feudal structure (for example, with some vassals specifically owing the service of a specified quota of mercenaries). Many examples also exist of western knights and other soldiers staying in the Levant after a crusade, for paid service.

Other "supra-feudal" expedients included the extensive use of native troops to bolster feudal armies. "Turcopoles" (a term used to describe soldiers of mixed race or of Turkish or Syrian descent) were used to good effect, particularly in providing the light cavalry so often missing from western armies; Maronites were used, particularly in the County of Tripoli (some of whom were enlisted into the feudal system as fief holders and knights); Syrians provided contingents of infantry; and Christian Armenians formed a major part of the armies of the states of Edessa and Antioch. Manpower was also available from the towns of the Latin Kingdom (primarily infantry sergeants) and from Church lands; naval forces were, in the early years of the Kingdom, generally supplied by the Italian communes, with all the added complications of mutual hostility that often accompanied them.

However, by the middle of the twelfth century, far more wide-ranging solutions were beginning to be put in place, which were ultimately to undermine the feudal structure in the Levant. The military orders (in this context, primarily the Hospitallers and the

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Templars) were increasingly vital in providing the professionalism and manpower that was required. They became the most important source of military power, providing high-quality heavy cavalry, turcopole light cavalry, and even naval forces. The Templars and Hospitallers were used as a conduit to funnel resources from Europe to the struggling Frankish states, but this was inevitably accompanied by a rapid rise in their political and economic influence (and a gradual "hollowing out" of the traditional political structures).

The lordship of Caesarea, one of the great seigneuries of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, provides a stark example of how this process of internal collapse gathered momentum. An analysis of land ownership within the lordship shows that even by 1168, almost half of the lordship was in the hands of the military orders or other religious institutions, and even before the disaster at Hattin in 1187, that figure had risen to almost two-thirds. Significantly, the majority of the lordship's castles and fortifications (of which there were thirteen) were also out of secular hands before 1187. By 1264, the preponderance of the military orders had become overwhelming, with only one castle (that of Caesarea itself) remaining in feudal hands; the strongest castle, Chateau Pelerin, and all other fortifications were in the hands of the Templars or the Hospitallers.

Ironically, feudalism's greatest triumph also highlighted its inherent fragility. The feudal structures that were in place when the crusader states finally collapsed were little more than a polite legal fiction to cover the embarrassment of the largely powerless mobility.

[*See also* Feudalism in Europe.]

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Steve Tibble

FILM

Cinematic depictions of medieval warfare naturally coalesce, like warfare itself, around the twin themes of battles and sieges. Other aspects of medieval warfare receive little attention from the cinema, although the Sherwood Forest sequence from *The Adventures of Robin Hood* (1938) reconstructs an ambush, while the Polish film, *Krzyzacy* (1960; *Knights of the Teutonic Order* in the United Kingdom and *Knights of the Black Cross* in the United States) depicts a duel to the death.

One of the oldest and, for film scholars, most revered cinematic portrayals of a medieval battle is the "Battle on the Ice" sequence from *Alexander Nevsky* (1938), directed by the renowned Soviet filmmaker Sergei Eisenstein. The scene is based on the famous defeat of the Teutonic Knights of Prussia by a Russian army led by Prince Alexander Nevsky of Novgorod at Lake Peipus (present-day Lake Chudskoye/Lake Peipsi) on 5 April 1242. The reenactment, staged on a backlot at Mosfilm Studios in Moscow, with sodium silicate standing in for ice during filming in July 1938, draws more on contemporary politics than medieval history for inspiration. It is clear from Eisenstein's memoirs and storyboards for the scene that the Prussian knights are meant to be stand-ins for Nazi storm troopers, while their automaton, en-masse movements mimic the Wehrmacht's mechanized panzer divisions. Despite the film's blatant propagandistic undertones, this sequence heavily influenced later cinematic stagings of medieval battles. Perhaps most indebted was Laurence Olivier's film adaptation of Shakespeare's *Henry V* (1944), which re-created almost frame for frame the horseback duel between Nevsky and the Grand Master of the Teutonic Knights, now substituted with King Henry V of England and the French constable. Although some elements of the

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real battle of Agincourt in 1415 remained, such as the scene where English longbowmen fire off their arrows from behind the protection of wooden stakes that have been driven into the ground. Olivier, like Eisenstein, was perhaps more interested in having his film serve as propaganda to help fight a modern world war rather than depict a medieval one.

Since the late 1980s, film reenactments have opted for a realistic approach that gives fighting sequences a gritty look, putting the viewer "in the midst of the battle." Examples include Kenneth Branagh's depiction of the battle of Agincourt in *Henry V* (1989) and Mel Gibson's portrayal of William Wallace's victory over English forces at the battle of Stirling Bridge in 1297 in *Braveheart* (1995). Although these films show more of the rough and tumble of medieval battle, they are not entirely accurate. Branagh, for example, leaves out King Harry's ordering his men to execute their prisoners, even though Shakespeare includes this detail. And Gibson chose not to stage his battle over a bridge, which was crucial to the Scots' victory at Stirling. (The famous schiltron formation that he does show was used later, at the battle of Falkirk in 1298.) Even so, both these films get their main point right, which is that infantry was demonstrating its effectiveness over cavalry, a "military revolution" that was taking place all over Europe.

These films were not the first to show mounted knights impaling themselves on ground-fixed spears. The Egyptian filmmaker Youssef Chahine, in his 1963 film, *El Naser Salah el Dine* (*Saladin* in the United States), gives an Arabic perspective on the events of the Third Crusade (1187–1192), naturally showcasing one of its hero's most important victories, the battle at the Horns of Hattin, near Tiberias, on 4 July 1187 (referred to only briefly in Ridley Scott's 2005 film, *Kingdom of Heaven*). At one point in the staged battle, Saladin's infantrymen step aside to reveal pointed stakes in the ground, onto which the Christian cavalry, led by the villainous Raynald of Châtillon, obligingly skewer themselves. Nowhere is this incident mentioned in any of the sources for the battle of Hattin, either Christian or Arabic (although the tactic was used later during the crusade by the Christians). Plenty of other details that are in the sources, however, such as the smoky fires, beating of drums, and volleys of arrows that tormented the crusaders during the battle, do make their way into the film.

Sieges also have a long pedigree in the cinema, which is appropriate given that they were as important as battles in medieval warfare, especially in terms of controlling territory. Joan of Arc films have been a particularly apt venue for showcasing the medieval siege, because her army's capture of the English bastide of the Tourelles at the southern end of the bridge leading to Orléans on 8 May 1429 was a turning point in the latter stages of the Hundred Years' War. The most effective reenactment of the event remains a French silent film from 1928, *La merveilleuse vie de Jeanne d'Arc* (*Saint Joan the Maid*, international English title), directed by Marco de Gastyne. Despite its age, the film is brutally graphic, showing, for example, the bodies of fallen French soldiers burning at the foot of the Tourelles, and it benefits in scope and grandeur from the four regiments of the French army that were lent to Gastyne by the French president Raymond Poincaré. Not even more recent films about Joan of Arc made in the 1990s can match this spectacle. Another French film, *Jeanne la pucelle* (*Joan the Maid*), directed by Jacques Rivette and released in 1994, suffers from a severe shortage of reenactors in its own portrayal of the Tourelles siege, despite the fact that it is scrupulously based on the recollections of Joan's comrades-in-arms as recounted in her "trial of rehabilitation" conducted in 1455–1456. Luc Besson's *The Messenger: The Story of Joan of Arc* (1999) corrects this fault with more casting, more props, generally more of everything. But even though his siege scenes are perhaps the best thing about his film, the gratuitous violence of a whirling ball-and-chain mechanism that lops off any besieger's head that gets too close to it, or giant stone balls that issue out of impossibly long murder holes to crush any soldier foolish enough to stand in front of its yawning opening, does little justice to historical accuracy or, indeed, believability. At the very least, an intelligent army could easily avoid such elaborate devices.

Crusade films are also tailor-made for sieges. Richard I's (Richard the Lionheart) part in the siege

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of Acre in June and July of 1191 is the setting for an epic scene from *The Crusades* (1935), an early effort from Cecil B. DeMille. As promised in the film's trailer, DeMille delivers "giant war catapults hurling balls of fire!" and a "battle of burning oil!" even though the sources reveal that Richard captured Acre through the more prosaic method of paying his soldiers for each stone they removed from the defensive walls.

Ridley Scott's politically charged film, *Kingdom of Heaven* (2005), depicting events leading up to the Third Crusade, climaxes with Saladin's siege of Christian-held Jerusalem in September–October of 1187. In this scene Scott showcases the latest special effects made possible by CGI (computer-generated imagery). Yet the image that perhaps best communicates the desperate courage required to conduct sieges is that of Muslim soldiers throwing water on each other as they are about to enter their siege towers. Finally, *The War Lord* (1965) offers one of the best depictions of how a small-scale assault on a stone-built fortification may have been conducted during the Middle Ages. The film tells the fictional story of an eleventh-century Flemish nobleman, Chrysagon, defending his lonely outpost on the sea coast against Frisian raiders and, eventually, even his own peasants. What makes *The War Lord* ring so true is its small scale. Even without the benefit of computer-generated special effects, the film's combat scenes have an energy and authenticity about them that impresses audiences to this day.

[*See also* Arts, Visual.]

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John Aberth

FIRE

"War without fire," King Henry V of England reportedly said, "is as worthless as sausages without mustard." Some three centuries earlier, the troubadour Bertran de Born expressed a similar sentiment: "Without fire and without blood ... , war is then no noble word." Elector Albrecht III of Brandenburg, who torched some two hundred villages during the First Margrave War of 1449–1450, proclaimed, "Fire adorns war, as the Magnificat adorns the Vespers." Perhaps fire was not relished by all medieval warriors, but it was certainly omnipresent in medieval warfare.

As scholars of the subject have emphasized for the past half century, ravaging was one of the dominant modes, perhaps *the* dominant mode, of medieval warfare. Devastation was used to weaken the enemy, to pressure him to submit, and in some cases to draw him into battle, and the torch was the most important weapon in the arsenal of destruction. "Destroyed and burnt" and "by fire and sword" are pairings found frequently repeated in the sources. Across much of Europe, most structures were constructed of wood, and so were vulnerable to flame. This was true not just of homes, but also of barns, granaries, water mills, windmills, wine- and oil-press houses, and stables—the very bones and sinews of an agricultural economy. Piles of threshed grain could be set alight using hot coals inside hollow tubes. Under the right circumstances, even vineyards and standing grain could be burned. The sheer efficiency and ease of destruction by fire was one of the principal factors shaping medieval warfare. When Petrarch visited France at the end of the first stage of the Hundred Years' War (1337–1453), he remarked, "Outside the walls of the towns there was not, as it were, one building left standing." This was hyperbole, but archaeological evidence suggests that about half the buildings of Southampton were burned down in the quick French raid of 1338, and Jean Froissart (c. 1333–1410) reports that the burning of the suburbs of Amiens in 1358, signs of which could still be seen decades later, consumed three thousand houses. Without the torch, such extensive (and unprofitable) devastation would have been far too labor-intensive to be practical. The destructiveness of fire is perhaps best illustrated by the case of the little village of Cagnocles, which was hastily plundered and burned in 1298. Though only half the

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Destruction by Fire. Two soldiers set fire to a house. Illustration from the *Mittelalterliches Hausbuch*, 13r, c. 1480

houses in the village were destroyed, the villagers estimated the value of their losses to fire at more than double their losses to pillaging. In response to this destructiveness, as royal and princely governments worked toward establishing a monopoly of licit violence, they developed rules that distinguished "private wars" between nobles and "public wars" authorized by sovereigns. One of the chief distinctions was that the use of fire was allowed and expected in the latter, but forbidden in the former.

Fire was also employed in siege warfare. Attackers might burn wooden outworks or gates, using incendiaries or simply piles of dry wood. Sally parties might use fire to destroy siege engines or to burn the besiegers' camp. Soldiers' shelters were often made of branches, and cloth pavilions could also catch fire. Although it was usually a last resort (because it could largely destroy the value of the place to be captured), besiegers sometimes tried to burn down towns that they could not capture otherwise, as at Berwick in 1333.

[*See also* Berwick, Sieges of; Devastation and Ravaging; Laws of War and the Just Conduct of War; Private War; Siege Warfare, *subentry on* Tactics and Technology; *and* Strategy.]

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Clifford J. Rogers

FIREARMS

See Artillery; Gunpowder; *and* Handguns.

FIRENZUOLA, BATTLE OF

By all accounts, the battle at Firenzuola d'Arda on 17 July 923, about twelve miles (nineteen kilometers) east of Piacenza, was exceptionally bloody. King Rudolf II of Burgundy (r. 912–937; king of Italy 922–926) defeated Emperor Berengar I (king of Italy, 888–924; emperor, 915–924). Berengar's remarkable ability to ride out the storms of Italian politics had at last failed.

In the turbulence that accompanied the collapse of Carolingian rule in Italy in 875, Berengar of Friuli became one of the competitors for the crowns of Italy and the empire. His success was founded on a combination of family alliances, luck, and longevity. He maintained his position for thirty-six years, obtaining the imperial title in 915.

More than thirty years after Firenzuola, Liudprand of Cremona wrote that the losses could still be felt in

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the shortage of available troops. Flodoard of Reims reports the number of dead as fifteen hundred. Both kings were on the field. Although initially victorious, Berengar's troops were routed when a second wave attacked while they were collecting the spoils. The attack was led by Rudolf's future brother-in-law Boniface (who became duke of Spoleto and marquis of Camerino) and Count Gariard of Novara, who had held their troops back from the initial encounter. Rudolf's troops then regrouped and returned to the fight. Berengar fled to his stronghold in Verona where he was assassinated the following year. Despite the victory, Rudolf never received the imperial coronation and gave up his claim to Italy in 926.

Rudolf's allies also included Marquis Adalbert of Ivrea and his sons Anscar and Berengar, Count Gislebert of Bergamo, and Archbishop Lambert of Milan, while only Guido, bishop of Piacenza, is named as Berengar's supporter. No information is given as to the disposition of forces or relative numbers of horse and foot, but the possibility must be considered that Rudolf's initial withdrawal was deliberate and coordinated with the second attack. Berengar's failure to hold his troops back from looting before the area was secure can be seen as a failure of leadership.

[*See also* Italy, *subentry on* Narrative (476–1000), *and* Berengar.]

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Valerie Eads

FLINT CASTLE

See Welsh Castles of Edward I.

FLOR, ROGER DE

(c. 1267–1305), Italian-German mercenary leader, Grand Duke and Caesar of the Byzantine Empire. Born of Ghibelline origin on the docks of Brindisi, Roger de Flor had ambition and skills that led him to the court of Constantinople. He served the Knights Templar as a ship commander until the fall of Acre in 1291, when he was accused of robbing the refugees. He fled to escape trial and became a pirate under the name of Friar Roger. From 1299 to 1302, he fought in the service of King Frederick II of Sicily against the Angevins of Naples and their allies of Aragon and Majorca. At the end of the Sicilian war, Flor offered his services to the Byzantine emperor Andronicus II Palaiologos, who needed troops to fight the Turks in Anatolia. From 1303 to 1305, Flor commanded the Great Catalan Company, a mercenary army that consisted of many contingents led by his comrades-in-arms. Its core were the units of *almogaveres*, the Catalan and Aragonese foot soldiers who fought under semi-independent conditions. Their indiscipline caused much trouble to the Byzantine people, who viewed them as enemies.

Through his marriage to Andronicus's niece, Mary of Bulgaria, Roger de Flor considered himself member of the imperial family, and therefore he sought to found a feudal principality of his own in Byzantine territory. With this goal in mind, after his successful campaign in Asia in 1304, Flor threatened to put his men at the disposal of the Latin enemies of Byzantium. Under this pressure, Emperor Andronicus bestowed on him the office of Caesar and made him governor over the entire land of Anatolia. However, before sailing for Asia, Flor was killed in Adrianople on 30 April 1305 by order of Andronicus's son, co-emperor Michael IX Palaeologus, who feared Flor's plans of domination. His murder led to an open war between the empire and the Great Catalan Company, the so-called Catalan Vengeance.

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[*See also* Byzantine Empire, *subentry on* Narrative (1204–1453); Catalan Company; *and* Catalan Expansion in the Mediterranean.]

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FONTENOY, BATTLE OF

The battle of Fontenoy was fought on 25 June 841 near Auxerre in northern Burgundy among the sons of Louis the Pious—Charles the Bald and Louis the German against Lothair I—to decide the succession to the Carolingian Empire. The fullest account of the events leading up to the battle and the battle itself was written by the historian Nithard. The battle was preceded by approximately nine weeks of preliminaries (mid-April until 23 June). The exchange of envoys, positioning their camps at specified distances, negotiations in the form of proposed agreements, and aggressive and defensive posturing formed a series of prearranged moves before the actual battle. These orchestrated maneuvers were made possible by communications. The frequent exchange of envoys doubling as reconnaissance patrols kept negotiations in progress and ensured that both armies knew the position of the opposing forces. Charles the Bald engaged in repeated attempts to force battle, while Lothair practiced evasive techniques, especially the established practice encouraging defections so that the opposing army would not have adequate forces to fight. Lothair's delay tactics bought time for the arrival of Pépin's forces from Aquitaine (24 June), which gave Lothair the confidence that he could win the battle. The immediate preparations for the battle (23–24 June) were a form of ritualized aggression, including precise observance of liturgical rituals to ensure that the outcome of the battle would reflect the judgment of God.

Some modern scholarship has proposed that Charles the Bald and Louis the German won the battle by a surprise attack. This view is suspect in view of the prearranged conditions reported by Nithard, including the stipulation that the battle was to begin at 8 A.M. Moreover, the sources favoring Lothair do not suggest deceptive tactics at the beginning of the battle. The sources reported that the fighting was fierce on all fronts, but tactical details are absent. The battle ranged across three locations. At Brittas, a forested area, Lothair attacked the forces of Louis and succeeded in pushing him to a stream called the Burgundian Brook, but reinforcements under Count Warin of Mâcon forced Lothair into a retreat. At an unidentified site called Fagit, Charles repelled the enemy on the first strike. At Solemnat, Charles had delegated the command of his forces to Adalhard. Pépin managed a surprise attack. Thinking they had won the day, his troops broke formation to pursue, but a counterattack led by Nithard reversed the tide of combat, and Pépin's forces were routed. Thus, the battle overall was a defeat for Lothair. Fontenoy did not, however, serve its declared purpose of deciding the succession of the Carolingian Empire, as all three of the major participants survived the battle.

The sources give only one clue regarding the numerical strength of the armies involved: Archbishop George of Ravenna reported that forty thousand men fell on Lothair's side. This is presumably exaggerated, but it is difficult to say by how much. Estimates of the numbers in Carolingian armies in general fall into two groups: the larger-number theory developed by Karl Ferdinand Werner and elaborated by Bernard S. Bachrach favors armies of one hundred thousand, while Timothy Reuter believed that Carolingian armies were much smaller, only a few thousand. Fontenoy was a high-stakes battle with the estates of all the magnates on the line. It is reasonable to assume that the mobilization was as complete as could have been achieved for a Carolingian battle.

[*See also* Charles the Bald; Lothair I; Louis I; *and* Louis II.]

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FORAGING

See Logistics and Transportation *and* Devastation and Ravaging.

FORMIGNY, BATTLE OF

This battle, fought on 15 April 1450 near the small village of Formigny on the road between Carentan and Bayeux in Normandy, marked the effective end of the English occupation of Normandy. In August 1449 the French king, Charles VII (r. 1422–1461), had broken the Treaty of Tours (1444), and by January 1450 the French had taken the towns of Rouen, Harfleur, and Honfleur, and Caen was under siege.

In December 1449 the English determined to send a relief army, under Sir Thomas Kyriel, to Cherbourg. Kyriel, who may have been in prison for debt when called upon to serve, was the only experienced English captain prepared to serve in what increasingly seemed a lost cause. His force consisted of a mere thirty-four hundred men, and its departure was delayed by problems with the payment of its wages. By the time that Kyriel landed at Cherbourg on 15 March, the English presence in Normandy had been reduced to Cherbourg and the towns of Caen, Bayeux, Vire, Domfront, and Falaise. Instead of making for Caen, Kyriel first laid siege to the town of Valognes, which blocked the way from Cherbourg to the rest of the Contentin peninsula. Edmund Beaufort, Duke of Somerset and the lieutenant general of Normandy, sent reinforcements to Kyriel in the form of contingents from the lower Norman garrisons led by Sir Matthew Gough, Sir Robert de Vere, and Sir Henry Norbury. Valognes fell on 27 March, and Kyriel's army, now numbering between four and five thousand men, began to march toward Carentan. They reached the town on 12 April, but the French garrison refused to sally out and give battle. Kyriel then turned east and headed toward Bayeux.

On 15 April, Kyriel's men were intercepted at Formigny by a French army led by the Count of Clermont. The English, in their traditional fashion, drew up behind sharpened stakes with their backs to a small tributary of the river Aure. Clermont led a number of unsuccessful attacks on the English positions, but then opened withering fire upon them with two culverins. Kyriel's men were unable to withstand this assault, and Kyriel ordered them to leave their defensive positions and capture the guns, which they succeeded in doing. But at that moment Clermont's force, which was outnumbered by as many as two thousand, was saved by the timely arrival of Arthur, Count of Richemont. Richemont's Breton cavalry—perhaps twelve hundred strong—charged into the English ranks as they attempted to carry off the French guns. The result was a massacre: between 2,000 and 3,764 English were killed and between 900 and 1,400 were captured, including Kyriel, Norbury, and Sir William Herbert. French and Breton casualties, by contrast, were probably less than a thousand. The defeat marked the end of England's hopes of maintaining its position in Normandy; Caen, the last English stronghold, fell on the following 24 June.

[*See also* Britain, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1500); Caen, Siege of; Charles VII of France; *and* Hundred Years' War.]

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David Grummitt

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FORTIFICATIONS

[*This entry contains two subentries, an overview of fortifications and on Byzantine fortifications and building techniques.*]

Overview

Fortification has a long history, going back several thousand years in the Near East. In Europe, the Germanic tribes that invaded the region from the north were confronted by Roman towns with elaborate Roman-towered walls. In the Mediterranean area, the Byzantines continued Roman fortifications, particularly during the expansion under Justinian. However, in the west, there was at first relatively little need for the construction of new fortifications until the arrival of the Vikings by sea, when the development was quite different from previously. The period of fortification described here falls between 900 and 1500 C.E. In this era, the number of fortifications, especially castles, in Europe rose dramatically, until the density of strongholds far surpassed that found elsewhere. This had a fundamental influence on strategy; it made conquest of an encastellated area very difficult, boosting the importance of raiding and devastating operations by default. It also affected the lives of medieval people profoundly. Land was held in return for military service, which might require defending the fortresses within or near which they lived (e.g., castle-guard or "watch and ward" service). They also bore the burden of the huge resources devoted to the construction and maintenance of these structures. In addition, the control of the fortifications by the elite of society served to ensure the lords' ability to sustain their lordship even to the point of oppression of their dependents.

Weapons and Methods of Attack. Fortifications were designed with the weapons used to attack and defend them in mind. Apart from the thrown spear, two types of projectile were in use: bows and arrows—antipersonnel weapons—and stone-throwing machines, used primarily against masonry and wooden structures. The crossbow, and its projectile (bolt), came into favor from the eleventh century because of its power, but later in the Middle Ages the longbow rivaled it. The weakness of the crossbow was its relatively slow loading process; one could practically shoot three arrows from a bow in the time required to load and shoot one crossbow bolt. The delay between shots was a real danger to a soldier in the open field, who might be ridden down while he was reloading, but it was much less of a problem for someone sheltered by the walls of a fortification, so crossbows were favored for siege warfare more than regular battle.

Various types of stone-throwing machines had been inherited from classical times that depended on torsion for casting, but by the start of the High Middle Ages, the "traction trebuchet," which was powered by a team of men or women pulling down on ropes attached to one end of a pole set up on a framework, thus causing the other end to swing up and launch a stone from an attached sling, was in use. These weapons could help clear the ramparts of defenders, and could even, with the launch of thousands of stones, demolish mud brick fortifications of the kind sometimes found in southern Europe. From about 1200, these were supplemented by "counterweight trebuchets," which could throw a much heavier weight farther than earlier engines—250 pounds up to 100 yards. These devices used pulleys to lift large weights (wooden cribs filled with earth or even lead) attached to the short end of the throwing arm; when the weight was released and fell, the long arm swung up and launched the projectile. Even these larger engines generally could probably not make a breach in a stone castle or city walls, but they would severely damage the top (thus seriously hindering the defenders). Not until the late fourteenth and, even more, in the mid-fifteenth century, did gunpowder artillery progress to the point where a breach by bombardment could be made effectively and rapidly. Like cannon, the trebuchets could be used by the defenders as well as the attackers; they may even, before the mid-fifteenth century, have strengthened the defense more than the offense, as at Kenilworth Castle, where wooden towers that were to be brought up to the wall were destroyed with heavy shot.

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One of the two most effective forms of attack on a fortress wall was to bring up a tall mobile wooden siege tower that was higher than the curtain, and from it use missile fire to drive the defenders off the wall-walk, thereby clearing the way for the attackers to assault the walls with ladders. The other mode of attack involved mining and making a breach in the wall. Mining was performed by driving a tunnel under the wall, propping the foundations up, and then setting fire to the props, leading to collapse. Other forms of attack were sapping by attacking the foundations just below ground level or using a battering ram or simply with scaling ladders. These threats were all taken into account in the design and siting of fortifications.

Fortification. The first step in the fortification of a castle was the choice of a site that allowed maximum use of natural features. (Towns, too, were occasionally built on locations chosen for defensibility, such as on river islands, but the practical requirements of commerce meant that they were usually on low ground, along riverbanks.) In early castles, this usually meant on top of a spur or hill with steep slopes or cliffs on three sides with the entry on the less steep side; Château Gaillard in Normandy, where Richard I (1189–1199) built a famous castle, is an example. If the site offered no hills, then an artificial one, a "motte" like an upturned flower pot, could be constructed, as at Farnham, Surrey. Low ground, on the other hand, had one great asset: water. The water-filled moat could prevent mining and indeed most forms of attack but was not usually available on a hill. The great success of the water defenses in the siege of 1266 at Kenilworth Castle may be cited. Broadly speaking, the early castle favored an impressive situation on a hill, whereas in the later Middle Ages, castle builders preferred water.

Thousands of earthwork castles of the tenth to twelfth centuries, the so-called motte-and-baileys—mounds with attendant enclosures—exist, and recently archaeologists have added a new type, the "ringwork," with a motte being a later addition. Only the rump is seen in this type of earthwork, since the main working parts were of wood and have vanished. The structures on the top of mottes, as shown on the Bayeux Tapestry, give an indication of what has disappeared, but a number of excavations by archaeologists have exposed traces that reveal many structures. The most notable discoveries were made by Barker and Higham at Hen Domen, Montgomeryshire, on the Welsh side of the Border. The reconstruction drawings of the fortifications are impressive. The tower base found at the center of a specially-made motte at Farnham, Surrey, is some indication of the function and practice of motte-making even as late as the 1130s. The mound there contains a windowless and doorless stone tower twenty-five feet high with a well shaft at the bottom. This suggests an earlier tradition of vertical wooden supports built into mottes to allow for the construction of large superstructures above.

In an earthwork, the soil excavated from the ditch was thrown up on the inside to form the defensive bank. The bank could be omitted and replaced by a wall, but a large ditch, fifty feet or more broad and twenty feet or more deep, was the basic defense of all medieval fortified buildings. This is what confronted the attacker in a siege, and if he wanted to reach the face of the defensive wall, he had to fill it up at the point of attack with whatever was available, which presented special problems if it was full of water or if he wanted to be able to bring up a very heavy wooden siege tower.

The great tower or keep of the twelfth century, intended for occupation by the lord or king, was normally square, although later examples may be round or polygonal. It had a double function, a military one to protect its owner, and a sociopolitical one, to display the status and authority of its owner, acting indeed as a sort of challenge to anyone in conflict with its owner. Its military character was revealed by the bareness of its lower wall, with scarcely any openings; decorated keeps like that at Norwich are altogether the exception. The most revealing military feature is the doorway, which was located on the story above ground level and entered by an external stair enclosed in the forebuilding. It could be a detached structure linked to the main

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body only by a movable plank bridge or drawbridge. Nevertheless, the keep relied for defense on its sheer bulk, the occupants passively relying on the building's strength. Other than allowing defenders on the top to drop things on their opponents, tower keeps were not well designed to allow for defense by firepower.

The siege of Rochester in 1215 is of special interest for the student of the keep. First, it illustrates that a keep could have a military role. Second, it shows how vulnerable it was to mining, which brought down one corner, and yet how the defenders got behind the internal cross-wall in order to continue the fight in the half of the keep they held. A cross-wall of this kind was used in the larger keeps to reduce the roof span. Third, this siege indicates that when the corner of the keep was rebuilt, the corner turret was constructed with a circular face unlike the remaining three turrets, which were square. It is usually thought that curved surfaces deflect missiles rather than allowing a direct impact on a flat surface, a comment often made to which the change at Rochester lends support.

The Curtain Wall. The curtain wall enclosing the castle was the main line of defense for the castle from the late twelfth century onward. Its domestic buildings, presided over by the great wall, usually in a south-facing position, were built against the curtain, leaving a courtyard in the middle. On the outside, the curtain, set on the edge of the great ditch, stood to twenty feet or more high to make scaling it difficult. The wall had to be at least six feet thick, since at the top of the front part was a parapet, which was crenellated, and room was needed to stand on the wall behind. The spaces between the merlons, which might themselves have "loops" (arrow slits), were an essential part of the archers' defense and could be closed with vertical shutters. The back half, perhaps at least three and one-half feet wide, was left as a sheltered pathway that ran round the castle, allowing defenders to man any threatened point on the circuit. The defenders could shoot or hurl missiles from the wall-walk, but as with the keep, the outer face of the wall could not be inspected without dangerous exposure. There might be tiers of arrow slits lower down on the wall, particularly if there were passages in the thickness of the walls, as at Caernarvon Castle. This did not solve the problem, to which two solutions were found: interval or "flanking" towers, as they are sometimes called, and machicolations.

Interval towers had been known in antiquity even before classical times and were used by the Romans in Britain. On Hadrian's Wall, the internal towers or turrets were for observation, but Roman towns of later times had projecting round towers that carried ballistae (stone-throwing machines). In England, there were some plain walls in medieval castles, which were soon replaced by square interval towers in the twelfth century and round ones in the thirteenth. There were a few cases of solid towers as at Conisborough, but the standard flanking tower from the thirteenth century rose well above wall-walk level and was open at the back containing rooms at two or more levels each furnished with its arrow slits facing all round. The flat back had a door and windows into the rooms. The towers could be circular or U-shaped.

The archers on the top and in the rooms below could provide a formidable firepower. If the distance was calculated, the wall space between the towers could be covered from both sides with overlapping defensive fire, and the towers might even be able to support each other. Indeed, one can see how this affected the shape of newly constructed castles; instead of long winding curtain walls that were costly to build and less defensible, a small square structure with towers at each corner gave each face protective fire from two towers. Philip II of France (1165–1223) built numerous castles on this basic square design, which became favored for the rest of the Middle Ages as is seen in Edward I's (1272–1307) castles in Wales and in fourteenth- and fifteenth-century castles in England.

Arrow slits in castles come in many forms and have been the subject of several studies. Starting with a simple slit, an *oeillet*, a splayed channel at the bottom, probably for improved observations of the ground, became common. Another development was one or two cross bars, probably to assist

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with the use of a crossbow, which was discharged in a horizontal position, unlike the vertically held long bow. Mesqui has many illustrations in his cited work.

The other method of commanding the lower face of the wall was with *hourds* or "hoardings" in wood, later changed into stone and called "machicolations." The principle was simple: a platform was created in wood or stone projecting outward from the wall face, usually at wall-walk level, with its own protective roof and shelter. In the platform were apertures over the external wall face through which missiles could be flung down on an approaching enemy. In the Mediterranean area, machicolations had been known from the twelfth century, but they were not adopted in England until the middle of the fourteenth century. They altered the appearance of the castle where they were used, and they continued in to be applied at the wall top as an ornamental feature long after they were functional.

A fortress could also have a double circuit of curtain wall, which might arise quite accidentally when two walls ran concentrically, perhaps widely separated and with their own ditches, as at Dover. Towns occasionally developed double circuits during periods of demographic expansion, when it was decided to enclose suburbs outside the shelter of an existing circuit of walls. However, the term "concentric castle," implies something much more sophisticated than a mere double circuit. It is best seen in some of Edward I's castles in Wales, or at Krak des Chevaliers in Syria. In cross section, there were four elements starting from the outside: the great ditch, overlooked by a relatively low curtain with its own small towers; next, a level terrace behind it; and finally, the main curtain wall with large towers dominating the outer features. The object was to have a double line of fire against enemies in front of the outer circuit and also to ensure that if the enemy took the outer line they were hemmed in on the terrace, at the mercy of the defenders on the main curtain. It was an ingenious scheme perhaps best seen at Beaumaris where the outer ditch was a water-filled moat. Unfortunately, the inner towers at Beaumaris were not finished, so that the effect is lost. At Harlech, the ditch is cut from rock, and the scheme is completed but on a smaller scale.

Gatehouses. The most vulnerable point in a castle or town wall is the point of entry, and not surprisingly much attention was lavished on its protection. The earliest gatehouses were simply a passage through a square keeplike tower as at Ludlow, Shropshire, and Richmond, Yorkshire, but this was abandoned in the later twelfth century when the normal type of later gatehouse was introduced. It was the invention of the flanking tower that provided the solution: two of the towers were simply placed side by side about eight feet apart, just wide enough for a mounted knight or cart to pass through, on the ground floor, while above the entry arch the two towers were joined to create a chamber from which the portcullis and drawbridge could be operated. The circular fronts of the two towers were furnished with arrow slits at two or three levels giving all-around coverage, and from the fourteenth century onward, the gatehouse would probably be strongly machicolated.

There were obstacles for the enemy in front of the gate and in the gate passage. A constricted alley, perhaps turning through a right angle, called the barbican, led to the gateway, from the walls of which the defenders could harass a confused enemy. The castle ditch was partly interrupted by a solid causeway, but at its end was a swing bridge that pivoted with a counterweight at the back. This moved down into a pit below the bridge, closing the gateway when it was up. Beyond this the gateway was shut by a gate and portcullis, a vertical grill running in grooves in the wall, which could be raised or lowered as required. There were apertures in the roof vault for missiles. The towers were extended at the back, so the passage was quite long with rooms on either side. This was the main gate but there could be a postern at the back of the castle, a secure small door available for concealed exit or access.

Artillery. Gunpowder was discovered or introduced in the early fourteenth century, and cannon were in use in field battles by the middle of the century (Crécy). On the Continent, its influence on castles was much more marked than in

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England; it played a large part in the French campaigns that drove the English out of France in 1450–1451. Mehmet II used cannon to breach the walls of Constantinople in 1453. There was some attempt to adapt castles to cannon by lowering towers and thickening walls both to resist bombardment and to provide solid emplacements for returning fire with cannon in France. However, medieval castles were generally poorly adapted for use when cannon were the main weapons, as attempts to do so in the English Civil War, 1642–1647, demonstrated. In the period up to 1500 under discussion, cannon had no significant influence on the design of castles in England, but of course immediately thereafter, Henry VIII's (1509–1547) coastal forts were designed as batteries to shoot from and be shot at.

However, the new arms left their traces on newly constructed castles from the second half of the fourteenth century in the form of holes more or less in the same position as arrow slits, usually on the ground floor of entrances. They are round or keyhole-shaped and were intended for handguns, a kind of antipersonnel weapon. Some are in rather improbable positions, and it has been forcefully argued that they were designed for prestige rather than use, which may well be so in some cases.

[*See also Bastides*; Castles, *subentries on* 500–1100, 1150–1350, *and* 1350–1500; Fortified Churches; Harbor Defenses; Rochester, Siege of, *subentries on* 1088 *and* 1215; *and* Urban Defenses]

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Michael W. Thompson

Byzantine Fortifications and Building Techniques

Four types of fortifications can be defined for the Byzantine Empire: forts with an exclusively military function, cities provided with defensive walls, linear fortifications, and fortified villages.

Forts with an exclusively military function erected after the Diocletian reforms were adapted to the new type of army, composed of smaller units. The new frontier fortresses, called *quadriburgus* or *tetrapyrgos*, had a quadrangular or rectangular shape, and square or round towers at the corners. The area of these forts varies between approximately sixteen hundred and eight thousand square meters (17,222 and 86,111 square feet). They were built along the Danube and the Rhine, in Africa, and on the eastern frontier. The *quadriburgia* continued to be constructed or repaired until the sixth century, when they also appeared in inland areas, such as the mountains of the Balkan provinces. On the eastern frontier, similar quadrangular forts were built in the seventh and eighth centuries. Another kind of fortification with exclusively military function was the watchtower, present on the Danube and eastern frontiers.

Urban defenses were erected from the third century in many Roman provinces to offer protection to the inhabitants during periods of crisis and invasion. Cities continued to be fortified in the fourth to sixth centuries. The plan was adapted to the topography (many precincts are polygonal, not rectangular like the Roman camps). The economic decline and the enduring danger of invasions changed the

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shape of surviving Byzantine cities in the seventh century. Called *kastra* instead of *poleis*, they had walls that enclosed areas smaller than the older cities. As the last line of defense, these forts were located in elevated locations (the *akropolis*) when possible. New *kastra* were built in locations difficult to reach by the enemy, in mountains or in the islands (as at Monemvasia). They were places of refuge for the civilian population, but their surface area was usually small. Other *kastra* were built inside the cities, which continued to preserve the early walls. In the period of urban revival that began around 800, the precincts were extended to cover larger areas in major cities like Ancyra (15.3 acres [6.2 hectares]). Such fortifications with military and civilian populations were the headquarters of the army structures known as *themata* and *turmai*.

The existence of permanent large military units required larger fortifications during the middle Byzantine recovery. They were built by the military themselves and by the inhabitants, usually by imperial command, either as new construction or by the repair of the old structures. After 1025, the resources allocated for military purposes were diminished and some forts were abandoned or given to foreign troops such as the Pechenegs or the Normans. A revival took place during the Komnenos dynasty, when the territory endangered by the Turkish advance was protected with new fortifications. The Nicaean empire and the restored Palaeologan empire continued to develop an intensive building program in the fortified cities.

Linear fortifications called *diateichismata* (sing. *diateichisma*) were stone walls with towers constructed in strategic narrow places. To be effective, linear fortifications required many men distributed along them. The main linear fortification was the Wall of Thrace. Other *diateichismata* built or restored in the fifth and sixth centuries protected the Isthmus of Corinth (the Hexamilion, or six-mile wall), the Thermopylae gorge, and the Thracian Chersonesus (a wall from the sixth century BCE repaired several times, 4.3 miles [7 kilometers] long). A stone wall that crossed the Dobrudja from Axiopolis to Tomis may also date from the fifth century. The Hexamilion was reconstructed in 1415 to defend the city of Mistra against the Ottomans.

Fortified villages appeared in Syria and Cappadocia by the end of the fourth century. In the sixth century, these *phrouria* were also present in the endangered Balkan provinces. The mountainous landscape facilitated the development of these refuges. In ninth-century Anatolia, during the wars with the Arabs, almost every village had a place of refuge called a *kataphygon*.

Building techniques were inherited from Roman architectural traditions. Fourth- to sixth-century precinct walls were still faced with ashlar blocks, or with ashlars interlaced with lines of bricks (*opus mixtum*), but this technique became unsuitable when the increasing danger on the frontiers required a faster pace of construction and at the same time great solidity. The core of mortared rubble was strengthened with wooden beams or with column drums. In the seventh and eighth centuries, many fortification walls were made of stones from ruined buildings. Bricks were used more frequently after the ninth century, because such spoils were less available.

Byzantine architects found some new ways to improve defensive capability against sieges. For instance, in the fifth century, projecting towers were made triangular and pentagonal, in order to resist catapults and rams better (for instance at Thessalonica, Salona, and Dyrrachium). In the seventh century, this technique was also applied in Anatolia against Persian and Arabian attacks. A sixth-century military treatise (*Anonymus Byzantinus*) asserts their value. The capability of the Persian and Arabian armies to sustain long sieges led to the development of stronger and more sophisticated defensive walls for forts, sometimes provided with bend gateways, outer walls (*proteichismata*), and ditches. The application of coats of mortar over their face, which appeared in the twelfth century, hindered the scaling of the walls during sieges. The last significant innovation in building techniques was the introduction of donjons and machicolations in the thirteenth century, following Western models.

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[*See also* Arabs; Byzantine Empire, *subentries on* Narrative (500–1000), Narrative (1000–1300), Military Ranks, Army and Navy, *and* Regiments; Danube Fortifications; Norman Conquests, Norman Expansion; *Themata* (Themes); Urban Defenses; *and* Wall of Thrace.]

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Alexandru Madgearu

FORTIFIED CHURCHES

The church in the medieval world was, in more senses than one, a place of refuge. In regions where the threat of invasion or internal hostility necessitated, and such was the case in many parts of Europe in the Middle Ages, urban and rural settlements required some form of defense not only to help ward off attack, but wherein residents could seek refuge in times of danger. In many settlements this need was most conveniently achieved by the construction of fortified churches or of fortifications around existing churches.

There are numerous examples of fortified churches throughout France, many, but not all, in the frontier regions. Romanesque churches in the south often had fortified bell towers and there were some fortified cathedrals such as the cathedral at Maguelonnée in Hérault near Montpellier which has remnants of a battlement parapet constructed on machicolation, or the nearby basalt cathedral of Saint-Etienne in Agde. The latter was fortified from 1173 on, with a keep, 115 feet (35 meters) high that has walls 6.5 to 10 feet (2 to 3 meters) thick with crenellations and machicolations. There are fortified rural parish churches in the south and west of France. The church at Rudelle in Lot has two stories of fortifications including crenellations and arrow loops, and it may also have had wooden hoardings. Many fortified parish churches were constructed during the Hundred Years' War. In some regions, as for example south of Fontainbleau forest, fortified churches far outnumbered other types of defensive buildings.

In England a number of fortified churches were constructed on either side of the Anglo-Scottish border. Saint Anne's Church, Ancroft, has a fortified tower with arrow loops and battlements. Farther south, Saint Gregory Bedale in northern Yorkshire has a fourteenth-century fortified west tower and its defensive elements included a portcullis.

Churches were fortified by both the Gaelic Irish and the Anglo-Norman invaders in Ireland. The Gothic cathedral of Saint Patrick's Rock, which was built in the thirteenth century, is fortified with a battlemented parapet and probably had hoarding, as witnessed by the presence of putlog holes. Between the ninth and twelfth centuries round towers were attached to churches or were constructed adjacent to the west door of churches to serve as belfries and possibly as lookouts and places of refuge.

Fortified churches are found in Scandinavia and the Baltic islands, in Spain, Germany, and Austria, and in the Caucasus region. Facing the threat of a Turkish invasion in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the Saxon settlers in central Transylvania fortified their churches with high walls, towers, and moats. There are over two hundred fortified churches in this region of Romania.

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In general, churches in the Latin East were not fortified structures, in the sense that they did not in most cases possess actual elements of fortification such as those that enabled castles to withstand siege and defend themselves against attackers. However, as in the West, church buildings were well constructed and often, by nature of their thick stone walls, narrow windows, and few doors, were well enough endowed to serve as refuges if the need arose. In addition, in the Latin East there are some churches that actually did possess their own defensive works and there were churches and chapels that were included in or attached to castles, in particular to castles of the three major Military Orders.

Sometimes the isolated location of a settlement necessitated the construction of a fortified church. At Abu Ghosh, a popular pilgrim site in the open countryside west of Jerusalem that was identified with the Biblical Emmaus, the Church of Our Lord's Resurrection was built, probably by the Hospitallers around 1140, with walls over eight feet (2.5 meters) thick. A small monastic chapel at the isolated monastery of Allar as-Sufla had walls up to twelve feet (2.75 meters) thick and the Church of Saint John in the Woods at Ain Karim had walls of seven to eight feet (2.1 to 2.4 meters) thick.

In towns without fortifications, such as Nazareth, the cathedral or principal church was, even if not originally intended as such, often the only building that could function as a refuge when needed. The western wall of the basilica at Nazareth was 16.5 feet (5 meters) thick. At Tortosa in the County of Tripoli the mid-twelfth-century cathedral of Notre Dame was built with massive walls up to 6.5 feet (2 meters) thick and two projecting towers on the corners of its east wall like the towers of a *quadriburgium*. Churches, like domestic buildings, might take advantage of an adjacent fortress for protection. At Bethgibelin the parish church was built directly onto the south side of the fortress.

Most medium- and large-size castles of the Military Orders incorporated chapels. These were enclosed in defensive works and were occasionally built within fortified towers and could combine the religious functions with that of refuge. The *église-donjon* (chapel in a fortified tower) is found in a number of sites, at Chateau Blanche (Safita) where the chapel is on the ground floor, at Sidon (Sea Castle) where it is on the first floor, and possibly in towers at Montfort, Arsuf, Safed, and other castles.

Elsewhere churches might be contained within their own fortifications. The Premonstatensian Order constructed a cruciform plan church on the hilltop of Nebi Samwil, the traditional site of the Tomb of the Prophet Samuel, 4.5 miles (7.5 kilometers) northwest of Jerusalem. Around the church were the convent buildings and at a certain stage, probably circa 1170, the church and monastery were substantially fortified with massive walls and a rock-cut ditch, in order to enable it to face the growing threat of attack by the Ayyubids. These fortifications were incomplete when Saladin arrived in September 1187.

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FOSSA GIVALDI, SIEGE OF

See Jeufosse, Siege of.

FRAGA, SIEGE AND BATTLE OF

Following a failed siege of Bayonne in Gascony, King Alfonso I of Aragon and Navarre (r. 1104–1134)

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gathered a mixed force of Frenchmen and Aragonese and moved toward the Ebro River along his southeastern frontier in the vicinity of the Almoravid-held town of Lérida. After capturing Mequinenza, some twenty-five miles from Lérida, Alfonso advanced on Fraga on the Segre River, a further fifteen miles away. His besieging army included forces gathered or financed by Bishop Guido of Lescar, Bishop Arnold of Jaca and Huesca, Bishop Pedro of Roda, Count Bertrand of Laôn, Viscount Aimeric II of Narbonne, and Viscount Centulle V of Béarne, castellan of Zaragoza. Beyond the seven hundred members of Alfonso's bodyguard, the *Chronica Adefonsi Imperatoris* (*Chronicle of the Emperor Alfonso*) offers no indication of the size of Alfonso's forces, but Orderic Vitalis's *Ecclesiastical History* cites the number twelve thousand. As with most contemporary estimates of forces, this is probably exaggerated, but an assumption of several thousand troops on each side would probably be more realistic.

King Alfonso spent the better part of a year before Fraga (1133–1134). At the outset, the Fragans sent envoys to their fellow Muslims, who gathered a relief force and marched on the besieged town. When Alfonso was informed of this, he gathered the many relics he brought with him (many seized from León while he formerly occupied it) and withdrew to a nearby defensible hill, swearing on the holy objects that he would not leave until he was victorious, or defeated and killed. He also sent for assistance in the face of the Almoravid assault. The Aragonese king resisted the attacking forces for three days, until a relief army under Robert Burdet, the Norman count of Tarragona, arrived to save the day and forced the Almoravids to retreat. Sufficiently confident to allow some of his own forces to return home to resupply, Alfonso then besieged Fraga once again.

The citizens of the town then sued for peace and offered tribute, but Alfonso would have none of it, resolving to take Fraga by force. Meanwhile a new Muslim relief army assembled under the command of ibn Ganiya, the governor of Valencia, and moved on Fraga once more. On 17 July 1134 the Almoravids sent camels loaded with supplies toward Fraga to act as bait for a trap. When Alfonso's forces pursued the supply train and drew away from the Aragonese camp, other Almoravid troops flanked his position and attacked, while the citizens of Fraga sallied from the town to capture his camp. Completely surrounded, Alfonso's forces suffered devastating losses, including the deaths of the bishops of Roda and Jaca, Count Bertrand, Viscount Aimeric, and Viscount Centulle. The bishop of Lescar was captured and later ransomed. Yielding to the admonitions of the bishop of Urgel to save his kingdom, King Alfonso, badly wounded, broke out of his enveloped position with sixty or seventy of his bodyguard, fleeing to the castle of Poleñino, where he died on 7 September 1134.

[*See also* Alfonso I of Aragon; Iberia, *subentry on* Narrative (1100–1300); Urraca; *and* Zaragoza, Siege of.]

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James F. Powers

FRA MORIALE

See Montreal d'Albarno.

FRANCE

[*This entry contains six subentries, on French sources from 900–1328 and 1328–1483, an overview of French military history from 900–1328 and 1328–1483, and on French historiography from 900–1328 and 1328–1483.*]

Sources (900–1328)

Many of the relevant texts are collected in the *Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France* (*RHF*). Among guides, Auguste Molinier's *Les sources de l'histoire de France* remains invaluable, as does, for Anglo-Norman and Angevin chroniclers, Antonia Gransden's *Historical Writing in England.*

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Useful shorter guides to some of the key sources, divided by period, are also to be found in Jean Dunbabin's *France in the Making*.

Tenth and Eleventh Centuries. The principal sources for warfare in tenth-century France are the *Annales* of Flodoard, canon of Reims, and the history of Richer of Reims, based on Flodoard up to 966 but providing a contemporary narrative from 966 to 995. Thereafter the most important narratives of political and military events are Radulfus Glaber's *Historiarum libri quinque* (*Five Books of the Histories*), probably begun at Cluny about 1026 and covering the years 900 to 1044, and the chronicle called *Chronicon Aquitanicum et Francicum* or *Historia Francorum* of Adémar of Chabannes, a monk of Saint-Martial in Limoges, which stops in 1028.

Some of the emerging territorial principalities, most notably Normandy and Anjou, began to develop important traditions of historical writing, in which the military affairs of their dukes or counts feature prominently. Dudo of Saint-Quentin's *History of the Normans* covers the wars of the early Norman dukes up to the death of Richard I in 996, but much of Dudo's work, written between 1015 and 1030, is legendary and must be used with caution. More valuable is its revision and continuation from 996, the *Deeds of the Norman Dukes*, originally completed by William, a monk of Jumièges, around 1070, then interpolated and extended by Orderic Vitalis and Robert of Torigni to the death of Henry I of England in 1135. William of Poitiers's *Deeds of Duke William*, completed about 1077, is a fulsome encomium of William II of Normandy (William the Conqueror) by one of his chaplains, who had formerly been a knight. His work is of primary importance not only as the principal narrative for the Norman conquest of England, but also for its descriptions of warfare on the frontiers of Normandy, as well as for William's conflicts with the French kings Henry I and Philip I and with Geoffrey Martel, Count of Anjou.

A highly significant visual depiction of mid-eleventh-century warfare is provided by the Bayeux Tapestry, the great embroidery probably commissioned by Odo of Bayeux, William the Conqueror's half brother, in the 1070s. This rare survival furnishes precious details, among much else, of contemporary castles, arms and armor, horses, and ships. The warrior ethos of the aristocratic elite is depicted still more vividly in the vernacular chanson de geste, *The Song of Roland*, the earliest written text of which dates to about 1100.

For Anjou, the important but all too brief chronicle of Count Fulk le Réchin (d. 1109), written about 1096, affords a rare glimpse of a count's own reflections on the martial feats of his ancestors. But for the wars of the counts of Anjou, and particularly those of Fulk Nerra (d. 1040), the most important source, although containing much legendary material, is the *Gesta consulum Andegavorum*, compiled at various stages during the first half of the twelfth century. Also of value are two related texts, the *Gesta Ambaziensium dominorum* (*Deeds of the Lords of Amboise*, c. 1155) and John of Marmoutier's *History of Geoffrey, Duke of the Normans and Count of the Angevins*, written in the 1170s for Geoffrey's son, Henry II of England. The warfare in Flanders resulting from the murder of its count Charles the Good in 1127 is vividly captured in the *Murder of Charles the Good*, by Galbert of Bruges.

The outstanding source for warfare in northern France from the mid-eleventh century to the 1140s is Orderic Vitalis's great *Ecclesiastical History*. Orderic (1075–c. 1142), of mixed Norman and English parentage, wrote at the monastery of Saint-Évroult on the southern border of Normandy, and his detailed history of the duchy and the wars not only of its kingdukes and their princely neighbors but also of the local aristocracy, with whom he had close connections, provides an unmatched account of the nature of fighting, siege, castle-based warfare, and chivalric conventions. Beyond the important material afforded by Orderic, the kings of France themselves are poorly served by the chroniclers until Suger's *Life of Louis VI*, written in the 1140s by the abbot of Saint-Denis, who had been Louis VI's leading counselor. This work vividly details the king's numerous campaigns, particularly against the turbulent castellans of the Île-de-France such as Hugh of Le Puiset and

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Thomas of Marle. The impact of such localized and castle-dominated warfare on local society is also reflected in the autobiographical writings of Guibert of Nogent, composed around 1115.

Reign of Louis VII. For the domestic military affairs of Louis VII (r. 1137–1180), little compares with the account written by Odo of Deuil, Suger's successor as abbot, of the king's actions during the Second Crusade; the *Historia gloriosi regis Ludovici*, although written in part by Suger, survives only in fragmentary form. The principal narrative source for warfare between Louis VII and his vassals, particularly Henry Plantagenet, from the 1150s to the 1160s is the pro-Angevin *Chronicle* of Robert of Torigni, a monk of Bec and abbot of Mont-Saint-Michel, whose annals, although often brief, are a contemporary record from 1147 to 1186.

In 1170, Roger of Hoveden, a clerk and diplomat in the service first of Henry II, then of Richard I, began his far more detailed *Deeds of Henry II*; he took this up to 1192 before revising and expanding it into a new work, the *Chronica*, which he continued to 1201. A principal source for the continental wars of Henry and Richard, as well as for Richard's crusade (in which the author participated until August 1191), Hoveden inserted much valuable record material, such as lists of prisoners taken in the "great war" of 1173–1174 and royal newsletters concerning key campaigns or engagements, such as Richard's victory at Courcelles-lès-Gisors over Philip II Augustus in 1198. Less extensive, but still valuable, are the *Images of History* of Ralph of Diceto, dean of Saint Paul's (published in his *Opera*), and the chronicle of Gervase of Canterbury. The *History of English Affairs* of William of Newburgh, completed about 1196, is based in large part on Hoveden's work but has a significant amount of original information relating to the war of 1173–1174. Chronicles written beyond the Anglo-Norman realm are much scantier, but the chronicle of Geoffrey, prior of Vigeois (*RHF*, vol. 18), is particularly notable for its coverage of the war of 1183 in the Midi, the depredations of the hated Brabançon mercenaries, and the peace movement of the Capuciati against them.

The survival from 1155 onward of an almost complete series of English royal Exchequer accounts, known as the pipe rolls—for which the French kings had no equivalent until the 1190s—furnishes much information relating to the raising of troops (including Welsh soldiers shipped to fight in France) and the building, repair, and garrisoning of royal castles. Regrettably, the accounts for the Chamber, the royal department that itinerated with the king and carried out much financial business on campaign, have not survived (see *The Great Rolls of the Pipe*). The equivalent records for Normandy, the Norman pipe rolls, are extant in whole or part for only a few years—1180, 1184, 1195, 1198, and 1201–1203—but nonetheless they reveal much about the size and payment of forces, as well as expenditure on fortifications and munitions, during a time of increasing conflict between the Angevins and Capetians (see *Magni rotuli Scaccarii Normanniae* and *Pipe Rolls of the Exchequer of Normandy*). The fast-expanding Angevin bureaucracy also produced a number of inquests relating to knight service and the holding of fiefs, notably that in England in 1166 and that in Normandy in 1172, which are of fundamental importance (see *The Red Book of the Exchequer*). A related survey, the *Feoda Campanie* of 1172 undertaken by Count Henry of Champagne, provides an invaluable picture of the feudal geography of a territorial principality (see Auguste Longnon, ed., *Documents relatifs au comté de Champagne*), and there is much relating to fiefs, military service, and castle service in *Feudal Society in Medieval France*, edited and translated by Theodore Evergates.

The dry record of clerks and the often laconic notices of campaigns in the Latin chronicles can be augmented by a number of vernacular texts that more closely approach the concerns and chivalric attitudes of the warrior nobility. A vivid account of the war of 1173–1174 (which was fought both in France and in Britain), written soon after its close and addressed to Henry II in person, is given by Jordan Fantosme, a clerk of uncertain identity who was an eyewitness to the war in northern England. His account provides unique information on the Franco-Scottish alliance between William the Lion

and Louis VII. The poems of the troubadour Bertran de Born, a minor nobleman from the Périgord, capture something of the martial spirit of the aristocracy of southern France, and also provide a key source for the war between Henry the Young King and his younger brother Richard in 1183. Most valuable of all is the *History of William Marshal*, a long Anglo-French poem celebrating the remarkable career of William Marshal (d. 1219), who through military service to the Angevin kings rose from being a landless younger son to becoming regent of England in 1216 on the death of King John. Written in the 1220s and drawing on both Marshal's own recollections and also those of his squire John d'Earley, the poem furnishes an unmatched account of the nature of the tournament, warfare, and chivalry. It is particularly important for its depiction of Plantagenet-Capetian warfare, including the invasion of England by Prince Louis in 1216–1217 and the French defeats at Lincoln and off Sandwich.

Reign of Philip II. The reign of Philip II Augustus (r. 1179–1223) marks a qualitative as well as quantitative transformation in the sources relating to and emanating from the Capetian monarchy. For the first time the composition of garrisons and field forces, as well as expenditure on fortress building and armaments, can be studied in detail through royal fiscal records (see *Le premier budget de la monarchie française*, *Le premier registre de Philippe-Auguste*, and *Les registres de Philippe Auguste*). These royal records—including such texts as the *Prisa servientum* of 1194–1195, which records the number of sergeants and wagons that all towns and abbeys in the royal domain were obliged to furnish the king in war—are discussed in detail in Edouard Audouin's *Essai sur l'armée royale* and John W. Baldwin's *Government of Philip Augustus*.

Such records are complemented by what are effectively official histories produced for the king. Rigord, a monk at Saint-Denis, originally completed his *Gesta Philippi Augusti* in 1196 but later extended it to 1206. His *Gesta* was continued up to 1214 by one of Philip's chaplains, William the Breton (Guillaume le Breton), who was an eyewitness to the siege of Château Gaillard and to the battle of Bouvines; although unashamedly partisan, William provides detailed descriptions of these and other key engagements. William also produced another version of the *Gesta Philippi*, taking it up to 1220, and a long Latin epic poem known as the *Philippiad* (or *Philippide* or *Philippidos*), first completed about 1222 and then revised about 1226. All these texts are collected in *Ouevres de Rigord et de Guillaume le Breton*, and William's works have been translated into French in François Guizot's *Collection des mémoires*. Extracts from the *Philippiad* and from other chronicles relating to Bouvines are translated in an appendix in Georges Duby's *Legend of Bouvines*. Two important vernacular chronicles providing a Flemish perspective on the bitter struggle between the Plantagenets and Capetians in the early thirteenth century were produced by the Anonymous of Béthune, an author writing for Robert VII, Lord of Béthune: the *Chronique des rois de France*, written between 1220 and 1223 (see Delisle, Léopold, ed., *Extrait d'une chronique française des rois de France*), and the *Histoire des ducs de Normandie*, particularly valuable for its account of the invasion of England by Prince Louis (later Louis VIII), because Robert VII himself was serving in King John's army with many Flemish knights. Both texts are analyzed in detail in Gabrielle M. Spiegel's *Romancing the Past*.

Among other chronicles relevant to Philip II's warfare are the *Chronica* of Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, continuing to 1241; Gilbert (Gislebert) of Mons's *Chronicon Hanoniense* (*Chronicle of Hainaut*); Robert of Auxerre's *Chronicle*; and Philippe Mouskes's *Chronique rimée*. The bitter wars between the northern French crusaders and their opponents in the Languedoc are chronicled by a number of sources, notably Peter of Vaux-de-Cernay's *Historia Albigensis* (*History of the Albigensian Crusade*), written before 1218 by a Cistercian who knew and supported Simon de Montfort; his account is particularly detailed from 1203 to 1208. The *Chanson de la Croisade albigeoise*, a Provençal poem covering the campaigns from 1208 to 1218, is particularly valuable in that its first part, written by William of Tudela, is partisan of the crusaders, whereas its anonymous continuator had more sympathy for the southern nobles resisting the

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crusaders' attack. Much relating to French military practice in the early thirteenth century is revealed by two eyewitness accounts of the Fourth Crusade, both written in the vernacular and revealing the attitudes of the knights themselves: that of Robert of Clari, a knight from Picardy, and that of Geoffroi de Villehardouin, a noble from Champagne.

Philip's conquest of Normandy and the Angevins' subsequent attempts to regain their lost continental lands are seen from the Angevin perspective in Ralph of Coggeshall's *Chronicon Anglicanum*, written in stages up to 1224. Roger of Wendover's *Flores historiarum* provides contemporary annals from 1216 to 1235. Henry III's warfare against Louis IX (Saint Louis; r. 1226–1270), notably the failed expedition to Poitou in 1242, is described by Matthew Paris, Roger's continuator and fellow monk at Saint Albans, who developed his great *Chronica majora* from 1235 to 1259. But no source approaches the spirit of the French warrior aristocracy under Louis more closely than Jean de Joinville in his *Life of Saint Louis*, a highly personal account of the king, with whom Joinville was captured at Mansourah in 1250.

Later Sources. Soon after Louis's death in 1270, a number of existing Latin chronicles were collated at Saint-Denis and translated into the vernacular to produce a quasi-official dynastic history, the *Grandes chroniques de France*, which was continued until 1461, providing a narrative of military and political events as seen from the French court. One of its compilers, William of Nangis (Guillaume de Nangis), also produced a chronicle up to 1300, used by Joinville, that was subsequently continued up to 1368. The extensive range of both French and Flemish chronicle sources relating to the Flemish wars of Philip IV, "the Fair" (r. 1285–1314), and in particular to the battle of Courtrai (1302), are critically discussed by Frantz Funck-Brentano in *Mémoire sur la bataille de Courtrai* and by J. F. Verbruggen in *The Battle of the Golden Spurs*.

As in the reigns of Philip Augustus and Louis IX, extensive royal accounts provide much detail concerning the composition and organization of French armies under Philip the Fair and the last Capetian kings: see, for example, Robert Mignon's *Inventaire d'anciens comptes royaux*, the *Comptes royaux (1285–1314)*, the *Comptes royaux (1314–1328)*, *Les journaux du trésor de Philippe IV le Bel*, and *Les journaux du trésor de Charles IV le Bel*. A number of important edicts relating to military service are edited in *Ordonnances des roys de France de la troisième race*.

The ubiquitous castles and town defenses that proliferate in almost every region of France afford another source of enormous importance, not only for the development of military architecture and of seigneurial residences, but also for the study of the wider impact of war on society and the landscape. Among a large literature, an excellent study is provided by Jean Mesqui, and the essential gazetteer that of Charles-Laurent Salch.

[*See also* Bayeux Tapestry; Britain, *subentries on* Sources (1000–1300) *and* Narrative (1000–1300); Galbert of Bruges; Gilbert of Mons; Joinville, Jean de; *and* Villehardouin, Geoffroi de.]

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Matthew Strickland

Sources (1328–1483)

The period 1328–1483, which begins with the accession of Philip VI as the first king of the Valois line and ends with the death of Louis XI, is characterized by two major conflicts. The Hundred Years' War, which began in 1337, was triggered by English counterclaims to Philip's accession. Its fifteenth-century phase, which ended with the English being booted out of Gascony in 1453, overlapped with the second major conflict, the internal conflict between the Armagnacs and the dukes of Burgundy, who from the late fourteenth century represented a collateral line of the French crown. This second conflict ended with the defeat of Charles the Bold, Duke of Burgundy, at the battle of Nancy in January 1477.

Narrative Accounts. The works of Jean Froissart and his Burgundian emulators—especially Enguerran de Monstrelet, Jean Le Fèvre, Jean de Waurin, and Georges de Chastellain, which cover much of the fifteenth century—loom large among narrative accounts. There is no lack of other valuable narratives, not least those that are associated with the abbey of Saint-Denis and have some claim to being an official royal chronicle. These include the *Grandes chroniques*, relevant for the fourteenth century, and the chronicle of the *religieux* (monk) of Saint-Denis, which provides useful material on the Armagnac-Burgundian civil war of the reign of Charles VI (r. 1380–1422) and on the invasions of Henry V of England.

Local chronicles, too, have their value, such as the various renditions of the *Chronique de Normandie* (or *Chronique Normande*) and the *Chronique de Mont-Saint-Michel*, not least because the monastery at Mont-Saint-Michel was the only location in Normandy that the English failed to take in the fifteenth century. Also valuable for the fourteenth-century wars, although not composed until the 1380s to 1390s, is the *Chronique des quatre premiers Valois*, whose author was probably a member of the clergy based in Rouen. The chronicle of Jean de Venette, head of the Carmelite order in France, is valuable for its account of the 1346 Crécy campaign, although it was not written until 1359–1360; it offers important glimpses of the impact of the war on the peasantry. The *Journal d'un bourgeois de Paris* (translated into English as *A Parisian Journal, 1405–1449*) is also useful for its view of the impact of the fifteenth-century phases of the war on France's capital—with constant moans on price levels and shortages, for example—and it also shows how the civil war between Armagnacs and Burgundians was linked to the Anglo-French conflict.

All these narratives are replete with military detail, although caution must sometimes be used with the figures given for the size of armies. In some cases, most notably that of Monstrelet, the chronicles contain verbatim copies of royal orders issued in wartime. The chronicles also provide insights into contemporary views, including interpretations of and responses to defeat. But they might also be composed as a result of success. In this context there is a particularly interesting group of narratives occasioned by the French reconquest of Normandy in 1449–1450. Auguste Molinier's *Les sources de l'histoire de France* remains the best guide to these narrative sources. Anne Curry's collection of texts on Agincourt reveals how the variety of interpretations of one event depends on the perspective of the chronicler. Some literary sources are also significant. Notable here are Jean Cuvelier's poem on Bertrand du Guesclin and Chandos Herald's on Edward the Black Prince. The records of the trial of nullification (or rehabilitation) of Joan of Arc are also important for the reminiscences they include of her companions in arms and of those in the relieved city of Orléans.

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In addition, historians are able to draw on several important treatises on military conduct written in France at the time. These include two texts written by men who themselves served as soldiers. Geoffroi de Charny, the bearer of the oriflamme at the battle of Poitiers (1356), where he was killed, was the author of three texts: *Demandes pour la joute, les tournois, et la guerre*, the *Livre Charny*, and the *Livre de chevalerie*. Dating to just over a century later is *Le jouvencel*, which is partly an autobiographical account of the campaigns of its author, Jean de Bueil (d. 1477), whose career began at the battle of Verneuil (1424) and ended in the War of the Public Weal (1465), and partly a didactic text on the conduct of war. In the interim, Honoré de Bonet (or Bouvet) developed the ideas of Jean de Legnano in his *L'arbre des batailles* (1386–1387), a work that was dedicated to Charles VI and that influenced Christine de Pizan's *Livre des faits d'armes et de chevalerie* (1410). Both Bonet and Pizan drew heavily on Vegetius's *De re militari* but added contemporary observations. The developing use of guns, for instance, is witnessed by Christine's observation that the ancients used "certain machines similar to those we now call *ribaudequins*" (book 1, chapter 23). This passage follows her observations on Charles VI's victory at Roosebeke in 1382 and on the victory of John the Fearless, Duke of Burgundy, over the Liègeois at Othée in 1408; according to Christine, both of these victories were achieved by a relatively small number of "good men-at-arms" against much larger forces (forty thousand and twenty-five thousand, respectively).

Administrative Sources. Such writings, along with the chronicles, provide vivid insights into warfare in a period that was marked as much with French failure as with French success. In addition a large range of administrative sources can be used to learn not only about the French crown itself but also about its princely and ducal regimes. Because throughout this period armies received pay—indeed, it was the need to provide defense of the realm that gave the French king the right to levy taxation—the financial records of royal and other administrations, emanating from the royal and princely *chambres des comptes* (chambers of accounts), are exceptionally valuable.

For the French crown, many of the archives of the *chambre des comptes* at Paris survive, but there are lacunae caused by the vicissitudes of later centuries, not least a fire in the *chambre* in 1757, the removal of documents by antiquarians, and the impact of the French Revolution. As a result the archives are now dispersed among several repositories, and very little is in print. Most of the survivals of the *chambre* archive are to be found in the manuscript section of the Bibliothèque Nationale (BN) and in the Archives Nationales in Paris. Even there, however, the materials have for the most part lost their original integrity. Nonetheless, useful materials survive for the historian, including orders to assemble troops, appointments to command positions, and receipts (*quittances*) for military wages. A series of *montres* within the *manuscrits français* and the *nouvelles acquisitions françaises* collections at the BN—files containing muster rolls of troops—exists in relatively large quantities from the 1370s onward; some of these are transcribed in Michael Jones's work on Du Guesclin and in Christopher Allmand's *Society at War*. Musters are also to be found within other collections of original documents and copies: the roll of the Count of Eu's retinue at Harfleur and Caen in 1346, for example, is BN De Camps vol. 83, f. 472. At the Archives Nationales, documents of different types, including musters, are in Serie K (*Monuments historiques: cartons des rois*). Reference must also be made to Serie JJ (*Trésor des chartes*, from the royal *chancellerie*): this series contains a variety of materials, including pardons, which often contain much circumstantial detail on military activity. For the early fourteenth century these registers are in print.

The range of sources available for the study of the French royal armies of the period is well evidenced in the bibliography of Philippe Contamine's *Guerre, état et société*. The optimum is where full account books of the treasurers of war survive, as is the case for the period between November 1339 and October 1340 (BN *nouvelles acquisitions françaises* 9238, 9239, and 9240). These show the distribution of 28,000 men-at-arms and 16,700 footmen, of whom a quarter

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were crossbowmen, in various locations against the English and their allies. Charles VII's reforms of the mid-fifteenth century, which created the Compagnies d'Ordonnance and the *francs-archers*, can be studied through surviving account books also in the BN, as well as in random survivals of muster rolls that are scattered among archive repositories in France. For instance, the account of Antoine Raguier, treasurer of war in 1461, shows a total of 1,729 lances (by then units of five men), commanded by thirty-four captains (BN *manuscrit français* 20692). Furthermore, because the English took over French administrative systems in their fifteenth-century conquests, their occupation of Normandy and other parts of northern France can be studied through the surviving archives of the *chambre des comptes*. For the siege of Orléans of 1428–1429, for instance, the English army can be reconstructed through the account book of Pierre Surreau, receiver general of Normandy (BN *manuscrit français* 4488), which was published by Louis Jarry in 1892.

Financial records for the dukes of Burgundy are particularly extensive and underpin all studies of the ducal armies. These are to be found in the Archives Départementales de la Côte-d'Or at Dijon, with some materials in the Archives Départementales du Nord at Lille. They cover the ducal armies of the earlier fourteenth century, as well as those of the royal duchy from the late 1360s. For instance, there are contracts entered into by Duke Eudes IV in 1337 for the service of knights from other areas of France against his rebellious nobility. Three knights from Beaujolais promised to serve for one year with one hundred men-at-arms in return for twenty-seven hundred livres, the promise of compensation for lost horses, and other benefits (Archives Départementales de la Côte-d'Or B11 721). The records at Dijon are particularly rich as sources for the study of artillery, as revealed in the edition of Joseph Garnier and in the later work of Robert Smith and Kelly DeVries. The archives of the duchy of Brittany are also particularly rich and allow study of the ducal armies, castles, weapons, and so on.

Also useful are the printed volumes of the *Ordonnances des rois de France*, which collect together royal orders of various kinds, including the *semonce des nobles*, which called to arms both the nobility and "those accustomed to follow war"—that is, men who were exempted from taxation because they were liable to provide service—and also the arrière-ban. Although the arrière-ban technically called the entire population between the ages of sixteen and sixty-five to arms, it was often used as a means of forcing towns and villages to provide money for a specified number of men. The *Ordonnances* also include royal orders to put fortifications into defensive state. On 14 May 1358, for instance, the dauphin (later Charles V), acting as regent for his father, who had been captured at Poitiers, ordered that all regional commanders inspect the fortifications and put them into good condition at the expense of the lords to whom they belonged (*Ordonnances*, vol. 3, p. 224). If this could not be achieved, then the fortifications were to be demolished. As king, Charles V ordered several such inspections, and in some cases the results of the visitations survive within the various Bibliothèque Nationale manuscript collections. Repairs of fortifications are also well evidenced in these collections.

Local Records. Other sources that are particularly useful for the military history of later medieval France are the administrative and financial records of the *bonnes villes*, the leading towns and cities of the realm, many of which survive today in the Archives Municipales, Communales, and Départementales throughout France. The major towns had substantial defensive responsibilities, often seeking the right to levy local purchase taxes (*quatrièmes*) for the building and repair of fortifications. Take, for example, the first surviving register of deliberations at Reims, that from 1422–1436, published by Sylvette Guilbert. These deliberations are full of references to the provision of gunpowder artillery, to the watch that citizens were obliged to pay at night, and to methods used when necessary to reinforce defenses. On 22 June 1425, for instance, not only were troops levied within the town, but also a decision was made "to write to several villages to send archers." This is not surprising, given that inhabitants of a *châtellenie* (castellany) had an obligation

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to provide troops for defense of their chief town or castle. At the next meeting, on 18 July, there was discussion of the chains customarily placed across streets for their defense, as well as complaints of the behavior of English and Burgundian troops in the neighborhood.

Town records also show ample evidence of troops provided for royal and princely armies. The records of Reims in 1355, for instance, show the inhabitants providing thirty mounted men for the king's host. For some towns, such as Lisieux, there are good runs of account books that provide detail on the construction of fortifications. The deliberations of the town council of Mantes show how the townspeople preferred to surrender to Charles VII in 1449 to avoid bombardment of their town. Records kept by a notary at Orléans between 1434 and 1438, now in the Archives Départementales du Loiret in the city, reveal the names of those in the city making armor, as well as reveal information on their clients, the pieces of equipment that they purchased, and the cost.

Assessment. All in all there is a vast quantity of source material for the military history of later medieval France. Much of it remains in manuscript, however, with little by way of effective finding aids. By the early twenty-first century there still had been only limited use of Internet catalogs for the major archival collections. Any study requires the piecing together of materials found in a wide range of archive repositories.

Also valuable are the various printed antiquarian collections, such as Urbain Plancher's work on Burgundy and Hyacinthe Morice's collection of *Preuves* for Brittany, both from the mid-eighteenth century. An excellent example is the collection of documents concerning Du Guesclin that has been assembled by Michael Jones from sources in forty-six different repositories in France, Belgium, England, Italy, and Spain, as well as from printed antiquarian works, which often include manuscripts that are now lost. The work of Philippe Contamine also reveals how much can be gleaned from the archival collections.

[*See also* Christine de Pizan; Geoffroi de Charny; *and* Jean de Bueil.]

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Anne Curry

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Narrative (900–1328)

The nature of warfare in France between the tenth and the early fourteenth century was shaped by a fundamental transformation in the structures of power, whereby highly fragmented and decentralized lordship gradually gave way to the increasing control of the Capetian kings. Long before the replacement of Louis V, the last Carolingian king of West Francia, by Hugh Capet in 987, royal authority and the military forces at the ruler's disposal had shrunk to but a pale shadow of that witnessed under Charlemagne and his immediate successors. During the tenth, the eleventh, and much of the twelfth century, the kings of France remained little more than *primi inter pares* (firsts among peers), set apart only by the sacral quality of their kingship from a number



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of territorial princes who, though technically their vassals, were frequently as powerful as the kings, if not more so. Yet by the death of Philip the Fair in 1314, the king of France exercised greatly increased control over much of France.

Warfare in Tenth-Century Francia. During the first half of the tenth century, the menace of Viking armies, which had brought such destruction to Francia in the ninth century, was still present. Their fortifications on the Seine were powerful enough to deter an attack by King Rudolf of Burgundy's forces in 925, though Viking groups were defeated by Frankish rulers in 930, 936, and 943. External raids gradually diminished, but King Charles the Simple's settlement in 911 of a group of Norsemen under their leader Rollo to act as a buffer against other Viking aggressors had the unintended result of creating the foundations of the duchy of Normandy, which by the early eleventh century had become one of the most powerful of the emerging territorial principalities. Norman aristocrats proudly recalled their Viking ancestry, and the duchy's chroniclers eagerly propagated the myth of the Normans as a race set apart by its superior prowess and peculiar genius for war and conquest. Yet by the reign of Duke William II (1035–1087), Scandinavian influence in Norman warfare is hard to detect; in 1066, Duke William even had to construct a fleet from scratch, and many ships for his invasion force were hired from Flanders. In reality, the Normans had assimilated into Frankish society, and their methods of war, including the use of heavy cavalry and castles, differed little if at all from those of their equally aggressive neighbors such as the Angevins, the Flemings, and the Capetians.

The nature of this warfare resulted from political fragmentation. From the 880s, former Carolingian regional deputies established themselves as effectively independent hereditary rulers of emerging principalities such as Flanders, Burgundy, and Aquitaine. Between about 940 and about 970, the near-constant warfare between the Carolingians and the emerging Robertian dynasty, founded by Robert the Strong (d. 866), allowed counts to become near-autonomous lords of units of local government known as *pagi*, as occurred in Anjou, the Auxerrois, Maçonnais, and the Nivernais, thereby multiplying conflict while generally reducing the scale of military operations. Whereas in 900, France south of the Loire had been controlled by some twelve great families, by 975 power had been divided between 150 local comital and vicecomital dynasties. The warfare in western Francia as recorded by the two principal chroniclers of the period, Flodoard (894–966) and Richer (c. 940–998), was dominated by raids, ravaging of opponents' lands, and sieges, particularly of major towns such as Laon, Châlons, Verdun, and Melun. Their heightened strategic as well and political and economic importance was reflected in improved defenses, which often combined town walls and a powerful citadel (*arx*), such as that built before 931 at Laon by Herbert II of Vermandois. This stone structure was perhaps the high tower, capable of holding five hundred defenders and surrounded by deep ditches, mentioned by Richer in 986. Some towns might contain separate fortified enclosures or suburbs, such as the Enclosure of the Merchants at Verdun. Richer's accounts of the sieges of such strongholds indicate that the majority of siege machines and methods used in later periods were already known, including mangonels and ballistae, wheeled rams and large belfries, and sapping. Though town defenses might fall to assault, the strength of the inner citadels often defeated direct attack, as at Nantes in 992, and many sieges involved lengthy blockades, with besiegers employing circumvallation and fortified siege camps.

Though chroniclers' use of classical terms such as *legiones* invites caution, it is possible that units of about one thousand men were important as subdivisions of larger armies. Richer states the army raised by Hugh Capet against Charles of Lorraine in 990 numbered six thousand men. In the same year he noted that Fulk Nerra, Count of Anjou (972–1040), regarded his force of four thousand sufficient to ravage the lands of his enemy Odo I of Blois, but not to confront him in battle. Mounted warriors, such as the "royal cavalry" mentioned by Richer, appear to have retained an important role in field engagements. At Conquereuil in 992, for example, Duke Conan I

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of Rennes defeated the initial charge of the horsemen of Fulk Nerra by digging concealed pits, flooded with water. Nevertheless, it would be mistaken to overstress the dominance of cavalry in tenth- or eleventh-century Frankish warfare. As throughout the medieval period, well-equipped members of the military elite were a flexible force, equally valuable in attacking or defending fortifications on foot as in fighting from the saddle. When Arnulf, the king of the East Franks, attacked the Viking camp on the river Dyle in 871, he dismounted most of his men for the assault, while keeping a reserve of cavalry to guard his rear.

Equally, it is likely that infantry continued to play a significant role in both siege and battle. Richer refers to "*equites et pedites*" (horsemen and footmen) and notes how at Laon in 988, Hugh Capet's knights were routed by a surprise sally of the garrison's *pedites* with the mounted *milites* (knights) following in support. At the battle of Pontlevoy in 1016, Fulk Nerra's final victory resulted in the massacre of many *pedites* in the army of Odo II of Blois, and an Angevin force sent to blockade Tours in 1044 was said to comprise two hundred *milites* and fifteen hundred *pedites*. The tenth century saw some of the earliest references to crossbowmen, such as those who defended Senlis in 949, and the Normans were able to employ this arm to great effect at Hastings. Though the great army of William II, soon known as William the Conqueror, that gathered for the invasion of England in 1066 was exceptional in its size, the importance he attached to his infantry arm may well have been more representative of forces in eleventh-century France. At Hastings, he drew up each of the three divisions into three lines, with archers, crossbowmen and slingers in the first, heavy infantry in the second, and cavalry in the third.

The later tenth century saw the rising importance of seigneurial fortifications, which contemporaries increasingly labeled as *castella* (castles). Prohibited in vain as early as 863 by Charles the Bald's edict of Pîtres, unauthorized fortifications of local lords continued to spring up, as much in response to growing internecine warfare among the Franks as to external raids by Vikings and Magyars. At Doué-la-Fontaine in Anjou, regarded as the earliest extant stone castle, a late Carolingian hall had been converted into a stronghold around 950 by Odo, Count of Blois-Chartres, by blocking the ground floor entrances. Such a structure was perhaps little different from the *casa firmissima* of Egfried recorded by the *Annals of Saint-Bertin* as being burned in 868. Stone hall-keeps, however, like those raised by Fulk Nerra from the 990s at Langeais, Loches, Montrichard, and Montbazon could only be constructed by the wealthiest lords, and elsewhere lesser castellans constructed fortifications on naturally defensible sites like crags, promontories, or islands, or threw up effective defenses of earth and timber. By the eleventh century, the large mound (*motta*), topped with a strong palisade and tower and surrounded by a ditch and having one or more dependent enclosures or baileys, was becoming increasingly common, though simple enclosures or ringworks were also widespread and often formed the primary stage in a fortified site's development, with a large mound (*motta*) or stone tower perhaps added later.

The proliferation of such fortifications in the decades spanning 1000 reflected and contributed to further political fragmentation, as counts themselves lost much control within each *pagus* (roughly, "county") over local castellans, who appropriated to themselves rights of justice, taxation, and military service known collectively as the *ban*. To defend or extend these powers against the ambitions of neighboring lords, to enforce their rights upon the hapless local populace, and to guard their fortifications, castellans retained retinues of *milites*, heavily armed, professional cavalrymen. Receiving their expensive arms and warhorses from their lord, living in the hall of his castle, and forming the core of his military household (*familia*), many such retainers were drawn from humble stock, while the castellan's kinsmen or more-favored vassals might receive a grant of land (*beneficium*, *feodum*) in return for military service. During the eleventh century, the status of these *milites* gradually rose: great lords themselves came to adopt the title *miles* to denote their martial function, and a collective sense of a "knightly order" was reinforced through increasingly

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self-conscious rituals such as dubbing. Lords and their knights shared a developing chivalric ethos, which by the later eleventh century at the latest had found expression in conventions restraining the conduct of war, by which—at least in theory—vanquished opponents of rank were spared for ransom, prisoners might expect honorable treatment, and sieges might be brought to a bloodless conclusion by negotiated surrender.

Such restraints, however, were usually restricted in their operation to members of the warrior elite. The absence of a strong central authority capable of suppressing aristocratic violence ensured that small-scale warfare between lords remained endemic, and it was the hapless peasantry, the *inermes*, who bore the brunt of the depredations, extortions, and forced labor on fortifications that these petty struggles endlessly engendered. Nor were the persons or property of the church safe; churches were plundered, clerics robbed, and monastic lands subject to widespread expropriation. An ecclesiastical reaction to these excesses led to a series of councils in Aquitaine and Burgundy, beginning at Le Puy in 975, promulgating the Peace of God, and its subsequent development, the Truce of God.

By the early eleventh century, some rulers, notably in Anjou, Normandy, and Flanders, gradually succeeded in regaining more control over local lords. Castles, whose proliferation had been a primary factor in the collapse of centralized power, now became a crucial mechanism in its reestablishment. Thus Fulk Nerra of Anjou steadily expanded his power by the systematic construction of more than one hundred fortified sites, with key castles placed within twenty miles (a day's march) from each other. In Normandy, contemporaries saw Duke William II's destruction of "adulterine" castles following his victory at Val-ès-Dunes in 1047 over a powerful rebel coalition as the beginning of his effective rule, during which he proceeded to prohibit the construction of unauthorized fortifications, and enforced the right to take his subjects' castles into ducal hands in time of necessity. So effective was this policy that many lords reacted to news of his death in 1087 by immediately expelling ducal troops from their castles.

Warfare under the Early Capetian Kings. Such reestablishment of power varied in its intensity and chronology in the various regions of France. In the Île-de-France itself, reduction of powerful independent castellans still occupied much of the military efforts of King Philip I (r. 1060–1108) and Louis VI (r. 1108–1137). Despite razing the predatory castellan Thomas of Marle's castles of Crécy and Nouvion and compelling his submission in 1114, Louis VI was again forced to campaign against him in 1130. The king likewise had to besiege Puiset in 1111 and again in 1118 to assert control over its lord. The military power of these Capetian rulers was paradoxical. On the one hand, they struggled to exert authority over dissident nobles within their own immediate areas of lordship, and they might be defeated by neighboring territorial princes. Thus Henry I (r. 1031–1060), alarmed by the rising power of Normandy, launched attacks against Duke William II that met with bloody defeats at the battles of Mortemer (1054) and Varaville (1058), while Louis VI was vanquished at Le Puiset and Toury in 1112 by an alliance of rebel vassals. Louis VI's biographer, Abbot Suger of Saint-Denis, provides a graphic description of how, covered by archers and crossbowmen, the king had dismounted his knights and advanced on foot against the enemy forces attempting to rebuild the castle of Le Puiset. Their initial attack was successful, but in their overconfidence their ranks became disordered, and they were routed, despite the king's efforts to rally them, by a surprise counterattack by mounted knights.

On the other hand, the Capetian kings were capable of leading expeditions further afield, such as those Louis mounted to Berry, Burgundy, Auvergne, and Ponthieu in 1098. Moreover, the residual authority of the kings of France allowed them on occasion to assemble very considerable armies, particularly at times of invasion or national emergency. Probably the greatest host was that summoned in 1124 to Reims to meet the threat of an invasion by the German emperor Henry V. As described by Suger, one section of the army comprised three main units, the first made up of knights and foot soldiers from Reims and Châlons, the second of the men of Laon

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and Soissons, and the third of contingents from Orléans, Etampes, Paris, and the abbey of Saint-Denis. To this was added the forces of the counts Theobald of Champagne and Hugh of Troyes, while the vanguard was formed by a division under the Duke of Burgundy and the Count of Nevers. Ralph, Count of Vermandois, commanded the right wing, leading the men of Ponthieu, Amiens, and Beauvais, and the Count of Flanders formed the rearguard. Careful provision was made for a plentiful supply of water and wine to be transported by carts; once at the site of a possible engagement, the wagons were to be "circled like the defenses of a castle," and the wounded brought within this *laager* (or defensive wagon encampment) for treatment. Faced with this great army, the emperor withdrew without an engagement, and Abbot Suger naturally attributed this "grand and prestigious victory" to the merits of his abbey's saint, the patron of France. King Louis had placed himself among the abbey's contingent, bearing the sacred banner of the county of the Vexin that he had brought from the altar of Saint-Denis, upon which the relics of the saint had been placed during the national emergency. Similar rituals came to be an integral part of royal preparations for great expeditions. Thus in 1147 when embarking for the Second Crusade, Louis VII took a sacred banner, possibly already the famous Oriflamme, from the altar of Saint-Denis, as did Philip Augustus in 1190 when setting out on the Third Crusade.

Occasions such as the great muster of 1124 were rare. From his own resources, the king could rely on the knights and sergeants of the royal military household (*familia regis*), who formed a small but permanent and professional core. It was, for example, units of the royal *familia* who quickly counterattacked to prevent Hugh of Le Puiset from rebuilding his castle in 1112. The *familia* could be supplemented by stipendiary knights and by those vassals of the royal domains holding their fiefs directly from the king, as well as the numerous military tenants of the great abbeys and bishoprics. In campaigns such as those of 1111 and 1114 against turbulent castellans, royal forces were bolstered by local militias, raised from the parishes and led by their priests. This echoed earlier peace associations such as that formed by Archbishop Aimon of Bourges in 1038, comprising all men in the diocese over the age of fifteen, led by priests to whom they had sworn an oath to defend the peace; but it also reflected the king's right, shared by the territorial princes like the Duke of Normandy, to summon all free men to serve "for the defense of the kingdom and the prince," and for a general war (*proelium generale*). Many of the infantry for the 1124 campaign must have been raised by just such a summons from local units of administration known as *prévôtés* and from the towns. The Capetian kings fully recognized the growing military potential of the "communes" (sworn urban unions), and granted rights to key towns, particularly in border areas, in return for service. Thus in recognition of their stout defense and service to the crown, Louis VII (r. 1137–1180) granted a commune to the strategically important town of Mantes in the French Vexin.

Nevertheless, for much of the time the Capetian kings were heavily reliant for military aid on the goodwill of their greater vassals. Even when they did serve in the royal host, the great counts and dukes regarded themselves more as allies than subjects, and their feudal obligations for military service might be very limited. Thus Count Robert II of Flanders (r. 1093–1111) provided only twenty knights for royal service, though he had sufficient resources to contract with Henry I of England to supply one thousand Flemish stipendiary knights in 1101. The service of the counts of Anjou, Blois, and Flanders fluctuated with prevailing political circumstances, while the dukes of Normandy—beginning in the 1050s—were among the principal enemies of the Capetians. Duke William's conquest of England, moreover, posed a potentially grave threat to Capetian power by enriching an already powerful dynasty with the military and fiscal resources of a wealthy and administratively sophisticated kingdom. Almost as soon as England was pacified, the Conqueror was employing Anglo-Saxon troops in his continental campaigns; in 1073, English forces took part in the conquest of Maine, where, noted the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* with evident pride, "they destroyed vineyards and burned down cities, and

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damaged the country severely, and made all the country surrender to the king." Money from England allowed William and his sons to field large numbers of stipendiary knights for campaigns in Normandy, Maine, and the Vexin.

Nevertheless, by repeatedly forging coalitions of the enemies of the Anglo-Norman rulers, and by skillfully exploiting rebellion by dissident nobles or aggrieved family members, both Philip I and Louis VI held their own with remarkable success. Thus in 1076, Philip successfully forced William the Conqueror to withdraw with heavy losses from the siege of Dol, held by a rebel Anglo-Breton lord, while in 1079 he furnished William's rebellious son, Robert Curthose, with an elite garrison of French knights at Gerberoi. A surprise sally by the garrison routed King William's besieging force, inflicting upon him the most humiliating defeat of his long military career. Likewise, Philip was quick to exploit the wars among the sons of the Conqueror; in 1094, for example, he assisted Robert Curthose in taking Argentan, capturing seven hundred of Rufus's knights, but allowed himself to be bought off from besieging Rufus himself at Eu. In such warfare, dominated by sieges and brief *chevauchées* into enemy territory, the superiority of defense over attack made rapid territorial conquests in areas thickly strewn with castles very difficult. Rufus was able to reestablish Norman control of Maine, but though he intended the construction of the great castle at Gisors in 1098 as a springboard to annex the Vexin, he was repulsed by the elite French garrison of Chaumont and its dependent castles. Even after Henry I had deposed his elder brother, Duke Robert Curthose, at the battle of Tinchebrai in 1106 and again reunited the kingdom of England with the Norman duchy, Louis VI was able to sustain military pressure. Much of the warfare focused on the key disputed lands between Rouen and Paris, with Louis taking Mantes in 1109, and Meulan in 1110. Here again, it was less Capetian resources than the ability to assemble powerful coalitions from the enemies of the Anglo-Norman kings that counted. In 1109, the French royal army contained the forces of the counts of Blois, Nevers, Flanders, and Burgundy, and many leading clergy. Louis, moreover, was able successfully to foment rebellion, in particular by backing the claims to Normandy of Robert's son, William Clito, and it was with considerable difficulty that Henry I managed to defeat the powerful alliances Louis directed against him in 1118–1119 and 1123–1124. Only when the French king was rash enough to commit his forces to a major battle at Brémule in 1119, in what Suger admitted was "a bold but careless attack," did he suffer a humiliating defeat when an ill-disciplined cavalry charge foundered against the ordered formations of Henry I's dismounted knights. Though the use of dismounted knights, often supported by archers and a powerful cavalry reserve, was characteristic of Anglo-Norman battle tactics, Fulk V of Anjou similarly employed mixed units of dismounted knights and missilemen in his defeat of Henry I's forces at Alençon in 1118, with the battle finally decided (as at Tinchebrai) by a cavalry charge.

In the Shadow of the Plantagenet: the Wars of Louis VII and Henry II. Capetian power under Louis VII was still more threatened by the rising power of Anjou. Succeeding in 1151 to both the county of Anjou and the duchy of Normandy, conquered by his father, Geoffrey le Bel, Henry Plantagenet profited from Louis's divorce of Eleanor of Aquitaine to marry her and add this wealthy region of southern France to his domains. Despite his efforts to support King Stephen's son Eustace against Henry in Normandy, Louis was unable to prevent his Angevin vassal from becoming king of England in 1154. The French king, who had shown considerable personal courage but poor strategic judgment during the disastrous Second Crusade, did succeed in thwarting Henry II's attempt to conquer the city and county of Toulouse in 1159, when his sudden entry into the besieged city in support of his brother-in-law, Count Raymond V, exploited Henry's reluctance directly to attack the person of his Capetian overlord. Yet Louis, lacked both the military ability and the resources seriously to undermine the hegemony of his powerful vassal; as he once remarked to Henry's courtier Walter Map, while the king of England was rich in men, horses, money, and luxuries, "We in France have nothing but bread

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and wine and gaiety." Nevertheless, the resources poured by Henry into the building, refurbishment, and garrisoning of castles along his frontiers, particularly in the Norman Vexin and in Berry, indicate that he did not underestimate the potential harm Louis could inflict during the sporadic outbreaks of war that punctuated the two kings' uneasy relations.

As with his father, Louis VII relied for any effective aggression on a coalition of powerful vassals, particularly the counts of Blois and Champagne, and the exploitation of internal dissent within the Angevin family. Louis's most intense military effort against Henry II combined both; in 1173–1174 he headed a formidable alliance including Theobald of Blois, Philip of Flanders, and King William the Lion of Scotland in support of a widespread rebellion throughout Henry's domains led by his disaffected eldest son, Henry the Young King, and fomented by his own wife Eleanor of Aquitaine. The allies' plans revealed an ambitious grand strategy. Louis and the Count of Flanders invaded Normandy, the strategic key to Henry's empire, in a pincer movement to encircle and capture Rouen. Meanwhile, William the Lion launched an invasion of northern England, while the Earl of Leicester landed in Suffolk with a force of three thousand Flemings, intending to reinforce his midland castles and raise further rebellious lords to arms before uniting with William. The campaigns of 1173 were, however, unsuccessful. Philip of Flanders withdrew from his attack in northeast Normandy after his brother Matthew of Boulogne was fatally wounded at the siege of Drincourt, while Louis failed to take the great castle and fortified town of Verneuil on the duchy's southern border, despite raising a special tax for the siege. After defeating a rebel force at Dol in Brittany, Henry relieved Verneuil by offering pitched battle, which Louis chose to avoid by a rapid retreat, while in England Leicester's forces were decisively defeated at Fornham.

Louis was able, however, to prevent Henry's sons from making peace with their father, and in 1174 the war was renewed. Fearful of widespread rebellion, Henry II returned to England with a powerful force of mercenaries to preempt an invasion by the Count of Flanders and Henry the Young King, but the ambush and capture of William the Lion at Alnwick caused the collapse of risings in England. This allowed Henry's return to raise the French siege of Rouen, again compelling Louis into a precipitous flight. Henry had triumphed by a combination of fine generalship, capable deputies and superior resources, which crucially allowed him to make extensive use of Brabançon mercenaries. Widely detested as social outcasts and condemned by the church at the Third Lateran Council in 1179 for their brutal conduct against noncombatants and their despoliation of churches, these *routiers* were highly effective troops, not only in siege warfare but in open battle, and when paid were unfailingly loyal at a time when Henry doubted the constancy of many of his vassals.

The "great war" of 1173–1174 was followed by a period of comparative détente between Henry and Louis until the latter's death in 1180, a policy soon overturned by his son and successor Philip II Augustus, who was bent on the destruction of Plantagenet power. In 1183 he sent troops to aid Henry the Young King and Count Geoffrey of Brittany in a campaign to wrest Aquitaine from their brother Richard, himself supported by Henry II, but this destructive civil war ended when the younger Henry died of dysentery. Increasingly exploiting his legal position as overlord of the Angevins' continental lands, Philip launched an unprovoked attack on Henry II in 1188. Had they stood together, Henry and Richard would have been able to contain direct Capetian aggression, but crucially, by playing on Richard's fears that Henry would disinherit him in favor of his youngest brother, John, Philip succeeded in detaching the Count of Poitou (Richard) from loyalty to his father. In 1189, Henry's position collapsed when a combined offensive by Richard and Philip took Tours and Le Mans; fleeing from this burning city, the ailing Henry was saved from the pursuit of his son only when William Marshal, covering the king's retreat, ran through Richard's horse with his lance. After agreeing to humiliating peace terms, the greatest general of his age died at the great fortress of Chinon in Anjou on 6 July 1189, defeated by the

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Château-Gaillard. Built by King Richard I (1157–1199) between 1197 and 1198. PHOTOGRAPH BY CLIFFORD J. ROGERS

two men who were to be the chief heirs to his influence on the art of war and fortification.

The Capetians on the Offensive: Philip Augustus and the Struggle with Richard I, 1192–1199. The uneasy alliance of Philip and Richard (now king of England as Richard I, "the Lionheart") continued just long enough for them both to embark in 1190 for the Third Crusade. Philip played a conspicuous role in the siege of Acre, but immediately after the city's fall on 12 July 1191, he returned to France to take possession of Artois following the death at the siege of Philip of Flanders. In 1192, the French nobles prevented Philip from attacking Richard's continental lands during his absence on crusade, but the Lionheart's capture on his homeward journey by Leopold of Austria and his subsequent imprisonment by the German emperor Henry VI transformed the political and military situation in Philip's favor, allowing him to secure much of northeast Normandy. The betrayal to him in April 1193 of Gisors, the strategic key to the Vexin, enabled Philip to besiege Rouen itself. Despite deploying twenty-three siege engines, he was forced to withdraw after stout resistance led by Robert, Earl of Leicester, though Philip was more successful in fomenting rebellion among dissident lords in Aquitaine. In January 1194, Richard's traitorous brother John ceded to Philip all of Normandy east of the Seine as well as Tours and key fortresses in the Touraine to buy French support for his bid to seize the throne of England, and before Richard (released in February 1194) could return to Normandy, Philip took Evreux and Vaudreuil.

Richard's efforts to recover the grave losses suffered in 1193–1194 were to dominate his military activities until his death in 1199, and prevented him from launching an intended second expedition to the Holy Land after the expiration of the truce with the Muslims in April 1195. His initial counterattack met with considerable success; Tours was recovered, Loches taken by storm, and at Fréteval (6 July 1194) Philip himself narrowly escaped capture when Richard overtook the rearguard of his retreating army, seizing the baggage train, royal archives, and much treasure. A long war of attrition followed, dominated by siege and punctuated by periodic truces, which inflicted increasingly heavy

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taxation as well as economic misery, exacerbated by famine, on the subjects of both kings. Though Richard gradually gained the upper hand, his forces were sometimes defeated, as at Aumale in July 1196, when Richard's attack on the French siege camp was repulsed with considerable losses. Despite significant campaigns in Berry in 1195, the main theater of war remained the densely fortified lands in the Seine valley between Rouen and Paris. Between 1196 and 1199, Richard built, at lightning speed and huge cost, the great fortified complex of Château-Gaillard, partly to plug the gap in the Norman defenses left by the loss of Gisors, but primarily to act as an offensive base for the recovery of Vexin. At Les Andelys, the defended harbor for Richard's newly built galley fleet—mirrored across the Channel by extensive works at Portsmouth—reflected a new naval dimension to the Angevin-Capetian struggle. Before Philip's acquisition of Artois, the only coastal possession of the kings of France had been the town of Montreuil-sur-Mer, but now the ports on the northeast coast became key strategic targets; the French sacked Dieppe in 1195, while Richard burned Saint-Valéry in 1197.

Philip responded to Château-Gaillard by strengthening a counter-network of castles, including Le Goulet and La Roche Guyon, but he was now very much on the defensive. In September 1198, his forces were routed in a surprise attack by Richard near Courcelles and Philip was nearly drowned when the bridge over the moat at Gisors collapsed under the weight of the fleeing French troops. The following year, however, Richard was fatally wounded by a crossbow bolt at the siege of Chalus-Cabrol in the Limousin while suppressing a local rebellion. It was to prove a fundamental turning point in the balance of power between the Angevin and Capetians. "God visited the kingdom of the French," wrote Philip's chaplain William le Breton, "for King Richard died."

The Loss of Normandy and the Collapse of the Angevin Empire. The rapid collapse of the continental Angevin empire under Richard's brother John (r. 1199–1216) was less the result of fiscal exhaustion or lack of a cohesive political identity than of Philip's ruthless exploitation of John's political and military ineptitude. John initially held his own, defeating his nephew Arthur's attempt in 1199 to detach Brittany, Maine, and the Touraine from Angevin control. Foolishly alienating the powerful Lusignan family in Poitou, however, John was summoned to answer in King Philip's court and on his refusal, was declared forfeit of his French lands as a contumacious vassal. Aided by Philip, the Breton threat now resurfaced, but at Mirebeau in 1202, John won a stunning victory, capturing Arthur and over one hundred of the leading Poitevin rebels by surprise as they besieged Eleanor of Aquitaine. What should have been a decisive engagement, however, was soon undone by harsh treatment of his captives, the subsequent murder of his nephew Arthur, and the alienation of key nobles like William des Roches, who now took control of Angers and much of the Loire valley, while Philip attacked eastern Normandy. Beset by growing defection among the Norman aristocracy, John's position in the duchy was crumbling by late August 1203, when Philip began his siege of Château-Gaillard. John's attempt to relieve it by a joint land and naval assault miscarried, and Philip refused to be drawn away by a diversionary attack against Dol. In December, John, expecting Philip to be held up by lengthy sieges of Château-Gaillard and Rouen, pinned his hopes on securing western Normandy along the line of the river Touques, then left the duchy for England to raise a new army. Before the expeditionary force could be made ready, however, Château-Gaillard fell to Philip on 6 March, 1204, after a valiant defense of six months. His subsequent campaign was a masterstroke; refusing to be drawn into a difficult siege of Rouen, he swept southwest to Argentan, before striking north to take Falaise, then Caen, with little or no resistance. Units of his army then reduced Cherbourg and other fortresses, while Philip marched on a now isolated Rouen. Knowing he could not bring relief, John authorized its surrender, and Philip entered the capital of Normandy on 24 June. A great expedition planned by John in 1205 came to nothing, but the following year he launched a successful campaign from La Rochelle, which

recovered much of Poitou and stabilized his position in Aquitaine.

For much of the warfare against John between 1202 and 1204, Philip had relied on a comparatively small but well-trained force, which served in effect as a standing army, with many troops retained on long-term contracts and paid by the local *prévôts* or *baillis*. The registers reveal, for example, that in 1202–1203, he commanded 257 knights, 267 mounted sergeants, 80 mounted crossbowmen, 133 foot crossbowmen, and around 2,000 foot sergeants. The record known as the "Prise of serjeants" of 1194 shows that Philip could summon 5,435 well-equipped sergeants from the abbeys of the royal domain, the *prévôtés*, towns, and communes, and after his conquests from King John, this number rose to between 7,695 and 8,069 sergeants, as well as 168 transport carts. Philip greatly expanded his predecessors' policy of granting privileges to towns, yielding not only greater revenue but establishing important centers of defense, particularly on the frontiers of Normandy and Flanders. Philip's conquests were consolidated by the garrisoning of a large number existing castles, and by a program of castle building or refortification. More than one hundred "castles and fortresses held by Philip, king of France" were listed in an inventory of about 1210, of which forty-five were in Normandy. Philip symbolized his newfound mastery by adding a great circular donjon to key Plantagenet castles such as Chinon, Falaise, Gisors, and Rouen, where he deliberately destroyed the tenth-century keep of the Norman dukes.

It was testimony to the great reserves of manpower in France that Philip could pursue his successful campaigns against John at a time when many French lords, including Thibaut of Champagne, Louis of Blois, and Simon de Montfort had embarked on the Fourth Crusade, first preached in 1199. The strength of the crusading army, whose original target was Egypt, but which notoriously was diverted to the capture and sack of Constantinople in 1204, was estimated in the contract made with the crusaders by the Doge, Henry Dandolo, to require transport for 4,500 knights, 9,000 squires and 20,000 foot. The king of France had eschewed any participation, however, regarding war against his Plantagenet rivals as his overriding goal. Mindful of an imminent counterattack by John, he similarly resisted the calls of the papacy from 1208 to become directly involved in a crusade against the Cathar heretics in Languedoc, though he permitted many French nobles to join the expeditions led by Simon de Montfort. The sack of Beziers (21 July 1209) marked the commencement of a bitterly fought war, initially directed against Raymond-Roger, Count of Carcassone and Beziers, but soon drawing into the conflict Raymond VI of Toulouse and his ally and brother-in-law, Pedro II, King of Aragon. Much of the increasingly bitter campaigning was dominated by siege warfare, but at Muret on 12 September 1213, Simon de Montfort won a striking victory by a sudden cavalry charge which destroyed the allied center and left King Pedro dead.

It was the superiority of the French cavalry that again decided the outcome of the great battle at Bouvines on 27 July 1214. John's strenuous efforts to regain his lands had culminated in a great offensive in 1214, which attempted to catch Philip in a pincer movement between John's own forces driving north from Poitou and an allied army under Otto IV of Germany attacking from the northeast. After early successes, however, John's Poitevin allies refused to join battle with Prince Louis at Le Roche au Moine, forcing John to fall back on La Rochelle. Philip was thereby able to concentrate his forces and, after a bitterly fought engagement, Philip crushed the allied army at Bouvines. His triumph not only set the seal on Philip's conquests, but even allowed an invasion of England itself. In 1216, Prince Louis, who had been invited in by the dissident barons struggling against John, landed with a powerful army of around seven thousand men. Though a sustained siege of Dover castle, "the key to England," failed, Louis gained control of much of southern and eastern England, including London. John's death, however, and the accession of the boy king Henry III, deprived him of much political support and, following a heavy defeat at Lincoln (20 May 1217) at the hands of the regent, William Marshal, and the destruction of his fleet in a naval battle off Sandwich (24 August 1217), Louis was forced to withdraw from England.

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Nevertheless, following the death of Simon de Montfort, killed by the stone from an engine at the siege of Toulouse (25 June 1218), Philip felt his position strong enough to allow Louis to lead an expedition to Languedoc, which soon returned after failing to take Toulouse.

Consolidation and Crusade, 1224–1270. For the Capetian realm, the triumph of Bouvines ushered in a period of comparative internal peace; between the truce of Chinon in 1214 and the Treaty of Paris in 1259, only six years were troubled by war: 1224–1227, 1229–1231, and 1242–1243. Nevertheless, this period witnessed the increasing control of the kings of France. In 1224, Louis VIII (r. 1224–1226) postponed a second expedition against the Albigensians to invade Poitou, which he quickly overran, capturing the vital port of La Rochelle. His attempt to annex Gascony, however, failed, and the duchy was secured by an English force in 1225. Louis himself died during a new crusade he led in 1226 against the Albigensians, but the astute rule of his widow, Blanche of Castile, prevented either Henry III of England or internal rebels from profiting from the minority of Louis IX. Henry's expedition to Brittany in 1230 achieved little, while his potentially more dangerous attempt to recover Potiou in 1242 ended in fiasco when he was betrayed by the wiles of his stepfather, Hugh de Lusignan, and his forces were easily routed by King Louis at Taillebourg and Saintes. Louis had not taken so easy a victory for granted, however, and had met the emergency by raising an army which may have numbered as many as four thousand knights and twenty thousand foot soldiers. Henry finally accepted defeat in the Treaty of Paris in 1259, by which he renounced his rights to the bulk of his lost Angevin lands, and agreed to hold Aquitaine as a fief of the king of France. Louis also sought to curb the small-scale but endemic violence between local lords by first ordering the imposition in 1249 of a five-year truce on all private warfare, then in 1258 banning outright all "wars, burnings and destruction of ploughs." Thereafter, Louis IX's military efforts were directed principally towards his two great crusading expeditions; the first (1249–1250) to Egypt, which ended in the disastrous defeat at Mansurah, cost Louis's subjects more than one million livres tournois, as well as the further huge sum of 167,000 livres to ransom back their captive king and many of his



Battle of Lincoln. The death of the French commander, the Count of Perche, at the battle of Lincoln on 20 May 1217. Illustration from Matthew Paris's *Chronica maiora II*, MS 16, fol. 55v, thirteenth century. THE MASTER AND FELLOWS OF CORPUS CHRISTI COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE

nobles, while the second (1270) cost Louis his life to disease in Tunis.

The reign of his son, Philip III (1270–1285), witnessed French armies involved in a brutal suppression of insurrection against imposition of direct French control in Navarre in 1276, an abortive expedition against Castile in the same year, and military intervention in the Papal States in 1281 to quell a rising against Pope Martin IV. In 1285, Philip embarked on a papally sponsored crusade against Peter III of Aragon, but despite the enormous cost of 1,229,000 livres tournois, the expedition was a humiliating failure. Crossing the Pyrenees, the French army took Gerona, but its supply lines by sea were cut by an Aragonese naval victory at Las Formiguas and, ravaged by disease, it was forced to withdraw with heavy losses.

The Wars of Philip the Fair and his Successors, 1285–1328. By contrast, Philip IV, "the Fair" (r. 1285–1314), pursued an aggressive policy of asserting direct royal control over the two greatest fiefs of France, Aquitaine and Flanders. In 1293, Philip exploited a series of naval clashes between the sailors of the Cinque Ports, La Rochelle, and Bayonne to confiscate the duchy of Gascony, provoking Edward I to war in 1294. Philip's forces, led by his brother Charles of Valois, and his able kinsman Robert of Artois, made significant gains in a war dominated by siege, while the lack of heavy siege engines seriously hampered the effectiveness of the major riposte led by Edmund of Lancaster in 1296. Despite large numbers of archers in the English force, there was little indication of their successful tactical deployment in the field and, in the only significant engagement, Artois routed the forces of the Earl of Lincoln while on the march in a surprise attack at Bellegarde in February 1297. Artois was again victorious in 1297 over Edward's chief ally, Guy de Dampierre, Count of Flanders, at the battle of Furnes, and the English king's direct intervention in Flanders the same year proved a costly failure. The oppressive nature of French rule imposed after the surrender and imprisonment of Count Guy in 1300 led to a major uprising in western Flanders, heralded by the massacre of the French at the "Matins of Bruges" in May 1302. Philip dispatched a large army under Robert of Artois to quell the rebellion, but the militia of the Flemish towns inflicted a bloody and humiliating defeat on the French at Courtrai. A truce established in 1303 proved ineffectual and in 1304 a second French campaign led to a naval victory over the Flemings at Zierikzee and to the battle of Mons-en-Pévèle on 18 August. Though not an outright victory, it allowed Philip to dictate harsh terms to the new count, Robert of Béthune, which were finally accepted in an altered form in 1309, ceding the castellanries of Douai, Bethune, and Lille to the French crown.

No complete account exists for any one of Philip IV's major expeditions; while theoretically he could muster some thirty thousand men, in reality armies seem to have numbered some five to ten thousand men. Thus, for example, the force under Charles of Valois that overran Flanders in 1299, among the largest raised in the reign, included more than sixteen hundred mounted men-at-arms and perhaps seventeen thousand foot soldiers (assuming a cavalry/infantry ratio of 1:10 or 1:15). The strength of the French army at Courtrai is unknown, but has been estimated at about three thousand knights and four to five thousand infantry. Cavalry and infantry forces were raised separately and, in battle, coordination between the two groups often proved difficult. At Courtrai, Artois was unable to recall his infantry before his cavalry charged, while at Mons-en-Pévèle, the cavalry failed to support the infantry under the Master of Crossbowmen. At Arques in 1303, a comparatively small French cavalry force routed a division of Flemings taken by surprise and in poor order, but against the impenetrable circular formation of Willem van Jülich, commanding the main unit of the Flemish army, they were unsuccessful and were repulsed with some loss.

The immense cost of this warfare to the French crown had far-reaching political consequences. Though a new French army assembled in 1314 to meet renewed disturbances in Flanders achieved little, the hostility aroused by war taxation forced the king to cancel the subsidy and his heir, Louis X (r. 1314–1316), to grant charters of liberty to provincial leagues in 1315. That same year, the refusal of Robert of Flanders to perform homage led to the raising

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of yet another invasion force, but heavy rains and widespread flooding forced the French to withdraw. A further abortive campaign was launched in 1319 by Louis's brother and successor, Philip V (r. 1316–1322) before a fragile peace was established in 1320. In 1323, the English seneschal of Gascony attacked and burned a new bastide built by Charles IV (r. 1322–1328) at Saint-Sardos in the Agenais, leading the French king to confiscate the duchy of Gascony. An invasion by Charles of Valois met little resistance from Edward II's commander, the Earl of Kent, who shut himself up in La Réole; after a truce, Edward's queen Isabella (daughter of Philip IV) helped reestablish peace. Her son, the future Edward III, paid homage for Gascony to King Charles, who kept the Agenais by way of a war indemnity. In 1325, Charles responded to a major rebellion in maritime Flanders by raising a great army, which resulted in the Flemish leader Robert of Cassel accepting terms in 1326 and the freeing of Robert's nephew, the captured count Louis of Nevers. Yet the more radical captains of the insurrection refused to accept the settlement, and it was left to Charles's cousin and heir, Philip VI of Valois, to finally inflict a crushing defeat on the Flemings at Cassel on August 28, 1328. The victory at Cassel helped confirm the legitimacy of Philip as king, despite the strong claims of Edward III of England, and, on the eve of the Hundred Years' War, confirmed France as the leading military power in western Europe.

[*See also* Bouvines, Battle of; Brémule, Battle of; Britain, *subentry on* Narrative (1000–1300); Castles, *subentry on* 1150–1350; Chivalry; Courtrai, Battle and Siege of; Edward III of England; Fulk Nerra; Germany; Hastings, Battle of; Henry II; John; Louis VI; Louis VII; Low Countries; Mansurah, Battle of; Marshal, William; Richard I; Robert II Curthose; Tinchebrai, Battle of; *and* William I.]

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Narrative (1328–1483)

In 1328, Charles IV of France died without a male heir, leaving a pregnant widow. His cousin, Philip of Valois, assumed the regency for the unborn child. When Charles's widow gave birth to a daughter, Philip VI assumed the throne as the nearest in the male line. Philip, an experienced figure, appeared a better option than Edward III of England, the son of Charles's sister, who had barely attained his majority and was mired in domestic crises in England. Even Edward appeared to accept Philip's accession, doing homage in 1329 for the lands he held in Gascony.

The status of these lands was a bone of contention. Disputes had sparked wars in the past, most recently in 1324, when they had been confiscated by Charles IV. Although they were restored to English rule, jurisdictional and other arguments envenomed relations in the early 1330s. These were already strained by events in Scotland (where the French were sustaining the cause of the infant David II against his English-backed rival Edward Baliol) and further damaged by Edward III's refusal to extradite Robert of Artois, once a close advisor to Philip VI, who had fallen out with him over inheritance disputes and fled to England.

By 1336, the situation was deteriorating fast, with French raids on English shipping in the Channel and an English embargo on wool exports to Flanders. In 1337 Philip VI confiscated the English lands in Gascony, and war began with French operations in the southwest to enforce this judgment. Meanwhile, a French fleet ravaged the English coasts. The main English activity came in the north, where Edward III assembled an alliance of local rulers with whose support he launched an invasion of France in the late summer of 1339. After a failed siege of Cambrai this turned into a ravaging expedition, the first of

Battle of Crécy, 26 August 1346. Illustration by Master of Mary of Burgundy, 1477. © COLLECTION OF THE EARL OF LEICESTER, HOLKHAM HALL, NORFOLK/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

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many English *chevauchées*. In response, Philip VI raised a large army that confronted Edward at La Capelle. Neither side was prepared to risk attacking the other, and Edward withdrew.

In January 1340, Edward proclaimed himself king of France. This move was taken to strengthen support in the Flemish towns, whose oligarchies had embraced the English cause for economic reasons. It also potentially destabilized Philip by offering an alternative allegiance for any of his subjects who came into dispute with him. Its immediate impact was limited, and Edward had to return to England to raise money. A French campaign in the Low Countries in the spring and early summer of 1340, aimed at Edward's local allies, was initially successful. The French also set about assembling a substantial fleet to block Edward's return to Flanders. On 24 June 1340, the fleets clashed in the Zwin Estuary at Sluys. The result was an overwhelming English victory, which enabled Edward to pursue his campaign in the Low Countries. This failed; a largely Flemish army under Robert of Artois was crushed at Saint Omer while Edward's siege of Tournai drifted into a stalemate. Philip again gathered a large army to counter the English threat, but, despite his numerical superiority, he was reluctant to risk battle. As Edward's funds ran out, the campaign fizzled out into a truce.

The war might have ended here had the duke of Brittany not died, leaving a succession dispute between Jean de Montfort, his half brother, and Charles of Blois, husband of his niece and nephew of Philip VI. Jean took the initiative and seized the major cities of the duchy in the summer of 1341. After initial wavering, Philip came down on the side of his nephew. Jean sought English aid. Although this arrived too late to save Jean from capture, his wife was able to hold out long enough for an English force to arrive at Brest in the summer of 1342. This was able to do little more than maintain a toehold, but it defeated Charles of Blois's army at Morlaix in September. In the autumn of 1342, Edward III arrived in Brittany with a small army that ravaged widely in the area. A French royal army was assembled to counter it, and the campaign again ended indecisively in a truce.

However, "truce" did not imply the restoration of peace. Peace negotiations under papal auspices went nowhere. Low-level hostilities continued in Brittany and Gascony as garrisons fought local wars loosely linked to the high-level conflict, extorted supplies, and ravaged indiscriminately. By the summer of 1345, Edward was ready to renounce the truce and launched offensives in Gascony and Brittany, where Jean III de Montfort (who had escaped French custody) returned to shore up his cause but died shortly thereafter. The Gascon campaign was highly successful; the Earl of Derby (later Duke of Lancaster) defeated French armies at Bergerac and, even more decisively, at Auberoche and La Réole. The French position in the southwest collapsed, with many towns changing sides. Financial strains were beginning to erode support for Philip VI, with discontent audible at the Estates General held in Paris and Toulouse early in 1346.

Discontent was compounded by military failure. The war in Brittany saw a series of English victories. An offensive in the southwest bogged down in the siege of Aiguillon, which was lifted in disorder after five months in response to events farther north. In July 1346, Edward landed an army in Normandy and embarked on a campaign of devastation, sacking Caen and ravaging to the gates of Paris before withdrawing north. Philip followed at a distance. The armies clashed at Crécy, where Philip finally gave battle despite being in an unfavorable situation and went down to disastrous defeat. It is likely that he saw defeat as less damaging to his kingship than another refused battle. Edward continued his march north and laid siege to Calais. The town was starved into surrender over the following eleven months. To make matters worse, Lancaster launched a ravaging raid northward as far as Poitiers, and the Anglo-Breton forces won a major battle at La Roche-Derrien, capturing Charles of Blois. Signs of disillusionment among members of the French elite were increasingly visible.

A truce was agreed on after the fall of Calais. This more or less held until 1349 (during which period both France and England were devastated by the Black Death), when the war resumed owing to

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continued Anglo-Gascon depredations in the southwest. In the following years, fragile truces came and went, as diplomatic negotiations for a final peace ground on. These truces were often ignored on the ground, although they caused problems for French commanders, whose financing often evaporated when a truce was agreed.

In 1350, Philip VI died, to be succeeded by his son John II. The new reign was marked by a determined drive to increase revenues by more effective tax collection and currency manipulation; this did little for the popularity of royal government, especially when the campaigns that this fund-raising supported showed meager results. Matters were further complicated by the arrival of Charles, King of Navarre. Of French royal descent in the female line and married to John's daughter, Charles had aspirations to play a major role in royal government and sought to present himself as the head of a "reform" party in the French administration. He also had territorial ambitions in Normandy. He was prepared to back up his claims to a role in government with violence, and he made contacts with the English in order to strengthen his bargaining position. Late in 1354, his lands were forfeited for treason.

In 1354 a peace agreement was made that would have granted Edward a substantially expanded territorial holding in full sovereignty. However, this was never ratified, and negotiations again broke down; war resumed in 1355 with English plans for a major offensive in the south under the command of Edward, Prince of Wales (the Black Prince), coupled with an invasion of Normandy in alliance with Charles of Navarre. The latter had to be aborted when Charles switched sides, but the former saw the prince devastate wide regions of southern France. In 1356 there were increasing signs of political disintegration, with John arresting Charles of Navarre and executing his most prominent associates. This threw his Norman supporters into the English camp, with the result that Lancaster campaigned in Normandy with their support. For his part, the Black Prince marched north on another *chevauchée*, which took him to the Loire Valley. On the way back south, he met the army that John had assembled and won a stunning victory at Poitiers. King John was captured along with many of his leading nobles.

This disaster led to a breakdown of royal government. The English and their Breton and Navarrese allies took control of much of Brittany, laid siege to Rennes, and raided deep into the heart of France. Rennes held out, thanks in part to the efforts of a then obscure Breton esquire called Bertrand du Guesclin, but elsewhere in Brittany, English government showed signs of putting down roots. The Dauphin Charles was forced to call an Estates General, which rapidly came to be dominated by Parisian interests articulated by Étienne Marcel, the provost of merchants. The next two years saw repeated political crises as the Estates were called, suspended, and called again. The Dauphin, Charles of Navarre, Marcel, and the members of the Estates General went through a bewildering series of shifts in alignment. Marcel's mobs dominated the streets of Paris. King John in captivity disowned his son's government and sought to make his own peace with the English. The Dauphin eventually managed to extract himself from quasi captivity in Paris, and by spring 1358 he had placed the city under blockade. At this point, the peasant uprising known as the Jacquerie broke out, at heart a rebellion against all noblemen and all armies of any obedience. The rebellion was ruthlessly crushed, not least by Charles of Navarre, but it gave rise to a surge of elite support for the Dauphin that ultimately swept both Charles and Marcel away in a counterrevolution in July 1358. Marcel was killed, but Charles lived to plot another day.

The chaos around Paris mirrored the chaos elsewhere in France. Bands of armed men claiming allegiance to one or another of the various contenders for power spread across the countryside, ravaging and pillaging. Charles of Navarre offered a convenient cover for many, and others were more English in composition, even if their direct links to the English crown were tenuous. Some regions, such as Languedoc, with strong local institutions and competent leadership, managed to beat off the depredations of what came to be known as the Great Companies; others, such as the Auvergne or the

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Rhône Valley, proved easier prey. Perhaps the worst affected areas were those in easy reach of Charles's Norman bases. There was no effective royal government and no royal army, since each province was left to its own devices.

Edward III, having made his deal with the captive King John, slowly came to realize that the latter was in no position to deliver on the massive ransom and the territorial concessions he had agreed to unless he was free. John, for his part, came to regard Charles of Navarre as a worse enemy than Edward. He therefore made a further deal that would have handed over almost half the realm to England. This was rejected by the Estates General. Edward landed a massive army at Calais late in 1359 and advanced in bad weather toward Reims. Shortage of provisions forced the raising of the siege, but the English advance looped south of Paris before closing in on the city. But it was clear that it was beyond the capacity of the English army to either storm or invest Paris, and it turned west. On 13 April 1360, the army was hit near Chartres by a massive thunderstorm, which generated sleet and hail, with devastating consequences. This reverse prompted Edward to make peace. Under the terms of the Treaty of Brétigny he renounced his claims on the French crown in return for substantially expanded holdings in the southwest of France (amounting to a full third of the realm) and a huge ransom payment.

This did not lead to instant pacification. It proved difficult, and at times impossible, to persuade garrisons that were on the "wrong" side of the new frontier to hand over their strongholds. Disbanded units from all sides remained in the field, swelling the ranks of the Great Companies, which continued to plunder and ransom in their habitual manner. Many of these men were English or Gascon in origin, and it is unclear how far they were operating with tacit English blessing to destabilize the rump of the French kingdom. Finding them alternative employment was a central concern of international diplomacy in the 1360s. Predictably, it proved difficult to raise King John's ransom, and the king returned to England for negotiations. He died there in 1364.

John was succeeded by Charles V, who was already in the process of settling accounts with Charles of Navarre when his father died. Navarre's garrisons were largely cleared from Normandy and his army defeated at Cocherel by royal forces commanded by du Guesclin, and Navarre's remaining holdings fell increasingly into English hands. Du Guesclin was next sent to Brittany, where the civil war had flared up again; here he was less successful, and the Montfortists (now led by the son of the original pretender) won a decisive victory at Auray, in which Charles of Blois was killed, in 1364. Nevertheless, events began to turn Charles V's way. Plans to employ the Great Companies elsewhere came to fruition when du Guesclin led an expedition to Spain to support Enrique de Trastámara in a Castilian succession dispute with his half brother Pedro I. This became a proxy Anglo-French war when Pedro sought the assistance of the Black Prince, and their combined armies triumphed over du Guesclin at Nájera in 1367. This proved a Pyrrhic victory. Pedro failed to keep the financial promises he had made to his English allies and was again overthrown by Trastámara and du Guesclin at Montiel in 1369. Pedro's failure to pay obliged the Black Prince to impose additional taxation on the English territories in Gascony. Disgruntled local elites appealed to the king of France's courts against this imposition; Charles, in breach of the peace terms, agreed to accept the appeal. Fighting had already begun in the southwest when war was formally resumed in the summer of 1369, with Charles V again confiscating Gascony and Edward III reasserting his claim to the French throne.

The following years saw the slow but steady erosion of the English position in France. A *chevauchée* launched from Calais in the summer of 1370, commanded by Sir Robert Knowles and composed largely of the English elements of the Great Companies, was defeated by du Guesclin (now constable of France) at Pontvallain in December of that year. The Black Prince's campaign in the southwest had already bogged down in the siege of Limoges; although this was successful, the sack of the town after its fall was a propaganda disaster for the prince. Subsequent

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years saw growing pressure on the English garrisons in France, which were spread out from Saint-Sauveur-le-Vicomte and Cherbourg in Normandy (taken over from Charles of Navarre's Norman holdings) to Brest in Brittany, Chizé in the west (where du Guesclin won another victory in 1373), and down to Gascony. Victory in the proxy war in Castile paid dividends; a combined Franco-Castilian fleet won a major action against the English off La Rochelle in 1372, and Franco-Castilian vessels staged repeated raids on the English coast in the following years. The English response was to launch a series of further *chevauchées*, most notably in 1373 when John of Gaunt, younger son of Edward III, marched an army all the way from Calais to Bordeaux. This looked spectacular, but he lost something like half his men in the process, with little long-term benefit. Later *chevauchées* in 1375 and 1380 had little more impact. The French campaign of reconquest in the southwest ground remorselessly on, and by 1377 French forces were within striking distance of Bordeaux, capital of the English holdings in Gascony.

The renewal of war also had an impact on Brittany, where Jean IV de Montfort, victor of Auray, found himself in a difficult position. Many of his subjects (starting with du Guesclin) were in French service, but his duchy was still the base for English companies. He sought to negotiate his way between both sides without success. In the spring of 1373, a French invasion sent him into exile in England. He returned with an English army in 1375, but the campaign was a fiasco, failing to save the remaining English positions in Normandy and on the Breton borders; Saint-Saveur surrendered in June. Jean was eventually able to return to power in 1378 as part of a compromise settlement with the Breton nobility to head off an outright French annexation of the duchy, and steered a cautious path between French and English interests thereafter. However, Brest remained in English hands until 1397.

The changed course of the war after 1369 was due to several factors. Part was a simple matter of leadership. Edward III had become a negligible military quantity well before his death in 1377, and the Black Prince was a dying man by the 1370s, whereas in du Guesclin Charles V had found a commander of talent. Part was a matter of resources and organization. Charles was able to draw on regular tax revenues (initially granted to ransom his father but soon diverted to long-term military ends), and from this fund he created a small permanent army that was retained even during periods of truce. Money was also invested in urban defenses, making it possible to withdraw populations within their walls when English *chevauchées* appeared on the horizon.

Charles died in 1380, abolishing taxes on his deathbed. He was succeeded by his underage son, also Charles, whose regency government was immediately faced by a surge of antitax rebellions as it sought to overturn the consequences of the late monarch's attack of bad conscience. In Flanders, these rebellions led to a coup against the count, whose daughter had married Charles V's brother Philip, Duke of Burgundy. Young Charles was present in the campaigns on behalf of his uncle. The rebels were defeated at Roosebeke in 1382 and finally crushed despite English intervention during 1383 in the shape of a "crusade" led by the bishop of Norwich (France and England predictably backed different popes in the Great Schism). A French expedition under Jean de Vienne operated in Scotland in 1385, and invasion fleets were prepared in 1386 and 1387, although neither sailed for England. However, the war had drifted into a stalemate interspersed by increasingly long truces; in 1396, a twenty-eight-year truce was agreed in the context of the marriage between Richard II of England and Charles's infant daughter Isabelle.

By then, however, the situation in France had changed dramatically. In 1388, Charles VI had taken personal control of government from the hands of his uncles with the assistance of Olivier de Clisson, an associate of du Guesclin. When in 1392 Clisson was the victim of an assassination attempt blamed on Jean IV de Montfort, Charles prepared to make a military intervention in Brittany. On a hot August day, though, in a forest near Le Mans, Charles suddenly went mad. He was to slide in and out of sanity for the remaining thirty years of his life, increasingly a figurehead around whom power struggles swirled.

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It was, of course, not immediately obvious that this would be the case; Charles regained sanity late in 1392. He slipped back into madness in 1393, and it became increasingly clear that he would never be free from mental illness. The result was an increasingly violent power struggle between a faction headed by the king's brother Louis of Orléans and one headed initially by his uncle Philip of Burgundy and then by the latter's son John. In part, this was a struggle over patronage, power, and access to royal funds, as well as on genuine policy differences over such issues as making peace with England or ending the papal schism. The Burgundian faction was strongly represented in sections of the royal administration, and, especially when out of power, it claimed to stand for the reform of government and the "common good." It also drew support from sections of the Parisian merchant and artisan classes. The situation became particularly envenomed after Philip of Burgundy died in 1404, which greatly strengthened Louis's position. On the night of 23 November 1407, Louis was murdered by a gang of assassins acting on the orders of John of Burgundy. John made no effort to deny his role, and indeed went out of his way to justify it.

Leadership of the Orléans faction devolved nominally on Louis's eldest son, Charles, in practice ultimately on his father-in-law the Count of Armagnac (from whom the faction came to take its name). In the years following Louis's murder, France slid inexorably toward a civil war in which the factions fought to govern in the name of the hapless Charles VI, whose wife, Isabeau of Bavaria, was to play an increasingly active role of her own, ultimately in alliance with the Burgundians. A Burgundian regime dominated Paris in the period from 1409 to 1412, and faced an alliance of rebellious nobles. After a Burgundian army had laid siege to Bourges in 1412, peace was patched up. This collapsed in the course of 1413, and power in Paris fell into the hands of a pro-Burgundian regime headed by the slaughterhouse worker Simon Caboche. Those in power sought to impose its version of reform of the royal administration. The radicalism of the Paris mob led to a reaction that drove the Duke of Burgundy from power and replaced him with a government nominally headed by Charles VI's son, Louis of Guyenne. A "royal" campaign against Duke John in 1414 ended in another fragile peace.

The growing chaos in France attracted attention from across the channel. The Anglo-French truce had more or less held, even after Richard II was overthrown by his cousin Henry of Lancaster, although it had become strained (the rebellious Welsh leader Owain Glyn Dŵr received French assistance, and piracy was endemic in the Channel). By the 1410s, English involvement in the French civil wars became increasingly apparent, and in 1412, Thomas, Duke of Clarence, crossed the channel to support the rebellious princes against the Burgundians. His presence encouraged the French parties to make peace, but both were now in the market for English aid. The new English monarch, Henry V, seized on the unstable condition of France to seek substantial territorial concessions. When negotiations broke down in 1415, he invaded Normandy. Capturing Harfleur after a protracted siege, he opted to turn his army north to Calais. The march, plagued by bad weather and sickness, could have ended in disaster. The French factions put their quarrels aside long enough to put a substantial army in the field. This intercepted Henry's force and, on 25 October, gave battle. The result was an English victory as decisive as it was unexpected; the battle of Agincourt saw countless members of the French elite (such as Charles of Orléans) killed or captured.



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Agincourt had little effect on internal French politics. French attempts to recapture Harfleur in 1416 failed, and political stability remained elusive, with an increasingly oppressive Armagnac government in Paris squaring up for another round of fighting against Duke John. When Henry V landed in Normandy again in 1417, most French energies were absorbed in a Burgundian campaign against Paris that ultimately saw the fall of the city to an army led by Villiers de L'Isle-Adam in May 1418. A massacre of Armagnac supporters followed, but the party, now assembled round the Dauphin Charles, continued the fight from the Loire Valley. Meanwhile, Henry V concentrated on the systematic conquest of Normandy. He captured Caen in 1417 and laid siege to Rouen in the summer of 1418. The city was starved into surrender in January 1419, and by then, most of Normandy was in English hands. An administration was established, composed of members of the local elite who were prepared to accept Henry's rule and English bureaucrats. Based on a network of closely administered English garrisons, who increasingly took root in their new home, it remained in place for more than forty years.

In desperation, the Dauphin's government imported an army from Scotland in 1419 to shore up its military situation. Additional Scots followed in subsequent years. Charles also entered into negotiations with John of Burgundy. A face-to-face "summit" between the two men on the bridge at Montereau in September 1419 ended in disaster, with John dead at the hands of Charles's men. John's son Philip (who also controlled Charles VI) entered into an alliance with Henry V. The Dauphin was disinherited and, under the Treaty of Troyes in 1420, Henry was betrothed to Charles's daughter Katherine and recognized as his regent and heir.

The war continued in a series of bitter sieges. When Melun fell to the Anglo-Burgundians in 1420, Scots in the garrison were hanged as traitors to their monarch James I, a captive in English hands. The Scots were to gain their revenge the following year when, with Henry V absent in England, his brother Thomas, Duke of Clarence, was defeated and killed at Baugé. Henry returned to France but in August 1422 died of dysentery contracted at the siege of Meaux. Charles VI followed him to the grave, leaving the infant Henry VI of England nominal monarch of France as well. Power was exercised by Henry's brother John, Duke of Bedford, supported by an administration composed of men whose primary loyalties often lay with the Duke of Burgundy. The dauphin, now Charles VII, continued the war at the head of what was derisively known as the "Kingdom of Bourges."

The fortunes of war initially favored the Anglo-Burgundians. They defeated an army of Scots, Italians, and French at Cravant in the east of France in 1423 and, after a major Scottish reinforcement landed in the summer of 1424, won a bloody slaughtering match at Verneuil against Charles VII's polyglot army. Two Scottish earls and thousands of Scottish infantry died there. Charles, increasingly short of money, faced political instability in his truncated realm, while the Anglo-Burgundian advance slowed owing to tensions between the partners. The next major campaign came in autumn 1428, with an English attempt to take control of the Loire Valley. This led to a protracted siege of Orléans. A Franco-Scottish attempt to intercept an English provision convoy was defeated at Rouvray in January 1429.

At this low point, a peasant girl from Lorraine turned up at Charles's court, claiming that she had been sent by God to raise the siege. After some hesitation, she was sent to Orléans with a relief army commanded by the Count of Dunois (Charles of Orléans's half brother). Charles was probably as surprised as anyone when Joan of Arc inspired his forces to a series of victories that led the English to raise the siege on 8 May. English forces were cleared from the Loire Valley and their army routed at Patay. Joan persuaded Charles to undertake a campaign in Champagne, which culminated in his anointing in Reims in July. Joan's star then began to wane. An attack on Paris was repelled in September, and she was increasingly marginalized. In May 1430, she was captured by the Burgundians at Compiègne and sold to the English. A church court condemned her to death in Rouen in 1431.

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Joan of Arc (c. 1412–1431). Illustration depicting Holofernes and Judith (*left*) and Joan of Arc (*right*) from *Le champion des dames* by Martin le Franc, MS FR 12476, 1451. *Le champion* is the oldest manuscript to depict Joan of Arc. BIBLIOTHÈQUE NATIONALE, PARIS, FRANCE/GIRAUDON/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

Joan of Arc's brief career hardly won the war for Charles. But as it was, however coupled with growing Burgundian disillusionment with the English alliance, the balance had begun to swing his way. Philip of Burgundy retained some interest in French affairs, supporting the prince of Orange in his campaign against Lyon, which was defeated at Anthon in 1430, and successfully upholding his claims in Lorraine against the house of Anjou, allies of Charles VII, at Bulgneville in 1431. Nevertheless, his interests lay increasingly in the Low Countries, where they clashed with those of John of Bedford's brother Humphrey. He became increasingly disengaged from the war in France after the French broke the siege of Lagny-sur-Marne in 1432.

With war weariness growing, a peace conference was held in Arras in 1435. The main result of this was the defection of Duke Philip to the French side. Burgundian participation in the war against their former allies was limited—Paris fell to Burgundian forces in 1436 but their siege of Calais that year collapsed ignominiously. Nevertheless, the English position was shaken. Dieppe and Harfleur were taken by the French, and a series of peasant risings created insecurity in the Norman countryside.

Charles, however, was not in a strong position to exploit these opportunities. His treasury was virtually empty, and his armies were living from hand to mouth, with operations in the late 1430s and early 1440s focused primarily on a series of sieges of English garrisons in the valley of the Seine and funded using whatever cash could be scraped together. Companies of men-at-arms flitted in and out of royal service, at other times making deals with whoever might hire them to prosecute private quarrels or to protect their lands from other soldiers—or simply living off the land. This was a throwback to the days of the Great Companies, although this time the predators were known as *écorcheurs* ("flayers"). Men such as La Hire, Xantrailles, and even Dunois, who had all fought with Joan of Arc, were of their number, as was the Castilian Rodrigo de Villandrando, who undertook an *écorcheur*-style raid on English Gascony in 1438 at royal behest. Charles sought to remedy the situation with an ordinance in 1439, which would have taken a number of captains into permanent royal pay. This would also potentially have altered the balance of court politics, and so sparked a noble rebellion known as the Praguerie, which was put down with some difficulty.

By the early 1440s, both sides were near exhaustion. After a French campaign in Gascony in 1442, local truces led to wider negotiations for a general settlement. These resulted in a general truce and the marriage of Henry VI of England to Margaret of Anjou in 1444. This settlement raised the question of future employment for the *écorcheur* units. As in the 1360s, the decision was made to employ them outside the kingdom, partly in support of the Angevins in Lorraine and partly in interventions in the politics of south German and Swiss cities. During 1444–1445, forces nominally under the command of the Dauphin Louis devastated a wide swath of territory from Alsace to Basel, winning a bloody victory at the gates of the latter city.

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This breathing space allowed Charles to restructure his army. In 1445 at Nancy, he promulgated an ordinance that established a permanent force composed of some fifteen companies each (at least in principle) made up of a hundred lances. Each lance was composed of a man-at-arms, two mounted archers, a light cavalryman, and two support personnel. The Compagnies d'Ordonnance were to be the backbone of French royal armies for the rest of the century. Their establishment did not solve all discipline problems overnight—they were initially composed of and commanded by men who had begun as *écorcheurs*—but they proved an effective tool of royal patronage, not least because they could be used to enforce the payment of the taxes that underwrote their existence. At the same time Charles also built up his siege artillery train under the Bureau brothers.

This restructured army was soon put to the test. In 1445, the English government secretly agreed to surrender Maine, but it took the best part of two years to move out the English garrisons. In March 1449, an Aragonese captain in the English service stormed the Breton town of Fougères and refused to withdraw. By August the truce was over, and the war had begun again. It proved amazingly one-sided. English garrisons were rolled over one after another, with only Rouen putting up any sustained resistance. The English field army was defeated at Formigny in April 1450, and by the summer Cherbourg, the last English foothold in Normandy, was taken. The war had also gotten under way in the southwest in 1449 with similar results; the campaign ended with the capitulation of Bayonne in August 1450. However, this was not quite the end. In late summer 1452 Bordeaux rose against French rule, and an English army under Talbot arrived to support the rebels. In the summer of the following year a French army advanced into Gascony and laid siege to Castillon; Talbot's army was destroyed when he tried to break the siege, and Bordeaux surrendered in October.

Despite these victories, the rest of Charles's reign was an unstable and edgy time, marked by a series of high-profile treason trials and purges of the army and the royal guard as well, as by the formal rehabilitation of Joan of Arc. The king quarreled with his eldest son, the Dauphin Louis, who fled to the Burgundian court.

In July 1461, Louis XI succeeded to the throne and promptly replaced some 75 percent of the captains of the Compagnies d'Ordonnance; many of the men purged by his father returned to favor. In turn, many of those he displaced entered the service of his brother, Charles of France, who, along with Charles of Charolais, heir to the Duke of Burgundy, became the focus of noble discontent. In the short term, this did not impede a French intervention in Aragon, leading to the occupation of Roussillon. In 1465, however, a coalition of the discontented rose up under the banner of the "Public Good." An indecisive battle at Montlhéry nearly cost Louis his life. The rebels then laid siege to Paris. Peace was made late that year, and Louis managed to break up the coalition against him. The following years saw Louis seeking to play his enemies off against each other, with mixed success. An ill-judged attempt at personal diplomacy with Charles of Burgundy in 1468 left him as a virtual hostage while Charles destroyed the city of Liège, which had risen against Burgundian domination in the expectation of French support. His interventions in England to support the House of Lancaster during the Wars of the Roses failed to sustain the restored government of Henry VI in 1470–1471. On the other hand, the birth of an heir in 1470 and the death of Charles of France in 1472 strengthened Louis's position, which was further reinforced when a Burgundian invasion that summer stalled outside Beauvais. A rebellion by the count of Armagnac was put down in 1473.

Meanwhile, Charles of Burgundy's ambitions increasingly turned eastward into the lands of the empire, where he aimed at creating a kingdom—an ambition that alarmed the Swiss and the German princes and increasingly led him into conflict with the House of Anjou and local rulers in Alsace and Lorraine. Charles intervened in German politics, vainly besieging the city of Neuss for nearly a year (1474–1475) while his representative in Alsace was defeated at Héricourt in 1474. His attempt to draw the English back into the conflict ended in a fiasco

when Edward IV allowed himself to be bought off by Louis at Picquigny in 1475. Charles decided to confront the Swiss but went down to defeat at their hands and those of their allies—first at Grandson; then at Morat in 1476; and finally, in January 1477, outside Nancy, where he was killed. This gave Louis an opportunity to seize the duchy of Burgundy and lands on the Somme. His attempts to take over the entire Burgundian inheritance in the Low Countries failed as Charles's daughter married Maximilian of Austria, son of the Emperor Frederick III, who defeated the French at Guinegate in 1479. The war in this region turned to stalemate. Louis, who had also taken advantage of the extinction of the House of Anjou to seize their lands, finally made a favorable peace with Maximilian in 1482, a year before his death.

[*See also* Agincourt, Battle of; Compagnies d'Ordonnance; *Écorcheurs*; Guesclin, Bertrand du; Hundred Years' War; Joan of Arc; *and* Orléans, Siege of.]

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Brian G. H. Ditcham

Historiography (900–1328)

There could be no more striking indication of the transformation in the study of medieval warfare, including that in France between the tenth and early fourteenth centuries, than that seen in comparing the focus and range of Ferdinand Lot's post–World War II survey *L'art militaire et les armées au moyen âge en Europe et dans le Proche Orient* (1946) with Philippe Contamine's profoundly influential *La guerre au moyen âge* (1980; English trans., *War in the Middle Ages*, 1984). Lot's work, though impressive in its chronological and geographical range, remains, in its emphasis on army composition, campaigns, and major battles, firmly in the tradition of Hans Delbrück's *Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der Politischen Geschichte* (1908–1909; English trans., *History of the Art of War within the Framework of Political History*, 1975–1985) and Sir Charles Oman's *A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages* (2d ed., 1924). The inclusion in Contamine's work—thematic and comparative throughout—of chapters with such titles as (in the English translation) "Juridical, Ethical, and Religious Aspects of War" and "Towards a History of Courage" reflects the influence of both the *Annales* school (the highly influential school of French historical thinking that developed from the 1930s and that stressed social and economic themes and rejected *l'histoire événementielle*, or the history of events) and also the emerging "new military history," which placed greater emphasis on both the impact of war on society and also the human experience of war and combat. Contamine himself discussed these trends in relation to French medieval military history in "L'histoire militaire et l'histoire de la guerre dans la France medieval depuis trente ans"; a broader and more recent overview of much value is provided by John France in "Recent Writing on Medieval Warfare."

Here, however, one may highlight two works for their significance both to the study of medieval warfare in general and also to that within France between about 900 and 1328 in particular: J. F. Verbruggen's *De krijgskunst in West-Europa in de Middeleeuwen, IXe tot begin XIVe eeuw* (1954; English trans., *The Art of Warfare in Western Europe during the Middle Ages*, 1977) and Georges Duby's *Le Dimanche de Bouvines* (1973; English trans., *The Legend of Bouvines*, 1990). Verbruggen explored in a revisionist manner not only the nature of tactics and the practice of war, but also the psychology of combat as experienced by both knights and foot soldiers, notably (but far

from exclusively) in relation to the battles fought in 1302–1304 between the Flemish and the French, such as Courtrai, Arques, and Mons-en-Pévèle. Duby, by contrast, rejecting a positivist approach to the study of military history, took the day of the battle of Bouvines, 27 July 1214, as a prism for exploring the *mentalité* (mindset) of the combatants, their cultural milieu, and the sociology of war from an anthropological perspective.

Nonetheless, overall there has been a marked paucity of military histories focusing specifically on France between 900 and 1328. Though Contamine's *Guerre au Moyen Âge* contains far more of relevance than do the earlier general surveys of Delbrück and Oman, as does John France's *Western Warfare in the Age of the Crusades*, there is still little comparable with Michael Prestwich's *Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages: The English Experience*, except for the excellent, though perforce succinct, chapters in Contamine's first volume of the *Histoire militaire de la France*. In part the explanation for the paucity is that although for much of the period *la douce France* might have existed as a concept—assiduously fostered by the Capetian rulers of the Île-de-France through myths of Charlemagne, the cult of Saint Denis, and rituals of sacral kinship—in reality the land between Flanders and the Pyrenees was a mosaic of virtually autonomous principalities. Not only that, but important areas were ruled by the Anglo-Norman and Plantagenet kings of England. The historian is thus confronted with multiple regional or dynastic histories (a challenge admirably addressed in Jean Dunbabin's *France in the Making*) and thus also—despite a number of common features—multiple potential military histories. The studies by Bernard Bachrach of the military organization of early Anjou, particularly during the reign of Count Fulk Nerra (r. 987–1040), demonstrate the great potential of such a regional approach, even if Bachrach's emphasis on the continuing influence of late Roman military practice remains controversial.

Similarly the duchy of Normandy, though made sui generis in important respects by William's conquest of England and the creation of a cross-Channel empire, has been extensively studied in relation to warfare, and important developments in Anglo-Norman and Angevin military history bear directly on the understanding of war in France as a whole. Thus, for example, the work of J. O. Prestwich and Marjorie Chibnall has revealed the key role played by the *familia regis*, or royal military household, as a small standing army, reinforcing the emphasis placed by R. Allen Brown on the skill and military professionalism of the Norman knights. The knight is now recognized to have been as effective when fighting on foot as when fighting on horseback, as a number of twelfth-century battles demonstrate (see Jim Bradbury, "Battles in England and Normandy"), and a clearer understanding has also been gained of the nature of warhorses: see the works by R. H. C. Davis and Ann Hyland. On mounted warfare and the real, rather than the imagined, capabilities of a knightly charge, see the articles by Matthew Bennett.

The theme of professionalism has been developed in a series of seminal case studies by John Gillingham. Through analyses of the campaigns of Richard I, Duke William of Normandy (later William the Conqueror), and William Marshal, Gillingham demonstrates how medieval commanders applied a science of war characterized by careful logistical planning, good intelligence, and the strategic reliance on siege, ravaging, and avoiding pitched battle save for exceptional circumstances. More recently, scholars such as Clifford Rogers and Stephen Morillo ("Battle Seeking") have challenged the extent to which such a strategy of avoiding battle was predominant, thereby provoking a fruitful and wide-ranging exploration of the place of major engagements in medieval strategy. These studies all interrogate the influence of the fifth-century Roman commentator Vegetius and his *De re militari*. All scholars, however, accept the centrality of siege warfare, to which battle was often closely linked; the nature of siege warfare has been further explored in a number of important studies, most notably that by Randall Rogers and Jim Bradbury's *Medieval Siege*. A useful review article is that by Bachrach, "Medieval Siege Warfare: A Reconnaissance."

Of necessity, much writing on Anglo-Norman and Angevin warfare involves discussion of war against

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their Capetian enemies and other rival territorial princes within France. What is striking, however, is that whereas studies of individual Capetian monarchs contain varying amounts of material on campaigns, armies, or warfare, there is as yet no dedicated military history of the early Capetian kings before Philip II Augustus (r. 1179–1223), or indeed of his successors up to Philip the Fair (r. 1285–1314), apart from Contamine's *Histoire militaire de la France*. The reign of Philip Augustus stands out as a marked exception; the enormous significance to the growth of Capetian power of his successful wars against his Angevin opponents are reflected in a range of studies exploring the nature of his armies, his castle-building and fortress policy, and the greatest of his victories, the battle of Bouvines. Equally, the French struggle against the Flemings in the early fourteenth century, including the great battle of Courtrai in 1302, has attracted much attention, not least as a key example of the so-called infantry revolution, in which predominantly non-noble armies of foot soldiers inflicted a series of severe defeats on forces dominated by noblemen and heavy cavalry.

Yet if such more traditional military histories are few, there has by contrast been a great deal of scholarship on the nature and extent of aristocratic violence within the society of the later tenth and eleventh centuries, on the emergence of a rising class of *milites* (knights), and on the castle as an instrument of seigneurial domination as well as of warfare. Those historians arguing for a "feudal revolution" or "feudal transformation" around the year 1000—whose views are most conveniently approached through Jean-Pierre Poly and Eric Bournazel's *La mutation féodale, Xe–XIIe siècles* (1980; English trans., *The Feudal Transformation*, 1990)—posit a marked intensification of localized violence stemming from the growth of banal lordship. But this model has been challenged in favor of an emphasis on greater continuity with the Carolingian past, most notably by Dominique Barthélemy. Barthélemy's and other studies, especially those in *The Peace of God*, edited by Thomas Head and Richard Landes, have further highlighted the nature of small-scale, localized warfare between rival castellans and the sufferings that this inflicted on the peasantry and other *inermes*, or noncombatants.

A concomitant focus has been on the development of a knightly class and of a chivalric ethos. Of particular importance are the works by Jean Flori, Barthélemy's *La chevalerie*, and, more broadly, David Crouch's *Birth of Nobility*. The key chivalric institution of the tournament has received much attention, most recently by Crouch in *Tournament*, with its valuable bibliography. Scholars are divided as to the date by which a chivalric code regulating conduct in war—notably in regard to ransom, clemency to the vanquished, and conventions of negotiated surrender—had emerged: whereas some see this as late as the twelfth century, others have argued for clear signs of a knightly ethos in the ninth century (Janet Nelson) or have stressed the importance of the later tenth and early eleventh century in the development of ransom and conventions of siege (Matthew J. Strickland, "Killing or Clemency?"; Gillingham, "Fontenoy and After").

An extensive literature on castles, above all for France, reflects the growth of a major area of scholarship. A convenient summary of work on the early development of the castle is Michael W. Thompson's *Rise of the Castle*, and great advances in understanding the nature of earth and timber castles are reflected in Robert Higham and Philip Barker's *Timber Castles*. The primacy of castles' military functions has been challenged, particularly in the work of Charles Coulson—conveniently epitomized in his *Castles in Medieval Society*—with increasing emphasis placed on their residential and symbolic functions. An outstanding architectural study is Jean Mesqui's two-volume *Châteaux et enceintes de la France médiévale*, along with his shorter survey. Essential gazetteers are provided by Charles-Laurent Salch.

Tenth- and Eleventh-Century Warfare. For the whole period, the essential political and social context is provided by Elizabeth M. Hallam and Judith Everard. Warfare in tenth-century Francia is surveyed by John France in "La guerre dans la France féodale." For types of forces, see Jacques Boussard's

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"Services féodaux, milices, et mercenaires" and the article by P. van Luyn. An invaluable case study of warfare and military organization in the territorial principalities is provided by Bachrach in *Fulk Nerra*. The same author's series of studies—including "Fortifications and Military Tactics: Fulk Nerra's Strongholds circa 1000" (1979), "The Angevin Strategy of Castle-Building in the Reign of Fulk Nerra" (1983), "The Cost of Castle-Building" (1984), and "Angevin Campaign Forces in the Reign of Fulk Nerra" (1989)—are all reprinted in his *Warfare and Military Organization in Pre-Crusade Europe*. For Normandy the essential study is Gillingham's "William the Bastard at War," while an important reassessment of the nature of feudal military service is given by Chibnall in "Military Service in Normandy before 1066."

Twelfth-Century Warfare. The general context for Louis VI's campaigns is provided by Achille Luchaire and Eric Bournazel. For the warfare of the Anglo-Norman kings against both the Capetians and other French territorial princes, an essential framework is provided by Frank Barlow, C. Warren Hollister, and Judith Green. Much of the success of the Anglo-Norman kings in defending the duchy of Normandy lay both in their extensive fiscal resources and in their maintenance of an elite military household, aspects examined by J. O. Prestwich in "War and Finance in the Anglo-Norman State" and "The Military Household of the Norman Kings." Chibnall looks at the same aspects in "Mercenaries and the *Familia Regis* under Henry I." A valuable overview is Morillo's *Warfare under the Anglo-Norman Kings*. Despite its title, J. O. Prestwich's *Place of War in English History, 1066–1214* is much concerned with warfare in the continental lands of the Anglo-Norman and Angevin kings and offers numerous insights regarding the interrelation of war, government, and economy.

Little specific has been written on the military aspects of Louis VII's reign, but the wider context of his campaigns is provided by both Marcel Pacaut and Yves Sassier. Outlines of Angevin-Capetian warfare between Louis VII and Henry II are also provided by Boussard in *Le gouvernement d'Henri II Plantagenêt* and by Wilfred L. Warren, although Thomas M. Jones's *War of the Generations* remains the only dedicated study of the great war of 1173–1174 between Henry II and the coalition of his enemies headed by his own son Henry the Young King and Louis VII. Despite its insular focus, there is much of value for Henry II's military affairs in general in John Beeler's *Warfare in England*. A reassessment of Henry's generalship is now provided by John Hosler, and a valuable overview is provided by Bachrach in "L'art de la guerre Angevin." Essential for strategy and the conduct of war in northwest France in the later twelfth century are Gillingham's "Richard I and the Science of War in the Middle Ages" and "War and Chivalry in the *History of William the Marshal*." For the aristocratic ethos of chivalry, its development, and its operation, see Flori's *L'essor de la chevalerie*, Strickland's *War and Chivalry*, and Barthélemy's *La chevalerie*.

The nature of the feared Brabançon mercenary *routiers* (the antithesis of chivalry) and their deployment by the Capetians and Angevins is discussed by H. Géraud, H. Grundmann, and Boussard in "Les mercenaires au XIIe siècle."

Philip Augustus to Louis IX. For warfare under Philip II Augustus, Edouard Audouin's *Essai* of 1913 remains valuable as the first scholarly analysis of the documentary material regarding the nature of Philip's forces, and the most comprehensive survey of the reign remains Alexander Cartellieri's four-volume work of 1899–1922. More recent studies are provided by J.-F. Finó, Contamine's "L'armée de Philippe Auguste," and John W. Baldwin, who provides much of value concerning military service, castle guard, and war finance. Frederick M. Powicke's *Loss of Normandy, 1189–1204* remains the most detailed analysis of Angevin-Capetian warfare from Richard I's accession to 1204, now augmented by Vincent Moss, who draws on new work on the Norman pipe rolls. Georges Duby's *27 Juillet 1214: Le Dimanche de Bouvines* (1973; English trans., *The Legend of Bouvines*, 1990) applies the socio-economic methodologies of the *Annales* school to the history of a single medieval battle to produce a groundbreaking study, setting the battle within its

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social context and the *mentalité* (mindset or worldview) of early-thirteenth-century France, as well as exploring the evolution of the battle's place in the historical mythology of French nationalism. Studies of Bouvines with a predominantly military focus are provided by Verbruggen's *Art of Warfare*, Frank Bauer, and the first appendix of France's *Western Warfare*.

The castle construction essential to Philip II's strategy and the nature of Capetian fortification generally have been examined by Jean Yver, Alain Erlande-Brandenburg, André Châtelain, and Coulson in "Fortress Policy." Coulson's *Castles in Medieval Society* provides further essential political and social context, with extensive bibliography. The continental castle building of the Angevins is surveyed by André Debord in an article in a collection featuring many valuable case studies, and for the Angevin defenses of Poitou in the first half of the thirteenth century, see P. E. Curnow and Marie-Pierre Baudry.

The most detailed study of the future Louis VIII's expeditionary force that invaded England in 1216 remains Charles Petit-Dutaillis's *Étude* of 1894, while a good account of the 1216–1217 campaigns, including the French defeats at Lincoln and Sandwich, is provided by David Carpenter. A good overview of the campaigns of the northern French crusaders in Languedoc is provided by Jonathan Sumption, and for the battle of Muret (1213), see Martín Alvira Cabrer. The brutal nature of conduct in this theater of war is discussed by Malcolm Barber.

Louis IX's principal military energies were directed to Egypt and the Holy Land, but William Chester Jordan wrote much of value concerning recruitment, finance, and logistics. For the nature of military obligation in a territory assimilating to Capetian control, see Joseph R. Strayer's "Knight Service in Normandy." Louis's only major engagement with his Angevin rival, Henry III, is analyzed by Charles Bémont, and it is analyzed from the Angevin perspective by Robert Stacey.

Philip the Fair and the Last Capetians. A good contextual discussion of Philip the Fair's wars is given in chapter 5 of Strayer's *Reign of Philip the Fair*, with a valuable appendix, and case studies of local military obligation and supply include the articles by Louis Carolus-Barré and Philippe Wolff. For the wider impact of war, see Strayer's "The Costs and Profits of War" and "Defense of the Realm and Royal Power in France" (in *Medieval Statecraft*), as well as the work by John Bell Henneman. For French military involvement in Flanders, Frantz Funck-Brentano's *Philippe le Bel en Flandre* and Jules Viard's "La guerre de Flandre (1328)" provide useful background. The best study of the great French defeat at Courtrai in 1302, containing valuable discussion of the composition and tactics of the French army and bibliography, remains Verbruggen's *De Slag der Guldensporen* (1952; English trans., *The Battle of the Golden Spurs*, 2002); also of value are Funck-Brentano's *Mémoire*, the works by Maurice de Maere d'Aertrycke, and the work by Henri Nowé. Useful discussions of the battles of Courtrai, Mons-en-Pévèle (1304), and Cassel (1328), together with further bibliography, are provided by Kelly DeVries.

[*See also* Britain, *subentries on* Narrative (1000–1300) *and* Historiography (1000–1300), *and* Hundred Years' War.]

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Matthew Strickland

Historiography (1328–1483)

French military historiography for the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries can be a formidable subject for someone approaching the topic for the first time, owing to its extended chronology and range, as well as to a pronounced regionalism and a relative paucity of English translations. Most studies on the Valois military are in French, and the sheer range of possible topics has ensured that general studies are rare. Most scholarly work—of which there is an enormous amount—sorts into inquiries of limited chronology, scope, or geographic range. The following topical outline barely scratches the surface of a rather disparate field, one that is overdue for new translations and new major studies and syntheses.

General Studies. Edouard Perroy's *La Guerre de Cent Ans* (1945; English trans., *The Hundred Years War*, 1951) has probably done more to shape English-language interpretations of the French wars than any other book, and its account of Bertrand du Guesclin and Charles VII still fascinates. Perroy's study aside, French medieval military history is dominated by the work of Philippe Contamine, most of it on some aspect of French military endeavor. Contamine's massive study *Guerre, état, et société à la fin du Moyen Âge* stands alone in its field, and along with the histories of the Hundred Years' War written by Perroy and Jean Favier, it has guided scholarly discussion since its publication in 1972 (in 2004 the work was republished in two volumes). Contamine covers every aspect of land warfare in fourteenth- and fifteenth-century France, and his work is fundamental for understanding the nature of French recruitment and mustering, the reforms of Charles V, the importance of Louis XI in fulfilling the potential of earlier reforms, and the development of the *francs-archers* and artillery corps, as well as for the masses of raw data, charts, and compilations it contains. In 1992, Contamine produced a condensed and updated study, with bibliography, in the *Histoire militaire de la France*, in which he wrote the chapters on French medieval military history. Finally, Contamine's popular study *War in the Middle Ages* contains much French material, as well as an excellent bibliography.

Three edited works also deserve mention. The collection *Guerre et société en France, en Angleterre, et en Bourgogne XIVe–XVe siècle* (1991), edited by Contamine together with Charles Giry-Deloison, and Maurice H. Keen, contains many articles crucial to understanding the wider workings of the French military. Particularly noteworthy in that volume are Malcolm G. A. Vale's article on the strategic situation in the Anglo-French wars to 1340, Françoise Autrand's article on the battle of Poitiers, Pierre Pégeot's study of rural and urban armament, and Christopher T. Allmand's analysis of "views of the soldier" in France. In 1996, Contamine and Olivier Guyotjeannin edited a two-volume collection titled *La guerre, la violence, et les gens au Moyen Âge*, which

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contains, among others, studies on the companies in Provence, Eustache Deschamps's theories of war, the English occupation of Normandy and the Pays de l'Oise, urban and village fortification, and the armament of urban populations. In 2000, Jacques Paviot and Jacques Verger edited a series of studies in Contamine's honor that was published by the University of Paris, Sorbonne. Many of the articles in that volume deal with late medieval French military history and are mentioned below according to their various topics.

Although Jonathan Sumption's multivolume history of the Hundred Years' War is as yet incomplete, the first three volumes (1990–2009), taking the war to 1399, have already gained wide acceptance and respect for their comprehensive approach to the conflict, and they are noteworthy for the amount of detail they give to the French war effort, as well as for the depth of bibliographic references for further study. The third volume, *Divided Houses*, gives perhaps the best overview in English of the military reforms and strategy of Charles V.

The work of Michael Jones also forms a major part of the English-language work on French military activity for the central parts of the Hundred Years' War, and for Brittany in particular. His volume *The Letters, Orders, and Musters of Bertrand du Guesclin* (2004) rendered the very disparate source material for the French constable easily accessible, and although the documents themselves are not translated, they are an indispensable catalog of material. Jones's chapter "War and Fourteenth-Century France" in *Arms, Armies, and Fortifications in the Hundred Years War*, edited by Anne Curry and Michael Hughes (pp. 103–120), is an excellent assessment of urban and rural experience. His lengthy "The Defence of Medieval Brittany" (1981) and shorter "L'armée bretonne, 1449–1491" (1985) introduce the military geography and sociology of this complex duchy, which Jones has made his particular area of expertise. Further studies by Jones have been collected in the volume *Between France and England: Politics, Power, and Society in Late Medieval Brittany* (2003), although this does not include his most recent survey of the issue, "War and Diplomacy in the Making and Unmaking of the Medieval Duchy of Brittany" (2005).

Operations. The tactical organization and deployment of French armies during the first phase of the Hundred Years' War has received less attention than the later phases have—and certainly less attention relative to the volumes published on English military practice for the same period. Contamine's three major studies (*Guerre, état, et société*, *War in the Middle Ages*, and *Histoire militaire de la France*) remain the standard works on the subject. Bertrand Schnerb's brief article in Andrew Ayton and Philip Preston's *Battle of Crécy, 1346* (2005) is probably the best introduction in English to the early Valois army and is supported by several other articles in the volume, notably one by Michael Prestwich on the battle itself and Ayton's detailed examination of the chronicle accounts of the battle. The administrative and legislative sides of the early conflict are illustrated by Pierre-Clément Timbal's *La Guerre de Cent Ans vue à travers les registres du parlement (1337–1369)* (1961), which includes copious discussion and primary source material on all aspects of the French war effort, from recruitment and operations to static defense and urban and fortress strategies.

Kelly DeVries's analysis of the naval battle of Sluys ("God, Leadership, Flemings, and Archery," 1995) is a useful English introduction to French naval affairs, and his 1996 study *Infantry Warfare in the Early Fourteenth Century* is invaluable for its detailed coverage of several French military operations, especially in the Low Countries but including Crécy and Morlaix. Clifford J. Rogers's studies of La Roche Derrien ("Sir Thomas Dagworth," 2005) and Henry of Lancaster's campaign of 1345 ("The Bergerac Campaign," 2004) close important gaps in our understanding of French operations and defenses in the period of English ascendancy, and they complement Jones's French study of Thomas Dagworth (1980). Though written from an English perspective, Rogers's *War Cruel and Sharp* (2000) also provides detailed coverage of French strategy, operations, and tactics up through 1360.

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The central part of the Hundred Years' War was covered by Siméon Luce's unfinished study on Du Guesclin (*Histoire de Bertrand du Guesclin et de son époque*, 1876) and by Roland Delachenal's massive five-volume study *Histoire de Charles V* (finished 1931); more recently this part of the war has received renewed attention in studies focusing on Du Guesclin and the Great Companies. The first volume of Kenneth Fowler's *Medieval Mercenaries* (2001) remains the most thorough work to date on the subject and throughout the narrative presents the reader with a wealth of archival material to consider. Other volumes on the constable of France include more popular ones by Micheline Dupuy (*Bertrand du Guesclin*, 1970) and Richard Vernier (*The Flower of Chivalry: Bertrand du Guesclin and the Hundred Years War*, 2003).

Regarding the later segments of the war, scholarly investigation has been somewhat unevenly distributed. Not surprisingly, English scholars have dominated the discussion of French operations for the Agincourt campaign, Contamine's studies excepted. Starting with Alfred H. Burne's *The Agincourt War* (1959), the conversation was renewed in the 1980s with the discovery of the much-discussed "French plan of battle" for Agincourt. This was extensively analyzed in 1984 by Christopher Phillpotts and in 2005 by Anne Curry, as well as in Matthew Strickland and Robert Hardy's 2005 study *The Great Warbow*, a volume that also contains excellent short treatments of many of the battles involving French armies in this period. The most comprehensive narrative analysis of French operations is probably Juliet Barker's *Agincourt* (2005), while Clifford J. Rogers's lengthy analysis of the battle takes exception to Curry's reduced figures for the French army ("The Battle of Agincourt," 2008).

The recovery of the French military and realm has been rather more thoroughly investigated, with Jean-Francois Lassalmonie's article on the deployment of the Compagnies d'Ordonnance during the War of the Public Weal (published in Paviot and Verger) charting their maneuvers in ways that complement Contamine's logistical analysis in the *Histoire militaire*. DeVries's *Joan of Arc* (1999) and Françoise Michaud-Fréjaville's article on Joan as *chef de guerre* (in Paviot and Verger) consider the Maid of Orléans within the context of French command structures. Finally, Allmand's study of desertion in France, England, and Burgundy (in Paviot and Verger) sheds light on an oft-overlooked aspect of campaigning, as does Jean Devaux's brief survey of foodstuffs, supply, and pillage.

For French naval operations, a recent general survey is Michel Mollat du Jourdin's chapters in the first volume of Contamine's *Histoire militaire*. Anne Merlin-Chazelas's *Documents relatifs* (1977–1978) is in many ways the standard documentary study on northern maritime affairs. The classic naval study is Charles de La Roncière's six-volume *Histoire de la marine Française*, of which the second volume (1914) is devoted to the Hundred Years' War; after about a century, it retains considerable value.

Culture, Society, and Economy. The role of French martial culture and social rank in warfare has been extensively covered in French and English. Richard Kaeuper has devoted considerable attention to the *Livre de chevalerie* of Geoffroi de Charny, most notably in the volume produced in 1996 with Elspeth Kennedy. Steven Muhlberger has worked on Charny's *Demandes* and their relation to French chivalric culture and military practice. Contamine's article on Jean Froissart and the military arts (1981) is an important one on this most popular chronicler, and Contamine's brief study of Philippe de Mézières's attitude toward warfare (in Hans-Henning Kortüm, ed., *Krieg im Mittelalter*, 2001) is also valuable. Two further articles by Contamine, "The French Nobility and the War" (1971) and "Points de vue sur la chevalerie" (1976), on the chivalric class at the end of the Middle Ages, deserve mention as well. James Magee's analysis of Mézières's crusading advocacy under Charles VI gives an impression of French military efforts in crusading, of which the best overview is Norman Housley's *The Later Crusades* (1992). Housley has also published in French and English on Jean II le Meingre, Marshal Boucicaut, including a 2003 article that is a good introduction to the marshal, whose medieval biography was critically prepared by Denis Lalande in 1988. John Bell

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Henneman's 1978 article "The Military Class and the French Monarchy in the Late Middle Ages" outlines the attitudes of the French nobility, backbone of the army, toward the French crown, and Michael Jones has considered analogous social issues in his study of careers in the Breton army in the fifteenth century ("L'armée bretonne").

The impact of war on French society was considered broadly in *The Recovery of France in the Fifteenth Century* (1971), edited by P. S. Lewis and translated from the French by G. F. Martin, particularly in the article by Robert Boutruche on rural devastation and recovery and in André Bossuat's essay on the enforcement of public order under Charles VII. The theme of warfare and destruction has long dominated French scholarship, dating from Henri Denifle's two-volume study *La désolation des églises, monastères, et hopitaux en France pendant la Guerre de Cent Ans* (1897–1899), which relentlessly cataloged the material losses endured by French society. The subject has also been considered by Michael C. Jones in an article collected in Curry and Hughes and by Clifford J. Rogers in "By Fire and Sword," his chapter in *Civilians in the Path of War* (2002). Nicholas Wright's 1998 study on the relationship between armies and the French populace is especially important, both as analysis and as an overview of a complex topic. It has, unfortunately, found relatively few imitators, though an article by Anne Curry on burghers and soldiers in Mantes during the Lancastrian occupation (in Paviot and Verger) deals with similar themes, as does Jean Favier's analysis of the English occupation of Paris (in the same volume).

Fortifications and Finance. Though most studies treat them separately, fortification and finance were often intertwined. In the late 1970s three major catalogs of French fortifications appeared thanks to Charles-Laurent Salch and his various collaborators: *L'atlas des châteaux forts en France* (1977), *L'atlas des villes et villages fortifiés en France (Moyen Âge)* (1978), and *Dictionnaire des châteaux et des fortifications du Moyen Âge en France* (1979). With the more popular four-volume *Châteaux et guerriers de la France au Moyen Âge* by Jacques Tealdi and others (1980–1981), Salch's works form starting references for the history, geography, and development of fortifications in medieval France.

Many articles have addressed the dynamics of fortification, most notably Contamine's 1978 analysis of the financial and economic aspects of construction ("Les fortifications urbaines") and Christiane Raynaud's lengthy article on fortifications in late illuminations (in Kortüm). Jim Bradbury's *The Medieval Siege* (1992) considers many of these fortifications from the opposite perspective and is an excellent reference tool for French sieges in the Late Middle Ages. The classic English-language study of French war finance remains John Bell Henneman's *Royal Taxation in Fourteenth-Century France: The Development of War Financing, 1322–1356* (1971), continued in his later volumes on John II (*Royal Taxation in Fourteenth-Century France: The Captivity and Ransom of John II, 1356–1370*, 1976) and on Olivier de Clisson (*Olivier de Clisson and Political Society in France under Charles V and Charles VI*, 1996). Nathan Sussman's 1993 article on debasements and inflation in the period of Henry V's invasion extends coverage to the fifteenth century, and both his and Henneman's works provide useful bibliographic overviews of the extensive literature in French and English.

The Military Revolution. Finally, late medieval France's place in the "military revolution" debate needs to be outlined. Many of the works mentioned above involve themselves in some way with the institutional, technological, and sociological changes associated with the "military revolution," however that term is defined. In general, French historians have tended to put less emphasis on the technological and more emphasis on the institutional and sociological aspects of change—as Contamine's chapters in the *Histoire militaire* and Jean Chagniot's study on the advent of "modern" warfare suggest (*Guerre et société à l'époque moderne*, 2001). Research into the composition and deployment of the *compagnies* and the reforms of Charles VII also tend to concentrate as much on sociological and broad operational features as on the technological development of Valois artillery. English-language scholarship, dominating

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the debate, normally places the French "revolutions" roughly at 1494, with Charles VIII's invasion of Italy and the confrontation of siege artillery with Italian fortifications. For nuanced, medievalist perspective on what is very much an early-modernist debate, the basic work remains Clifford Rogers's "The Military Revolutions of the Hundred Years War" (1993), which notes some of the challenges and obstructions to French infantry development and the growth of the artillery arm.

The above discussion omits mention of Burgundian military affairs, although these were closely related to French developments. Richard Vaughan's four volumes on the Valois dukes of Burgundy—*Philip the Good* (1970), *Philip the Bold* (1962), *John the Fearless* (1966), and *Charles the Bold* (1973)—contain extensive discussions of campaigns and exhaustive bibliographies. Jacques Paviot's *La politique navale des ducs de Bourgogne, 1384–1482* (1995) is an important corollary to Mollat du Jourdin's work on the French navy, while Robert Douglas Smith and Kelly DeVries's *Artillery of the Dukes of Burgundy, 1363–1477* (2005) has much of related interest for French artillery as well. Malcolm Vale's study *War and Chivalry* (1981), though dealing mainly with Burgundy, discusses the practice and ethos of warfare in France as well and remains an indispensable reference for the details of late medieval armor, tactics, and martial ethos.

[*See also* Britain, *subentry on* Historiography (1300–1500); Chivalry; *and* Hundred Years' War.]

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Daniel P. Franke

FRANKFURT, BATTLE OF

In the wake of the deposition of Emperor Frederick II by Pope Innocent IV in 1245, the kingdom of Germany was divided between supporters of the papacy and those who remained allied to the Hohenstaufen. As propapal rival to Frederick II, Henry Raspe, landgrave

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of Thuringia, was elected as king in Veitshöchheim near Würzburg on 22 May 1246. Two months later, he was accompanied by the archbishops of Cologne, Mainz, and Trier on the way to Frankfurt, where a diet was to be held on 25 July. However, his entry into the city was blocked by King Conrad IV, Frederick's son, with an army of about three thousand men. Both sides set up camp beside the Nidda River near its confluence with the Main River on 31 July. After a few days of waiting, Raspe began the hostilities on 5 August. Conrad IV was supported by ships from Worms but was decisively weakened by the betrayal of the Swabian counts Ulrich I of Württemberg and Hartmann I of Grüningen, who retreated from the battle with two thousand mounted knights and crossbowmen. According to the account of Walter of Ocra, Conrad continued the battle with his remaining thousand knights until, having lost approximately two hundred men, he pulled back into the city of Frankfurt, where he organized the retreat of his army into southern Germany. The historical sources give no clear indication as to whether Frankfurt capitulated to Raspe, but it seems unlikely that this was the case. The accounts of the number of prisoners taken by Raspe vary considerably, between 400 and 1,000, and Raspe himself claims to have captured 624 prisoners. The numerical strength of his own army is not stated.

After the battle of Frankfurt, Raspe officially confiscated the duchy of Swabia and all the German possessions of Conrad IV, who, however, managed to maintain his position in the traditional Hohenstaufen bastions of Swabia and in the Rhine-Main area. Raspe fell sick during the siege of Ulm in January 1247 and withdrew to his homeland in Thuringia, where he died on 16 February 1247.

[*See also* Frederick II.]

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Translated from the German by Duane Henderson

FRANKS, CAROLINGIAN

[*This entry contains three subentries, on Carolingian sources from 751–899, an overview of Carolingian military history from 751–899, and on Carolingian historiography from 751–899.*]

Sources (751–899)

To take the period between 751 and 899 when speaking about sources for the Carolingian wars is problematic. The year 751, when Pépin the Short was crowned king of the Franks and the last Merovingian ruler was deposed, marks a clear dividing line in political history today. But nevertheless, this event did not loom so large in the contemporary sources. Carolingian annals start either with 687 (the battle of Tertry), 714 (the start of Charles Martel's term as mayor of the palace), or with 741 (the start of the rule as mayors of the palace of Martel's sons, Pépin III and his brother Carloman). Also many military activities in Merovingian times had already been organized by the Carolingian mayors of the palace in the seventh and eighth centuries.

For the time before and after 751, readers must always reckon with the ever-present Carolingian viewpoint from which history is described. There are no impartial and objective reports about the wars the Carolingians led. The bias of the so-called *Royal Frankish Annals* (*Annales Regni Francorum*), which open with the year 741, is particularly strong.

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They were written from 787 to 793 in one step and afterward updated year by year until 829. They present all the campaigns of the Carolingians as wars in the name of God, which therefore quite naturally ended only with victories. Defeats, such as the long-lasting war of Charlemagne against the Saxons, were either not mentioned or played down. Most significant in this sense is the great defeat of Charlemagne's rear guard in the Pyrenees, which according to other sources, such as the so-called Einhard's Annals (*Annales qui dicuntur Einhardi*) (not written by Einhard himself) or Einhard's famous *Life of Charlemagne*, weighed heavily on the emperor's mind. However, no word about this defeat appears in the *Royal Frankish Annals*.

Especially in the parts that refer to events before 793, readers must refer to other sources such as Einhard's Annals to obtain more detailed information about Charlemagne's strategic thinking or the sometimes uncoordinated attacks of Frankish warriors on the battlefield. Nevertheless, the *Royal Frankish Annals* sometimes provide significant insight into the role of Frankish elite warriors, the so-called *scarae* (units of highly mobile mounted warriors), as well as the building of a lighthouse at the Channel coast on nearby Boulogne with a fire at its top in the night. For the period after 793, the annals became more and more detailed; they tell much about the military necessities of a great empire whose long frontiers had to be defended against numerous enemies and that had already lost its offensive military power and could therefore only react against the invasions.

It is characteristic that the *Royal Frankish Annals* suffered the same fate as the empire. When the unity of the empire was lost, annals viewing the Carolingian Empire as a whole disappear; the political division was reflected in the division of the former *Reichsannalen* (Imperial Annals). In the West, the so-called *Annales Bertiniani* describe events from a more specific West-Frankish point of view starting in 862, often flavored with bitter personal comments by the author Archbishop Hincmar of Reims (d. 882) about the military incapacities of the Carolingian rulers. In the East, the *Annales Fuldenses* present events from a typical Eastern Frankish point of view. Relatively little insight into the military realities can be gained through the reading of the biographies of Charlemagne (768–814) by Einhard and of his son Louis the Pious (814–840) by Thegan and the Astronomus (Astronomer). Einhard is more interested in the political results of the different wars than in the warfare itself. The wars Charlemagne led are only examples for the perseverance of the emperor, which was in the eyes of Einhard his most outstanding quality. Definitely pessimistic is the assessment of Louis's military abilities by his biographer Thegan. The most realistic and vivid impressions of Carolingian warfare are found in the biography written by the anonymous Astronomus. He describes special tactics used by Carolingian warriors, such as marching under cover of night and lying quiet in forests at day, crossing rivers using transportable ships, and so on. He also describes the bitterness of civil wars in the 930s when the brothers were struggling for their heritages.

One might expect many interesting details concerning contemporary warfare from an author who as an (illegitimate) member of the Carolingian family and also as a commander was personally involved in the civil war after the death of Louis the Pious. But frustratingly little information is available from the *Histories* of Nithard (d. 844), who himself, as a grandson of Charlemagne, fought on the side of Charles the Bald and Louis the German against the Emperor Lothair in the famous battle of Fontenoy in 841. He narrates only events leading up to and after the battle, saying almost nothing about the battle itself, other than noting his own significant role in winning the battle. He clearly intends to describe this battle as a trial by ordeal, but a careful reading suggests that the end of the battle was more or less ambiguous, which is also confirmed by the so-called *Rhythmus Angilberti*, a poem written by a partisan of the Emperor Lothair. It is difficult, if not impossible, to reconstruct the military reality by using epic texts. Nevertheless, they do include realistic details, because the audiences of such epic works expected a certain verisimilitude in descriptions of contemporary warfare. Such

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is the case in the great epic *In honorem Hludowici christianissimi Caesaris Augusti* (In honor of the most Christian Emperor Louis) consisting of about twenty-six hundred verses written by Ermoldus Nigellus (Ermold the Black) coming from Aquitania in 920. It described other events of the Frankish intervention in the frontier area in the Pyrenees, ending with the conquest of Barcelona in 801 under the nominal command of Louis, and the later interventions of the emperor in Brittany (the last one in 824). In this context of epic sources, it is necessary to mention also the impressive report of the siege of Paris by the Norsemen (885/886) written in hexameters by Abbo, a monk of Saint-Germain-des-Prés and therefore an eyewitness of the siege, only a few years later.

Besides the historiographical and epic sources of which only the most important could be noted here, charters of the Carolingians rulers exist, and last but not least the famous documents called capitularies (named after the division of their texts into several chapters, or *capitula*). These capitularies have been especially useful for information on how the Carolingians organized warfare. For example, there were capitularies that defined the minimum of armament for warriors and the demand for transport capacities. Capitularies play a central role when discussing a fundamental problem: how and to what extent the Carolingian rulers could rely on defined military obligations for the *liberi* (the free commoners). Finally, historians often discuss very specific documents such as the so-called *De Ordine Palatii* (Concerning the Organization of the Palace), written in the ninth century by two members of the ruling elite, Adalhard of Corbie and Hincmar of Reims, which inform us about *milites expediti*, elite warriors kept in the royal household as a sort of rapid deployment force.

[*See also* Einhard; Franks, Merovingian, *subentry on* Sources (482–751); *and* Louis I.]

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Hans-Henning Kortüm

Narrative (751–899)

Warfare was endemic in Carolingian times. In the following survey the main wars are documented for each generation of Carolingian kings, starting with

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Carolingian Franks. A group of knights pledge their allegiance to King Charlemagne (742–814). Illustration from a Venetian codex, fourteenth century. BIBLIOTECA MARCIANA, VENICE, ITALY/GIRAUDON/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

the first and ending with the sixth. Because a full understanding of Carolingian warfare can be gained only by looking closely at the historical context, the second part of this essay treats the wars of the Carolingians in a more comprehensive structural fashion.

Chronological Overview. Modern historiography commonly organizes the chronology of Carolingian history by the different generations of Carolingian rulers.

First Generation: King Pépin the Short (r. 751–768). The first war of Pépin III, "the Short," was an expedition over the Alps with a relatively small army against the Lombard king Aistulf in 754. The war ended with the encirclement of Aistulf's capital, Pavia, and a forced peace treaty. Two years later, in 756, a new war broke out, and again Pavia was besieged by Frankish troops. A new peace treaty was made: this one included territorial concessions by Aistulf to Pépin's ally, the pope. In 759 the Mediterranean coastal region around Narbonne (the former Gallia Narbonensis, later called Septimania) was brought under Frankish dominance. From 760 until 768, Pépin campaigned almost every year in the Aquitanian region to the west. In 762 the important city Bourges was conquered; in the 768 campaign the Aquitanian duke Waifar was killed.

Second generation: King and Emperor Charlemagne (r. 768–814). Pépin's son Charlemagne presided over an age of full-scale warfare that was directed against the same enemies as in former times. In 769, Frankish troops again invaded Aquitaine, and a relative of Waifar's, Hunoald (his son?), was surrendered to Charlemagne. In 774 the Lombards were finally eliminated after a long-lasting encirclement of Pavia. Desiderius, their king, was deposed by Charlemagne.

More challenging was the thirty-year fight against the Saxons. This began in summer 775 with a campaign that by the next year yielded remarkable territorial gains in West Saxony. The year 778, however,

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was disastrous for the Franks. On 15 August the rear guard of Charlemagne's army was crushed by Muslims at Roncesvalles in the Pyrenees (the defeat celebrated in the famous *Chanson de Roland*), and in the same year Saxon resistance emerged under the command of Duke Widukind as a sort of guerrilla warfare. The year 782 also saw heavy fighting, including an unexpected Frankish defeat at Süntel near the river Weser and the merciless killing of many Saxon prisoners of war at Verden on the river Aller. Between 783 and 785 many pitched battles occurred along with small-scale warfare, ending with a Frankish victory symbolized through the baptism of Widukind at Christmas 785.

In 786–787, Charlemagne once again invaded Italy to seek the submission of the Lombard duchies in the south, Capua and Benevento. In 787 the deposition of Duke Tassilo III of Bavaria was enforced through a Frankish invasion. After careful planning, the conquest of the realm of the Avars was begun in 791 with a coordinated operation involving separate Frankish armies departing from the Bavarian capital, Regensburg, under Charlemagne and from northern Italy under Charlemagne's son Pépin. Operations against the last isolated Avar war bands ended no later than 803. Between 794 and 799, Charlemagne once again had to face Saxon resistance, which he overcame militarily by troop actions, legally by tightened penal legislation, and socially by forced relocation of Saxon people.

After 800, Charlemagne sought to organize border warfare against enemies who were threatening the Frankish frontiers, such as the Muslims in the Pyrenean regions. Frankish troops conquered Barcelona in 801, but it proved impossible to repel the Vikings from raiding the Carolingian frontiers in the north and west—Normandy, Flanders, Friesland, and the valleys of the Eider and the Elbe. The region between the Elbe River in the south and the Eider River in the north, so-called Nordalbingia, was heavily disputed between Charlemagne and the Danish Vikings. After the final defeats of the Saxons in 804, Charlemagne sought an alliance with the Slavic tribe called the Obodrites, who were permitted to establish their dominance in Nordalbingia. Nevertheless this region was under permanent threat by the Vikings, who invaded it in 808. Until the death of Charlemagne, Nordalbingia was an embattled area; the Franks led several campaigns to repel the attacks of the Danes and of other allied Slavic tribes. One cannot speak of sustained Frankish campaigns, but only of limited defensive actions against roving war bands.

Third generation: Emperor Louis the Pious (r. 814–840). As emperor, Charlemagne's surviving son, Louis I, "the Pious," did not engage in active war campaigns as his father had. Instead his reign involved difficult frontier struggles against the Norsemen, the Saracen pirates on the Mediterranean coasts, Bretons in the west (824), and Muslim incursions in the Spanish March (827). Louis never achieved any important military success, and during the 830s his own authority as commander was repeatedly disputed, as in 833 when many of his own troops went over to the camp of his rebellious sons.

Fourth generation: Emperor Lothair I, King Louis the German, and King Charles the Bald, from 840 to 877. Apart from isolated counterattacks against the Norsemen, warfare during the fourth Carolingian generation was dominated by internal wars among the offspring of Louis the Pious. Initially a coalition of Louis the German (Louis II of East Francia) and Charles the Bald (Charles II of West Francia) defeated Emperor Lothair I at the great battle of Fontenoy, near Auxerre (841), with heavy losses for all parties. All three kings were unable to protect their kingdoms against Norse attacks, which were especially directed against rich monasteries such as Jumièges and Saint-Wandrille (841) and against cities such as Rouen (841), Quentovic (near Étaples, 842, 844), Nantes (843), Paris (845), and Bordeaux (848). In the south a combined Frankish-Italian campaign was organized in 848 to oppose the Saracen warriors who threatened not only Lombard duchies like Salerno and Benevento but even Rome, the residence of the pope and the emperor.

In 853, Louis the German was invited by political opponents of Charles the Bald, his brother and

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former ally, to overthrow Charles and assume the throne of West Francia. Because Louis was militarily tied down on the eastern front, he instead sent his son Louis the Younger to western France for a short-lived invasion of the realm of his uncle Charles. Louis renewed this campaign in 858–859 but again found no backing among the West Frankish nobility. During that period the two brothers avoided the risk of a major field encounter.

Meanwhile on the eastern frontier, Louis the German and his sons Louis the Younger and especially Carloman were engaged in bitter and damaging border warfare against the Slavs, including the Sorbs, Obodrites, and Moravians. These struggles lasted from the late 850s through 874 when a peace agreement with the Moravian leader Svatopluk was concluded that guaranteed the formal independence of Moravia. After the death of his brother Louis the German in 876, Charles the Bald seized the opportunity to annex eastern Lotharingia and even some territories in the western Rhine region, but he was forced to retreat following a disastrous defeat at the hands of Louis the Younger at the battle of Andernach (876).

Fifth generation: King Carloman, King Louis the Younger, Charles the Fat, and Louis II, from 877 to 888. Constant and mostly successful Viking attacks continued to plague the succeeding Carolingians of the late ninth century. The invaders even intensified their military pressure, especially in the Maas (Meuse)-Scheldt region of what is now Belgium. Frankish warriors were frequently vanquished by the Norsemen, as in summer 880 when the West Frankish arch-chancellor Gauzlin and his warriors suffered a defeat defending their northern frontier. So it was a remarkable exception when in 881 Louis III, the son of Louis II (the son of Charles the Bald), won a victory at Saucourt in the Somme Delta that gave him great prestige but had little strategic consequence. The Franks appeared to be in a hopeless position in November 885 when Paris was besieged by the Vikings, who by now possessed all the logistical and technical skills to conclude such an enterprise. The emperor Charles III, "the Fat," eventually came to the city's aid, but he was unable to relieve Paris after his most effective commander, Henry of Franconia, was killed in a Norman ambush in October 886. The city was spared only through a peace treaty that permitted the Vikings to plunder southern Burgundy during the winter of 886–887.

Sixth generation: Arnulf, King of East Francia and Holy Roman Emperor (r. 887–899). Arnulf of Carinthia, son of Louis the German's son Carloman, King of Bavaria, achieved his undisputed dominance as king and emperor through his military achievements and great energy. In 888 he ventured into Alsace to force the new king of Burgundy, Rudolf I, to abandon his claim to Lotharingia. In 891 he won a greater battle at the river Dijle (Dyle) near Leuven (Louvain) against the Norsemen; in 894 he marched over the Alps and conquered the north Italian city of Bergamo; returning, he systematically devastated the Burgundian realm of his old enemy Rudolf. In 895–896, Arnulf invaded Italy once again and reached Rome, where in February 896 he was crowned emperor by Pope Formosus, his political ally. On his return, however, a crippling stroke put an end to his military activities.

Analysis. Wars were undertaken by members of the Carolingian family from the early 600s until 987 when the new Capetian dynasty finally began to rule over the western part of the empire. Nevertheless there are convincing reasons to focus on the years 751–899. From 751 the former Carolingian mayors of the palace could wage their wars as anointed kings, officially recognized as such by the Roman pope. From 800 to 899 several members of the Carolingians even received the title *imperator* (emperor), which strengthened their position in terms of prestige, but also committed them to fulfill the duties and expectations that came with this prestigious title. After 899 it was not for sixty years that another emperor sat on the famous throne of Charlemagne, and he was from another dynasty, the Ottonians. The remainder of this essay describes the wars of this period, the causes of war, the makeup of the armies, and the strategies and tactics used.

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The wars of the Carolingians. It is possible to distinguish between two different periods of Carolingian warfare. First, from 751 to about 800, were the wars of expansion and political domination or supremacy led by Pépin III and his son Charlemagne. The Carolingian rulers inherited these wars largely from Charles Martel. For example, wars were fought nearly every year in the 760s against Aquitaine, which in 768 was finally brought under Carolingian control. Under Charlemagne new wars of naked aggression—directed against territories never previously dominated by the Carolingians—were conducted beyond the Pyrenees. These efforts ultimately established a sort of cordon sanitaire, the so-called Spanish March, against the Muslims who ruled most of Spain. The same could be said of the wars against the Lombards in northern Italy. They began shortly after the visit of Pope Stephen II to Pépin in 754 and officially ended with the conquest of the Lombard capital, Pavia, by the army of Charlemagne, who from 774 bore the title King of the Franks and the Lombards.

The wars against the Avars in Pannonia (in modern Austria and Hungary) were unquestionably wars of expansion. They began in 791 and ended with the destruction of the so-called Ring—the Avars' fortified capital between Carinthia and the Danube—and the death of the khan, the Avar ruler, through a campaign led by Charlemagne's son Pépin of Italy in 796. Another manifest war of expansion was the thirty-year campaign of Charlemagne against the Saxons. This began in 772 with a campaign into the western parts of Saxony (today called Westphalia and Lower Saxony) and ended only in 803. Because this war was accompanied by proselytization and the Christianization of the Saxons, the Carolingian rulers could present it as a religious, and therefore just, war.

The year 800 marks a sharp dividing line in the nature of Carolingian warfare. After 800 the Carolingians led no comparable offensive wars against their neighbors. The ninth century constituted a second long period of defensive frontier warfare against more or less aggressive neighbors. Because the main enemies, the Norsemen or Vikings, were highly mobile, Carolingian rulers faced many problems in organizing an effective resistance. This period is characterized by frequent Viking raids and incursions into the Carolingian empire. Military logistics at that time were fairly primitive, so it was practically impossible for rulers such as Louis the Pious to organize effective defenses of their frontiers while residing at their favorite residences or hunting in their forests. Because the wars of defense were organized mainly by the members of the imperial aristocracy and by members of the local aristocracy, one can no longer speak of wars led by the Carolingians. The occasional Carolingian ruler's personal victory against the Vikings, like that of the West Frankish king Louis III at Saucourt in 881, was an exception. The campaigns of Louis the Pious against the Bretons (up to 824) had no success.

Meanwhile at the eastern frontiers, political supremacy over the Slavs could no longer be sustained. After 800 even Charlemagne had to cooperate with the Obodrites, a Slavic tribe in the Elbe region, because he needed their support against the Danish king Gottfried, whose aggressive alliance with the Slavic Wilzen (sworn enemies of the Obodrites) was feared by the Franks. Carolingian rulers frequently concluded their campaigns by buying off the enemy and giving him great territories, as in 850 when Emperor Lothair I gave much of Frisia to the Norsemen, or in 886 when Emperor Charles the Fat led an army against the Norsemen who were besieging Paris. Charles risked no battle but gave the Norsemen express permission to go into nearby Burgundy to plunder and ravage. Under King Louis the German of East Francia, his three sons had to fight frontier wars against the Moravians, a Slavic tribe living east of Bohemia. In 874, Louis the German had to conclude a peace treaty that guaranteed their independence.

The Carolingian rulers invested most of their resources in the civil wars of the ninth century, beginning with the succession struggles of the 830s involving Louis the Pious and his sons Pépin I of Aquitaine, Emperor Lothair I, and Louis the German—all of whom resented the old emperor's plan to give Charles the Bald, his youngest son

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(b. 823) by his second wife, a significant portion of the empire. Therefore they sought to alter the fixed division plan of 817. The fluid fraternal coalitions are beyond the scope of this essay. Only the famous battle of Fontenoy, fought near Auxerre in Burgundy in 841, must be noted. This was perhaps the cruelest battle of the civil wars that followed the death of Louis the Pious. It was devastating for the high aristocracy, which lost many members on the battlefield. After the battle, which ended with an ambiguous victory for Charles the Bald and Louis the German over their brother the emperor Lothair I, the empire broke into three parts, defined by the Treaty of Verdun in 843. Dynastic warfare nevertheless continued among the Carolingians as each brother sought a greater part of Charlemagne's empire at the expense of the others.

In 853, Louis the German was invited by a group of Aquitanian nobles to become their ruler at the expense of their king Charles the Bald, but Louis sent only his son Louis the Younger, who had no success and therefore had to return. In 858, Louis the German was again invited by a group of nobles into the realm of his brother Charles the Bald. This time he accepted the invitation himself, marching into the West Carolingian realm and spending the winter of 858–859 at the royal palace of Ponthion. The occupation was abandoned in 859 when most of the German warriors decided to go home.

Territorial struggles continued in 869 when the king of Lotharingia, Lothair II, died without legitimate issue. Charles the Bald was the first to come into Lotharingia, where he was crowned and anointed, but his brother Louis the German reacted forcefully, and therefore a treaty was concluded to divide the territory between them. Charles's new-won prestige as an emperor crowned by the pope in Rome (875), plus the death of his brother Louis the German (876), seduced Charles to march into East Francia, the realm of his three nephews. But he was beaten by one of them, Louis the Younger, in a battle near Andernach at the Rhine in 876 and had to retreat hastily.

Causes of war. Why were all these wars fought among the Carolingians? It is necessary at the outset to distinguish not only the period—before or after 800—but also the different levels of the actors: high aristocrats; the other nobles, who appear in the sources as *mediocres*; and finally the various ranks of ordinary warriors. First, the rulers themselves: Did the Carolingians have a grand strategy? Did they really want to "reconstruct" the ancient *regnum Francorum*, as Bernard S. Bachrach argues? It seems more plausible that they were simply making rational choices from among various military options in pursuit of political ends. For example, Pépin the Short was obliged to wage war against the Lombards after he had been visited by the pope, who in 754 personally crossed the Alps seeking an alliance against his enemies. Pépin had to fulfill his part of the treaty. He had no alternative if he wanted to retain his title (since 751) as *rex*. Therefore he fought against the Lombards in 754 and 756, even when this created serious resistance among his nobility and their warriors, who viewed the Lombards as old friends and allies. This resistance may explain why Pépin mustered only a small army against the Lombards.

It was also quite natural for Pépin to march into Aquitaine almost annually. His father, Charles Martel, had fought constantly against the Aquitanians, making the struggle part of Pépin's heritage. Aquitaine, with its attractive Roman-founded cities, highly developed agriculture, and rich landowners, was an attractive destination for the whole warrior class, who undoubtedly felt themselves militarily superior to the Aquitanians. Warfare in the eighth century was much less risky than in the ninth century, when new aggressors, like the Vikings, raised the danger level. In Aquitaine, Carolingian warriors could reasonably expect a good return on their military investments. All the enemies of the Carolingians until 800—including the Lombards, the Aquitanians, the Bavarians, the Avars, and even the Saxons—were militarily inferior to them.

The endemic Carolingian warfare between 741 and 800 could also be explained by the doubtfully legitimate dynasty's need to boost its prestige through successful campaigning. The deposition of the last Merovingian king in 751 could rightly be seen as

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a coup d'état, and therefore the Carolingians had to prove themselves the better kings. Guy Halsall has convincingly demonstrated that early medieval rulers felt a strong need to go to war early in their reigns. The same pattern applies for a new ruling family. Military success could legitimize a new dynasty. The ideal for a king was to reign actively. Carolingian intellectuals derived the word *rex* from *regere* (to act as king), which originally derives from *agere* (to act). Thus *regere* means, not simply to be king, but to act as king, that is, to rule actively. A king was a ruler who acted like a king. Kings doing nothing, like the later Merovingians, were no kings at all, and could be deposed by rivals within the dynasty or the high nobility.

Evidently many Carolingian rulers lost the feeling that they had to act forcefully because they were kings. They believed that they could delegate the duty of waging wars to their principal commanders, the *duces* (dukes). Through such delegation, however, the later Carolingians lost the prestige of ancestors like Charles Martel, Pépin the Short, and Charlemagne. Charles the Fat's attempt to relieve the siege of Paris in 885–886 offers a good example. When his commander, Duke Henry of Franconia, was killed in a Norse ambush, the emperor found himself helpless. As the *Annals of Saint-Vaast* put it, "Because the duke was dead, Charles did nothing that was useful." This assessment of the military situation in 886—when Charles possessed a great relief force before Paris—is a devastating one. In the eyes of the annalist the emperor (ideally even more puissant than a *rex*) does not deserve his title. Accomplishing nothing, he is a useless ruler, like the last Merovingian king, Childeric III, who therefore had to be deposed.

A newly acquired title could impose a heavy burden for the medieval ruler, committing the bearer to do something outstanding, like crush the enemy by waging war. Thus following his imperial coronation in Rome in 875, the fifty-two-year-old Charles the Bald decided to invade the realm of his brother Louis the German. According to the East Frankish *Annales Fuldenses*, Charles declared that he would "do incredible things against his brother and his realm. He would bring together such a plenty of horses that they would drink out the whole Rhine so that he could go over the Rhine without getting his feet wet. Afterward he would completely devastate the realm of his brother." In other words, Charles promised his warriors that he would reign in a most active way. He was forced to do so because his new title obliged him to do something imperial.

Carolingian warfare often sprang from the mere appetite to have more than someone else, typically a dynastic rival. In the *Annales Fuldenses* a whole chapter is devoted to an apologia for Louis the German's campaign to West Francia in 858–859. It blames Charles the Bald, West Francia's king, for doing nothing against the rapacious, plundering Norsemen. In other words, Charles is a *rex inutilis*, a useless king. Remarkably, the annalist, writing during the reign of Louis, speaks of people who freely condemned the invasion undertaken by their own king. Evidently they saw through the king and his counselors, who wanted to legitimate the war by pretended concern for their West Frankish neighbors, oppressed (allegedly) in a double way—by the Norsemen and by their own king, Charles the Bald. People in the eastern part of the former empire recognized that Louis's desire to augment his territory was really behind his decision to attack his western neighbor. This is a clear indication that public opinion could not always be influenced by court propaganda. Moreover, that Louis and his counselors were irritated by this negative reaction shows that public opinion was a significant political factor.

Makeup of the armies. Who were the soldiers who actually fought in these ceaseless wars? Force composition differed with the time and place. Let us begin with the generally accepted facts.

First we must abandon the old-fashioned romantic view—a misguided interpretation of the *Germania* of the Roman historian Tacitus, written about 98 C.E.—of Germans who fought willingly and with great enthusiasm out of their inherent love for war. Tacitus's purpose was not so much to give an accurate and rounded picture of the contemporary Germanic tribes as to offer his contemporaries an

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example of prowess and bravery that the degenerate Romans ought to imitate.

Second, there exists a strong bond between ownership of land and military obligation. This can be seen in some of the legislative capitularies of Charlemagne and his heirs. The Carolingian rulers fixed the military obligation of free Franks according to their wealth, measured by the number of *mansi* (manorial holdings) they had at their disposal. That is, the military obligation was property-based. Modern research (for instance, by Walter Goffart) has made it clear that most likely these *mansi* were tributary units from which the owner could expect an income, because they were also "given out" to other people who lived and worked on these properties. The more *mansi* that a free Frank could dispense to other people, the more income he received, and likewise the greater the amount of his military obligation to the king. A free Frank who had only one *mansus* to dispense was not in a position to fulfill the expensive duty of unpaid military service. Therefore it was expressly permitted—indeed required—by the Carolingians that several Franks could band together and send one of their number to fulfill the military service for them.

It is doubtful whether this highly bureaucratic system could work effectively in reality. Much time would have been needed for such a mobilization, and both the numerical strength and the military quality of such a general levy would be uncertain. Carolingian rulers likely lacked confidence in such troops and preferred instead to collect a tax from landowners, as was done by Charles the Bald several times during the 860s and 870s. His realm was in a difficult situation, with Norse warrior bands raiding his kingdom almost every year. Charles preferred to buy them off rather than to organize military resistance. To secure the necessary funds, Charles levied a tax on landowners, whose wealth continued to be measured by the number of *mansi* they possessed. Thus the military power of the Carolingians seems to have rested primarily on the expectations of the warrior class that they could get a good return on their investment in military service and equipment. When this return seemed uncertain, the warriors might even abandon their commander, as the troops of Louis the German did at the end of 858, no longer willing to stay in the country they had invaded under his command some months before. The East Frankish annalist did not even mention any sort of fine for this unauthorized desertion, known as *harisliz*, a great offense under Frankish law.

For the warriors a good return on investment consisted both in rich plunder and perhaps also in the opportunity to transgress moral norms. For the high nobility, return on investment meant having the heredity of their benefices guaranteed by the ruler, as in 877 when Charles the Bald had to confirm the vassals' estates before ordering them a second time to Italy. As for the general levy to which all able-bodied men were theoretically obligated, there is no indication in the sources that it ever played a great role. It seems more likely that the nobles wanted to monopolize their right to fight. In 859 when the common people in the realm of Charles the Bald convened and swore a solemn oath to fight against the Norsemen of the Seine region, they were killed by their own nobility, who evidently did not like the idea that the ordinary folk wanted to fight. Such attitudes explain why the Carolingian rulers, like their successors, wanted to maintain household troops (the *familia regis*). Although such troops were expensive to maintain, they offered the advantage of standing ready for deployment. The Carolingians called these rapid deployment forces *milites expediti*, "soldiers ready for combat."

The numerical strength of these mounted troops is unknown, but it must have been significant because they are expressly mentioned in a programmatic and informative ninth-century treatise written by two members of the ruling elite, *De ordine palatii* (On the Administration of the Central Office [of the Emperor-King]). From this source we know that the precious horses and all their fodder, together with the accommodation and payment of the warriors, were guaranteed by the court.

Comparable (perhaps identical) with these elite warriors were the *scarae*—bands of normally mounted, highly mobile warriors who could ride very quickly. For example, in 778 while Charlemagne

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campaigned against the Muslims in Spain, a revolt against his rule broke out in Saxony. The returning monarch, learning of the revolt while in Burgundy, sent a *scara* ahead against the Saxon warriors, who had already reached Deutz opposite Cologne on the right bank of the Rhine. At the news that Charlemagne had sent a *scara* against them, the rebels sought to return to Saxony. But the *scara* caught the fleeing Saxons at the river Eder near Battenberg and crushed them after a ride at full speed of almost four hundred miles (some six hundred kilometers).

Strategy, tactics, and matériel. Wars of expansion, wars of defense, and civil wars all required different tactics. The almost yearly wars of expansion against Aquitaine fought by Pépin the Short in the 760s followed well-established patterns. Plundering and devastation of towns and countryside were systematic and designed to demonstrate both the superiority of the attackers and the inability of the local ruler, the Duke of Aquitaine, to defend his subjects. A calculated purpose lay behind this systematic burning, destroying, and raping.

To wage war in such a manner over long distances, the Carolingians needed considerable numbers of warhorses, packhorses, and cart horses. The high esteem given to horses and arms is evident in the contemporary legal codes. Fines for stealing, wounding, or killing precious warhorses were extremely high. Horses and arms were the necessary requisites that defined the identity of men as warriors. On the eve of the battle of Fontenoy (24 June 841) the allied brothers Charles the Bald and Louis the German, making a peace proposal to their brother, Emperor Lothair, offered him everything that he could find in their camps—with the exception of arms and horses. In the same context the principal source, Nithard (who is well informed in military matters), relates that Lothair's army, after a hard ride, could not immediately attack his two brothers, because their horses were worn out and required two days' rest. The same author also reports that during a meeting one year later near Mainz, the two allied brothers organized warlike games to train the warriors and entertain the spectators.

This last point, the "spectacle" aspect of military games, must be taken into account when reading Nithard for information about Carolingian battlefield tactics. Nithard, like other contemporary sources, does not describe actual combat. Carolingian troops were indeed trained in the tactic of feigned retreat, as Nithard relates, but one should not speculate further regarding the excellent riding abilities of ninth-century Carolingian cavalry based on Nithard alone. Indeed, in the above-mentioned context Nithard speaks two times of a show, a spectacle (*spectaculum*), and he does not mention cavalry but refers to well-trained people of different ethnicities who acted as a kind of stuntmen.

Ninth-century sources must be read with caution. Nithard does not say that the riders were brandishing or shaking their spear shafts, from which it has been concluded that for this show "the iron heads had been removed to avoid any unnecessary injuries" (Bachrach, p. 126). The Latin text shows clearly that Nithard is relying on a widespread expression used by Virgil and other poets: saying that the riders were (*h*)*astilla crispantes* (swinging their spears) is evidently a poetic metonymy wherein the shafts (*hastilia*) stand for the spears as a whole. The contemporary Hrabanus Maurus should be read with similar caution regarding military training and tactics. His military training recommendations derive from Vegetius's *De re militari*, a handbook of late antiquity. But should we really accept that Frankish cavalrymen used wooden horses for training and that "the practice of jumping [on and off their horses] flourished greatly among the Frankish people" (as cited by Bachrach, p. 124)? Hrabanus's description seems more like an idealistic and theoretical conception of how training should be conducted, written by a typical intellectual cleric about things of which he has no practical experience. Hrabanus Maurus is full of commonplace observations, such as the importance of early military training.

More important is the insight that great problems arose for Carolingian warriors when they encountered asymmetric warfare, as in 778 when the heavily armed troops of the Carolingian rear guard were badly defeated in the pathless, unfamiliar ground

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of the Pyrenees. The mountainous terrain inhibited their superiority in the kind of well-coordinated attacks that they commonly executed on the plains. Asymmetrical warfare characterized the ninth-century struggles against the Viking invaders. The Carolingian fortified places could not be defended against such enemies, and therefore the rulers pursued strategic alliances to set Norsemen against other Norsemen. Territories were yielded to them in the hope that stability would follow. Nor should we imagine the Vikings as primitive barbarian warriors. They quickly adopted elements of Carolingian warfare for their own purposes. They too used horses, and they mastered siege techniques against Paris in 885–886. After the 840s there was no real Carolingian strategy against their enemies. All that existed was a series of ad hoc defense measures organized by leaders of the local or regional nobility, who could earn great prestige through their defense activities.

[*See also* Andernach, Battle of (876); Avignon, Siege of; Charlemagne; Charles Martel; Charles the Bald; Einhard; Fontenoy, Battle of; France, *subentry on* Narrative (900–1328); Germany, *subentry on* Narrative (911–1024); Horsemanship; Horses; Hrabanus Maurus; Lombard League; Lothair I; Louis I; Louis II; Nithard; Paris, Siege of; Pépin the Short; Roncesvalles, Battle of; *and* Vikings.]

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Hans-Henning Kortüm

Historiography (751–899)

Since the late twentieth century many historians have taken a specifically cultural approach to Carolingian military history, viewing the Carolingian wars as an expression of a specific, typically medieval society. Historians see few connections between late Roman and Carolingian times with regard to military affairs. Scholars like Guy Halsall describe the Merovingian period as one of "barbarization," during which old Roman institutions were broken down. "Barbarization" here means a process that had already begun in the fifth century as the Roman military organization came under the dominating influence of barbarian warriors. The Romans, no longer ready to engage in warfare themselves, instead hired barbarian warriors living in the Roman Empire. Thereafter warfare was waged by barbarian kings who wanted above all to stabilize their own rule through permanent warfare.

This could also explain the endemic character of warfare in early Carolingian times until about 800. The expectation of rich tribute and plunder that could be gained through warfare with limited risks held together the warrior class on which the Carolingian kings heavily relied. After 800 the Carolingian empire fell into a crisis attributable to the impossibility of further expansion for the Carolingians and their warriors. Now tribute and plunder could be gained only through waging wars

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within the empire. The Carolingian civil wars, especially those after 830, can be explained by this circumstance. This thesis was developed primarily by the English historian Timothy Reuter (d. 2002) and has gained wide acceptance. This interpretation sees the decline of the Carolingian states as caused less by enemies coming from outside, especially by the Vikings, than by the inability of the Carolingian kings to offer lucrative prospects for their warriors.

In his 2002 overview of Carolingian history, the German historian Thomas Scharff also offers a deep cultural interpretation strongly influenced by Halsall and Reuter. Nevertheless an alternate school of Carolingian military history exists, one that concentrates more on the specifically military facts and affairs in Carolingian times; this school is represented by, among others, the historian Bernard S. Bachrach. There is much skepticism, to put it mildly, between what one might call the "modernists" and the "classicists" over the interpretation of military affairs, though some results reached by the classicists, who emphasize continuity rather than change, are now generally accepted. The old thesis of Heinrich Brunner (d. 1915), the most influential German legal historian of the turn of the twentieth century, for example, has been given up. Brunner constructed a strong connection between the development of the Carolingian heavy cavalry as the most typical arm in the time of the Carolingian mayor of the palace Charles Martel (d. 741) and the development of the feudal system. This interpretation has been given up thanks to Bachrach's persuasive argument that there was an insufficient basis in the sources to support Brunner's thesis (or Lynn White Jr.'s "stirrup thesis" variation on it, presented in his 1962 *Medieval Technology and Social Change*). Already in Merovingian times Frankish warriors used horses in their wars, and there was no "military revolution" under Charles Martel, whose actions differed little from those of his ancestors. He rewarded his followers by granting them lands and estates taken from the church—for example, from disloyal bishops—but this was nothing new and does not deserve the title "feudal system." Also, considering that the contemporary sources barely mention stirrups, their military importance in Carolingian times must not be overestimated.

Because of the general nature of the Carolingian sources it is very difficult to gain much insight into military tactics and discipline. We have pitifully little direct information from our sources, and therefore a tendency exists among the classicist military historians to squeeze the contemporary texts perhaps too much. In the middle of the ninth century a Carolingian author called Hrabanus Maurus rewrote, in the manner typical of Carolingian intellectuals, the famous treatise *De re militari* of the late-fourth-century Latin author Vegetius. Both Hrabanus and Vegetius were theorizers with little practical experience, and one must remain very skeptical concerning the extent to which Hrabanus's information reflects the realities of Carolingian warfare. At least the majority of scholars give no credit to the practical use of Vegetius for Carolingian warfare.

Perhaps the most contested matter in the historiography of Carolingian warfare is the question of how armies were raised in Carolingian times. No agreement can be reached over this difficult question. Surely one must differentiate both between the types of war, as Reuter rightly proposes, and of course also between the early and the late Carolingian times. In the late period much more defensive warfare was organized by local levies and the local nobility; in the early period, with its wars of expansion, the Carolingian rulers themselves organized the levies by rewarding the warriors before the wars began or by promising them rich tribute and plunder.

The question of military obligation is especially much debated among scholars. Walter Goffart argues that still in Carolingian times all free men owed unpaid military service when summoned. He dates this obligation into late antiquity (fifth century) when barbarian warriors got land from the imperial *fiscus* or other landowners, for which they had to perform unpaid military service. Charlemagne or Charles the Bald, in the ninth century, insisted on this duty for all free men, but they refined the system. Legal acts called "capitularies" defined the necessary income for a free man to join the army. Goffart believes in the effectiveness of

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this system, enforced by state agents called *heribannitores* already mentioned in Merovingian times. These officers collected the fines owed by those who failed to join the army when called. The fine could be interpreted as a sort of tax paid for the army. Royal orders for taxes to finance warfare in critical situations like the frequent Viking invasions are well known in the West Frankish kingdom under King Charles the Bald (r. 840–877).

Other scholars are more skeptical concerning the existence of such a well-established system, because it could function only when some type of state with governmental structures still existed—something that is debatable for this period, at least after the death of Louis I, "the Pious," in 840. Historians like Reuter argue against Goffart's view based on the realities of Carolingian warfare and the logistical problems that would arise if such a great number of warriors were brought together. It would be impossible to feed thousands of warriors, to move such a great army from one point to another, to maintain the necessary discipline, and so forth. Thus in the opinion of these scholars the Carolingian armies consisted mainly of the royal household warriors, often called *scarae* (cf. German *Schar*), and the warriors that Carolingian magnates brought with them to the king. John France steers a middle course between the two positions on army size and composition.

[*See also* Charles Martel; Charles the Bald; Hrabanus Maurus; *and* Louis I.]

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Hans-Henning Kortüm

FRANKS, MEROVINGIAN

[*This entry contains three subentries, on Merovingian sources from 482–751, an overview of Merovingian military history from 482–751, and on Merovingian historiography from 482–751.*]

Sources (482–751)

The period between 482 and 751—from the beginning of the reign of King Clovis I (r. 481–511) to the official end of the Merovingian dynasty when the Merovingian king Childeric III (r. 743–751) was deposed by the mayor of the palace Pépin the Short—is marked by an extreme scarcity of sources. Moreover the sources that do survive are often quite partial. Such a judgment must be made of the most important historiographical source for the Merovingian period, the *Decem libri historiarum*, or *Historia Francorum* (Ten Books of History, or History of the Franks), written by Bishop Gregory of Tours (d. 594). Especially for the time of King Clovis no other comparable source with such rich detail survives, but the work's historical value for the period of expansion under Clovis is much disputed: as the famous English historian John Michael Wallace-Hadrill said, "Clovis is Gregory's Clovis, whether we

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like it or not." Even for the later period when Gregory tells of the history of his own times, he cannot always be believed: for example, all the numbers of warriors given are exaggerated, and his descriptions of the wars and of the warriors involved in them are often stylized along biblical patterns.

The work of Gregory ends in 591, so for the following events we must use the so-called *Chronicle of Fredegar*, an anonymous chronicle of the seventh century—nothing is known of this author "Fredegar," whose name is mentioned only at the end of the sixteenth century. Writing circa 658 or 660, the chronicler reports much about the numerous wars of the beginning of the seventh century. For the period between the end of the sixth century and 642 this is our most precious source, giving information about events based on other sources that are now lost.

The *Liber historiae Francorum*, written circa 726/7, is our best guide to the period between 643 and the 710s. Though its chronology is badly confused, this work offers much information about the ascension of the early Carolingians in the 650s and 680s, such as the battle of Tertry in 687. The *Liber historiae Francorum* is also valuable for its telling of the military success of Charles Martel after the death of his father Pépin II in 714: the author was probably living in the west near Soissons and was a Merovingian legitimist, but he was not without some sympathies for the rising Carolingian dynasty, especially for Charles Martel.

Last but not least are the so-called *Continuations of Fredegar*, which were written by two members of the Carolingian family, Childebrand (d. after 751) and his son Nibelung (d. after 768)—making this source a partisan report of the activities of the early Carolingians. Recent research has emphasized the independent character of these *Continuations* from *Fredegar* and thus calls for the use of a new title, *Historia vel gesta Francorum*. After Roger Collins, it is now believed that the last section, covering 751–768, was probably written circa 787.

Besides these few chronicles there are more than forty biographies of saints, the so-called *Vitae*, which also offer much information regarding aspects of military history. Nevertheless until now they have never been systematically analyzed. In addition to the sometimes difficult Latin of these biographies, a great problem with them is that most of them exist only in a Carolingian version, and not in their original Merovingian version: that is, the copyists of the Carolingian age could have rewritten the original Merovingian text they used. Often this happened because the Carolingian intellectuals despised Merovingian Latin as a bad Latin that did not follow the rules of the Latin used during Cicero's time. Biographies of saints in the Merovingian era include plenty of military details because these saint-heroes were often engaged in the secular quarrels and disputes of their times. They represent the so-called *Adelsheiligen*: that is, saints who were important members of society not only because they were saints but also because they were nobles, and this means, of course, men with a military background.

A saint might well desire martyrdom in imitation of Jesus Christ, and therefore it is not surprising that one of the most important biographies in the Merovingian history of the seventh century is the *Passio Leudegarii*, probably written before 684. Leudegar (or Leodegar), as bishop of the Burgundian city of Autun from about 662 to 677/9, shared Burgundian desires for autonomy and was therefore deeply involved in the civil wars fought by, among others, Ebroin, the mayor of the palace of Neustria. The sworn enemy of Leudegar, Ebroin was responsible for the mutilation and death of the bishop. Interpreting the various vitae is also complicated because often the anonymous authors give relatively little historical information, not being interested in it. Instead the authors use many stereotypes, called *topoi*, in describing the lives of their heroes, which is why reading such texts can be relatively boring. But often we can get much valuable information when a biography formerly under suspicion is rehabilitated, as happened with the *Vita Genovefae*, now often cited, which gives details of the long siege of Paris by the Franks after 486.

Besides the historiographical sources, the charters must also be mentioned. Only those privileges coming from the Merovingian kings are assembled in a modern scholarly edition. Also important are

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the many letters of the elite in Merovingian times, mostly assembled in letter collections. Very confusing especially for an ordinary historian is the situation concerning the archaeological sources, which are relevant for the reconstruction of Merovingian history. Normally the different types of grave goods are interpreted by archaeologists ethnically, and therefore the Franks and the Gallo-Romans can be distinguished. But this sort of interpretation is declared old-fashioned by some historians who also consider themselves archaeologists. Guy Halsall, for example, argues that grave goods mainly reflect individuals' and families' struggle for prestige and power—that grave goods are often mere symbols of wealth and authority in a society whose traditional Roman system of values no longer exists.

[*See also* Clovis I; Soissons, Battle of; Tertry, Battle of; *and* Tolbiac, Battle of.]

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Hans-Henning Kortüm

Narrative (482–751)

Strictly speaking, the dynasty of the Merovingian kings did not dominate warfare during this period. After the reign of King Dagobert I (d. 638/9) or at the latest after the reign of Childeric II (d. 675), most Merovingian kings no longer played an active role in politics: rather, they served as shadow kings, more or less dominated by their so-called mayors of the palace. The office of mayor of the palace offered leading nobles the opportunity officially to act in the name of the king, but in reality to act in favor of their own families.

The most famous family in this context were the Carolingians, or more precisely, the Pippinids and the Arnulfings, their names deriving from Bishop Arnulf of Metz (d. c. 640) and Pépin I (d. 640). With Pépin and Arnulf's common grandson, Pépin II (d. 714), the final countdown for the Merovingians began as they were cast aside politically. The son of Pépin II, Charles Martel, became accepted as the unique ruler in the western region of the old Merovingian realm: in Neustria, Aquitaine, and finally also southern Burgundy, now Provence.

Thus it is reasonable to split up the narrative here into different sections: (1) expansion under Clovis (r. 481–511), (2) further expansion under his sons (511–561), (3) civil wars (561–584), (4) the failure of further expansion and internal Austrasian wars (584–613), (5) monarchy under the kings of the Franks Chlothar II (r. 613–629) and Dagobert I (r. 629–634; d. 639), (6) the rise of the mayors of the palace (639–680), and finally (7) the rise of the Austrasian mayors of the palace: Pépin II, "the Middle," his son Charles Martel, and his grandson Pépin III, "the Younger" or "the Short." The final period culminated with the anointing of Pépin III as king of the Franks in 751.

The reconstruction of Merovingian history—and therefore of its military history—is extremely difficult. Because of the scarcity of the surviving

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sources and because these sources are often written in difficult Merovingian Latin, there has been and there will continue to be much debate concerning the chronology of—or even the possibility of writing—a coherent military history of the Merovingians. Thus the narrative here is restricted to facts that have been safely ascertained.

Expansion under Clovis (r. 481–511). Even if one is skeptical about the extent to which the performance of a single ruler can change history, no one can underestimate the consequences of the military victories achieved by Clovis. Not only were his victories over his enemies victories in a strict military sense, they also were victories that changed contemporary politics and in the long run influenced the course of world history in a fundamental way.

Clovis started his career with a double function: he was both a Roman general and a Frankish king among other Frankish kings. Benefiting from the death of the great king of the Visigoths, Euric, in 484, Clovis won a decisive victory over another Roman general, the *magister militum* Syagrius in 486. This first victory was the decisive starting point for all his other conquests in the two decades that followed. In this comparatively short time Clovis became a global player comparable to his great rival Theodoric the Great, King of the Ostrogoths (d. 526). Clovis's success was largely because important rulers of the Catholic Church saw in him—though he was only the king of a relatively small territory centered at Soissons—a welcome ally against the so-called barbarian kings of their time. These were either pagans, as other Frankish or Alemannic kings were, or Arian heretics such as Theodoric and Euric. Clovis and his warriors could rely on the help and encouragement of the Catholic Church, as well as on the help of the Catholic emperor residing in Constantinople.

After his victory at Soissons, over several campaigns Clovis and his warriors conquered the western region called Armorica (or Aremorica), located between the Seine and the Loire (at the latest in 494), and the large southwestern kingdom of the Visigoths (in 507 at the battle of Vouillé). In the east the Alemanni were probably defeated by two battles in 496/7 and 506. In the northeast, other Frankish kingdoms lying in the Rhine-Maas region were conquered by Clovis's taking advantage of inner-Frankish family rivalries. The dates when all these events occurred remain disputed.

Expansion under Clovis's Sons (511–561). The extent of this second phase of expansion is minor compared with the first. One reason is that traditionally all legitimate sons of a king had the right to follow their dead father as king of their own kingdom. The fatal consequence of this was that on the king's death, the military power of territories formerly united under one king had to be shared among several sons. If no political agreement could be reached among the sons, it would be difficult for any one of them to expand his realm. The situation became very complex when Clovis died in 511: he had four sons—Childebert, Chlothar, Chlodomer, and Theuderic—who resided in the region between the Seine and the Rhine that was called Francia.

There was also the danger that after the death of a king, uncles might not respect the right of a nephew to follow his dead father as king, especially when the legitimate heir was not already established as a ruler. Childebert I (d. 558) and his brother Chlothar I (d. 561) arranged for the murder of two sons of their brother Chlodomer (d. 524), who had perished in a battle against the Burgundians. Afterward they apportioned his realm between them. On the other hand, Theudebert (d. 547) could follow his father Theuderic (d. 533) as king residing in Reims because he became established as a ruler during his father's lifetime and counted influential warriors, the so-called *leudes*, among his intimates and most loyal supporters. Because their own realm, later called "Austrasia," lay in the easternmost part of the former territory of Clovis I, Theuderic and Theudebert concentrated their efforts on conquering other nearby regions in the east and in the south beyond their realm.

At that time Thuringia—a great kingdom, not comparable with the region that is today called Thüringen—was a very attractive military objective

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for the Merovingians. Theuderic attacked it in the 520s, but he had little success until 531 when he won a decisive battle at the river Unstrut. King Hermanfrid of Thuringia thereafter had to pay tribute and finally, in 534, was killed. During these campaigns Theuderic and Theudebert also received help from both King Childebert and, more important, the Saxons, who were former enemies of the Thuringians. The Saxons were compensated for their aid by the grant of land north of the Unstrut. Together with Childebert, Theuderic was also able in 531/2 to conquer the region between the Garonne and the Pyrenees, called Novempopulana and dominated by the Visigoths; with this the Visigoths lost their last zone of influence in Gallia, aside from Septimania, a small coastal region at the Mediterranean. The peak of the Merovingian policy of expansion seemed to be reached with Theudebert's attempt to profit from the war in northern Italy between the Ostrogoths and Byzantine troops under the general Narses (d. 574). After Theudebert's death in 547 his son Theudebald was forced to retreat.

Another attractive military objective for Merovingian aspirations was Burgundy, in the south of Clovis's former realm. Though the Merovingians attacked Burgundy as early as the 520s, they failed to conquer it. The Burgundian king Sigismund was killed in 523, but he was immediately replaced by his effective brother Godomar. In 524 the Burgundians and Franks fought a battle at Vézeronce, near Vienne, where King Chlodomer lost his life. Finally, in 532/4 the two brothers Chlothar and Childebert joined forces and were able to conquer all of Burgundy and kill Godomar.

Civil Wars (561–584). King Chlothar I, who after 558 had ruled Clovis's former realm alone—all his brothers and nephews having died without leaving any legitimate sons—himself perished in 561. Like his father Clovis, Chlothar had four surviving sons—Charibert, Guntram, Sigebert, and Chilperic—but times were changing: no longer was there a possibility of expansion through conquest. As a result a time of civil unrest began as wars were waged by the four sons of Chlothar I against each other. Of course, as in the former period, we can find coalitions of two brothers against a third. After Charibert died in 567 without leaving any sons, his three brothers divided up his territory, giving the easternmost part of Chlothar I's territory to Sigebert I (d. 575), King of Austrasia, who was more or less in permanent war with his brother Chilperic (d. 584), King of Neustria, residing in Paris. Such Neustrian-Austrasian antagonism was a constant during this period. In 575, after he had gained a position of military superiority over his brother, Sigebert was unexpectedly murdered. Between 575 and 584, Chilperic rose to military and political superiority, forging a Neustrian-Austrasian alliance against his only surviving brother, Guntram (d. 592), who ruled Burgundy. But after Chilperic himself was murdered in 584, King Guntram became the dominant figure until his own death in 592.

Guntram had adopted his nephew Childebert II (d. 596), the son of the assassinated Sigebert, in 577. This adoption preserved the existence of Sigebert's Austrasian kingdom. What was new during this period was the political and military importance of influential groups of great nobles, often with the mayor of the palace at their head. These groups were frequently responsible for forging alliances, meaning that the kings were not the only players: for example, great nobles of Sigebert's and Guntram's kingdoms favored Guntram's adoption of Sigebert's son and favored the subsequent Austrasian-Burgundian alliance against Chilperic. At that time it was the mayor of the palace, Gogo (d. 581), who led the kingdom of Austrasia, together with Brunhilda (Brunichild), the wife of Sigebert. The years between 581 and 583 saw the forging of a new coalition, made up of Austrasian and Neustrian nobles, that was directed against Burgundy under Guntram. Possibly this was because a new mayor of the palace, Wandalenus—who evidently favored Chilperic, the sworn enemy of Guntram—was now installed in Austrasia. But such a coalition was not as stable as it seemed: in 583 the *minor populus* (lesser folk) in the Austrasian army revolted against this coalition formed by the nobles. Thus once again a new Austrasian-Burgundian coalition was mounted against Chilperic.

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Failure of Further Expansion and Internal Austrasian Wars (584–613). Between 584 and 588, Guntram failed to conquer Septimania, which was still held by the Visigoths. This defeat, like the failure of the young Austrasian king Childebert II in his struggle against the Lombards in 588 and 590, reflects the loss of expansion power. Guntram had fought the war against the Visigoths under the pretext of avenging King Sigebert's daughter, who had been married to the son of the king of the Visigoths but was killed in 585 during troubles that arose between the son and the king. But Guntram experienced military success in another instance. He had problems with a rival pretender to the throne, Gundovald, who had lived a long time at the Byzantine court and claimed to be an illegitimate son of King Chlothar I. Already in 582, Gundovald had been used by political opponents of Guntram to question Guntram's authority. Now in 585 he was again used to destabilize the authority of Guntram, who sought to control the young Chlothar II, the late-born son of Chilperic. In Gascony at Saint-Bertrand-de-Comminges in 585, Gundovald was besieged and killed by the army of King Guntram.

After the death of King Guntram in 592, bitter fighting occurred in the different Merovingian realms, especially Austrasia. Childebert II had already died at the age of twenty-six in 596, so it was his mother, the famous Queen Brunhilda (d. 613), who reigned in the name of her two grandsons, Theudebert II of Austrasia and Theuderic II of Burgundy. After 605 the young kings developed a strong rivalry against each other, although previously they had worked together, winning in 600 an overwhelming victory over the Neustrian king Chlothar II at Dormelles near Montereau-fault-Yonne. The rivalry between the two brothers was strengthened by the different groups of nobles living at the courts of the two kings, in Metz and Chalon. Bitter fighting in the years 610–612 witnessed Theuderic as the victor, enabling him to kill his brother Theudebert and his nephew Merovech, the son of Theudebert. But in 613, Theuderic died unexpectedly before waging war against Chlothar II. Again Brunhilda tried to assume control of Austrasia and Burgundy, this time for her great-grandchild, but in vain. She was herself killed by opposing Austrasian nobles, led by Arnulf of Metz and Pépin I, "the Elder," the ancestors of the so-called Carolingians. They had invited King Chlothar II of Neustria to come to Austrasia to help them.

Monarchy under Chlothar II and Dagobert I. The time of Chlothar II (r. 613–629) as the king of all the Franks was a very peaceful one, without wars. Nevertheless under his son King Dagobert (d. 639) trouble arose on the eastern frontier of Austrasia. In tribute to Austrasia's fight against the Wends, a Slavic tribe, King Dagobert installed his son Sigebert III (d. c. 656) as its king in 633/4. This installation had no practical purpose because Sigebert was too young to fight personally on the battlefield, but it was a symbolic demonstration of the respect shown by Dagobert for the relative independence of Austrasia and its nobility.

Rise of the Mayors of the Palace (639–680). The period 639–680 was one of the most troubled in Merovingian history, filled with permanent quarrels and wars among Austrasia, Neustria, and Burgundy. The history is especially complicated because inside each realm various factions of the nobility often were fighting against each other.

The trouble in Austrasia began after the death of King Sigebert III in about 656. Probably the same year Grimoald, the son of Pépin I, wanted to install his own son on the throne as successor to King Sigebert. Thanks to Grimoald's dominant position as Austrasian mayor of the palace, Sigebert had adopted Grimoald's son Childebert and ascribed to him the typical Merovingian king name "Childebertus Adoptivus," or Childebert the Adopted. In other words a Carolingian was deemed the rightful heir to the throne by virtue of his adoption by a Merovingian king. Not surprisingly, such a scenario was not accepted by the Neustrians and their king at that time, Chlothar III (r. 657–673). Grimoald and his son Childebert were probably executed in 657, or at the latest in 662, and their family lost its influence in Austrasia until the early 680s.

The situation in Neustria and Burgundy was also characterized by fierce controversies between the Neustrians and the Burgundians under the

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formal rule of King Clovis II (r. 639–657), son of Dagobert I. Since the four-year-old king could reign only nominally, the mayors of the palace came to play an important role. Above all else Burgundy wanted its autonomy to be respected. Thus the Neustrian government under Queen Nanthild and her mayor of the palace, Erchinoald, was obliged to install for Burgundy its own mayor, Flachoald, a Frankish noble who had to swear that he would respect the independence of the Burgundian nobility. Nevertheless a power struggle soon emerged between Flachoald and certain mighty nobles of Burgundy, ending in a fierce battle between them in 642. Significantly, the Neustrian mayor of the palace did not intervene on the side of his colleague Flachoald, who won the battle but died immediately afterward. Because of the silence of the period's main source—Fredegar, who ended his narrative in 642—little or nothing is known about the following few years.

Chroniclers have left us better informed about the events that transpired at the end of the 650s. These years are characterized by the dominance, starting around 658, of the mayor of the palace of Neustria Ebroin (d. 680/1) under the formal rule of King Chlothar III. The nobility of Burgundy did not accept Ebroin—who was trying also to assert power in Austrasia and Burgundy—and thus several revolts broke out that were all suppressed in a cruel manner. The leaders of the revolt of 660 were put to death. In 663, Ebroin faced a dangerous adversary in Bishop Leodegar of Autun, who organized the resistance in Burgundy against him. After the death of Chlothar in 673, Ebroin was forced to seek refuge in the monastery of Luxeuil in the Vosges because the king of Austrasia, Childeric II (d. 675), had been invited to Neustria by leading nobles who were opponents of Ebroin. Modern historians regard Childeric II as the last actively reigning Merovingian king, but he also had a dominant mayor of the palace at his side, Wulfoald, who arrived with the king from Austrasia. Because Childeric II and Wulfoald wanted to bring Austrasia, Neustria, and Burgundy once again under one government, resistance broke out in Neustria and Burgundy. Especially Bishop Leodegar, who pled for Burgundian autonomy, lost his influence on the king. Finally he was accused of high treason and was sent into exile at the Luxeuil monastery. But Childeric was unexpectedly assassinated in 675, and Wulfoald had to flee back to Austrasia.

In the period that followed, the situation became even more complicated because Ebroin waged a successful comeback after his release from the monastery in 675, as did his rival, Leodegar. At first it seemed that Leodegar would prevail after he and his nobles successfully elevated a new king, Theuderic III (d. 691), the brother of the assassinated Childeric II. Also, a new mayor of the palace, Leudesius, was installed. But Ebroin was able to influence King Theuderic III, who officially renominated Ebroin as Neustrian mayor of the palace after his rival Leudesius had been killed. In Burgundy, Bishop Leodegar was imprisoned, blinded, and finally executed in about 680. In Austrasia the former mayor of the palace, Wulfoald, dominated. He and his nobles had nominated a king of their own: Sigebert III's son Dagobert II, who was unexpectedly murdered in 679. Afterward Ebroin still prosecuted a centralizing strategy aimed at his acceptance as mayor of the palace over all three Merovingian realms. Ebroin refused to allow the Austrasians to have their own mayor of the palace. This, of course, was not tolerated by a mighty group of Austrasian nobles under the leadership of the *dux* Martin and Pépin II, "the Middle." In a battle in 680 at Lucofao (Bois-du-Faye near Laon) waged against the Austrasians by Ebroin and his king, Theuderic III, Martin was killed but Pépin escaped. Then Pépin successfully organized the assassination of Ebroin in 680 or 681. Ebroin's successor as mayor of the palace of Neustria was Waratto, with whom Pépin made peace.

The Rise of the Austrasian Mayors of the Palace. This period should be considered one of Carolinian rather than Merovingian history. It was marked by the success of the Carolingian family in overwhelming and killing other rivals, who like themselves were mayors of the palace. During this period the Carolingians were able to exploit and monopolize the function of the mayor of the palace for their own family by regarding it as a hereditary

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office. The first important step was the victory of Pépin II over his rival, the Neustrian mayor of the palace, Berchar, the son-in-law of Waratto, in the battle of Tertry at the Somme in 687. Berchar himself was not killed in the battle, but he died in 688 or 689, and afterward Pépin laid claim to Neustria, where he installed as his agent Nordebert. After Nordebert's dismissal around the year 695, Pépin installed his son Grimoald as mayor of the palace of Neustria, with Pépin's son Drogo receiving the *ducatus* (office of a duke) for Burgundy.

The death of Pépin's two sons before Pépin himself—Drogo died in 708, and Grimoald was killed shortly before Pépin died in 714—destabilized the rule of the Carolingian family for some years. There was a deep crisis regarding the succession because Pépin's wife wanted Theudoald, the son of the dead Grimoald, to become the mayor of the palace. Once again opposition in Neustria mobilized, acclaiming Raganfred in 715 as mayor of the palace. It was the outstanding military capabilities of a late-born son of Pépin II, Charles Martel (d. 741), that led to the decisive victory at Soissons in 718 against Raganfred. After his defeat Raganfred lost practically all influence in Neustria. Charles Martel gained further military prestige with other victories against other enemies, such as the Frisian ruler Radbod, Aquitaine's *dux* Eudo (Odo), and the Muslims. The total political independence and autonomy that Charles Martel had achieved are shown in that after 737 when the shadow king Theuderic IV (r. 721–737) died, the *dux Francorum* felt no obligation to nominate another Merovingian as king. Only Charles Martel's two sons at the time of their rule saw a necessity to install a new Merovingian king, Childeric III. He "ruled" between 743 and 751 when he was officially deposed and replaced by the newly anointed Carolingian king Pépin the Short (r. 751–768).

Assessment. This short abridgment of complex Merovingian history extending over 250 years makes clear the great problems that one faces when writing about military affairs during this period. It is also clear that after Dagobert I or at least Childeric II, one cannot speak of Merovingian kings as active political-military leaders. Instead of the king, mighty noble families played the dominant role. Sometimes a member of such a family could secure the strategic office of mayor of the palace, the individual entrusted with organizing military campaigns with the family's own warriors and those of their friends. In essence a network prevailed that had been established by certain noble families who were dominant in the different regions of the Merovingian kingdoms. Although an active, fighting king was no longer needed by the nobility, the nobility nevertheless needed a king because he facilitated the waging of wars. The mayors of the palace could thus declare the wars they led to be affairs of the state. This strategy allowed them to use the existing resources of an also still-existing Merovingian state—the *thesaurus* (treasure) of the king.

Especially in the wars beginning in the mid-seventh century, it is clear that at that time the office of the mayor of the palace was deeply anchored in the three important realms of Austrasia, Neustria, and Burgundy. Conflicts that were fought out militarily during this period may be explained as resistance against mayors who tried to impose a centralizing policy without sufficiently respecting the traditions of the different realms, as in the case of Ebroin. Already in the first generation after Clovis, one can identify a sort of consciousness bound to the reign of a certain king. The royal family of a particular king, rather than the whole Merovingian royal family, was evidently seen as the guarantor of the identity of a specific realm. Thus no real chance existed for a king to unite all the different realms under one royal rule. This is clear in the wars waged by Sigebert, Chilperic, and Guntram in the 570s and 580s. By adopting the young son of Sigebert of Austrasia, Guntram showed respect for the feelings of an Austrasian nobility that did not want to be dominated by the Neustrians ruled by Chilperic or the Burgundians ruled by Guntram.

To a certain degree it seems reasonable to regard Merovingian warfare in terms of its preserved sixth-century structures, typically Roman ones. But it is almost impossible to prove exactly which traditions of Roman heritage survived, such as certain

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practices of training troops, certain manners of marching and fighting, and so on. Military historians note heterogeneity among Clovis's troops. The army of this king could be regarded as a sort of mixed composite, including "warbands of the *reguli* [petty kings], armed followings of the magnates, [and] descendants of Roman soldiers" (Bachrach, p. 17).

If one accepts this view of Clovis's army, it would seem only natural that specifically Roman traditions were vanishing, especially from the 640s onward. Thereafter the military effectiveness of Merovingian officials appeared to be dependent on the possibility of organizing a great number of warriors. Little is known about the mobilization of Merovingian armies, but there are hints in the contemporary sources that the mobilization of warriors was based on a regional structure. One could assume that the late Roman institution of private soldiers, the so-called *buccellarii*, fed and maintained by great landowners, continued to exist after Clovis. But it is debatable whether in the seventh century a general military obligation existed for all free Franks to join the military unpaid; nevertheless Charlemagne did revitalize such an obligation at the end of the eighth century. In late antiquity the obligation of unpaid military service arose for those who had received public land, that is, land from the *fiscus* (state treasury). If one was not willing to fulfill his obligation and did not join the army when called, he had to pay a fine. Still at the end of the sixth century the demand to pay a certain sum could be justified by agents of the king with the argument that going to war on royal order was a public duty (*functio publica*). Yet the privatizing of war through warriors secured by great nobles and their family networks was ongoing and intensifying.

There are also indications that during the Merovingian period, warriors conducted themselves very self-confidently. This seems especially true for the *leudes*, the great men bound by an oath of fidelity (*sacramentum fidelitatis*) to the king. Not only did they counsel the king and indeed elevate him as king, but according to Gregory of Tours they also "defended him and stabilized his reign," as in the case of Theudebert, the son of Theuderic, when his uncles sought to deprive him of his paternal kingdom. Such self-confidence was also manifested in warriors when they sometimes refused to accept the command of the king: King Theuderic did not want to assist his two brothers Chlothar and Childebert in their campaign against Burgundy, but he had to obey his warriors who threatened to desert him to follow his two brothers. He thus promised his warriors that he would also go southward to a land where, in the words of Gregory of Tours, they could find "gold and silver, herds and slaves, and clothes abundantly."

This suggests that rich booty was a critical factor for many warriors—at least those without (or with only minor) wealth—in deciding whether to go to war. And it is known that there were different social classes present in the Merovingian armies. One must remember that moral restrictions concerning Merovingian warfare were quite often not respected. Churches were burned down, noncombatants were tortured and killed. Even the corpse of a king's son was not spared in those days, as in the case of Theudebert, the eldest son of King Chilperic, who (again, according to Gregory) lay dead and stripped on the battlefield in 575. After his 585 campaign against Septimania failed, King Guntram established a fact-finding commission to determine the reasons for failure; the *duces* fled into a church because they feared a harsh judgment by the king and therefore their own execution. In this instance one sees a tendency that returns in Carolingian times: most wars were led, not personally by the king, but by his representatives as commanders in chief.

[*See also* Charles Martel; Clovis I; Dorestad, Battle of (695); Pépin the Short; Soissons, Battle of; Tertry, Battle of; Tolbiac, Battle of; *and* Tours, Battle of.]

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Historiography (482–751)

Merovingian history has been studied intensively in the past few decades. Many articles and even entire books have been written concerning matters of politics, economy, archaeology, mentalities, and processes of ethnogenesis (that is, the processes of building ethnic groups, historiography, and so on). But with the exception of some Anglo-American authors, there are no scholars who have dedicated themselves expressly to themes of Merovingian military history. After World War II, neither in France nor Germany was there affection for military history, which seems explicable by the historical experiences of these two countries. But there is still another point that needs to be emphasized. Especially regarding Merovingian history, with the scarcity of the sources that are written by the contemporaries in the sixth to eighth centuries, it often seems bold to say something definitely about military affairs in Merovingian times. Of course, the contemporary writers did not write to inform modern scholars about military affairs; rather, they wrote to demonstrate the intervention of supernatural powers such as God, the Devil, and the saints in secular history, often rewarding good people and punishing bad people. They were also writing to praise their favorites, the good kings and the saints, to delegitimize the bad kings and people who were morally suspect. Therefore, there is much reserve among German and French scholars about mentioning things that they believe should not be discussed.

Eugen Ewig, the undisputed Nestor of Merovingian history, who wrote *Die Merowinger und das Frankenreich* (The History of the Merovingians, 1988), which is still the leading scientific history of the period and is still up-to-date, says nothing about specific military themes, and this is not without reason. Even the most fundamental information, that is, the chronology itself, seems uncertain. Until now it has not been known how many battles were fought at which date exactly against the Alemans by Clovis. What of the siege of Paris laid by Clovis? Nobody can really know how long it lasted. Did it really last five years as proposed by Bernard S. Bachrach (although he did say that the sources "are admittedly of limited value")?

Moreover, nothing is actually known about the details of the main battles in which the Merovingians fought. In particular, reconstruction of battles seems impossible. For example, the reconstruction of the battle of Vouillé given by Bachrach is not acceptable because his understanding of the Latin text of the only source, the not-contemporary Gregory of Tours, is not correct, as Jan Verbruggen has already observed in his review of Bachrach's 1972 book *Merovingian Military Organization, 481–751.* Nevertheless, this monograph is the only synthesis of this topic and therefore remains valuable. Bachrach follows a generation-oriented model—he distinguishes Clovis, the sons of Clovis, the grandsons of Clovis, the last of the ruling Merovingians, the *rois fainéants* ("do-nothing kings"), and the mayors of the palace. Bachrach is fighting against the image of Frankish warriors as "half-naked levies of poorly armed and ill-disciplined Frankish infantrymen, depicted as the numerically preponderant and tactically decisive military element," who "performed military service because of some putative Teutonic duty." Therefore, he puts much stress on the influence of Roman military tradition, such as siege warfare, which according to Bachrach was central already for the Merovingians. They were only continuing well-established Roman traditions.

Bachrach has his point of view once more resumed in a thoroughly researched monograph concerning the so-called Gundovald Affair. Gundovald pretended to be a son of King Chlotar I (d. 561), and therefore his appearing in Merovingian territory in 582 was perceived to be a threat, especially by King Guntram (d. 592), who ordered the killing

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of the pretender, who was then enclosed at Saint-Bertrand-de-Comminges in Gascony by the troops of King Guntram. The last chapter of the book is dedicated to the techniques of siege warfare, where the author sees "the technological legacy of the later Roman Empire ... in the deployment of various types of siege equipment, such as the *onagri*, the battering rams, and the *agger*." Nevertheless, Bachrach also sees significant changes in the organization of military affairs during the sixth century. Under Clovis's grandsons the "local levy" was introduced as "a great innovation"; this loses its importance after the death of King Dagobert in 639. In the following period of the so-called *rois fainéants*, who had at their side influential mayors of the palace, "the primary military forces in the most of Gaul" became now "the magnates and their armed supporters."

The great synthesis of early medieval warfare given by Guy Halsall gives a rather different picture of Merovingian military history. The very title of his monograph, *Warfare and Society in the Barbarian West, 450–900*, shows that he has a radically different perspective on the military history of the period. The years between 450 and 900 are seen as something different and new compared with the Roman era. The author is attacking traditional military history represented by someone such as Bachrach. In the eyes of Halsall, Bachrach has a short-sighted view of military issues, which is characterized (or rather, despised) as a "normalist approach." In the eyes of this author, this approach is inadequate because in contrast to the "substantivist approach" Halsall himself prefers, normalists do not adequately take into consideration the culture of the societies that are waging wars. The behavior of warriors is deeply influenced by the cultural norms of a society and therefore should not be neglected.

In this historiographical essay, it is not our task to take sides in this dispute. Each scientific approach has its own worth; of course, there are also many dangers lying in the substantivist approach that could also be criticized. For example, it is certainly right to describe medieval societies as shame-and-honor societies, but it would be too simple to understand medieval military conduct only using these categories. Moreover, it is also a heuristic problem that is related to source material. Evidently, it is merely an assertion of the contemporary sources that people's actions had been dictated by the unwritten rules of honor and shame. With such an argument, they were seeking only to explain, apologize, praise, or condemn certain behavior of their protagonists after the events had taken place. It is the typical post-*festum* perspective. Setting aside the sometimes futile polemic between the two authors, the main difference is that Halsall is stressing typical barbarian traits in Merovingian military history. In contrast to Bachrach, for him warfare is a barbarian affair already in the fifth century. Roman society had outsourced the waging of wars, which meant necessarily a sort of barbarization of warfare (for example, questions of booty became of great importance); warfare was a sort of politics for a king to secure the loyalty of his warriors. Logically, Halsall sees no necessity to make a substantial difference between Anglo-Saxon and Merovingian warfare because being identical, they could be treated together. He is also skeptical about the possibility of knowing how many men were raised when summoned to do military service and he therefore turns against an overestimation of the numerical strength given by unreliable contemporary sources.

[*See also* Clovis I; Franks, Carolingian, *subentry on* Historiography (751–899); *and* Roman Heritage.]

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FREDERICK I BARBAROSSA

(c. 1122–1190), crowned German king in 1152 and Roman emperor in 1155. Medieval and modern historians alike have often perceived this emperor as bellicose, if not ferocious—an incarnation of *furor teutonicus* (Teutonic fury). The Italian Renaissance writer Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527) even believed that Frederick could not bear life without waging war. Partly this perception takes up the image of a victorious and severe, but knightly, ruler spread by Frederick's own propaganda, and partly it comes from the devastating impact that his vast military resources made in Italy. But regarding his military personality, it is a misconception. As the young Duke of Swabia, Frederick indeed seems to have been a hotspur who actively took part in southern German feuds. His later attitude toward warfare was probably shaped by his personal experience of the disaster that struck the German army, led by his uncle, King Conrad III (r. 1138–1152), on the Second Crusade in 1147. After Frederick succeeded Conrad in 1152, he proved himself to be, not a warmonger, but rather a politician who had large forces at his disposal and knew how to use them in a functional and sometimes ruthless way in pursuit of ambitious political targets. Because he was a cautious but determined leader in war, his particular strengths were on the strategic level, as he emphasized thorough planning, well-prepared logistics, and cohesion in the field through rigorous discipline. On the tactical level his Italian victories did not last and were outnumbered by resounding defeats.

Northern Italy was Frederick's main theater of war; there he got his nickname "Il Barbarossa" (the Redbeard). The evolving city-states had effectively shaken off imperial rule, and the metropolis of Milan claimed hegemony. After a first clash on his way to Rome for the imperial crown (1154–1155), Frederick was determined to reassert control—a decision that led to twenty years of intermittent war against large cities with strong fortifications and well-trained militias. The overwhelming four-pronged, cross-Alpine attack against Milan in 1158 shows just what Frederick was capable of achieving as a strategist. But his initial victory quickly disintegrated into small-scale warfare that became a constant drain on imperial resources and finally overstretched them when Frederick lost his army to a plague at Rome shortly after a triumphant victory in battle at Tusculum in 1166.

On this battleground shaped by cities, sieges predominated: Milan (1158), Crema (1159–1160)—famous for the atrocities committed there and important as a platform for the proliferation of siege technology—Ancona (1167), and Alessandria (1174–1175). The catastrophic defeat at Legnano (1176) effectively ended this militarized period of Frederick's Italian policy. The entire effort had been possible only after about 1156 when Frederick succeeded in ending internal German feuding and in uniting the forces of the realm. The only internal war that he had to wage consisted of two swift campaigns in 1180–1181 against Henry the Lion, Duke of Saxony and Bavaria, to execute his politically prepared downfall.

Frederick's last campaign was his part in the Third Crusade (1187–1192). This campaign also sums up his character in warfare in that he systematically eliminated the problems that he knew had plagued the crusading army of 1147, such as insufficient preparations and lack of cohesion. This last land-based crusade began successfully, culminating in the storming of Ikonion (modern Konya, Turkey). On 10 June 1190, however, Frederick Barbarossa accidentally drowned while bathing in the river Saleph (Göksu). After his death most of the army retreated.

Frederick is an important figure for the student of high-medieval warfare for three reasons. First, as a commander he showed considerable capabilities in organizing large-scale operations and was able to shape diverse forces into disciplined armies. His leadership is characterized by a noteworthy rationality that reflects cultural developments in the

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twelfth century. This also included draconian laws of war and well-considered acts of cruelty, however. In this context, note that a number of bishops—men who had a formal intellectual education—served him as delegates in command. Second, because of the scale of his ambitions and resources, his military career instructively illuminates the evolution of warfare, including the progress of siege technology, the growing importance of mercenaries, and, in Italian militias, the rise of infantry. Finally, his career is documented exceptionally well by a wide range of narrative sources and charters.

[*See also* Alessandria, Battle of; Alps and Alpine Passes; Conrad III; Crema, Siege of; Crusades, *subentries on* Sources (1180–1245) *and* Narrative (1180–1245) Germany, *subentries on* Sources (1125–1250) *and* Narrative (1125–1250) Henry the Lion; Infantry; Italy, *subentries on* Sources (1000–1300) *and* Narrative (1000–1300); Legnano, Battle of; Mercenaries; Milan, Sieges of; Otto of Freising and Rahewin; Siege Warfare, *subentry on* Tactics and Technology; *and* Urban Defenses.]

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FREDERICK II

(1194–1250), German king (r. 1212–1250), King of Sicily (r. 1198–1250), and Holy Roman Emperor (r. 1212–1250). Frederick II is certainly one of the most interesting medieval rulers. His long reign and his manifold military campaigns can be divided into four periods. The first period (1194–1220) was marked by multiple threats to Frederick's life and position. After the death of his father, Henry VI, and his mother, Constance, Frederick grew up in the city of Palermo and became the pawn of different Sicilian parties and especially German mercenary commanders. But the most dangerous situation arose from the Guelph emperor Otto IV's attempt to conquer the kingdom of Sicily after having emerged victoriously from the struggle for the German throne. Only the quick and venturesome crossing of the Alps and the gaining of the German crown behind Otto's back rescued Frederick and allowed him to become emperor after Otto's disastrous defeat at Bouvines in 1214 by Philip II Augustus and Otto's death in 1218. The main worry of the papacy—the unification of the empire and the kingdom of Sicily and the encirclement of the papal states—had thus been realized, leading to strained relations between pope and emperor.

The shorter second period (1220–1227) was characterized by the attempts of Frederick to consolidate his Sicilian kingdom by legislation (the assizes of Capua), strengthening the royal administration, subduing the barons in southern Italy, and combating and deporting the last Muslims of Sicily to the city of Lucera. Lucera became a Muslim colony to some extent, surrounded by Christian areas. These Muslims were considered to be extremely loyal and also immune to papal excommunication. Therefore they provided elite troops (especially archers) for Frederick's army.

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The third period began about 1227, with the first excommunication of Frederick by the pope. The main reason was certainly Frederick's delaying tactics against the pope's pressure for crusading. But there were also tangible conflicts of interest, considering Frederick's efforts to reinforce the imperial position in central and northern Italy. In spite of his excommunication and against papal prohibition, Frederick went on crusade. This expedition seems to be unique in medieval history because Frederick was able to avoid military operations and—because of his excellent relations with Muslim rulers—to come to terms with al-Kamil, the Ayyubid sultan. Frederick obtained the city of Jerusalem and the surrounding countryside for ten years. Soon after this agreement, Frederick was forced to return to southern Italy because papal troops had attacked the kingdom of Sicily.

The fourth period started around 1235. The experience of the invasion led Frederick to the decision to fortify his kingdom in a way previously unknown. Simultaneously, he tried to come to terms with the pope, but the consequent reconciliation was short-lived. New tensions arose from Frederick's policy toward the city-states of northern Italy. He was determined to keep a tight rein on the communities and to revive imperial rights. However, the cities headed by Milan fought back the imperial intentions and in 1226 had already brought the Lombard League back to life. On 27 November 1237, Frederick's army totally triumphed over the city-states in the battle of Cortenuova (near Bergamo). Frederick refused peace offers and insisted on unconditional surrender. He increased his armed forces, asked several European rulers for military help, and gained support from England and Hungary (among others). But the tide turned. The difficulties of siege warfare and the papal opposition were too much for Frederick to overcome; he was unable to capture several large cities. In 1239, he was excommunicated for the second time, and in 1245, he was declared deposed by the First Council of Lyon. The last five years of Frederick's reign until his unexpected death in 1250 were marked by military defeats (for example, the disastrous destruction of the siege camp Victoria on 18 February 1248 by the defenders of the besieged city of Parma), vigorous military effort, oppressive tax burdens, several rebellions and plots against him, and cruel revenge by Frederick in return. So in spite of all his resources and instruments of power Frederick—like his grandfather Frederick I Barbarossa—failed in his attempt to subjugate the Lombard cities.

[*See also* Henry VI *and* Otto IV.]

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Stefan Burkhardt

FREDERICK III OF HABSBURG

(1415–1493), elected German king 1440, crowned Holy Roman Emperor 1452. Although as king Frederick was commander-in-chief of the empire's armies, and as prince of Habsburg he could recruit for the land's militias, he was constrained by both the estates of the empire and the estates of Habsburg to secure Hungary when the Turks invaded in 1469 and 1475.

Frederick himself did not believe in the offensive use of military force; he was not a "soldier-king" like his opponent, the Hungarian King Matthias Corvinus. Frederick wanted to achieve his goals through diplomacy, alliances, and patience. Hence, he was on the defensive whenever a military confrontation occurred.

During armed conflicts, Frederick did not stand out as a commander. In most cases, he supported his subjects from a distance. For example, in 1485 he fled Vienna, which was besieged by the Hungarians, and transmitted to his fighting troops an encouraging message announcing his plan to send support and money and exhorting them to persevere. His appeal did not suffice to prevent the surrender of Vienna (June 1485) to Corvinus, who managed to conquer Austria below the River Enns by 1487. Frederick fled to the empire, vainly trying to recruit a strong army; only after Corvinus's death in 1490 could he return to his hereditary lands.

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On two occasions during his old age, Frederick himself commanded a large army. In July 1474, Duke Charles the Bold of Burgundy besieged Neuss, a strategically important town in the archbishopric of Cologne. It took almost a year before the sixty-year-old emperor could muster about twenty thousand soldiers, who arrived outside the besieged town under his command in May 1475. With these forces he compelled the Burgundians to withdraw. But the real success was the subsequent agreement that his son Maximilian would marry Charles the Bold's daughter, Mary. With the inheritance of Burgundy, the house of Habsburg began to rise to dominance in Europe. The Habsburgs' use of marriage to expand their influence gave rise to the saying, "Let others wage wars, but you, happy Austria, shall marry," which became a motto of the dynasty.

After King Maximilian I was seized in 1488 in Bruges, the emperor, then seventy-three years old, managed to assemble an army of four thousand cavaliers and eleven thousand infantrymen. With the advancing guards of the army, he set out for Bruges in order to free his son and punish those who had imprisoned him, an action he saw as a crime against the crown. Through a campaign in Flanders, the emperor could once again demonstrate imperial power.

Emperor Frederick III was mostly a politician, less a commander, and even less a "soldier-king." But the use of military force—albeit primarily for defense—was key to his ability to maintain his position. He usually did not lead the troops personally, instead appointing army commanders (*Reichskriegshauptleute*) who led the troops in battle upon his order. The emperor took the chief command himself only when major dynastic interests were at stake.

[*See also* Maximilian I; Neuss, Siege of; Pfeddersheim, Battle of; *and* Seckenheim, Battle of.]

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Jörg Rogge

FREEDOM, PERSONAL

The link between personal freedom and military capability is as ancient as the Greek hoplites and as contemporary as debate about the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. In theory the ability to defend oneself is an essential condition of maintaining one's personal liberty, and thus of being able to defend one's community in war. This desideratum led the Athenians, for example, to extend political rights first to those landowners able to provide themselves with a hoplite panoply and eventually to every male citizen capable of pulling an oar on the city-state's war galleys. Similarly the barbarian Franks, after settling down as the military defenders of late Roman Gaul, chose to derive the meaning of their tribal name from "free men."

In the medieval context the connection between individual liberty and military capability has always been complicated by the role of service in medieval military organization. The very word "knight," used in English to designate the quintessential military figure of the Middle Ages, derives from a Germanic term for servant. The Latin *puer*, used by many medieval writers to describe the fighters in a magnate's retinue, is also used for household slaves. And *ministerialis*, a synonym for an Anglo-Saxon royal official (thegn, or thane), refers in medieval Germany to an unfree person placed in a position of military authority. Indeed, whenever we encounter unfree people in military contexts, we likewise find terms (*laeti*, *dedidici*, *servi*) used in specialized ways to describe them—an association suggesting that military service by the unfree required organization over and above that for free individuals.

In the medieval period, warfare had already become the province of disciplined professionals whose expensive equipment and constant training enabled them to outclass the militias that armed

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and trained themselves. The requisite organization to support those professionals required an economic and logistical foundation commanded by only the most powerful individuals and eventually available only to centrally organized kingdoms or realms of similar power. Yet like modern technologically superior armies, the medieval war machine relied on designated professionals in the main combat role while still using the equivalent of combat-minded reservists and militia in technical and support capacities. Even at the height of the trend toward professional fighting men supported by ostensibly private resources, all free people and, more important, free land had some obligation to support the state in war, whether through direct service in the general levy; work on fortifications, roads, and bridges; or simple logistical support. As the medieval economy developed, many obligations that had begun as service requirements were replaced by tax payments. Finance, not the insignificant combat skills of the city militia, explains why citizens of late medieval Venice owed military service until age seventy.

Thus the connection between personal freedom and military obligation was never entirely broken. Moreover the act of rendering of military service gradually expanded claims to personal freedom. Descendants of the eleventh-century unfree *ministerialis* became barons and counts, and townspeople defended their "free air" (and expanded the purview of their charters) with weapons carried on the walls. Even though these trends did not progress at a uniform pace everywhere (indeed, some regions saw decreases in personal freedom), individuals called on to undertake military functions (or pay military taxes) did not miss the connection to their position in society. From a ninth-century Frankish peasant assembling with his fellows to drive off a pirate raid to a fourteenth-century Nuremberg merchant claiming the right to participate in a tournament because his obligation to defend his city rendered him armigerous, medieval people took seriously their military roles and the rights enjoyed thereby. Nor was gender a barrier, except perhaps in frequency. From a Mercian peasant woman lifting rocks to help build a fort to stop the Danes to a tenth-century Saxon abbess insisting that royal charters specify that troops raised from the convent's lands be under her sole command while on campaign, medieval women were deeply involved in the military organization of their society. Ultimately medieval ideas about the connection between military function and personal freedom informed the Enlightenment's ideals regarding the rights of free men.

The specific examples provided here have generally been treated as curiosities. Scholarship has not provided a thorough presentation, much less a reasoned evaluation, of the role that ordinary individuals played in medieval military organization or of the impact that this had on their rights and responsibilities within medieval society. Partly as a result, the topic remains an open field for polemicists and ideologues. Thorough investigation will certainly find many differences across specific times and localities, but this should not prevent medievalists from investigating a relationship so central to the society they study.

[*See also* Nobility; Obligation, Military; *and* Slavery.]

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FRÉTÉVAL, BATTLE OF

The battle of Frétéval (4 July 1194) was the second dramatic defeat suffered by Philip II of France against Richard the Lionheart of England, newly returned from captivity and determined to recover the Continental strongholds and territories that Philip had been taking by diplomacy and force

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during Richard's absence. Coming just thirty-seven days after a precipitous flight from Verneuil, the rout at Frétéval confirmed that, despite his previous momentum and new resources, Philip Augustus was now overmatched in the field against his former ally.

Philip had turned his attention to the Touraine after several destructive forays into Normandy, raids that had probably been meant to induce Richard to accept Philip's terms for a truce. With no apparent success there, he was now attempting to block Richard's reassumption of control over the rest of his ancestral lands. Coming into the valley of the Loire, Philip encamped at Frétéval; Richard, having kept informed of his movements, countered by moving up to Vendôme to block his route, camping outside the ill-fortified city. A bit of showmanship followed as Philip announced via messenger that he would attack Richard the next day. Richard, who built much of his success around his reputation for boldness, replied that he would happily await the attack, or would come "visit" the king of France in like manner if Philip did not deliver on his own promise.

When Philip did not attack, but instead began a withdrawal back up the valley, Richard led his own forces forward, and clearly met great success in disrupting the French retreat. The details of what happened are suspect since the sources for the battle are naturally quite partisan. On the English-Angevin side, Roger of Howden reports the French immediately turning in flight, with many slain and captured. Richard scored treasure in almost every form it could come: gold and silver, Philip's private furniture, and papers that related to all of Richard's subjects who had been minded to defect during Richard's time away on crusade, in captivity and slow return.

Richard himself stayed at the front of the rout, according to Roger of Howden, "breathing forth threats and slaughter" against Philip. The king of France, however, avoided capture by attending mass at a local church while the bulk of his forces drew Richard's attention away toward Châteaudun. Richard's personal efforts were abetted by his hired soldiery (his mercenary captain Mercadier gave him a fresh mount after he exhausted his own horse in the chase). While glossing over the debacle, French chroniclers like Rigord complained vigorously about Richard's ability to buy troops. Nonetheless, a Flemish scout apparently ended the rout by erroneously reporting that Philip was now out of reach.

As Richard's apologists have enjoyed pointing out, the English warrior-monarch managed Frétéval as a mixture of chivalric daring and careful generalship. In the celebrations afterward, Richard praised William Marshal for having followed his orders to hang back with a reserve force. Richard was thus able to augment his military glory, all the while knowing his back and flanks were protected.

[*See also* Philip II; Richard I; *and* Verneuil, Battle of.]

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Steven Isaac

FROISSART, JEAN

(c. 1337–c. 1404), great chronicler. Jean Froissart was born around 1337 in Valenciennes, Hainaut. In 1362 he traveled to England to the court of Philippa of Hainaut, wife of Edward III. There he met a large number of French hostages who lived in "courteous prison" (*prison courtoise*, or honorable imprisonment) in London; they provided new information on the conduct of the battle of Poitiers (1356). During this period he also visited many princes and lords, including David II of Scotland (1365), Edward Despenser (1366), Joanna and Wenceslas of Brabant (1366), and Edward the Black Prince (1366–1367). Froissart continued his journeys with a trip to Italy in 1368–1369.

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After the death of Philippa of Hainaut on 15 August 1369, Froissart returned to Valenciennes, where he began writing the first book of his *Chroniques*. At that time Guy of Châtillon, Count of Blois, became his new patron. In 1373 he allowed Froissart to occupy the curacy of Estinnes-au-Mont. In 1382, Froissart accompanied Guy of Châtillon as a follower of the king of France in the campaign against the Flemish rebels. This expedition became Froissart's motivation in preparing his second book. In 1388 he went to Orthez, at the court of Gaston Fébus, Count of Foix-Béarn. This trip became the inspiration for his third book. Around 1391 or 1392, Albert of Bavaria, Count of Hainaut, and his son William became Froissart's new patrons, Guy of Châtillon being ruined. Froissart attended peace negotiations in Leulinghem in 1392, and in 1395 he returned to England but was disappointed by the court of Richard II. This last trip allowed him to prepare the fourth book of his *Chroniques*. Froissart disappears from the records after 1404. The date and circumstances of his death are unknown.

In his *Chroniques*, Froissart wanted to celebrate chivalric exploits during the wars between the kingdoms of France and England. The first book focuses on events of the years 1302 to 1378. Included in this time period were the wars of Scotland, with the siege of Berwick (1333) and the battle of Halidon Hill (1333); the origin of the Hundred Years' War and the first military operations of the conflict associated with the destruction of Cambrai (1339); the great English *chevauchées*; the sieges of Cambrai (1339) and Tournai (1340); the battles of Sluys (1340), Crécy (1346), Poitiers (1356), and Nájera (1367); and the Combat des Trentes (1351). The second book is devoted to events that occurred between 1378 and 1385. It deals specifically with the revolt of the county of Flanders, including the 1382 battles of Beversholtsveld and Roosebeke; the popular uprisings in France (the revolt of Maillotins of 1382–1383) and England (the Peasants' Revolt of 1381); the war of succession of the duchy of Brittany; and the crusade of the Bishop of Norwich (1383). The third book covers the years 1385 to 1389. It focuses on the travel in Béarn; the conflict between Castile and Portugal, with the siege of Lisbon (1384); and the battle of Aljubarrota (1385). Finally, the fourth book examines the years 1389 to 1400, the last years of the reign of England's Richard II (r. 1377–1399); the most important military event of that time was the crusade in Hungary and the battle of Nicopolis (1396). Enguerran de Monstrelet later continued the work of Froissart, resuming the chronicles from 1400 until 1444.

The use of the *Chroniques* of Froissart by historians poses many problems. There exists neither an original version that can be consulted, nor a final version. The four books that form this work were rewritten several times by Froissart himself. In every version he subtly modifies his judgments, accentuates the role of some of the protagonists, and sometimes changes his opinions completely. For example, in one of the versions of the first book Froissart seems to describe the English with great admiration, almost without reservation. In another version, however, he is very critical. The portrait of John III, Duke of Brabant, changes in the different versions, with John's responsibility for the failure of the military expeditions led by Edward III in the north of France becoming exaggerated. The accuracy of certain events has yet to be verified. Indeed, Froissart does not hesitate to invent episodes and insert fictitious speeches in the text if doing so allows him to develop his story or explain the sequence of events. One such example is the expedition led by Robert of Artois at the head of four thousand men-at-arms in Gascony in 1337, which is confirmed by no other historical source and seems never to have taken place. Elsewhere, the prelude to the battle of Beversholtsveld is clearly modeled on biblical texts.

All this embellishment does not mean that we can neglect Froissart's work. Some events, like the siege and taking of La Roche-Vendeix (1390), have been the subject of careful analysis that shows the narrative of Froissart to be beautifully consistent with the records and archives. Froissart is not a historian, and unlike some other authors, he had little interest in the strategy, tactics, or the intricacies of diplomacy. But researchers interested in the sociocultural aspects of the nobility and chivalry in the fourteenth century can extract copious amounts of information from the *Chroniques*. After all, Froissart's mission

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was to record the feats of arms of the nobility before those feats fell into oblivion. Froissart, both in the extent of his *Chroniques* and in the diversity of the information they contain, is the premier source on the Hundred Years' War in the fourteenth century.

[*See also* Aljubarrota, Battle of; Berwick, Sieges of; Beversholtsveld, Battle of; Britain, *subentry on* Sources (1300–1500); Crécy, Battle of; France, *subentry on* Sources (1328–1483); Halidon Hill, Battle of; Hundred Years' War; Lisbon, Siege of, and the Battle of the Tagus (1384); Low Countries, *subentry on* Sources (1300–1479); Nájera, Battle of; Nicopolis, Battle of; Poitiers, Battle of (1356); Sluys, Naval Battle of; *and* Tournai, Siege of.]

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Sergio Boffa

FRONTIERS

Frontier areas were numerous and varied, but they shared political and military characteristics: they were locations where different jurisdictions met and often clashed. As such, these regions were particularly marked by the impacts of war, and they tended to be more than usually violent places. Yet frontiers could be stable, as agreed points of demarcation between realms, such as the border between England and Scotland usually was. Or the frontier could shift, like the Islamic-Christian interface in Iberia, which moved spasmodically southward over seven centuries of conflict until Islamic Granada was finally conquered in 1492. Other frontier regions featured complex and changing patterns of interaction between ethnic groups, such as medieval Ireland after the arrival of invaders from England in 1169 and halting attempts at conquest thereafter by the English crown. Military conquest could facilitate heavy settlement, as in the German expansion east of the Elbe from the tenth century. By contrast, the level of Western settlement in a very different frontier location, the Holy Land after the First Crusade, remained limited.

Like the hugely varied nature of frontier zones, the effects of war also were naturally extremely varied. Though a local and detailed view of any frontier presents a picture of great complexity, some characteristic frontier traits, though not equally evident in all frontier zones at all times, can be identified. Distinctive militaristic features could be as striking as the great crusader castles in the Holy Land or as invisible to us today as the systems of beacons routinely set up in border areas to give early warning of enemy attack. Frontier aristocracies often adopted roles of military leadership. The responsibility of powerful local figures to administer and defend the frontier was often formalized in the development of march wardenries, offices featuring a combination of legal, administrative, and military powers. Economies also tended to become adjusted to the prevalence of war. Frontier zones were often located in upland areas already ill-suited to arable farming. War further encouraged locals to shun labor-intensive, vulnerable crop growing in favor of pastoral farming, because flocks and herds could be moved away from enemy raiders. In these circumstances the cattle raid, often on a relatively small

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scale, became the classic method of frontier warfare. War also affected social and cultural patterns on the frontier. One such cultural pattern is the mutual celebration, even by rival frontier communities, of martial lifestyles, notably in the form of the ballad. War also created conditions in which criminality could flourish. In frontier regions, social structures were based on kinship, honor was heavily stressed, and the blood feud was a means of settling grievances.

The medieval frontier, then, was a zone at once violent, picturesque, and distinctive. Care must be taken, however, not to exaggerate the militarized aspects of frontier life and how far these diverged from norms evident elsewhere. The medieval social structure was, after all, based on war. To this extent all medieval societies were frontier societies.

[*See also* Border Defenses, Earthwork; Crusader Castles; *and* Crusader Settlement.]

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FUEROS

The term *fuero* denotes rights and exemptions from existing obligations, or a contract between agreeing parties governing the use of land. The term derives from the Latin word *forum*, indicating the place where justice was administered in Roman towns. In Visigothic Spain, the Hispanic and Visigothic jurists used the word *forum* for the large territorial code of law entitled the *Forum iudicum* (also *Liber iudiciorum*), later translated in the Hispanic style as the *Fuero juzco*. Following the Leonese monarchy's limited attempt to revive the *Fuero juzco* in the ninth and tenth centuries, the Leonese-Castilian kings Fernando III (r. 1217–1252) and Alfonso X (r. 1252–1284) renewed the territorial concept of *fuero* when they sought to apply the *Fuero juzco* to the newly conquered towns in Extremadura and Andalusia.

The term *fuero* also found other, more local applications, both in grants of rights and immunities to individual nobles and churchmen and also in municipal charters granted to the emerging towns. In Castile, León, Navarre, and Aragon the Romance term *fuero* was used, while in Portugal *forais* was used, and in Catalonia *furs* was used. These grants arose from the need to populate the frontier lands acquired during the reconquest, establishing the rights and obligations of the new settlers while also delimiting the municipal boundaries. These municipal *fueros* grew steadily in length during the twelfth century, especially in Castile and Aragon, culminating in the charters granted to Cuenca and Teruel, which contained highly similar laws. These charters extend to more than two hundred pages each in a modern printed edition, the longest one-time grants of municipal law anywhere in Europe at the time. Moreover, close copies of Cuenca's *fuero* were given to other towns. Twelve of these *fueros* exist in modern printed editions. A similar group of seven lengthy *fueros* was granted to western municipalities by the Leonese monarchy, beginning in the late twelfth century and extending well into the next century. During the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the Leonese-Castilian monarchy attempted to supplant these generous collections of municipal freedoms with bodies of national legislation influenced by Roman law that favored a more centrist legal tradition; such legislation was not fully successful until the reign of Alfonso XI (r. 1312–1350) and the Trastámara dynasty that followed.

In the area of military law the *fueros* constitute the best evidence we have of the municipal military system that evolved in the Iberian Peninsula. During the eleventh and early twelfth centuries the charters simply mandate an obligation to perform offensive and defensive military requirements, but in the later twelfth and thirteenth centuries these mandates began to include an extraordinary amount of detail regarding the way these requirements were to be

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accomplished. Urban military laws specified the length of service in royal military assemblies, the creation of a system of vigilance that guarded the territories of the town and assured the garrisoning of its walls, the equipment demanded of knights and infantry who served, and an elaborate structure for the distribution of booty. For the study of peninsular military practice, the *fueros* are indispensable.

[*See also* Iberia, *subentries on* Sources (1100–1300) *and* Sources (1300–1500): Militias, Urban; Reconquest, Concept of; *and Repartimientos.*]

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FULK NERRA

(c. 972–1040), Count of Anjou (987–1040). Anjou was one of many territorial principalities that emerged in the wake of the dissolution of the Carolingian Empire. The magnates who ruled these principalities had power and resources comparable to those of the young Capetian dynasty. Fulk Nerra was one of several powerful magnates north of the Loire who pursued aggressive policies of territorial expansion. His chief rivals were the counts of Blois, Tours, and Chartres, Odo I and II.

Fulk Nerra consolidated his territories with fortifications. His castles were designed during the first decade to maintain lines of communication by means of the road connections. Thereafter, the castles functioned according to defense in depth, the concept of fixed fortifications made flexible with highly mobile forces to operate in the spaces between the fortifications. The distance between the castles was no more than twenty miles (thirty-two kilometers), the distance a horse could travel in a day and still retain combat effectiveness. Fulk's building program relied on mounted detachments that patrolled the countryside from their castles. Most important, these troops acted as relief forces to attack the besiegers of a neighboring castle and to intercept enemy relief forces. Raiding expeditions, consisting of logistical wars to destroy the material resources of opponents, also disrupted lines of communication and prevented supplies from reaching enemy fortresses. As the intensity of a conflict escalated, the concept of flexibility could be extended to include the coordinated use of mounted patrols.

Fulk practiced a strategy of indirect approach, a long-term–oriented building program to form strategic groups of castles. His most famous castle, Langeais, constructed from 992 to 994, whose remains are still visible, added a link in a defensive strategy of largely preexistent castles for maintaining lines of communication along the Loire between Amboise (990s) and three other castles of the 980s: Loches, Villentrois, and La Haye Descartes. After the death of Odo I in 996, Fulk abandoned his indirect-approach strategy and seized Tours, only to be forced into surrendering the city under pressure from a Capetian marriage alliance with the family of Blois. After the loss of Tours in 997, Fulk resumed his indirect-approach strategy with a string of fortifications forming a broad arc in northern Touraine to maintain lines of communication between Amboise and Angers, consisting of the fortified *domus* of Morand, Semblançay, and Château-la-Vallière. This group of fortifications complemented the one that included Langeais to complete the encirclement of Tours. Montbazon, constructed after the loss of Tours, illustrates how a castle could operate in both defensive and offensive capacities. Defensively, Montbazon could protect the route to Loches. In an offensive mode, Montbazon could interdict the lines of communication between Tours and Odo II's fortification at Chinon.

The principal drawback to this system of fortifications was the ever-present potential of defection by castellans. The repercussions of such a defection could exert a major impact on Fulk's building program, as with the defection of Aimery of Thouars in 994. The castellan at Thouars protected the route from Vihiers to Loudon, the fortress held by Odo I

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that controlled the route from Poitiers to Saumur. Without the allegiance of Thouars, the distance from Vihiers to Loudon exceeded the endurance limit for a relief force to respond and remain capable of engaging in battle. To secure this route, Fulk ordered the construction of Passavant (996–997) and Montglan.

[*See also* Castles, *subentry on* 500–1100; Fortifications; France, *subentry on* Narrative (900–1328); *and* Strategy.]

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Galbert of Bruges

Galbert of Bruges wrote one of the most important chronicles of the twelfth century. As a chronicler of military events he has few equals for his depth of detail, his seemingly journalistic retelling of some events, and his careful analysis of the troubles that beset Flanders in 1127 and 1128. Galbert himself states that he was a notary from Bruges who worked in the household of the Count of Flanders, Charles the Good. Though strongly partisan toward his patron, the notary was particularly well placed to record events beginning with the assassination of the count on 2 March 1127, followed by the siege of Bruges between 9 March and 19 April, and finally developments in Flanders as it fractured into war between two main claimants to the title of count. Galbert jotted down parts of his account as some of the events occurred. He informs us that he wrote on wax tablets as flaming arrows and combat raged around him. For this sense of immediacy some have considered him the first "journalist" of the Middle Ages.

Galbert's account has two military centerpieces. The first is the siege of Bruges, which began after Count Charles was murdered during Mass by vassals who believed he planned to disinherit them. Galbert offers his audience an almost day-to-day account of a medieval siege and urban warfare, filled with plausible detail and development. After the siege of Bruges concludes, Galbert discusses his other centerpiece, the struggle over political control of Flanders, which lasted about another fifteen months. Since Charles the Good had died childless, several people laid claim to the office. The preferred claimant was William Clito, grandson of William the Conqueror. William Clito gained the acceptance of Louis VI, King of France and feudal overlord of Flanders. By granting many concessions William also won over Flanders's population. Soon, however, he reneged on his promises, causing a rebellion in favor of the other major claimant, Thierry of Alsace, which resulted in the battle of Thielt and other military contests. Galbert finishes his account after William Clito dies from a spear wound to the hand. This is where the chronicler ran into a conundrum. William Clito had been the legitimate first choice for count, as Galbert admits, yet inconveniently died fighting against his rival. Galbert resorts to the circular argument that since William Clito died while the title was still being disputed, God showed his favor to Thierry, which is why Thierry became count.

Galbert's value as a journalistic chronicler has been questioned in recent years, and it seems clear that parts of his account were edited more heavily than others. In spite of the caveats raised about his retelling of certain events, few accounts

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of the Middle Ages can match his depiction of twelfth-century western Europe. Galbert of Bruges produced a microcosm of the medieval world with his description of warfare, the political and social dynamics of an expanding region, and the luminaries and people of twelfth-century Flanders.

[*See also* Bruges, Siege of; Louis VI; Low Countries, *subentry on* Narrative (855–1300); Siege Warfare, *subentry on* Tactics and Technology; Thielt, Battle of; *and* Urban Defenses.]

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GALLEYS

The word "galley" is derived from the Latin, or Byzantine Greek, *galea*. From the eleventh or twelfth century well into the eighteenth, this term designated a specific type of oared warship of the Mediterranean. The basic form taken by galleys—very slender and low in the water—is dictated by simple physics. Long, narrow hulls move more efficiently through the water than broader shapes. Galleys could be sailed, though not very efficiently except directly before the wind. Typically, a galley had two masts, and each mast carried one large lateen (triangular) sail. When traveling long distances, galleys would sail as much as possible. On going into battle, the sails would be lowered and the great yards from which they were suspended would be stowed away.

Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries. The fully developed medieval galley always had a single bank of oars rowed from benches affixed to a deck that closed the hull. These benches were angled from stern to bow so that more than one man could pull at an oar without interfering too much with the other rowers on the bench. From the twelfth century until the end of the thirteenth, galleys were biremes—that is, each bench seated two rowers, and each rower pulled one oar. Later galleys might have three men rowing from the same bench (a trireme) and some attempts were made to use four (quadrireme) or five (quinquereme) rowers per bench. Medieval galleys were rowed by free men, either citizens or hired foreigners.

From the reign of Charles I of Anjou (1269–1284) there is documentary evidence that provides data upon which to form a relatively firm idea of what the medieval bireme galley was like. It was basically 39.5 meters (about 129.5 feet) long, the beam amidships was 3.7 meters (about 12 feet), and the midships depth in the hold was 2.04 meters (about 6.7 feet). There were 108 rowers, two to a bench, with 27 benches to a side. These and many more detailed dimensions were issued again and again during Charles's reign. Galleys of 108 rowers are commonly noted over a wide range of time and geography, but there are also mentions of galleys with rowing crews from 100 men up to some Catalan galleys with 120 rowers.

In the last decade of the thirteenth century there were significant developments in galley design. The most important of these was the addition of a third rower to each bench to produce a trireme galley that rapidly displaced the bireme as the standard. The bireme galley was so narrow in the beam that it was not possible to add a third rower to each bench on a regular basis without widening the hull. The Genoese *Liber Gazarie* contains regulations from 1333 that establish the measurements of galleys considered fit for use as warships. By then, the trireme galley was the standard. The overall length of these galleys was 40.11 meters (131.6 feet), with a beam of 5.03 meters (16.5 feet) and a depth in the hold amidships of 2.07 meters (6.8 feet). They were only slightly longer and deeper than the Angevin bireme galleys but were significantly broader. The additional

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1.33 meters (4.4 feet) in breadth allowed for two additional rowers across, one to each bench in each rank. Trireme galleys typically had 25 benches to the side, giving them a rowing crew of 150 men. Fewer ranks of rowers in a hull that was as long, or slightly longer, than that of a bireme galley allowed for more space at the bow for a larger fighting platform and, ultimately, for the addition of artillery. Greater width meant greater stability. With a crew that was 39 percent larger than a bireme there was, theoretically, that much more power available. In practice, less than the full theoretical power increase was realized. Nonetheless, a trireme galley was capable of equaling, or slightly bettering, the speed and maneuverability of a bireme, in a hull that made for a better fighting platform. The discovery of a fourteenth-century galley hull at San Marco in Boccalama in the Venetian lagoon during the summer of 1997 is adding substantial, concrete technical knowledge to the understanding of galley design but has not significantly altered the broad outlines of what is known about the developmental history of this ship type.

Fourteenth to Sixteenth Centuries. In the course of the fourteenth century different kinds of economic pressures shaped the development of the galley. The medieval economy of scarcity required that some freight was shipped in galley hulls in spite of their extremely limited capacity. Trireme galleys were still limited in capacity but could carry approximately three times as much as a bireme. This was sufficient to make galleys practical in the specialized niche of transporting goods like spices, luxury fabrics, gold, and silver. The large crew and ability to maneuver under oars could provide protection for these precious cargoes. On routes to the East, where these costly goods were an important element of commerce, the Italian city republics ensured that the galleys that carried these cargoes were essentially war galleys.

In 1277, Benedetto Zaccaria of Genoa had demonstrated that galleys could make the journey westward through the Strait of Gibraltar, hitherto impossible because of the domination of the strait by hostile powers and because of the strong inflowing current. The primary cargoes from England and Flanders were wool and woolen cloth, valuable but not as expensive as wares from the East. This stimulated the construction of broader, deeper galleys that could carry more cargo and better withstand the Atlantic swells. These "great galleys" (*galee grosse*) were pure merchant ships, not agile enough to fight in the fleets alongside the slender war galleys (*galee sottile*).

Unlike warships from other eras, the galley was not a "ship-killer." It carried neither the waterline ram with which classical rowed warships would smash the hulls of their opponents nor the artillery of modern warships. Galleys had a spur, or beak, that extended at deck level from the bow, which was designed to ride over the barricades along the sides of other galleys and to act as a boarding bridge for marines. Galley battles were typically hand-to-hand melees between opposing marines and crews, preceded by volleys of missiles from archers or crossbowmen placed on a fighting platform in the bow. Because they were so vulnerable from the side and because their chief offensive armament was in the bow, galleys were disposed in line abreast for battle. Galleys might reach seven or eight knots but could do so only briefly before the crew was exhausted. It is generally accepted that an experienced rower in good condition could expend maximum effort for up to twenty minutes before becoming completely exhausted. Of course, a completely exhausted crew would be unable to fight or to respond to any other challenge, so the practical limit on full-speed maneuvers would be much less than twenty minutes. By the end of the fourteenth century, gunpowder artillery began to be mounted on the galleys' bows. Guns could not be reloaded before the ships closed for hand-to-hand combat, so fire was reserved to the last possible moment before contact. Artillery added considerable weight, so that more power became desirable. In the course of the sixteenth century experiments with four and five rowers per bench were tried, but these provided little or no advantage over triremes.

Also, the wages of skilled rowers began to increase rapidly, and the expense of larger crews became

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difficult to bear. A solution to the need for more power and the expense of skilled rowers came when a system of one oar per rower was replaced by a single large oar pulled by several rowers. In this latter system only the inboard rower needed to be skilled, because he set the stroke; the others merely provided additional power. This allowed the use of untrained volunteers, convicts, and, eventually—in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries—slaves as rowers. As increased power became available, galleys could be made larger and capable of carrying a larger weight of artillery. The same developments allowed the great merchant galleys also to grow even larger, to the point where they became primarily sailing ships with auxiliary oar power for maneuvering or emergencies. By the middle of the sixteenth century, sailing merchant ships were improved to such an extent that these merchant galleys were rendered obsolete. War galleys were, however, still useful. Studies suggest that a cannonball from a French galley might have sunk Henry VIII's great sailing ship, the *Mary Rose*.

Without the limitations imposed by the supply and expense of skilled rowers, fleets became larger. While in the fourteenth century fleets rarely exceeded 75 or 80 galleys, with crews of perhaps 200 or slightly more, including 150 rowers, by the late sixteenth century, at the battle of Lepanto in 1571, both the Turkish and the Allied fleets exceeded 200 galleys with crews of as many as 400 men. The battle of Lepanto may be regarded as the apogee of galley warfare in the Mediterranean, the largest galley action ever. In addition to the galleys in the fleets, the Venetians brought a half-dozen great merchant galleys out of mothballs and armed them heavily with artillery that, because of the greater freeboard of the merchant galleys, was not constrained to firing only forward. These converted merchant galleys, called galleasses, deployed ahead of the Allied battle line. They disrupted the Turkish fleet before the battle was completely joined, and contributed to the Allied victory. In a sense, they also heralded the demise of the galley as a principal warship. Their high freeboard and large numbers of cannon that could fire to the side were soon to be equaled and surpassed by highly maneuverable sailing ships mounting numbers of broadside artillery that no galley could equal.

[*See also* Naval Combat and Tactics; Ships, Byzantine; *and* Ships and Sailing.]

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GAMMELSDORF, BATTLE OF

See Germany, *subentry* on Narrative (1250–1415).

GATTAMELATA

See Erasmo da Narni.

GAVERE, BATTLE OF

The citizens of Ghent began yet another rebellion in 1449, this time against Philip the Good, Duke of Burgundy. For the next three years the duke showed little interest in putting down the rebellion with his army, though he did seek to solve the city's problems diplomatically. These efforts were rebuffed, however, and by early 1452 it became apparent that Philip would have to settle the rebellion by military force. On 18 June 1453 the Burgundian army invaded the county of Flanders.

Rather than march directly to Ghent, Philip decided to attack three smaller Ghentenaar

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fortifications en route to the city: the castles at Schendelbeke, Poeke, and Gavere. In each attack the Burgundian gunpowder artillery train played a major role. Schendelbeke fell quickly, on 27 June, after less than two days of siege and bombardment by gunpowder weaponry, and its garrison of 104 rebels was executed. Poeke lasted only a little longer, undergoing a siege from 2 to 5 July; its walls were destroyed, and again the garrison was executed.

Then the Burgundian army marched to Gavere, arriving on 18 July. Immediately Philip began the bombardment of the fortifications, and for four days his guns fired without stopping. On 23 July the city's army arrived to face the Burgundians. Contemporary sources claim that the rebel army was thirty thousand strong, probably an exaggeration, although it does seem that they were more numerous than the Burgundians. The rebels also had several guns. What they did not know is that they had arrived too late to relieve the siege. On the morning of 18 July the castle had surrendered, and the garrison of twenty-eight to thirty was hanged. The duke also had formed his troops into battle lines, his scouts having told him of the Ghentenaars' approach. When the rebels arrived at Gavere and saw the duke's preparations, they also formed into lines.

The battle began with an artillery exchange, with the Ghentenaars clearly superior to the Burgundians, forcing the duke to move his artillery closer to the rebel army. This proved effective: these guns soon began to weaken the Ghentenaar resolve, and the soldiers began to flee from the battlefield. One contemporary Flemish source claims that the reason for the rout was actually that one of their gunners allowed a spark to fly into an open sack of gunpowder, which then burst into flames. All the nearby cannoneers panicked and ran, and when other Ghentenaars saw this, they also took flight. In response the Burgundians charged forward in pursuit. Some rebels tried to regroup in small units, and these troops fought fearlessly until dispersed. Casualties among the rebels were high, ranging from sixteen to twenty thousand, according to most contemporary narratives. Losses on the Burgundian side were much lower.

The battle of Gavere proved decisive. Within days the rebellion had ended, and the Ghentenaars opened their gates to the Duke of Burgundy and his soldiers. Philip was merciful, punishing the citizens only financially.

[*See also* Low Countries, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1479).]

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Kelly DeVries

GENGHIS KHAN

See Mongols.

GENOESE-VENETIAN WARS

[*This entry contains three subentries, on the first, third, and fourth Genoese-Venetian wars.*]

First War

The maritime city-states of Venice and Genoa competed aggressively to dominate the lucrative trade routes between Europe and the eastern Mediterranean in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. As Venice and Genoa expanded commercially, their interests began to clash in their struggle to dominate the markets around Constantinople and Acre. Their rivalry eventually led to the outbreak of a series of wars, primarily fought on the high seas, which would last for over a hundred years. The First Genoese War (1257–1270) began when a Venetian murdered a Genoese in Acre and the Genoese retaliated by attacking the Venetian quarter of the city.

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This prompted the doge of Venice to send fourteen extra galleys with the Venetian convoy to the East in 1257. The Knights Templar, the Pisans, and Provençal merchants came to the aid of Venice, while barons from various crusader states allied with the Genoese.

In the naval battles of the First Genoese War, the Venetian fleet was usually numerically and operationally superior and tended to beat the Genoese in direct naval confrontations. The Genoese fleet often sought to evade encounters with the Venetian fleet. The Genoese instead maintained the effective strategy of raiding Venetian ships: a tactic that proved extremely costly to the Venetian state and its merchants. While the Venetians focused their resources on keeping their trade routes safe and protecting their convoys in the face of Genoese aggression, the Genoese regularly tried to lure Venetian galleys away from these convoys so that Venetian merchant vessels, undefended, could be attacked. Though the Venetians won the major naval battles of this war, they suffered financially from the costs incurred to provide their merchant fleet with extra protection. The three principal naval battles of this war (at Acre, Settepozzi, and Trapani) and the various skirmishes that occurred around them illustrate this general pattern.

Venetian and Genoese forces first openly fought one another in the harbors of Acre and Tyre. In response to Genoese aggression in Acre, the Venetian fleet broke through the Genoese chain blocking the harbor, burned a group of Genoese ships, and eventually expelled the entire Genoese colony from the city. These naval engagements typically involved galleys—swift, long and narrow ships of war powered primarily by rowers—and round ships, which were wider and larger cargo-carrying vessels. The Genoese attempted to retake the city with fifty galleys and four round ships (to Venice's thirty-nine galleys and four round ships), but with reinforcements from Crete, Venice, and the population of Acre itself, the Venetians ultimately captured half the Genoese galleys in the battle of Acre (1258). Over seventeen hundred Genoese died or were made prisoner by the Venetians, many of whom were taken in chains back to Venice to use as bargaining chips in peace negotiations.

As the war continued, however, its battles expanded out into the eastern and central Mediterranean. In 1263, when a fleet of thirty-eight Genoese and Byzantine galleys carrying supplies to Morea (the Peloponnese, in modern Greece) and the Black Sea clashed with thirty-two Venetian galleys en route to Negroponte (modern Euboea), the Venetians soundly defeated the Genoese in the ensuing battle of Settepozzi, near the modern island of Spetsai off the eastern Peloponnese. The allied Genoese fleet under the command of Gilberto Dandolo initially refused to do battle, but the Venetians attacked and broke its formation. The Genoese lost over a thousand men. Several years later, the Venetians attacked the Genoese fleet again off the coast of Sicily in the battle of Trapani (1266). Confronted with relentless Venetian assaults, the Genoese leapt overboard and abandoned their ships in terror, dying in the thousands as they tried to swim to shore.

The Genoese, however, did often outwit or evade the Venetians, and they tended to gain an advantage when they were able to raid Venetian convoys. For instance, the Genoese captured a Venetian round ship and three galleys off the coast of Abydos in the Dardanelles in 1262: ships loaded with cargo from a year's trade in the ports of the Black Sea. In 1264, the Genoese admiral Simone Grillo tricked the Venetians into thinking the Genoese fleet had departed for the East and, in an ambush, seized all of the galleys of the Venetian fleet near Dyrrachium in the southern Adriatic as it was returning from Constantinople. In 1266, three Genoese galleys captured a Venetian round ship that had lost its convoy in the Aegean, capturing a bountiful cargo and a hundred and eight prisoners.

Neither side, however, gained any decisive advantage in the Mediterranean. The war came to an end when the French king Louis IX threatened to confiscate Genoese properties in France if Genoa did not make peace with the Venetians. Louis IX wanted to go on crusade in Egypt and desired peace between the two warring factions, as well as the Genoese fleet. In 1270, the battles temporarily came to a halt.

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[*See also* Acre, Siege of; Alghero, Siege and Naval Battle of; *and* Porto Longo, Naval Battle of.]

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Third War

As was the case for the earlier conflicts (1257–1270 and 1294–1299), the causes of the Third Genoese-Venetian War (1350–1355) lay in the intense rivalry between the two city-states for dominance of the immensely valuable trade in high-value goods like spices and silks between these cities and "Romania" (the territories of the Byzantine Empire and the shores of the Black Sea). Both states had established trading centers at strategic points and vied with each other for influence at Constantinople, where the Genoese had the advantage of a fortified base at Pera (now Beyoğlu), on the far side of the Golden Horn. Set-piece battles between galley fleets and sustained commerce raiding were prominent features of the conflict.

The war was precipitated by the opportunistic taking of ten Genoese galleys by the Venetian commander Marco Ruzzini near the Venetian base at Negroponte (also called Euboea) in 1350 in pursuit of a quarrel with the Genoese over trading rights at Tana, on the Sea of Azov, a trading center usually dominated by the Genoese. The Venetians lost the opportunity to eliminate the whole fleet of fourteen vessels because some galley crews were eager to plunder those already taken. In revenge, the Genoese raided Negroponte itself, but their main response was to dispatch a large fleet (around sixty-four galleys) to the Aegean the following year. This was despite the fact that both sides found it difficult to man their fleets following the catastrophe of the Black Death.

By making alliances with Aragon and the Byzantine emperor, John Kantakouzenos, by which their allies supplied galleys—some paid for by the Venetians, some at their own expense, but all manned by their subjects—the Venetians managed to gather an opposing fleet of around sixty galleys under the command of Niccolò Pisani. This combined force was intended to assemble in Greek waters. The Genoese, under Paganino Doria, based themselves at Pera in the winter of 1351–1352, hoping to prevent the allied fleet from coming together. This they were not able to do because in February, after a stormy winter, a strong south wind carried the enemy fleet towards Pera. In atrocious weather the two fleets engaged in the Bosporus with fighting continuing into the night. There were heavy casualties on both sides, but the advantage lay with the Genoese because the allies withdrew.

The next year the Venetians took the conflict to the western Mediterranean in support of Aragonese claims to Sardinia and defeated a Genoese fleet off Alghero. This victory, however, had little effect on the situation in the Aegean where both sides were suffering heavy losses in merchant ships. Pisani's fleet failed to bring Doria to battle off Chios, and in October 1354 Pisani retired for the winter to Porto Longo, a harbor on the island of Sapienza near Modon (present-day Methoni, on the Peloponnesos), one of the main Venetian bases in the region. He placed a guard of fourteen galleys under Nicolò Querini at the harbor mouth, while a further twenty-one were beached. Doria's forces appeared suddenly at the harbor mouth to challenge the Venetians to battle, but Pisani, following orders from Venice, declined. The next day the Genoese evaded the harbor guard and won a total victory, taking the entire Venetian fleet. Pisani and his fellow officers were taken prisoner. On their eventual release they were put on trial in Venice for their apparent cowardice and incompetence.

This seeming Genoese triumph had few if any long-term consequences for either side. Genoa's rulers at the time, the Visconti, wished for peace. Neither state had the financial resources or access to sufficient manpower to continue the war.

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A truce was made in 1355 that merely required mutual attacks on trade to cease and trading with Tana to be suspended for three years. The war does, however, illuminate the nature of warfare between the Venetians and the Genoese in the Mediterranean at this time. While strong commercial reasons ensured that most actions took place in the Eastern Mediterranean, fleets could extend their range to cover almost the whole area. Even so, actions took place near shore, usually in the vicinity of a port, but with little or no participation of land forces. These battles were hard fought by galleys under the control of experienced and professional commanders, but the final outcome of the war owed more to shore-based diplomats than to the actions of the fleets.

[*See also* Alghero, Siege and Naval Battle of *and* Porto Longo, Naval Battle of.]

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Fourth War

Considering that the Third Genoese-Venetian War (1351–1355) was concluded by a truce that did little or nothing to remedy the problems that stoked the mutual enmity of Venice and Genoa, it was not surprising that the conflict was renewed twenty-three years later with the fourth war (1378–1381). On this occasion the ostensible cause was the status of Tenedos (now called Bozcaada), a small island just south of the Dardanelles Strait, a position that allowed its ruler to control trade to and from Constantinople and the Black Sea. To the fury of Venice, Genoa acquired the island in 1376; the next year, Venice sent a fleet east to claim the territory for itself. In 1378 war began in earnest.

Attacks on commercial shipping were intermingled with the engagements between galley fleets that had characterized the earlier wars, although on a larger scale. The fourth war also developed into a much more serious threat to Venetian independence than any previous conflict had. The Genoese were able to profit from mistakes by both Venetian commanders and the authorities of the city, mistakes that put Venice in real danger. The Venetians opened their campaign by sending their main fleet of fourteen galleys, commanded by Vettor Pisani, the captain general of the sea and nephew of Niccolò Pisani, to the west to attack Genoese trade. After a successful and profitable cruise in the Tyrrhenian Sea he retired, as ordered, to Pula in Istria to winter there. The pursuing Genoese fleet managed to penetrate right to the northern end of the Adriatic unobserved, found the Venetians moored at Pula, and attacked, apparently with sixteen vessels. It seems that a further six galleys were concealed from Pisani behind a headland, and Pisani, even though his galleys were not at battle readiness, put to sea with twenty-four vessels to face what he thought was a fleet only two-thirds the size of his. When it became clear that the Venetians were facing defeat by a fleet of nearly equal size, Pisani fled with around six galleys, leaving the remainder and their crews to be taken by the enemy.

This news was received with horror in Venice, where Pisani was accused of deserting his command and was imprisoned with ignominy. The situation was serious. Venice faced a victorious Genoese fleet, augmented by the captured galleys, in its home waters. The only large galley force left to the city had already sailed for the western Mediterranean under the command of the Venetian admiral Carlo Zeno; communication with this fleet was virtually impossible. Venice was thus almost defenseless and found itself cut off from the Italian mainland by the armies of Hungary and Padua, allies of the Genoese, while the Genoese fleet patrolled the sea off the lagoon unhindered. A chronicler vividly recorded the turmoil in the city and the growing fears of starvation.

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The situation became even more serious when the Genoese took Chioggia and settled down for a long siege. The Venetian authorities then yielded to public pressure and released and reappointed Pisani. Using his extensive local knowledge of the lagoon, Pisani managed to sink blockships in the main channels, while small local vessels under his command used shallow winding ways through the lagoon to harass and attack the Genoese. Zeno also returned in January 1380 with his fourteen galleys after a series of successful attacks on Genoese trade. The besiegers were now themselves besieged and cut off from supplies by land or sea. In June the Genoese at Chioggia surrendered. Once more diplomatic endeavors produced a treaty, the Treaty of Turin of 1381.

The terms of this agreement were not on the surface favorable to Venice: the Genoese kept Tenedos. Venetian trading rights at Tana, the trading colony on the Sea of Azov, were suspended for two years, and Hungary retained its hold on Dalmatia. It can be argued, however, that this war had valuable lessons for a state like Venice that had, up until this point, relied almost entirely on its galley fleets for defense. It was now plain that sea routes to and from the city must not be obstructed. Venice must also endeavor to keep the Adriatic free of enemy shipping. Venice also could not ignore the need to keep land routes open. In the kind of amphibious operations that were a prominent feature of naval warfare in this region, commanders needed to be resourceful and energetic and have adaptable forces. Neither successful sea battles nor disruptions of marine trade were likely to ensure victory on their own.

[*See also* Chioggia, Battle of; Galleys; Italy, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1493); Naval Combat and Tactics; *and* Ships and Sailing.]

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GEOFFROI DE CHARNY

(c. 1305–1356), French nobleman, soldier, diplomat, and author of several chivalric treatises. Born into a Burgundian family of the lesser nobility, he belonged to the first generation of petty noblemen raised to a powerful position thanks to professional service in the Hundred Years' War.

Charny's first known military service was in 1337, on the Gascon front (Hundred Years' War). In the following decade, he managed to prove himself a courageous warrior and an able commander, despite participating in a string of French setbacks (notably the battle of Morlaix in 1342) and a sterile crusade to Anatolia (1345–1356). Charny's one major military success was as leader of the defense of the town of Béthune in 1346 against an invading Flemish army. This was the sole French success in an otherwise disastrous year, and Charny was rewarded with a place on the royal council and later with the command of the northwestern frontier, which faced rebellious Flanders and English-occupied Calais. Following this success, Charny's record of valiant failures continued with several unsuccessful attacks on Calais (1348–1349), defeat and capture in a major combat below the walls of Calais (1350), and finally with his heroic death at the battle of Poitiers (1356).

Charny was recognized by contemporaries as a paragon of chivalry. Kings Philip VI and Jean II of France chose him on several occasions to be the bearer of the *oriflamme*, the sacred royal standard, which was traditionally entrusted to the best knight of the realm. Charny played a central part in forming the Company of the Star, the royal French order of chivalry, founded by King Jean II in 1352.

Charny's chief importance for present-day scholarship is his role as a theoretician of chivalry. Three treatises on chivalry written by Charny have survived: the *Demandes pour la joute, les tournois, et la guerre* (Questions concerning the joust, tournament,

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and war); the *Livre Charny* (Book of Charny); and most important, the extensive *Livre de chevalerie* (*Book of chivalry*). All three were probably written as instructional or inspirational material for members of the Company of the Star. They are among the most important sources available for understanding medieval chivalry, since they were composed by an actual paragon of chivalry on the basis of real military experience and were addressed to an audience of knights in the middle of a deadly war.

[*See also* Chivalry, *subentry on* Sources *and* Poitiers, Battle of (1356).]

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GERALDO THE FEARLESS

(d. 1172), adventurer and folk hero. In the era of small-scale raiding and political anarchy after the Christian reconquest of Lisbon in 1147, the Portuguese reconquest was continued by Geraldo Geraldes, called *o Sem Pavor*, "the Fearless." Like "El Cid" (Rodrigo Díaz de Vivar) of an earlier era, Geraldo the Fearless used the unstable political situation to go into the business of reconquest for himself. Gathering a small army of retainers, the adventurer normally used stealth tactics that unleashed small parties of commandoes on the targeted Muslim outpost. Secretly scaling the walls and killing the sentries, these irregulars would then open the gates to the frontal attack of Geraldo's army. Using these daring methods in 1165–1166, Geraldo captured Cáceres and other small towns. His successes alarmed not only neighboring Muslim rulers but also their ally, Fernando II of León (r. 1157–1188).

When Geraldo abandoned his normal modus operandi for a full-blown siege of Badajoz in 1169, he quickly called for more troops from the Portuguese king, Afonso I Henriques (r. 1139–1185). Meanwhile the Muslim garrison got word to the Leonese king, whose relief party eventually broke up the siege and bagged its commanders in the process. After buying his freedom by surrendering his earlier conquests to León, Geraldo despaired of further victories on the Portuguese frontier and moved his base of operations to eastern Spain, where he gained some fleeting victories in Murcia and southern Valencia. He returned to Portuguese campaigning in 1172 and, allied with Afonso I, captured Beja. Rapidly falling out with the Portuguese monarch over the division of plunder, however, Geraldo almost immediately entered Almohad service. Soon he was suspected of being a Portuguese spy and was executed. Despite his violent demise, Geraldo Geraldes stands as a hero of Portugal's reconquest who paved the way for the ultimate victory over Islam in the thirteenth century.

[*See also* Díaz de Vivar, Rodrigo *and* Iberia, *subentry on* Narrative (1100–1300).]

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GERMANY

[*This entry contains fifteen subentries, on German sources from 911–1024, 1024–1125, 1125–1250, 1250–1415, and 1415–1493; an overview of German military history from 911–1024, 1024–1125, 1125–1250, 1250–1415, and 1415–1493; and on German historiography from 911–1024, 1024–1125, 1125–1250, 1250–1415, and 1415–1493.*]

Sources (911–1024)

Sources for German military history in this century are both uneven and difficult to use because of difficulties of translation and the often fragmentary

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nature of many chronicles' annual entries. Some, however, do contain significant details on warfare in the Ottonian period, within their own geographic and ideological emphasis.

Chronicles of Widukind and Thietmar. Two chronicles dominate the rest: Widukind of Corvey's *Rerum Gestarum Saxonicarum* and Thietmar of Merseburg's *Chronicon*. Depending on one's interpretation of their reliability, these are informative and wide-ranging accounts, and are useful not only for reconstructing Ottonian strategic geography, but also for obtaining an idea of the number and quantity of campaigns during this period. They contain significant pitfalls, however. Widukind's language, for example, is not always easy to penetrate; various interpretations of Henry I's military reforms hinge on the interpretation of the phrase "*agrarii milites*" from Widukind's chronicle, the only instance where this phrase appears.

Thietmar of Merseburg's *Chronicon* is the outstanding source for later Ottonian warfare, particularly Henry II's Italian and Polish-Slavic campaigns; it contains fewer details concerning Otto I's early campaigns. The utility of Gerhard of Augsburg's life of Bishop Ulrich of Augsburg has been highly debated over the years. Many historians view Gerhard's portrayal of the Lechfeld campaign as an exercise in hagiography to the exclusion of accurate reporting. However, Charles Bowlus's most recent work (2006) argues for its value as a predominantly eyewitness source of the siege of Augsburg in 955 and the subsequent battle on the Lechfeld, and the reader is directed to Bowlus's discussion and bibliography, as well as to Walter Berschin's brief 2005 article, for further reading on this controversial subject. At any rate, even Bowlus concedes that Gerhard's quality declines noticeably when the action shifts beyond the eyewitness range of the author. Other accounts, such as the Annals of Flodoard of Reims and the continuation of Regino of Prüm's chronicle, all contain significant campaign details from their authors' perspectives (in this case the western and central Frankish realms, respectively). In combination they are especially useful for filling in details on Ottonian warfare in Lotharingia. Adam of Bremen's somewhat later chronicle of the archbishops of Hamburg-Bremen presents the perspective of the northern coast, including details on frontier warfare against the Danes and Slavic tribes in Mecklenberg. Liudprand of Cremona's works tend to focus more on diplomacy during the later tenth century, but he does record military activity as well, particularly for the reign of Otto II.

As Timothy Reuter has suggested in his article "Carolingian and Ottonian Warfare" (1999), the rather episodic chronicle references are not greatly augmented by surviving artistic remains. Portrayals of late ninth- or early tenth-century warriors, such as in the Golden Psalter of Saint Gall, are often based on earlier templates, with little regard for contemporary practice. Archaeological sources must be similarly handled with caution. Recent work on tenth-century fortifications suggests the use of this discipline for augmenting our knowledge of military geography (see Bowlus, 2006). Similarly, excavations of Ottonian-era burials extend our knowledge of the physical world of the warrior, but are not especially helpful in clarifying chronological practice and material provenance.

Monumenta Germaniae Historica. The chronicle sources for the Ottonian period were published in the *Monumenta Germaniae Historica*, first in the *Scriptores Rerum Germanicarum* series, and more comprehensively in the first six volumes of the folio *Scriptores* series; the latter series' holdings deserve to be summarized here. Volume 1 holds the continuation of Regino of Prüm's chronicle through 967 by Adalbert of Trier, with detail on the middle Frankish kingdom and the Italian expeditions. Volume 2 contains the Würzburg Annals, which are typical of later summaries drawn from various contemporary accounts; the detail is cursory and of uneven accuracy. For example, Lechfeld is placed in 956, with the Hungarians causing the complete devastation of Bavaria (*totam Baioariam depopulantes*). Volume 3 holds many core Ottonian historical writings, including the parallel chronicle traditions of the imperial abbeys at Hildesheim, Quedlinburg, and Weissemburg, as well as the works of Liudprand of Cremona, a dated edition of Thietmar's Chronicle,

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and the account of Flodoard of Reims. The Quedlinburg Chronicle in particular contains details on the reigns of Otto III and especially Henry II, and is a useful corollary to Widukind's account. Volume 4 emphasizes the lives of ecclesiastics, and includes the various histories of Bruno of Cologne, Otto I's brother and stalwart defender. While told from a distinctly ecclesiastical viewpoint, these "lives," particularly Ruotger's account, contain a large number of details on Ottonian diplomacy and warfare, particularly in the Rhineland and Italy, as well as frequent mention of Otto I's military affairs. Also present is Gerhard's life of Ulrich of Augsburg, mentioned above. The life of Saint Adalbert, bishop of Prague, while again a life told from a hagiographic tradition, contains some interesting details on the politics and career of Otto III. Finally, there is Adalbert's life of Henry II, which, while it ranges freely to the middle of the century and is once again told from a hagiographic viewpoint, is an essential companion to Thietmar's Chronicle; it is followed by a life of Henry's wife, Kunegunde, and the life of Bishop Burchard of Worms, one of Henry's most trusted prelates.

Volumes 5 and 6 move to chronicles compiled in the mid- to late eleventh century and occasionally later, and present many third-hand summaries of the Ottonian period, the *Herimanni Augiensis Chronicon* being the most prominent of these in volume 5 (most chronicles deal with later Salian history). In volume 6, Ekkehard's universal chronicle contains the same entry for Lechfeld as the Würzburg Annals three volumes earlier. Sigbert of Gembloux's chronicle is perhaps the best representative of this class of widely read summaries, as it provides stylish renderings from Widukind and other Ottonian-era sources regarding the military and political happenings of over a century before. The one exception to this state of affairs is the *Annalista Saxo*, the Saxon yearbooks, composed by an unknown author who chronicled events through 1139. His entries for the Ottonian years are long and extremely detailed, representing similar reading to Sigbert. Other later writings, some showing original material, include the *Gesta Pontificum Cameracensium* (Cambrai), which includes interesting details concerning the Hungarian invasions shortly before Lechfeld. Leo and Peter's *Chronica Monasterii Casinensis* (Monte Cassino), from Italy, contains extensive discussion of the military, political, and religious situation in Italy during the Ottonian period, though the compilers were active in the later Salian era.

English and Digital Versions. An increasing number of major chronicles have been critically translated into English, including Thietmar of Merseburg's *Chronicon*, Flodoard of Reims's history, and Liudprand of Cremona's works. As of 2010, Widukind of Corvey still awaits a definitive English translation.

In addition to printed chronicles, various manuscript collections have been digitalized, including materials in the archives of Saint Gall monastery, as well as selections from various university libraries in Germany, such as Heidelberg and Darmstadt, and the Archbishopric of Cologne's codices. The best introductory site for these collections is the *Mediaevum* Web portal, whose manuscript pages ("Handschriften, Inkunabeln und frühe Drucke") contain links to digitalized documents, databases, catalogs, and indices that the Ottonian scholar will find worth examining.

[*See also* Augsburg, Siege of; Lechfeld, Battle on the; Otto I; *and* Thietmar of Merseburg.]

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Sources (1024–1125)

The study of German medieval military history during the reign of the Salian emperors is based primarily on the analysis of contemporary works of narrative history. This article will discuss in chronological order those sources that provide extensive information about intra-German and border wars and whose authors either had good contacts at the imperial court or wrote historical narrations in or near the war zones.

After Conrad II's death in 1039, his chaplain Wipo, who had accompanied the emperor on his campaigns in Burgundy and against the Liutizi, composed the *Gesta Chuonradi II imperatoris* (The deeds of the Emperor Conrad II) between 1040 and 1046. Hermann, a monk of the monastery of Reichenau, who wrote his chronicle between 1045 and 1054, provides further information about Conrad's military expeditions but especially about the warfare of his son and successor Henry III. A detailed description of Henry III's military expeditions against Bohemia and Hungary survives in the *Annales Altahenses* (Annals of Niederaltaich), which were drafted in about 1075 in Niederaltaich, a monastery situated in eastern Bavaria near the theaters of war. The narrative of these annals relies not only on Hermann's account but also on local traditions and probably on a now-lost depiction of these wars.

Henry IV's military conflicts with regional opposition in Saxony, which later enlarged into a rebellion of Saxon and southern German princes, drew much more attention. The anonymous *Carmen de bello Saxonico* (Song of the Saxon war), covering only the years from 1073 to 1075, and the *Vita Heinrici IV imperatoris* (The life of the emperor Henry IV), which probably was written shortly after the emperor's death in 1106, both reflect the martial events from a pro-Henry position. In contrast, several authorities portray the fighting from the perspective of Henry's adversaries. These include Bruno of Magdeburg (or Merseburg), who in his *Bellum Saxonicum* (The Saxon war) narrated the conduct of war until the beginning of 1082; Lambert von Hersfeld, whose annals extended until 1077; Berthold of Reichenau, whose chronicle extended to 1080; and Bernold of Konstanz, who built on Berthold and continued his chronicle until 1100. Finally, two important sources for the campaigns of the last Salian emperor, Henry V, are the chronicle of Ekkehard of Aura and the *Historia de duabus civitatibus* (History of the two cities) of Henry V's nephew Otto of Freising, a bishop who completed his chronicle in 1146.

The historiography of the later Salian era also reflects the development and rise of the German *Ministerialität* (ministerial rank) in that it

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particularly emphasizes the important military role of these dependent servants in the service of Henry IV and Henry V. In addition, some royal charters are indicative, especially of the social advancement of the *ministeriales*. Previously Henry III had made territorial gifts to his servants Obbert (13 January 1050), Azelin (18 February 1050), Rafoldus (10 February 1051), and Otnand (21 September 1056). Even during Henry IV's minority, several kingly charters document territorial donations to *ministeriales* at the intercession of leading members of the regency: for example, to a certain Cuno (28 May 1057), to Salecho (14 March 1059), and to Mazelin (7 August 1061). Other royal charters, however, witness the unfree legal status of the *Ministerialität*, as when servants were given away by the king—as to the episcopal church of Hamburg-Bremen (22 June 1083; 28 December 1085) or to the abbey of Saint Gall (12 May 1093). Furthermore, the *ministeriales* of Saint Gall already possessed in 1064 a special service law that Henry IV also granted to the servants of the monastery of Einsiedeln (23 February 1064). The king's charter is silent concerning their particular rights and duties, but this could resemble the regulations of the service law for the *ministeriales* of the episcopal church of Bamberg, which survives in a charter from around 1061. The service law provides information about the servants' legal status in court, their right to obtain fiefs in exchange for service, their hereditary right, and their functions at the lordly court, as well as their obligations during military expeditions.

[*See also* Bruno of Magdeburg; Henry III; Henry IV; Henry V; Lambert von Hersfeld; and *Ministeriales*.]

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Martin Völkl

Sources (1125–1250)

The military historian looking for treatises on military theory written in the era of the Hohenstaufen will search in vain. Even the relevant passages in the encyclopedia of Vincent of Beauvais, written as it was in the second half of the thirteenth century, turn out to be largely dependent on the classical Roman treatment of this subject by Vegetius. However, narrative historical sources can be helpful. One such source, the *Gesta Friderici I. imperatoris* (The deeds

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of Frederick I, Holy Roman Emperor), written by Otto of Freising and his successor Rahewin, illustrates the concept of "just war" as seen from the perspective of the emperor and provides relatively accurate descriptions of campaigns and sieges (despite Rahewin's tendency to plagiarize from the first-century texts of the historian Josephus). Narrative sources occasionally include official documents, such as Barbarossa's decree of July 1158 governing the order of his troops. This particular document enables a reconstruction of the living conditions in the camps of the German army and reveals the treatment of noncombatant persons in Italy. For example, it details the punishments for the crimes of injury and manslaughter occurring within the army, the disciplinary measures taken against plundering and pillaging, and the interdictions forbidding contact with women and the fraternization with non-German-speaking Italians.

Otto von St. Blasien also continued the *Gesta*. Otto was not an eyewitness to the events he describes in his account (written ten or twelve years after the fact) of the campaign into southern Italy by Henry VI, the King of Germany and Holy Roman Emperor. Otto's *Gesta* proves to be often quite factually unreliable and may be viewed as an example of ideal concepts of military campaigns rather than as a factual account.

Descriptions of Individual Events or Campaigns. Historical sources dealing exclusively with a single campaign, battle, or siege are relatively rare. For the reign of Frederick Barbarossa, the short anonymous treatise *De ruina civitatis Terdonae* (On the fall of the city of Tortona) and the *Liber de obsidione Ancone* (English trans., *History of the Siege of Ancona*), written by the rhetorician Boncompagno da Signa, fall into this category. The former, an anonymous work presumably written by a capitular of the cathedral of Tortona, describes Barbarossa's march through Lombardy in 1154–1155 and the capture of Tortona from an anti-Hohenstaufen perspective, thus providing an ideal counterpart to the view of the events in Otto's *Gesta*. It gives detailed information regarding the composition of the armies and the chronology of events, and it minutely describes the siege from the point of view of the defenders.

The 1173 siege of Ancona by the Hohenstaufen imperial legate Christian I, archbishop of Mainz, is the subject of Boncampagno's book, which was written in a perfectly literary, almost humanistic style a few decades after the events. Although the historical value of this work was regarded with great skepticism for some time, modern historians have rehabilitated the *Liber de obsidione Ancone* considerably, since it appears that Boncompagno relied on eyewitness accounts for his depiction and wrote for a public that itself had firsthand experience of the siege. Of particular interest are his vivid and detailed descriptions of the famine in the besieged city, the individual battle scenes, and the war machines.

A unique source for military history is the *Liber ad Honorem Augusti* (Book in honor of the emperor), the versified and illustrated chronicle of Peter of Eboli describing the conquest of the Norman kingdom of southern Italy by Henry VI. In particular, the illustrations of fortifications, siege machines, weapons, armor, and even warships, not to mention the rather drastic battle scenes depicting the severed body parts of the combatants, offer a vivid impression of war in the twelfth century.

Poetic Descriptions. Unexpectedly perhaps, poetic works often reveal themselves to be valuable sources of information for military history since they revel in depicting scenes of battle, describing armory and weaponry more profusely—and hence in greater detail—than do prose texts. For the reign of Frederick Barbarossa, the *Gesta Friderici I* of Godfrey of Viterbo and the fragmentary *Carmen de gestis Frederici I imperatoris in Lombardia* (English trans., *Barbarossa in Italy*) are worth mentioning. The latter poem describes Barbarossa's war against Milan from 1154 until the battle of Carcano in 1160 as seen from the perspective of a supporter of the emperor who himself participated in the campaign. This outlook was shared by Godfrey of Viterbo, who, as notary of the imperial chancery, was present in Italy in 1161–1162 and 1167 and depicted Barbarossa's conflict with the Lombards and the supporters of Pope Alexander III in the forty-seven poems contained in

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his *Gesta*. For the reign of the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II (also King Frederick I of Sicily), three anonymous poems about the emperor's defeat in 1248 at Parma (*Carmina triumphalia de Victoria urbe eversa* [Triumphant songs on the destruction of the city of Vittoria]) provide interesting details that are not contained in other works, mentioning, for example, Parma's banner-wagon and the loss of the imperial banner after the battle.

Travel Journals and Letters. Of "peripheral" importance for the Holy Roman Empire in the literal sense of the word was the Mongolian intrusion into eastern and central Europe in the first half of the thirteenth century. In a description of his journey into Mongolia, the Franciscan friar Giovanni da Pian del Carpini (or Giovanni di Plano Carpini) devotes three chapters to the Mongolian methods of warfare, implicitly differentiating these from the military practices of the Christian Occident, which he considered to be more reliable and better organized. The reliability of some information, such as the claim that the Mongols burned human fat during sieges, may, however, be viewed as questionable.

Lastly, war reports in the form of letters deserve to be considered as a genre of source material for military history, albeit of variable character. For example, the description of the battle of Tusculum (1167) in a letter written by the German prelate and politician Rainald of Dassel, then the archbishop of Cologne, may allow an exact reconstruction of the sequence of events and provides a clear picture of the self-image of an imperial bishop in military service. However, the war reports sent by the supporters of Frederick II to him in Italy, and Frederick's own depiction of his victory at the battle of Cortenuova in 1237, served quite a different purpose and may be interpreted as largely propaganda. Nevertheless, the source value of such letters is not to be underestimated, considering that they generally contain proportionally less fictional matter than do historiographical or poetical sources.

[*See also* Frederick I Barbarossa *and* Italy, *subentry on* Sources (1000–1300).]

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Sources (1250–1415)

The most important group of sources for medieval war is the chronicle texts. Not only are the political contexts described, but they often contain the only information anywhere on military actions. In England, the burdens of conducting war were mostly borne by the crown, which consequently had at its disposal a complex system of administration, resulting in a correspondingly large number of written sources. A comparable level of administration and bureaucracy, however, did not exist at the German court. The German documents from 1250 are available mainly in the form of *Regesta Imperii* (Acts of the emperor), which are not complete editions of the texts, but compilations in summary form. They reflect the entire spectrum of royal authority, not just wars.

Chronicle works for the period under consideration are quite numerous. They are written in Latin or a German vernacular. Hardly any exist in English translation. There is no single main source on war for the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, so historical questions on war must be approached through the individual conflicts of the period and their sources. An overview of the late-medieval German sources includes *Quellenkunde zur Deutschen Geschichte im Spätmittelalter (1350–1500)*. Despite the dates indicated in the title, this work also deals with sources from before 1350.

The historical writings of the period fall into three groups, distinguished by the focus of their reporting and by their origins. World chronicles take a supra-regional view, encompassing the history of the world from its beginnings up to the composition of the chronicle. The large number of regionally-oriented works concern themselves with the history of a region or a country. Municipal chronicles are the expression of an increasing community consciousness and a corresponding need for city histories. A few examples are presented.

Supra-Regional Chronicles. One of the most important fourteenth-century chroniclers was the Basel canon lawyer Matthias von Neuenburg (d. 1364), whose chronicle covers the period from 1245 to 1350. It mentions several military conflicts as part of the empire's political history, such as the battles of Dürnkrut and Mühldorf. Its interest lies more in anecdotal stories than in military contexts. Still, many of these stories allow conclusions to be drawn about matters of military history.

Regional Texts. Texts with a regional focus are primarily concerned with the wars in their region—that is, wars in which their regional figures took part. Thus, Jan van Heelu concerns himself with the battle of Worringen in his text, which is very informative for the study of war. He wrote his account for the daughter-in-law of the duke of Brabant; the duke took part in this battle.

Chronicles from the milieu of Duke Louis IV of Bavaria likewise show a clearly regional, Bavarian focus. The *Chronik der Herzöge von Bayern* [Chronicle of the Dukes of Bavaria] reports on the Upper Bavarian house of Wittelsbach from 1309 to 1372—especially Louis IV—and on its wars. The title reveals the subject exactly, and the chronicle's bias is entirely pro-Wittelsbach. The same is true of the *Fürstenfelder Chronik* or *Chronica de gestis principum* [Chronicle of the acts of the princes], which probably comes from the milieu of the Wittelsbach family monastery, Fürstenfeld, and provides some information on military history on the battle of Mühldorf in 1322. It deals with the consequences of the war for the Fürstenfeld monastery, and thus illustrates the effects of war on noncombatants. The report's bias appears perhaps most clearly in *Das Leben Kaiser Ludwigs IV* [Life of Emperor Louis IV], which portrays Louis as a shining hero. All writings about wars are dominated by this tendency.

Municipal Chronicles. The most important series for municipal chronicles is *Die Chroniken der Deutschen Städte vom 14. bis ins 16. Jahrhundert.*

From the Lower Saxon city of Braunschweig comes the so-called *Fehdebuch* [Book of feuds] for

the years 1377 to 1388. In it, municipal scribes recorded the damage suffered by citizens of Braunschweig at the hands of nobles from the surrounding regions. Here the subject is not great wars, but a look at everyday attacks and disturbances. This information was intended to support later legal demands and claims for restitution. They make it quite clear that warlike acts of force were not limited to battles and battlefields, but could be a part of everyday life in a late-medieval city.

Another important representative of the late-medieval municipal chronicle is Andreas von Regensburg (d. 1438), who reports on fourteenth-century military actions in his *Chronik der Päpste und Römischen Kaiser* [Chronicle of the popes and the Roman emperors]. The south-German city wars and the 1388 siege of Regensburg are mentioned here. He is interested mainly in the fortunes of the city and of the monastery of St. Mang (St. Magnus), to which he belonged.

In both cases, as in most works of this genre, the author's interest in war is definitely limited to local concerns. Military details are found rarely and unsystematically.

[*See also* Dürnkrut, Battle of; Heelu, Jan van; Louis IV; Mühldorf, Battle of; Noncombatants in Armies; *and* Worringen, Battle of.]

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Translated from the German by Johanna M. Baboukis

Sources (1415–1493)

When discussing late-medieval warfare in the German-speaking region in the fifteenth century, a distinction must be made between sources of material objects and written narrative and documentary sources. In addition, three further types of sources must be taken into account:

1. "War ordinances" (*kriegsordnungen*);
2. Illustrated technical manuscripts with drawings, descriptions of weapons, war equipment, and other technical artifacts; and
3. The first "instruction manuals" for the science of war.

Weapons and war equipment from the fifteenth century are held and displayed in many museums and collections, such as the Emden Rüstkammer the Deutsches Historisches Museum in Berlin, the Germanisches Nationalmuseum in Nuremberg, and the Hofjagd- und Rüstkammer and Heeresgeschichtliches Museum in Vienna. Weapons for striking and stabbing, helmets,

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armor, crossbows, firearms, and artillery from this period not only illustrate the chronicles and other reports; in some cases, they have also made possible authentic reconstructions, with the help of experimental research on materials, so as to understand the function and effectiveness of these weapons.

Lists of the condition of weapons and equipment are a rich source still held in many archives. The archives also include the account books of cities and nobles, showing the costs of purchase or production of necessary war equipment; often, they also list the pieces seized as booty from a defeated enemy. Additionally available are acts of the Imperial Diet proclaiming war resolutions, such as King Sigismund's call to arms against the Hussites in 1420; the patent for the crusade of 10 February of the same year; and the Taborites' response in the form of a public declaration of the Seventy-Two Articles of the Hussite movement, as promulgated that November in Prague. Many descriptions, by heralds or other chroniclers, exist of wars, battles, or sieges, in some cases including formal written calls to war—for example, in Soest from the mid-fifteenth century; some even name names: "Dat banner des rydenden volkes sal hebben Laurentius Eppinch" (Laurentius Eppinch shall raise the banner of the mounted forces).

Extensive reports of military activities may be found in the chronicles of cities and territories. This is true, for example, for the *Great Burgundian Chronicle* (or *Zürcher Schilling*) of Diebold Schilling of Bern and for the *Duringische Chronik* (*Thüringen*) of the Eisenach municipal scribe Johannes Rothe. It must be noted, however, that the reports are usually partisan in nature. The Historical Commission of the Bavarian Academy of Sciences compiled and published the chronicles of the German cities from the fourteenth through sixteenth centuries as early as 1862. Corresponding reprints were published in 1961. Examples of the relevant materials in this collection include the war journal of Bartholomeus von der Lake, which includes a description of the 1447 siege of Soest. Many relevant chronicles were published in the massive Monumenta Germaniae Historica series, which is now available online at http://www.dmgh.de.

The "war ordinances" that have been preserved provide information on the conduct of war and its legal framework. In addition to Swiss and Hussite ordinances, some German Imperial ordinances survive; the one from 1427, along with samples of military news bulletins, mobilization plans, and chronicle narratives relating to the Hussite Wars, have been translated by Thomas Fudge in his source collection on that subject. These all document the mercilessness of the fanatical fighting in the Hussite and Burgundian wars. Even though the war ordinances clearly forbade warriors, on pain of punishment, to kill women and children, to torture wounded enemies to death, to cut the hearts out of defeated soldiers, or to burn down mills, the fact that these prohibitions were considered necessary allows one to draw conclusions regarding the usual practices of the time. Additional source material on these conflicts, which loomed large in the military history of late-medieval Germany, can be found in Palacky's collection of documents.

For the second half of the fifteenth century, the "History of Frederick III" by his secretary Aeneas Silvius (Enea Silvio Piccolomini, later Pope Pius II) and the "History of Frederick III and Maximilian I" by Joseph Grünpeck are of some value.

The technological aspects of weaponry in the fifteenth century may be examined in many illustrated manuscripts on relevant subjects, and in illustrations from the chronicles of the period. Under titles such as *Bellifortis* (Strength of war), *Kriegsbuch* (Book of war), *Feuerwerkbuch* (Book of firearms), *Strydbuch* (Book of fighting), *Büchsenmeisterbuch* (Gunsmiths' book), or *Buch von den probirten Künsten* (Book of practical arts), works of this kind list the medieval equipment still in use as well as various newer styles of firearms, provide formulas for gunpowder, and describe the use of artillery and hand weapons quite precisely. There are also tactical recommendations dealing with the organization of sieges, the arrangement of *Wagenburgs*, and the order of marching armies, as well as various treatises containing suggestions for treating wounds in men and horses.

The most important sources of this type are available in the various manuscript collections; in 2000 Rainer Leng provided an excellent and comprehensive review and evaluation of these special sources in his award-winning study *Ars belli: Deutsche taktische und kriegstechnische Bilderhandschriften und Traktate im 15. und 16. Jahrhundert* (The art of war: German tactical and military-technical illustrated manuscripts in the 15th and 16th century).

Some of the above-mentioned manuscripts also include texts with tactical suggestions, but these are mainly compilations of ancient authors that are scarcely relevant to late-medieval warfare. The first theoretical treatment of fifteenth-century forms of warfare came from the Franconian imperial minister Philipp von Seldeneck, who is known to have taken part in the battle near Seckenheim in 1462, probably as a commander. He draws on his military experiences in a treatise titled *Philips von Seldenneck verzaychnus der ordenung* (Philipp von Seldeneck's register of military ordinances), which treats among other subjects the Eid der Kriegsknechte (Soldiers' oath), the Ordnung der Fussknechte (Order for infantry), the Ordnung für die Reiterei (Order for cavalry), and the Feldbestellung für grosse Heere (Field dispositions for large armies).

A war manual is contained in the manuscript *Durlach 18* in the Badische Landesbibliothek in Karlsruhe (pp. 78r to 116r). This is more comprehensive than any previous work, representing the first effort toward military theory in the late Middle Ages. It offers the most detailed description, until the end of the fifteenth century, of infantry and cavalry tactics for both smaller and larger armies, and is based on the adaptation of military traditions as well as contemporary practice in relation to the author's own military experience.

[*See also* Maximilian I; Sigismund of Luxemburg; Switzerland, *subentry on* Sources; *and* Žižka, Jan.]

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Volker Schmidtchen
Translated from the German by Johanna M. Baboukis

Narrative (911–1024)

There were five Ottonian kings/emperors during this period: Henry I (r. 919–936), Otto I (r. 936–973), Otto II (r. 973–983), Otto III (r. 983–1002), and Henry II (r. 1002–1024). The major military activities in each of reign are considered below.

Warfare was, as Karl Leyser has suggested, "endemic" to German society during the "long" tenth century, and German rulers campaigned on a yearly basis, even when chroniclers described the kingdom as being at peace. When not campaigning against foreign invaders, the Saxon Liudolfing dynasty was

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putting down chronic rebellions against its authority, both from rival princes and within its own ranks in Saxony. From 951 onward, its military activities included periodic campaigns into the Italian peninsula, occasionally as far south as Taranto, and culminated in generally unsuccessful campaigns against the Byzantines and the Saracen powers in Sicily. Add to these numerous disputes with the late Carolingian and early Capetian kings over control of Lotharingia (Lorraine), as well as internal feuds, and any attempt at summary runs the risk of being dangerously reductive. One of the most distinctive features of warfare during this century, however, was its character as a largely royal enterprise, and therefore what follows takes the Liudolfing dynasty as its focus.

The high incidence of offensive warfare under Otto I and his successors, especially after the battle of Lechfeld in 955, and culminating in Henry II's reign, is indicative of the place that warfare held in contemporary theories and theologies of kingship: a good king was one who demonstrated his prowess and leadership on the battlefield, or at the very least by organizing the kingdom for victory. Success indicated divine blessing and the righteousness of the royal cause. For those below the king, warfare was often a means to acquire a modicum of wealth or redress wrongs done to one's family. On the Slavic frontiers, offensive warfare was often simply a source of income and a matter of prudence, but not of faith—though some chroniclers such as Adam of Bremen emphasized preaching and conversion, rather than martial colonization. Thus war made eminent political, spiritual, economic, and judicial sense for the vast majority of participants during this century.

Henry I. Henry I was acclaimed king in 919, but was never officially crowned—which has intrigued historians ever since. His military experience was hard-bought, including a narrow escape in 915, when after being outmaneuvered by Conrad I and besieged in the fortress of Grone, he was relieved at the last minute by a Count Thietmar. Henry enjoyed only two years of actual peace (927 and 935): the rest of his reign, until his death in 936, was dominated by the wars that were to occupy his successors: conflict with West Francia over which kingdom would control Lotharingia, Magyar raids, Slavic frontier wars, and the occasional excursion against the heathen Danes (the last of these in 934). Only at the Riade in 933 do any of these campaigns seem to have involved troops from all the duchies; most engagements were smaller in scale. Henry invaded Lotharingia several times, and defended his position there as well, from Charles III (the Simple) in 921 (which ended in a truce without a major engagement); against Duke Giselbert and Rudolf of Burgundy in 923–924, where Henry besieged Metz before withdrawing in the face of a Western Frankish relief army; and again in 925, when he secured Giselbert's submission after besieging him at Zülpich.

On the northeastern frontier, Henry attempted to keep the Slavic confederations at bay, and to secure the submission of Bohemia, through aggressive campaigning and by coordinating with Duke Arnulf of Bavaria—thus the campaigns of 922, 928, 929, 932, 934, and finally in 936, where the frontier garrisons supported the Slavic tribes against Boleslav I of Bohemia. Our main source for these years is Widukind of Corvey's chronicle, the *Rerum Gestarum Saxonicarum* (The affairs of the deeds of the Saxons), which is well informed concerning many of these events. A more-or-less typical entry describes Henry's campaign against the Dalemintzi in 928, in which he captured the fort of Brandenburg, established the fortress of Meissen, and pushed on to besiege, storm, and pillage the fortress of Gana, before invading Bohemia (where Wenceslaus submitted without a fight). At Gana, the young men (*puberes*) were slaughtered, the young boys and girls (*pueri ac puellae*) taken as slaves; this was the grim reality of warfare on the Slavic frontier. In 929, at the battle of Lenzen, Henry delegated command to two subordinates, whose victory assisted the establishment, in the following decade, of significant marcher territories (military border districts) up to the Oder River.

The year 928 is significant for other reasons as well, for it is in this year that Widukind claims that Henry began his famous and much-debated overhaul of

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the realm's defense, which involved the reorganization of fortress garrisons, so as to centrally store and protect a district's agricultural produce, streamline that production, and in some measure standardize and improve the troops (*agrarii milites*, literally "rural soldiers")—fortress garrisons that could take the field when the kingdom was threatened with invasion. What precisely ignited these reforms, how original and extensive they were, and what Widukind meant by *agrarii milites*, are questions that have long puzzled historians, but there seems little doubt now that the reforms were prompted by Henry's recent experiences with the Hungarian raiding armies, and his dissatisfaction with the performance of his garrison troops in combat.

The Hungarians had raided Henry's realm as early as 919, and in 924 had invaded Saxony again, essentially trapping Henry at the fortress of Werla until counterraiding German columns captured a Hungarian noble. At this point Henry was able to negotiate a nine-year truce in exchange for paying tribute. He made no attempt to interfere with a Hungarian raid into southern Germany two years later, but did feel confident enough in 933, as the truce expired, to confront and defeat the Magyar armies at the river Riade on 15 March; after the battle, his troops hailed him as *imperator*. The victory was notable not only for the manner in which the heavily armored cavalry overwhelmed the Hungarian horse archers, but also for the effectiveness of the frontier garrisons in withstanding attack, and the German light cavalry's skill in blinding the enemy army.

Otto I. Otto I's reign began diffidently, with a minor defeat at the hands of the Bohemians and a mixed success against the Redarii Slavs—his controversial young commander Herman Billung won victories, but was resented by the rest of the army leadership, and Otto had no real way of enforcing aristocratic cooperation with his chosen commander. This early disaffection was symptomatic of the challenges to his rule that Otto faced until the battle of Lechfeld in 955, and occasionally thereafter; first rival dukes, and then his own family and *milites* (soldiers in general, but also used more specifically to refer to heavy cavalry), often found themselves plotting or in open revolt against his royal claims, and occasionally in alliance with the Slavic tribes to the east. Otto faced two particularly serious rebellions involving his family members acting in concert with rebellious princes: 937–939, and 953–954. The results of both of these were the tightening of Otto's grip on the military resources of his own duchy, Saxony.

Otto and Berengar. King Otto I (912–973) receives the submission of Berengar of Ivrea (*left*) in 952. Image from *Chronique Othonique*, twelfth century. BIBLIOTHÈQUE NATIONALE, PARIS, FRANCE/GIRAUDON/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

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His campaigns against these enemies demonstrate, in their density, frequency, and geographic diversity, the continuing level of sophistication the Saxon war machine enjoyed vis-à-vis its opponents. Otto was consistently able to coordinate and supply his troops on multiple campaigns in a year, often many leagues from their home bases while in the midst of enemy territory. In 938, after putting down a revolt by sons of the late Duke Arnulf of Bavaria, Otto's half-brother Thankmar and Duke Eberhard of Franconia rebelled, kidnapping Otto's brother Henry I of Bavaria and taking him to Eresburg, which, however, opened its gates as the Ottonian army approached. Giselbert of Lotharingia soon joined the rebels, followed by Louis IV of France, son of Charles III (the Simple) of West Francia, and eventually by the archbishop of Mainz. However, Otto defeated the rebels at Birten and Andernach, Giselbert drowned, and Eberhard was killed in battle, and the rebellion broke up. In 939, Otto's attention was entirely taken up with the Slavic frontier, while in 940 he campaigned into West Francia, without any major engagements taking place.

Evidence of Otto's military activity becomes scarce for some years after 940, with one campaign against the Western Franks in 946: Rheims was successfully besieged, but attempts to invest Paris and Rouen were less productive. Hungarian invasions, which had been infrequent after 933 (one major raid in 937), took place in 947 and 949, and it was basically left to Otto's brother, Henry I of Bavaria, to stop them. Henry's field army, while too small to gain a decisive victory, apparently kept the Hungarian commanders off balance in 950.

Otto's decision in 950/951 to invade Italy changed the complexion of the German military landscape, and not simply for the oft-listed reasons of political distraction and disintegration for which the Italian ventures may (or may not) have been responsible. Rather, the advent of Ottonian armies in Italy in September of 951, preceded by Liudolf of Swabia's forces, raised large obstacles to the king's ability to conduct multiple campaigns on multiple fronts in one year (a hallmark of Ottonian generalship until then), and put a greater logistical strain on the nascent Ottonian state than did even campaigns into West Francia, since those could rely to some extent on river transport. Further, in the decades to come one can see an increasing royal emphasis on the "feudal" service of heavy cavalry contingents for trans-alpine operations, where they would be facing opponents far different from the Slavic, Danish, or West Frankish forces. Much of the discussion centers on a surviving document from circa 981, the *indiculus loricatum*, listing the ostensible troop contingents to be furnished by the princes (lay and ecclesiastical) for the imperial campaign into Italy.

The absence of the royal army in Italy was an invitation to disaffected princes to contemplate rebellion, and in 953 Liudolf of Swabia and Conrad the Red of Lotharingia did just that. They were joined by the archbishop of Mainz, and then the Bavarians. Fortunately for Otto, his brother Bruno I, archbishop of Cologne, remained loyal, and anchored the western flank of the duchy. Early in 954, with the rebellion still in full force, the Hungarians invaded again, and Otto, strategically on the defensive, devoted himself to protecting Saxony. As the danger passed, and Augsburg held off a rebel force, he quickly passed over to the offensive, advancing through Swabia into Bavaria, where he besieged Regensburg, without decisive effect. By February 955, however, he defeated the remaining rebel forces at Mühldorf, and the rebellion was effectively over.

By the summer of 955, the Abodrite confederation had attacked the northern frontier, and Duke Herman Billung (Otto's commander on the lower Elbe River), was unable to stabilize the situation. Otto, however, was again called south in response to urgent messages from the bishop of Augsburg, begging for aid against a massive Hungarian besieging army. The resulting campaign and battle of Lechfeld in June were a resounding victory for Otto, and effectively cemented his power over Germany. By September, Otto had moved north and defeated the Slavic tribes at the Recknitz River.

After the Lechfeld, Otto's military activity was largely confined to lengthy Italian campaigns (from August 961 to 965, and again from August 966 to 970), and the Slavic frontier was largely left to the marcher

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lords, who, in aggressive raids, pushed toward Poland. Otto was less successful in his southern campaigns than in his German ones, putting down the odd rebellion (through his lieutenant Burchard III of Swabia, 965), and curbing Roman resistance to the pope who had crowned him emperor in 962. In 968, Otto attempted to besiege Bari, but his forces were too weak, and operations in Calabria against Byzantine forces were generally also unsuccessful. By 970, he had given up Apulia, and withdrew to Germany, where he died in 973.

Otto II. Otto II had been crowned coemperor with his father on 25 December 967, in Rome, and thus had few problems assuming his inheritance in 973.

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In 968, Liutprand of Cremona was sent to Constantinople to arrange, among other things, the marriage of Otto II to a Byzantine princess. The Byzantine emperor used the occasion to question the German ambassador closely about Ottonian strengths, providing a glimpse into an outsider's view of the Ottonian military. The Byzantines derided the Ottonian cavalry for being bad horsemen, and too weighted down with armor and awkward weapons to be of much use on foot. Liutprand seems to have been most incensed at the charge of bad horsemanship, suggesting the growing prestige of cavalry in German warfare.

Ironically, however, the tide of Ottonian arms was ebbing. Otto led a campaign into Flanders in 973, three campaigns against the Bohemians (975–977), one against Henry II (the Wrangler) of Bavaria's rebellion in 977, one against West Francia in 978, and one against the Slavs in 979. Comparatively few details survive for these operations, but in general Otto seems to have been moderately successful, winning battles at Pilsen (Plzeň) and the Aisne River, and sieges at Laon, Regensburg, and Passau. On the other hand, he was forced to hurriedly flee from Aachen in the summer of 978, when Lothair of France seized and pillaged the Carolingian palace. Lothair soon withdrew, and Otto's army pursued him as far as Montmartre, but without result. In November 980, Otto launched his Italian campaign, which seems to have lacked a clear objective aside from establishing the primacy of imperial authority at any opportunity. The city of Salerno surrendered in 981 in return for Otto's recognition of its new duke's title; since he was a Byzantine ally, this was a dubious strategic success, and was not remedied by his siege of Taranto in January, 982. Otto's Italian venture came to an end at the battle of Cotrone (called Cape Colonne in some accounts), on 13 July, when the German host was annihilated by a Saracen army. The Saracens remarkably did not break after enduring a German cavalry charge and the death of their commander. Thietmar of Merseburg estimated imperial casualties to have been roughly four thousand men killed and massacred after capture, including some of Otto's most dependable commanders. The emperor himself escaped courtesy of a Greek ship, and died in Rome in December 983 while preparing a new campaign against the Saracens.

Otto III. Assessments of German military activity grow progressively more difficult after the death of Otto II, in part because of the increasingly fragmented nature of political power and the localized nature of campaigning at the end of the tenth century. Otto III, aged three at the time of his father's death, was a comparative military nonentity for much of his short life, and the lack of overall imperial strategic direction becomes apparent in the 980s, as Lothair of France and Boleslav II of Bohemia launched various campaigns into Lotharingia and the March of Meissen, respectively. The Slavic federations overran the northern marches and bishoprics in the summer of 983, leaving only the marches of Meissen and Lausitz east of the Elbe—a situation that would essentially last until the twelfth century. It was only with Polish assistance that an invasion of Saxony itself was repulsed in 987, and the Slavs invaded Brandenburg in 995, repulsing Saxon counteroffensives. Henry the Wrangler of Bavaria meanwhile kept the Hungarians at bay through a variety of offensive probes, climaxing in the siege of Melk in 985. Offensive and counteroffensive continued without respite on the Elbe frontier, but few gains were made. Even warfare with Viking raiders intensified, something not seen since the days of Otto I.

Otto III, meanwhile, having assumed power in 994, spent most of his time campaigning in Italy (996, 997, and 1000), with little concrete success. Sieges of major urban centers were the main feature of imperial Italian warfare, and Otto did not greatly distinguish himself in this field. The revolt of Arduin of Ivrea and the German defeat at the battle of Lucca in 1002 signaled the brief eclipse of Ottonian rule in Italy.

Henry II. With the premature death of Otto III, the direct Ottonian succession was interrupted, and Henry II, having initially trained for the priesthood, was elected king. Analysis of military activity during his reign reveals the advent of a firm strategic grasp, and a corresponding revival of royal German military success. Although parts of his reign were dominated

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by aristocratic feuding (especially in 1009, 1012, 1016, and the early months of 1018), the majority of campaigns were directed by Henry against exterior enemies, and in many cases included the troops of more than one duchy (a major change from the previous three decades). In particular, Henry was determined to restore a level of imperial authority to Italy, and to bring the eastern frontier under control. The first years of his reign saw him suppress internal resistance to his succession, before leading an imperial army into northern Italy in 1004.

In the summer of 1004, fresh from the Italian campaign, he turned his attention to Polish domination of Bohemia and the eastern frontier. The army assembled at Merseburg around mid-August, with transport and supply ships concentrated at points to suggest an advance into Poland and deceive any spies and traitors. Suddenly, however, taking advantage of heavy rains, Henry switched direction, and moved on Bohemia. Caught completely flat-footed, Bolesław III of Bohemia attempted to block his approach by establishing an archer position on a wooded height along Henry's line of march. Henry, through his scouts, learned of these preparations in time, and sent specially selected armored troops to break up the archers and secure the position for the passage of the imperial army. By 8 September, Bohemia had fallen. This eastern campaign demonstrates many of the qualities of Henry's generalship, qualities that he was to display on repeated occasions over the next twenty years, and his roughly eight further eastern campaigns.

Not every campaign was crowned with success, of course, and German commanders seem to have suffered at times from an acute inability to coordinate their forces, even when operating on the same front. They also seem never to have effectively addressed defense against massed archery—curious, in light of earlier generations' experience with Magyar horse archers. In 1005, along the River Spree, one Thiedbern, hoping to gain renown, on his own initiative attempted to ambush a Polish column. The Poles withdrew in good order to the woods, and broke up the attack with archery fire. In 1015, Henry, the Bohemians, Bavarians, Bernard Billung, and Thietmar of Merseburg failed to unite their individual detachments, and the emperor's column was ambushed by Bolesław I of Poland's troops, under cover of what must have been massive archery fire; roughly two hundred men were lost.

Nevertheless, by the time of Henry II's death in 1024, the military fortunes of the empire were largely restored, save for the northern marches. Much of this was due to military abilities and force of character of the emperor—perhaps a somewhat unexpected assessment of the only German monarch to be canonized by the Catholic Church. Yet the patterns of extensive logistical preparations, strategic vision, tactical steadiness (if not innovation), operational decisiveness, strong fortifications, the offensive use of heavy cavalry, excellent scouting, and a very real trend toward an *imperial* army based on regularized service requirements, were all Henry's legacy to his successors in the eleventh century, and epitomized Ottonian war craft at its finest.

[*See also* Henry I; Lechfeld, Battle on the; Otto I; *and* Thietmar of Merseburg.]

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Daniel P. Franke

Narrative (1024–1125)

Henry II, the last emperor of the Ottonian dynasty, whose members (King Henry I and the emperors Otto I, Otto II, Otto III, and Henry II) had ruled the German kingdom and the Holy Roman Empire since 919, died childless on 13 July 1024. Conrad the Older, who was later elected king, had to assert himself during the following years against an opposition that formed in the summer of 1025 and was led by his stepson Ernst, Duke of Swabia; his cousin, Conrad the Younger; and Count Welf II. Despite his domestic problems, Conrad II, founder of the new Salian dynasty, set out the following year for Italy, where he tried to consolidate his regal authority. In Pavia the townsfolk had, after Henry II's death, destroyed the palace of the kings in the town and now refused to rebuild it. Conrad II subsequently devastated the surrounding region and left behind troops to intimidate the town, while he departed to subdue his opponents among the Italian nobility. After the king had captured Ivrea in December 1026, Pavia finally submitted, as did Margrave Rainer of Tuscany soon afterward. Conrad II then moved to Rome, where he was crowned emperor on Easter 1027.

A New Imperial Dynasty and the Annexation of Burgundy. Having returned north of the Alps, the emperor had no problems ending the dissidence of his German antagonists. Then in 1029 Conrad II responded to a raid by King Mieszko II of Poland (r. 1025–1034), who had invaded Saxony the previous year. The emperor led a campaign eastward into Poland, but Mieszko avoided a pitched battle, and the advance of the German host was inhibited by thick forests, marshes, and a lack of good roads. During his retreat to the west Conrad even failed to occupy Bautzen. As result of this unsuccessful military expedition, Mieszko entered Saxony once again the following January and pillaged the lands between the Elbe and the Saale. The emperor deferred a new campaign against Poland until the following year, because in 1030 he led an army into Hungary against King Stephen I (r. 1001–1038), who had earlier raided Bavaria. Stephen, too, avoided direct combat, so Conrad could only devastate the territory up to the river Raab before having to pull back his troops. In 1031 Conrad's son and heir Henry III, Duke of Bavaria and German king since 1028, made peace with Hungary, so the emperor had a free hand to turn once more against Poland. As Mieszko II was also threatened by his brother, Conrad needed only a small host to force his adversary to hand over Lusatia, some castles, and the loot of his raid into Germany the year before.

During the years 1032–1034 Conrad was engaged in the incorporation of the Burgundian realm into his empire. The Salian emperor had inherited the claim to this kingdom from his predecessor, Henry II, whom the childless king Rudolf III of Burgundy (993–1032) had appointed as heir. Moreover, Conrad was married to Gisela, Rudolf's niece. Although the Burgundian king had assured Conrad II of his succession to the throne in August 1027, Count Odo of Champagne as competing contender established his

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control, especially over the western and southern parts of the realm after Rudolf's death in September 1032. Consequently the emperor invaded Burgundy in January 1033 and tried to expel Odo's adherents. However he failed to conquer Odo's strongholds Murten and Neuenburg and therefore retreated to Lotharingia, from where he invaded and ravaged the count's territories in Champagne. The following year Conrad returned to Burgundy with two armies: the first he himself conducted via Basel to the Rhône Valley and then met before Geneva with the second, which came from Lombardy by way of Turin and the Great St. Bernard pass, under the leadership of Archbishop Aribert of Milan, Margrave Boniface of Tuscany, and Count Humbert of Savoy. Odo of Champagne subsequently fled the Burgundian realm, and Conrad's opponents submitted to the emperor, who by now was commonly accepted as king of Burgundy.

After his successful second Burgundian campaign, Conrad II turned against the pagan Liutizi, a confederation of Slavic ethnic groups who had raided eastern Saxony in 1034. The following two summers the emperor led expeditions against them. In 1035 when he tried to cross the Elbe the Liutizi defended the eastern bank, so Conrad sent a detachment to cross at a nearby ford and attack the the rear of the opposing force. His maneuver worked, and the Liutizi were put to flight. The German combatants devastated the enemy lands and treated the Slavs with great cruelty before they retreated in autumn. With his second campaign into Slavic territory in 1036, Conrad compelled the Liutizi to resume paying their former tribute. In 1037 the emperor then returned to his Italian kingdom, where he failed to conquer Milan in May. Archbishop Aribert, now opposing Conrad, meanwhile urged Odo of Champagne to invade Lotharingia to force the emperor to return to the north. Odo, however, then died in combat near the city of Bar, defeated by Gozelo I, the duke of both Upper and Lower Lotharingia.

Henry III's Attempt to Establish Imperial Supremacy over Bohemia and Hungary. After Conrad's death in 1039, the twenty-one-year-old Henry III without difficulty succeeded his father in the German and Burgundian kingdoms. He directed his first military action against Bretislav, Duke of Bohemia (1034–1055), who had become a menace to the predominance of the German realm when he had occupied Polish territories. Henry III knew the Bohemian landscape from his campaign to subject Bretislav's father Udalrich in 1033. His strategic planning of the 1040 and 1041 expeditions against Bohemia arranged for two armies to invade the enemy territory simultaneously, one from the north and one from the west. After his vanguard had been beaten by the Bohemians in the frontier forests, which were difficult to access, Henry had to abandon his plan in 1040, but the following year he succeeded. When the first host under the command of Margrave Ekkehard of Meissen advanced from Saxony into Bohemia from the north, the German king divided his second army, coming from Bavaria, into two parts. The first he ordered to hold the position to occupy the hostile forces while Henry himself led the rest of his troops into the rear of his enemies. Then he ravaged the countryside and moved to Prague, where he met with the Saxon army. Bretislav capitulated, promised tribute, destroyed the wooden fortifications in the border forests, and made an oath of fealty and military service.

After his military success in Bohemia, Henry III had to deal with Hungary, whose king, Peter Orseolo (r. 1038–1041, 1044–1046), fled to the German king after the usurper Samuel Aba came to power in 1041. The following year Samuel Aba invaded and pillaged Bavaria with two armies north and south of the Danube. So Henry led a first expedition into Hungary, where he destroyed Heimburg and Bratislava but failed to reinstall Peter on the throne. Henry's aim of bringing the Hungarian king under German supremacy was eventually achieved in 1044. He gathered a small and highly mobile army consisting of his *aulici* (household knights), reinforced only by Bavarian and Bohemian troops, and led it into enemy territory. Accompanied by Hungarian guides he avoided geographical obstructions and met Samuel Aba's army in a battle near Menfö on the river Raab on 5 July. After he had routed the hostile army, Henry III reinstated Peter as king and left

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behind a German security force to protect his claim of hegemony.

Henry had not only external foes but also opponents within Germany. In response to the revolt of Godfrey the Bearded, Duke of Upper Lotharingia, Henry organized an expedition in 1045, conquered and destroyed the castle of Böckelheim, accepted the submission of the rebelling duke, and reconciled with him. Then, in 1046, Henry III moved to Italy, where he was able to solidify his power. Having also gained the imperial crown, Henry soon returned across the Alps, because in Hungary a new king named Andreas (1046–1060) had usurped the throne. In addition, Godfrey the Bearded formed an alliance with Baldwin V, Count of Flanders, and once again rebelled against the emperor. After an ineffective punitive expedition, the emperor ceded the conduct of war against the insurgents to his bishops in the northwestern German regions. Godfrey finally submitted again in 1049, whereas Baldwin continued the struggle until a successful campaign led by Henry in 1050 caused him to abandon his opposition.

In 1051, after renewed frontier warfare broke out on the southeastern border of the German realm, the emperor was compelled to occupy himself once more with Hungary. So Henry III conducted an expedition from Carinthia into the Hungarian lands and ordered a second army under the command of Bretislav, Bishop Gebhard III of Regensburg, and Duke Welf of Carinthia to invade via a northern route. Henry's campaign was ultimately unsuccessful because he managed only to desolate the country, while Andreas evaded a decisive battle. The following year the emperor returned to Hungary to besiege Bratislava, but he raised the siege at the request of Pope Leo IX, who had negotiated peace. Nevertheless the Hungarians invaded and pillaged Carinthia during the following years. Furthermore an old menace reappeared in the east: when in 1045 the Liutizi had threatened the eastern frontier of the German realm, Henry III had appeared with a large army to counter the insurgency and brought them into subjection. Now, in 1056, the Slavs rose again and destroyed a Saxon force. The emperor had no opportunity to respond to this danger, for he died on 5 October 1056.

Henry IV's Efforts to Maintain Salian Power in an Era of German Revolts. When Henry IV succeeded to his father's throne, he was a five-year-old boy, but despite the rivalries of German princes concerning their influence on the regency during the period of the king's minority, external enemies' attacks were repelled. In 1057 a Saxon army conquered the Liutizi and ensured their tribute, and in 1058 a peace agreement was made with Hungary, when Henry's sister Judith became engaged to Salomon, the heir of King Andreas. Two years later Andreas died in an uprising; Salomon and Judith fled to Henry. In September 1063 young King Henry accompanied a German host led by Otto of Northeim, Duke of Bavaria, to install Salomon as king of Hungary. Assisted by Hungarian scouts, the army advanced to Wieselburg and captured the castle. Salomon's rival in this struggle for power, his paternal uncle Bela, died soon afterward, facilitating Salomon's ascent to the throne.

In 1066 the Obodrites, a Slavic ethnic group, invaded the realm, destroyed Hamburg, devastated the surrounding regions, and killed many Christians. During the winter of 1067–1068 the Saxons had carried out a first retaliatory campaign, and Henry IV (who had come of age in 1065) personally laid waste to the Slavic lands during the winter 1068–1069.

From the beginning of his autonomous reign Henry intensified his presence in Saxony, aiming to regain royal influence and power in a region where the princes had acted relatively independently during the regency. To achieve these aims he built castles and manned them with foreign—especially Swabian—*ministeriales*, who were loyal to the king. This policy led to a perilous revolt, involving not only the Saxon nobility but also the lower social classes of Saxony, which lasted the first half of the 1070s. The insurgents blamed Henry for disregarding the inherited liberties of the Saxon tribe and for exacting far too onerous taxes. Moreover they accused him and his *ministeriales* of exceptional cruelty. During the summer of 1073 a Saxon army (led by the deposed Otto of Northeim, Archbishop Werner of Magdeburg,

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and Bishop Burchard II of Halberstadt) proceeded against several royal castles and drove Henry IV out of the Harzburg. But when in the following year Saxon countrymen not only destroyed the fortifications of the Harzburg but also the church inside it, which held the tombs of Henry's deceased brother and son, the king gained the support of the German princes to levy an army and avenge those deeds. In the ensuing battle at the river Unstrut on 9 June 1075 he defeated his opponents and then pillaged and devastated the Saxon lands.

After his successful Saxon campaign Henry IV was undisputed ruler of the German kingdom—but not for long. In the context of the beginning "investiture controversy" (a conflict between church and state over power to appoint church officials) Pope Gregory VII (1073–1085) excommunicated Henry, deposed him as German king, and suspended all oaths made to him. Consequently many of the German princes now opposed Henry, above all once again Otto of Northeim, but also Berthold, Duke of Carinthia; Welf IV, Duke of Bavaria; and Rudolf of Rheinfelden, Henry's brother-in-law and Duke of Swabia. To oppose them Henry could count on some German and Italian bishops, his *ministeriales*, and the inhabitants of some towns, such as Worms and Speyer. In March 1077 the rebelling party elected Rudolf of Rheinfelden as the new king, initiating a permanent state of war in the German lands. During this period raids alternated with sieges and a striking number of pitched battles. The first one took place near Mellrichstadt about eighty-five kilometers (roughly fifty-three miles) north-northeast of Würzburg on 7 August 1078, and Henry was defeated. On the same day, at the river Neckar, Welf and Berthold routed a host of Franconians who were trying to prevent the two southern German dukes from joining forces with Rudolf of Rheinfelden and Otto of Northeim. The next battle occurred on 27 January 1080 at Flarchheim, a little village in Thuringia about fifty kilometers (thirty-one miles) west-northwest of Erfurt. As Otto of Northeim's army stood in battle array, Henry IV managed to bypass the enemy army and hit it from the rear. The ensuing attack was impeded by a snowstorm, and in the end Henry fled with his army. This was evidently not a severe defeat for the Salian king, because he once more sought a decisive battle that very year: on 15 October the opposing forces met at the river Elster, where Henry once again lost the battle—but the anti-king Rudolf sustained a lethal injury.

The German opposition met at Ochsenfurt on 6 August 1081 to elect Hermann of Salm (1081–1088) in Rudolf's place. Henry IV meanwhile had moved to Italy to install Archbishop Wibert of Ravenna as anti-pope, who could crown him Holy Roman Emperor. To achieve this aim Henry spent three years: his sieges of 1081 and 1082 failed to capture Rome, but in 1083 he was able to occupy at least the quarter around St. Peter's. The following year the inhabitants of Rome finally opened the town gates, and Henry was able to put his plan into action. Afterward he returned as emperor to the German

Investiture Contest. Henry IV (1050–1106, *center*) asking Matilda of Tuscany (*right*) and Abbot Hugh of Cluny to intercede for him in the conflict with Pope Gregory VII (c. 1020–1085) in 1077. Illustration from a poem by Donizon, twelfth century. BIBLIOTECA APOSTOLICA VATICANA, THE VATICAN, ITALY/FLAMMARION/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

lands, where his supporter Frederick, Duke of Swabia (and grandfather of the later Holy Roman Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa), had tried to maintain the Salian interests during Henry's absence but lost the battle near Höchstädt some forty kilometers (twenty-five miles) northwest of Augsburg against Hermann of Salm on 11 August 1081. In summer 1085 the emperor led a campaign into Saxony, but he suffered a new defeat at the battle of Pleichfeld about fifteen kilometers (about nine miles) northeast of Würzburg on 11 August 1086. Another failure on the battlefield followed on 24 December 1088, when Henry IV besieged the castle Gleichen in Thuringia, some twenty kilometers (about twelve miles) southwest of Erfurt. After the emperor had divided his forces and sent one part to support Quedlinburg, which he thought was threatened by Margrave Ekbert II of Meissen, Ekbert actually appeared with his army before Gleichen and beat the imperial army. Henry had finally lost any chance of rebuilding Salian influence in the Saxon lands.

The German civil wars declined in the late 1080s, and Henry could therefore return to Italy in 1090 to subjugate his opponents there. In 1091 he was victorious in a battle at Tricontai against followers of Matilda, Margravine of Tuscany, who was one of the most important supporters of the papacy. Nevertheless the following year Henry failed to conquer Matilda's main stronghold, Canossa, and even was beaten back in a battle in front of the castle. The emperor lost more and more ground in Italy, and from 1093 on he was trapped in the region of Verona. There he stayed until 1096, when he reconciled with Welf IV, who controlled the Alpine passes. When Henry was back in his German kingdom he tried to reach a compromise with the papacy, but the fronts had been too hardened.

Near the end of his life the emperor had to face a new rebellion: his son Henry V, German king since 1098, conspired against him in 1104 and even managed to take his father prisoner, but in 1106 Henry IV escaped to Liège. The young king pursued his father, whom Ekkehard of Aura in this context characterized as *vir bellator ab adolescentia sua* (a warrior from his youth), echoing the Bible verse I Samuel 17:33. In this way the chronicler not only delegitimized Henry IV as a new Goliath but also recognized him as strong and experienced in warfare. But unlike a new David, Henry V failed to conquer his opponent, whose followers repelled Henry V's army in the battle of Visé on 22 March. But the emperor was not able to take advantage of this triumph, for he died soon after on 7 August.

The Wars of Henry V. After his father's death all of Henry V's opponents submitted to the young king. In the following years Henry attempted to strengthen his political domination of the eastern neighbors of his realm. When in 1108 Álmos, the younger brother of the Hungarian king Coloman (r. 1095–1116), tried to usurp the throne he requested help from Henry. The German king led an expedition into Hungary but failed to capture Bratislava and retreated without success. By contrast in 1109 Henry moved an army into Poland and despite a fruitless siege of Glogau obliged Bolesław III (r. 1102–1138) to pay an annual tribute.

In 1110 the German king crossed the Alps to show his flag in Italy. The following year he arrested Pope Paschal II (1099–1118), repelled an assault of the Romans, and pressed the pope to crown him emperor. After he had released his prisoner he returned to Germany, where in the tradition of his father he tried to strengthen Salian authority in Saxony. Because of his aggressive policy he provoked the opposition first of the Saxons and then of Lotharingian princes, bishops, and towns. In 1113 he campaigned successfully in Saxony, but in the following year he besieged Cologne, and as in July 1106, he again failed to take the well-defended town. Then in autumn the Lotharingian insurgents defeated an imperial army near Andernach on the Rhine, while Henry himself was heavily beaten in the battle of Welfesholz on 11 February 1115.

After his defeats Henry evaded the German opposition and moved once again to Italy, where he took possession of the inheritance of Matilda of Tuscany. Back in the German lands in August 1118, he had to occupy himself with continuous uprisings until he reconciled with most of his foes in 1119. But despite the settlement of the hostilities the

emperor never won back great political influence in Saxony. The Saxon duke and later German king Lothair of Süpplingenburg led an expedition against the Slavs in 1121 and appeared in the years that followed as a militarily competent counterweight to the emperor.

Having married Matilda, a daughter of King Henry I of England (r. 1100–1135), Henry V set out in 1124 to assist his father-in-law in his struggle for Normandy against the French king Louis VI (r. 1108–1137). The emperor approached with only a small force, and when he was faced with the immense opposing army (which contained combatants from all over France) he retreated. Instead he laid siege to Worms, which capitulated after the emperor had killed or mutilated captive townsmen. Henry died on 23 May 1125.

[*See also* Andernach, Battle of (1114); Elster, Battle of; Henry II; Henry III; Henry IV; Henry V; Mellrichstadt, Battle of; *Ministeriales*; Pleichfeld, Battle of; Unstrut, Battle at the; Visé, Battle of; *and* Welfesholz, Battle of.]

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Martin Völkl

Narrative (1125–1250)

The era of the Hohenstaufen can be divided into three parts: the beginning of the dynasty under Conrad III, its heyday under Frederick I Barbarossa and Henry VI, and its last part under Frederick II and his sons.

The Reigns of Lothair of Süpplingenburg and Conrad III. Although ultimately the Hohenstaufen were successful in establishing a royal dynasty, during the second quarter of the twelfth century the Germans lived in a permanent state of war.

The Wars of Succession (1125–1135). After the death of the emperor Henry V in 1125, Lothair of Süpplingenburg, Duke of Saxony, was elected as his successor to the German throne—much to the disappointment of Henry's nephew and heir, the Hohenstaufen Frederick II, Duke of Swabia, who refused to surrender the imperial possessions that he had provisionally governed since the death of the emperor. Lothair planned to send the imperial army into the field against the rebellious Hohenstaufen, but Lothair first engaged in his ill-fated Bohemian campaign of 1126, which ended in his defeat at the battle of Culm. Lothair's siege of Nuremberg in the next year also proved to be unsuccessful. Thus the Hohenstaufen were emboldened to raise Frederick's brother, Conrad, as pretender to the throne. While in the following years (1128–1130) Conrad fruitlessly pursued his claims to the Italian lands formerly owned by Countess Matilda of Canossa, the wars of succession to the throne continued to be fought on German soil. Supported in particular by his son-in-law, Duke Henry X of Bavaria, in late 1129 or early 1130 Lothair managed on the second attempt to force the city of Speyer, which he had vainly besieged in 1128, to capitulate, and he also broke the resistance of Nuremberg. On the strength of these victories Lothair marched into Italy in 1132 and was crowned emperor in 1133. Returning to Germany in 1134, he successfully concluded the war with the Hohenstaufen, capturing Ulm and forcing submission upon Frederick and the crown pretender Conrad the following year.

The Italian Campaigns of Lothair III (1132–1133 and 1136–1137). Lothair III's first Italian campaign, that of 1132–1133, is of little significance for military historians. Although he achieved his purpose of expelling the antipope Anacletus II from Rome and reinstating Pope Innocent II in his stead—for which service the pope crowned him emperor—this success was short-lived: after Lothair's departure, Innocent was promptly forced to withdraw from the city. Lothair initially sought to avoid a major conflict with the Normans in Italy. Under the pressure of combined appeals from Byzantium, Venice, Robert of Capua, and Bernard of Clairvaux, however, Lothair was convinced to gather a large army and march into Upper Italy in 1136. With the exception of Cremona, he met with no significant opposition. At the beginning of 1137, Lothair divided his troops into two armies, one of which he personally led on the direct road to Bari, while the other marched through Tuscany and captured Benevento before joining the emperor for the siege of Bari. The capture of this strategically and economically important port was the crowning success of Lothair's second Italian campaign. But once again the success proved to be short-lived: on Lothair's departure from Italy, Roger II of Sicily was soon able to reestablish his power and overthrow Rainulf of Alife, whom the emperor had enfeoffed with Apulia.

Conrad III and the Succession to the Duchy of Saxony (1138–1142). Lothair III died while returning from his second Italian campaign late in 1137, and his previous rival, Conrad III of Hohenstaufen, was elected king. Because Lothair had left the duchy of Saxony to the Welf Henry X, "the Proud," Duke of Bavaria, the new king demanded that Henry renounce the possession of at least one of his duchies. Henry refused, and he also refused to recognize Conrad as king. In response Conrad deprived Henry of both his titles and gave the duchy of Saxony to the margrave Albert the Bear, who promptly seized Lüneburg and areas in western Saxony and Nordelbien. Henry's supporters in eastern Saxony united against Albert and carried the war into his homelands, setting fire to the fortress of Bernburg, in which Albert's mother resided, at the end of 1138. The following year Henry himself joined the battle in Saxony, recapturing Lüneburg and defeating Albert's vassal, the Count of Holstein. In the summer of 1139 a royal army was summoned and marched against Henry. A decisive battle was prevented by the efforts of the bishops on the king's side, who organized a truce. The Welf power base in Saxony was thus preserved and even survived the sudden death of Duke Henry: by invading and laying waste to Albert the Bear's territories, causing an acute famine, Henry's Saxon supporters forced Albert the Bear to renounce his claims to the duchy. In 1142, Conrad III finally accepted the situation and gave the duchy of Saxony to Henry's son, Henry the Lion.

Henry the Lion and the Crusade against the Wends (1147). While Conrad III, participating in the Second Crusade, led his crusading army to Palestine, in 1147 the magnates of Saxony, with the permission of Pope Eugenius III, directed their crusading efforts against the Slavic peoples living near the river Elbe. The peoples, known as the Wends, avoided open battle with the better-armed knights, withdrawing into protected fortresses, woods, and swamps. The crusaders divided their forces into two contingents: one of these, under the command of Albert the Bear and the Archbishop of Magdeburg, besieged Demmin and Stettin, while Henry the Lion led the other against Dobin, the fortified seat of Niklot, chief of the Obodrites. Because the Saxon magnates planned to settle, evangelize, and integrate the Slavic lands into their territories, only with reserve did they use the military tactics of laying waste and plundering, and they were quite content with pro forma baptisms and payments of tribute. From the point of view of the Saxon magnates, the crusade was a political success, providing them with a legal justification for their conquests.

Conrad III's Conflict with Welf VI and Henry the Lion. During the course of his conflict with Henry the Proud, Conrad III deposed his rival as Duke of Bavaria and in 1138 gave the duchy to his half-brother from the House of Babenberg, Margrave Leopold IV of Austria. While Henry the Proud pursued his claims in Saxony, he left his brother Welf VI to carry on the conflict in southern Germany with the

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Hohenstaufen–Babenberg alliance. Large-scale battles took place in the earlier and later phases of this struggle. At Valley on the river Mangfall in the year 1140, Welf was able to defeat Leopold, but shortly afterward he himself suffered a defeat against the numerically inferior forces of Conrad III in the battle of Weinsberg. Later Welf accompanied the king on his crusade in Palestine. On his return in 1148, however, Welf revived the conflict in the name of his nephew, Henry the Lion, with financial support from King Roger II of Sicily. As Welf led an attack on Conrad's possessions in Swabia in 1150, the king sent his son Henry with a few hundred men to intercept him. Retreating, Welf's army encountered Henry's reconnaissance troops at Flochberg near Nördlingen and was held there until the rest of the king's army arrived to triumph over its disarrayed and numerically inferior enemy. In Saxony, meanwhile, Henry the Lion forced Conrad III to abandon the siege of Braunschweig (Brunswick) without a fight. The conflict remained thus undecided at Conrad's death in 1152.

Feuds among the German Princes (1125–1151). During the reigns of Lothair III and Conrad III, the German princes engaged in numerous feuds. One of the more important feuds under Lothair III flamed up between Count Walram III of Limburg and Duke Godfrey of Brabant. Another major feud was that in 1133 for the inheritance of Calw (Calwer Erbfehde) among Welf VI, Albert of Löwenstein, and Conrad of Zähringen following the death of the count palatine, Godfrey of Calw, in 1131. To capture the fortress of Wartenberg, Welf VI is said to have gone so far as to use proper siege machinery. In 1132 a fraternal feud broke out between Dietrich VI of Holland and his brother Florens, who had supported the Frisians in their rebellion against Dietrich's rule. During the course of this conflict the cities of Alkmaar and Haarlem were plundered, and Friesland was subjected to large-scale burning and pillaging. The next year Florens became involved in a feud with the counts of Cuyk, who had refused him the hand of their wealthy niece and who eventually managed to kill the unwanted suitor in battle.

The reign of Conrad III was no more peaceful than that of Lothair. The western regions of the German empire in particular were repeatedly subjected to attacks and plundering campaigns by various feuding parties. In 1140, Henry of Limburg invaded Lower Lorraine, probably seeking to usurp power in the duchy. The same year, feuding with Bishop Albero II of Lüttich, Count Henry of Luxemburg and Namur destroyed the city of Fosse. The year after, however, Henry militarily supported Bishop Albero in his feud with the Count of Bar: the count had seized possession of the fortress Bouillon, which had been pawned to the bishops of Lüttich. The same Henry of Luxemburg repeatedly went to war with the archbishop of Trier, who was attempting to bring the imperial abbey of Saint Maximin under his jurisdiction. In the course of this feud—a typical feud—Henry suffered a major defeat in 1142 but recovered his strength sufficiently to invade the archbishop's territory the following winter, plundering and laying waste in the usual manner but failing to capture Trier itself. The archbishop countered with a combined army of knights and townsmen, capturing and destroying an important fortress of his adversary. Similarly in the feud between the Duke of Bavaria and the bishop of Regensburg, which culminated in the siege of Regensburg in 1146, considerable military forces were involved, including Bohemian reinforcements on the side of the duke. This feud was brought to an end through the intercession of the king, but such peaceful solutions were seldom the case at the time.

The Reigns of Frederick I Barbarossa and Henry VI. Although Barbarossa started his reign with the purpose of pacifying the realm, there were many feuds, campaigns, and wars in the era of Frederick I (r. 1152–1190) and Henry VI (r. 1190–1197).

Feuds in Germany (1152–1197) and Barbarossa's War with Henry the Lion. Instituting and upholding the king's peace (*Landfriede*) was one of Frederick Barbarossa's central political goals. For this purpose he enacted several laws, but they failed to control the practice of feuding. On several occasions the emperor was obliged to negotiate peace between Henry the Lion and various princes of Saxony, beginning with an armed conflict between Henry and Albert the Bear near Goslau during the first year of

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Frederick's reign. In 1166, Albert joined forces with the archbishop of Magdeburg and other Saxon magnates against Henry, and in the following two years several battles were fought on a large enough scale to come to the attention of even such a distant observer as John of Salisbury. In 1177, Henry the Lion became involved in a conflict over territorial claims with the archbishop of Cologne. The archbishop found ready allies in Henry's enemies in Saxony and was able to march his troops to the river Weser in 1178, capturing several of Henry's strongholds on the way.

On his return from Italy in November 1178, Frederick Barbarossa summoned the conflicting parties to arbitration. Henry the Lion failed to respond to repeated summonses, so in 1179 he was placed under a ban, and in 1180 he was officially deprived of his feudal titles—actions that led up to a general declaration of war against him. In a preliminary action, archbishop Philip of Cologne assisted his colleague, the archbishop of Magdeburg, in the siege of Haldensleben with a company of reportedly four thousand non-knightly foot troops notorious for their brutality toward civilians—apparently the first recorded employment of mercenary troops on German soil. In spite of Henry the Lion's victory over the landgrave of Thuringia at Weissensee, Frederick's invasion of Saxony at the head of an imperial army forced Henry to withdraw to the north of the duchy. When Lübeck capitulated to the emperor in 1181, Henry's fate was sealed.

Between 1188 and 1189 the margravate of Meissen was scourged by war as Albert, the elder son of the margrave Otto, sought to revoke his father's testament favoring his younger brother. When the margrave himself was captured, Frederick Barbarossa intervened successfully for his release. But the emperor's efforts to resolve the conflict depended on his presence and were consequently ignored when he left Germany on crusade. Albert went so far as to bring Bohemian troops into the war, and he plundered his father's treasury of around three thousand marks. A solution to the conflict finally came through the intervention of Barbarossa's successor, Henry VI, and the natural death of the margrave.

Barbarossa's absence also provided Henry the Lion with the chance to return to the duchy of Saxony from his exile in England early in October 1189. The situation in Saxony, riven with numerous internal feuds and also suffering the effects of external war, was conducive to Henry's return to power. In mid-October, Henry VI started arming the imperial army to march against the returned exile; Henry the Lion was already driving Duke Bernhard, with whom Barbarossa had replaced him, from his last strongholds in Saxony. An expedition under the leadership of the king in the winter of 1189–1190 proved to be ineffective, but with assistance from Holstein, supporters of Bernhard managed to lift Henry the Lion's siege of the city of Segeberg and defeat his allies in a battle near Lübeck. These setbacks forced Henry to accept conditions of peace in July 1190, ending a war that had been largely characterized by pillaging expeditions and sieges without decisive battles.

Barbarossa's Wars in Upper Italy. In Italy, Frederick Barbarossa pursued a policy of asserting imperial rights against the semiautonomous Upper Italian cities and of defending the *honor imperii*. The heart of the anti-imperial resistance was Milan. During his first Italian campaign (1154–1155), Barbarossa had placed Milan under imperial ban and drastically punished its ally Tortona, capturing and sacking the city. His second Italian campaign, in 1158–1159, was largely in response to the numerous appeals for help against Milan that the cities of Pavia, Cremona, Lodi, and Como directed to him. Leading an army of around fifteen thousand heavily armed knights that he divided into four divisions, Barbarossa crossed the Alps and took up position under the walls of Milan.

Thanks to their system of a civic militia based on communal military service, the Milanese rapidly were able to organize an army that was hardly smaller than the German force. Supported by their archers, Barbarossa's troops were able to capture an outwork of the defenses, from which they bombarded the city. A trebuchet that they constructed for this purpose became the target of their opponents' artillery, however, and was quickly destroyed. As the prospects for a rapid victory faded, and with

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neither side interested in a protracted siege—Milan suffering economically under the destruction of its agricultural resources and Barbarossa's troops being logistically unable to maintain a long siege—both parties welcomed a peaceful conclusion. At the price of subjugation, Milan escaped more serious consequences and was allowed to maintain its military alliances.

Having thus achieved his immediate goal, Barbarossa went on to Roncaglia, where in November 1158 he enacted laws aimed at reviving imperial rights in Italy and restricting the economic and political freedom of the communes. The peace was not long-lived. In the following year Barbarossa's chancellor, Rainald of Dassel, archbishop of Cologne, attempted to preside over the election of consuls in Milan, and the smoldering conflict flamed up anew. In July 1159, Barbarossa laid siege to the city of Crema, an ally of Milan. The battle for the city lasted six months and—as numerous sources testify—was pursued by both sides with extreme brutality, ending finally in Barbarossa's capture of Crema. Because various contingents were obliged to complete military service for only a certain time—and when their obligations expired, new contracts had to be negotiated with individual princes—the emperor experienced continual difficulties in maintaining his troops during the campaign. Furthermore, the outbreak of the Alexandrine schism in 1160 made the political situation unstable.

When in August 1160, Milan succeeded in gaining a strategic but dearly bought victory over him at Carcano, Frederick changed his strategy, employing his decimated forces mainly to destroy Milan's rural infrastructure and the lines of communication to its allies, while Rainald of Dassel gathered fresh reinforcements in Germany. Strengthened by the arrival of these new troops, Barbarossa seized the offensive against Milan, which was now weak after a disastrous fire. He concentrated on starving the city by cutting its supply lines and burning its fields. This proved to be successful: Milan capitulated in March 1162. After the citizens had ritually subjugated themselves to him in Pavia, Barbarossa deported them to surrounding villages and destroyed the city of Milan completely. He took this opportunity to reform the structures of local government in Upper Italy and to introduce new taxes.

But with this victory Barbarossa's engagement in Italy was by no means at an end. The next year, 1163, he led troops against the Normans in southern Italy, though he was forced to abandon the project after resistance by a number of Upper Italian cities. In 1166, Frederick undertook a fourth Italian campaign with the dual purposes of deposing Pope Alexander III and attacking the Norman kingdom. The unpopularity of his administrative reforms weakened his position in Upper Italy, causing the defection of even previously pro-imperial cities such as Cremona and Pavia and leading to the foundation of the Lombard League, which readily joined arms with the pope during Barbarossa's siege of Ancona. During this critical time the imperial archbishops Rainald of Dassel and Christian I of Mainz were able to defeat a much larger army at the battle of Tusculum in May 1167, forcing Alexander III to abandon his position. From a military-historical perspective the battle is particularly significant for marking the first known employment of Brabançon mercenaries in German armies.

After the victory at Tusculum, Barbarossa abandoned the siege of Ancona in order to capture Rome and enthrone his pope, Paschal III, at Saint Peter's. But this success proved to be short-lived: in the summer of the same year an outbreak of malaria decimated the German forces, claiming the lives of thousands of men and numerous princes, including Rainald of Dassel, and forcing Barbarossa to retreat.

The emperor's last Italian campaign, in 1174–1178, responded to a provocation caused by the naming of the newly founded city of Alessandria (in Piedmont) after the emperor's archenemy, Pope Alexander III, and culminated in Frederick's defeat at the battle of Legnano in May 1176. Barbarossa finally came to terms with Pope Alexander III in the Peace of Venice (1177) and withdrew from Italy. He concluded the negotiations for peace with the Lombard League six years later in the Peace of Constance (1183).

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Peace of Venice. Pope Alexander III (c. 1105–1181) and Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa (c. 1122–1190) enter Rome, possibly following the end of their conflict in 1177. Detail from a fresco by Aretino Luca Spinelli, 1407. PALAZZO PUBBLICO, SIENA, ITALY/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

Henry VI's Conquest of the Norman Kingdom in Southern Italy. On the death of King William II of Sicily in 1189, the German king and later Holy Roman Emperor, Henry VI, claimed the Norman throne of Sicily in the name of his wife, Constance of Sicily. His claim was disputed by William's cousin, Count Tancred of Lecce, who received the crown at the hands of the archbishop of Palermo, thus provoking Henry VI to march into southern Italy to defend his rights. Drawing funds from the treasury of a previous Sicilian king, Roger II (d. 1154), Tancred was able to gather a formidable army and defeat the imperial minister Conrad of Lützelhard in battle. A further Hohenstaufen invasion led by the marshal Henry of Kalden miscarried on the defense of the Apennines by the Count of Accera, and Tancred stabilized his position through an alliance with the English king, Richard I, as he returned from the Holy Land.

In January 1191, Henry VI finally arrived in Upper Italy with his army and was crowned emperor in Rome in April on his way south. With the naval assistance of Pisa he laid siege to Naples, but he was unable to cut off the lines of supply completely. The choice of season for the operation proved to be fatal: sickness broke out in the ranks, eventually forcing the emperor, himself ailing, to give up the siege. On his way back to England, Richard I fell into the hands of Duke Leopold V of Austria, who delivered him into the custody of the emperor, and the ransom money provided Henry VI with the financial means to raise and equip a second army to send against Tancred in 1194. This second campaign took on the character of a punitive expedition. With the support of naval forces from Pisa and Genoa, Henry VI was able to capture the cities of Naples and Palermo. Salerno, which had captured and imprisoned the empress in 1191, was destroyed.

Otto IV and the German War of Succession. At the death of Henry VI in 1197, his son Frederick was only three years old, so the supporters of the Hohenstaufen elected Henry's brother, Philip of Swabia, as German king, while the Welf party raised their own pretender to the throne in the person of Otto, son of Henry the Lion and Matilda Plantagenet, whom Richard I had made Count of Poitou. The ensuing war of succession was initially

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pursued through small-scale ravaging campaigns that yielded no decisive advantage. Otto was able to draw Pope Innocent III to his side through promises to respect papal rights in central and southern Italy, and the pope consequently placed Otto's rival under a ban. This did not, however, hinder Philip from gathering support and scoring military victories. In 1204 important allies of the Welf, including the landgrave of Thuringia and Otto's own brother, the count palatine Henry, deserted his cause, and following Otto's defeat at the battle of Wassenberg on 27 July 1206, his last bastion, Cologne, surrendered to the Hohenstaufen. Otto's chances of success seemed to be dwindling, but then in 1208 his rival Philip was suddenly murdered by the count palatine Otto of Wittelsbach—possibly in revenge for impugning his honor—thus bringing the war of succession to an unexpected end.

Otto IV set off for Rome and received the imperial crown in 1209. In violation of the promises he had made to the pope, the newly crowned emperor promptly began with the conquest of southern Italy, seeking on the one hand to gain control of the strategic ports for his planned crusade and on the other hand to drive Henry VI's son, Frederick, from Sicily. The campaign was carefully prepared, with comprehensive measures to recruit and arm the necessary troops, and met with little resistance on the Italian mainland. Frederick was preparing to flee when Otto IV was forced to abandon the undertaking and hurry back to Germany, where the pope, who had now placed Otto under a ban for breaking his promises, and the French king, Philip II, had organized opposition to his rule. With the consent of Pope Innocent III, several German princes elected Frederick as future emperor, and on his arrival in Germany in late 1212, Frederick II of Hohenstaufen was crowned as German king in Mainz. Otto IV was able to defend his stronghold in northern Germany until, during the course of militarily supporting his ally, John I of England, against the French king, he became involved in the English debacle at Bouvines (1214). Following this disaster, most of Otto's support evaporated among the magnates of the Lower Rhine area, who now sided with Frederick and joined in crowning him a second time at Aachen in 1215. Otto IV withdrew to Harzburg near Goslar in the heartlands of his territory, where he died in 1218.

Of military historical significance was Otto's employment of the counterweight trebuchet north of the Alps, a type of siege engine with which he became acquainted during his campaign in Apulia. A further innovation in German military technique seems to have been the introduction of the tuck or estoc, a thrusting sword specially designed for breaking through armor. This weapon was apparently first used by German knights during the battle of Bouvines and established itself thereafter as an additional class of weaponry for armored knights.

Germany under Frederick II and His Sons. The most important wars in the last phase of the Hohenstaufen era were the war between Frederick II and the Lombard League and the wars against the popes Gregory IX and Innocent IV.

The War for Supremacy in Italy and the Wars against the Popes. At the beginning of his reign, Frederick II resided in Germany and instituted his son, Henry, as German king in 1220. Thereafter he departed for Italy, received the imperial crown from Pope Honorius III, and began with the reestablishment of his authority in the Kingdom of Sicily. The emperor's pledge to undertake a crusade in the Holy Land, made while still in Germany, remained in the meantime unfulfilled, leading ultimately to conflict with the pope. In order to gain the support of the Upper Italian cities for his crusade, Frederick II summoned a *Hoftag* (court assembly) in Cremona in 1226, thereby provoking Milan through the choice of location and precipitating the reanimation of the Lombard League. When the transport of crusaders to the Holy Land was already under way, Frederick II fell acutely ill and was forced to postpone his embarkation, whereupon Pope Gregory IX, viewing this as a breach of his pledge, placed him under a ban. Nevertheless Frederick II departed for the Holy Land the following year, where he succeeded in arranging a ten-year truce with the Muslims and presented himself attired as the king of Jerusalem in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre.

Meanwhile the Kingdom of Sicily was being ravaged by papal mercenaries and rebellion.

On his return from the Near East in June 1229, Frederick II conducted a brutal punitive expedition against the renegade provinces. Thanks to the mediation of the German princes and at the price of numerous concessions to the pope, Frederick II obtained his release from the papal ban in July 1230. Two years later, however, faced with renewed conflict with the Lombard League, the emperor found little assistance from the pope, to whom he had appealed as arbiter. Furthermore, Frederick's treatment of his son Henry (VII), whose authority he had continuously undermined by overturning his decisions against the German princes, led Henry to make an alliance with the Lombard League, forcing Frederick II to lead his troops to Germany. Because Henry's meager support quickly dwindled in the face of the emperor's ostentatious demonstration of power the conflict was resolved without a major confrontation. The renegade son having been deposed and deported to captivity in Apulia, Henry's brother Conrad IV was installed in his place, and the emperor gathered troops for the war with the Upper Italian cities.

In spite of being temporarily forced to interrupt the campaign and notwithstanding the strategy of his opponents, who sought to avoid a large-scale open battle, Frederick was able to achieve a decisive victory over the Lombard League at the battle of Cortenuova (1237). Milan's suspicions toward the emperor—which were not unjustified—caused the ensuing peace negotiations to be fruitless and left Frederick faced with the resistance of Milan and its allies: Bologna, Brescia, Faenza, and Piacenza. In July 1238 he began with the siege of Brescia, but he was forced to abandon the project because of poor weather and the danger of an epidemic in his ranks; the hostilities there had been characterized by the atrocious mistreatment of captives on both sides. In 1241, Frederick II, once again excommunicated, successfully concluded the siege of Faenza and marched on Rome.

After failed negotiations with the emperor, the new pope, Innocent IV, fled to France, assembled a church council at Lyon in 1245, and pronounced the emperor deposed. But the repercussions of this ruling remained limited to small-scale revolts against the Hohenstaufen in Germany and Sicily that hardly endangered Frederick's rule, and the emperor himself prepared to launch a campaign against France. Having already assembled his troops at Turin, he was forced to turn back by the defection of Parma, to which he promptly laid siege. Here on 18 February 1248 the emperor suffered a major defeat when the defenders launched a surprise attack and succeeded in capturing the imperial camp "Victoria," laying their hands on Frederick's treasury, his seal, and even his crown. Despite this setback Frederick II managed to resubjugate large areas of the Romagna to his rule and again prepared his armies to attack Lyon. However, his sudden death on 13 December 1250 not only put an end to this plan but also precipitated the demise of the Hohenstaufen dynasty. Assisted by his brothers, the heir to the German and Sicilian throne, Conrad IV, sought to uphold his rights, but he died shortly afterward, in 1254. Another of Frederick's sons, Manfred of Taranto, was crowned king of Sicily and Apulia in 1258, but he lost both the throne and his life in 1266 in a battle against the papal champion, Charles of Anjou, who two years later also executed Conrad IV's son Conradin, thus putting an end to the family line.

Germany under Henry (VII) and Conrad IV. During the minority of Frederick's II son Henry (VII), the archbishop of Cologne and, after him, the Duke of Bavaria administered the regency of the German empire. The regents found themselves confronting Danish expansion in the area of the Baltic Sea. Following the demise of Henry the Lion in 1195, Valdemar II (Duke of Schleswig 1182–1202, King of Denmark 1202–1241) had initially tolerated Frederick II, but now he began to extend his power along the Baltic coast, annexing Mecklenburg, the Wendish lands, and Pomerania. In 1216, Valdemar captured the city of Stade and, against conventions, massacred its civilians despite their capitulation. The Danish expansion soon lost its impetus, however. In 1223, Valdemar II and his son fell into the hands of Henry, Count of Schwerin, who held them

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captive until November 1225, releasing them on condition of the payment of a large ransom and withdrawal from the lands east of the Elbe. Meanwhile Henry of Schwerin allied himself with Adolf IV of Schauenburg, whose father Valdemar had deposed from the county of Holstein, and defeated the Danish vassal Albert of Orlamünde at the battle of Mölln. Attempting to regain his lost lands, Valdemar suffered a total defeat in July 1227 near Bornhöved at the hands of an army composed of contingents from Schwerin, Holstein, Hamburg, Lübeck, Bremen, and Saxony under the leadership of Henry of Schwerin. In the aftermath of this defeat, Danish rule in the area between Holstein and Pomerania crumbled.

In July 1227 an internal conflict in the German kingdom flared up between the bishop of Strasbourg and the Count of Pfirt in Alsace on account of a disputed inheritance. In a major battle near Blodelsheim, the bishop's armies triumphed and, pursuing their routed enemy, succeeded in killing and maiming many and in carrying home a large booty. In this case, as in others, feud warfare proved to be no different than "real" warfare.

Henry (VII) took power in 1228. His reign began with an armed conflict with the Duke of Bavaria, which he was able to decide to his advantage through a campaign on the Upper Danube, and ended in rebellion against his father, Frederick II.

The Wars between the Hohenstaufen and Their Rivals to the Throne. Following the deposition of Frederick II at the Council of Lyon in 1245, the emperor's son and German king, Conrad IV, faced the revival of resistance to the Hohenstaufen in Germany. The opposition elected the landgrave of Thuringia, Henry Raspe, as anti-king on 22 May 1246; he succeeded in defeating Conrad at the battle of Nidda on 5 August and the following winter laid siege to the cities of Ulm and Reutlingen in the Hohenstaufen heartlands. But having received a mortal injury, Henry was forced to abandon his campaign and died in February 1247. Backed by the pope, next the anti-Hohenstaufen party elected William of Holland as king. The following year William was able to capture the city of Aachen and receive the royal crown, but his position proved to be untenable, and he was forced to withdraw to Holland.

Other Wars Involving German Princes. In addition to the conflicts already mentioned, German princes were involved in a number of military confrontations of historical significance during the reign of the Hohenstaufen. The campaign of the bishop of Bremen against the Stedinger peasants of Friesen/Saxony was, although purely politically motivated, labeled a crusade and ended in the crushing defeat of the peasants at the hands of the far superior "crusaders" in the battle of Altenesch (27 May 1234).

After overthrowing Kiev and Halicz in 1140, the Mongols presented a palpable threat to the existence of the German empire. Beside Polish troops, German contingents under the leadership of princes such as Duke Frederick the Quarrelsome of Austria participated in the battle of Legnica (Liegnitz) on 9 April 1241. The same Frederick, having become involved in border skirmishes with the Hungarian king Béla IV, fell in the battle of Leitha in 1246.

Assessment. During the era of the Hohenstaufen, political conflicts were most often solved through military means. On the basis of the means employed, no clear distinction between (large-scale) war and (locally limited) feud can be made, because—in accordance with the advice of the military strategist of late antiquity, Vegetius—in both cases the combatants principally employed strategic devastation and destruction combined with siege. Large-scale open battles, on the other hand, were a rarity. Whether the defeated enemy was to be spared or killed depended on various factors. Although insurgents and opponents who had been classified as heretics could generally expect less mercy than enemies of equal standing, nevertheless, even in a feud among peers, the physical elimination of an enemy remained an option.

In the twelfth century in the German empire, mercenaries appear occasionally at the side of traditional vassal knights, but their employment in Germany did not attain the importance that it had elsewhere, such as in the service of the English crown. The historical sources speak of them, accordingly, as exceptions. In the field of military technology the era

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of the Hohenstaufen saw the further development of fortified defense systems—the city of Cologne, for instance, expanded its walls to enclose its suburban quarters, too—and various innovations in the technique of siege warfare. Drawing from experience gathered on crusades and abroad, new siege engines such as the trebuchet, siege towers, and Greek fire began to be used, and thus technically adept engineers became more important.

[*See also* Aachen, Siege of; Altenesch, Battle of; Bornhöved, Battle of; Brabançons; Carcano, Battle of; Conrad III; Conradin; Cortenuova, Battle of; Crema, Siege of; Faenza, Siege of; Frederick I Barbarossa; Henry VI; Henry the Lion; Legnano, Battle of; Legnica, Battle of; Lombard League; Lothair III of Süpplingenburg; Milan, Sieges of; Otto IV; Parma, Siege and Battle of; *and* Wassenberg, Battle of.]

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Julia Knödler

Translated from the German by Duane Henderson

Narrative (1250–1415)

The boundaries of this article are somewhat problematic from the military-history point of view. The death of the Hohenstaufen emperor Frederick II in 1250 marked a break in political as well as military history. In hindsight, its significance as a turning point for the German empire is clear in that, with Frederick, the epoch of "great" kings came to an end.

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In terms of both political power and military potential, the late-medieval German kings lagged behind their western European colleagues. German rulers of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries were incapable of military action on the scale of the French and English rulers during the Hundred Years' War. Since the kings were the most important war leaders, it can be stated in general that the conflicts in Germany during this period were comparatively small. Of course, this did not make them any less terrible for the people affected.

By contrast, in the unfolding of military history, the year 1415 has a more indirect significance. In this year, the Council of Constance condemned the Bohemian theologian Jan Hus to death and burned him at the stake, which was the direct cause of the Hussite Wars of 1420–1434. These wars were of great importance in late-medieval military history and introduced a number of innovations (such as war wagons and the *Wagenburg*, or defensive wagon formation). In the fifteenth century, many of these military innovations became fully developed. They characterize late-medieval war tactics and distinguish them from high-medieval battles: infantry with spears in massed formations, firearms of various shapes and sizes, booty-seeking by the heavy cavalry, and so on.

The fourteenth century can be understood as a transitional period in military history, with old and new techniques side by side; it saw the last of the "knights' battles" as well as the first successful use of massed infantry. Artillery also came into use during this time, although with little success. In the military-historical literature, the German empire plays a subordinate role in these developments. The literature reports battles outside the empire (Courtrai or Bannockburn), or those that were part of the dispute with the Swiss Confederation (Sempach or Morgarten). One gains the impression that the heart of the German empire was a sort of subsidiary theater in terms of tactical and organizational developments.

The German empire was marked by numerous conflicts and social upheavals between 1250 and 1415: peasant uprisings, city-dwellers' fights, and other socially motivated disturbances and movements are typical. These conflicts often involved opponents trained in the use of weapons—usually in the form of citizens who had to train with arms as members of their city's militia; however, it is questionable whether these disturbances rose to the level of actual war. Often they were local (limited to a single city) and did not necessarily involve military actions. The same is true for the numerous actions of municipal or feudal authorities against criminal acts such as highway robbery. These are to be regarded as police actions rather than as wars.

No major international wars took place in the German empire during this period.

Developments in Style of War. The interesting military-historical developments of the period between 1250 and 1415 fall into the realm of changes in strategy and technical developments.

Strategy: Ways of Fighting. The development of strategy during the Middle Ages reveals the increasing importance of infantry as a decisive force in battles. In the course of this process, mounted units increasingly served as auxiliary troops, whose function was to protect and support the infantry. A related phenomenon is that of men-at-arms fighting on foot. Horses now served more as transport in military contexts, although they retained their important social function as a status symbol. One sign of this development can be seen in the fact that knights fought unmounted and formed combat units with other soldiers, such as archers and lancers, who traditionally had always fought on foot.

This trend did not develop linearly. At the end of the Middle Ages, from the fifteenth century, the culmination of this development can be seen in the form of troops fighting in closed ranks with long spears; however, the road to this point was not at all straight or continuous. Even in the early and high Middle Ages, men-at-arms fought battles on foot, and in the period under discussion there are many examples of battle tactics in which knights fought on horseback. The fourteenth century is the century of the "last great knights' battles" on

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German soil (see below). This expression indicates that mounted divisions fought each other here in a manner that might retrospectively be called "classically medieval": the warriors attacked each other with couched lances, trying to determine the outcome by the force of the initial impact. In many battles, mounted units were the "weapon" that, in the commanders' eyes, should win the fight.

Technical Developments. The importance of cavalry can also be seen in the realm of technical developments. Plate armor was developed during the fourteenth century. This armor, made of separate iron or steel plates that could slide against each other, protected the body from lances and gunshots better than the old scale armor, mail, and strapped-on armor. Germany was one of the centers of armor-making, particularly the Upper German cities of Nuremberg, Augsburg, Landshut, and Innsbruck. Here, plate armor was made in Gothic design, distinguished from the Italian type by its square-cut and serrated shapes. This armor curved away from the chest, leaving an empty space between the armor and the thorax—similar to the crumple zone of a car—to attenuate the force of a blow to this vulnerable area of the body. Among other things, its purpose was to cushion lance blows, suggesting that this form of combat between mounted soldiers was considered an important element of war.

An innovation in weapons technology for long-handled weapons, on the other hand, underlies the development of strategy leading up to the massed forces of the fifteenth century: the halberd. Probably developed from work tools, it resembles an axe with a long shaft. Opposite the blade is a hoe-shaped claw, a blow from which can be aimed at any particular point on an opponent's body. Because of the long shaft, halberd blows were quite heavy. The appearance of this weapon in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries has a double significance. First, the infantry was conceived as an offensive unit that was to enter into the battle action not only reactively, in a supporting role. The halberd is an offensive weapon that can be used to strike both horse and

Halberds. German soldiers fighting with halberds and lances. Woodblock engraving, fifteenth century. © FRANÇOIS GUENET/ART RESOURCE, NY

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foot soldiers. Second, the development of this weapon out of the ordinary work axe indicates a change in the social structure—that is, in the understanding of professionalism. Farmers and other rural and urban classes often took up arms and played an important fighting role during the Middle Ages. Yet the technical developments in weaponry of the late Middle Ages, including the flail and the scythe, make it clear that a new value was accorded to these fighters. The development of farm tools into weapons recognizes the importance of these social strata in war.

By far the most effective innovation in weapons technology in the fourteenth century was gunpowder. Until the mid-fifteenth century, heavy cannons were used primarily against fortified places. By contrast, the stone guns of the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries—so named from the stone bullets they shot—were not very important in open battle. The great advantage of firearms over thrown missiles was their straight trajectory. Nevertheless, heavy weapons propelled by gunpowder remained rare into the fifteenth century: they were expensive to manufacture, heavy and cumbersome to operate, and slow to reload. Thus they were used mostly in combination with older projectile-throwers. Smaller handguns were first used in Germany in 1379 in Regensburg. These handguns could be used by one person, but were stationary at first. Production costs and effectiveness led to the rapid spread of handguns in Europe.

Specific Wars. Looking at the wars that were waged in Germany between 1250 and 1415 one realizes that there was no political figure or institution that was predominant in the field of warfare. Wars were waged by different groups in various political and strategic circumstances. Thus one cannot tell the story of war in this period in a classical chronological order; listing the different battles and sieges between 1250 and 1415 would not paint a picture of warfare in this period, but merely provide an account of military actions.

The main military conflicts—in terms of numbers of people involved—were the various fights for the German crown and some rivalries among local nobles competing for leadership of a certain region. The first major battle of the period was fought in 1278 between Rudolf of Habsburg and Přemysl Otakar II of Bohemia near Dürnkrut. Ten years later the archbishop of Cologne fought the citizens of "his" town and the forces of the duke of Brabant near Worringen and lost. This battle has to been seen together with a series of armed conflicts between various archbishops and the townspeople. The latter fought for their independence; the bishops for control of the town. Several sieges and some minor encounters were fought within the process, for example at Frechen (south west of Cologne) in 1257—rather indecisively. The same sort of conflict—rivalry over the communal power—led to the battle of Hausbergen (near Strasbourg) in 1262 where the bishop of Strasbourg was defeated by the townsmen's forces. In 1298 the rivalry for the crown led to the battle of Göllheim (near Worms) where King Adorf of Nassau was defeated and lost his crown. The battle of Mühldorf in 1322 saw Louis IV victorious over Frederick III the Fair of Austria—again in a dispute over the German throne. In 1371 the Duke of Brabant, Wenzel, fought Count Wilhelm of Jülich near Baesweiler (north east of Aachen) for the political leadership of the Lower Rhine, was captured, and lost both the battle and the supremacy. In 1377 the townsmen of Reutlingen fought successfully against the Count of Wurttemberg in front of the gates of their town. Eleven years later the counts of Wurttemberg were victorious near Döffingen (southwest of Stuttgart).

These various conflicts can best be analyzed by categorizing them into three main classes of war: disputes over thrones, conflicts among nobles, and conflicts between cities. Rather than treating them chronologically, this entry will consider them in those categories.

Disputes over Thrones. The first category consists of disputed kingship, which as a rule was settled by military means. The period between 1250 and 1415 is characterized by continual dynastic changes at the head of the German empire. The electors constituted the major power in the selection of kings, so that—unlike in France or England—no dynasty was

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able to secure long-lasting hereditary power. The resulting rivalries often erupted into wars. Between 1250 and 1415, sixteen kings from nine different families made claims to the throne. During six periods—1250–1273, 1298, 1314–1322, 1346–1347, 1349, and 1410–1411—several candidates were disputing the throne. Not every case resulted in military conflict, since many of the pretenders did not have enough power to endanger their competitors seriously. Still, in the first half of the period under discussion, disputes over the throne were often decided on the battlefield.

Dürnkrut. In 1278, Rudolf of Habsburg and Přemysl Otakar II of Bohemia faced off near Dürnkrut and Jedenspeigen. Ultimately, Rudolf won because of a strategic error on the part of his opponent, which gave him enough time to assemble troops and position them. The second factor in Rudolf's victory is said to have been his tactical arrangement. Like his opponent's, it was based fully on the usual medieval concept of three battles. They would engage one after another, rather than side by side, so that only one division from each side was fighting at a time. In this battle, Rudolf managed to lead his third and final division in a decisive attack against Otakar, whose third wave never made it into the battle. Rudolf made use of a tactical reserve, which held back from the battle at first and then, at the crucial moment, attacked the enemy's flank. This tactic is mentioned repeatedly in the literature, because it supposedly offended the knightly ideal of honor of that time and was used comparatively rarely. In fact, the sources express this discomfort only relatively late; it probably reflects a dichotomy between the performances of individual soldiers, seeking personal bravery and honor, and the demands of discipline and tactics required for collective success. In any case, this procedure is not a tactical innovation. For one thing, similar maneuvers are recorded in other times and battles in the early and high Middle Ages. For another, this is not, so to speak, an instance of an influential technique in the conduct of war that spread as time went on. Tactical reserves were used where space and circumstances required or permitted; they were not specific to late medieval battles. Dürnkrut was fought on horseback, so it is also an example of what the German literature calls a "knights' battle." This, of course, refers to the fact that mounted soldiers were fighting each other, rather than to the fighters' social status.

Göllheim. The dispute between Adolf of Nassau and Albrecht I was decided by the battle of the Hasenbühl near Göllheim (west of Worms) in 1298. This battle, too, was waged in the high-medieval cavalry tradition, with three waves of mounted fighters. Adolf and Albrecht commanded their respective second waves. The numerous contemporary chronicles paint quite a lively picture of this battle but allow only partial reconstruction of events. However, they point to interesting aspects of war; for example, at Göllheim, the personal participation of the pretenders to the throne was crucial. Commanders who stay far away from the battle while directing their troops are not (yet) in evidence. Adolf's death—preceded by a fierce attack and a fall from his horse—decided the battle. The chroniclers make conspicuous mention of the large number of horses killed; they apparently outnumbered the dead warriors. This suggests that attacking horses was a deliberate war tactic. The Bavarian soldiers fighting for Adolf are said to have repulsed the enemy attack by barricading themselves behind their dead horses.

Mühldorf. The decisive battle between Louis IV and Frederick III (the Fair) in 1322 unfolded in the same way. In this case, too, the personal fates of the two rivals to the throne proved decisive, because Frederick was captured. Here, too, two mounted armies clashed. As at Dürnkrut, one division entered into the battle late and decided matters in Louis' favor. Mühldorf is also called "the last great knights' battle on German soil." In terms of the size of the conflict, this is certainly correct, but not in terms of battle style: mounted soldiers fought each other "like knights" throughout the fourteenth century.

Conflicts among Nobles. The nobility were the most important war-waging group in the fourteenth century, because it was they who usually determined the outcome of a war. Indeed, a medieval war without the participation of nobles was unthinkable;

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they fought in one role or another in every conflict of the period under discussion. Even city militias were led by professional soldiers from the nobility (as at Courtrai). Many mercenaries came from noble families. In this sense, all of the conflicts presented here were "noble." In a narrower sense, the term refers to wars in which one or more noble parties were brought into conflict over their own political interests. The numerous local and regional conflicts of this type cannot all be discussed here. A few examples will suffice.

Upper Bavaria versus Austria: Gammelsdorf. On 9 November 1313, the armies of the Upper Bavarian duke Louis of Bavaria and the Austrian dukes Leopold and Frederick III met. The cause of the quarrel, which anticipated the political constellation of the battle for the throne after 1314, was the guardianship of the underage duke of Lower Bavaria, sought by both Louis and the Habsburgs. Louis was supported by the cities of Lower Bavaria, the Habsburgs by the Lower Bavarian nobility. The Austria–Lower Bavaria party was probably numerically superior to the Upper Bavarians. The sources for this battle are dominated by the efforts of the Bavarian chroniclers to depict Louis as a great warrior. (Louis would later challenge Frederick III for the throne in the battle of Mühldorf and become the German king.) Therefore, the sources emphasized the significance of this fight and turned the Gammelsdorf skirmish into a genuine battle, in order to establish Louis as a warrior king. This demonstrates the significance of military success and the consequences attached to victory, in a society of warrior nobles.

Among other factors, the weather worked to Louis's advantage at Gammelsdorf: thick fog covered the battlefield, so that Louis's actual strength was hidden from his opponents. The city militias from Lower Bavaria on Louis's side fought on foot, the other participants on horseback. This battle also demonstrates the effect that social position could have on battle tactics. The outcome of the battle makes it quite plain: although Louis was in a position to draw political advantage from the Lower Bavarian territories and nobles in the future, he refused to pursue and destroy the defeated fighters. No names of the fallen nobles were recorded. Gammelsdorf is another of the battles described as "the last knightly battle."

Thuringian Counts' Feud. The Thuringian counts' feud of 1342–1346 is an example of the numerous small conflicts that arose in the fourteenth century out of the conflicting interests of local nobles, as they built up their authority over countries or regions. A group of Thuringian counts banded together in Arnstadt (southwest of Erfurt) in 1342 against Frederick II the Earnest, margrave of Meissen and landgrave of Thuringia, of the House of Wettin. Frederick had declared a general peace in 1338, which had as its goal the subjugation of the small landholders and local rulers. Armed resistance to these decrees arose among the nobles, who wanted to secure their rights and protect their independence. Archbishop Heinrich of Mainz, who was already at odds with Frederick, sided with the rebels. The city of Erfurt sided with the landgrave. The sources for these battles are strongly biased toward Erfurt, so that the parts of the conflict in which Erfurt forces participated receive particular attention. These sources provide neither an exact chronology nor precise information on the military forces. This seems to be typical for local disputes in the fourteenth century. The essential tactics in this conflict were pillaging, burning, and sieges. Frederick first besieged Arnstadt, with the support of Erfurt, but then lifted the siege. As the Erfurt militia and the landgrave's troops retreated, they got into several small fights with the opposing counts; at Egstedt, two counts from Schwarzburg were captured, and the landgrave himself was wounded. The *Cronicae S. Petri Continuatio secundus* (Chronicles of St. Peter, second continuation), of Erfurt origin, mentions a fight with heavy casualties and the loss of many horses; this can perhaps be understood as a reference to cavalry, but it cannot be definitely connected to this battle. An initial peace treaty was concluded in November 1342, in which Emperor Louis IV awarded enormous reparations to the landgrave. Hardly any military action took place in 1343, except one attempt by Erfurt against Altenburg, in which ten truce-breakers were captured and beheaded.

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This could be evidence of the way that similar small-scale hostilities were handled.

As for the further course of this dispute, it is definitely known that the landgrave Frederick succeeded in gradually drawing individual families out of the coalition of rebel counts by means of separate alliances. War broke out again in 1345, taking place mainly around cities and strongholds. Erfurt enjoyed a series of successes: the cities of Rudolfstadt and Wiehe were burned down, and the Häsler and Willerstadt castles destroyed. Werichhausen castle was conquered by Erfurt, and five enemy men-at-arms (*galeati*, or "helmeted ones") captured; however, Erfurt soon lost it, and twenty men were captured. These figures show that this was a local conflict of quite limited dimensions. Dornburg castle was besieged unsuccessfully by Frederick and the Erfurt forces for five weeks. A conclusive peace treaty, ending the hostilities, was finally reached in 1346. The landgrave acquired several castles and territories from his opponent and emerged from the counts' feud as the political winner who also managed, in the end, to confirm his position as ruler.

Conflicts between Cities. The example of the Thuringian counts' feud reveals the importance of the participation of municipal armies in fourteenth-century wars. Further examples of the participation of urban contingents in wars are the battles of Worringen, Reutlingen, and Courtrai. The chief reason for the greater engagement of urban soldiers was the increasing importance of cities in the fourteenth century. They became political actors and thus were also active in war. Examples of this phenomenon in the wars of the high Middle Ages are the northern Italian cities in their disputes with Frederick I in the twelfth century. Townsmen fought as foot soldiers at Worringen and Courtrai, and the development of military tactics in the direction of greater reliance on infantry is undoubtedly due to the political importance of cities and, consequently, the increased presence of urban—usually infantry—contingents. The Swiss Confederation also owes its military successes to this development. In addition to the often superior tactics of massed infantry, the self-awareness of city dwellers as a political group certainly contributed to their success: they were fighting for their city's rights and knew why they were risking their lives.

Cities took part as actors, above all, in two German wars of the fourteenth century. Both cases involved, not individual cities, but leagues of cities. The Hanseatic League took part in the so-called Hansa Wars against the Danish king Valdemar IV, which ended in 1370 with the Peace of Stralsund and a Hanseatic victory. The hostilities in this war were mainly naval operations, which will not be detailed here. Two other major German leagues were the Rhenish City League and the Swabian City League. In 1388–1389, they waged wars in southern Germany against the regional princes who had formed an alliance in Nuremberg. The cause of this war was the action taken by Frederick, Duke of Bavaria, against the archbishop of Salzburg, who was allied with the Rhenish-Swabian league. In summer 1388, war was declared by some of the league's cities (particularly those lying south of the Main River). Some of the battles and larger military conflicts of this war were the battle of Döffingen on 23 August 1388, a defeat of the Swabian cities by the Count of Württemberg, and the attack at Pfeddersheim, in which the Rhenish cities were defeated by troops of the Electoral Palatinate. Thereafter, the war disintegrated into scattered actions and was brought to an unsatisfying close—for the cities—with the Imperial Peace of Eger in 1389.

Warfare among cities shows clearly that the connection between cities as war participants and infantry as warriors should not be viewed as overly close or unbreakable. It is true, if somewhat simplified, that in wars involving cities, the cities faced off against the rural nobility, but this does not mean that cavalry were fighting against infantry. On the contrary, the princes also had foot soldiers—mainly farmers—in their ranks, and some city soldiers fought on horseback. Frankfurt alone is said to have sent more than 250 cavalry to Pfeddersheim.

This situation was especially significant at the battle of Döffingen. A city detachment rode through

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Arms of the Hanseatic League. German school. © MUSEUM OF LONDON, UK/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

the Count of Württemberg's lands, plundering. At Döffingen, some farmers had retreated into the churchyard and were trapped there by the city troops. When Württemberg troops rode to their relief, battle was joined. Both contingents consisted of mounted soldiers and infantry. Precise figures are difficult to come by: the urban soldiers had an estimated 750 cavalry and 1,000 to 2,000 infantry, their opponents between 600 and 1,100 cavalry and 2,000 to 6,000 infantry. Thus, the sizes of the forces engaged were comparable to those of a classic high-medieval knights' battle. Count Ulrich of Württemberg is said to have fought on foot with the majority of his knights, which accords with typical tactics of the period. The battle was resolved in Württemberg's favor with the arrival of an additional mounted division of 100 men, which turned the tide of the battle; several of the city contingents were put to flight. Thus, although politically this was a new type of war, it was waged in an entirely conventional manner. Equally conventional was the fact that the city's side was bolstered by mercenaries, who fought entirely in the traditional style. The battle of Döffingen is also, in this respect, known as a "knights' battle."

[*See also* Armor, Body; Artillery; Bannockburn, Battle of; Courtrai, Battle and Siege of; Dürnkrut, Battle of; Frederick I Barbarossa; Frederick II; Handguns; Hausbergen, Battle of; Italy, *subentries on* Narrative (1000–1300) *and* Narrative (1300–1493); Louis IV; Morgarten, Battle of; Mühldorf, Battle of; Přemysl Otakar II; Reutlingen, Battle of; Rudolf I; Sempach, Battle of; Strategy; Switzerland, *subentry on* Narrative; Weapons, *subentry on* Hand-to-Hand; *and* Worringen, Battle of.]

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Narrative (1415–1493)

There were so many wars in the German-speaking area in the fifteenth century that it makes sense to limit our study to examples of military conflicts that involved significant political consequences or produced major technical, tactical, or theoretical developments in warfare. For the period covered here, these primarily include the Hussite wars (1419–1434), the Burgundian wars (1474–1477), and the subsequent war (ending in 1479) of the Habsburg heir Maximilian against France over his Burgundian inheritance. Of more regional significance were disputes carried out by means of war, such as the Soest Feud (1444–1449) or the War of the South German Cities (1449–1450), although even these conflicts produced events that were in some way typical of the structural changes in European warfare during the fifteenth century.

The Hussite Wars. The series of conflicts known as the Hussite wars arose from religious and national conditions in Bohemia. The church was split by the Great Schism, with one pope in Rome (Gregory XII) and another in Avignon (Benedict XIII). The empire was experiencing a decade of political turmoil following the abdication of King Wenceslas in 1400, forced by the princes, until King Sigismund of the house of Luxemburg succeeded in reclaiming imperial power in 1410. But in his own electorate, the Kingdom of Bohemia, Sigismund was unable to assert himself. Jan Hus, influenced by the reformist teachings of the English theologian John Wycliffe, was preaching against the official Roman Catholic Church and its possessions, against claims of papal power, and in favor of the right of the faithful to receive complete communion (the ritual consumption of bread and wine), as well as the freedom to preach. In just a few years Hus's rhetorically skillful preaching generated a lay movement that encompassed the majority of the Czech-speaking population of Bohemia, and as it took a sharper and sharper line against German political, economic, and spiritual supremacy, the movement soon assumed a political dimension.

When Jan Hus, under King Sigismund's assurance of safe passage, came before the Council of Constance in 1415 and refused to repudiate his teachings, he was condemned and burned as a heretic. His followers in Bohemia regarded him as a martyr, called their overlord Sigismund a perjured traitor, refused to give him their allegiance, and continued to build the Hussite movement underground. On 30 June 1419 an uprising in Prague opened a fifteen-year struggle—of a type that in the early twenty-first century would be called "asymmetrical warfare"—against the empire and the Roman Church.

Until 1434, Hussite armies rode back and forth through Bohemia, Silesia, Upper Hungary, Austria, Upper Palatinate, Franconia, and Lusatia (then known as Meissen and Brandenburg). Except for the fight near Brüx (Most) in August 1421, won by Frederick of Meissen but with no lasting effect, and the battle near Hiltersried in September 1433, when Johann von Pfalz-Neumarkt destroyed a small Hussite division of sixteen hundred men, the Hussite

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German Cavalry. Late fifteenth century. Illustration from the *Mittelalterliches Hausbuch*, 22r, c. 1480.

warriors won every battle, to the great astonishment of their contemporaries. Between 1420 and 1432 the pope declared a total of five crusades against the Hussites; they defeated every imperial army that challenged them. They conquered fortified places and laid waste to wide swaths of countryside. An essential factor in these spectacular military successes was the joining of new technical and tactical developments in the form of the Hussite *Wagenburg*. Its creator is said to be the southern Bohemian nobleman Jan Žižka, who had had a great deal of military experience and had fought at Tannenberg (Grunwald) in 1410 in the army of the Polish king against the Teutonic Knights. As a famous warrior in Bohemia and an enthusiastic follower of Jan Hus, Žižka quickly acquired a leading role in the Prague rebellion.

Evolving Hussite Tactics and Weaponry and Their Impact. When King Sigismund called for war against the "Bohemian heretics" at the imperial parliament at Breslau in 1420, based on Pope Martin V's declaration of a crusade, Žižka's task was to raise his own Hussite army, from farmers and townspeople, that could fight successfully against a force of experienced knights and their followers. This required finding some type of weaponry that

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could be mastered with little practice and that, combined with suitable tactics, offered enough support to withstand professional warriors in battle. The Hussite commander did enjoy two psychological advantages: the high fighting morale of "God's warriors," born of their fanatical sense of mission, and their unconditional discipline, based on their trust in him and in his military leadership.

Žižka could not adopt his enemies' fighting tactics, which his troops would not be able to sustain; he was also convinced that, under certain conditions, defensive actions offered considerably more advantages than offensive ones. Making a virtue of necessity, he fell back on an *instrumentarium* of weaponry with which his fighters were familiar. They needed only to transfer it to a new tactical framework. The use of spear and sword was familiar to the city dwellers in the Hussite army from their civil-defense duties; a number of them also knew how to use light- and medium-weight firearms, with which the fortifications of several Bohemian cities had been armed since the second half of the fourteenth century. The noble lords who joined the Hussite cause were experienced warriors, although the great majority of their fighters were farmers. For them, farming tools such as scythes, axes, picks, and threshing flails were as familiar as horses and wagons. These tools could be used as weapons; thus, for example, the war flail, reinforced with iron bands and thorns, became one of the most famous Hussite weapons.

The Wagenburg. The farm wagon, long used merely as a means of transport, Žižka turned to military use. Some of them carried troops, weapons, and supplies; others were remodeled into platforms from which the enemy could be fought. The Hussite commander developed a new tactical principle: all wagons should be constructed so they might be converted, in the shortest possible time, from marching order into a *Wagenburg* that could withstand any enemy attack. The arrangement of baggage wagons into a *Wagenburg* as protection for encamped troops had been known since antiquity. Žižka made it a sort of movable fortress that turned this defensive principle into an offensive strategy. The defense of a fortified structure behind palisades or walls was familiar to both farmers and townspeople. With the help of the *Wagenburg*, this situation could now be created in open country; ultimately it offered the one guarantee of success against attack from a knightly army.

After their early experiences with conventional wagons, the Hussites began building their own war wagons in 1422, substantially larger than baggage wagons. The outer side, which was turned to face the enemy, was equipped with an additional attachable wall with strong planks. One section in the middle of each side wall folded outward, allowing people to climb in and out, unseen, on the side facing away from the enemy. Also, a strong board was installed under the wagon, running its entire length, which could be folded down when the *Wagenburg* was set up, covering the space between the wagon and the ground. Every wagon held picks, shovels, spades, axes, a feed trough for the horses, and a strong chain, which was used to fasten the wheels of neighboring wagons close together when the *Wagenburg* was formed. There were movable shields to cover up any gaps that might be caused by the terrain. The wagons also carried firearms, powder, lead bullets, shield bolts, and food for the twenty-man crew. The crew included two horse grooms, six crossbow archers, two marksmen, and eight fighters equipped with war flails, halberds, and spears. Two men armed with swords were responsible for the wagon's movable shields. During battle, only the marksmen and some of the spearsmen and halberdiers remained on the wagon; once the animals had been unharnessed, the grooms withdrew with them into the *Wagenburg*. The other four or six men per wagon took their long-handled weapons and joined the foot soldiers, who fought in special formation independently of the wagons.

Each wagon was under the command of a captain, forming its own tactical unit. Each group of ten wagons was under another captain, who was responsible for their order on the march and for the smooth joining of the vehicles into the *Wagenburg*. Depending on the terrain, the Hussite wagons rode in two or four parallel columns, under the leadership of a commander for all the wagons. Of the same rank

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as this commander were the commanders of the large infantry groups, the cavalry, and the accompanying weaponry. They all received their orders directly from the field commander: at first Jan Žižka himself, and Prokop the Bald (also known as Prokop the Great) after Žižka's death in 1424. This hierarchy made it easier to carry out immediately the field commander's decisions, because of the clear chain of command and the discipline of all the Hussite warriors, as expressed in unconditional obedience—a state of affairs unthinkable for the imperial armies of knights. This hierarchical structure was functional because it was based on the tactic of setting up the *Wagenburg* and, conversely, created the very conditions that allowed it to be implemented in battle.

Of decisive significance for Hussite military superiority, and thus for the success of their *Wagenburg*, was the inclusion of an artillery component. This went back to Žižka himself. He ordered small and medium-size weapons mounted on their wagons as movable "cart guns" and positioned within the *Wagenburg*. They shot charges such as nails, bits of lead, or small stones. This "hailshot" produced devastating effects against attacking cavalry and infantry at an average range of about a hundred miles (160 kilometers). With the *Wagenburg* assembled to fit the terrain and its weapons deployed, the Hussites created a situation comparable to the defense of a city. In fact, the *Wagenburg* system was more flexible than the usual fixed defenses of a position fortified with walls and towers. If the enemy should attempt to fire on the *Wagenburg* with their own artillery, the wagon could be quickly moved to a new position, a possibility that offered new tactical opportunities for battle. The average Hussite army of 180 war wagons had more than 35 guns and considerable firepower. When the flanks and rear were concealed by clever use of the local terrain, the guns could be concentrated in one spot on one side of the *Wagenburg*. In such a situation a gun would be positioned every twenty feet (six meters) on a front line that was approximately seventy feet (twenty meters) long. Even in unfavorable terrain, thanks to the good discipline of the troops, the Hussites almost always managed to concentrate firepower to aim at an advancing enemy: the enemy's momentum could usually be broken with the initial salvo of artillery, hand weapons, and crossbows.

On the march, vanguards cleared the way for the wagon columns, breaking through forests, filling in trenches, or building bridges when necessary. They were protected by lightly armed—and therefore highly mobile—cavalry divisions, which also carried out reconnaissance along the route. It was their job to deal with any suddenly appearing enemy soldiers until the *Wagenburg* was assembled and could protect all the fighters. Normally the Hussites deliberately left one or two gaps as emergency gates for their cavalry and infantry. The gaps were covered with movable shields. If the initial enemy attack could be repulsed by the combined use of long-distance weapons, the Hussite warriors, on command, would then go on the offensive: the cavalry and infantry who had been held in reserve inside the *Wagenburg* would stream through the emergency gates toward the enemy. Their goal in battle was the merciless physical destruction of their opponents. Captives were not usually taken, and the victory was topped off by the dogged pursuit and destruction of the fleeing enemy troops. This is what happened at Pilsen (Plzeň) in December 1419, at Kuttenberg (Kutná Hora) and Deutschbrod (Německý Brod) in 1422, at Maleschau (Malešov) in 1424, at Tachau (Tachov) in 1427, and at Taus (Domažlice) in 1431.

The Hussites even fought among themselves with the same rage and mercilessness at the battle of Lipany on 30 May 1434. In this battle, the moderate Utraquists, who represented the Bohemian professional classes and were prepared to offer concessions to the empire and the church after so many years of war and economic decline, defeated the extremely radical and fanatical Taborites, who believed firmly in the imminent end of the world and wanted to eradicate everyone who did not share their beliefs. In this case, too, there was no mercy for the defeated. A peace agreement was reached, and Sigismund, who had been crowned Roman emperor in 1433, was also recognized as king of Bohemia at the 1436 parliament in Iglau. Many of the Hussite soldiers, who were admired and feared for their military

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achievements, hired themselves out as mercenaries to powerful princes throughout the empire.

The Hussite *Wagenburg* quickly became a model for similar technical and tactical efforts in other armies, and for corresponding legislation. The first *Wagenburg* ordinances can be found in German acts of parliament as early as the 1420s, and until 1450 many German cities passed such ordinances. Even in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, *Wagenburg*s continued to be mentioned in warfare literature as an important component of an army, although generally as a marching camp or temporary field fortification. Nowhere is there evidence that they were used as an element of a flexible defensive tactic in offensive operations, as the Hussites had used them. For the most part, other armies lacked the discipline and motivation of the troops of Žižka and his successors.

Long-handled Weapons. An epochal change in warfare took place during the course of the fifteenth century, to which the Hussites made an important contribution, although it was limited mostly to them. It had become clear that the dominance of armored noble knights on the battlefield was a thing of the past. New techniques in weaponry, in combination with newly developed fighting tactics that made better use of infantry, allowed infantry to play a larger role against mounted troops and thus to rise, in terms of military value, from poorly regarded auxiliary troops to a decisive fighting force. The main factor responsible for this change was the introduction of long-handled weapons and their use in tightly closed, massed groups of infantry. Although the infantry's halberds and battle-axes were shorter than cavalry lances, these weapons had a longer reach than the knights' swords. In order for the long-handled weapons to succeed, it was important for the infantry to hinder the mass attack of the armed cavalry with their couched lances, or else to attack first. Once the horses and riders were stopped, the advantage lay with the long-handled weapons. A few fourteenth-century battles were still won by infantry over cavalry by means of clever use of the terrain (Kortrijk and Morgarten Pass) or by superior distance weapons (longbows at Crécy). Masses of long spears up to 17.72 feet (5.4 meters) in length soon proved their superiority, however, over any type of cavalry formation.

The Swiss Confederation developed the tactic of massed infantry and perfected it in the Burgundian wars. Their standard formation of a square or oblong mass of five thousand to ten thousand men was a group of armed citizens surrounding a core of soldiers with halberds and battle-axes. This formation permitted an effective cover against cavalry attack, as well as adequate strength to repel an infantry attack. The outer sections lowered their spears, forming a "hedgehog" of sharp iron. As with the Hussites' *Wagenburg*s, the attackers' horses shied from them or else ran against them. At the front of the formation there were always a few marksmen with guns or crossbows who fired their weapons once and then withdrew into the crowd.

Operating under this type of group tactic in open terrain presupposed a considerable level of morale and discipline, comparable in this respect to Žižka's *Wagenburg* tactics. The Swiss Confederation was particularly adept at it, and after their first few campaigns using this new method of fighting, they set down written ordinances (for example, the Sempach Letter of 1393) to govern it. The Swiss Confederation also had an efficient organization that allowed them to raise an army of twenty thousand within three days. If the Hussites were deeply convinced of their role as "God's warriors," the motivation of the Swiss in war, as well as their self-assertion after the founding of the confederation by the original cantons at the end of the thirteenth century, stemmed from their general conviction of the necessity of defending their own independence against outside influences.

The sense of unity among countrymen created a considerable psychological advantage: men from one canton always fought together under their own banner. Regular drills, even in peacetime, allowed the troops to be called out quickly, into massed formations, at the sound of drums, for over a mile in all directions in open terrain. The massed spears could turn tightly in any direction upon a signal, which offered commanders broad tactical options. In battle the objective was to repel the enemy cavalry and

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overrun the infantry. It could easily happen, among such forces, that one would survive the battle only by pushing or being pushed, because the fighters, especially the spearsmen, tried to break the enemy's line by closing their own flanks and front as tightly as possible. When opponents gave up and dissolved their formation, the halberdiers and axe-men went into action. Every soldier was aware that success depended on sticking together, and that there were draconian punishments for lack of discipline. For example, anyone who left formation without being wounded was to be killed on the spot by his comrades. This strict discipline, in itself, transformed the Swiss into feared opponents who rarely pardoned enemies and expected no consideration themselves. This internalized victory-or-death principle is what made the fairly primitive tactic of mass formation so successful, especially in the Burgundian wars, because such a concept was completely foreign to the noble professional soldiers.

Usually at least two, if not three, groups were formed for a battle, because having several such formations allowed for various tactical options. For example, if one group could not advance, another could attempt to surround the enemy infantry, while the first group pinned them down. The major test for the Swiss came during the Burgundian wars.

Outcome of the Burgundian Wars. At Grandson on 2 March 1476 all the attacks of the nobles of Charles the Bold, Duke of Burgundy, failed against the first large mass formation. Even when the Burgundian field artillery fired at this target, which was not easy to miss, the Swiss warriors remained firmly in position, in spite of heavy losses, waiting for their second group to arrive on the battlefield. The failure of Charles's cavalry, and the stoic calm with which the confederated troops met his artillery, induced the duke to regroup his forces in the midst of the conflict. Just as his men were adjusting their positions, the second Swiss group arrived and threw itself at the Burgundian troops, who could no longer maintain their battle formation and fled. The battle was over before it had properly begun. Not only did the Swiss acquire all the Burgundian artillery and other weapons abandoned on the field, but they also plundered Duke Charles's entire camp of rich treasures. This went down in the annals as "Burgundy booty," which became a byword for immeasurable riches.

The mass tactics of the Swiss found further success in the particularly bloody battle of Murten on 22 June 1476, in which ten thousand Burgundian fighters fell, and in the battle near the Lorraine capital of Nancy on 5 January 1477, where Charles the Bold himself suffered an ignominious death. These victories permanently established the so-called renaissance of the infantry as the fighting force that would ultimately decide battles in the subsequent centuries. The Burgundian wars ended in 1478 with the Peace of Zurich, but then a war began with France over Charles the Bold's inheritance, which the young archduke Maximilian of Austria, later emperor, claimed as son-in-law of the fallen duke. In the armed struggle against King Louis XI of France, Maximilian reinforced his army with the self-confident urban militias of the Flemish cities, the remnants of the Burgundian army, and German mercenaries who had previously fought with the Swiss. Having learned his lesson from the Burgundian wars, Maximilian made the infantry his main weapon. He was supported and advised by Count Romont from the Neuenburg Lake region west of Bern, an experienced fighter familiar with Swiss warfare. At Guinegate on 7 August 1479, Maximilian drew up his Flemish infantry and German mercenaries in the mass formation used by the confederation. Long spear in hand, the young Habsburg went out in the first division and fought there against the French army. His personal bravery in the front line not only brought him the respect of his soldiers, but also raised him in the esteem of the infantry because of his success. He subsequently built his German mercenaries into a troop that was the equal of the Swiss in nobility of birth and was even capable of defeating them: the *landsknechte*.

[*See also* Battlewagons; Charles the Bold; Grandson, Battle of; Guinegate, Battle of; Infantry; Maximilian I; Murten, Battle of; Nancy, Battle of; Prokop the Bald; Sigismund of Luxemburg; Slavic Lands, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1500); Switzerland; *and* Žižka, Jan.]

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Translated from the German by Johanna M. Baboukis

Historiography (911–1024)

The historiography of the Ottonian military is dominated by Karl Leyser and Bernard S. Bachrach. No work can be done in the field without in some way acknowledging the influence of the ideas of these two experts. Leyser is perhaps most famous for propounding the 1968 thesis of the "Saxon military revolution," which centered on Henry I's reforms in the 920s and 930s. According to this theory, Henry I based his army around a new corps of heavily armored horsemen, who were able to close with the Hungarian horse-archers and sweep all before them. This new force was result of an innovative fortress strategy, in which the *agrarii milites*, the rural knight, was supported by the labor of the others in the garrison. This theory has the attraction of providing an explanation for much of Germany's later socio-military structure (such as the rise of the *ministeriales*, or unfree knights), while explaining how the Liudolfing dynasty achieved such remarkable successes on most fronts. However, it does not, as Charles Bowlus has observed, explain exactly how heavily armored horsemen were supposed to defeat experienced horse archers. Nor does Leyser's theory (or later theories) explain the performance of Ottonian forces against Saracen, Byzantine, and Polish forces. Edward J. Schoenfeld's 1999 article on Saxon military reforms remains an excellent summary of the intellectual background to Leyser's theory.

In 2008, Bernard and David Bachrach published an article attempting to debunk Leyser's theory, arguing instead for greater continuity with the late Carolingian empire's practice of war. Henry I's true contribution to military history, they argued, lay in his successful attempts to improve the quality of his garrison levies. This allowed him greater operational and strategic flexibility in reacting to enemy incursions, since he could then rely on local levies to hold their ground. Much of the rest of the article is devoted to rescuing the Saxons from the dubious military reputation that Leyser had claimed they possessed. Ultimately, these two accomplished scholars, while making a cogent case for the true

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nature of Henry's reforms, leave open the questions of the origins, use, and maintenance of Ottonian heavy cavalry.

The latest full-length work on the subject is by Bowlus, whose 2006 study of the battle of Lechfeld utilizes an extremely wide range of scholarship. Bowlus devotes considerable attention to the Hungarian forces and argues that the Ottonian armies relied far more on combined arms than previously thought, since heavy cavalry alone would be unable to weaken a mobile opponent. Furthermore, he makes clear that the reforms, both in cavalry and fortifications, were in fact general reforms and not solely Saxon in origin. If anything, Henry I's work signaled a return to the late Roman strategy of defense in depth.

Comparatively few German scholars have devoted so much attention to the military aspects of Ottonian Germany. Karl Ferdinand Werner's study on Ottonian military organization is the most prominent of these, while Bruno Scherff's unpublished 1985 dissertation is perhaps the most comprehensive survey to date on royal German armies through the early Salian dynasty. Gerd Althoff and Hagen Keller list the most recent German scholarship in their 2008 volume on the Ottonians in the new Gebhardt handbook series.

Many profitable areas of potential research remain in the field of Ottonian military studies, not least being a major study revisiting origin and function of the Ottonian armored horseman, or a study of Henry II's generalship. Ottonian command structures and transportation networks have also yet to be systematically examined, although David Bachrach is preparing a study of Ottonian administration, with a view to illuminating the nature of their command, financial, and logistic abilities. His 2008 article on Ottonian military organization is basic reading for this complicated issue. Ottonian siege techniques have also received less emphasis, beyond broad standard works such as Jim Bradbury's *The Medieval Siege*. Increased dialogue between history and archaeology, in the manner of Bowlus's work, should continue to yield innovative results. The religious and symbolic elements of warfare also await a general study, building on David Bachrach's recent book, *Religion and the Conduct of War*. This might include recorded acts of martial symbolism, as Sverre Bagge has recently done for kingship. Differences among various Ottonian opponents, and techniques of multifront warfare and combat doctrine, are also potentially profitable areas of future endeavor. Finally, new critical editions of Ottonian chronicles, especially a definitive translation of Widukind's work, would be of great service to students and scholars alike.

[*See also Agrarii Milites*; Henry I; Lechfeld, Battle on the; *and Ministeriales.*]

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Daniel P. Franke

Éléments sous droits d'auteur

Historiography (1024–1125)

The historical research that deals with German warfare and military history during the era of the Salian emperors especially focuses on Emperor Henry IV and his conflicts with opposition inside Germany. Hans Delbrück, concerned with the course of the battles of Homburg (1075), Mellrichstadt (1178), Flarchheim (1080), Hohenmölsen (1080), and Pleichfeld (1086), evaluates Henry IV—despite problems with lack of control over his knightly army—as one of the few medieval commanders to use real strategic and tactical thinking. Delbrück's narrow interpretation of the concept of strategy is contradicted by Wilhelm Erben, who adduces examples of well-planned military operations like Emperor Henry III's campaigns against Bohemia (1040 and 1041) and Hungary (1051), where the German king invaded the enemy country from two sides. These actions necessitated military reconnaissance, as Bruno Scherff emphasizes.

In his study concerning the armies of the Ottonian and Salian dynasties Scherff also provides a tabularization listing all warlike expeditions in and from the German lands, the participating contingents, and the battles and sieges between 919 and 1056. Csaba Szabó describes the aspiration of the Salian emperors for political influence in Hungary, and the resulting border clashes and campaigns, stressing that the Hungarians usually tried to avoid pitched battles against the better equipped and more effective German host. In contrast, Henry III sought a decisive battle in Hungary, as later did his son in his inner-German conflicts.

In his biographical survey Ian Robinson extensively describes the course of Emperor Henry IV's wars in Saxony (1073–1075) and against the antikings Rudolf of Rheinfelden (former Duke of Swabia) and Hermann of Salm (1078–1086), criticizing Henry's "unorthodox and unrewarding strategy" (p. 351). Gerd Althoff notes that Henry IV as well as his son again and again violated formal rules of conflict settlement. They sometimes refused princely intermediation between war parties, didn't abide by agreements, tried to impose hard punishment on their adversaries, and therefore lost the confidence of opposing princes. This ultimately led to a violent and long-standing escalation of the inner-German wars.

We have little information about the size of Salian armies. Karl Ferdinand Werner examines the number of mounted combatants available for Carolingian and Ottonian rulers from their vassals. Werner interprets the famous *Indiculus loricatorum* (list of ecclesiastical and secular princes of the German realm with an enumeration of armored horsemen whom they had to lead or send to reinforce Emperor Otto II's army in Italy) not as a unique requirement of troops in 981 but as a schedule of combatants whom royal officeholders had to contribute to the imperial army generally during the Salian-Hohenstaufen era. From this document Werner calculates an overall number of approximately nine thousand horsemen who had to be provided by all of the bishops, royal monasteries, dukes, counts, and other vassals of the German king for his military expeditions. Of course an imperial host never included all of these fighters at once.

During the Salian period the armies were made up not only of free knights but also of *ministeriales*. Thomas Zotz and Benjamin Arnold have investigated the advancement of these unfree warrior-servants, their social and legal status, and their administrative and military functions.

In his opus on warfare in the Middle Ages, Malte Prietzel examines the behavior of combatants before, during, and after battle. In this context he considers among others the era of the Salian emperors, which supplied him with examples of bragging, mockery, and provocation before combat and with instances of disgraceful death at the hand of persons with lower social status. Prietzel also investigated the military role of *iuvenes* (bellicose, ambitious, and therefore often young men), the meanings of battle cries, destructions, looting, mutilation, counting the dead, and holding the battleground after combat. In another study of the description of battles during Henry IV's inner-German wars, Prietzel considers the strategies of contemporary chroniclers to attribute positive-valued military actions to the side

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favored by the particular author and to delegitimize and stigmatize the identified enemy by adscription of negatively rated practices. Prietzel concludes that these stylizations make it difficult to reconstruct the exact course of battle from biased sources. Similar to Prietzel, Hanna Vollrath and Simon Karzel in their examinations of Henry IV's wars also dealt with the strategies of idealization and demonization of the belligerent parties by the writers of these chronicles.

[*See also* Henry IV; Henry V; *and Ministeriales.*]

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Martin Völkl

Historiography (1125–1250)

Since World War II, if not earlier, war and military history have ceased to be a focus of German medieval historical research. Quite generalized, not specifically focused on Germany and the Holy Roman Empire, and written from a cultural-historical perspective are the treatments of medieval warfare by Norbert Ohler, dealing with the Middle Ages as a whole without subdivisions into periods, and by Malte Prietzel, who makes a distinction between the era before 1200 and the time thereafter and treats in particular the self-image of the fighting nobility.

On the other hand, there is no dearth of modern German sociohistorical or psychological studies on the self-conception of the noble warrior caste, which in the Hohenstaufen era modeled itself on the French ideal of the knightly class. A good introduction to the most recent discussion of this subject may be found in a volume on knighthood and courtly culture under the Hohenstaufen edited by Johannes Laudage, to which the editor himself contributes a

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study on the military and pragmatic aspects of the campaigns of Frederick Barbarossa. In an anthology studying the relationship between the state and war from a constitutional historical perspective, Werner Rösener demonstrates the influence of the courtly ideal of knighthood through the comparison of knightly armies with mercenary armies. The strictly regulated rules of battle demanded by knightly ethics manifested themselves, according to this study, in the chivalrous medieval tournament as well.

A further area of research with relevance for medieval military history is the study of rituals and conflict management. In his examination of the ritualized *deditio* (surrender), for example, Gerd Althoff describes the different forms of ritual submission practiced by the northern Italian communes besieged by Frederick Barbarossa in the years 1158–1162. Raising the question of whether Barbarossa may have broken the accepted rules of armed conflict through his particularly severe treatment of the Italian cities, Wolfgang Giese has called for a systematic analysis of Frederick's warfare, using the methods developed by this school of research.

Two articles offer a good summary of earlier research and a general characterization of the military practices in the reign of the Hohenstaufen. One is by the Marxist historian Helmut Schnitter, on Frederick Barbarossa; the other is by Hans Meier-Welcker, on Frederick II.

Two specifically German historical phenomena with relevance for the study of military history have been the subject of recent German and international research. The so-called *ministeriales* (German, *Ministerialen*; often rendered in English as "unfree knights"), a social group of unfree vassal warriors who played a particular role in German feudal society, are the subject of a recent study by Jan Keupp dealing with the *ministeriales* under Barbarossa and Henry VI from a sociohistorical perspective. A somewhat older work by Benjamin Arnold also treats the military function of this social group, as, for example, in feud warfare against secular and religious powers of the empire. A second German peculiarity, the active military participation of imperial bishops under the Hohenstaufen in armed conflicts and their role as commanders of troops, has been variously interpreted. Although Timothy Reuter views the appearance of German bishops such as Rainald of Dassel or Christian of Mainz in the role of military commanders as an exception to the rule, Jan Keupp, studying the discrepancy between church norms and the military engagement of imperial bishops, has furnished numerous examples of bishops at war acting as vassals of the king and as territorial lords.

Concrete forms of military service deriving from the feudal obligations of vassals to their lords are the subject of studies by Jan-Peter Stöckel, who statistically analyzes the importance of imperial bishops in the composition of imperial armies, and by Peter Thorau, who examines the armies of Frederick II to determine the extent to which knights fulfilling their feudal military duties but also receiving payment for their service may be regarded as mercenaries. Thorau concludes that no mercenarization of the feudal system took place under Frederick II. His inquiry draws attention to the forms of remuneration for feudal military service, opening a promising field of research that has thus far been insufficiently studied.

The military activity of individual imperial figures is a further area of research that has hardly received the systematic treatment it requires. The exception is Lutz Partenheimer's work on the wars of Albert "the Bear."

An example of modern military-historical research in the era of the Hohenstaufen may be taken from a recent monograph on Barbarossa's war against Milan (1158–1162) by Holger Berwinkel. The author reconstructs the events in minute detail and explains the emperor's strategy of wasting and besieging in terms of the historical context, not only investigating the relationships between military and political strategy but also describing the various phases of a war of siege and attrition. Similar studies on warfare under the Hohenstaufen, dealing, for example, with Frederick II's conflict with the northern Italian communes, would be a valuable contribution to the history of this era.

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As an introduction to the history of military technology in the high Middle Ages, Volker Schmidtchen's contribution to the anthology, *Europäische Technik im Mittelalter 800 bis 1200*, provides an overview of the results of German research in this area. A history of the development and employment of European catapults by Mark Feuerle contains relevant information on the use of the trebuchet under Otto IV north of the Alps. Further innovations in military technology that developed in the twelfth century are dealt with by Dieter Hägermann. Nonetheless, a comprehensive and detailed treatment of the subject of high-medieval weaponry remains to be written, as does a similar work on high-medieval systems of defense and, as Leopold Auer remarked in 1982, an overview of the relevant iconographical material.

[*See also* Clergy, Roles in Warfare of; Frederick I Barbarossa; Frederick II; Italy, *subentry on* Narrative (1000–1300); Knighthood and Knights; *Ministeriales*; Otto IV; Weapons, Hand-to-Hand; *and* Weapons, Missile.]

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Historiography (1250–1415)

In examining the lines of development over the past twenty or thirty years in German research on military history from the late thirteenth to the early fifteenth centuries, one sees quickly that there has really been no development, and almost no literature worth mentioning, on this subject. The end of World War II in 1945 marked a hiatus in German research into military history. Because of the defeat, and in reaction to the Third Reich, everything military took on a negative cast. This affected not only the country's own armed forces but also any scholarly work on the subjects of war or the military. Not until the late 1990s did German medieval studies take up the subject; a generation of distance then separated the world war from the changed political situation after the reunification of Germany in 1990, which brought with it a greater involvement of German troops abroad and made war once again a fit subject for politics and research.

This belated (compared with the Anglophone research tradition) look at the subject of war resulted in Germany now having no developed field of medieval war studies in which different schools of thought could form and debates could unfold. Works of military history have been mostly individual efforts, isolated in the research landscape. Certain fields that have long been worked in English medieval studies have lain fallow in German scholarship. These include the conduct of war (tactics and strategy), recruitment, and logistics. Since many of these fields display a certain unity of development across medieval Europe, German research need not start from zero, but can build upon existing knowledge. Thus it happens that several works of research from the western European tradition rely on examples from German history—for example, J. F. Verbruggen's *The Art of Warfare in Western Europe during the Middle Ages*. This does not contain a systematic analysis of German relationships, however, and covers only the period up to 1340.

The delayed entrance of German medieval studies into war research has not only resulted in the neglect of numerous subjects; it is also responsible for the orientation of the content of research. Thus, in the most recent research, the unmistakable influence of cultural studies can be seen. It is centered not on the facts of war themselves, but on its perception, description, and interpretation by contemporaries. For the late Middle Ages, the most important works have been produced by a group of Würzburg researchers on the theme "The Image of War in the Transition from the Late Medieval to the Early Modern Period." These works include Constantin Hruschka's *Kriegsführung und Geschichtsschreibung im Spätmittelalter* (The conduct of war and the writing of history in the late Middle Ages); Christoph Heiduk, Almut Höfert, and Cord Ulrichs, *Krieg und Verbrechen nach spätmittelalterlichen Chroniken* (War and crime according to late medieval chronicles); and Sonja Kerth, *Der Landsfrid ist zerbrochen: Das Bild des Krieges in den politischen Ereignisdichtungen des 13. bis 16. Jahrhunderts* (The peace of the land is broken: the image of war in the political narrative poetry of the thirteenth to the sixteenth centuries).

To these works may be added others, not dealing exclusively with late-medieval war per se, but rather offering a general analysis of war in the history of the Middle Ages. Looking at this from the cultural-studies viewpoint is Malte Prietzel, *Kriegführung im Mittelalter: Handlungen, Erinnerungen, Bedeutungen* (The conduct of war in the Middle Ages: Actions, memories, meanings). In the late-medieval section, the author often refers to English and French wars. More fact-oriented, and intended as an overview,

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is Norbert Ohler's *Krieg und Frieden im Mittelalter* (War and peace in the Middle Ages).

Basic for technical and tactical developments in late-medieval war in Germany is Volker Schmidtchen, *Kriegswesen im späten Mittelalter: Technik, Taktik, Theorie* (Military affairs in the late Middle Ages: Technology, tactics, theory). This presents, in particular, the various weapons and theoretical concepts in great detail, but gives greatest attention to the fifteenth century.

Certain monographs deal with particular commanders or battles, such as Ulrich Lehnart, *Die Schlacht von Worringen 1288* (The battle of Worringen 1288). Apart from these, one must turn to older research. This does deal with the questions of military history covered in this encyclopedia, but does not reflect modern research. It includes the classic pre-1945 German military histories: Hans Delbrück, *History of the Art of War*, vol. 3, *The Middle Ages*; and Wilhelm Erben, *Kriegsgeschichte des Mittelalters* (Military history of the Middle Ages). These works have the advantage of hewing closely to the medieval sources, so that they still offer a good foundation for any work on late-medieval wars.

[*See also* Britain, *subentry on* Historiography (1300–1500); Italy, *subentry on* Historiography (1300–1493); *and* Low Countries, *subentry on* Historiography (1300–1479).]

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Historiography (1415–1493)

All research into war and warfare in fifteenth-century Germany inevitably faces two major problems. First, war and military matters became highly unpopular topics for German historiography—especially for medieval studies—in the aftermath of World War II. Accordingly, German historiography remains rather sketchy in this field of study, compared with other similar research in western Europe. Second, studies into Germany's fifteenth-century history have long been dominated by regional historical research; therefore, late-medieval wars and feuds were seen as regional or even local events rather than being placed in the broader context of German history.

This implies that not only works on regional or local history need to be consulted for information about particular late-medieval German wars, but usually also older literature of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—for example, Köhler's survey of the military history of the period, Rathgen's work on gunpowder artillery, or Frauenholz's comprehensive studies on the beginnings of German mercenaries. These works are often unhelpful for modern research, as they typically are written from a rather narrow nation-state perspective emphasizing the connection between war and the state.

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During the second half of the twentieth century, German historiography has for the most part left modern questions and issues of medieval military history to French and English historians. Their results have long been considered important reference points in Germany, although there are evident historical differences between fifteenth-century central Europe and western Europe.

Since the 1980s, studies in early modern German history have slowly opened up to military history and—as with western European historical studies—to its social, economic, and cultural aspects, including study of gender roles and psychological elements. German medievalists followed the lead of Anglophone and French researchers, particularly in their work on the transition period of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Important examples are Volker Schmidtchen's studies of military technology, Werner Paravicini's works on chivalric culture, and the interdisciplinary collections edited by Horst Brunner. They found a solid footing in Germany's traditionally diligent studies in local history and in the huge available source material, such as urban governments' financial accounts and administrative documents of late-medieval times. The latter allowed further research into municipal administration and financing of warfare (see, for example, Wübbeke and Fouquet).

Similarly, regional historians used the abundant source material of territorial accounts to analyze war, finances, and administration, accentuating social, economic, and cultural aspects. In the early twenty-first century this research has generated several works on the logistics and theory of late-medieval warfare and on the organization and finances of late-medieval armies and mercenaries. Among the most noteworthy of these are Leng's study of late-medieval German military theory, Zeilinger's book on everyday life in war, and Tresp's volume on Bohemian mercenaries in Germany, showing in detail the recruitment, organization, and administration of mercenary armies by the German princes.

Traditionally, German research into medieval theological and legal reasoning devoted some attention to military issues, particularly regarding the rationales used to legitimate wars and military actions. Recent historical and literary studies analyzing the perception of feud and war in late-medieval chronicles, particularly the works of Kerth and certain essays in Brunner's collections, benefited from this tradition and refined basic approaches of microhistory as well as attitudes toward war and law.

Another specifically German field of historiography, research on the German Order (the "Teutonic Knights") in Prussia, has continued almost without respite after 1945, although with certain ideological reservations. In the early 2000s Polish research in this field has initiated a somewhat broader approach, which has led to more international cooperation. Comparatively rich source material has allowed productive research into mercenary forces, tactics, and logistics of late-medieval armies, as well as studies into the culture and mentality of belligerent nobility, as evident in the works of Ekdahl and Paravicini.

Since the 1990s these works have correlated with a new impulse in German studies of chivalry, discussing aristocratic self-conception as professional warriors. Research focuses on aspects of group formation, tournaments, and the interaction between noble mentality and the use of force in the course of war and feuds. Some recent examples are the studies of Bach and Rabeler.

In a number of fields the quality of German historiography has meanwhile caught up with standards of western European and American research, although it has not yet achieved comparable quantity. Several promising approaches need to be pursued in order to free the history of battles and wars in Germany from its confinement in regional history. As German medieval studies are currently highly differentiated, it appears desirable above all for specialists in medieval history to pool efforts and research with experts in military history in order to achieve a complete systematic or comparative description of war and society in late-medieval Germany.

Fifteenth-century Germany in particular, with its host of great and far-reaching acts of war, still offers scope for further projects and studies, as recent

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works on cultural history or history of mentalities in war have shown. Above all it must be borne in mind that wars such as those against the Bohemian Hussites, Duke Charles the Bold of Burgundy, the great wars among the German princes, or those of the Teutonic Knights around the middle of the century were no less intense or less significant than the Hundred Years' War and deserve to come out of their historical shadow.

[*See also* Britain, *subentry on* Historiography (1300–1500); Charles the Bold; France, *subentry on* Historiography (1328–1483); Hundred Years' War; Hungary, *subentry on* Historiography (1300–1526); Italy, *subentry on* Historiography (1300–1493); Low Countries, *subentry on* Historiography (1300–1479); Mercenaries; Orders, Military, *subentry on* Northern Orders; Nobility; *and* Tournaments and Jousts.]

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Telif hakkı olan materyal

GIBRALTAR, SIEGES OF (1309, 1333, AND 1350)

Because of its location, Gibraltar served as both an entrance into the Iberian Peninsula and a base from which to patrol maritime traffic through the Straits. This made its possession a matter of fundamental strategic importance. By 1300 the port was under the control of the Marinids, who used it not only to transfer soldiers and supplies across the Straits, but also as a base from which to harass Christian vessels and to launch raids into Castilian Andalusia. Gibraltar's natural geography gave it the high ground against any enemy approaching from land. This natural advantage was enhanced by its fortifications, which were built and expanded alternately by its Muslim and Christian overlords.

In 1309 Fernando IV of Castile (r. 1295–1309) and the king of Aragon coordinated their efforts, with the former besieging Algeciras and the latter Almería. Fernando funded the operation, which involved mobilizing both a fleet and an army, partly through the extraordinary collection of five *servicios* (levies). While attempting to reduce Algeciras, the Castilian king, perhaps sensing Gibraltar was vulnerable, sent some of his forces along with two siege engines to place it under siege. The garrison cracked under the pressure and negotiated its surrender. Upon entering the city, the Castilian monarch had its walls repaired and ordered that a new, more protected shipyard be built before returning to his camp at Algeciras. Although the joint campaign was unsuccessful, Fernando's capture of Gibraltar kept it from being a total loss.

For the next twenty-four years Gibraltar remained an embattled Christian outpost in the midst of a Muslim area. It was perennially underdefended and undersupplied owing to Castile's lack of a permanent fleet. The travails endured during the minority and early adult years of Alfonso XI (r. 1312–1350) further isolated it.

In 1332, Morocco started a steady transfer of soldiers into Algeciras coordinated by the Moroccan crown prince, Abu Malik. The Castilian monarch was concerned but could do little, as he was occupied with rebellions led by the magnates Don Juan Manuel and Don Juan Nuñez de Lara. By February 1333 the Moroccan forces had moved against Gibraltar, completely surrounding it and even occupying its shipyards. In addition, they submitted it to a constant artillery barrage, using two siege engines. To make matters worse, Gibraltar had only about one month's worth of supplies. Alfonso ordered local nobles to head to the city's defense. Yet this by itself proved to be difficult since the Granadan ruler, Muhammad IV (r. 1325–1333), laid siege to Castro, near Córdoba. Although his efforts proved fruitless, his armies kept the Christian armies occupied instead of aiding Gibraltar.

By June 1333, with Alfonso desperately trying to assemble a relief force and the city having endured for five months, the situation at Gibraltar had reached a critical point. Supplies were so low, the sources state, that many of the city's residents were reduced to eating boiled leather strips. The Castilian admiral Juan Jofre Tenorio, in a last-ditch effort to supply Gibraltar, mounted trebuchets on ships and launched sacks of grain toward the city walls. While some flew across the walls, most ended up in the hands of the besiegers. Vasco Perez de Meyra, Gibraltar's castellan, faced with a hopeless situation, surrendered the city and its defenses in return for safe passage for all Christians.

When Alfonso arrived, the events had changed his relief operation into a siege. He encamped his armies near the city and attempted to surround it from both land and sea. The difficult operation took its toll on both sides as, according to the chronicles, the Christians used six engines to constantly bombard the city and attempted to mine Gibraltar's walls. In the end, the Muslims were able to drive them away. Alfonso then found himself threatened by armies from Algeciras, Granada, and some Castilian nobles. This intolerable situation, made worse by the lack of supplies in the Christian camp, forced the Castilian king to abandon the operation after less than a month and sign truces with both the Moroccans and the Granadans.

The sting of losing Gibraltar never left Alfonso who, five years after the capture of Algeciras,

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launched a crusade to recover it in August 1349. He funded the operation through three extraordinary levies, shares of ecclesiastical income granted by the papacy, and the sale of some royal lands. Once the siege had begun, the Gibraltar garrison found itself in dire straits because a civil war in northern Africa prevented Abu al-Hasan (r. 1331–1351) from relieving it. Even so, the eight-month operation came to an inauspicious end, because a bubonic plague outbreak decimated the Castilians. Alfonso stubbornly refused to lift the siege, became infected with the disease, and died on 25 March 1350. Gibraltar would not be conquered by the Christians until 1462.

[*See also* Alfonso XI of Castile; Algeciras, Sieges of; *and* Iberia, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1500).]

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GIBRALTAR, SIEGE OF (1462)

Situated on the European side of the Strait of Gibraltar, the city of Gibraltar, throughout the Middle Ages, had enormous strategic importance for control over the passage of armies between Africa and the Iberian Peninsula. The Castilian monarchy had attempted its conquest several times: taking it in 1309 only to lose it again in 1333; unsuccessfully attacking it in 1333, 1349–1350, and again in 1426; and finally annexing it in August of 1462.

The factors that allowed its conquest were essentially based on treason and the element of surprise. A Muslim from Gibraltar, who had converted to Christianity, alerted the Castilians that a large contingent of the garrison had marched off temporarily, leaving the city defenseless. Neighboring Christian cities, as well as the Count of Arcos and the Duke of Medina Sidonia (the two most powerful noblemen of the region), were quickly notified and in a short period of time penetrated the city with little armed resistance. The scarce number of defenders for Gibraltar took refuge in the fortress, and after a few days surrendered to the Duke of Medina Sidonia after negotiating an agreement that would allow all Muslims to abandon the fortress unharmed with their belongings.

The Castilian conquerors barely engaged in battle with the Muslims, nor did they find any need for siege weaponry. The greatest danger lay in the chance that the contingent forces under the Count of Arcos and the Duke of Medina Sidonia would face off in battle for the control of the city. A conflict did not arise among the Christian forces, however, and the city of Gibraltar finally came under the control of the Castilian king Enrique IV (r. 1454–1474).

[*See also* Gibraltar, Sieges of (1309, 1333, and 1350) *and* Iberia, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1500).]

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GILBERT OF MONS

(c.1140/50–1225), Flemish chronicler. Gilbert worked at the court of the counts of Hainaut and about 1178 became chancellor to Baldwin V of Hainaut (r. 1171–1195) for the remainder of his reign. Immediately after his retirement, Gilbert wrote the *Chronicle of Hainaut*, which originated as a tribute to his dead master but became a general history of the county

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from the mid-eleventh century to the end of the twelfth. He based his work on his own recollections and on the records of the county, making it very valuable for the history of the Low Countries. Gilbert was at the center of affairs in a principality that was at the heart of European diplomacy in the twelfth century, for his master was a vassal of the German emperors Frederick I (r. 1152–1190) and Henry VI (r. 1190–1197) and of the French king Philip II Augustus (r. 1180–1223), who married his daughter Elizabeth (Isabelle). Although he was a cleric, Gilbert was well versed in military matters.

In 1184 Count Baldwin V was attacked by an alliance of Flanders, Louvain, and Cologne, and Gilbert describes in detail how he devastated the land to deny his enemies food and retreated to his castles, deploying three hundred mercenary knights and three thousand mercenary sergeants along with three hundred unpaid knights who received rations only, to bolster the loyalty of his vassals. The war was concentrated between All Saints' Day and Christmas 1184, but it became caught up in the wider interests of the French conflict and stuttered to an end only in 1185. Devastation in the county was immense, and the count was left in debt to the amount of forty-one thousand Valenciennes pounds, which he had to clear by heavy taxation. This is only one of many snapshots in the *Chronicle of Hainaut* that bring us face to face with the realities of warfare in the twelfth century.

[*See also* Frederick I Barbarossa; Henry VI; *and* Philip II.]

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GŁOGÓW, SIEGE OF

When Prince Zbigniew was deposed as co-ruler of Poland by his younger stepbrother Prince Bolesław "Krzywousty" (Wry-Mouthed), he sought help from King Henry V of Germany, who came to his aid with a huge army of about ten thousand warriors, supported by two thousand Czechs led by Prince Svatopluk. The army proceeded along the left bank of the River Oder, trying to cross it, until they reached Głogów (Glogau, Silesia), where they were able to do so.

The Polish stronghold of Głogów fulfilled a defensive role as it was between two rivers, the Oder and the Barycz. Prince Bolesław sent a detachment to prevent the enemy from crossing the river, but on 24 August 1109, Bolesław's military camp was attacked unexpectedly while inhabitants of the stronghold were attending mass at a church inside the walls. The Germans seized the Polish camp and plundered the tents. They also captured as many people as could not find shelter in the stronghold. Henry did not assault the stronghold but started to negotiate with its inhabitants. He granted them a five-day truce in which to seek Bolesław's permission to surrender. Bolesław, however, threatened Głogów's defenders with the death penalty if they gave up their city. Meanwhile, the defenses of Głogów were improved, and the prince's troops blocked the riverbed and its banks.

After five days Henry attacked the stronghold. Although (according to the Anonymus Gallus) the king had promised to return the town's hostages at the end of the truce period, he instead tied them to his siege engines, hoping to deter the defenders from shooting at them. The Germans used throwing engines, battering rams, and siege turrets. The defenders replied with their own engines, reportedly casting huge millstones, sharpened stakes, and wheels with metal blades. The bravery of the defenders made Henry V abandon the assault.

There were also some problems with the provision of food, as Bolesław Krzywousty, lurking nearby, destroyed the detachments that tried to supply the food for the army and fodder for horses. About 15 September, Henry V broke off the siege and advanced toward Wrocław along the Oder. He was subsequently defeated by Bolesław in the battle of Psie Pole.

Material com direitos autorais

[*See also* Germany, *subentry on* Narrative (1024–1125); Henry V; Psie Pole, Battle of; Siege Warfare, *subentry on* Tactics and Technology; *and* Slavic Lands, *subentry on* Narrative (1000–1300).]

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GLYN DŴR, OWAIN

(c. 1359–c. 1416), styled Prince of Wales in 1400. Of princely lineage in Powys and Cardiganshire, he was proclaimed prince by family and friends at his house at Glyndyfrdwy on 16 September 1400 and thereafter waged war in rebellion against King Henry IV. The revolt's causes included Owain's personal quarrel with the marcher lord of Ruthin, Reginald Grey, as well as social and political resentment of English rule that was felt more broadly. Yet the revolt divided Welsh opinion in town and country and, with no tradition of centralized rule in Wales, it was far from being a national uprising. Starting within a year of Henry IV's usurpation of the English throne (1399), it was the most serious and long-lasting threat to his new dynasty: Henry himself led three expeditions to Wales (1400–1403), and his son Henry, created Prince of Wales in 1399 (and later Henry V), was heavily involved against the rebels from 1403. Owain's strategy was to link with other enemies of Henry IV, especially the Percys, and his objectives were clarified by 1405–1406 when he formulated ambitious plans for an independent and enlarged Welsh principality and church (with two universities).

The initiative was taken by Owain in September 1400, when he and several hundred kinsmen and supporters attacked the borough of Ruthin and other towns in northeast Wales. His service at Berwick in the 1380s with the Earl of Arundel, a neighboring marcher lord, had familiarized him with Scottish raiding, and after 1400 he made lightning attacks and used guerrilla tactics that were effective in mountainous north Wales. Even Conwy Castle was briefly captured in 1401 before descents were made into mid- and southern Wales, where the castles of Harlech, Aberystwyth, and Carmarthen were seized and held for extended periods. He sought allies in Ireland, Scotland, and especially France, and recognition from the Avignon pope. But the balance of military advantage soon shifted in favor of the crown, and the revolt was gradually suppressed. The military and financial infrastructure available to Owain was primitive; he did not have command of the sea nor does he appear to have used cannons for his sieges (one of the longest, at Coity in Glamorgan in 1404–1405, was unsuccessful). At no time did he securely control south Wales, and it is unclear how numerous were his supporters.

By contrast, Henry IV commanded greater financial and human resources: he could draw ships and supplies from Bristol and west country ports; such border towns as Chester, Worcester, and Hereford acted as bases for English armies recruited in neighboring counties and offered access to central Wales from the English lowlands; and the king had cannons and gunpowder from London and Bristol workshops. Armed encounters were more often in the nature of Welsh raids and ambushes rather than battles, and burning and destruction are more commonly noted by (generally hostile) chroniclers than chivalric episodes. By 1406 the rebellion had passed its peak and by 1409 was petering out. Owain was never captured: he is thought to have died in hiding before 1417 when his son Maredudd was offered a pardon.

[*See also* Britain: Narrative (1300–1500).]

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GODFRED

(d. 810). Godfred is the first Danish king of whom we know a little more than just the name. A king "Godfredus" is mentioned in the Royal Frankish Annals as challenging Carolingian forces in 804 and building a rampart stretching from the North Sea to the Baltic, although earthworks had been erected in this area since the Iron Age. The rampart, the Danevirke, formed a military boundary against the Danes' German (Prussian) neighbors up to the mid-nineteenth century. It is likely that some early Viking raids, such as that on Lindisfarne (northeast England) in 793, were caused by the fallout from Godfred's attempt at unifying the peoples of Jutland and the closer islands into a single polity.

In 808 Godfred's forces moved against the Slavic trading port of Reric (still unidentified) and sacked it. Aside from the immediate military injury caused by this opportunistic assault, Godfred astutely inflicted economic damage on his rivals by forcefully removing the merchants from Reric and settling them at the newly founded Danish trading port of Haithabu (now Hedeby in Schleswig).

By 808 Charlemagne's forces extended their subject territory to the Danevirke, which the Danes stoutly defended. A treaty negotiated between Godfred and Charlemagne, guaranteed by Danish hostages taken to Aix-la-Chapelle (Aachen), fixed the Danish border at the River Eider. Some minor raiding of Frisia took place in 810, but later that year the king died. Godfred's legacy was important in that he managed to establish Danish military power as a considerable threat to Carolingian dominance of the north and to embed his kingdom into the trading network of western Europe.

[*See also* Baltics, *subentry on* Narrative (500–1300); Britain, *subentry on* Narrative (500–1000); Charlemagne; *and* Franks, Carolingian, *subentry on* Narrative (751–899).]

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GODFREY OF BOUILLON

(c. 1060–1100), Duke of Lower Lotharingia (1087–1100) and ruler of the Kingdom of Jerusalem (1099–1100). Godfrey was regarded in the Middle Ages as an epitome of knighthood, celebrated in romances, and counted as one of that select chivalric pantheon known as the Nine Worthies.

Godfrey's contemporary reputation—and most of what we know of him as a soldier—derives from his exploits as one of the leaders of the First Crusade (1095–1099), although by then he already had acquired over two decades of military experience in defending his ancestral lands from hostile powers. He commanded an army of crusaders from Lotharingia, northeastern France, and western Germany, which he led to Constantinople without incident, and attracted additional followers after joining the combined crusade armies there. As a commander, he was competent and energetic if unadventurous, and shrewdly loaned troops to his brother Baldwin (later king of Jerusalem), who used them to conquer the region around Edessa (modern-day Şanlıurfa, Turkey) from the Turks. His courage was undoubted: he was regularly in the forefront of battle and once single-handedly saved a fellow pilgrim attacked by a bear. In July 1099 he commanded the siege tower that made the breakthrough into Jerusalem, and was one of the first to leap onto the city walls to confront the enemy. His valor and personal piety endeared him to the crusader rank and file and helped secure his election as

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ruler of Jerusalem with the title Defender of the Holy Sepulchre.

Left with only three hundred knights and two thousand foot soldiers after the completion of the crusade, Godfrey worked tirelessly to defend his new kingdom against the surrounding Muslim powers, defeating a Fatimid invasion at Ascalon (12 August 1099) and establishing control over central Palestine before his premature death through illness.

[*See also* Ascalon, Battle of; Crusades, *subentries on* Sources (1095–1183), Narrative (1095–1183), *and* Historiography (1095–1183); *and* Fatimids.]

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GOLDEN HORDE

Golden Horde is the name of the western successor state to the Great Mongol Empire founded by Genghis Khan (d. 1227) that existed from 1259 to 1419. The appellation "Golden Horde" cropped up in sixteenth-century Russian sources and was used retrospectively thereafter in modern scholarship.

Originally, it consisted of Khwarezm and the territories west of the Irtysh that Genghis bequeathed to his eldest son Jochi (d. 1227). Jochi's would-be realm (in Russian *Dzhuchiev ulus*) was actually realized by the conquests of Jochi's second son Batu (d. 1255), who, following the decision of the Mongol imperial council (*quriltai*), during the great western campaign from 1236 to 1241 crushed the Volga Bulgarian state, the Kipchak-Cuman tribal confederation, and invaded the Russian principalities of Poland and Hungary. After the Great Khan Möngke's death in 1259, the Golden Horde seceded from the Mongol Empire.

The state and society of the Golden Horde were composed of distinct parts: in addition to nomadic Turco-Mongol warriors, tradesmen and an urban population were also very much present, especially in the capitals of Saray and Saray al-Jadidah on the Volga. Batu's brother and his successor, Berke (r. 1257–1267), forged a long-standing alliance with the Egyptian Mamluks against their common enemy, the Il-Khans of Persia. During Özbek Khan's long reign (1313–1341), Islam became the official state religion and the Golden Horde reached its apogee in terms of wealth, trade, influence, and military might. But after his death, a decline began and beyond 1359 the Golden Horde fell prey to a long period of anarchy.

Toqtamish Khan (r. 1379–1391, 1392–1395) brought back former greatness, but in the 1390s the Turkic conqueror of Central Asia, Timur (also known as Tamerlane, r. 1369–1404), devastated the flourishing cities and trade routes, which never fully recovered. After the warlord Edigü's death in 1419, the Horde dissolved into separate entities (Kazan, Kasimov, Crimea, Astrakhan, Siberia, the Nogai Horde, and the Great Horde).

[*See also* Mamluks *and* Mongols.]

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GOURNAY, SIEGE AND COMBAT OF

The siege of Gournay occurred within the context of several dynamics. The future Louis VI (Louis the Fat, r. 1108–1137) was already acting as de facto monarch in the royal domains around Paris, working to bring the Île-de-France's independent-minded castellans to heel. In addition, Louis was enmeshed in the web of powerful families whose support was necessary to the early Capetians; in this regard, he had been betrothed years before to Guy de Rochefort's daughter.

When Pope Paschal II (r. 1099–1118) declared Louis's future marriage invalid on grounds of consanguinity on 23 May 1107, the Rochefort clan saw its downfall being engineered in this action, either by the prince-king or his new allies, the Garlandes. Perhaps this assumption was why Hugh de Créci, seneschal of France and son of Guy de Rochefort, soon thereafter attacked merchants on a royal highway from his castle at Gournay. Louis's biographer Suger presents the future king as incensed by this insult to royal authority, but it was also a golden opportunity to augment royal power.

Louis moved in on Gournay quickly to forestall its being supplied for a long siege. He began the investment by crossing the Marne and seizing an islet below the castle. He prepared a two-fold assault: one part by men in river boats who kept their full gear; another part by infantry and cavalrymen who stripped for the crossing. Louis, "boldly entering the river himself," led the attack, although Suger does not tell us how far his undress went. The landing was hotly contested as defenders used rocks, lances, stakes, and missile fire to ward off Louis's troops. Eventually, enough boats beached to result in hand-to-hand fighting, and the defenders withdrew into the castle.

Not wanting a protracted siege, Louis led an assault up the slopes against the oak palisade. He and his troops crossed the swift stream that acted as a moat and reached the wall but were repulsed, some of his men being hurled back down the slope into the river.

Next, Louis constructed a siege tower of three stories. The tower allowed his archers to lay down suppressing fire, which the defenders avoided by creating dugouts and awaiting actual assaults. When those occurred, they used long staves to upset the tower's drawbridge and tumble attackers into prepared pits below.

Weeks of blockade followed while Guy de Rochefort found an ally in Theobald of Champagne, who led a force to the castle's relief. Guy joined him with troops and provisions to send in to his son. Louis knew of their approach and, without breaking his camp before Gournay, went east to meet the new threat. A sharp fight ensued, beginning with a cavalry charge but quickly involving all of Louis's infantry and bowmen. Suger claimed that Theobald was one of the first to flee. With the relief force vanquished, Louis had little trouble inducing the garrison to surrender; the defenders were banished and the Garlandes took custody of the fortress.

[*See also* Louis VI *and* Suger of Saint-Denis.]

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GRANADA, SIEGE OF

Between the years 1482 and 1492 the Catholic Monarchs Isabella I of Castile (r. 1474–1504) and

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Ferdinand II of Aragon (r. 1479–1516) conquered the last bastions of the Islamic world left on the Iberian Peninsula when they invaded the Nasrid kingdom of Granada. By besieging the large cities and fortresses of Granada throughout the decade, the Christians captured Alhama, Ronda, Loja, Malaga, Baza, and Almería. At the beginning of 1490 the truncated Muslim kingdom found itself isolated and with little chance of fending off a siege against its capital city, Granada. Handing over control of the city to the Castilians had been initially agreed upon with Muhammad XI (r. 1482–1492), known to the Spanish as Boabdil, who finally reneged on his agreement, and in the first months of that year the Catholic Monarchs initiated military preparations while Granada carried out some offensives.

The Castilians began siege operations in April 1491 by setting up their camps in such a way as to cordon off the city. Then in July they erected in front of Granada a new city, Santa Fe, which served as a permanent base to house Christian troops and further isolate the capital. While some minor skirmishes took place, no artillery was employed or attacks carried out. The strategy implemented by the Catholic Monarchs was not so much based on the use of force as it was on the economic weakening of the city's inhabitants. They expected that hunger would force the Muslims to negotiate asurrender without the need for the use of massive military resources.

The plan was successful, and in August negotiations were under way for a surrender. This took place on 25 November when "capitulations" were signed. In this agreement, the sultan of Granada promised to surrender to the Catholic Monarchs the city, its palatial fortress—known as the Alhambra—and the remaining territories still under his control, as well as to release the Christian prisoners held in their city.

For their part, Isabella and Ferdinand granted their enemy some important concessions. They gave Boabdil lordship over lands near the city along with a significant sum of money, while they spared the lives of the Muslim inhabitants, guaranteeing them their freedom, possessions, property, economic livelihood, and religious practices. The Granadan population was also pardoned for any crimes they had committed and were allowed to keep their horses and weapons, with the exception of firearms. Those who chose to migrate to North Africa were issued safe conduct and were given the freedom to return within three years. Granada's inhabitants who had been captured previously and were living like slaves in Christian cities were to be set free after payment of an indemnity to their owners.

On the night of 1 January 1492 a few officers and troops in the service of the Catholic Monarchs entered the Alhambra and by daybreak had taken possession of its palatial grounds. Five days later, on 6 January 1492, Isabella and Ferdinand, along with their army, entered the last Islamic capital that remained on the Iberian peninsula.

[*See also* Catholic Monarchs, The; Iberia, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1500); Setenil, Sieges of; Toro, Battle of; *and* Zahara, Sieges of.]

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GRANDSON, BATTLE OF

At the beginning of 1476, Charles the Bold, Duke of Burgundy, launched a campaign against the Swiss Confederates and their allies, who had preemptively occupied a number of fortresses in the Vaud region. The duke, having assembled his army in Franche-Comté, crossed the Jura Mountains through the pass at Jougne between 8 and 12 February 1476.

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He probably had twenty thousand fighters, about 40 percent of whom were foot soldiers. A portion of these warriors belonged to the compagnies d'ordonnance (companies of the ordinance), including the Italian companies, and another part was composed of contingents levied on a feudal basis in the duchy and the county of Burgundy. The duke's artillery was sizable, probably containing several hundred pieces.

Once past the mountains, Charles headed toward Neuchâtel and, along the way, he besieged the town and castle of Grandson, occupied by a garrison from Bern. The siege lasted from 19 to 28 February, on which date the besieged forces surrendered unconditionally and were executed. On 1 March, the duke decided to resume his march on Neuchâtel, where he had learned that the Swiss army had gathered. He left the castle of Vaumarcus, about seven miles (twelve kilometers) from Grandson, occupied by four hundred men-at-arms and archers. His idea was to bait the enemy in order to draw it out and force it to fight. The next day, 2 March, the bulk of the Burgundian army left its camp at Grandson and set off on the road along Lake Neuchâtel.

At the same time, the Swiss were moving in the direction of Grandson. Their army was composed of about fifteen to twenty thousand infantry—pikemen, halberdiers, and crossbowmen—but no cavalry. It was split into two corps. A strong vanguard of probably about eight thousand men was several hours ahead of the main body. The Confederates' first objective was Vaumarcus, where the garrison resisted. But then, nearby, came the first clash between the Swiss advance troops and the Burgundian reconnaissance group. Abandoning Vaumarcus to pursue the enemy, which had withdrawn, the Confederate vanguard ran into the army of the duke of Burgundy, three miles (five kilometers) from Grandson, near the village of Concise. Charles, whose troops were in marching order, reacted quickly: he rallied his troops, deployed his artillery, and launched an attack led by a corps of mounted men-at-arms flanked by archers on foot. The Swiss took up a defensive formation, a compact square formed of four rows of men with long pikes, with halberdiers in the center and flanked by units of crossbowmen. When the Burgundian cavalry retreated, after two successive charges that had somewhat broken the opposing formation, the arrival of the Confederates' main body on the battlefield threw the Burgundian army into confusion.

The unexpected appearance of this new enemy formation, accompanied by the unaccustomed sound of the Swiss war trumpets, created insuppressible panic in the ranks of the duke of Burgundy's forces. His efforts to control the situation were in vain. His entire army, most of whom had not yet even engaged, broke up and fled. The precipitous retreat did not stop at the Grandson camp, which was abandoned to the enemy. The Swiss, lacking cavalry, could only pursue the fleeing troops without causing them any significant losses; the Burgundians probably lost fewer than a thousand men in this unfinished battle. On the other hand, the spoils taken by the victors were considerable. Besides the jewels, tapestries, fine fabrics, and gold and silver coins that the Swiss found in the Burgundian camp, they also seized all of the duke's artillery (probably more than two hundred pieces); hundreds of wagons, tents, and pavilions; and large stocks of weapons, ammunition, and supplies.

[*See also* Charles the Bold; Compagnies d'Ordonnance; *and* Switzerland, *subentry on* Narrative.]

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GRAVE, SIEGE OF

William I, Duke of Guelders, desired to regain the lands of Millen, Gangelt, and Waldfeucht, seigniories

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within the duchy of Jülich that formed a defensive line protecting the lands of Outre-Meuse. In 1385 he attacked the north of Brabant, which began the second war of Guelders (1385–1390). The town of Grave was a strategic point. Situated on the banks of the Meuse, it provided easy access to invade the neighboring territories. The castellan, a vassal of Brabant, was in a difficult position because his son was engaged to a daughter of the Duke of Guelders. In an effort to avoid offending anyone, the castellan proposed to allow twenty-five Brabançons to enter and protect the town on the condition that the town not be used as a base for raids into Guelders. His son then imprisoned him and let the Guelders forces into the town. The duchy of Brabant had suffered an important setback, and the recovery of Grave was the Brabançons' major objective for the rest of the war.

The first siege of Grave began at the start of October 1386 and lasted twenty days. Because Duke William had had time to fortify and provision the town, the defenders resisted the assault valiantly. The siege lengthened, and the militias complained of the passivity of the commanders, grumbled against the nobles, and threatened to raise the siege. William, surprised by the rapid counterattack and by the size of the forces involved, decided to negotiate, and an armistice was concluded. Having no intention of abandoning Grave, however, he reinforced the town once the Brabançons left and refused to free his prisoners.

In May 1388 a large number of Brabançon troops were gathered. This army must have been impressive, because William immediately offered to surrender Grave. The leaders of the Brabançon army accepted the offer, while certain militia commanders demanded that William defray the costs of the expedition. Negotiations turned hostile, and William decided to defend the town.

At the start of June the Brabançons besieged Grave once more. Their morale rapidly diminished as the town held out despite violent fighting. They decided to encircle the town completely so as to cut off communication between Grave and Nijmegen and to prevent supplies from reaching the town. The Brabançons began to build a bridge that would allow them to control both banks of the Meuse. The Guelders forces, however, destroyed the bridge before it was finished.

The Brabançons then decided to cross the river by the bridge at Ravenstein. On 27 June they crossed the bridge but, disobeying orders, pillaged the surrounding area. When William and his men-at-arms appeared, there was panic. The massacre lasted almost two hours. When the survivors reached camp, there was a general rout as the Brabançons feared the advance of the enemy knights. The war continued until 1390, but because military operations were held mainly on other fronts, Grave did not undergo further sieges.

[*See also* Brabançons *and* Low Countries, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1479).]

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GREAT COMPANIES

The Great Companies phenomenon (1360–1369) arose from the massive use of mercenaries by the various warring nations during the first phase of the Hundred Years' War. These professional soldiers came from every corner of western Europe; however, based upon the origin of their leaders, the majority were southern Frenchmen, Englishmen, or Bretons. Socially speaking, the same diversity was also found; the captains included members of the lower nobility—Seguin de Badefol, for example—bastards of the great noble families, such as Bertucat d'Albret, and even former valets, such as Petit Meschin and William Hugate.

Materiał chroniony prawem autorskim

The Early Years. Prior to 1360, Edward III, King of England, led his soldiers in a war that mainly consisted of devastating mounted raids. One of the primary goals of these *chevaucheés* was to damage the economy and weaken the French subjects' confidence in their king by ravaging the countryside and burning down villages. His troops thus formed the habit of using certain modes of warfare, of which pillaging and robbery were integral parts, and not merely incidental. What is more, with the same goal in mind, the English ruler chose to allow some relatively autonomous bands to do as they pleased; not bound to him by contract, they installed themselves here and there on French territory to wage their own war on his behalf. After the French defeat at the battle of Poitiers in 1356, these bands preyed on the French king's vulnerability and on Edward III's resolve to further weaken France in order to intensify their marauding by ruining crops, extorting money from the rural populations, and forcing entire villages to pay them protection money. Thus, when the French and English kings signed the Treaty of Brétigny in 1360, France was plagued by thousands of routiers carrying out pillaging campaigns for no other reason than personal gain, under the orders of leaders who more or less could do whatever they liked because they enjoyed legal immunity. Opposing French forces were highly fragmented in their efforts to defend each province and town, and therefore unable to mount a united front against them.

All of these routiers could scarcely consider giving up their activities. For the common mercenary soldiers, war and adventure was often the means to leave behind unenviable lives. At the same time they enabled their captains, particularly those of middle or low birth, to earn a living as professional soldiers like the great nobles and to sometimes even be accepted into their circle. Few routiers were willing to give up their positions, and a man like Arnaud de Cervolle was unlikely to choose to survive instead on his meager private income and to urge his men to resume their lives as artisans or valets.

When they joined forces once again, after 1360, they resentfully dubbed themselves the "Tard-Venus"—meaning those who came late, after the time of devastation authorized by the war—or the "Adventurers"—referring to the "adventure" as a type of war in which the goal was to gain riches by any means possible. Ultimately, they simply called themselves companions, as the members of "companies," which at that time meant groups with a strong sense of solidarity and with a subversive connotation. Wishing to stress their large numbers so as to more deeply impress their contemporaries, they dubbed them "Great Companies."

Circumstances greatly favored their activities. In fact, although the French and English kings were no longer involved in direct warfare, several peripheral conflicts were still going on in which professional soldiers were very much in demand: Brittany's War of Succession, the Franco-Navarrese war in Normandy, and the feud between counts of Foix and Armagnac in southwest France. Finally, since the French king's power was declining, the routier captains faced little opposition in pursuing their misdeeds in territories that they had formed the habit of ravaging in prior years.

Meanderings. By virtue of the Treaty of Brétigny in the summer of 1360, Edward III initiated the order to evacuate the territories that he was holding in France, the first consequence of which was to regroup the then-unemployed soldiers into several Great Companies in the northeast corner of the French kingdom. By that fall, the latter were heading south, looting everything in their path, and seizing Pont-Saint-Esprit, which was a strategic crossing point on the Rhone River. Their number then kept on growing, which induced the pope, secluded behind the walls of Avignon, to negotiate their departure after failing to repel them by force. Some bands managed to be recruited into the service of the marquis of Montferrat for his Italian wars, while others were hired by the king of Aragon.

Subsequent to the peace concluded between the Spanish kingdoms of Aragon and Castile, the Companies that were headed for Spain dispersed in southwest France, where they joined up with those that had already set themselves up there. In November 1361 they agreed by treaty to evacuate

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the region, but that merely displaced the problem because they then marched farther northward and eastward until they were once again scattered across the Rhone valley. While there, they took over the town of Brignais, where in April 1362 they soundly defeated one of the two French armies raised to oppose them. They then started to pillage throughout the southern provinces of the Kingdom of France.

The corollary of the gradual end to the peripheral conflicts was a new rise in the number of unemployed routiers. The Count of Foix's victory at Launac in December 1362 temporarily halted the conflict between the houses of Foix and Armagnac, while the Treaty of Pampluna in March 1365 terminated the Franco-Navarrese war in Normandy. Finally, the following April, the Treaty of Guérande brought peace to Brittany. Their predecessors' successes, particularly in Brignais, persuaded the newly demobilized bands not to reign in their excesses: by mid-1365, the Great Companies' pillaging was at its height.

During the spring of 1365, in a final attempt to free the Papal States, Pope Urban V devised the idea of financing a crusade in Hungary to get rid of the Companies. Emperor Charles IV entrusted the expedition's command to the routier captain Arnaud de Cervolle, "the Archpriest," but the latter profited from the crusade to go and ravage the Rhine River valley and its surroundings.

The War of Castile. After being crowned in May 1364, Charles V resolved to rid his kingdom of the routiers. In the autumn of 1365, he ordered Bertrand du Guesclin to raise an army with them in order to take them into Spain to support his ally, Henry of Trastámara, whom he was planning to make king of Castile in place of his half-brother, Pedro the Cruel (Pedro I of Castile). He thereby set off a conflict that would occupy a substantial part of the companies for the next two years and, in the process, would to some extent free his kingdom of their misdeeds while eliminating many of them in battle. However, between each phase of the conflict, a large number of routiers managed to reenter France and resume their wrongdoings.

Du Guesclin's first campaign was a rapid success, and Enrique de Trastámara was crowned king of Castile in early April 1366. By the end of that year, however, the Black Prince had come to the aid of Pedro I of Castile, raising an expeditionary force composed of routiers who ultimately defeated Du Guesclin and Enrique de Trastámara at the battle of Nájera, on 3 April 1367. The Black Prince nonetheless failed to retain control over Spain because of inadequate funds and Du Guesclin, who resumed the offensive in 1368 with a new mercenary army, enabled Enrique de Trastámara to emerge as the ultimate victor in the following year.

The Great Companies' members were not fundamentally outlaws, for they realized that, in order to pursue their endeavors, they would have to give themselves at least an appearance of legitimacy, as they had done from 1356 to 1360, when they had laid waste to entire regions in the name of the kings of France and England. Many of the bands dismissed from service in 1360 decided to serve under the patronage of the French king's enemies so that they could keep on pillaging the French kingdom; others returned to Brittany and southwest France to legally take part in the conflicts still underway. Finally, the War of Castile allowed them to go on fighting in a completely legitimate way.

Similarly, it would be simplistic to limit the Companies' role to pillaging whole regions, for they did have a considerable impact on the geostrategic situation of France between 1360 and 1369. They composed most of the armies that were fighting during the Franco-Navarrese war and Brittany's War of Succession, notably during the battles of Cocherel and Auray in 1364. The first battle enabled Charles V to regain control of Normandy and to consolidate his power, while the second led to the investiture of a duke of Brittany who favored the English. Their participation was decisive in Spain: not only did they help to bring about the crowning of a king who looked favorably upon France, but the Black Prince's inability to pay those who served under him led to renewed open warfare between the French and English kings in 1369. In order to pay the soldiers' wages for the 1367 expedition,

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he severely strained his source of funds and had to levy a new tax in his duchy, which created discontent and caused certain of his subjects to bring complaints to the French king. The latter, by being sensitive to these grievances, and by summoning the Black Prince to appear for judgment before his royal court, reignited the conflict, and the Companies were once again allowed to legitimately fight in France.

[*See also* Guesclin, Bertrand du; Edward the Black Prince; Enrique II; *and* Pedro I.]

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Translated from the French by Carol Macomber

GREEK FIRE

According to the chronicle of John Malalas, an incendiary weapon was invented by the engineer Proklos (not the philosopher) when Constantinople was attacked by Vitalianus in 515. No details are available on its composition, but it is known that it was able to set fire to an entire fleet. Therefore, it could be considered a prototype of the inflammable weapon invented by the engineer Kallinikos in 673, when the Arab ships that besieged Constantinople were destroyed. Theophanes Confessor records that Kallinikos further developed an existing weapon. Its Byzantine name was "liquid fire," but it is usually known as "Greek fire," an expression introduced by the crusaders. The use of the weapon was decisive in conflicts including the Arab siege of Constantinople in 717–718, the Russian attack against Constantinople in 941, and the siege of Dristra in 971.

This inflammable weapon, like modern napalm, was able to burn in water. It seems that only a combination of urine, vinegar, and sand could extinguish it. According to military treatises and narrative sources, the liquid was launched with bronze pumps (*siphones*) installed on a floor above the deck of the *dromon* warships (one at the prow and another on the bow, sometimes also on the sides). There are also recorded handheld tubes (*cheirosiphones*) used on ships and also on land during sieges. The launching system was a technological secret that was never disclosed to enemies, although the Arabs used a similar incendiary weapon from 830. The Bulgarians were unable to handle the pumps and the fuel they captured in 812 at Develtos. The Byzantines themselves abandoned the weapon by the end of the twelfth century.

The composition of the burning substance, and the way in which it was launched, are now clear, following research and experiments by John Haldon. The basic substance was not a kind of gunpowder, as some historians and chemists believed, but a light crude oil (naphtha) obtained from Zichia, on the northeastern shore of the Black Sea, and from other places in the Caucasus. Experiments have shown that this crude, mixed with some wood resins and heated at 60°C, forms a proper fuel. It is also possible that the crude was distilled at low temperature to produce a light kerosene. The pump constructed by Haldon follows the models of the pistons and cylinders described by Vitruvius and Heron of Alexandria. This pump with cylinder was connected through a pipe to a bronze tank, from which the heated fuel was absorbed into another pipe with a mobile nozzle. From this nozzle a fire jet was launched for a few seconds that was propelled forty-nine feet (fifteen meters). It seems that Kallinikos's improvement was to use pumps to shoot the substance that had previously been launched in pots or in another way.

Material chroniony prawem autorskim

Greek Fire. A ship's crew project Greek fire, made from a flammable composition inextinguishable in water, through a bronze tube on the galley's prow. Illustration from the *Madrid Skylitzes*, twelfth century. PRADO, MADRID, SPAIN/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL.

Western Europeans, through the end of the Middle Ages, often used the term "Greek fire" for various incendiaries, usually thrown in pots by hand or engine, that may have been quite different from the real thing.

[*See also* Arabs; Constantinople, *subentries on* Rus, Attacks (860, 907, and 941) *and* Siege of (717–718); Incendiaries; Treatises, Byzantine; Vitalian; *and* Weapons, Byzantine.]

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Alexandru Madgearu

GREGORY OF TOURS

(538–594), Frankish bishop. Georgius Florentius Gregorius was born into an old family of Gallic senatorial stock in Auvergne, a family that since Roman times had provided leaders both ecclesiastical and secular at the highest levels in Gaul. Gregory, whose writings reveal a nature both learned and active, was in 573 consecrated as bishop of Tours, a site strategic for its central location in Gaul and important as a pilgrimage center for the cult of Saint Martin. Gregory authored a number of important hagiographical works, but he provides most political and military information in his *Ten Books of History*

Матеріал, захищений авторським правом

or *Histories*. Started soon after his accession to the episcopacy, beginning with book 2 the *Histories* provides a selective view of a Gallic-centered history from the death of Saint Martin in 397 to Gregory's own time at the end of book 4. From then to the end of the work Gregory provides a contemporary, though still selective, account of his Gallo-Roman world. The latest entry is dated to 591, and Gregory himself died in 594.

At the beginning of book 5 Gregory decries the Merovingian civil wars of the 570s and contrasts with those of the contemporary kings the exploits of Clovis, who with God's help had fought and conquered the pagan and heretical invaders of Christian Gaul. In the early books of the *Histories*, Gregory's account of the wars of the Merovingians appear as parts of a theological drama that recapitulated the history of Old Testament Israel, including the entry of a Chosen People (the Franks) into a Promised Land (Christian Gaul) and the rise of a divinely legitimated dynasty (the Merovingians). His symbolism, however, is unstable and often difficult to interpret, and throughout the work Gregory is, like a preacher citing daily-life examples in sermons, a historian always seeking to extract the moral meaning of events.

Although Gregory in the *Histories* foregrounds the moral interpretation of events, he does provide incidental information on the sixth-century Merovingian military that is confirmed by other sources. Frankish armies were of diverse composition, including bodies of armed retainers of the kings and the leading magnates, as well as the descendants of Roman military colonists and even surviving remnants of the regular Roman army. In the late sixth century these forces were supplemented by local levies based on the *civitas*—a Gallo-Roman town that was often an episcopal see, together with its surrounding territory—commanded by the local count.

Owing to Gregory's incidental reportage of military matters, one looks in vain for detailed descriptions of campaigns and battles, the only exception perhaps being the account of the suppression of Gundovald's revolt in 585. For example, Gregory devotes more detail to describing a riot in a nunnery at Poitiers than to the decisive battle of Vouillé against the Visigoths in 507 that secured most of Gaul for the Franks. Gregory's *Histories* provides more evidence for the ideologies underlying war than for details of armament, strategy, or tactics. Appearing especially in the early books are ideas inherited from late antiquity on the proper justification for war and on restraint in its prosecution, ideas that culminated in the just-war doctrine of the late Middle Ages. Also inherited from classical and Christian antiquity was the idea that victory indicated divine favor for the victor and legitimated rulers, whereas defeat, as in the Bible, betokened divine judgment.

Because Gregory's *Histories* is difficult to interpret, scholarly judgments differ as to his overall attitude toward war. Some have argued that Gregory's view was basically negative: that for him the true heroes were the saints. Others think that his view was not uniformly negative: that he recognized the need for the effective defense of Christian Gaul against its enemies. Such are the ambiguities and subtleties of Gregory's evidence that both interpretations can be in part right, and both in part wrong.

[*See also* Clovis I; Just War, Just Motive; *and* Laws of War and the Just Conduct of War.]

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Phillip Wynn

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GRUNWALD, BATTLE OF

The greatest of all the Polish-Teutonic battles took place on 15 July 1410 in what is modern northeastern Poland. The Polish army, under the command of Władysław (Ladislaw) II Jagiełło, entered the territory owned by the Teutonic Order, whose domains fringed the Baltic Sea. The Teutonic grand master, Ulrich von Jungingen, decided to fight the Poles in an open battle in order to prevent them from despoiling the country. The two armies met near the villages of Grunwald (Grünfelde), Stębark (Tannenberg), and Łodwigowo (Ludwigsdorf). The battleground was a bit uneven, unwooded in its northwestern sector and with clusters of trees in the southeast. The armies were separated by a small stream. Jagiełło's troops arrived from the south, whereas the Teutonic Knights came from the northwest.

Jagiełło's army set off in the early morning of 15 July, not expecting an imminent battle. The king was unaware of the Teutonic army's location. The Teutonic Knights knew more about the position of the Polish-Lithuanian army: their position was signaled by the villages torched by Jagiełło's warriors. At about eight in the morning Jagiełło ordered a halt for the celebration of Mass. But when the preparations for the Mass began, messengers brought word of the arrival of the enemy army. Jagiełło ordered his army to prepare for battle. First the Teutonic army took its position, facing southeast. Jagiełło's forces took up their positions with some delay, covered by some four to six banners of cavalry.

Estimates of the Teutonic strength range from eleven thousand to thirty-two thousand warriors. The most recent studies estimate fifteen thousand. No reliable source mentions the participation of the Teutonic infantry. Therefore, even if there was some infantry at the battle of Grunwald, it must have been represented by a small number of people who either stayed in a camp or protected artillery. The Teutonic army comprised troops of many nations. In addition to Germans from Prussia, there were Czech mercenaries, Moravians, Silesians, Swiss (probably), allies from France, reinforcements from western Pomerania, and Poles and other inhabitants of Teutonic territories, including those who had betrayed Jagiełło and joined the enemy.



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Jagiełło's army probably consisted of some twenty thousand Poles and about ten thousand Lithuanians. A part of the Lithuanian army led by Grand Duke Vytautas consisted of Ruthenian and Moldavian troops. The entire front between the armies stretched for nearly two miles (about three kilometers), with the armies arrayed some two hundred to three hundred yards (or meters) apart.

The battle started about noon. The Lithuanian army, on Jagiełło's right flank, attacked first. It was followed by Polish banners on the left flank. Although the Teutonic Knights used their bombards (artillery) twice, the projectiles caused little damage. Soon the Teutonic right flank started to retreat under the pressure of the Polish army. After an hour of fighting, however, the left wing of the Teutonic army managed to destroy a part of the Lithuanian contingent, which began to flee. A number of Teutonic warriors started to pursue the Lithuanians, effectively removing themselves from the battle.

At this point the Teutonic Knights attacked the Polish center. During one of the charges the principal Polish standard, displaying a white crowned eagle on a red background, was lost. Its disappearance may have been understood as a signal to retreat. The Teutonic Knights who noticed the event understood it as their victory and started to sing their anthem, *Christ ist entstanden* (Christ is risen). Soon the Polish standard was raised again, and the tide turned in Jagiełło's favor. The Lithuanian forces that had previously left the battlefield started to return. The exhausted Teutonic army began to flee.

After three hours of fighting, Grand Master Ulrich von Jungingen decided to conduct a final attack. He personally led a detachment of fifteen or sixteen banners, including his reserves and some troops who had probably participated in the battle. Ulrich intended to attack the Polish right, but his detachment was observed by the Polish forces there, and they readied their defense. Meanwhile Jagiello committed a part of his reserve, which attacked Ulrich's left flank. The returning Lithuanians attacked the rear of the Teutonic reserve, surrounding it. When Ulrich was killed, the Teutonic army started to leave the battlefield.

The last phase of the battle was the attack on the Teutonic camp, where some survivors had found shelter. The Poles conquered after a short battle. When Jagiełło heard about the conquest of the camp, he arrived there and ordered his troops to destroy the barrels containing wine so as to prevent the warriors from celebrating the victory.

About eight thousand people from the Teutonic army were killed in the battle, including at least 203 knights-brothers. Two princes allied with the Teutonic Order and six hundred significant knights were taken prisoner. (Some sources mention as many as nine hundred prisoners.) Historians estimate that about two to four thousand combatants were captured. Polish losses were not so severe. Jan Długosz in his *Annales* writes that only twelve high-ranking Poles were killed. Jagiełło in his letters sent from the battlefield wrote that he won with "insignificant losses" and that only "few of the country people were killed, none of the more important nobles."

Some of the Knights' survivors arrived at their fortress of Malbork (Marienburg) the next day. Within twenty-four hours they had covered about 110 kilometers (68 miles). On the day after the battle, Ulrich's body was found and sent to Malbork. After a few days Jagiełło's army moved northwest from Grunwald to Malbork, laying siege to the capital of the Teutonic Order on 25 July. But the army was unable to capture the formidable Teutonic fortress.

Archaeological explorations have included only a part of the battlefield. A few mass graves were found near the ruins of the chapel erected by the Teutonic Knights after the battle. Skeletons carried the marks of hits by swords, axes, or crossbow bolts. Only fragments of the weaponry were found. During the Communist period the battle of Grunwald was used by Communist propaganda to encourage anti-German and antireligious feelings. Communist historiography tried both to present the battle as the victory of a union of eastern nations over Germans who aspired to conquer eastern Europe and also to emphasize the important role of plebeian infantry. More recently the participation of infantry in

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the battle has been questioned, and Polish and Lithuanian historians disagree over the importance of Grand Duke Vytauta and Lithuanian units in the battle.

[*See also* Baltics; Marienburg, Siege of; Orders, Military, *subentry on* Northern Orders; *and* Slavic Lands.]

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GUADALETE, BATTLE OF

The battle of Guadalete, fought in southern Spain most likely in the year 711, witnessed the decisive defeat of the Visigothic forces by Muslim invaders. This brief statement is uncontroversial, but almost all other details concerning the battle, including the precise dating, location, size and composition of opposing forces, and even the final outcome, are debatable. The sources are extremely scarce. The only near-contemporary Christian source, the *Chronicle of 754*, provides skimpy details of the battle. Muslim contemporary sources are few, made fewer by the deliberate destruction of much Muslim literature by the Spanish following the end of the *Reconquista*.

At the time of the invasion, Spain was ruled by the Visigothic king Roderick. Roderick's seizure of power in 710 or 711, in which he likely overthrew his predecessor, Witiza, had apparently resulted in a civil war. Many surviving chronicles emphasize the dissension between Roderick and members of other great families—dissension that apparently led to treachery on the battlefield of Guadalete and seems to have been a significant cause of the Visigothic defeat.

After the conquest of North Africa, the Muslim invaders, under the command of Tariq ibn Ziyad, crossed the Strait of Gibraltar, probably in April 711, at the direction of Musa ibn Nusayr, the governor of what is now Tunisia. Their crossing may have been facilitated in some way by the collaboration of a disgruntled Visigothic count, Julian (though this is a point of particular debate), who commanded the Visigothic enclave of Ceuta on the African side of the strait. The Muslims under Tariq spent some time consolidating their hold on southern Spain after their initial crossing. During this period, while King Roderick was apparently engaged in the north fighting either Basques or rivals to the throne, the Muslim forces defeated Visigothic forces in the vicinity of Córdoba.

Roderick finally arrived in the south with an army, exaggeratedly estimated by later chronicles at between forty thousand and one hundred thousand men, to counter the Muslim invaders under Tariq, whose force may have numbered as many as twelve thousand. The precise location of the battlefield itself is unclear. Arabic sources name Sidonia (modern Medina Sedonia, fifteen miles southeast of Jerez de la Frontera) and also refer to a *wadi al-lin* (valley of mud). The Guadalete River lies within twelve miles of Medina Sedonia.

The battle took place, according to Muslim sources, on 19 July 711. That family members of the preceding Visigothic king, Witiza, commanded the wings of the Visigothic army—as some Muslim chronicles report—seems unlikely. But most contemporary accounts record that many of Roderick's forces treacherously abandoned him on the battlefield. All accounts record that the Visigothic forces were crushed. The fate of Roderick, however, is not completely clear. He may have been killed during the battle, may have attempted to flee across the

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river and drowned, or may have fled to the north and been killed later (this last possibility being the least likely).

[*See also* Al-Andalus; Covadonga, Battle of; *and* Iberia, *subentry on* Narrative (500–1100).]

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GUESCLIN, BERTRAND DU

(c. 1323–1380), constable of France (1370–1380). Du Guesclin was the most famous French soldier of his generation. His major military achievement was to recover the territory ceded to the English by John II in the Treaty of Brétigny (1360) after the Hundred Years' War recommenced in 1369, thereby restoring political as well as military credibility to the Valois monarchy. Separating fact from fiction for his career is not easy. Hailed as the "Tenth Worthy" by the poet Eustace Deschamps during his own lifetime, Bertrand's exploits became the stuff of legend, thanks chiefly to Cuvelier's extensive verse-life (24,346 lines in the most recent edition). Written circa 1385, shortly after the constable's death, this late chanson de geste was quickly turned into prose at the request of Jean, Sire d'Estouteville, who had campaigned with him. These "lives" remained popular into early modern times and, especially in Cuvelier's case, have greatly influenced all subsequent biographers, often being uncritically rehashed down to the present day. Among other contemporaries who related Du Guesclin's action-packed career, the most influential is Jean Froissart, whose account also requires critical handling. Virtually all late-fourteenth-century chroniclers of England, France, or Spain cover particular campaigns; nevertheless, from about 1357 until his death on 13 July 1380 from an illness contracted while besieging Châteauneuf du Randon (Lozère), archival evidence is also plentiful, so his career may be studied from many angles. Few are so informative about the realities, successes, and misfortunes of individual soldiers in late medieval warfare.

Bertrand was the eldest son of a minor Breton lord, Robert du Guesclin, Lord of Broons, and his Norman wife, Jeanne Malemains, and virtually everything that is recounted about his upbringing derives from Cuvelier's imaginative account. An ugly and hot-tempered child who imposed his will on his siblings and playmates, often in games of a warlike character, Bertrand was allegedly to a large extent rejected by his parents and left to his own devices. It was an apprenticeship that encouraged self-reliance and resourcefulness, which would serve him well. Growing into an adult short in stature but powerfully built, he had enormous energy and a dominating, self-confident, even impulsive character, allied to considerable managerial skills. Men flocked to serve him. He inspired loyalty and devotion in his troops. He was very much a soldier's soldier, rising from obscure origins to high military office and great personal wealth.

As a young man, Bertrand was ambitious and anxious for action, and the outbreak of the Breton War of Succession in 1341 provided him with opportunities to display his military talents in guerilla warfare, sieges, and the occasional tournament. Early dates and details are difficult to pin down. A celebrated attempt to do so was Siméon Luce's account of du Guesclin's "youth," published in 1876, which linked

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Tomb of Bertrand du Guesclin (c. 1320–1380). Basilique Saint-Denis, Paris.

him with events from the earliest days of that war, largely following Cuvelier and Froissart. Much of this can be rejected as anachronistic, the fruit of fertile authorial minds glossing the 1340s in the light of later events. It is only from the early 1350s, by which time du Guesclin was a mature figure in his early thirties, that more reliable evidence becomes available. It shows his career developing through patronage by powerful military figures such as Pierre de Villiers; Marshal Arnoul d'Audrehem; his own liege lord, Charles de Blois, Duke of Brittany; and most importantly, Philip, Duke of Orléans, younger brother of John II. Through them du Guesclin, who never forgot his Breton origins, became known in royal circles. His part in the successful defense of Rennes (1356–1357), rewards from the Dauphin, knighting, and appointment as royal captain of Pontorson (December 1357) marked a major turning point in his career from local guerilla leader to royal captain. For the next twenty-three years he was almost continually engaged in warfare, principally in western France.

Du Guesclin was competent in all forms of warfare on horseback and on foot: recruiting men (especially drawing on his Breton and Norman links); mounting sieges (some, such as Rolleboise in 1363–1364 and Cherbourg in 1378, amphibious); defending towns and castles; leading freebooting soldiery, most notably in his expeditions to Spain in support of Henry of Trastamara (who later became Enrique II of Castile) in 1365–1367 and 1368–1369; serving as overall commander in field battles (Cocherel, 1364; Auray, 1364; Nájera, 1367; Montiel, 1369; Pontvallain, 1370; Chizé, 1373; Eymet, 1377); methodically reducing provinces castle by castle, town by town (Poitou, Saintonge, and Brittany alone in 1372–1373, reoccupying Périgord in 1376, retaking Navarrese fortresses in Normandy in 1378); opportunistically launching a naval raid on Jersey in 1373; implementing administrative reforms within the royal army when he was constable, an office that he held in the highest regard; closely supervising the construction and transport of siege weapons; organizing defense in depth or implementing Fabian tactics (sometimes reluctantly) on instruction from the royal council, in whose deliberations he also occasionally assumed an important role.

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Du Guesclin was not always successful: some sieges he laid had to be raised, such as those at Ussel (1371) and Cherbourg (1378). His record as general commander included crushing defeats at the hands of Anglo-Breton forces at Auray and Anglo-Gascon and Castilian forces at Nájera. On both occasions he was captured, as also in minor actions in 1359, by Robert Knolles, and in 1360/61, by Hugh Calveley. Thanks to his growing reputation, he was held to successively larger ransoms, which, after Nájera, were perhaps inflated by du Guesclin himself to emphasize his military worth. His loyalty was at times torn between service to his immediate liege lord, the Duke of Brittany, and his sovereign, as in 1363–1364 and again in 1379. His political judgment could be faulty. His private interests, especially the ambition to acquire extensive lordships and material rewards, sometimes selfishly determined his actions. He was venal and a hard taskmaster. But he drove himself with the same unrelenting harshness he sometimes displayed toward others. The force of his personality, his ability to command loyalty, his formidable military experience, and his extensive connections both at the royal court and among the nobility of many French provinces enabled him to play a central role in restoring French military pride. He was buried in May 1389 near Paris at the Basilica Saint-Denis, alongside Charles V, the monarch he had so valiantly served, and his life was commemorated in an impressive state funeral attended by courtiers and many former military companions. His achievements and reputation lived on, inspiring later generations.

[*See also* Enrique II; Froissart, Jean; Hundred Years' War, *subentries on* Causes *and* Costs; *and* Rennes, Siege of.]

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Michael Jones

GUIDORICCIO DA FOGLIANO

(c. 1290–1352), Italian mercenary soldier from Reggio nell'Emilia. Guidoriccio passed much of his career in Tuscany; his most notable service was for the city of Siena as captain of war from 1326 to 1333, when he helped defend the city against the advances of the Lucchese tyrant Castruccio Castracani. In later years, Guidoriccio worked for Verona, where he was elected *podesta* (chief magistrate) in 1337. In 1343, he briefly joined the Great Company led by the German mercenary Werner, also Duke of Urslingen. Guidoriccio returned to Siena in 1349 and died there in 1352. He was given a decorous funeral and buried in a local Dominican church.

There is little evidence of Guidoriccio's qualities as a soldier. His most successful military achievement came while he was in Sienese service at the siege of Montemassi (1328), a town in the Maremma region that had, at the instigation of Castruccio Castracani, rebelled against Sienese authority. After seven months, Guidoriccio emerged victorious, in large part owing to an elaborate *battifolle* (field fortification) he had built outside the town that prevented Castruccio from relieving it. The siege and *battifolle* are commemorated in Simone Martini's famous painting of Guidoriccio in the Sala del Consiglio in the Palazzo Pubblico in Siena. The painting has, however, been the subject of intense scholarly debate; art historians question the dating and authorship of the work. The disagreement has focused in part on the depiction of the *battifolle*, which some scholars believe is too sophisticated for the period and belonged more likely to the succeeding century.

[*See also* Fortifications, *subentry on* Overview; Italy, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1493); *and* Siege Warfare, *subentry on* Tactics and Technology.]

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GUINEGATE, BATTLE OF

This battle, fought in Artois near the city of Aire on 7 August 1479, was the first important fight in the Burgundian Wars, which set Maximilian I of Habsburg, Archduke of Austria, against King Louis XI of France, after the death of Charles the Bold in 1477.

At the beginning of the campaign, Maximilian's troops besieged Thérouanne, a major fortification on the Picardy border. Philippe de Crèvecoeur, marshal of France and the king's lieutenant general, heading an army of about twenty thousand fighters, tried to help the city. Informed of the movements of the French, Maximilian came to meet them with similar forces (twenty-three thousand men). The French troops were composed of compagnies d'ordonnance (companies of the ordinance), representing 1,800 "lances," or 10,800 cavalrymen (each lance was made up of one man-at-arms, one *coustillier* (light horseman), two mounted archers, and two servants), plus about eight thousand *francs-archers* (regular archers). The Burgundians, on their part, had 825 "new regulation" lances (created in the autumn of 1477)—theoretically, 4,950 cavalry and 2,475 infantry. (The Burgundian lance comprised one man-at-arms, one *coustillier*, three mounted archers and halberdiers, one servant, one pikeman, one archer, and one handgunner.) In addition to these forces, there were contingents provided by the Flemish militias, partly armed with pikes on the Swiss model, and German and English mercenaries.

The battle was joined at Guinegate. Maximilian placed the bulk of his infantry in the center, surrounded by two hundred men-at-arms on foot and protected by a defensive circle of wagons. Three formations of English archers, reinforced by handgunners and halberdiers, and by artillery field pieces, took up positions in front of the main line. The flanks of the army were covered by wings of mounted men-at-arms. The marshal of France, Crèvecoeur, opposite the Burgundian position, had divided his army into three battalions. At the start of the engagement, which began around 2:00 P.M., the French had the advantage; their cavalry, avoiding a frontal attack which the archduke's dispositions had made too difficult, attacked the right flank and put to flight the Burgundian mounted men-at-arms. After this initial success, one group of attackers set off in pursuit of the fleeing soldiers, while another group set about pillaging the enemy baggage. The French then directed their efforts toward the main Burgundian line. After capturing some of the Burgundians' artillery pieces and turning their weapons against them, the French threw themselves against the Flemish infantry, which held a solid defensive position. Thus the momentum of their attack was blocked and, after a long period of indecisive fighting, a Burgundian counterattack finally forced the French to retreat in the direction of Hesdin, at about 8:00 P.M. Maximilian's troops recovered the lost artillery, then occupied and pillaged the camp abandoned by the French. The next day, they withdrew toward Aire. The French losses were estimated at thirteen hundred dead—which is probably exaggerated—with five thousand Burgundian dead.

Although the battle of Guinegate was not decisive in terms of the Burgundian Wars, it had the effect of confirming the personal position of the archduke of Austria as the inheritor of the Burgundian power. On the French side, the impact of the defeat was felt especially in the realm of military institutions. The weakness of the *francs-archers* having been clearly revealed, Louis XI decided to disband them and replace them with a permanent infantry organized on the Swiss model.

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[*See also* Compagnies d'Ordonnance *and* Maximilian I.]

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GUNPOWDER

Gunpowder is a simple physical mixture of saltpeter (potassium nitrate), sulfur, and charcoal. Though the latter two ingredients have been known for millennia, it is probable that saltpeter was first discovered by alchemists in China in the fifth or sixth century C.E. By the tenth century they were mixing it with sulfur and carbonaceous materials to make basic incendiary mixtures. It is not known when the first projectile-firing gun was developed; Joseph Needham indicated that this occurred by the mid-thirteenth century, though recent work has suggested an earlier date. By the late thirteenth century the "secret" had made its way west by unknown means; a recipe for gunpowder has been recognized in the papers of Roger Bacon, a Franciscan, although the first confirmed date of a cannon is 1326/1327, when illustrations of guns were included in texts prepared for Edward III of England.

For most of the fourteenth century guns were small and comparatively uncommon, possibly because the saltpeter necessary to make gunpowder was being brought overland from the East. By the last quarter of the fourteenth century saltpeter was being made in Europe, possibly first in Frankfurt, on special "plantations." Saltpeter was produced by the action of microorganisms breaking down urea in animal wastes into nitrates, which were then extracted by a process of solution called lixiviation.



Manufacture of Gunpowder. A master gunner (*left*) supervises the pounding of the powder. From *Feuerwerkbuch* (The firework book), fol. 87r, c. 1420. HIP/ART RESOURCE, NY

At first the available saltpeter was contaminated with other salts, such as sodium chloride, or with calcium nitrate, a highly deliquescent material that quickly becomes wet. However, by the end of the fifteenth century many of the production processes involved had been discovered, and the method sufficiently developed, to make a consistent material.

Early gunpowder was just a simple physical mixture of the three ingredients, but the process of corning—that is, wetting the gunpowder and forcing it through a sieve to make small pellets, or corns—was developed in the fifteenth century. Corned powder is more powerful, though just how much so is not clear, and it is also more consistent. A number of

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different gunpowder recipes were used for different purposes; the most common was 75 percent saltpeter, 15 percent charcoal, and 10 percent sulfur.

Although it is just a simple mixture, the properties of medieval gunpowder are surprisingly complex and still not well understood in the early twenty-first century. For example, though the amount of saltpeter in gunpowder affects its burning properties, these depend, to a much greater extent, on the degree of containment it is put under. A loose pile of powder burns in a few tenths of a second. When tightly constricted, in a gun barrel, it explodes in a few thousandths of a second. If it is highly compressed in a tube with a cavity through the center, it burns in a few seconds and can propel a rocket.

[*See also* Artillery; Incendiaries; *and* Weapons, Missile.]

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Hab, Battle of

The narrow victory won by a coalition of Franks of Outremer over the joint army of Naj al-Din Ilghazi ibn Artuq, ruler of Mardin and Aleppo, and Tughtagin, atabeg of Damascus, on 14 August 1119 is known variously as the battle of Hab, Zardana, or Tall Danith, after different sites in the vicinity of the fighting (in modern-day northwest Syria).

The battle came about as a defensive response to Ilghazi's crushing defeat of the army of Prince Roger of Antioch on 28 June that year, known as the *Ager Sanguinis* (Field of Blood), which had left the principality severely weakened. In late July a Frankish relieving force under King Baldwin II of Jerusalem and Count Pons of Tripoli arrived at Antioch, where they joined up with reinforcements from Edessa and the few Antiochene troops that were still available. The most pressing task was to relieve the towns and castles in the east of the principality that had come under siege from Ilghazi's troops. The combined Frankish forces may have been slightly more numerous than the army that had been defeated in June, and they were encouraged by the presence of the relic of the True Cross, carried from Jerusalem by Evremar, archbishop of Caesarea. Muslim numbers had increased. The cavalry of Ilghazi and his Turcoman allies, and the Arab militia (*ahdath*) of Aleppo had been reinforced by Tughtagin with his Turkish mamluk cavalry and ahdath from Damascus. The Muslim forces also included effective miners and other siege specialists, for by the time the Franks camped on the hill known as Tall Danith on 13 August, the castles of al-Atharib and Zardana had been forced to surrender.

The Franks started to advance toward Hab but encountered the Muslim forces soon after dawn. The ensuing hard-fought battle confused the chroniclers who wrote about it. It seems likely that the Franks were organized into nine divisions, with the bulk of their infantry in the center, guarded by cavalry squadrons: the Tripolitans on the right, the Antiochenes on the left, and Baldwin II and the Jerusalemites in the rear. After the Tripolitans were driven back and dispersed, the Frankish infantry suffered heavy casualties from volleys of arrows and then charges at close quarters. When it appeared that they could no longer hold out, Baldwin committed his reserves and forced a Muslim withdrawal. Casualties were some five hundred to eight hundred on the Christian side and considerably more on the Muslim. Regrouping his forces on the battlefield, the king claimed victory, but Ilghazi was able to withdraw with most of his troops and a large number of Frankish prisoners, most of whom suffered public execution in Aleppo. The battle stabilized the defense of the principality of Antioch in the short term, but the cumulative losses of Antiochene manpower in

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1119 and the continuing Muslim threat meant that Baldwin II and the army of Jerusalem were regularly required to provide substantial military assistance until 1125.

[*See also* Crusades, *subentries on* Sources (1095–1183), Narrative (1095–1183), *and* Historiography (1095–1183).]

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HALIDON HILL, BATTLE OF

On 17 July 1333, Archibald Douglas, regent of Scotland, received word that besieged Berwick-upon-Tweed, by far the most important town of his realm, had made a surrender compact with Edward III of England. The agreement gave the regent just three days to relieve the town, effectively forcing Douglas to abandon his raid into northern England and do battle with the better-equipped English army. Trusting in his army's numerical superiority (probably about 2 to 1) and hoping for a replay of Bannockburn rather than Dupplin Moor, he collected his forces and marched sixty-three miles in about forty-eight hours in order to appear outside Berwick on the morning of 19 July.

Douglas found his enemies waiting for him atop a five-hundred-foot hill just outside the town. The sea and the river Tweed blocked the other approaches to Berwick. Edward III had deployed his men-at-arms on foot in three battles, each flanked by two forward-leaning wings of longbowmen. He commanded one; his constable and Edward de Balliol the others. Another detachment guarded against a sally by the garrison.

The position was brilliantly chosen. Just in front of his lines, a slight but steep declivity gave his men a position from which, as Andrew of Wyntoun put it, "a single man could defeat three." Unaware of this obstacle, Douglas launched his men forward, one phalanxlike *schiltrom* (group of men carrying pikes) against each English battle. Few of the Scots were well armored, and during their advance thousands of them were struck down by the English arrows, loosed "thick as rays in sunlight." Disordered by their advance and their losses, out of breath, many of them wounded by arrows, the Scots had no chance of winning their hand-to-hand fight against the better-armored English men-at-arms. Two of their *schiltroms* broke rapidly. Edward III immediately ordered his victorious men-at-arms to mount and pursue the fugitives—who fled on foot, their panicked grooms having ridden off. More soldiers were killed in the subsequent eight-mile chase than on the actual battlefield. The elite third *schiltrom*, meanwhile, fought fiercely, but equally met defeat.

Both sides had apparently forbidden the taking of prisoners; Edward III executed all those he could find the next day. Scottish losses were in the thousands, including five earls and the regent. English dead were reportedly one knight and ten archers. The battle effectively (although only temporarily) broke the resistance to Edward de Balliol's rule in Scotland; only four castles held out against him.

[*See also* Bannockburn, Battle of; Berwick, Sieges of; Dupplin Moor, Battle of; *and* Edward III of England.]

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HANDGUNS

Little is known for certain about the forms of gunpowder weapons after their appearance in Europe in the early fourteenth century, since there are few contemporary illustrations or surviving examples.

Materiál chránený autorskými právy

Handcannons. Soldiers with handcannons besiege a castle. Illustration from *Quinte curse ruffe des fais du Grant Alexandre*, MS Roy 17, fol. 1, c. 1468. BRITISH LIBRARY, LONDON, UK/© BRITISH LIBRARY BOARD. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

Although early guns were quite small, they were probably not held in the hand until the latter part of the fourteenth century, when we have specific references to handguns in sources such as the accounts of the dukes of Burgundy. However, from the early fifteenth century handguns were being ordered in large quantities and must have been used extensively on the battlefield, although again there are few written references to them and only rare glimpses in the chronicles of the period.

Surviving early examples are rare and difficult to date accurately. The handgun found in Tannenberg, Germany, dated by association to around 1400, is a very simple barrel, octagonal at the rear and circular in cross section at the front. The back is hollowed; into it a simple wood stock was originally fitted. The so-called Mörkö gun, from Sweden, has in the past been attributed to the same period, but is probably of a later date; it is decorated with religious inscriptions and, like the barrel from Tannenberg, is octagonal. However, it has a hook on the underside and a bust of a male figure on top.

These examples suggest that early handguns consisted of short iron or copper-alloy barrels into the rear of which a wood stock was secured for handling. They were fired by applying a lighted cord or match to the touchhole on the top of the barrel. Illustrations show handguns being held in three different ways for firing—the stock resting on top of the shoulder, tucked under the arm, or lying on the ground and supported on a rest.

The first mechanism used to ignite the powder charge was probably introduced in the early decades of the fifteenth century and consisted of a pivoting Z-shaped lever. Pressing or squeezing one end lowered the other, which held a piece of smoldering match-cord, into a pan. By the later fifteenth century two further methods of firing handguns had developed. Both were attached to a flat iron plate secured to the side of the stock. The first, the snap-matchlock, consisted of a simple cock whose end was held in the pan by a spring. The cock, with a piece of smoldering cord secured at its end, was pulled back and held by a sear that was released when the trigger was pressed. The second and improved method, the sear lock, acted in the opposite way. A spring held the cock away from the pan, and pulling the trigger lowered the cock through a series of levers and a tumbler into the pan—releasing the trigger withdrew the cock from the pan. Together with the development of the lock, the barrel was made longer and thinner and the touchhole moved to the side of the barrel, with a small extension added as a pan for the powder.

Over the course of the late fifteenth century the wood stock developed into a form resembling the modern firearm. The front part was hollowed out to form a gutter into which the barrel fitted, and the butt was flat and rectangular and could be held under the shoulder or pressed against the cheek for firing. In addition the barrel was made by forging a tube open at both ends and then plugging the end with a screwed breech plug.

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Handgunners augmented archers and crossbowmen and were probably used in much the same way on the battlefield—all three weapons existed side by side until the later fifteenth century. Whether they were more effective than these two traditional weapons is not an easy question to answer. While the longbow needed long years of practice and considerable skill to shoot, the crossbow was a relatively easy weapon to master, and both could be shot considerably more quickly and were more accurate than the early handgun, which had to be loaded from the muzzle with powder and ball. Recent experimental work has, however, indicated that the velocity of a bullet was considerably greater than either the crossbow's bolt or the longbow's arrow—handguns offered a greater impact and armor-penetrating ability, offsetting their inaccuracy and low rate of fire. Illustrations from the fifteenth century, especially those in the various manuscript copies of the Swiss Chronicles, show many handgunners, but it is not until the battle of Pavia in 1525 that they made a significant contribution to the battle's outcome.

[*See also* Artillery; Gunpowder; *and* Hand-to-Hand Combat.]

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HAND-TO-HAND COMBAT

During the Middle Ages a variety of different hand weapons proved their utility and versatility in close combat against the combinations of arms and armor they were called upon to face. During this brutal period, different weapon and armor types evolved in response to the needs of fighting men engaged in all manner of personal violence. These led to newer martial techniques, which in turn promoted still more changes in arms and armor, and so on, in a continuous cycle of development. But for every family of hand weapon, there was a fundamental common way to wield the weapon effectively.

Hand-to-hand combat in the medieval period was savage, vicious, and usually unforgiving, though not without its moments of chivalric fair play and honorable mercy. As chronicles and accounts from the time document, piercing weapons and sword points could often puncture assorted armor and helmets or stab clean through a body. The edges of most bladed weapons were sharp enough to shear through flesh and bone, cleave deep into the torso, and sever limb or head with a single swipe. Even while cutting through hard armor, blades could sometimes impact with enough force to smash the flesh and bone underneath. The edge of a bladed weapon did not actually have to cut in order to exert tremendous force on a small area of its target. This was even truer of specialized concussion weapons.

Fencing and combative skills in this period comprised the use of single and two-handed swords, daggers, assorted polearms, and shields; the coordination of two-weapon combinations; fighting in armor; extensive use of grappling and wrestling; body throws, trapping holds, and joint manipulation; kicks and empty-hand strikes; disarming techniques; facing multiple opponents; and fighting mounted and on foot. Whether on foot or horseback, a man-at-arms had to be adept at warding off whatever attack another man might deliver and at causing harm to him at close range. This was best achieved through continuous training in fighting skills based on a systematic understanding of the core principles and concepts involved.

There were many kinds of weapons and specific techniques for using them simply because there were many different, challenging conditions of personal combat. Different weapons—by virtue of varying length, weight, center of gravity, and maneuverability—facilitate different actions (e.g., cutting, piercing, or smashing). They also enable different degrees of defensive warding and parrying

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Hand-to-Hand Combat. Illustration from *Das Solothurner Fechtbuch*, a German fighting text, c. 1423. Reprinted in *Die Fechtkunst im XV. und XVI. Jahrhunderte* by Gustav Hergsell, 1896. COURTESY JOHN CLEMENTS

of blows (by deflecting motions, trapping actions, and displacing counterstrikes). The capacity of any weapon to combine such actions is a matter of both its functional design and the user's skill. Some weapons offer greater innate utility for performing some of these actions than do others, and thereby allow the development of particular modes of fighting (or fencing). Combat styles in turn influence the design of weapons that best accommodate the effectiveness of their method of use.

Tactically, effective hand-to-hand combat involved careful application of range, timing, perception, pressure, leverage, specific technique, and appropriate attitude. The personal attributes required of skilled fighting men are obvious enough: courage, tenacity, audacity, wisdom, and prudence combined with strength, dexterity, and endurance. Martial discipline—fighting prowess and skill at arms—was a personal necessity for war. This was true whether for general battlefield defense, judicial combats, chivalric feats of arms, communal security, or personal protection on the streets.

To be sure, not every man who took up a weapon or entered combat in the Middle Ages was a skillful fighter or expertly trained in a system of self-defense. Some men relied solely on natural talent to serve them in combat. But the raison d'être for the art of arms was to overcome an adversary's physical advantages in size, strength, speed, or aggressiveness. Professional teachers of arms are known to have existed from at least the twelfth century, and experts in knightly fighting skills and public guilds that taught combat arts emerged by the mid-fourteenth century. While apprehension and hesitation were natural in a fight, the historical martial-arts literature from the late thirteenth to late fifteenth centuries encouraged the combatant to avoid fear and passivity in favor of aggressively seizing the initiative. Such works teach the warrior to strike blow after blow from opening to opening, strongly and without pause, keeping in constant motion. The warrior's finely crafted tools were formidable, sophisticated, and highly effective implements, and his methods of combat were swift, intense, athletic, and fierce. It was thus simply because men fighting for their lives or filled with the fury of battle are often not easily slain or deterred.

Medieval hand-to-hand fighting required power and dynamic skill. Fighting men used quick, economical techniques that conserved motion to provide a firm defense and deliver strong attacks. This was an age when the concern in personal combat was for immediate, practical lethal function over any display of form. Combat was typically a desperate affair. Close combat in western Europe during the medieval period was energetic, intense, and invariably vicious, yet by no means without tactical skill and technical artistry. The unequivocal picture of combat presented by the historical sources is one of trained warriors expertly employing well-balanced, well-made, cleverly designed, agile weapons and armor with ferocious efficiency.

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[*See also* Knighthood and Knights; Manuals, Military; Schools and Masters of Arms; Training; *and* Weapons, *subentry on* Hand-to-Hand.]

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John Clements

HARALD HARDRADA

(c. 1015–1066), King of Norway. Harald Sigurdsson was the youngest of three sons of King Sigurd of Norway; his biography is recorded in the romantic thirteenth-century *King Harald's Saga* by Snorri Sturluson. In 1030, King Cnut of England and Denmark invaded Norway, and Harald's elder half-brother, King Olaf II Haraldsson, was killed defending his realm. Although only about fifteen years old, Harald escaped with a small band and fled to Kiev, where they served King Yaroslav for several years. In time Harald saw better opportunities farther south and joined the Varangians, the elite bodyguard of the Byzantine emperor. The saga relates vivid incidents from this period of Harald's life, but many are probably derived from contemporary storytelling. One frequently cited discrepancy is Snorri's claim that Harald blinded the emperor Constantine IX Monomachos, though it was actually Constantine's predecessor, Michael V Kalaphates, who in 1042 was blinded by Varangians loyal to the empress Zoe, whom Michael had exiled.

Harald was certainly a prominent member, and at times the leader, of the Varangians and led many successful campaigns against the Muslims. In the execution of these campaigns, Harald accumulated much personal wealth, and as middle age approached, he began to consider returning to his homeland. Cnut had died in 1035, and Norway was ruled by King Magnus, the son of Olaf, but the Danish court still held considerable power in Norwegian affairs. Magnus's reaction to Harald's return in 1045 as a wealthy, established military commander with a force of seasoned troops was pragmatic: he agreed to share the throne with his uncle. Within a year Magnus died in mysterious circumstances. For twenty years Harald ruled Norway ruthlessly and terrorized the Danes, earning himself the sobriquet "Hardrada" (*Harðráða*, "hard ruler").

Perhaps the king yearned to recapture the excitement of his youthful adventures, or perhaps his greed for wealth and power outweighed his good sense, but when Tostig Godwinson, the exiled brother of Harold II of England, urged Harald Hardrada to press his claim to the English throne, the king agreed. This claim descended to Harald as the successor to Magnus, the successor to Cnut (but only in respect of the Norwegian throne). Harald must have known that his claim to lordship over England was extremely tenuous, but he also knew that if he could secure a military victory over the English, the legal niceties could be brushed aside.

In September 1066 the fifty-one-year-old Harald landed in Yorkshire with a fleet of more than three hundred ships. His army of perhaps nine thousand men destroyed the local forces gathered against them at Fulford on 20 September and captured York. Five days later King Harold II of England arrived with a combined English army, having traveled two hundred miles from London, and surprised the Norwegians. The encounter at Stamford Bridge was bloody but short: by nightfall the invasion force had been slaughtered and the Norwegian king himself lay among the dead. Harald's invasion, though unsuccessful, certainly weakened the English

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forces—which engaged William II of Normandy just a few days later—and contributed to the Norman overthrow of the English king.

Throughout his life Harald was a colorful character, a formidable warrior and commander, an opportunist, and a daring strategist, perhaps the foremost military leader in northern Europe of his day. With the passing of King Harald Hardrada, the Viking Age came to an end.

[*See also* Britain, *subentry on* Narrative (1000–1300) *and* Varangian Guard.]

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Stephen Pollington

HARANGUES, BYZANTINE

Byzantine generals were expected to deliver *protreptikoi logoi*, "inspiring speeches," before battle, but also after campaigns as rewards were distributed and armies disbanded. Troops might then be inspired by tales of their own valor and achievements, and encouraged to return to the camps when next summoned. Emperor Maurice, in his *Strategikon* (ca. 600 C.E.), records that the function of *kantatores* (heralds) was "to address the troops to encourage them and get them to recall their previous victories."

Herakleios is illustrated haranguing his troops in portions of poems by George of Pisidia preserved in the chronicle of Theophanes the Confessor. The author of the *De Velitatione* (ca. 970) urged commanders to assemble their men and incite them to courage with honeyed words, supplying some suggestions. Fuller instruction on the forms that exhortations might take was outlined in a manual of military rhetoric, the sixth-century *Rhetorica militaris* attributed to Syrianos Magister. This has been preserved in part in two manuscripts compiled in the later tenth and early eleventh centuries; in the latter the *Rhetorica* is followed by a collection of pertinent speeches drawn from Xenophon, Flavius Josephus, and Herodian, ending with two harangues composed by, or for, Constantine VII Porphyrogenitos. These last were included as contemporary models with, in the second manuscript, generic plurals introduced to mask the commander to whom the oration once referred, McGeer offers translations of, and insightful commentary on, both tenth-century harangues, which he places in a tradition "as old as the *Iliad* . . . the power of oratory to inspire soldiers could be used to great effect by ancient commanders, as shown by an Alexander or a Caesar." Constantine VII was neither, for he dispatched his harangues from Constantinople to be delivered by others.

[*See also* Herakleios; Heralds and Heraldry; Maurice; *and* Treatises, Byzantine.]

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Paul Stephenson

HARBOR DEFENSES

Being vulnerable as well as valuable commercial assets, the harbors of many medieval coastal and river ports were afforded special protection through their own dedicated defenses. Five different means of fortifying medieval harbors can be identified, found individually as well as in combination. First, a metal chain across the harbor mouth could be suspended between freestanding boom towers or mural towers attached to the city wall. Retractable and usually

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Harbor Defenses. View of Dubrovnik's harbor. PHOTOGRAPH BY SANJA CABARKAPA

operated by a windlass, these could be readily raised and lowered to block the movement of ships. Second, breakwaters, sea walls, or quays forming part of the harbor perimeter could be provided with features of defensive architecture such as crenellations, wall-walks, and towers, operating in effect as extensions of the urban enceinte. Third, roads leading to and from quaysides and harbors might pass through defended gates pierced through the town wall. Fourth, a castle might be built to overlook a harbor and contribute to its protection. Particularly large and important coastal castles sometimes incorporated docks and small-scale harbor facilities of their own, so that they could be supplied from the sea, as was the case with several of the famous late-thirteenth-century castles of Edward I in north Wales. Fifth, the spread of gunpowder artillery saw the construction of blockhouses and artillery towers designed to accommodate batteries of cannon overlooking harbor entrances and maritime approaches, especially from the fifteenth century on. In the early period of experimentation with artillery fortification, gun towers with rectangular or square plans were sometimes favored, while those built into later harbor defenses tended to be rounded in plan or featured angled bastions in the Renaissance style.

As well as protecting harbors and quayside facilities from piracy raids and acting as a deterrent against full-scale sieges, these defenses also helped towns regulate trade and collect tolls. But defense fortifications of harbors and quays sometimes conflicted with the commercial functions of port towns. For example, the important port of Southampton on the south coast of England was effectively fortified on only two sides, with the defenses of the quays and waterfront consisting of ineffective timber structures. This left the town venerable to a devastating attack in October 1338 by the French and their Genoese allies. Subsequently, Edward III ordered a stone wall built along the quayside, and by the end of the fourteenth century, gunports had been added to the Southampton defenses.

Among the better preserved examples of medieval defended harbors in Europe, Dubrovnik stands out for the integrity of its fortifications, which are attached to a completely surviving urban enceinte dating from the thirteenth to seventeenth centuries. In the former Crusader states, where the main urban

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centers tended to be port towns clustered along the Mediterranean coast, Acre, Atlit, Caesarea, Sidon, and Tyre possessed important fortified harbors either under the shadow of castles or equipped with their own defenses. Rhodes, another good example, always had extensive harbor defenses since at least ancient times, but they were rebuilt a number of times in the Middle Ages.

[*See also* Fortifications; Hundred Years' War, *subentry on* Naval Raids on England; Naval Combat and Tactics; *and* Urban Defenses.]

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Oliver Creighton

HARFLEUR, SIEGE OF

Harfleur today forms the eastern suburb of Le Havre, but in the Middle Ages it was the first major settlement on the northern side of the Seine estuary. Thanks to construction activity between 1344 and 1361, it was fully walled, with twenty-four mural towers and three main gates, which were further protected by outworks: the author of the *Gesta Henrici Quinti*, the earliest account (c. 1417), calls these "barbicans" but notes that the common people called them "bulwarks." On the landward side the town is surrounded by hills, Mont Lecomte to the west being particularly steep. The Lézarde River runs through the town before meandering through marshland to the Seine. By damming the river at its entry point to the town, the inhabitants—who may have numbered five thousand—were able to flood the land on the western side, thereby making access to the walls difficult. The town therefore presented a formidable challenge to Henry V and his army—numbering around twelve thousand men. In order to lay siege, he established his camp on Mont Lecomte, sending his eldest brother, Thomas, Duke of Clarence, with some of the army to Mont Cabert to the east. According to the *Gesta*, three hundred men under Raoul de Gaucourt entered the town from that side before the duke was able to establish his position, thereby reinforcing the companies of esquires and crossbowmen—around two thousand strong—already in the town under the captain, Sir Lyonnet de Bracquemont.

Henry began his investment of Harfleur on 17 August 1415. By the twenty-third, the inhabitants sent word to Constable Charles d'Albret at Rouen that they were no longer able to make contact by land, asking for, and being provided with, a small galley so that they could exchange news and victuals with Honfleur, on the other side of the estuary. Henry soon realized that he needed to blockade the town by positioning ships on the Seine and smaller boats in the flooded area around the town. The French made serious efforts to counteract this under the direction of the admiral, Clignet de Brabant, culminating in an attack on English ships between 14 and 16 September. The failure of this action was no doubt a factor in the decision of the townspeople to enter into negotiations with Henry two days later.

The landward siege was pursued by various means, all well described in the *Gesta*. Henry had his men construct trenches to protect themselves and the various guns and throwing machines, which were largely trained on the barbicans. The French deployed their own gunpowder artillery, as well as making sorties against English positions and in the early weeks being able to repair at night the damage caused by bombardment. They made access to the walls difficult by throwing jars of sulfur and quicklime and setting fire to siege towers. On the Duke of Clarence's side, a mine was dug to undermine the walls, but lack of space left the diggers vulnerable to attack, and the plan was abandoned in the face of countermines and sorties. Even when the outer defenses were in ruins, the defenders brought their guns inside the town and continued to harry the English.

Henry tried on several occasions to persuade the defenders to negotiate just as they themselves sent messengers to the dauphin at Vernon in the hope of

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

SHELLEY REID

a relieving army. On 17 September Henry announced that an assault would be made the next day, and maintained a bombardment all night. This prompted the besieged to agree a treaty of composition, whereby they would surrender on 22 September if the French did not come to raise the siege by then. Henry made ceremonial entry into Harfleur on 23 September, but the town had been won at considerable cost. In addition to those killed in action during the siege, over thirteen hundred had to be invalided home because of dysentery, which had flourished in the unsanitary and overcrowded conditions of the camps. The fortifications had been so weakened that Henry needed to install a garrison of three hundred men-at-arms and nine hundred archers to ensure the safekeeping of the town. The town had taken longer to capture than he had anticipated, and he abandoned plans to attempt the capture of any other towns but decided instead to march northward toward Calais, thereby drawing the French away from an early attack on his newly taken, but still vulnerable, town—and, in the event, bringing on the battle of Agincourt.

[*See also* Agincourt, Battle of *and* Henry V.]

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Anne Curry

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HARLECH CASTLE

See Welsh Castles of Edward I.

HASTINGS, BATTLE OF

The year 1066 was one of battles for succession to the English throne following the death of the childless Edward the Confessor in January. Harold II, whom Edward had himself designated, nevertheless "met little quiet" as he sought to defend his kingship, first against an Anglo-Flemish force under his brother Tostig, the deposed Earl of Northumbria, which raided along the south and east coasts in the spring, and then against two "foreign" claimants. In the north the Norwegian king, Harald Hardrada, had defeated an army led by the Earls of Northumbria and Mercia, the brothers Morcar and Edwin, at Fulford outside York (20 September). King Harold, alerted by coastal beacons, appeared suddenly after a forced march and the Norwegian force, also including Tostig, was surprised and comprehensively defeated at Stamford Bridge (25 September). Much of Harold's success to this point is attributable to preparations to meet a greater threat in the south from Duke William of Normandy.

Battle of Hastings. William of Normandy (c. 1028–1087, *right*) killing King Harold II (c. 1022–1066) at the battle of Hastings, 14 October 1066. Illustration from *Decrees of Kings of Anglo-Saxon and Norman England*, MS Cott Vitt A XIII, fol. 3v, fourteenth century. BRITISH LIBRARY, LONDON, UK/© BRITISH LIBRARY BOARD. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

Preparations to invade England had been hatched at Lillebonne in February, with spring and summer spent publicizing the expedition among William's own Norman followers, neighboring French, Breton, Flemish, and Poitevin lords, and in diplomatic missions, one of which secured papal support. An invasion fleet of six hundred ships in the estuary of the Dives in July was delayed for a month by poor weather, before moving up the coast to St. Valéry-sur-Somme in Ponthieu. From here, and not without several tense incidents, it crossed the channel to land at Pevensey on 29 September almost at the end of the traditional campaigning season. Both leaders by this stage had committed themselves to high levels of risk-taking.

In England Harold had summoned the largest forces ever demanded, an army, the *fyrd*, and a fleet, the *scipfyrd*, to counter invasion threats along the south coast, but each had dispersed for lack of supplies by 8 September. Both had been recalled before Harold reached London on 6 October, where he spent five days waiting for reinforcements. In Sussex the Norman army had constructed an earth-and-timber castle at Hastings and commenced to forage and ravage the surrounding countryside. This was the more normal pattern of warfare as both leaders had known and practiced it, on borders in Wales and Brittany. A customary response would have been to destroy lands beyond the range of William's foragers and wait for his supplies to become exhausted, or to seek to buy off the invader. Both strategies were actively explored in negotiations between London and Hastings, but the

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season, the prospect of a reassembled English fleet, and the fragile structure of English politics seem to have driven both parties to look for the unpredictable outcome of a pitched battle.

Harold's army of ten thousand men, although weakened, was still the larger; it consisted of his own military household, other mounted thegns including his brothers' men, and the elements of the *fyrd* from southern England. The Mercians and Northumbrians, mauled at Fulford and Stamford Bridge, and perhaps lukewarm in their support for Harold, mostly stayed away, Edwin and Morcar reportedly deserting the king before the battle. The recent success of a forced march against Harald Hardrada encouraged the English to try to confront William by surprise, leaving London as late as 12 October, but the Normans were forewarned and moved seven miles north from Hastings to meet the English as they emerged from the Weald at dawn on 14 October to occupy "a hill near the forest with a neighbouring valley," a damp and marginal landscape of sedge, "untilled because of its roughness." Harold's choice of the ground, an east-west ridge projecting from a narrow spur of the Weald that also controlled the road to London, gave him important tactical advantages but allowed little opportunity for retreat. His household occupied the summit, flanked by the *fyrd*.

At the foot of the slope William's Normans were by 9:00 A.M. arrayed in three lines, archers to the front with armored foot soldiers and mounted knights behind. The left flank of Bretons, and the right of French and Flemings were similarly organized. The whole force comprised somewhere around seven thousand men. The battle would last until dusk, the two armies evenly balanced but different in fighting style. The English, increasingly accustomed to the use of horses, preferred to fight on foot with axes and spears behind a shield wall, but seem here to have had few archers; William's army, reliant on cavalry mostly armed with lances rather than the rarer sword, nevertheless employed a considerable number of infantry, archers, and crossbowmen.

The initial Norman advance in lines was clumsy and constricted by the slope and gave the English their greatest chance of victory. The Bretons on the left flank broke and fled under the weight of spears from the *fyrd*, who pursued them downhill. The Normans in the center too fell back, Duke William having the first of several horses killed under him and a rumor of his death circulating quickly. The English pursuit might have driven William from the field, but the counterattack faltered, perhaps as a result of the deaths of Harold's brothers, Gyrth and Leofwine, though other sources place their demise at the end of the day. William rallied his troops, riding in front with his helmet raised to show his face. His half-brother, Bishop Odo, performed a similar function, wielding a club and his tongue at the retreating horsemen. The halt allowed the Bretons to regroup and to annihilate a stranded element of the pursuing *fyrd*.

The day wore on, longish pauses separating further attacks on the resilient shield wall. Casualties were high among the Normans, but the initiative had passed to William who now adopted the feigned flight, first of his Franco-Flemish right flank, as a stratagem to tempt the *fyrd* from the hill. By the late afternoon the battle had become one of attrition, English ranks thinning under volleys of arrows. As long as Harold lived and his household held the field, the success of William's campaign remained perilous. However, the English had no way of achieving victory beyond their stubborn resistance on the ridge top. The manner of Harold's death near dusk was not immediately known, and was probably extrapolated from the wounds later discovered on his body. He may have been wounded by an arrow to the head and cut down as his household broke in the final assault. The "arrow in the eye" was adopted by the artist of the Bayeux Tapestry, no doubt because of its allegorical significance as a punishment for perjury.

Harold's household died with him. The remnants of the *fyrd* fled at the news of the king's death and were ridden down by Norman cavalry. Hastings is indeed often seen as a triumph of cavalry over infantry, but the duration of the battle is as telling in support of a contrary view. William's cavalry certainly found the ground to be a challenge, and their

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discomfort in dealing with isolated pockets of the *fyrd* is shown on the Tapestry. The occasional disasters they experienced in the pursuit of the English army from the field are also detailed in later literary sources. Orderic Vitalis reports an incident in which Norman horsemen plunged into a deep gully, later known as the *Malfosse* (evil ditch).

The battle was not initially seen as decisive and William waited fruitlessly in Hastings for submissions from the remaining English elite. Only after several weeks of traditional raiding and some desultory resistance did the surviving earls and senior clerics submit at Berkhamsted. Harold's body was recovered from the field and buried at Waltham Abbey; the field itself became a kind of English Nicopolis, a memorial church founded on the site of Harold's standard and his death, a town established along the narrow neck to the ridge, and a landscape delineated as the "territory of battle." Contemporary names for the site, including Senlac, were almost immediately superseded by the official name, first recorded in the Domesday Book, Hastings.

[*See also* Bayeux Tapestry; Cavalry; Commemoration of Battles and Warriors; Domesday Book; Harald Hardrada; Infantry; *and* William I.]

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HATTIN, BATTLE OF

The defeat of the army commanded by Guy de Lusignan, King of Jerusalem, by Saladin, sultan of Egypt and Syria, west of Tiberias (modern-day Teverya, Israel) on 3–4 July 1187 represented the greatest Muslim victory over the Franks of the Christian principalities of Outremer.

After seizing control of Muslim Syria on the death of his lord, Nur al-Din (1174), Saladin had launched repeated fruitless attacks on the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem. In the summer of 1187 he collected a huge army of some thirty thousand men from his own dominions and those of his allies throughout the Near East, who gathered at Ashtara in the Hawran (modern-day southern Syria). Its most important elements were the heavy cavalry and horse archers recruited from among Turkish and Kurdish mamluks (slave soldiers). As he gained intelligence of Saladin's preparations, King Guy assembled what was probably the largest army ever raised by the Franks of Outremer: the entire feudal host of the Kingdom of Jerusalem save for minimal garrisons, together with the forces of the Templars and Hospitallers, allied contingents from the county of Tripoli and the principality of Antioch, and numerous mercenaries hired with funds provided by Henry II of England. This combined force of perhaps five thousand knights, mounted sergeants, and Turcopoles and some ten to fifteen thousand infantry mustered at Saforie (modern-day Zippori, Israel), west of Lake Tiberias, in anticipation of an invasion of Galilee.

Saladin intended to ravage Frankish territory and seize strongpoints, but his main aim was to engineer a pitched battle that would allow him to destroy the majority of Frankish forces in Palestine. In late June his troops crossed the Jordan, and on 1 July they took up positions in the hills west of Lake Tiberias, while a detachment seized control of the town of Tiberias, whose garrison held out in the castle. Count Raymond III of Tripoli (the lord of Tiberias) and others argued in favor of avoiding battle and facing off the Muslims from the strong and well-watered position at Saforie, if necessary retreating toward Acre. In 1183 Guy (at that time regent of the kingdom) had followed this precise strategy in a quite similar situation, but despite forcing Saladin to withdraw on that occasion, he had been subsequently criticized for his inaction by opponents among the Jerusalem nobility. As a result of this experience, he was

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inclined toward the offensive option advocated by his allies Raynald of Châtillon, lord of Transjordan, and Gerard of Ridefort, the master of the Temple, who both urged relief of Tiberias.

Saladin's troops occupied high ground that controlled the main routes to Tiberias as well as most of the water sources. The Franks left Saforie on 3 July, but were surrounded by Muslim units that harassed them as they marched. They stopped at the village of Maskana, where they spent an uncomfortable night standing to arms, with only minimal water supplies available from a few cisterns. The Muslims were well provided with cartloads of arrows and plentiful water from the lake, and either during the night or at dawn they set fire to the scrub around the Christian camp. The precise sequence of events the next day (4 July) is difficult to reconstruct, and there is no agreement among the various sources. Saladin planned to delay close combat in order to maximize the effects of the heat on the Franks, and continued to harass them with brush fires and repeated volleys of arrows, but after learning of their pitiful state from deserters he ordered his troops to close in and attack. Some commentators have argued that the Franks intended to fight their way through to the lake, but their ability to use their cavalry to advantage must have been severely restricted given the effects of the heat and lack of water on their warhorses. It is more likely that Guy and his counsellors decided to attempt to gain a quick victory by means of an attack against Saladin and his household troops, stationed in the Muslim center. While the infantry were held back, the knights and light cavalry launched a series of charges which came close to overwhelming Saladin himself, but the Muslim troops held and began to force the Franks back in disorder.

As the Frankish army broke up, a large number of the infantry sought refuge on two peaks between Maskana and Tiberias, known as the Horns of Hattin. The king and most of the surviving cavalry retreated to this point, where they made a last stand around the royal banner and the relic of the True Cross. Raymond of Tripoli and his much depleted cavalry division eventually found themselves beyond the Muslim lines and managed to escape to Tyre (modern-day Sur, Lebanon), as did a few individuals from the rearguard.

The surviving Franks on the battlefield were made captive after fighting to the point of exhaustion. Saladin's old foe Raynald of Châtillon was beheaded on the spot, and the same fate was meted out to the surviving Templars and Hospitallers with the sole exception of Gerard of Ridefort. He, the king, and some other prisoners were eventually ransomed, but the majority were sold into slavery. The consequences of the battle for the Kingdom of Jerusalem were devastating. With no remaining Frankish forces left in the field, Saladin was soon able to capture Jerusalem and the kingdom's other cities except for Tyre. The magnitude of the defeat and the loss of the True Cross sent shock waves around Christendom, whose response was to launch the Third Crusade.

[*See also* Crusades, *subentry on* Narrative (1180–1245) *and* Saladin.]

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Alan V. Murray

HAUSBERGEN, BATTLE OF

On 8 March 1262, northwest of Strasbourg, the militia of the city defeated their bishop, Walther of Geroldseck, who was attempting to reassert his seigneurial rights. It ended the long struggle of the *Waltarkriege*, and Strasbourg became an Imperial Free City.

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When the burghers dispatched a force to have one of the bishop's fortified church towers near Mundolsheim destroyed, Geroldseck blocked their return. He assembled a great army of all his knights and *ministeriales*, totaling three hundred knights and five thousand foot soldiers. The bishop, however, did not prevent reinforcements from joining the initial sortie force. The burghers' cavalry and foot soldiers were now much greater in number, including three hundred crossbowmen led by two experienced knights, which some historians describe as being held in reserve.

Aside from these three hundred, the townsmen had no mercenaries. Strasbourg's chief ally, Rudolph of Habsburg, did not take part in the battle. The well-structured communal army formed their battle order and the cavalry, instructed by their knightly superiors, assaulted the enemy. The crossbowmen, instead of being used as support troops, had been withdrawn from the main body to prevent the bishop's foot soldiers from joining his cavalry. It is still debated whether this was a conscious plan, as one source claims. It seems unlikely that a three-hundred-man-strong unit would have been expected to be able to cut the cavalry from its five-thousand-man-strong infantry. It is more likely that when the burghers made a detour to bypass a ditch, the bishop supposed they intended to withdraw and dashed forward far ahead of his foot soldiers. The crossbowmen apparently occupied a height and fired constantly (half reloading while the other half shot), which had a shocking impact, but it was the Geroldseck's imprudence and self-confidence in rushing forward with great impetus that put him out of reach of his foot soldiers. He ordered this charge against the advice of "the wiser and more experienced knights" (*Bellum Walther*ianum), who realized the numerical superiority of their adversaries.

The bishop's cavalry were outflanked by a solid mass of "numberless" foot soldiers thrusting with their long spears against horses even if it meant killing their own men-at-arms' mounts. Exposed to the pikes the knights were overpowered and the townsmen "killed as many as they wished" (*Richeri Gesta Senoniensis Eclesiae*). Walther barely escaped with his life. More than fifty nobles were killed, and more than seventy were captured.

The Strasbourgers had battle axes, *ascias* or *haches danaises*, against which, claims the *Richeri Gesta Senoniensis Eclesiae*, "neither shield, nor helmet, nor armor could protect." Historians, however, have questioned this statement since it cannot be seen why this weapon would not have been used otherwise with such success.

Hausbergen was one of the first combats between urban infantry and men-at-arms where pikes were used in a melee. The knights were crushed by the enormous weight of foot soldiers, in coordination with heavy cavalry, as well as a careful use of terrain and considered tactics. The communal leadership involved professionals, drilling a rapid and disciplined fire of crossbowmen (half shooting, half reloading), and timing an outflanking movement efficiently.

[*See also Ministeriales.*]

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Attila Bárány

HAUTEVILLE, ROGER DE

See Roger I.

Material com direitos autorais

HAWKWOOD, JOHN

(c. 1320–1394), English soldier of fortune. John Hawkwood was the most successful mercenary captain in fourteenth-century Italy. Born in England, in the town of Sible Hedingham, Hawkwood began his military career in France during the Hundred Years' War, most likely in the retinue of Humphrey de Bohun. However, he spent the majority of his career in Italy, arriving in 1361 with the White Company in the employ of the marquis of Montferrat. Over the next thirty-three years, Hawkwood distinguished himself both as a captain of local armies and leader of marauding free companies. When he died in 1394, the Florentines, his last employer, buried him in the cathedral and commissioned an equestrian portrait in his honor. The painting was redone in 1436 by the great artist Paolo Uccello and remains Hawkwood's most enduring legacy to the modern world.

The Florentines may have commemorated Hawkwood in a painting, but he had numerous other employers in his Italian career. In addition to the marquis of Montferrat, Hawkwood worked for Pisa, Milan, Padua, Naples, and the papacy. In 1363, he first emerged as an independent commander when he was in Pisan employ. However, Hawkwood's first campaign was unsuccessful; he drove his army in frigid weather and was forced to retreat. Nevertheless, months later, he led Pisan forces to the Florentine walls, where he later refused a bribe to abandon his employer, thus gaining a posthumous reputation for honesty.

For much of the 1360s and 1370s, Hawkwood worked for the city of Milan and its ruler, Bernabò Visconti. Hawkwood led Milanese troops effectively, scoring battlefield victories at Rubiera (near Modena) in 1372 against papal forces and at Montichiari, on the banks of the Chiese River, in 1373. In 1375, he briefly took up service with the papacy in its war against Florence (War of Eight Saints). Just prior to that, he directed a free company of soldiers on the most profitable raid of the era, on Tuscany, netting more than 200,000 gold florins.

During his service to the pope, Hawkwood participated in the famous sack of Cesena (1377) alongside

John Hawkwood (1323–1394). Equestrian fresco by Paolo Uccello, 1436. DUOMO, FLORENCE, ITALY/ALINARI/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

Breton mercenaries, which led to the murder of most of the civilian population of the town. Hawkwood left the employ of the Church shortly thereafter, married an illegitimate daughter of Bernabò Visconti, and served with the Florentines, covertly allied with Milan. In 1378, Hawkwood rode against Verona at the head of Bernabò's army. But the two men fell into bitter disagreement over the conduct of the campaign, and Hawkwood never again worked for Milan.

However, it was outside of Verona in 1378 that Hawkwood met Geoffrey Chaucer, sent by representatives of King Richard II to help arrange a marriage between the young monarch and one of Bernabò's daughters. Hawkwood traveled with Chaucer to Milan, but the embassy failed. Nevertheless,

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Hawkwood thereafter frequently served the king as ambassador and more generally functioned as an instrument of English policy in Italy.

Hawkwood's military reputation was primarily a result of the discipline of his troops and his ability to maneuver in the field. He appears to have been most effective in the broad plains of Lombardy, less so in hills of Tuscany, Umbria, and the *Regno*. His greatest field victory was in Lombardy at Castagnaro in 1387 in the employ of Padua. Seemingly trapped near the Adige River, Hawkwood effected an enveloping maneuver, sending a cavalry contingent across a canal that he had filled with dirt. He surrounded the enemy (Verona) and captured almost the whole of their forces. The tactic, reminiscent of the battle of Poitiers (1356), has led some scholars to suggest that Hawkwood participated in that battle.

Hawkwood also gained substantial renown for his retreat in 1391 from Milanese territory, fleeing the forces of Jacopo dal Verme and crossing three rivers to safety. Chroniclers of the city of Florence, for whom Hawkwood then worked, praised the retreat as having saved the army and state from sure defeat.

[*See also* Castagnaro, Battle of; Cesena, Massacre at; Condottieri; Poitiers, Battle of (1356); *and* Verme, Jacopo dal.]

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William Caferro

HEELU, JAN VAN

(fl. thirteenth century). Jan van Heelu was the author of a Middle Dutch verse epic written between the battle of Worringen (1288) and the death of the Duke of Brabant, John I (1294). It glorifies the heroic deeds of the duke in the Limburg war of succession (1283–1288) (in Part I, vv. 1–3920) and especially the battle itself (5 June 1288) (in Part II, vv. 3921–8948) between the coalitions of Brabant, Berg, and the citizens of Cologne on one side and the archbishop of Cologne, Guelders, and Luxemburg on the other. The war had two aspects: a territorial one (the possession of the duchy of Limburg and the control of the trade connection between Cologne and Flanders) and the acquisition of freedom (revolt of the citizens of Cologne against the archbishop). Heelu and his Brabantine followers accentuate the first aspect, the Cologne and other German authors the second.

Heelu's description of the battle of Worringen consists of two parts. The first is a chronological report of its course in 2,240 verses, the climax of which is the assault on the banner of the duke of Luxemburg, who is killed. The second is a description in 1,252 verses of the feats of the individual Brabantine knights, who are grouped and ranged according to their dignity, starting with the duke. The battle was mainly fought by knights on horseback, but farmers from the county of Berg also played an important role as footmen.

Heelu claims a certificate of reliability by declaring that other people who had described these events were not well informed (vv. 59–62) and by asserting that he himself had been an eyewitness of the battle (v. 7553). He evidently knows the topography of the war of succession very well. It is accepted that the literary phrasing of the events and the author's taking the Brabantine side do not harm the reliability of his report very much.

[*See also* Worringen, Battle of.]

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HELGEÅ, BATTLE OF

The battle of Helgeå (a river in Skåne, present-day southern Sweden) was a combined naval and land

engagement between the Anglo-Danish king Cnut and an alliance of Olaf II Haraldsson, King of Norway, and Anund Jacob, King of Sweden. Most likely the battle occurred in 1026; the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* puts it in 1025. The Norwegian-Swedish alliance aimed at challenging Cnut's grip on Denmark and weakening his influence on the rest of Scandinavia.

In 1026, King Olaf and Norwegian magnates with a fleet of 420 ships raided Jutland, while Anund began occupying Danish Skåne with a land army and a fleet of sixty ships, as the alliance tried to win over Danish magnates and freemen. Cnut brought a large fleet from England, made up of Englishmen and Danes, in order to reinforce his position. The allies withdrew, and the combined Norwegian and Swedish armies made a stand at the mouth of the Helgeå. The Danish fleet, twice the size of the combined Norwegian and Swedish fleets, became strung out during the passage to Skåne, and it took well over a day to assemble for battle. Although the numbers may be exaggerated, the relative strengths are probably correct.

The two main narratives differ, but both emphasize massive logistical and engineering projects. According to Saxo Grammaticus (*Gesta Danorum* 10.16.1–11), Cnut led some of his troops on land to defeat the Swedish king at nearby Stangebjerg (*Stanga mons*), while he sent his fleet to attack the Swedes anchored on an island in the wide river mouth. The Danes built a pontoon bridge in order to attack them, but the Swedes let loose arrows and javelins from the shore. When in response the Danes made a massed charge, the bridge collapsed and many drowned. That night the Swedes abandoned the island, leaving the Danes to attack abandoned ships the next day.

According to the *Saga of Saint Olaf* in Snorri Sturluson's *Heimskringla*, Olaf had been upriver with his men for several days constructing a dam; when notified that the Danes were taking up position by the river's mouth, he broke the dam. The resulting surge, along with the debris of logs thrown into the riverbed, caused a great number of casualties: many of Cnut's troops had gone on land, and Danish ships that had been assembling in and around the harbor were smashed or driven out to sea. Battle was joined by accident when Cnut's flagship was driven against the allied fleet, but his ship was so large and well defended that it repulsed all attacks.

Both the version given by Saxo Grammaticus and the version in the saga may well be true because the fighting was very chaotic. The allied fleet withdrew eastward, but Cnut did not pursue, going back to Denmark when the alliance began to disintegrate. This left the Swedes in "possession of the place of slaughter" (*Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*). The battle was a tactical draw but a devastating strategic and political failure for the allied kings, especially Olaf. His magnates, bribed by Cnut, abandoned him (leaving him with only 120 of the original 420 ships), and within two years he was driven from his kingdom, which recognized Cnut as overlord. Olaf fell at the battle of Stiklestad (1030) while trying to reclaim his kingdom.

[*See also* Cnut; Olaf II Haraldsson; *and* Stiklestad, Battle of.]

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HELMETS

Making armor for the head was always a compromise between protection and the need for good vision and flexibility. For much of the medieval period, open, bowl-shaped helmets were preferred, though many forms were produced in response to the perceived threats of combat. Helmets were not always about protection, however, but were at various times, especially in the earlier period, symbols of prestige and power.

Evidence for helmets in the period following the fall of Rome is scarce, but it is clear that they were two types. The first was a simple iron skullcap, a bowl shape covering the top of the head. The other was called a *spangenhelm*, a more complicated piece, made from a metal framework consisting of an iron

Kettle Hat. The soldier (*holding a spear*) wears a *kettle hat*, a close-fitting bowl with a wide, flat brim. Musèe National du Moyen Âge, Paris. PHOTOGRAPH BY CLIFFORD J. ROGERS

band circling the head with two further bands running over the head from front to back and side to side. The triangular spaces were then filled either with metal plates or with horn. With either type, the sides of the face might be protected by cheekpieces, and the neck by an extension at the rear. In some helmets, semicircular holes were cut into the front of the helmet for the eyes, with a long, thin piece of iron in between to serve as a nose guard. In others, most notably the Vendel-style helmets found in sixth- and seventh-century Swedish graves, the eyes and upper nose were protected by a metal visor, with a smaller nose guard, or, as in the Sutton Hoo helmet, the eyes, nose, and much of the chin were covered by a larger faceguard. This latter form of construction was widespread throughout Europe from the late Roman period until after the eleventh century.

By the time of Charlemagne in the late eighth century, most warriors wore a simple open helmet, with a fairly shallow skull fitting closely to the head and flared out just above the level of the ears to form a brim. The famous Bayeux Tapestry, dating to the late eleventh century, shows soldiers wearing a plain type of conical helmet with a bar, the nasal, extending down to protect the nose. Although such helmets were initially made in sections, like the *spangenhelm*, it became more common for them to be made from a single sheet of iron. Many of the soldiers in the tapestry are also shown with a mail *coif* beneath their helmets as an additional protection. This was attached to a mail shirt like a hood.

Use of the plain conical helmet with a nasal spread across Europe throughout the twelfth century and well into the next. A slightly more rounded form appeared toward the end of the twelfth century, and both were used side by side for a while. From about 1220 a rounded skull-like helmet, called a *cervelliére* and later a *basinet*, often worn under the mail coif, became very common. From the early years of the thirteenth century, a guard to protect the face was sometimes fitted to the helmet, and this was extended around the head to produce the *helm* or *great helm*. This piece was essentially cylindrical in form, with a flat top and with sight and breath holes cut into the front; it was worn over the mail coif and was secured with a chinstrap. The soldier could wear a padded hood underneath.

Basinet with *Aventail*. German helmet, c. 1360. Deutsches Historisches Museum, Berlin. PHOTOGRAPH BY ROEL RENMANS

The *kettle hat*—a close-fitting bowl with a wide, flat brim similar to that used in the Carolingian period—was reintroduced toward the end of the twelfth century. This helmet type had a very long life—similar shaped helmets were still being made and used in seventeenth-century Europe. Early examples, at least until well into the fourteenth century, were constructed like the *spangenhelm*, but later they were made either from a single piece of iron or from two plates joined down a central ridge. Relatively easy and cheap to produce, the kettle hat was used by the common soldier, although it was sometimes also worn by the knightly and upper classes.

From about 1250 the mail coif was no longer attached to the mail shirt but was worn as a separate defense. The helm, often worn over the *cervelliére*, was made larger so that it touched the shoulders. From about 1300 the *cervelliére* was supplanted by the basinet. There were three types of basinets: a small globular form covering the sides and rear of the head, often with a visor; a deep conical helmet arched over the face and extending down almost to the shoulders at the sides and back, and also fitted with a visor; and a tall conical helmet with a straight horizontal lower edge cut off at the level of the ears. All three continued in use until the middle of the fourteenth century. The kettle hat also continued in use, although from about 1320 it began to display basinet-like features, such as the tall skull.

The basinet remained a popular helmet throughout the period, and by about 1330 it extended down to the base of the neck and forward to cover the rear of the cheeks. It was now usually fitted with an *aventail*, a mail extension protecting the neck and shoulders, secured to the helmet by *vervelles*, iron pegs with a transverse hole through which a cord or leather strip was threaded. The basinet was fitted with a visor, called a *klappvisier*, which at first was rounded and pivoted at the sides of the skull, although it later became more pointed and was usually attached to the center of the face opening. The visored basinet, the tall form of the basinet with a point toward the rear and a visor pivoted at the sides, became common throughout Europe from about 1380. A *great basinet*, a variation of the basinet fitted with plates resembling the aventail, was used primarily for jousting. The great helm changed very little throughout the fourteenth century, though after about 1350 it was increasingly used only for tournaments.

The two major centers of armor manufacture, north Italy and south Germany, also favored particular types of helmets. The typical helmets of the Italian workshops were the sallet, the armet, and the kettle hat. The *sallet*, a helmet closely fitting to the front of the head and formed into a long tail at

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Sallet. German helmet, c. 1475. Deutsches Historisches Museum, Berlin. PHOTOGRAPH BY ROEL RENMANS

the rear covering the neck, developed early in the fifteenth century. The front was cut out around the face and closed with a visor, which was fastened to the sides of the helmet skull and could be lifted to provide extra ventilation. A slit between the top of the visor and the helmet bowl provided vision when the visor was down. The *armet* consisted of a shallow bowl covering the top of the head, with a narrow extension down the back. Two large plates, hinged to the lower edge of the bowl, covered the sides of the face. The opening over the face was fitted with a pointed visor, pivoted at the sides. The kettle hat continued to be worn, although it was becoming less common.

In Germany the kettle hat, often with a wide brim, remained in use until about 1450, and the basinet continued to be worn. The Germans developed a different type of sallet. The tail was sometimes formed of several plates, with a deep skull fitted to the shape of the head. The helmet either had a visor pivoted at the sides, the eye slot formed between the lower edge of the skull and the upper edge of the visor, or was in one piece, with eye slots cut in the face.

The *close helmet*, developed shortly after 1500, consisted of a bowl covering the top of the head and extending down round the back of the head and neck. It was fitted with a visor that was usually formed of three separate plates with slots for seeing and breathing, was hinged at the sides, and could be lifted when needed.

The *burgonet* appeared in the early sixteenth century, probably as a development of the sallet. The skull of the burgonet was similar to that of the close helmet, but instead of a visor covering the face, the front was open. Above the eyes a small peak jutted forward, and hinged cheekpieces, which were tied together with a cord beneath the chin, protected the sides of the face. It allowed much greater vision and was less uncomfortable to wear than other helmets, as it left the mouth and nose open, although an additional piece, the *buffe*, was fitted to the front to protect the lower face when necessary. Used especially by the infantry and the light cavalry, it was popular throughout the sixteenth century. By this period, the kettle hat had developed into the *morion*, which had a tall skull and a narrow brim fitted with

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cheekpieces, which were tied together under the chin.

[*See also* Armor, Body; Metallurgy; Shields; *and* Weapons, Hand-to-Hand.]

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HENRY I

(c. 876–936), Duke of Saxony from 912 and King of Germany from 919. The son of Otto I, the Illustrious, Duke of Saxony, and eventually the father of Emperor Otto I, Henry "the Fowler" was a military leader of considerable achievements and lasting influence. Historians have long disputed the exact nature of these achievements.

In general, Henry is regarded as a significant commander for two reasons: his cultivation of units of heavy cavalry, and his push to revive the late Roman strategy of defense in depth against numerous and more mobile opponents. Regarding heavy cavalry, it seems that he inherited, as Duke of Saxony, a considerable army from his father, enough to make King Conrad I and the other German dukes cautious in their dealings with him. The extent, therefore, to which we can discern his own abilities as an innovative strategist is still open to debate. However, there is general agreement regarding his abilities in static defense and defense in depth, and his ability to identify the weak link in his military machine and to take effective steps to correct it. As Bernard and David Bachrach have argued, his reforms were designed to make the frontier fortresses both self-sufficient and productive of higher-grade soldiers than before his time, so that the garrisons could be used in open battle. It is unclear how developed this system was at the time of his death, and whether Henry was innovating or following a trend (since complex fortress systems existed elsewhere in East Francia around the same time).

Henry seems to have been a thoughtful strategist who was more comfortable with the organization and "approach to battle" than battle itself, in which he was only moderately successful. It is significant that, in at least two instances, his victories did not result from personal command. The capture of the Magyar king in 924, which allowed Henry to negotiate a decade of peace from Hungarian invasions, was accomplished by militia levies, as he had taken refuge in the fortress of Werla. Five years later, at the battle of Lenzen against the Wends, Henry delegated command of the royal army to two subordinates, rather than lead himself. How much this rather tentative style had to do with his own political insecurity, or with the overall condition of Saxon armies, is open to question. There seems little doubt that at the Riade in 933 Henry personally commanded his reorganized army against the Magyars, but he does not seem to have been viewed as a great warrior in the sense that his son Otto was.

As a field commander, Henry seems to have been neither better nor worse than his contemporaries. He was capable of forced marches and surprise attacks on fortresses, though, operationally, Conrad I and the Western Franks outmaneuvered him on several occasions. Comparatively little is known of Henry's ability in siegecraft. Despite his organizational abilities, Henry did not succeed in annihilating the Hungarian armies to the extent that his son did. Yet in the Riade campaign, Henry smashed two Hungarian armies in succession and managed to catch his more mobile opponents at a disadvantage, underscoring his abilities when on the operational offensive, but strategic defensive.

[*See also Agrarii Milites*; Germany, *subentry on* Historiography (911–1024); *and* Otto I.]

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HENRY II

(r. 1002–1024), German king and Holy Roman Emperor, last of the Saxon dynasty of emperors. Proclaimed the German king in 1002 and Holy Roman emperor in 1014, Henry stabilized the empire's position as the preeminent military power in central Europe. Noted for his support of the Church, he was canonized in 1147.

For the majority of his reign, Henry was at war. The death of Otto III without a designated heir created an unstable succession and, once on the throne, Henry had to deal with threats along the frontiers, maintain the position of the realm in Italy, and intervene in ongoing dynastic feuds. Accordingly, Henry fought wars against Bolesław Chrobry of Poland in 1003–1005, 1007–1013, and 1015–1018; Frisia in 1005; Flanders in 1007; Burgundy in 1018; the Abodrites in 1021; and Italy in 1004, 1013–1014, and 1021–1022. Only in the southeast, where his brother-in-law Stephen I was King of Hungary, could Henry rely on stability and peace throughout his reign.

Although Henry's campaigns were not uniformly successful, his military achievements must be evaluated in context. Henry faced threats on multiple fronts and was never completely free to concentrate the full resources of the empire. Yet he did not simply rush from one crisis to another; rather, his choices display a clear strategy: immediate threats to the integrity of the realm received the first priority, while disputes with enemies beyond the frontiers would be settled by negotiation when necessary and dealt with militarily when possible. Thus, the campaign of 1005 against Bolesław ended in a truce because Henry had to subdue Frisia, and after successful negotiations with Robert II of France about the western border, Henry used part of 1007 to secure the submission of the Count of Flanders.

Operationally, Henry displayed the mastery of space and time characteristic of Ottonian military organization. In 1004, for example, he withdrew from a campaign on the eastern frontier in late February, assembled forces for the Italian campaign at Regensburg in March, and crossed the Alpine passes in early April—by August, he was once again on the Elbe organizing a campaign into Bohemia. Henry also used converging columns on the Carolingian model: successfully in southern Italy in 1021, less successfully against Bolesław in 1015 when the columns were defeated in detail. Often, his operational desires encountered political limitations, with allies such as the Liutizi willing to help against Bolesław but equally wary of letting Henry become too powerful.

Henry's tactical acumen likewise met the professional standard of the period. He used specialized troops (Carinthians) to seize the Alpine passes in 1004, flank attacks to take difficult positions, and (essentially mercenary) Normans to supplement his forces in southern Italy. If his campaigns were characterized more by maneuver than pitched battles, that too was part of the professional repertoire of the medieval general. Battles were chancy events, and often there was no real desire to kill potential subjects or future allies. Henry II had his priorities straight—military force was a tool to be used to stabilize the realm, just as the Church could be used to administer it.

[*See also* Bolesław I Chrobry *and* Tactics, Battle.]

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Edward Schoenfeld

HENRY III

(1017–1056), German king and Holy Roman Emperor. Born on 28 October 1017, Henry succeeded his father, Conrad II, founder of the German royal dynasty of the Salians, when the latter died on 4 July 1039. He was crowned Holy Roman Emperor in 1046. Although his policies were devoted to the ideal of peace, he had to prove himself again and again as a military commander in conflicts with intra-German opponents and external enemies.

Henry III's campaigns in 1040 and 1041 to subordinate Bohemia and his military expedition into Hungary in 1051 clearly demonstrate strategic planning and thorough geographical knowledge of enemy territory. During the 1040 campaign, he ordered an advance guard to capture the wooden fortifications in the west Bohemian forests, to clear the way for his main army; when it was beaten, he abandoned his campaign, only to return the following year. This time Henry used one part of his army to pin his opponents, while he himself led another into their rear and then met up before Prague with a third army, which he had sent to invade Bohemia from the Saxon lands in the northwest.

After the subjection of the Bohemian duke, Henry turned against Hungary. In 1044, accompanied only by his *aulici* (household knights) and some Bavarian and Bohemian troops, the German king defeated a Hungarian host in the battle of Ménfő. Despite his military abilities—in 1051 he once again divided his forces and led a raid into Hungary north and south of the Danube—in the end Henry failed to subject the Hungarian princes. Although he led successful campaigns against his internal and external enemies (for example against the pagan Liutizians in 1045 and against Count Baldwin of Flanders in 1050), Henry's achievements were not enduring.

[*See also* Germany, *subentry on* Narrative (1024–1125); Hungary, *subentry on* Narrative (1000–1300); *and* Ménfő, Battle of.]

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HENRY IV

(1050–1106), German king (r. 1056–1106) and Holy Roman Emperor (r. 1056–1106). German king in 1053, sole king after 1056, crowned Holy Roman Emperor in 1084, and deposed in 1105, Henry IV is perhaps the best known and most controversial German ruler of the Middle Ages. His efforts to maintain royal power ultimately failed against the opposition of the papacy, the territorial nobility, and at the last his own son and successor.

The reign was stamped indelibly by the premature death of his father (Henry III), which left Henry IV sole king at age six. Political ineptitude and power-seeking by various regents led to Henry being declared of age in 1065 and beginning his personal rule a year later at age sixteen, although the nobility retained real control. Henry's attempt to secure a base of power by systematically building fortifications (*burgen*) in Saxony led to a war that eventually undermined his position with the nobility. Conflict with the papacy over the right to name bishops (the so-called Investiture Controversy)

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led to excommunication, humiliation at Canossa, war against a series of antikings, and campaigns in Italy against the papacy and Matilda of Tuscany. After decades of conflict, Henry's change to a more consensual style of rule and the adoption in 1103 of his father's principle that the king should guarantee the realm's peace (*Landfrieden*) came too late—Henry's heir (the future Henry V) rebelled in 1104, captured Henry IV, and took control of the realm in 1105.

Although Henry's reputation as a ruler varies from brutal tyrant to magnanimous protector (often depending more on the ideology of the commentator than anything else), his military achievements merit a much more positive evaluation than that usually based on battle results and rank him as one of the better generals of the Middle Ages. Personally brave and tactically skillful, Henry made innovations by using professional administrators (*ministeriales*) to supervise fortifications, maintained discipline over his forces to secure victory at the Unstrut River, showed strategic acumen in the campaign leading up to Mellrichstadt, conceived daring operational plans in the campaign of the Elster, and successfully inspired his troops under adverse conditions while trapped at Verona (1093–1097). Henry's operational concepts did sometimes exceed his capabilities, as in his first campaigns against the Saxons in 1073 or his choice to seek battle against Matilda in 1092 (even though at the end of a long and vulnerable line of communications). In addition, Henry's finer moments did not always end in victory: at Elster he was forced to retreat, his situation rescued only when the antiking Rudolph of Swabia died of his wounds, and after Pleichfeld, Henry had to reorganize after defeat and try again to relieve Würzburg.

Overall, Henry's campaigns demonstrate both the high level of ability that could be elicited from a medieval army and the limitations that the era's infrastructure placed on imposing the royal will through warfare. It was simply too difficult to knock an enemy out of a war, and the forces (and leaders such as Matilda) often were too evenly matched for decisive success. Yet despite these limitations, Henry the general often rescued the fortunes of Henry the king.

[*See also* Elster, Battle of; Mellrichstadt, Battle of; Pleichfeld, Battle of; *and* Unstrut, Battle at the.]

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HENRY V

(1086–1125), German king from 1098, Holy Roman Emperor from 1111. Henry V was elected king by the German princes in 1098 at the instigation of his forty-seven-year-old father, Emperor Henry IV. In 1104/1105 Henry V conspired against his father and led a rebellion that lasted until the latter died on 7 August 1106.

The contemporary chronicler Ekkehard of Aura noted Henry's "bold heart" (*animosum cor*) and, like the *Anonymi chronica imperatorum Heinrico V dedicata* (Anonymous chronicle of the emperors dedicated to Henry V), explained the defeat of Henry V's army at the battle of Visé in 1106 with reference to his youthful boldness (*iuvenilis animositas*): in an imprudent and ill-prepared military action the German king had gone to wage war against his father with only a small force. Henry V's advance guard was smashed at the bridge over the river Maas near Visé by his father's troops. This defeat had no serious consequences for the king because Henry IV died soon after, but it was only the first of three great defeats in Henry V's military career—and he never managed to gain a victory in any pitched battle.

As at Visé, Henry V was not present in person at the battle of Andernach in 1114. Once again he had delegated the waging of war to his supporters, and again he failed. But even when Henry personally led an army into a battle—as was the case the following year at Welfesholz—he was not able to ensure the cohesion of his army and hence lost his most experienced military commander, Count Hoyer of Mansfeld, in an uncoordinated first attack. In the

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end the emperor suffered a decisive defeat and forfeited his political influence in the northeastern parts of the German kingdom. Thenceforth he avoided great battles. In 1124, when he invaded France to support his father-in-law, King Henry I of England, in his struggle for Normandy, the emperor retreated immediately when he realized the size of the French army.

Henry V's failures in pitched battles were accompanied by rare successes in siege warfare. He had to abandon the sieges of Cologne (1106, 1114), Douai in Flanders (1107), Bratislava in Hungary (1108), Głogów (Glogau) in Poland (1109), Mousson in Lorraine (1113), Mainz (1121), Aschaffenburg Castle, east of Mainz (1122), and Schulenburg Castle near Utrecht (1123). He did, however, manage to capture Nuremberg (1105); Novara in Italy (1110); Hornburg Castle, northwest of Halberstadt (1113); Bar in Lorraine (1113); and Faulquemont Castle near Liège (1122). Finally, the emperor did not effect the capitulation of Worms in 1124 through his military skills but by using terror: he massacred or mutilated captured townsmen until Worms at last surrendered. All in all, except for some effective campaigns—or rather, raids—in the German territories and a few captured castles and fortified towns, Henry V can surely be seen as a rather unsuccessful military commander.

[*See also* Andernach, Battle of (1114); Visé, Battle of; *and* Welfesholz, Battle of.]

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HENRY VI

(1165–1197), German king (r. 1190–1197), King of Sicily (r. 1194–1197), and Holy Roman Emperor (r. 1190–1197). As the second son of Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa, Henry was designated to be heir to the throne as a child and was elected German king by the prince electors at the age of four. He received a knightly education in which he was embued with the military arts, the moral values of Christian knighthood, and courtly manners appropriate to his social standing. He took part in tournaments and writing verse, and this culminated in his being knighted by his father at the assembly of Mainz in 1184.

Henry's first active military command occurred during his sojourn in Italy (1185–1187) on account of his marriage to Constance of Hauteville. He directed this campaign against the propapal cities of northern and central Italy, pursuing a pragmatic strategy of plundering and causing damage without laying siege to well-fortified strongholds. In this way, he managed to stabilize the power of the Hohenstaufen as far south as the border of Apulia.

Following the death of his father and his own coronation in Rome in 1191, Henry led an army into southern Italy against Tancred of Lecce with the intent of asserting his claim to the throne in the Norman kingdom of Naples. However, laying siege to the city of Naples, he was unable to cut the city off from supplies or to break its defenses, and he was finally forced to abandon the siege by the outbreak of an epidemic in his ranks. In his second expedition against Tancred in 1194, Henry avoided making the same mistakes. The fleet of ships drawn from Genoa and Pisa was better coordinated, and Henry chose a more suitable time of year for the campaign, entrusting the command of the army and the fleet to experienced leaders such as Markward of Anweiler, Conrad of Lützelhard, and Diepold of Schweinspeunt. Many cities, including Naples and Palermo, surrendered without a fight. On the other hand, in other cities such as Salerno, which had delivered his wife into the hands of Tancred three years previously, Henry's campaign had more the

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character of a punitive expedition than a war of conquest. He suppressed a Norman revolt against his rule in 1197 even more ruthlessly, subjecting its leaders to unusually brutal forms of punishment; for example, the burgess of Castrogiovanni (modern-day Enna) was condemned to have a glowing hot crown nailed to his head.

Historical sources do not depict Henry as an idealized knight and military commander who would dig a moat with his own hands, as his father Frederick is said to have done. He was no innovative strategian, using the tactics of wasting and plundering and siege common to the time, and he showed himself to be rather cautious than bold, relying on numerical superiority and experienced commanders. Henry never commanded troops in a major battle but revealed his leadership qualities, particularly in the coordination and organization of military engagements, including large-scale expeditions such as the preparations for the crusade, shortly before his death. The extent to which his untimely passing is to blame for the failure of this crusade is difficult to define. Certainly his leadership would have settled the questions of rank among the crusaders and ensured a unified strategy, and his pragmatic, purposeful, and consequent personality may well have improved the chances of success.

[*See also* Frederick I Barbarossa *and Ministeriales.*]

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Translated from the German by Duane Henderson

HENRY II OF CASTILE

See Enrique II.

HENRY II

(1133–1189), King of England and Duke of Aquitaine, Brittany, and Normandy, and Count of Anjou, Maine, and Nantes. Called in his time "the most victorious king since Charlemagne," Henry II was an avid campaigner, directing at least thirty-six military campaigns within his domains and into Berry, Blois, France, Ireland, Scotland, Toulouse, and Wales. Most of his territorial gains came by way of treaties, which were themselves the result of persistent military efforts.

Henry's strategy is often associated with Vegetian precepts, but his characterization as an avoider of open battle has recently been challenged. He generally besieged castles and fortified towns or used otherwise confrontational actions to goad his opponents into combat. The results included victories (Wales, 1157; Avranches, 1173), nonactions (Wallingford, 1153; Châteauroux, 1187), defeats (Wales, 1165), or skirmishes against retiring rear-guards (Chênebrun, 1168; Verneuil, 1173). Other campaigns sought the demolition or relief of enemy and allied fortifications, respectively. His rapidity of movement and delegation of command often gave him advantage of position, as evidenced by his triumph during the rebellion of 1173–1174, a conflict Henry won by way of forced marches around Normandy, decisive victories at Fornham, Alnwick, and Avranches (all won by subordinates), and the dramatic relief of Rouen.

Henry was concerned with identifying, organizing, and constructing military assets. Inquires that led to the 1166 *Cartae baronum* (barons' certificates) sought to precisely count available knights' fees; such obligations were often satisfied by way of scutage (shield-tax), which Henry used to pay for mercenaries. The 1181 assize of arms and a similar, unnamed assize in Normandy created reserves by way of arming citizens. He leaned on the English Jewry to finance troop transport and crusading

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activities, although he never journeyed east himself. Henry also paid for the construction of more than one hundred castles, the most notable examples being Dover and Chinon (in Touraine).

[*See also* Assizes of Arms; Castles, *subentry on* 1150–1350; Clare, Richard FitzGilbert de; Louis VII; Marshal, William; Mercenaries; Philip II; Richard I; Siege Warfare, *subentry on* Tactics and Technology; Stephen; *and* Vegetius.]

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HENRY V

(1387–1422), King of England (r. 1413–1422). Born at Monmouth, Henry died at the castle of Vincennes, east of Paris. He became Prince of Wales, Earl of Chester, and Duke of Cornwall, and he was created Duke of Aquitaine, when his father, Henry IV (Bolingbroke), deposed Richard II in 1399. Thanks to the unsettled conditions that followed, Henry had a long military apprenticeship, including both experience of pitched battle against the rebel Sir Henry Percy at Shrewsbury in 1403 and of siege warfare and guerilla warfare in putting down the Welsh uprising of Owain Glyn Dŵr (1400–1409). Acceding to the throne on 22 March 1413, Henry soon sought to take advantage of divisions within France by invading Normandy in the summer of 1415, taking Harfleur after an arduous siege and famously winning the battle of Agincourt.

These actions, as well as his second campaign of 1417, show Henry to be both obsessive and ambitious as a commander. In order to launch as large an army in 1415 as possible when desperately short of funds, he used the royal jewel collection as security for army wages. Faced with the possibility of renewed attack at Agincourt when he thought the victory already his, he ordered the killing of most of the French prisoners. His ambitious strategy in France—to undertake the systematic conquest of Normandy—was a marked departure from the policies of his predecessors. He learned from his mistakes of 1415, where the long siege of Harfleur had prevented further conquest, by being careful in 1417 to go for an easily secured bridgehead in lower Normandy, well away from French troops. Once he had secured Caen and its region, he wisely divided his army so that attacks could be launched simultaneously to the west and east, as well as to the south, thereby conquering territory quickly and making effective French response difficult. He also showed consummate patience and perseverance in the long-drawn-out siege of Rouen, again learning from the problems of the defense of Harfleur by ensuring secure food supplies for his siege army.

Henry was seen by contemporaries as a firm but effective commander. He achieved much by following initial harshness toward the civilian population of Normandy with a high level of conciliation and protection from soldierly excesses, as witnessed by his encouragement of Norman separatism and his concern for military discipline. His career suggests that he was a strong all-rounder, combining skills as a military commander with political acuity. Had it not been for his successes at Agincourt and in the conquest of Normandy, he would not have been in a position to exploit the murder of John, Duke of Burgundy, in September 1419 and to be accepted as heir to the French throne in the Treaty of Troyes (May 1420). He spent much of the last two years of his life in military actions to secure this settlement, dying likely as a result of illness contracted at the siege of Meaux (October 1421 to May 1422).

[*See also* Agincourt, Battle of; Britain, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1500); Caen, Siege of; France,

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HENRY OF GROSMONT

(c. 1310–1361), Earl of Derby (1337) and Lancaster (1345); Duke of Lancaster (1351). Described by his contemporary Jean le Bel as surpassing all other men in prowess and called by Matthias von Neuenburg a "surpassingly victorious soldier" (*milite invictissimo*), Henry was one of the most effective military commanders of the Middle Ages, part of the team of excellence that enabled Edward III of England, in the first phase of the Hundred Years' War, to subdue a realm with triple the population and resources of his own kingdom.

Henry was King Edward's cousin, and before coming into his inheritance as the greatest magnate of England he served the young king as one of his principal captains in his Scottish wars—including at the siege of Berwick and probably at the battle of Halidon Hill. Created Earl of Derby in 1337, he played a prominent role in the Low Countries operations of 1337–1340, leading the Cadzand strike of 1337, heading a division at Buironfosse in 1339, and fighting at Sluys in 1340. From then until the 1360 Treaty of Brétigny, Henry was (with the possible exception of the Black Prince) King Edward's most important and effective lieutenant for both military and diplomatic missions.

He brought very large retinues to join most of the armies (and navies) commanded by Edward III, sometimes serving as leader of one of the three divisions into which English armies were typically organized, as during the 1359–1360 Reims campaign. More significantly, however, he frequently served as an independent theater commander, for example in Scotland in 1336 and 1341–1342, in Aquitaine in 1345–1347, 1349, and 1351, and in Brittany and Normandy in 1356–1358. It was in Aquitaine that he scored his greatest triumphs, using far inferior forces to destroy major French armies at Bergerac and at Auberoche. In the Bergerac campaign, he brilliantly concentrated his forces to strike at one element of the dispersed French armies, lured some of his enemies into an ambush, then followed up with a fast, hard blow against the remainder. At Auberoche, he surprised another French army in its siege camp, taking advantage of the initiative and intelligent use of the terrain to win a lopsided victory. He showed equally great skill at the operational and strategic levels of war, both in exploiting his battlefield successes and in the conduct of fast-moving, opportunistic *chevauchées* in which he did great harm to his enemies, enriched himself and his own men with vast quantities of plunder, and seized and retained strongholds when he could do so more by fear than by force. He even knew when it was best to run away and how to do it well, as in 1356 in Normandy, when his small force was nearly caught by the royal army of John II. In addition to all this, he was a crusader (to Prussia) and the author of a devotional tract (which includes a few nuggets of military wisdom) and of a lost treatise on the art of war.

[*See also* Edward III of England.]

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HENRY THE LION

(c. 1133–1195), Duke of Saxony and Bavaria. Son of the deposed Welfduke Henry "The Proud," young Henry

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regained his legacy Saxony in 1142 and Bavaria in 1156. His main sphere of activity was Saxony, where he built up the nucleus of a territorial state and aggressively asserted his rule against competing princes and nobles. Henry resorted to violence more readily than was usual in twelfth-century Germany. His military base of power was a strong and dedicated force of *ministeriales* (servant-knights) that enabled him to expand his frontiers on the southwestern shore of the Baltic Sea by subduing Slavic nations in Mecklenburg. These wars against the Obodrites (and Pommeranians) (1158–1177) were his most important military venture. While besieging their stronghold Werle in 1163, he introduced the heavy siege engines he had gotten to know at Crema in Italy to that region. With his commitment to Frederick I Barbarossa's Italian wars, where he distinguished himself in battle; for example, during the bloody street fighting at Rome in 1155, Henry secured the emperor's essential political support against his numerous enemies in Saxony, who challenged his rule in vain in a bitter feud from 1166 to 1170. But after Henry refused further military support in 1176, Frederick sided with Henry's enemies who renewed fighting the next year.

Henry was a successful commander and kept winning his battles up to the end; he defeated the landgrave of Thuringia at the battle of Weißensee in 1180. However, the withdrawal of the emperor's political protection quickly eroded his base of power, and he was brought down in a short coalition war in 1180–1181. Henry lost his fiefs; an attempt to take them back by force was beaten down by the crown prince, Henry VI, and regional princes from 1189 to 1192.

[*See also* Germany, *subentry on* Narrative (1125–1250).]

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HERAKLEIOS

(c. 575–641), Byzantine emperor (610–641). The son of the exarch of Carthage, Herakleios secured the throne in 610 with the African fleet and many Berber recruits (according to John of Antioch). His earliest struggles were against supporters of the deposed emperor Phokas and his brother Komentiolos. This allowed Slavs and Avars to invade the Balkans, and the Persians to launch the first of a series of invasions under Shahrbaraz, a general of Khosrow II. An attempt to stop the Persians at Antioch failed in 613, culminating in the capture of Jerusalem in 614, and the occupation of Egypt from 619. Herakleios made peace with the Avars to concentrate on the eastern front, and shifted his European armies from Thrace to Anatolia. He withdrew to his winter palace to plan campaigns free from spies, and seems to have read Maurice's *Strategikon* rather carefully.

Herakleios launched his counteroffensive in April 622, achieving several significant victories. A key factor was the emperor's ability to secure defections from the Persians, as it would be in later campaigns. However, the peace with the Avars broke down upon his triumphal return to Constantinople, and tens of thousands of his subjects were taken captive. Only by sending two hundred thousand solidi and numerous hostages, among them his illegitimate son John and his nephew Stephen, could Herakleios secure another, ephemeral treaty, in order to turn again against the Persians in March 624, heading first for Armenia. Expeditionary warfare was conducted over vast distances, and the emperor did not return to Constantinople for four years, during which time Constantinople endured a mighty Avar siege in 626. Persian forces under Shahin sent to support the Avars were defeated by Herakleios' brother Theodore, probably in July 626.

Disaffected by his lack of success, Khosrow determined to remove his general, Shahrbaraz, driving the latter to make a pact with Herakleios and neutralize forces under his command. Subsequently, Herakleios was able to invade Persia itself in winter 627, and on 12 December he won the decisive battle of Nineveh. As Herakleios advanced on Ctesiphon,

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Khosrow fled, ordering the killing of thousands of prisoners. He was himself killed shortly afterward. Further Byzantine victories followed in 628, before the emperor returned in triumph to Constantinople.

The wars that Herakleios fought against the Zoroastrian Persians generated art and literature that suggest that the war was charged with religious rhetoric and zeal. The vexed issue of martyrdom in battle also arose. However, the recovery of the "true cross," upon which Christ had been crucified, and which had been captured in the Persian sack of Jerusalem in 614, was not an objective of these wars, and it does not feature in literature composed between 622 and 628 (namely the *Persian Expedition* and *Heraclias* of George of Pisidia). However, after the negotiated recovery of the cross, its return to Jerusalem in 630, and its transfer in 635 to Constantinople ("New Jerusalem"), it became the central motif of the Herakleios story. The cross was presented as the symbol of Christian victory in various historical works, in the later poems of George of Pisidia, and on Herakleios' coins.

Success was ephemeral. In 634, Arabs invaded Syria, and in 636 they defeated a Byzantine army decisively at the battle of Yarmuk. Mesopotamia, Armenia, and Egypt all fell swiftly.

[*See also* Byzantine Attitudes toward War; Manuals, Military; *and* Phokas.]

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HERALDS AND HERALDRY

Heralds and heraldry were very much products of medieval warfare. Heraldic arms (or "armorial bearings" or "coats of arms") were hereditary shield emblems, passed down through the generations along with the family name, title, and estates. As the heritability of fiefs was established during the twelfth century so this led to an increasingly hereditary class of knights, conscious of their ancestry and inheritance, position in society, and critical role in warfare. Heraldry provided this warrior aristocracy with powerful and hereditary visual indicators of status, family pride, and, in time, military achievement. The battlefield and, especially, the tournament afforded excellent opportunities for their display.

Twelfth-Century Developments. The adoption in a martial context of what were initially haphazard devices and patterns led to three important heraldic developments in the twelfth century. Firstly, as kings, lords, and lesser knights began to decorate the new broad surfaces of their "heater-shaped" shields, flowing surcoats, horse trappings, and banners, and even helmets and saddles, so they came to be increasingly recognized by the patterns and devices displayed. This resulted in the deliberate and consistent use of the same design to avoid confusion when in full armor. By the end of the century such men were adding crests to the top of their pot helms, again for better identification and to provide a greater sense of presence and prestige. From the 1170s their followers sometimes repeated the same arms on their own surcoats and shields, thereby engendering a sense of esprit de corps and presenting an imposing unified front to the enemy. So successful did heraldry become in identifying individuals and armies that some leaders dressed others in their own arms to act as decoys; however, not to wear one's personal arms might result in indiscriminate death rather than capture for ransom or political advantage. Literary works often mention knights entering tournaments disguised in bogus arms or those of another knight.

Secondly, so clearly was an individual associated with, and identified by, a distinctive coat in battle or tourney that the same arms were transferred into civilian and family life. As early as the 1130s the equestrian portraits of knights on their personal seals bear the same arms. By the end of the century some of these arms actually replaced the iconic

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Herald. Illustration from the grant of arms made by John Smert, Garter King of Arms, to the Tallow Chandlers' Company on 24 September 1456. TALLOW CHANDLERS' COMPANY, LONDON, UK/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

depiction of the mounted knight, thus metamorphosing themselves into a kind of symbolic alter ego of their owner. In time, nonbelligerents, including women, bishops, merchants, and lawyers, adopted arms. Esquires first used personal arms in the early fourteenth century and were followed by mere "gentlemen" in the fifteenth.

A third consequence of the increasing popularity of heraldry in the twelfth century was the rise of those professionally involved in its control and recording. Because of their expertise in identifying arms these men, known as heralds of arms, were used, from at least the 1170s, to announce the combatants at tournaments otherwise unrecognizable in their armor. A lucky few were attached to individual masters, but initially many wandered from tournament to tournament in search of work and were often confused with minstrels. It was probably the heralds following their masters on military campaign who, from the mid-thirteenth century, compiled the first official heraldic records, known as rolls of arms. As well as recording those present by their arms, they also set down the exploits of their masters and helped identify the dead by their arms. From the early fourteenth century those attached to households were given titles reflecting their master's name, lordship, motto, or badge; they later bore his arms on their tabards. Heralds were also given greater responsibility conveying messages between warring parties or negotiating on their masters' behalf. They were by now seen as the secular high priests of chivalry, experts in genealogy, heraldry, and precedence. In 1407 the French royal heralds were organized into a college and in 1420 their English counterparts formed themselves into a voluntary corporation with their own common seal. From the late 1430s English heralds granted arms on behalf of the crown; before then, arms had either been adopted at will or bestowed by the crown or great nobles. In 1484 the English heralds received their first charter of incorporation and were given a home in London, the College of Arms. From here they held heraldic jurisdiction (under the earl marshal) over England and Wales, granting arms, recording pedigrees, and organizing and marshaling ceremonies such as coronations and funerals. Scotland had its own heralds. Few private heralds of great lords still existed in 1500. By the end of the Middle Ages heralds were regarded as an international brotherhood, their tabards supposedly providing diplomatic immunity. Three ranks of officers of arms (generically known as "heralds") existed: the kings of arms (usually with their own provincial "marches"), heralds, and pursuivants (probationer heralds).

Systemization and Recording. From the very beginning, rules were devised to keep shield designs simple and effective as a means of recognition. These and the special language ("blazon") used to describe arms were very probably the work of the heralds. The recording of arms became increasingly important as designs multiplied and men adapted the arms of others with whom they wished to be associated by slightly "differencing" those same

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arms with a small charge or by changing the colors. Husbands "impaled" their arms with those of their wife on the same shield, and children sometimes quartered their father's arms with those of their mother if she were an important heiress. Heraldry was thus able to reflect a wide variety of family, feudal, and tenurial relationships. In the later Middle Ages supporters were added to either side of the shield to complete the full heraldic achievement of arms, and, with the growing use of liveried followers and the adoption of long tapering standards, heraldic badges became more evident on the battlefield.

As arms became important symbols of family pride and social honor so legends (often military in origin) grew up around them. Men might even go to court to protect their right to a particular coat. Heraldry had outgrown its military origins and had extended its colorful influence far beyond the battlefield.

[*See also* Banners; Chivalry, *subentry on* Overview; Shields; *and* Tournaments and Jousts.]

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Adrian Ailes

HEREDÍA, JUAN FERNÁNDEZ DE

(c. 1310–1396). Spanish military leader. Heredía is important for military historians because he rose from obscure origins to become master of the Order of the Hospital of Saint John, mainly because of his military skills. By 1328 he had already joined the Order. Ten years later he was one of the king of Aragon's closest advisers. From 1339 to 1348 he served Pedro IV (r. 1336–1387) against the Aragonese and Valencian union. In 1349 he accompanied the Aragonese invasion of Mallorca. Along with other Hospitallers, he participated in the battle of Lluchmajor in which Pedro IV's army triumphed. In 1356 Heredía was a member of the diplomatic mission to prevent the battle of Poitiers (1356). The impulsive Hospitallers eventually fought for the French and was taken prisoner. Pope Innocent VI (r. 1352–1362) ransomed him so that Heredía could return to administer Avignon and Venaissin's defenses. From 1357 to 1376 Heredía oversaw the expansion of Avignon's defensive walls and its mercenary defense force. He did not remain there exclusively as he also served in the War of the Two Pedros (1356–1366) in Spain.

In 1377 Gregory XI (r. 1370–1378) named him master of his Order. The following year Heredía led an operation into the Balkans. His forces besieged Arta, where he was captured by the Albanians, and then sold to the Ottomans. He was ransomed in less than a year, yet with Gregory's death in 1378, the Balkan campaign fizzled and the Order withdrew in 1381. In his remaining years, Master Heredía administered the Order from Rhodes and dealt with the constant Ottoman threat. He secured a defensive agreement with the king of Cyprus and others, and continued the expansion of Rhodes's defenses. The headquarters' precarious condition forced him to return to Avignon to secure much needed manpower and funding. However, the hardening papal schism and the Turkish advance into Europe made this task difficult. In spite of everything, he served as an able and disciplined administrator until his death in 1396.

[*See also* Iberia, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1500) *and* Pedro IV.]

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Nicolás Agrait

HÉRICOURT, BATTLE OF

This battle was fought near the border separating the counties of Ferrette (Upper Alsace) and Burgundy (Franche-Comté). It was the first sizable confrontation pitting the Burgundian troops against the Swiss during the battles waged by Charles the Bold against the Swiss Confederation.

On 25 October 1474 the Swiss Confederates declared war on Charles the Bold, joining a coalition that included Sigismund of Habsburg, Duke of Austria-Tyrol, and a league of cities, the most important of which were Strasbourg, Basel, and Colmar. The letters of defiance had barely been sent when a contingent of three thousand soldiers from Bern and five hundred from Freiburg and Soleure, under the Bernese commander Nicolas de Schachnachthal, set out on the march. This troop passed the Jura mountains west of Bienne and emerged in an area called the "Burgundy Gate," which connected Upper Alsace and Franche-Comté. On 5 November, the Swiss arrived outside Héricourt, a fortified town and a strategic point along the route from Besançon to Belfort and Basel. This first contingent was then joined by a second one coming from Basel. With these reinforcements, the army assembled outside Héricourt amounted to about eighteen thousand men. They were mostly infantry, accompanied by a small corps of Austrian cavalry.

As the Swiss began the siege of Héricourt, two Burgundian captains—Henri of Neuchâtel, lord of Belmont, and Jacques of Savoy, count of Romont—assembled troops, including some Italian companies, to try to liberate the besieged city. They had eight thousand mounted fighters (men-at-arms, *coustilliers* [light cavalry], and mounted archers) and four thousand foot soldiers. With these forces, they pitched camp close to the enemy. On 14 November 1474 they set out. They could not, however, move quickly enough to take the enemy by surprise: the day before, the Swiss had detected the Burgundians' presence and decided to attack them. On the morning of the fourteenth, they took up their combat positions, splitting their army into two distinct divisions, formed chiefly of pikemen and halberdiers. Apparently this offensive move on the part of the Confederates surprised their opponents, who could not withstand the blow. The Burgundian army, whose battle order is unknown, was quickly broken up and put to flight, pursued by the Austrian cavalry. The victors, who suffered only slight losses, counted sixteen hundred enemy troops killed on the battlefield. In accordance with their custom, they took few prisoners: only seventy were taken to Basel. As a result of the battle, Héricourt surrendered on 16 November and was occupied by an Austrian garrison.

The importance of this confrontation lies in the fact that, from a tactical point of view, it foreshadowed the great defeats that Charles the Bold suffered shortly thereafter at Grandson and Morat (2 March and 22 June 1476, respectively).

[*See also* Charles the Bold *and* Grandson, Battle of.]

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Translated from the French by Johanna M. Baboukis

HERMANN OF SALZA

(d. 1239), grand master of the Teutonic Order from 1209/10. Although Hermann von Salza led the Teutonic Knights, he was perhaps more a politician than a military commander. Hermann was a trusted supporter of the emperor Frederick II and served him well on numerous diplomatic missions, in remuneration for which the emperor granted Hermann's Order special concessions and privileges. Hermann's participation in both phases of the

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Fifth Crusade (1218/19 and 1221) is his only notable military command, but it is difficult to determine the role he actually played: Although the Teutonic Order was actively involved in the fighting leading to the capture of Damietta in 1219, the historical sources give no indication as to Hermann's engagement as their leader. In July 1221, Hermann accompanied King John of Jerusalem into Egypt and was involved in the fighting, but again the sources do not describe his individual part in this conflict. On the other hand, Hermann's important role in the surrender of Damietta is well documented, as he, together with the grand master of the Knights Templar, managed to convince the numerically still quite strong crusading army to accept the capitulation and withdraw from the city, demonstrating his leadership qualities in diplomacy rather than on the battlefield.

[*See also* Orders, Military, *subentry on* Northern Orders *and* Frederick II.]

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HERRINGS, BATTLE OF THE

See Rouvray, Battle of.

HOBELARS

A hobelar was a mounted infantryman or light horseman deployed against the Scots in the Anglo-Scottish wars of the early fourteenth century. The term is thought to derive either from the Irish word *obann* (swift) or from the Flemish *hobeleu* or French *hober* (to budge, to move oneself).

Typically, the hobelar rode an unarmored small horse or pony, called a "hobin" or "hobby," rather than the full-size horse ridden by the man-at-arms. Rather than fight on horseback, the hobelar dismounted to fight. The hobelar was commonly paid four pence per day (like a mounted archer), whereas the man-at-arms was paid six or twelve pence, depending upon whether his horse was armored. Hobelars were used for scouting, patrolling, and ambushing in mountainous, forest, and boggy areas, and as the offensive arm of castle garrisons. The principal reason for their deployment was to bring the Scots to battle in difficult terrain. Later, however, they fulfilled the general functions of light cavalry. Early hobelars may have worn little armor, yet from 1311 the standard of body armor officially prescribed for hobelars, as for all classes of infantry, was constantly revised upward until in the next reign they were ordered to bear the full range of infantry armor: hacqueton, basinet, visor, iron gauntlets, sword, knife, and lance.

Until recently, hobelar warfare was thought to have originated in late-thirteenth-century Ireland. Recent work suggests that such warfare also occurred on the marches of Wales in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. The muntator, a class of light cavalry or mounted infantry deployed in Shropshire and Staffordshire against Welsh raiders, may be the antecedent of the hobelar. In his *Expugnatio Hibernica*, Gerald of Wales advocated deployment of "that breed of men which has been brought up in the Welsh borders and trained in the warfare that goes on in those parts," because "when the changing conditions of war demand it, they are skilled horsemen at one moment, at another quick-moving infantry." It seems likely that this form of warfare was imported into Ireland by the Cambro-Normans (Normans settled in Wales) who led the invasion of Ireland in the twelfth century.

In the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, the hobelar was brought to the Scottish borders by Irish magnates engaged by Edward I of England (r. 1272–1307) for his conquest of Scotland.

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In 1296, 261 Irish hobelars joined Edward's first invasion of Scotland. In January 1300, Edward specifically ordered three hundred hobelars for his forthcoming campaign, but only a few served. Some 391 and 499 Irish hobelars served in the Scottish campaigns of 1301 and 1303, respectively.

Many Irish hobelars probably remained in northern England and southern Scotland, for hobelar warfare quickly became endemic in the area. When the Scots began inflicting swift mounted raids on northern England from 1311, the English employed hobelars in castle garrisons to deter the raids. There were twenty hobelars at Berwick in 1311, six at Carlisle in 1312, and forty at Alnwick and thirty each at Carlisle and Bamburgh in late 1314. To counter the long-range Scottish raids that ravaged the north of England from that point, Edward II (r. 1307–1327) deployed hobelars. These highly mobile, lightly armed troops were his best hope of bringing the Scots to battle. They also continued to be recruited from Ireland: in 1315 the Earl of Pembroke ordered five hundred hobelars from his own Irish estates for an expedition to the north of England.

Continued recruitment from Ireland perhaps explains the high concentrations of hobelars found on the western march: in 1319, Andrew Harclay, based at Carlisle, led 361 hobelars to Edward II at the siege of Berwick, and in 1322 he assembled 1,435 of them. The tradition wherein Harclay is cast as a pioneer of hobelar warfare is misleading, in that his rivals John de Castre and Antony Lucy also appeared as commanders of hobelars. Use of hobelars was widespread: an indenture that reveals the size of nineteen castle garrisons on both marches and throughout northern England, in preparation for a campaign to be led by the Earl of Arundel in 1317, shows the deployment of 750 hobelars at northern castles.

In a long-term perspective, hobelars may be viewed as predecessors of the reivers and moss-troopers, whose swift mounted raids characterized the Anglo-Scottish border until the sixteenth century.

[*See also* Britain, *subentries on* Narrative (1000–1300) *and* Narrative (1300–1500); Cavalry: Compagnies d'Ordonnance; *and* Infantry, Mounted.]

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Colm McNamee

HOMBURG, BATTLE OF

See Unstrut, Battle at the.

HOMILDON HILL, BATTLE OF

See Humbleton Hill, Battle of.

HONOR

The Latin equivalent of "fidelity," used in medieval Hungary from the thirteenth century, and especially in the fourteenth, to describe a way of governing a certain part of the kingdom in the name of the ruler. The method of entrusting a part of the realm to reliable followers of the king for a limited period (but not one specified in advance) was employed earlier in other European countries as well (Germany, Catalonia, England, southern Italy) in return for military service. The territory belonging to an honor was under control of the baron appointed by the king. The honor holder exerted judicial, military, and financial power over the counties under his command, and he could use some of the revenue from the same territory for his own purposes. His appointment was not hereditary; the king could resign the honor bearer without prior notice and entrust him another honor somewhere else in the realm. The honor system, in the hands of the Angevin kings (Charles I, r. 1301–1342, and Louis I, the Great, r. 1342–1382), was an effective means of keeping a firm grip on the government of the realm, since they

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granted the most substantial honors to their most reliable followers.

[*See also* Hungary, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1526).]

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Ferenc Sebők

HORSEMANSHIP

Medieval horsemanship was associated with proficiency in combat. Not until the early fifteenth century did treatises on horsemanship reappear in the medieval West. Information on horsemanship has to be obtained from references scattered in a variety of sources. From these sources emerges a picture of horsemanship that was characterized by two basic styles (or "seats") in medieval mounted warfare, each dependent on the length of the stirrup leather. The styles were discussed in Iberian horsemanship treatises of the fifteenth century, as for example King Duarte I of Portugal, *Livro da ensinança de bem cavalgar toda sela* (Book of Instruction on Riding Well in All Saddles, 1438), but the realities of these styles were present much earlier. The Spanish term *a la jineta* referred to the style of the Muslims of al-Andalus, who rode with short stirrups, emphasizing close contact with the horse performing sharp turns at high speed characteristic of the raiding bands of the Reconquista; but the Avars and Magyars and the Muslim cavalry of the Crusades also rode short. Around 1100 in France a new style emerged, *a la brida*, with knights riding with long stirrups and straight legs, braced for the hard impacts of "mounted shock combat." In both styles of mounted combat the rider's arms were occupied with wielding offensive and defensive weaponry. Both hands of the mounted archer were occupied with shooting the bow, while the right arm of the heavily armored knight wielded the lance or sword and the left arm held the shield in a position to protect the center and left side of his body. With his arms occupied, the rider had to work the reins and bit in combination with leg aids or cues to direct the horse. Through the communication of these aids, a skilled horseman developed a partnership with a horse well trained in the performance of precise maneuvers.

Training a warhorse began with the hindquarters, where movement originates for collection and lead change, the two most important features of warhorse performance. Collection refers to a shortening of the outline of the horse with the hindquarters tucked well underneath the body. This position enables the horse to spring from the hindquarters with a thrust of energy known as impulsion. This energy then flows along the back muscles and rounds or arches the neck to result in flexion at the poll, the point just behind the horse's ears, with the front of the horse's face roughly perpendicular to the ground as in the horses of the Bayeux Tapestry. Collection enables the horse to perform correct lead changes and 180-degree turns. At a canter, the foreleg that extends ahead of the other is called the leading leg. In order to canter on the right lead, the horse will have pushed off the left hind, underscoring the importance of collection. Leads are indispensable for balance and turning. A horse on the right lead can turn more easily to the right; similarly, a left lead facilitates turning to the left. In *a la brida* military games and in combat the right lead was desirable so that the horse could more easily absorb the shock of the lance blow, as the lance was positioned to the left of the horse's head. Half turns could be performed preferably as a canter half-pirouette, a turn that maintained the rhythm of the canter throughout the turn, with the horse driving on both hind legs. Fully engaged hindquarters imparted a fluidity of motion in executing the turn and retained flexibility in either direction when facing an opponent.

Riding short was the style favored by mounted archers, who used their stirrups and horse as a mobile platform to shoot arrows from a short

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

Horsemanship. Illustration from the *Mittelalterliches Hausbuch*, 21v and 22r, c. 1480.

composite or recurved bow. The Avars were the first of the medieval steppe nomads to ride with stirrups. According to the *Strategikon*, a treatise written during the reign of the Byzantine emperor Maurice (r. 592–602), the Avars were skilled in the rapid alternating use of the bow and lance. The *Strategikon* (1.1) also elaborates on the tactics of mounted archers: "They prefer battles fought at long range, ambushes, encircling their adversaries, simulated retreats and sudden returns, and wedge-shaped formations, that is in scattered groups." The wedge shape refers to a formation of horsemen riding toward the opponent's forces in the shape of an arrowhead aiming at double envelopment. As the mounted archers closed with the enemy the riders forming the tip of the arrow gradually slowed their horses to draw the enemy toward them while the riders forming the wings of the arrow increased speed to envelop the enemy. The tactic of riding in small groups to swarm enemy flanks was also practiced by Muslim cavalry during the Crusades. Writing at the request of Sultan Muhammad VII of Granada (r. 1392–1408), 'Ali ibn 'Abd al-Rahman Ibn Hudayl al-Andalusi advised that a horse be trained to change direction sharply, and he emphasized the importance of lead change. Ibn Hudayl directed his instructions to the lancer, but his advice on sharp turns would apply equally to the mounted archer. Abu Bakr ibn Badr wrote a horse-training and veterinary manual for the Mamluk sultan al-Nasir Muhammad ibn Qalawun (1290–1340). Both authors advised practicing circles in a figure eight pattern with lead change at the center.

The earliest work in the Latin West that provided instruction in horsemanship was Rabanus Maurus, *De procinctu romanae miliciae*, an epitome of Vegetius's *De re militari*. Rabanus's abridgment departed from Vegetius in adding information on horsemanship. First, he advised boys to learn horsemanship skills at an early age, presumably to overcome balance and fear issues faced by individuals who try to learn horsemanship at a later age. Rabanus recommended the use of wooden horses to teach a recruit how to mount, emphasizing the importance of the ability to leap upon a horse's back from the left, right, and rear. This text should not be advanced to support an argument for absence of stirrups in ninth-century Francia. In the crush of combat, the length of time to mount a horse with stirrups could give the enemy the advantage to strike a decisive blow; leaping on the horse's back would ensure a much faster escape. Riding long with straight legs was the style favored by medieval knights.

The written sources suffer from the deficiency that relatively few experienced horsemen, counted among the secular aristocracy, were literate and wrote down observations that reflect a knowledge of horsemanship. The works of Wolfram von Eschenbach (d. 1220) exhibit a familiarity with Spanish equestrianism, so he understood the importance of collection. In his *Willehalm*, Wolfram describes how a knight should initiate a charge. The charge began with a transition from the horse moving without collection, a free canter, to a collected gallop. The rider signaled the horse to gather his hindquarters underneath him by tweaking the reins. Initiating collection from the forehand is actually considered incorrect in modern practice, which advises the rider to use pelvic bones to make deep contact with the horse's back to ask the horse to gather hind legs underneath his body and a slight

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stroke of the left spur toward the flank to initiate the right lead. The opposite action was taken for the left lead. Wolfram's choice of the aid of the reins may be explained by the medieval war saddle, which was raised so far above the horse's back as to impede communication with the horse through the pelvic bones. Duarte emphasized the importance of collection in complaining about a horse that was so poorly collected that the rider lost control of the bit.

The Muslim authors of equestrian treatises deplored the training and performance of Frankish horses. Abu Bakr commented that Frankish-trained horses were not collected and difficult to turn, saying these horses needed a large space because they were moving from the forehand instead of the hindquarters. Abu Bakr wrote what he saw, but the context of his remarks should be evaluated. He was writing during the later crusades. Possibly, the Frankish knights were not taking their prized Spanish destriers on crusading expeditions, given the ill-fated experiences of earlier crusades. The horses Abu Bakr was describing may have been of lesser quality in both appearance and training.

[*See also* Avars; Cavalry; Horses; Infantry, Mounted; *and* Tournaments and Jousts.]

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HORSES

Few treatises on equestrianism were written during the Middle Ages. Information on medieval warhorses is patchy, and references are scattered in a wide range of sources. The most important issues, rather than short summaries of a wide range of topics, will be described here.

Size. The widely accepted theory that medieval horses were smaller than their Roman counterparts seemed to be supported by the work of R. H. C. Davis, who argued that during the collapse of the Roman Empire in the fourth to sixth centuries, horse-breeding stud farms, and especially the stallion-proof fences, were destroyed by marauding armies—resulting in herds of stray horses running loose in the countryside and breeding randomly. Over several generations these horses degenerated into feral horses, with a corresponding decrease in size. Davis's theory was not based on thorough research of the written source material; he cited only one reference to a group of unattended horses, those of Pope Gregory the Great (r. 590–604), on papal lands in Sicily. Davis's theory used as a model the Spanish horses of the conquistadores, which degenerated on the American plains to a feral horse known as the mustang. The similarity does not stand up to close scrutiny, however. Various Roman armies, tribes, and war bands regarded abandoned horses as war matériel and would have rounded them up as the spoils of war. A similar political disruption occurred with the Viking invasions. The Vikings stole numerous horses to extend their raids inland from the river courses, and some rebel nobles even sold horses to the Vikings in the 850s and 860s. In the Edict of Pîtres of 864, Charles the Bald imposed the death penalty for anyone giving or selling horses to the Vikings. This prohibition implies that nobles had horses available for sale and that at least some

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Jousting. Knights being taught to joust. Illustration from *Roman du Saint Graal*, MS 527, fol. 5v, fifteenth century. BIBLIOTHEQUE MUNICIPALE, DIJON, FRANCE/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

studs were still operating during these invasions. The number of years between the Viking invasions and the first Norman dukes would have been insufficient for the horses to degenerate.

Surviving equestrian equipment also suggests that the horse did not decrease in size. Late Roman, Merovingian, and Carolingian bridle bits were made to fit normal-sized horses of around thirteen to fifteen hands (each hand is four inches, measured to the top of the withers) and weighing perhaps eight hundred to one thousand pounds. An examination of Norman horseshoes verified these estimates of weight and stature.

The iconographical evidence generally does not portray the horse and rider in proportion: the horse often appears on a smaller scale than the rider does, as in the Golden Psalter of Saint Gall and the Bayeux Tapestry. In later medieval pictorial evidence, such as the Luttrell Psalter (c. 1340), horse and rider are depicted in more exact relationship, except that the horse's body is unusually long. It is difficult to argue on the basis of pictorial representations that horses increased in size in the period 1200–1500 over those in the period 800–1000 because the trend toward larger horses is documented by intensive breeding programs from about 800. The difference between the iconography of horsemen from the period 800–1000 and from the period 1200–1500 rather may be ascribed to a gradual change in artistic portrayals toward realism.

Equally difficult to interpret are the data from medieval English horse skeletons. These are articulated skeletons, making ascertainable their approximate height and build. The majority of the finds have measured in the range of 12.5 to 15 hands, but their function cannot be determined. Stocky in build, these horses could have been used for either riding or hauling. An examination of thirteenth-century horse transports indicates that destriers possessed a stocky build and measured 15 to 15.2 hands. Equine plate armor formed a shell that once contained a late medieval warhorse. Measurements of this armor taken by the Royal Armouries at Leeds to ascertain the height and conformation indicated that the horse that could best wear this armor resembled a heavyweight cob standing 15 to 15.2 hands and weighing 1,200 to 1,300 pounds (see Hyland, p. 105). This evidence has required a reevaluation of what was meant by *magnus equus*, a term that first appeared in 1282. Davis theorized that *magnus equus* denoted a horse standing 17 to 18 hands, the height of a modern Shire horse. More probably the term referred to musculature, with its concomitant physical strength, as well as training, rather than to height.

Breeding. The written sources provide no descriptions of horses comparable to the Hunnish horse described by Vegetius in his *De mulomedicina* (c. 450). Gregory of Tours's *History of the Franks* provides data on horse breeding, briefly mentioning the managers of two Merovingian stud farms, showing that these farms were flourishing during the period when, according to Davis, they were supposed to have been destroyed. Two Frankish documents dated to around 800 show that Charlemagne had as extensive and sophisticated a breeding program as any in classical antiquity. The capitulary *De villis* provides general guidelines for estate management, with a number of directives for the breeding of warhorses. A closely

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Equestrian Armor. South German, c. 1475. © WALLACE COLLECTION, LONDON, UK/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

related document, the *Brevium exempla*, contains detailed data on the breeding populations of four royal estates in present-day northeastern France, categorizing the horses into age and gender groupings. Moreover, in prohibiting the export of stallions in his 781 capitulary of Mantua, Charlemagne recognized that horse breeding was a long-term project and intended to preserve his prized bloodstock. Under his successor, Louis the Pious (r. 814–840), the poet Ermoldus Nigellus—whose work, written in 826–828, contains valuable information on equestrian maneuvers—praised the size of horses bred in Francia, elaborating that Frankish horses were too tall to mount. This is the only evidence, however, that affirms that Carolingian horses did not decrease in size.

An indication of the kind of horses in Charlemagne's breeding program appears in the biography of Notker the Stammerer (d. 910), which states that Charlemagne and the Persian king Haroun al-Rashid exchanged gifts, with Charlemagne sending Spanish horses and mules. The types of medieval warhorses were generally defined, not as breeds, but according to geographical origin or military function. Throughout the medieval West, Spain was the source of quality bloodstock. Spain enjoyed an even older historic reputation in producing outstanding warhorses for the Romans. The Muslim invasion of Spain in 711 possibly brought two varieties of horses into Spain to join the indigenous Iberian warhorses: the Barb and the Arabian. Davis minimized the Arabian component, arguing that geographical provenance favored the Barb of the Berber tribesmen. Spanish horses were imported into Europe as the best and most expensive warhorses, but they were also used to improve the quality of existing horses.

Numerous sources in the Latin West report the importation of Spanish stallions, but little is known about the indigenous horses that were being upgraded. As early as 876, Pope John VIII requested the king of Galicia to send him some of the excellent Spanish horses called *al faraces*. This term probably denoted Arabian horses rather than the beginning of a generic term for horses of high quality; certainly horses of this breed are corroborated by two Muslim authors, Hisham ibn al-Kalbi and Muhammad ibn al-Arabi, each of whom wrote a treatise on the Arabian horse around 820 in Andalusia. Texts noting the importation of Spanish horses continued to increase into the fourteenth century. As an example, Gerald of Wales (c. 1214) wrote that Robert of Bellême, a vassal of William the Conqueror, imported Spanish stallions for his domain in Wales. The importation of Spanish horses waned in England after 1342 for several reasons. The Castilians may have been reluctant to export stallions to England because of a recent alliance concluded with the French. So great had been the European demand for Spanish horses that the Spanish kings prohibited their exportation, presumably to stop the diminution of their own bloodstock. A further explanation could have been the preference for larger horses from Lombardy, whose horses were of Spanish descent, a trend that coincided with the development of plate armor.

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Types of Horses. Medieval horses were categorized according to function rather than breed. The written sources recognize three types of warhorses—the destrier, the courser, and the rouncey—all generally referred to as chargers. The name "destrier" is derived from the Latin *dextrarius*, a term that could refer to a warhorse's being led either by a squire at the knight's right side or by the squire's right hand. Alternatively, *dextrarius* could refer to a warhorse trained to assume the right lead, enabling the horse to retain his balance on impact of the lances in a tournament or joust, or to swerve away from the point of impact in response to the rider's cue. The Spanish destrier, the forerunner of the modern Andalusian, was bred from the descendants of Roman warhorses of Spanish descent, with a possible infusion of Barb and Arabian bloodstock after the Muslim conquest of Spain in 711. These were the most desirable and expensive. As stallions, destriers were capable of aggressive behavior toward other stallions. The advantages of this behavior were explained in the thirteenth century by Albertus Magnus in his treatise *De animalibus*. According to Albertus, destriers jump and smash into battle lines biting and kicking. The handling of stallions in these circumstances could be achieved only by advanced riders. An additional difficulty was encountered by Frankish knights during the Crusades with Muslims, who preferred to ride mares into battle. At Nicaea in 1097, some of the mares of the Turkish archers were in their estrous cycle, making the Frankish stallions uncontrollable.

In actual warfare, the courser and the rouncey were the preferred types. The courser, or *cursarius*, was a swift, strong riding horse that appeared in England from the fourteenth century onward. It was ridden by knights and men-at-arms. The rouncey, or *runcarius*, first appears in the Domesday Book as an agricultural workhorse, but from the thirteenth century onward it was an all-purpose riding horse that could be trained for war and was often used as the standard mount by squires, men-at-arms, and poorer knights.

The number of horses accompanying a knight on the tournament circuit or actual campaign varied considerably according to his wealth, but a bare minimum of five would include at least one warhorse in addition to the riding horses and packhorses. The prices of various types of horses vary greatly from different sources, but destriers were the most expensive. Quoting the prices of horses from a wide range of source material is less informative than examining the qualities contributing to the enormous gap in price between destriers and other types of horses. These desirable qualities include athletic ability, soundness, mind or willingness to perform tasks, and above all, training. The training of warhorses was expensive, requiring the investment of substantial time by experienced horsemen to teach and school prospective warhorses in the maneuvers that they would need to perform in jousts, tournaments, and real warfare.

Horses in Combat. The current scholarly tendency devalues the importance of horses in combat, arguing against the effectiveness of the stirrup in combat and the infrequency of set battles in comparison with sieges. More recent research emphasizes that mounted forces performed the important functions of raiding and reconnaissance in relation to sieges. These tasks required fast horses with good endurance. Charlemagne deployed special mounted strike forces (*scarae*), which carried out raiding missions against the Saxons. The ready availability of horses could make a substantial difference in the outcome of military operations. During his Avar campaign of 791, Charlemagne's army ceased to function because an equine epidemic killed a reported 90 percent of his horses. In his narrative of the fratricidal war among the sons of Louis the Pious, Nithard reports a number of forced marches and pursuits that had to be aborted because of exhausted horses.

The need for fast horses with good endurance was expanded with the widespread practice of castle warfare that is generally associated with the reign of Count Fulk Nerra of Anjou (r. 987–1040). His extensive building program depended on horses with plenty of endurance to make his system workable: mounted forces patrolled the areas separating the castles, often engaging in marauding and skirmishing warfare that required horses capable of sharp

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turns. In conjunction with sieges, this type of warfare was more characteristic of medieval warfare than set battles and continued to achieve even greater prominence in the Hundred Years' War. During this war the English launched cavalry raiding expeditions (*chevauchées*) into France from Flanders and Gascony. France was also overrun by roving bands of unemployed mercenaries called *routiers*. To pacify the French countryside, Bertrand du Guesclin, the high constable of France from 1370 to 1380, hired *routiers* to practice the guerrilla tactics comparable to those of the English, such as crop destruction in the path of enemy forays, interdicting lines of communication, ambushes, and night attacks. All of these operations continued the trend, well established by this time, of needing horses with good endurance, especially coursers.

Horses were also differentiated in function for warfare with the emergence of mounted shock combat, a new cavalry style that became widespread by the mid-twelfth century. This mode of mounted combat was slow to coalesce because its component parts—the stirrup, the elongated shield, enveloping cantle, and the couched lance—did not all develop in the same geographical area or at the same chronological pace. This style of cavalry is associated with the destrier, the horse used in set battles and tournaments. The Golden Psalter of Saint Gall (c. 875) is the earliest securely dated manuscript acting as a forerunner to the new style in depicting mounted warriors, riding in full battle array as if in a procession, with all the components of mounted shock combat except the elongated shield. But even up to the time of the Bayeux Tapestry, lances were relatively light and were used in a variety of ways, including throwing and thrusting. Written sources from the ninth through the eleventh century note relatively frequent use of the feigned-retreat tactic, which put a premium on the agility (and endurance) of mounts. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, when the couched-lance charge—which relied on the momentum of horse and rider rather than on the muscle strength of the warrior's arm—became the principal cavalry fighting method, then larger, heavier horses became favored.

[*See also* Barding (Horse Armor); Cavalry; Horsemanship; Hussars; Infantry, Mounted; Logistics and Transportation; Stirrups and Stirrup Thesis; *and* Tournaments and Jousts.]

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C. M. Gillmor

HOUSEHOLD KNIGHTS

Household troops are one of the continuities that stretch across medieval Europe geographically and chronologically. At Maldon in 991, the decision of Byrhtnoth's retainers to die with their lord has its echo in 1346 at Crécy when the blind king of Bohemia's retainers stayed with him during his

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valorous but fatal charge. Rooted in the Germanic war band, with its ethos of unswerving loyalty among the members, reward from the successful leader, and honor or station gained by martial prowess, these armed retinues manifested across the Middle Ages. In time, they became more formalized, with offices and inherited duties for members; however, they also remained open to new recruits. The recruitment and maintenance of household knights have drawn a great deal of attention, much of which has involved administrative hairsplitting (witness the creation of concepts such as bastard feudalism). The primary fact is that lords drew about themselves retainers whom they rewarded with a living and with opportunities for advancement. Their service in turn advanced that lord's agenda.

Naturally, monarchs had the greatest wherewithal to attract household knights. The most fully attested, because of both chronicles and financial memoranda, are the military retinues of the English monarchs. Groundbreaking studies by J. O. Prestwich and Marjorie Chibnall showed how fully the Anglo-Norman kings relied on this core group. Stephen Morillo argued that its professionalism raised the caliber of the king's less capable levies. S. D. Church's study of King John's household knights confirmed that approach and showed the household knights as both a ready strike force and the means by which John could extend his governmental reach. Michael Prestwich's research has amply demonstrated that the later Plantagenets used household knights for military and political functions, assigning them as constables of key castles, giving them (rather than less trustworthy magnates) vital military commands, and using them to recruit more troops and supply the army. Other knights were entrusted with foreign diplomatic initiatives. On the domestic front, household knights sometimes checked the legal and financial abuses of sheriffs and other officials, holding hearings and arresting malefactors.

The greater magnates naturally operated their own mirror versions of the royal household. David Crouch's study of William Marshal conclusively notes this for the late twelfth century, and Peter Coss's research has carried the picture forward into the thirteenth. As magnates, the great prelates of the church likewise kept military retinues, often because their estates encumbered them with public duties, but also, as Benjamin Arnold has shown in the case of medieval Germany, because they needed protection themselves in the rough local politics. In the Angevin realms, more than one bishop and abbot suffered when the knights did not meet royal expectations of quality or quantity.

It is tempting to see the worthy veterans named as seneschals, chamberlains, and marshals as the backbone of the household, but the majority of members were still "on the make"; many were described as bachelors—men still waiting to secure their place in society via marriage and significant grants. Their military prowess was key. Thus, membership among the household knights was a military tool that offered advancement along multiple avenues.

[*See also Familia Regis.*]

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Steven Isaac

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HRABANUS MAURUS

(c. 780–856), abbot, archbishop, and writer. Hrabanus Maurus was one of the most productive ecclesiastical writers of the Middle Ages. As a so-called *puer oblatus* (a child offered by his parents to a monastery), he was given by his noble parents to the famous monastery of Fulda. In 801 he was sent by his abbot to the famous Anglo-Saxon scholar Alcuin, who at that time was lay abbot in Tours. He may also have spent time at the court of Charlemagne before 800. Hrabanus's period as abbot of Fulda (822–842) was ended by Louis II the German (r. 840–876) because he was an open supporter of the emperor Lothair I (r. 840–855), who was fighting for the union of the Carolingian Empire. Nevertheless the elderly abbot became reconciled with Louis, and even became archbishop of Mainz in 847. Though Hrabanus was deeply involved in the great ecclesiastical controversies of his day, he never interrupted his writing.

Since the 1980s there has been intensive research on the works of Hrabanus, which are now interpreted as typical products of a Carolingian scientist and writer. His goal, like many other authors of that time, was not to fulfill the ideal of originality but only to help the reader of his works to get a better understanding of the world created by God, making use of pagan writers when necessary. In this sense we can understand his treatment of Vegetius, who wrote the military handbook *De re militari* in the fourth century. Hrabanus's abridgment of Vegetius's work, published under the title *De procinctu Romanae militiae* (Making Roman soldiers ready for combat), is one of the oldest testimonies to the influence of Vegetius's text in the Middle Ages. Hrabanus generally left out passages and themes that were too specific to the Romans to be useful to Carolingian military leaders. As he explained, his purpose in preparing this text was practical—to help his countrymen in resisting frequent "barbarian" attacks—rather than antiquarian. Thus, his choices of what to include or exclude can offer important insights into the nature and capabilities of the Carolingian army.

[*See also* Charlemagne; Franks, Carolingian, *subentries on* Narrative (751–899) *and* Sources (751–899); Lothair I; *and* Vegetius.]

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HUESCA, SIEGE OF

Aragonese military expansion for control of the Ebro basin in northeastern Spain led to alliances of convenience. King Sancho I Ramírez of Aragon (r. 1063–1094) initiated the campaign to take Huesca in 1089 by fortifying the abbey of Montearagón, three miles (five kilometers) northeast of Huesca. In 1094, from this well-protected vantage point, he initiated a siege of starvation. Christian cavalry were able to interdict travel along the main route between Huesca and Lérida and to interrupt at will agricultural work in the area that surrounded the well-fortified Muslim city. Rodrigo Díaz de Vivar, the Cid, allied himself with Banu Hud against the besieging Aragonese army. The Almoravids also allied themselves with Alfonso VI of Castile-León (r. 1065–1109), who in the meantime had raised an army in Alava to take on the Aragonese.

To determine Huesca's weaknesses, Sancho I inspected the city walls on horseback on 4 June 1094. As he pointed to a spot, his cuirass fell open and his arm was laid bare. Seeing this, a Muslim archer released an arrow that found its mark in his right side, through his open sleeve. Sancho kept quiet about his wound, returned to Montearagón, ordered his noblemen to swear allegiance to his son Pedro, and extracted promises to continue the siege until Huesca was taken. Shortly afterward he died.

Huesca fell on 21 November 1096 to Sancho's successor, Pedro I (r. 1094–1102), perhaps as the

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result of a contributing event. Two days before, at the battle of Alcoraz, the Aragonese king had defeated for the first time in conventional warfare an Almoravid relief force from Zaragoza (modern Saragossa), which was led by al-Musta'in. The Muslim army also included Castilian and Leonese forces commanded by Counts García Ordóñez of Nájera and Gonzalo Núñez of Lara. This stunning victory may have led the Almoravid defenders to abandon Huesca, which Pedro I then entered unopposed, and opened the approaches to Zaragoza, which would fall to Pedro's brother, Alfonso I (r. 1104–1134), in 1118.

[*See also* Alfonso I of Aragon; Fraga, Siege and Battle of; Iberia, *subentry on* Narrative (500–1100); *and* Zaragoza, Siege of.]

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Arnold Odio

HUETE, SIEGE OF

Huete is a small castle town situated about 70 miles (113 kilometers) east of Toledo. The Castilian monarchy had settled it by agreement with the Muslim rebel, King Lobo of Murcia. Strategically positioned on the northern fringe of La Mancha, the town anchored Toledo's eastern frontier. When the Almohad caliph Abu Ya'qub Yusuf I (r. 1163–1184) took Murcia at King Lobo's death in 1172, he moved to reclaim all of the deceased ruler's holdings while he had a large expeditionary army at his disposal. With a force estimated by the Muslim chronicler Ibn Sahib at 100,000 men, Yusuf seized nearby Vilches and Alcaraz, and then laid siege to Huete (11 July 1172). Anticipating the threat, the young King Alfonso VIII of Castile (r. 1158–1214) had dispatched reinforcements to the town a few weeks earlier. Huete's fortifications had recently been extended with a newly excavated ditch. Neither the added forces nor the earthworks, however, quite assured the necessary defense. Yusuf completely surrounded the town, cutting off its water supply and that of its expanded population.

By 12 July, the Almohades breached the defenses and engaged the defenders in street fighting. During this period Yusuf's forces had purloined the town's church bells, an ever popular piece of Muslim ecclesiastical booty. The defenders had crowded into the town's castle keep (*alcázar*), badly overtaxing the supply of water within the fortress. The Castilian castellan Niño Manrique, fearful his garrison would die of thirst, sued for peace on 13 July, but the caliph rebuffed the offer, possibly wishing to annihilate the defenders. Christian sallies failed to break the siege, but costly assaults proved equally unable to force Huete's surrender before 16 July, when a most untypical summer storm front arrived, refilling the wells and cisterns of Huete and badly disrupting the Almohad camp. The next day the continuing rain blunted a major Muslim assault on the town, and thereafter the attackers noticed a notable revitalization of the Christians' morale.

Yusuf berated his army for betraying Allah by not fighting with sufficient vigor, then retreated to his tent for theological consultations, ignoring his battlefield commanders. The size advantage of the Almohad force became disadvantageous when a requisition for food from the surrounding countryside turned up nothing on 20 July. Meanwhile, word reached Huete's defenders that King Alfonso VIII, with the help of a promise of an indulgence for all volunteers by Papal Legate Hyacinth (the future Pope Celestine III), was recruiting a large relief force in Toledo. Continual preaching and prayer accompanied by challenges to fight harder in the Muslim camp failed to deliver the *alcázar* of Huete or to deliver more food for the hungry army. Frustrated that so large an army had been unable to take so small an objective, Yusuf despaired of capturing the town. On 23 July he packed up his booty, destroyed

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his war machines, and departed for Andalusia with his famished forces, by way of Cuenca and Murcia. Huete was saved, and its town militia would serve Castilian royal forces repeatedly in the decades to come.

[*See also* Al-Andalus; Alfonso VIII of Castile; *and* Iberia, *subentry on* Narrative (1100–1300).]

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James F. Powers

HUMBLETON HILL, BATTLE OF

The catastrophic defeat at Humbleton Hill outside Wooler on 14 September 1402 ended medieval Scottish military ambitions. Not until Flodden (1513) would a great host again cross the border into England, and no English king sought to cross into Scotland. To the longer-term advantage of Scotland, border warfare reverted to a war of chivalry and localized conflict. Both Archibald II, fourth Earl Douglas, and the lieutenant Robert Stewart, Duke of Albany, saw the regime of Henry IV as fragile, so with tacit French support, Douglas led an army of some thirteen thousand men into England as far as Newcastle. This was both an engorged aristocratic affinity and a national force, including a contingent under Albany's son, Murdoch Stewart. Returning toward Coldstream on the border, they found their route blocked at Milfield by a larger force with some seven thousand archers under the exiled George Dunbar, Earl of March, and Sir Henry Percy, styled Hotspur. This too was a grand army from northern England and beyond. Retreating across the river Glen, the Scots climbed Humbleton Hill, where, contrary to Vegetian maxims, they stood so huddled together that the wind could scarcely pass between them, trusting that the English, after climbing the steep slope, would be too exhausted even to raise their weapons, and that the "extremely costly" plate armor their leading men-at-arms had recently acquired would protect them from archery.

Under the ensuing English tactics, widely credited to the Earl of March, archers advanced to rain arrows on the crowded Scots, leaving them "bristling like hedgehogs." In the space of an hour after midday, the bowmen achieved a major victory, reducing noblemen and knights to idle bystanders. There was no named English casualty. The terrain of the battle is not securely established. Walsingham observed that the English had drawn themselves up on a hill opposite the enemy, and that their archers kept up their fusillades from the valley bottom. Reconstructions have struggled to find suitable hills in Glendale, either leaving the English men-at-arms on Milfield Hill, three miles away, or ingeniously bringing them up the same ridge by the adjacent slope of Harehope Hill, separated by a thousand yards of the shallow start of Monday Cleugh. On the hill the Scottish army was disorganized and discomfited. A mainly Lothian group under Adam Gordon and Sir John Swinton, heroically breaking out of the killing ground, was overwhelmed and killed in an effort to overwhelm the archers. Although Walsingham credits Douglas with a similar foray, he probably remained with the main body, where he is known to have lost an eye.

Some seven hundred men-at-arms were killed, and others drowned crossing the Tweed. After a battlefield court, Hotspur executed Sir William Stewart of Jedburgh for switching allegiance in the 1380s. Five earls and eight barons, including Douglas's and Albany's sons, as well as Jacques de Heilly and Pierre des Essarts, two of the Duke of Burgundy's entourage, were taken. As Walter Bower in *Scotichronicon* claimed, "The flower of Scotland was captured and ransomed." Several were later paraded in parliament, and many remained in captivity across England. An ambassador in France held lists of their names, and French military support was redirected toward Owain Glyn Dŵr's rebellion in Wales. Those held at Chester later joined Hotspur's rebel army at Shrewsbury with Douglas, where Dunbar too reprised his role as strategic advisor for Henry IV.

[*See also* Glyn Dŵr, Owain.]

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Philip Morgan

HUNDRED YEARS' WAR

[*This entry contains three subentries, on the causes and costs of the Hundred Years' War and on naval raids on England.*]

Causes

The origins of the Hundred Years' War, the "great war" of late medieval European history, lay in long-standing, historically based developments as well as more immediate causes. Ever since the twelfth century, kings of England had held lands in France as vassals of the French crown, thereby creating an unequal relationship between two rulers otherwise regarded as equal and sovereign. Although the Treaty of Paris (1259) attempted to regulate the situation, it nonetheless left the duchy of Aquitaine, in the far southwest of the country and held by the English crown, vulnerable to the expansionist ambitions of France. In 1294, on King Edward I's refusal to appear in Paris to answer for hostile acts allegedly committed by English sailors at sea, King Philip IV declared Aquitaine confiscate. A period of intermittent hostilities continued until 1303, after which several attempts were made to reach a settlement through diplomatic means. However, entrenched positions and little inclination for compromise prevented the creation of a lasting peace. In 1323 the French tried to build a *bastide*, or fortified settlement, at Saint-Sardos. Regarding this as a provocation, the English destroyed the *bastide*, a measure that led to the second confiscation of Aquitaine. Although the status quo was to be restored within three years, the matter of the English claim to sovereignty in Aquitaine was left unresolved.

In 1328 King Charles IV of France died, leaving no heir apparent. In these unusual circumstances the crown was claimed by his nephew, King Edward III of England, son of his sister, Isabella, until recently queen of England. Uncertainty about the laws of succession then prevailing (could a woman pass on to her son a right that she might not herself exercise?) and alarm at the possibility of having the king of England, still a young man and not one of them, as their ruler, encouraged the French nobility to choose Philip of Valois, a cousin of the late Charles IV, to succeed him as king. The scene was thus set for a conflict over the succession to the throne of France. Although Edward III appeared at first to recognize the de facto claim of his rival, Philip VI, by giving him simple homage in 1329 and liege homage in 1331, the ambiguous situation in Aquitaine gradually deteriorated, leading to the third confiscation of the duchy on 24 May 1337.

Meanwhile, the international situation had been further aggravated by the historic enmity between English and Scottish kings over English claims to Scotland and the constant state of war on their common border. Matters deteriorated when, in 1326, Charles IV, planning to destabilize his English rival, promised military aid to Scotland, while in 1334, Philip VI refused any settlement with England unless it involved Scotland. As a result, Anglo-Scottish relations, into which the French delved with effect to embarrass the English, became a significant element in raising political and military tensions in the 1330s and in creating a situation that, in 1337, would lead to war.

[*See also* Edward I of England; Edward III of England; *and* Philip VI.]

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Christopher Allmand

Costs

Most scholars agree that France paid a larger price than England during the Hundred Years' War because the war was fought largely on French soil, but there is considerable disagreement on the extent to which French losses ended up as English profits. The situation is made more complex because many of the costs of war—ransoms, plunder, indemnities, and *appatis* (protection money)—were the opponent's gains, and a victor's spoils one day could turn into a source to pay off his ransom the next. Both sides, however, suffered from wartime disruption of trade, the diversion of resources and manpower, and the impact of raids, sieges, and *chevauchées* on noncombatants and infrastructure, although French losses were clearly greater in this regard. The efforts of the English and French to pay for the war, moreover, led to the acknowledgement of the crown's right to levy regular taxation and thus to the development of more effective and centralized fiscal institutions.

Paying for the War. Both England and France drew on similar sources of revenue—taxes and loans—to defray the costs of war. In England, direct taxes on the laity's moveables (chattels and surplus goods, but not land or buildings) and on the income of the clergy accounted for over 60 percent of taxation revenues into the 1340s, but thereafter indirect taxes such as customs on overseas trade, particularly taxes on wool exports, were more important. Together these two forms of taxation raised over £9.5 million in England during the war. We have no such exact figures for France, where direct taxation often took the form of local levies to meet the crown's demands for troops or to maintain local fortifications. Direct taxation in France also varied widely, from hearth taxes and levies on landed property to the head-tax or *taille*. Indirect taxation in France relied more on the *gabelle*, or salt tax, than on overseas customs. But in both countries, the regressive nature of the rising taxation required to fund the war led to increasing resentment and social unrest. The Peasants' Revolt of 1381 in England was caused in part by three poll taxes (levied at the same rate on all adults) in five years, while the Jacquerie Revolt of 1358 in France was provoked by resentment over the taxes required to pay the enormous ransom of King John, taxes that the nobility—responsible for losing the battle of Poitiers, where the king was captured—were exempt from paying. These and other anti-fiscal riots of the late fourteenth century encouraged greater reliance on indirect taxation to pay for the war.

The costs of the war were also met by loans from wealthy individuals, towns, and institutions. Theoretically such loans were to be repaid—in England, often out of the customs revenues—but in practice the English kings in particular failed to meet their obligations; the failures of Edward III even caused the bankruptcy of two Italian banks which had loaned him over £174,000 in 1336–1340. Thereafter the English kings tried other schemes, including syndicates of merchants who were given trading privileges in exchange for advancing loans. The French too relied on loans, but not to the same extent as the less-well-off English, who in the first years of the war depended on credit to finance about 90 percent of its costs. Another type of loan that affected peasant producers in particular was the practice of purveyance (*prise* in France), whereby the crown used its authority to requisition provisions and fodder at set prices with a promise (too often delayed or unfulfilled) to pay in the future. The system caused so many disputes that this form of loan became more regulated and less common by the late fourteenth century.

Costs Borne by Soldiers and Noncombatants. Soldiers also bore the costs of war in a variety of ways, including their weapons and armor, and often

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a share of their food and drink as well. Knights and soldiers of higher social status were vulnerable to capture and ransom, the most notorious case being that of King John, whose ransom of £500,000 was never fully paid. Bertrand du Guesclin, who rose to be constable of France, received many ransoms, including £130,000 for one English earl, but since Du Guesclin himself was captured and ransomed three times for ever larger sums, his overall profits were not substantial, even though he received help from his royal friends to pay his ransoms, a favor that most captured men did not enjoy. The Moleyns family was forced to sell or mortgage the bulk of its property to pay the ransom of Robert Lord Moleyns. The ransom of Luke de Warton was only forty-four marks, but his family was never able to recover the lands they had to mortgage to pay the ransom.

The costs of war for noncombatants lay not only in the taxes and loans they were required to pay, but also in the damage that war caused to their property and livelihood, not to mention loss of life. English ports such as Southampton and Winchelsea were burned and plundered by the French and their Spanish allies, creating a permanent tension in coastal communities that was only partly alleviated by the expensive construction of town walls and the creation of a coastal defense system. Coastal raids and, in particular, the sieges and *chevauchée*s conducted by the English in France were even more devastating, as the sorry aftermath of the siege of Limoges testifies. English and French garrisons and free companies also charged whole districts protection money to forestall attacks; in 1359–1360, over ten thousand pounds in *appatis* was collected from one region in Brittany, much of which the English spent on maintaining their castles and garrisons in France. The English occupation of Normandy was also costly to the French, many of whom lost their lands, rents, and offices to the foreign occupiers.

The protracted costs of the Hundred Years' War forced both the English and French governments to develop innovative ways to extract funding for the war. Not only did soldiers and noncombatants caught in the line of fire pay a price, but those who were involved in assembling and transporting troops and supplies, or were harmed by the disruption of trade and the continual demands of kings for taxes and loans, also bore some of the costs. These widespread demands also prompted governments to be more sensitive to public opinion, which in turn led to a greater reliance on propaganda and stimulated the development of ideas about royal power, the just war, and the role of the noncombatant.

[*See also* Guesclin, Bertrand du; John; Limoges, Siege of; *and* Prisoners and Ransoms.]

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Maryanne Kowaleski

Naval Raids on England

Cross-Channel raiding was a strategy used by the French and English alike during the Hundred Years' War. The military aim of both sides was to reduce the enemy's naval capacity by destroying their shipping and ports. However, over time, retaliation for past attacks may also have become an end in itself, with loot and personal revenge as powerful incentives for the sailors and soldiers involved. Massacres of civilians, mutilation, and rape were commonly perpetrated by all combatants, along with the burning of towns and villages.

Apart from intervention in Scotland and attempts to invade England (all of which failed), coastal

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raiding was the only way for the French to carry the war directly to the English homeland. Most French attacks came in a series of intense campaigns, in the years 1338–1342, 1359–1360, 1370–1373, 1377–1380, and 1403–1406. They did not always take place during periods of open war, but they usually had official sanction. The assaults were concentrated on the southwest, south, and southeast coasts of England and on the English-controlled Channel Islands off Normandy. Many attacks were successful, and some unfortunate places suffered repeatedly, like Fowey (Cornwall), Southampton and the Isle of Wight (Hampshire), and Winchelsea (Sussex).

Fast, shallow-draught galleys (powered by both sail and oars) were ideal for raiding, and the French used them frequently. The galleys were drawn from the royal fleet and were sometimes accompanied by allied squadrons from Genoa, Castile, or Portugal. Privately owned sailing ships also took part, with most raids emanating from the ports of Normandy and the Pas-de-Calais.

The English rarely had much warning of a specific attack, and the planned interception of raiders at sea was almost impossible. Chains of fire beacons and peals of church bells were used to alert the population once an attack was in prospect or in progress, but this left little time for organizing counterattacks.

In most cases, it was only possible to defeat a raid if there was a strong garrison already on the spot, with a well-fortified base. Despite troop reinforcements in coastal areas, English defensive measures were not very successful, and local militias often fared badly in battle. The refortification of cities, towns, and castles was piecemeal, and the standard of work varied considerably. Cannon-armed defenses did become more common from the 1380s (at Southampton, Canterbury, and other places), but the crown lacked the resources for a major fortification program.

The most effective way to prevent the raids, or at least to reduce their frequency, was to cripple or destroy French sea power. This was achieved for a time by English naval victories in 1340, but it was only the English conquest of northern France in the 1420s that succeeded in largely removing the French threat for a generation.

The attacks, and rumors of attacks, often created panic. It has been suggested that the failure of the authorities to protect the coast may have helped to incite Kentish peasants to revolt in 1381. For all this, the raids did not represent a "war-winning" strategy. They hampered the English war effort at times and spread much death, destruction, and terror, but they did not prevent the English from taking their war into the heart of France.

[*See also* Artillery; Atrocities; Devastation and Ravaging; Fortifications, *subentry on* Overview; France, *subentry on* Narrative (1328–1483); Harbor Defenses; Henry V; Jean de Vienne; Naval Combat and Tactics; Private War; Raids and Raiding; Scouts and Scouting; Sea Power; Ships and Sailing; Sluys, Naval Battle of; *and* Urban Defenses.]

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Ian Friel

HUNGARIAN DEFENSE SYSTEM

The Hungarian defense system was built in the fifteenth century to halt the Ottoman advance. After his defeat by the Ottomans at the battle of Nicopolis on 25 September 1396, King Sigismund of Luxemburg (r. 1387–1437) reorganized his country's defense system. First introduced at the diet of Temesvár (present-day Timişoara, Romania) of 1397 and further developed under Sigismund's successors, the new multilayered defense system consisted of buffer or vassal states; the banates (frontier provinces

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ruled by *bans* or governors); two parallel lines of border forts situated along the southern borders of the country; and the Hungarian field army, as a last resort in case the Ottomans broke through the first three layers of defense.

Sigismund used Walachia, Serbia, and Bosnia as buffer states against the Ottomans. The arrangement worked best with Serbia. Its rulers cooperated with Hungary, and until Serbia's conquest by the Ottomans (in 1439 and 1459) they halted the Ottoman advance. Bosnia and Walachia were more hesitant to submit to Hungarian sovereignty and often sided with the Ottomans. Sigismund also secured Nándorfehérvár (present-day Belgrade, Serbia) through an agreement (in 1426) with Despot Stefan Lazarević of Serbia and took possession of it in 1427. Nándorfehérvár became the key fort in the Hungarian southern border-defense line until its conquest on 29 August 1521 by the Ottoman sultan Süleyman I (r. 1520–1566), and it withstood two major Ottoman sieges (1440 and 1456).

Sigismund also granted extended military authority over the garrison soldiers serving in the counties of the Temesköz and the banate of Mačva to the count (*comes*) of Temes county and the *ban* of Mačva, respectively. To the west, the two *bans* of Croatia and Slavonia had been given similar military authority. Many of the soldiers of the border forts were refugees from Serbia and served as *hussars* (light cavalry), boatmen, or peasant soldiers (*vojnik*).

In the 1470s King Mátyás Hunyadi (r. 1459–1490) reorganized the border from the Adriatic through the Eastern Carpathians under three military officials and integrated the garrison forces with the noble troops of the counties (*banderia*) under the command of these officials. The offices of the *bans* of Croatia-Dalmatia and Slavonia were united under one person, and this *ban* commanded all the military forces of the counties up to the Lower Danube. To direct the defenses of the Lower Danube region, Mátyás Hunyadi created the office of the captain-general of the Lower Parts of Hungary, held usually by the *comes* of Temes, who commanded the garrisons and military forces of fifteen counties, including those between the Drava and Sava rivers. The easternmost territories were under the command of the *voivode* of Transylvania, with similar authority.

The border forts under the command of these three military officials formed two parallel lines. The southern chain of forts stretched from Klis near the Adriatic through Knin, Jajce, Srebrenik, Šabac, Zemun, Nándorfehérvár, Pescari, and Orşova to Turnu Severin; the northern one extended from Senj on the Dalmatian coast to Bihać, Krupa, Petrovaradin, Timişoara, Lugoş, and Caransebeş. This defense line and their garrisons successfully halted the Ottomans for 150 years until it collapsed in the 1520s and the Hungarian army was crushed at the battle of Mohács (29 August 1526), which led to the Ottoman occupation of Hungary in 1541.

[*See also* Banate; *Banderium*; Hunyadi, Mátyás; Hussars; Mohács, Battle of; Nicopolis, Battle of; *and* Sigismund of Luxemburg.]

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HUNGARIAN RAIDS

The events of the Conquest (German: *Landnahme*) of the Carpathian Basin and those of the raids have been interwoven in Western historiography, because the Hungarians entered the area with raiding troops invited either by the East Frankish court (862, 892) or their Moravian opponents (881, 894). In a broader sense the beginning of the raids goes back to the middle of the ninth century, but in a strict sense the classical raids took place during the final years of the *Landnahme*, 896/899 to 970. After the defeat in the battle on the Lechfeld (955), the Hungarians

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stopped the raids toward the west, and, as a consequence of their defeat at Arcadiopolis (Lüleburgaz) by the Byzantines, stopped raiding toward the southeast as well. Their approximately forty western raids are thoroughly recorded by Latin sources. Their advance to Byzantium and the east is less well known; they are believed to have made about ten attempts, although the number could have been much higher.

The classical age of the raids begins with an attack against northern Italy in 899–900, on the "invitation" of King Arnulf. Returning from their victory at the river Brenta (24 September 899), they occupied Transdanubia, the former Pannonian duchy of the Franks. Until 902/906 they also occupied the duchy of the Moravians, and later consolidated their power at the battle of Bratislava (907).

After 906 they regularly raided the German territories (Saxony, Bavaria, Thuringia, Swabia), distant areas of the west (Burgundy, the Atlantic and Danish littoral, southern France, Italy), and even Iberia in 942. The Italian, German, and Byzantine courts paid high tribute to them for decades. The most successful in defense were the Germans who, after minor victories and military and political reforms, finally crushed them in 955.

The raiding armies could be regarded as professional auxiliary troops hired by foreign dukes and kings to press their adversaries politically and militarily; the logistical problems of the raids could not have been solved without their active cooperation. The Hungarians preferred densely settled territories, such as Italy. This is proved by the fact that the coins found in graves originate mostly from Italy (67 percent) and France (21 percent), with a few from Germany (7 percent). Concerning the inner structure of the raids, very little is known; they moved in small contingents and, even united for a large battle, could exceed no more than a few thousand, despite being overestimated in the tens of thousands in contemporary sources. They regularly used reconnaissance; communicated during the maneuvers with the help of fire, smoke, and horn signals; and terrified their opponents with "diabolic" war cries of "*hui, hui.*" Their numbers seemed much higher because of their reserve horses and the speed and rotating movements of their battle tactics. Their feigned retreat tactics are often described in battles, and strategically on a larger scale as well.

Their most respected weapon was the nomadic composite bow, having a maximum range of 492 to 656 feet (150 to 200 meters) (effective for aimed shots at 197 to 230 feet [60 to 70 meters]), with twelve to fifteen arrows loosed per minute, creating a terrifying shower of whizzing arrows and disintegrating the opponent's battle order. They had to be resupplied with arrows several times during the fight, because the quivers contained no more than fifteen or twenty; their forces always had to possess a supply of several thousands. They were also masters of the saber, one of which is still displayed in Vienna as the saber of Attila.

The raids started mostly in spring, when their horses were fresh, but in some cases they began in late autumn or winter, suggesting that they could feed the horses without pasture. The physical abilities of their horses were well known; they were used not only in battles, but as a means of transport over the whole continent. It is still debated whether the Carpathian Basin was large enough for breeding hundreds of thousands of horses, and whether that problem could have been a possible reason for the end of the raids.

The campaigns were led on the level of tribes, but there was certainly cooperation between them in reconnaissance and in general policymaking. The regular plunder and booty became the basis of their economic and social structure, and gave the nomadic raiding way of life an extra century of existence, as well as the chance for a gradual acculturation to the sedentary agricultural economy of their neighbors, though it is still debated how much they were nomads or seminomads by the end of the tenth century. On a political level, the success of the raids secured a more independent statehood for the Hungarian Christian kingdom than for the Bohemians and Poles facing the German empire.

Hungarian historiography (with a few dissenting voices) regarded the raids as a great achievement of Hungarian martial virtues; the Hungarian term

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kalandozás lacks any pejorative connotation, as opposed to the English "raids" or German *Raubzüge*. In Hungarian oral traditions, up to the present time, fictive stories of raiders survive, such as the breaking of the Golden Gate of Constantinople, or the alleged avenging of the defeat of 955, when the Hungarian captive warlord Lél, before his execution, is said to have killed the German king with his war horn.

[*See also* Arcadiopolis, Battle of (970); Bratislava, Battle of; Byzantine Empire, *subentries on* Narrative (500–1000) *and* Narrative (900–1204); Franks, Carolingian, *subentry on* Narrative (751–899); Hungary, *subentry on* Narrative (500–1000); Italy, *subentry on* Narrative (476–1000); *and* Lechfeld, Battle on the.]

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László Veszprémy

HUNGARY

[*This entry contains nine subentries, on Hungarian sources from 500–1000, 1000–1300, and 1300–1526; an overview of Hungarian military history from 500–1000, 1000–1300, and 1300–1526; and on Hungarian historiography from 500–1000, 1000–1300, and 1300–1526.*]

Sources (500–1000)

Some dozens of Arabic, Persian, Greek, and Latin sources throw light on the Hungarian military up to the foundation of the kingdom in 1000 CE. Their authors often adapt centuries-older treatises on nomadic tribes, updating them to reflect the habits of contemporary Hungarians.

The Arabic sources are based on the al-Jayhani tradition (first half of the tenth century), originating from c. 870. Geographical treatises such as those of Ahmad ibn Rustah, Abu Said Gardizi, and Abu 'Ubayd 'Abd Allah al-Bakri relate the numerical strength of the Hungarians, the military duties of the tribes and their chieftains, and their wars against the Slavs. A more detailed description survives in the works of 'Abu al-Hasan al-Mas'udi (d. 956), who offers a fine picture of a Hungarian raid and victory against the Byzantines, also referring to the Hungarians' Muslim auxiliary troops. The chronicle of Ibn Hayyan (d. 1076) of Cordova describes a Hungarian raid against Andalusia in 942, discusses the taking of prisoners, and offers an account of the Hungarians' logistical problems and the failed siege of Lerida.

Byzantine military treatises such as the *Tactics* of Emperor Leo VI (the Wise), written c. 904 as an update to the treatise of Maurikios (c. 600), are very important as well. The authenticity of the work regarding battle tactics, organization, military equipment, training, and tactical advice is beyond doubt, as the Hungarian conquest took place during Leo's reign. *On the Government of the Empire* (c. 952) by Emperor Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus (r. 913–959) summarizes the characteristics of the neighbors of Byzantium, including the Hungarians, from a diplomatic and historical rather than a military point of view.

Among the Latin sources, the world chronicle (up to 906) of Regino, abbot of Prüm, characterized Hungarian light cavalry tactics, with their surprise attacks, their masterful riding and use of horn bows, and their inability to conquer fortified cities during their raids. His work became the standard on nomadic tactics for later chroniclers, even in Hungary. The chronicle of Liutprand (d. 972) offers a fine account of the feigned retreat of 910, entitled *Antapodosis* (Repayment). The battle on the Lechfeld (Augsburg, 955) has unique importance as the most richly documented battle of the tenth century,

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with accounts by Widukind (d. 1004) and Gerhard, the biographer of Ulrich (Udalrich), bishop of Augsburg (c. 990). These works provide insight into the everyday maneuvers of the Hungarians abroad, including their intelligence-gathering practices. They also describe the German side, discussing the organization of the imperial army, the cooperation among different units, and the tactics that led them to annihilate the Hungarians as the latter retreated and crossed the rivers. Widukind also describes the first important German victory against the Hungarians at Riade (also called Merseburg; 933), referring to the heavy cavalry reforms of King Henry I. Additional information can be gained from church histories and annals, such as those from Fulda, Lobbes, Sankt Gallen, or Cambrai, which sometimes include anecdotal stories. Finally, Gerhard's biographical work is a first-class source for the siege of Augsburg.

[*See also* Augsburg, Siege of; Byzantine Empire, *subentry on* Sources (500–900); Hungarian Raids; Lechfeld, Battle on the; *and* Leo VI.]

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Sources (1000–1300)

Hungarian history from 1000 to 1300 is labeled the age of the Árpád dynasty. From a military point of view, the most important events of this age are the defeat of rival chieftains by Stephen I (István; r. 1000–1038), resulting in the foundation of the state, including the organization of the castle system and that of the border defense; the beating off of expansionist attempts by the Holy Roman and Byzantine empires; the fight against the Cumans and Patzinaks (Pechenegs) who were attacking Hungary from the east; Hungarian expansion toward the Adriatic Sea and the Balkans, as well as toward the northeast (Halych, Volhynia); and finally the Mongol invasion. The tension caused by the traverse of crusading armies—for example, the crusaders' capture of Zara (Zadar, Croatia), then ruled by the Hungarian king, in 1202—also deserves attention.

The most important historical documents were produced in Latin: Hungarian historiography developed on the model of Western historiography. Although earlier Hungarian historiography, with the exception of the *Annales Posonenses*, lacks annals, it is rich in legends belonging to saint-kings, bishops, monks, and even female members of the Árpád dynasty. In the *Legenda S. Stephani regis minor* (Stephen's lesser legend), the emphasis is on Stephen's person as the energetic founder of the state, whereas the *Legenda S. Gerhardi episcopi* (Legend of Bishop Gerard) relates how the king's opponent, Ajtony, was subdued.

Owing to the emergence of a royal chancellery in the 1180s, the thirteenth century saw the rapid expansion of written records. Besides the chancellery, the central courts and the "places of authentications" (*loca credibilia*) also produced charters, and these—especially their narrative parts (*narratio*)—often serve as sources of information about the military exploits of various people. In the early thirteenth

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century the oldest comprehensive Latin Hungarian history, the *Gesta Hungarorum*, was written by an anonymous author, called "Master P." or "Anonymus." By projecting the geographical names and ethnonyms, as well as the structure of the landed estates, of his age back to the ninth century, the author recounts in a fictitious story—that nevertheless contains many real elements—the origins, migrations, and glorious land-taking of the Hungarians. His idea that Álmos, first prince of the Hungarians, was the offspring of Attila the Hun is developed further by Simon Kézai, chaplain of King Ladislas (László) IV, who wrote his own *Gesta Hungarorum* between 1282 and 1285. It was Kézai who formulated the idea that the Huns and the Hungarians shared a common origin and ethnic identity, emphasizing that the land-taking was the recapture of Attila's heritage. Kézai also developed ideas concerning the origin and nature of noble status—ideas that, together with the Hun-Hungarian identity, served as a source of national glory. In addition, Kézai gives a detailed account of the battles of Dürnkrut and Hód-tó, the latter being the place where Ladislas IV crushed the Cumans.

In his *Carmen miserabile* the Italian Rogerius, archdeacon of Várad and later archbishop of Spalato, describes as a contemporary eyewitness the story of the Mongol invasion of 1241–1242. Rogerius's account is reliable, although he is biased against King Béla IV, whose flight to and stay in Dalmatia is described by Thomas of Spalato in his *Historia Salonitana*. Military and other events of the Árpád era are also related in chronicles produced in the period between the early fourteenth and the sixteenth century—the *Illuminated Chronicle* and its variants, the chronicles of Thuróczy, Ransanus, and Bonfini—as well as in works written abroad. The *Illuminated Chronicle*, summarizing Hungarian history up to 1330 on the basis of earlier works since then lost, is extremely important (see *Chronici Hungarici compositio saeculi XIV*).

[*See also* Cumans; Dürnkrut, Battle of; Mongols; Patzinaks; *and* Slavic Lands, *subentry on* Sources (1000–1300).]

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See page 146.

István Petrovics

Material com direitos autorais

Sources (1300–1526)

Fourteenth- and fifteenth-century narrative and archival sources (charters) provide rich material for scholars of Hungarian military history. In this context emphasis must be placed on those parts of chronicles that depict military events and on a special feature of Hungarian charters containing privileges. The *Chronici Hungarici compositio saeculi XIV* (of which one of the surviving ten manuscripts is the famous *Chronicon Pictum*), compiled in the late 1350s, contains relatively few chapters describing warfare, but it is quite informative about the campaigns of Charles I of Anjou. The chronicle written about the deeds of Louis I (the Great) by John Küküllei, the king's chaplain, the text of which was preserved by John Thuróczy's and some other chronicles, however, dedicates many chapters to the description of the king's military activities. These range from campaigns to Naples to battles and sieges in Lithuania or against the Mongols. Both chronicles can be regarded as providing reliable pieces of information on military events. For the fifteenth century, the third part of the chronicle of John Thuróczy and Antonio Bonfini's *Rerum Ungaricarum Decades* (the chapters dedicated to the history of the Hunyadis, especially Mátyás) must be mentioned as primary sources of military history. Thuróczy depicts the deeds of John (János) Hunyadi in great detail, focusing on his successful battles and campaigns against the Turks, but covering his failures as well. He goes on to provide a picture of the military achievements of Mátyás (r. 1458–1490) too, but his emphasis is on the anti-Ottoman wars, which indicates that Thuróczy, like many of his contemporaries, was not entirely satisfied with the policy of Mátyás. Bonfini's work, on the other hand, puts the emphasis on the regnal era of Mátyás, including its military events, either anti-Ottoman or against the Czechs, the Poles, or the Holy Roman Empire. Both Thuróczy—whose work is still a piece of medieval historiography—and Bonfini—who was already a humanist in his approach to writing history—can be regarded as trustworthy writers who obtained their information partly from eyewitnesses and partly from written documents, and both attempted to exert a certain critical approach.

A unique feature of privileges issued in medieval Hungary is the fact that quite a great number of them contain narrative parts, which describe the merits and deeds—predominantly military achievements—of the person(s) receiving the donation. These narrations are sometimes relatively long, describing parts of battles, sieges, or tournaments; in other cases they are quite short, consisting of only a few sentences—but they never contain stereotypes. In each case, the narration is a full story of a feat of arms, which sheds new light on events of military history. These narrative parts of charters are especially important for scholars of Hungarian history, because in a number of cases hitherto unknown parts of the national past emerge from the so-far-unpublished archival sources. The tradition of incorporating long and informative narrative parts into charters is, according to some scholars, derived from the pagan tradition of heroic sagas. The main body of information about the battle of Mohács was provided by a humanist historiographer, István Brodarics, eyewitness and participant of the battle, who wrote his work in 1527.

[*See also* Hunyadi, János; Hunyadi, Mátyás; *and* Ottoman Armies and Military Methods.]

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Ferenc Sebők

Narrative (500–1000)

After the defeat and dispersal of the Huns the Carpathian Basin was inhabited by German tribes, first the Gepids, and later, between 526 and 568, the Langobards (or Lombards). Meanwhile there were fights between the German tribes around Sirmium (modern Sremska Mitrovica, Serbia) in the south. In 568 the newly arrived Avars, led by Kaghan Bayan, won the upper hand, and made the Langobards leave Pannonia peacefully. The second part of the sixth and the seventh centuries witnessed important and often well-documented sieges by the Avar and Slavic forces, such as Sirmium in 582, Thessalonica in 597, Salona (near Solin, Croatia) in 612, Constantinople in 626, and Cividale in 628. According to the miracle collection of Saint Demetrius, the different engines at the siege of Thessalonica show that the Avaro-Slavic army possessed up-to-date siege technology. The western border of the Avars, around the valleys of the Alps, was ill defined, but in the northwest it was marked by the line of the River Enns; their territory was later inherited by the Hungarians. The military power of the Avars was challenged and weakened in the seventh century by the Danube Bulgars and Khazars, so they almost completely gave up their aggressive military expansion and adopted a less nomadic way of life.

Relations with the Franks. The Franks attacked the Avars several times, but faced the difficulty that there were no fortified centers to be conquered. Charlemagne's attack in 791, and his son Pépin's in 796, conquered the Avars' borderlands and sacked their capital, the famous "Ring," from several directions. The final blow to the Avars was given by the Bulgar Khan, Krum, in 803–804, though the details and the results of this campaign are still debated. Later the Bulgars seized the southern part of the Great Hungarian Plain (Alföld) and southern Transylvania, which they retained until the Hungarian Conquest. The Carolingian campaign of 791 is a classic example of a developed medieval strategy: the attack was launched with four divisions from two directions, one led by Duke Pépin from Friuli and three by Charlemagne from the north (on both banks of the Danube and by ships). They penetrated deeply into Avar territory without serious encounters with the Avars. The Franks certainly had losses, but it is not known whether those who perished during the operations were killed or died of natural causes. This multipronged strategy employed by the Carolingians in 791 may have been imitated later, as in the campaign leading to the battle of Bratislava in 907.

During the Frankish reign this region was organized into provinces and dukedoms under changing names: Avaria, Oriens, Ostmark. The fate of the Avars is still debated, as they are mentioned for the last time in 822. After the 820s the Slavic population under Moravian leadership was integrated into the empire with centers in Nitra and Mosaburg (today Zalavár). The Slavic-Moravian dukes, Mojmir, Rastislav, and Svatopluk, took an active role in the internal conflicts between the Bavarians and Franks, and Bavarians and Bulgars. From the 830s until 894 the region witnessed a limited but almost constant "small war" activity, which led to the end of Moravian rule between around 902 and 906. They disappear from the sources in the same rapid and unexpected way as the Avars had some decades earlier, suggesting an unremarked integration into the new Hungarian society. In the realm of armament, the eighth to the tenth centuries were an exciting period of intermingled Western and nomadic features. It was probably the Avars, for example,

who introduced the stirrup to their neighbors in the early eighth century.

The Hungarians as Allies. The Hungarians, having taken control of the territories between the River Dniester and the East Carpathians after the 840s, became a leading military power with their twenty thousand riders (according to contemporary Arabic sources). They were often invited to serve as auxiliary troops by various belligerents, for payment and booty. They entered the Carpathian Basin for the first time in 862 when they supported the sons of Emperor Louis the German, and appeared again at Vienna in 881. Perhaps they infiltrated into the Basin during these decades; it is certain they acquired an excellent geographical, diplomatic, and political knowledge of the territories west of the Carpathians. They could have recognized that the passes of the Carpathians were suitable for the march of greater armies, and that the Basin as a whole was not controlled by any great power. They kept the main routes under military control, as witnessed by the archaeological finds of a nomadic warrior at Przemyśl and several others east of the Carpathians. Apart from the Franks their most important political partners were the Moravians; this is supported by the evidence of the surviving oral traditions about entering into alliance with Svatopluk, and purchasing his country for a white horse, as a part of a political trickery. The historical records suggest that the Hungarians fought against Svatopluk in 892, and in alliance with the Moravians against the Franks in 894.

By 895 the Hungarian tribes with their nomadic allies occupied the central parts of the Basin, except west of the Danube (Pannonia), and established their headquarters in the upper Tisza region, where a series of richly provided warrior graves has been excavated. It is well known from the sources that the Hungarians were attacked by the Pechenegs by surprise, encouraged by the Bulgarians; this seems to have been a decisive impetus for their leaving their earlier territory and for the final conquest of the Basin. The Pecheneg victory was preceded by a Bulgaro-Byzantine conflict at the lower Danube, where the Byzantine diplomacy deluded their Hungarian allies. They made an unexpected truce with the Bulgarians, who successfully counterattacked the Hungarian raiding contingents and their territories outside the Carpathians. Though the conquest must have been part of a large-scale military strategy, the details are totally unknown. There are no mentions of fights between the conquerors and the local population, even possible fights between them and the Moravians, and there are no archaeological finds of aggressive actions around the Moravian strongholds. The authenticity of early thirteenth-century Hungarian Latin sources, describing heavy fights during the conquest, is debated. The numerical strength (between 100,000 and 500,000) of the conquering Hungarians is still open to dispute, as is the process of the linguistic assimilation of the local sedentary population. The Basin, in spite of the spectacular differences with the Eurasian steppe, offered ample room to continue their traditional horse breeding, for decades at least, and served as a favorable base for launching plundering expeditions, indispensable for the survival of the traditional militarized social structure.

The Hungarian Raids. The classical age of the Hungarian Raids could be set between 899 and 971, when the raiding troops roved over practically the whole continent—to the Atlantic Ocean, the Iberian Peninsula, and southern Italy—hired by disputing parties ready to pay their nomadic auxiliaries. The professional nomadic art of war (the tactical use of quickly moving, disciplined mounted archers, shooting at the enemy while pursuing them) remained successful for almost a century against their western and Byzantine opponents. Alongside hundreds of smaller clashes, a few battles are among the best-documented contemporary armed conflicts, such as those at the Rivers Brenta (899), Riade (933), and Lechfeld (955). The battle of Brenta offers a fine example of a strategic feigned retreat, ending in an unexpected river-crossing and the annihilation of the troops of King Berengar (in a similar way the Tartars defeated the Hungarians in 1241 at the battle of Muhi). At the battle of Riade the Germans tried to use the tactical feigned retreat as a stratagem, but the Hungarians recognized it and fled successfully from the battlefield. The battle on the Lechfeld

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testifies to the fatal consequences of rain for the nomadic composite bows, contributing to the disastrous defeat of the Hungarians, and the outcome of this battle testifies to the success of Western efforts to modernize their way of warfare, stimulated by the Hungarian raids.

Reorganization. For the Hungarians their defeat in 955 and the breaking off of the raids toward the west was a major military and political turning point, giving an impetus for a reorganization of western border defense, the establishment of large uninhabited areas, called *indagines* (Hungarian: *gyepü*), to defend the country from all directions, and the settling of nomadic tribes in the western border areas, such as the Hungarian-speaking Székelys (who later declared themselves of Hun origin), or foreign auxiliaries like the Pechenegs. After 955 they gave up the line of the River Enns and the Wienerwald, and retreated to the line of the River Leitha. They were rarely attacked by the Germans until 1030, when the outcome of the fights proved the effectiveness of the recently built defense line. The Hungarian chroniclers of around 1200 claimed that the beginnings of the earliest castle system dated to the time of the conquest, but according to the latest archaeological evidence they were built of earth and timber only during the eleventh century.

[*See also* Avars; Bratislava, Battle of; Byzantine Empire, *subentries on* Narrative (500–900) *and* Narrative (900–1204); Charlemagne; Franks, Carolingian, *subentry on* Narrative (751–899); Franks, Merovingian, *subentry on* Narrative (482–751); Hungarian Defense System; Hungarian Raids; Khazars; Lechfeld, Battle on the; Louis II; Muhi, Battle of; Slavic Lands, *subentry on* Narrative (500–1000); Strategy; Szeklers; Tactics, Battle; *and* Weapons, Missile.]

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László Veszprémy

Narrative (1000–1300)

The military basis of the power of the Árpáds comprised the nomadic warriors of the steppe, complemented by the Patzinaks (Pechenegs) and armored western knights in the escort of the first queen, Giselle of Bavaria. This combination of various military groups constituted the powerful army with which Stephen I (István; r. 1000–1038) successfully defeated the other tribal leaders, such as Gyula (1003) and Ajtony (c. 1028).

Stephen based his military organization on a new foundation: he linked the people able to serve on military campaigns to the castles as centers. Such an administrative unit was called a *vármegye* (*vár* meaning "castle," *megye* meaning "county"). The leadership was in the hands of the count (Latin: *comes*; Hungarian: *ispán*) nominated by the king. The counties were organized on a territorial rather than a clan (genus) basis. The clans were pushed back into the personal sphere: each clan disposed of its own lands and had a hereditary ruler who ruled over the entire clan; as a result, by the thirteenth century, clans had again become a potent factor in Hungarian society. In the neighboring countries where no such reorganization took place (e.g., Poland and the Kievan Rus')—where the military command continued to be grounded upon the network of clan relations—the regional centers, retaining the tribal frameworks, could easily become independent; thus disintegration of the country naturally followed. Hungary was

able to avoid this kind of disintegration thanks to King Stephen's organization of counties.

Dynastic Conflicts. For eleventh-century Hungary the most serious danger from abroad came from the Holy Roman Empire. The first imperial campaign occurred in 1030. Later, German attacks and inner conflicts always coincided. Rulers enjoying German support could achieve short-lived victories, such as that of the second ruling period of King Peter Orseolo (r. 1038–1041, 1044–1046) after the battle of Ménfő on 5 July 1044. When the entire Hungarian military force could be deployed against imperial troops, the Germans faced a powerful enemy. This was the case in 1051–1052, 1079, and 1108. In the second half of the eleventh century, German expansion was facilitated by Hungary's practice of assigning representatives of the dynasty control over one-third of the realm's territory (a *ducatus*): more than once the dukes who got control of the *ducatus* used their rule as a path to the throne. For example, the dukes Géza I (r. 1074–1077) and his brother Ladislas I (László I; r. 1077–1095) came to power by overthrowing the crowned Solomon (r. 1063–1074). Possession of the *ducatus* had its roots in the tradition of *senioratus* (that is, the principle of succession to the throne in which the ruler's brother, not his son, succeeds to the throne). This tradition was abolished under Coloman (Kálmán; r. 1095–1116).

During the twelfth century the conflicts within the dynasty provoked the interest of the Byzantine emperors, first through the attempts of Prince Boris, who called himself the son of Coloman, and second through the struggle between the brothers and sons of Géza II (r. 1141–1162)—Géza's brothers Ladislas II (r. 1162–1163) and Stephen IV (r. 1163–1165), and Géza's sons Stephen III (r. 1162–1172) and Béla III (r. 1172–1196). Gyula Moravcsik has referred to this time as the "era of Byzantine influence." Byzantium primarily tried to thwart Hungarian expansion in the Balkans, and began to aim to have an impact on Hungary only in the 1160s. This aim was strengthened by the fact that Emperor Manuel I Komnenos (r. 1143–1180) was a relative of the Árpáds on his mother's side. As a result of the peace concluded in 1165, Prince Béla (who became Béla III) went to Byzantium, bringing the conquests of the Hungarian kingdom in the Balkans as his "paternal inheritance."

From Coloman to Béla III it was a major challenge for the Hungarian kings to retain their realm intact while a number of armies crossed the country. The leaders of the crusaders, such as Godfrey of Bouillon and Frederick I Barbarossa, had to negotiate conditions for crossing the realm. The exceptions were the first five armies arriving during the reign of Coloman. These adventure-seeking troops, eager to loot, provoked the ire of contemporary chroniclers. Most of the chroniclers relating these events write sympathetically of the measures taken, and the retaliation inflicted, by the Hungarian king. The next occasion when the crusaders behaved as an enemy on Hungarian soil occurred in 1202. To fulfill their financial obligations to Venice, the crusaders besieged the Dalmatian city of Zára (Zadar), then under the rule of the Hungarian king.

The participation of the Hungarian sovereigns in the Crusades became an issue for the first time under Béla III, but only after the failure of the third crusading army. Béla died before being able to participate. He instructed his younger son, the future Andrew II (András; r. 1205–1235), to take the Cross; Andrew's military campaign to the Holy Land in 1217 was a diplomatic maneuver: he himself was trying to get the title of the Latin emperor. In 1189 some Hungarian noblemen turned back, but one Hungarian count and "many Hungarians" with him are mentioned at the siege of Acre in 1191.

Expansion. The expansionary efforts of the Hungarian kingdom started in the late eleventh century, during the reigns of Ladislas I and Coloman. The first campaign led to the seizure of Slavonia, which at that time did not belong to either the Hungarian or the Croatian king. In Slavonia an administrative system similar to that of the Hungarian counties was set up, whereas in Croatia the former *zhupanies* were not reorganized. In 1102, Coloman had himself crowned king of Croatia in Biograd na Moru, initiating a Hungarian-Croatian personal union.

The Hungarian kings showed an interest in other regions of the Balkans, too. In 1138 they brought the valley of the Rama River, which formed the central part of the future Bosnia, under their rule. The territory appeared as a new conquest in the titles of the Hungarian kings, who were now also called *rex Ramae*.

Hungary was attacked several times from the east—by the Patzinaks in 1068, by the Cumans in 1091—leading to successful counterattacks by the Hungarian royal army. Like Patzinak groups, other warriors, also from the east (such as the Caliz and the Busurman), were settled. Coloman encountered Cuman troops outside Hungary when, at the request of the Kievan grand prince, he dispatched troops against Peremyshl (Przemysl) in 1099. The catastrophic defeat of the Hungarian army is surprising in many respects—especially surprising because the army proved to be ineffective against the Cumans, who used typical nomadic tactics. The appearance of Hungarians on the territory of the Rus' in the twelfth century did not lead to expansion. The situation changed with the military campaign of Béla III in 1188–1189. King Andrew II led numerous campaigns to Halych between 1205 and 1234. The Hungarian territorial claims were thwarted partly by the conflicts with the Krakovian princely court, partly by the more numerous troops of the Cumans. Béla IV (r. 1235–1270) ended the conquering efforts after the unsuccessful attack on Yaroslavl in 1245. In the struggle for the Babenberg inheritance he supplemented his troops with warriors from Halych.

The Mongol Invasion. The wars of the eleventh and twelfth centuries had turned in favor of the Kingdom of Hungary. The army of the realm based on the counties could successfully face the attacks from the west and from Byzantium, as well as from the steppe. Moreover, Hungary could expand in the Balkans and tried to do the same in a northeasterly direction. On the basis of this experience it seemed enough, as preparation for a Mongol attack, to fortify the frontiers and to invite the support of Cuman troops. Yet this time complete failure followed. The Mongol invasion of 1241–1242 sacked Hungary and brought it to the verge of devastation. On 11 April 1241 the royal army suffered a total defeat at Muhi; King Béla IV himself fled with a small personal troop to the Dalmatian city of Trogir, and from there to the Adriatic islands.

Mongol Invasion of Hungary, 1241. Illustration from the *Chronica Hungarorum* by Johannes de Thurocz, 1488. PRIVATE COLLECTION/ARCHIVES CHARMET/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

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The reason for the failure can be traced back to the changes in Hungary that took place in the thirteenth century. The territories of the royal counties that formed the basis of the military diminished considerably because of the granting of lands around the castles. The castle people (*castrenses*) and a number of their officers, the castle warriors (*iobagiones castri*), living there, came into the dependencies of the barons—that is, they became serfs. But the barons who thus increased their land still did not have a respectable number of private troops. The royal sergeants (*servientes regis*), rendering military service and subject only to the kings, were kept in the service of the king by the Golden Bull of 1222 (and by two confirmations in 1231 and 1267), but their organization proved to be an impossible task for the king. Therefore at the battle of Muhi only traces of the strong army of the previous century were present.

Béla IV learned lessons from the Mongol invasion and initiated several measures to strengthen the kingdom's military. In order to increase the number of his army he settled a significant number of the Cumans in the depopulated central parts of the country, thereby increasing the light cavalry. Along the Lower Danube he gave lands to the Knights of the Order of Saint John, which increased the number of armored warriors he could draw on. Because stone castles were the only remedy for Mongol attacks, he promoted the building of them. Only rich barons could afford to build castles, and the king gave further financial means for doing so. The *servientes regis* received smaller estates, which again contributed to the increase in the number of armored men. Hungary was attacked only once more by a Mongol army, in 1285.

The reforms also increased the power of the barons, who built castles that gave them refuges from which they could confront the king's power. Also, by the 1270s the private armies of the barons had been set up. The king could not prevent the smaller estate holders, who had been warriors, from coming under the domination of the lords. The result was a unique Hungarian system that linked the holders of small and medium-size estates to the king, while in private contracts the holders supported the barons with their military force in return for contributions in kind. In the last third of the thirteenth century the Hungarian kingdom consisted of "provinces" standing under the rule of widely independent barons, and the majority of the royal army comprised Cumans and Alans. Territorial disintegration did not follow, however, because the barons were interested in the presence of royal authority, which was the basis of their legal existence. The extinction of the Árpád dynasty in the male line in 1301 created a new crisis for the Hungarian state.

[*See also* Acre, Siege of; Béla IV; Cumans; Frederick I Barbarossa; Godfrey of Bouillon; Manuel I Komnenos; Ménfő, Battle of; *and* Muhi, Battle of.]

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Márta Font

Narrative (1300–1526)

In Hungary the late medieval period commenced in 1301, when the first ruling dynasty, the house of Árpád, became extinct.

Bahan dengan hak cipta

The Anjou Period. Three pretenders, all related to the Árpád dynasty in the female line, struggled for succession: Wenceslas III of Bohemia, the Anjou Charles of Naples, and Otto Wittelsbach, Duke of Bavaria. At first Wenceslas seemed to be successful, but in the long run Charles prevailed with the aid of the Hungarian high clergy and the papacy, strengthening his grip on the realm after the battle of Rozgony (Rozhanovce, Slovakia) in 1312, in which he defeated the army of the most powerful barons opposing his rule. Real consolidation of his power came only after 1321, which marks the death of his most dangerous opponent, Máté Csák, who held the northwestern territories of Hungary under his control.

Charles I stabilized the economy of his realm, issued for the first time in Hungary a golden florin following the example of Florence, introduced the honor-based administration of the country granting the most important positions to his close and reliable followers, from whom a new aristocracy evolved. The king attempted to strengthen his grip over the Balkan vassal states, but his efforts met with only partial success. One of his memorable defeats, the battle in Walachia, took place in 1330 at the hands of Basarab I, voivode of Walachia. At the end of his reign his son, Louis I (the Great) inherited a relatively rich, politically stable realm from his father. In the first part of his reign Louis I aimed at securing the Kingdom of Naples for his younger brother, Andrew, but the latter was killed in September 1345, in Aversa, in a plot organized by his wife, Joan of Anjou. Louis immediately sought revenge and to obtain the kingdom for himself. He led two campaigns to the Kingdom of Naples (1347–1348 and 1350, respectively), but these ultimately failed. Though he managed to take the city of Naples as well as other strongholds and cities in the kingdom, it was impossible for him to stabilize his rule over southern Italy, so he finally abandoned his plan, though he retained his claim to the Kingdom of Naples until his death.

Regarded as a knight-ruler, Louis embodied the ideal of chivalry with his bravery in war and hunt, his attitude toward the arts and science, and his adoration for his wife and family. Militarily, he was one of the most active of the Hungarian kings. During his forty-year reign he spent more than three decades on campaign in various directions. On the Balkan Peninsula he followed his father's footsteps, but with more success. The voivodes of the Romanian principalities can be regarded as his faithful vassals, and for a short period he even managed to conquer the northwestern part of Bulgaria. In 1370 he became king of Poland, creating the first Hungarian-Polish personal union. As king of Poland, Louis took an active part in the campaigns against the Lithuanians, the last pagan people in Europe. Louis was victorious against the Venetians as well, who in 1378 had to resign their claim over Dalmatia in the peace treaty of Turin (1381).

When Louis died, leaving no male heir to the throne, his elder daughter, Mary, became queen (he left his other kingdom, Poland, to his younger daughter). Mary's rule was short-lived, as warring factions of the aristocracy fought for power, and she was unable to crush the ensuing anarchy. Louis's nephew, King Charles III of Naples, was invited by one of the factions to occupy the Hungarian throne as Charles II and was assassinated. In retaliation, Mary and her mother were captured, and the latter was strangled in her prison. The situation was saved by Mary's future husband, Sigismund of Luxemburg, who was elected and crowned king of Hungary in 1387.

The Late Medieval Period. Sigismund ruled for fifty years, the longest reign in Hungarian medieval history. After he came to power the honor-based administration system of the realm broke down, because Sigismund, having no stable group of barons behind his policy, resorted to lavish donations of royal wealth to gain supporters. Before Sigismund's reign half of the approximately three hundred castles with their adjoining lands were in royal possession, creating a solid base from which the king could govern the realm. Sigismund, after all of his donations, could only rely on approximately seventy castles. Sigismund was the first Hungarian king who had to deal with the Turkish threat.

Siege of Belgrade, 1456. Detail of a fresco in the Church of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin Mary, Olomouc, Czech Republic. The fresco, which dates to 1468, is probably the oldest depiction of the siege. PHOTOGRAPH BY MICHAL MANAS

The Ottomans crossed the borders of Hungary in 1389 for the first time. The king took his new enemy seriously and personally participated in limited counteroffensives, and in 1396 he organized a crusade with the aim of liberating the Balkan states from Turkish rule and coming to the aid of the Byzantine Empire. The battle of Nicopolis in 1396 was a total failure for the Christians. Sigismund escaped only with great difficulty. After the debacle of Nicopolis, he convened the diet of Temesvár (now Timisoara, Romania), which introduced a new system for the defense of the realm called *militia portalis*, which remained in effect for the rest of the Middle Ages. In the second part of his reign he launched only one limited-scale offensive in 1428 to capture the stronghold of Golubac (Serbia), which the Ottomans had occupied a year earlier. This undertaking also failed. However, Sigismund managed to build up a strong defensive line of castles and fortresses along the southern border of Hungary, and this line effectively controlled the Turkish attacks until 1521.

Sigismund's diplomacy was more successful than his campaigns. He established a partnership with the Balkan states against the Ottomans, which mostly worked to Hungary's advantage. Sigismund, who was elected king of Germany in 1410, and king of Bohemia in 1419, played an important role in European diplomacy, too. In 1415 he convened the Council of Constance, which eventually ended the schism in Christianity. Sigismund launched several unsuccessful campaigns against the Hussites. Ultimately he compromised with their milder faction.

Sigismund of Luxemburg (1368–1437). Pope Martin V (1368-1431) gives Sigismund a symbolic gift of a golden rose at the Council of Constance, c. 1415. The council, which ended the Western Schism, was held in Constance, Germany, 1414–1418. Illustration from *Chronik des Konzils von Konstanz* by Ulrich von Richental, fifteenth century. PRIVATE COLLECTION/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

At the peak of his career, in 1433 he became Holy Roman Emperor.

When Sigismund died in 1437 with no male heir, Albert II of Germany acceded to the Hungarian throne. The new king organized a campaign against the Ottomans, but contracted a disease in the camp and died in 1439. At the time of his death his wife was expecting a baby, but the prelates and barons decided to elect a king who would immediately be ready and able to defend the realm against the Turks. Thus King Władysław III of Poland became King Ulászló I of Hungary, creating a personal union between the two countries for the second time.

Under the new king's reign a Hungarian baron, János Hunyadi, became the most famous Christian military leader of his time. After several minor victories he defeated the Turks in the battle of Ialomiţa (Romania) in 1442, which was the first Christian victory over the Ottomans in a set-piece battle. Hunyadi led his winter campaign into the Balkans in 1443–1444 and achieved spectacular results. Sultan Murad II offered favorable peace conditions, which the king apparently found acceptable, but Hunyadi convinced him of the necessity of a second campaign, which would liberate the whole of the Balkans. Władysław III launched the ill-fated Varna campaign, which ended up in disaster in November 1444. Hunyadi wasted no time in organizing the remaining forces at his disposal to withstand a future Turkish attack. In 1446 the Hungarian diet elected Hunyadi to be regent of the realm, as King Albert's son, the future King László V (Ladislav of Bohemia), was only six years old. Hunyadi organized another offensive, but in a two-day battle at Kosovo Polje in 1448 he could not overpower the Ottomans.

This battle marked a turning point in the history of Hungarian-Turkish warfare. After the battle the Ottomans grasped the strategic initiative, which resulted in the fall of Constantinople in 1453, then the second siege of Belgrade in 1456 (Sultan Murad II had already besieged Belgrade, in vain, in 1440). Due to the brilliant strategy of Hunyadi the siege of Belgrade ended in total disaster for the Ottomans, who committed several mistakes during the siege and did not adequately coordinate the moves of the different parts in their army. Hunyadi took advantage of the failure of the Ottoman military leadership and relieved the siege, then broke out of the fortress at the right moment to spread terror in the Turkish lines. Sultan Mehmed II fled, leaving his baggage train and artillery behind. Victory secured, Hungary remained independent for another seventy years. After the battle an epidemic broke out and Hunyadi fell victim to it. The ensuing internal political anarchy resulted in feuds from which—after the untimely death of King László V in 1457—Hunyadi's younger son, Matthias Corvinus, emerged as king of Hungary.

In the first part of his rule Matthias took an active part in the defense of the southern borders, though he definitely avoided set-piece battle with the Ottomans. His long-lasting achievements were the recapture of Jajce in 1464 and the successful siege of Šabac in 1476. Both of these fortresses were important elements in the defensive line of the border. After 1467 Matthias' attention turned toward Bohemia and later to Austria. He aimed to create a strong central European conglomerate of states, which could face the Ottomans in the hope of success, by occupying these countries. However, King Matthias could only partially achieve his goal. In 1485 he occupied Vienna and made it his seat. As he had no legitimate son, his death in 1490 caused upheaval in the realm. In the ensuing struggle, two brothers from the Jagiełło dynasty, Władysław and John Albert; and Matthias's illegitimate son John Corvinus fought for the throne. The Hungarian diet elected Władysław as King Ulászló II, who had to fight for more than a year to defeat his rivals, but finally managed to stabilize his power.

In the fourteenth to fifteenth centuries the economy of Hungary was thriving, especially the agriculture and mining industries, however the development of towns was far behind that of their western European counterparts. Town-dwelling people only made up for 5 percent of the population, which was estimated at 2.5–3 million. King Matthias overstretched the economy by creating a standing army of mercenaries, and patronizing the arts and culture. King Ulászló II and his son, Louis II (r. 1516–1526), could not maintain that level of spending. The mercenary army was disbanded, and the country's defense system was again based on the *banderia* of prelates and barons. Serious internal struggles further weakened the resistance against the Ottomans. In 1514 a peasant revolt broke out. The archbishop of Esztergom with a papal bull declared a crusade against the Turks, but the assembled peasants turned against the lords. The rising was crushed only with great difficulty. In 1516, after his father's death, King Louis II came to the throne. Sultan Selim I, busy with the conquest of Egypt, did not attack Hungary. After his death Sultan Süleyman I took the strategic initiative in 1521 and captured Šabac and Belgrade, the latter after an eight-week siege. Unlike Hunyadi in 1456, Louis II and his barons were unable to relieve the siege, so the two important bastions of defense fell. The fate of medieval Hungary was sealed in 1526, when Sultan Suleyman led his army of 150,000 warriors to the heart of Hungary. At Mohács about 26,000 to 28,000 Christians faced the Ottomans, who defeated them decisively in less than two hours. The road to Buda was open. King Louis II drowned in a stream as he was fleeing from the battlefield. The independent Hungarian kingdom fell under 150 years of Ottoman rule.

[*See also Banderium*; Honor; Hunyadi, János; Hunyadi, Mátyás; Kosovo Polje, Battle of (1448); Louis I of Hungary; *Militia Portalis;* Mohács, Battle of; Nándorfehérvár, (Belgrade), Siege of; Sigismund of Luxemburg; Toldi, Miklós; *and* Walachia, Battle in.]

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Ferenc Sebők

Historiography (500–1000)

There is a wide range of research concerning early Hungarian (Magyar) history and the history of the Carpathian Basin before the Hungarian Conquest (895). Because the Hungarians entered the world of written sources only in the 830s, various schools of thought and hypotheses exist regarding their route from the Ural Mountains to the Black Sea region and farther west, as well as regarding their military and social relations with the Volga and Danube Bulgars,

Khazars, Byzantines, and Pechenegs (Patzinaks). The historical background of the Hungarian Conquest is still elusive: the only accepted fact is its final year of 895. It is an open question whether Hungarian warriors remained and settled in the Carpathian Basin after earlier raids, or even during Avar times; if they did, it would require a major revision of our understanding of the whole process, as argued in Gyula László's theory of the "twofold conquest" (*kettős honfoglalás*). There is a consensus about the importance of the Pecheneg attack against the Hungarians in 895, described as a decisive moment in this process, but the damage it caused to the Hungarians is debated. Some historians suggest that the conquest was only accidental, whereas others argue that it was part of a careful war plan of the tribal leaders.

The actual conquest of the Basin is not documented at all, and it is unclear whether in the first decades the cohabitation of the Avars, Slavic (Moravian) people, and others (some even suppose Romanians) was peaceful or warlike. A significant part of the Carpathian Basin was dominated by the Avars from the sixth century up to the Carolingian campaigns to Pannonia, but the issue of their survival and integration into Slavic and Hungarian societies is controversial. Much ink has been spent on the reconstruction of the historical climate and geography of the basin, considering its steppelike character and its relatively limited horse-breeding capacity, and ascribing the final defeats of the Huns, Avars, and Hungarians to these circumstances.

Regarding the raids, their chronology and tactics are settled, but the structure, motivation, and strategy of the raiding troops are debated. Some put the raids into the framework of international relations, while others regard the raids as pure plundering and looting activities, in the framework of a nomadic or half-nomadic economic and social system. Some archaeological finds—such as coins found in the graves, as well as weaponry, saddles, and tack—have given new information on the early Hungarians' material culture both in Hungary and outside it. With the spectacular development of practical archaeology the weaponry—such as composite bows, quivers, sabers—and the methodology of the nomadic art of war have been successfully reconstructed, and copies of medieval bows are employed in war games. Some campaigns, such as the battle on the Lechfeld (955) and the battle of Bratislava (907), have been reanalyzed using modern historical methods. Some relatively recently developed research approaches promise new perspectives in anthropology, human genetics, archeozoology, and historical climatology. The questions that remain most open are in the field of linguistics, such as the question of runiform script among the Avars and Székelys, and the correlation of the different layers of loanwords.

[*See also* Bratislava, Battle of; Lechfeld, Battle on the; Patzinaks; *and* Slavic Lands, *subentry on* Historiography (500–1000).]

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László Veszprémy

Historiography (1000–1300)

Military history in general, and that of the Árpádian age (1000–1301) in particular, was a neglected field of research in Hungary for a long time. The first comprehensive overview of Hungarian military history was written by József Bánlaky in twenty-four volumes between 1929 and 1942. Marxist historiography (1949–1989) favored economic and social over military history, and except for defensive campaigns and wars, in its early phase Marxist historiography evaluated the military activity of the Hungarian kings merely as a means of expansionist policy. The first Marxist monograph on Hungarian military history, that of Ervin Liptai, was published in two volumes in 1984–1985. Although the Middle Ages (1000–1526) form an organic part of it, this monograph pays relatively little attention to the Árpádian age.

The first book giving a thorough analysis of the Árpádian age, including the conquest of the Carpathian Basin and the Hungarian raids on Europe, is Gyula Kristó's *Az Árpád-kor háborúi*. He does not simply relate the chronicle of military events: he also explores the reasons for campaigns and wars, and deals with strategy, tactics, and the social and technical aspects of warfare. The types and participants of the campaigns, as well as questions of armor and weaponry, are discussed in this monograph by Kristó and László Kovács, who wrote one of its chapters. This monograph and other works also explore the emergence of the retinue of the (grand) princes and the kings and the role of military auxiliary peoples. The issue of foreign knights—mostly Germans—is especially important in connection with the foundation of the state, a long process during which Grand Prince Géza and King Saint Stephen annihilated the rival chieftains, resulting in the unification of Hungarian territories. The new regime was organized into "castle districts" (Hungarian: *várispánságok*) and counties (Latin: *comitatus*; Hungarian: *vármegyék*). The link between these two organizations was for a long time obscure, until finally Kristó explained it. The castle district, with the castle at its center, was the basis of military organization, and until the early thirteenth century the warriors and castle folks belonging to the castles made up the bulk of the royal army. The county was an administrative unit (see Kristó's *A vármegyék kialakulása Magyarországon*).

Archaeological research has proved that the first fortresses were erected by the Hungarians not earlier than the last quarter of the tenth century (see István Bóna). On the other hand, historians pointed out that the new type of stone castles, erected after 1241, served as power centers of the

barons and contributed to the emergence of the oligarchs (Hungarian: *tartományurak*). Anniversaries of historical events and large-scale projects—such as the one resulting in the publication of the *Korai Magyar történeti lexikon* (Early Hungarian historical lexicon), under the general editor Gyula Kristó—have also contributed to the synthesis of research on different aspects of military history. The latest research examines military campaigns within the framework of foreign policy (Ferenc Makk) and revisits the complex problem of Hungary's role in the Crusades (László Veszprémy, *Lovagvilág Magyarországon*), as well as the activity of military orders (Zsolt Hunyadi and József Laszlovszky).

[*See also* Auxiliary Peoples, Military; Crusades, *subentries on* Historiography (1095–1183) *and* Historiography (1180–1245); Cumans; Hungarian Raids; Orders, Military, *subentry on* Levantine Orders; *and* Patzinaks.]

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István Petrovics

Historiography (1300–1526)

Recently there has been something of a revolution in the study of the military history of Hungary in the fourteenth through early sixteenth centuries. With the decay of the Marxist historiography that preceded the transformation of the political system in 1989, military history, including that of the late Middle Ages, came to the forefront of interest. The focal points of research were formerly King Charles I and his struggles against the oligarchs; King Louis I and his campaigns; the rise of the Ottoman threat and King Mátyás's efforts to contain it, along with his anti-Ottoman and western campaigns; and especially the military history of Hungary during the Jagiełło period (1490–1526), culminating in the battle of Mohács. As a result of employing new, multidisciplinary methods and taking into consideration hitherto unknown archival sources from Hungary and abroad, Hungarian military historians have achieved considerable results in shedding new light on important issues of warfare in medieval Hungary.

In 1988, Gyula Kristó described the wars of the Angevin period (1301–1387) in a monograph based on substantial research of both narrative and archival sources. The anti-Ottoman wars remain a primary interest for scholars. Pál Engel, László Veszprémy,

Gyula Rázsó, Géza Perjés, Ferenc Szakály, and András Kubinyi, to name only a few, have dedicated a considerable part of their scholarly work to providing a more detailed and reliable picture of the events taking place from the rule of King Sigismund (r. 1387–1427) until the debacle of Mohács in 1526. These authors have depicted the beginnings of the anti-Turkish wars, the crusade of Nicopolis, the phases of Turco-Hungarian warfare along the southern borders of Hungary, the attempt of King Mátyás to set up a new mercenary army with the aim of creating a strong central European monarchy, and the military reforms of the two Jagiełło kings, Władysław II and Louis II, to protect the remnants of the former Hungarian kingdom against the Ottomans.

The results of contemporary research prove clearly that Hungary alone was unable to withstand the Turkish threat, not even with the aid of a crusade like that which occurred in 1396. Nevertheless the Hungarian military forces were able to adapt quite quickly to the changes required by anti-Turkish warfare, which led to the evolution of a Hungarian light cavalry par excellence, the hussars. It is also true, though, that after the death of János Hunyadi, Hungary lacked great field generals who might have been able to strategize effectively against the changing features of Turkish warfare. A telling example is the notorious scarcity of infantry, which had to be imported from abroad, mainly from Bohemia, Poland, and Germany.

Contemporary research also has shown that Hungarian kings and military leaders were aware of the importance of fire weapons. Conscious of it, King Sigismund, King Mátyás, and the Jagiełło kings attempted to provide their armies with the necessary firepower. But the ability to arm forces depended mostly on available financial reserves, and in the case of the Jagiełłos, such resources would not have been abundant. Another interesting conclusion of modern military historiography concerning Hungary is that the battle of Mohács (1526)—long regarded as a tragic event of Hungarian history—also marked the beginning of decay for the Turkish empire, because the Ottomans had by then reached the limits of their operational freedom in the heart of Europe.

[*See also* Hunyadi, Mátyás; Mohács, Battle of; *and* Nicopolis, Battle of.]

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Ferenc Sebők

HUNS

The original homeland of the Huns was somewhere in Inner Asia, north of China, though their identification with the earliest written, archeological and linguistical sources (e.g., their relation to the Xiongnu/Hsiung-nu) and their historical chronology before their migration to the Pontic area are still uncertain.

Speeding past the Visigoths, Vandals, Sueves, Alans, and Burgundians, the Huns initiated the first great migrations into Europe beginning in 376 CE. Their military successes made them the first to enter central and western Europe from the steppe, and fundamentally transformed the political geography of Europe. They confronted both

the Eastern and the Western Roman Empires, and gathered huge amounts of booty and tribute, although as *auxiliaries foederati* (called Unnigardae or Massageteans) they occasionally rendered help as well, and by means of this temporary alliance even contributed to the survival of the Western Empire. Under the outstanding warlord Attila (d. 453) they attacked Gaul in 451. After the unsuccessful siege of Orléans, the campaign finally ended at the battle of the Catalaunian Fields (modern Châlons-sur-Marne) in June 451 with the humiliating retreat of the Huns. The 453 campaign, featuring a Hun army of some twenty thousand, shocked the West again. Aquileia, Padua, Verona, and other cities were taken and plundered, although Attila's achievement was short-lived; hunger and plagues forced him to give up these territories.

Ancient writers admired the Huns' light cavalry, very similar to that of the Avars and Hungarians but without the use of stirrups. It inherited the Eurasian steppe tradition, using the stratagems characteristic of mounted archers: feigned retreats, unexpected attacks, encirclement, constant harassing of the enemy, frightening war cries, and showers of arrows. Their most important missile weapon was the asymmetrical composite bow, shooting arrows with three-edged iron heads, with special types for different targets. In close combat they used double-edged swords and war knives. Bows and swords covered with gold are supposed to have been symbols of power and dignity. They were famous for their horses as well, because of their endurance and undemanding nature. The high-pommeled wooden saddle was a typical part of their horse harness.

The structure of the empire was based on military effectiveness, developed into a system of vassal dukedoms, and by 450 the whole of eastern and central Europe was under their yoke. After the incorporation of several defeated tribes their army lost its original strategic and tactical swiftness, mostly because of the German infantry auxiliaries and their trains of wagons. Ultimately the Great Hungarian Plain, with large areas ideal for horse breeding—though there are controversial scholarly opinions about the horse breeding capacity of the Carpathian Basin—became the base of the empire; the seat of the great king was somewhere north of the Mureş (Maros) River.

Because of their similar style of war, the later Avars and Hungarians were called Huns by their contemporaries. Their memory has become somewhat distorted by the epic of Attila and the Nibelungen tradition.

[*See also* Avars; Cavalry; *and* Hungary, *subentry on* Narrative (500–1000).]

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HUNYADI, JÁNOS

(c. 1405–1456), Hungarian statesman and general who delayed the occupation of Hungary by the Ottomans for several decades. Of Walachian origin, his family was brought to Hungary by King Sigismund of Luxemburg at the end of the fourteenth century. He is mentioned for the first time in a charter dated 1409, when his father was granted the estate of Hunyad (Hunedoara, Romania). Hunyadi acquired his military skills in the 1420s at several noble courts, serving first Pipo of Ozora (Filippo Scolari), a general in Hungary, then Štefan Lazarević, despot of Serbia. Both were involved in the wars against the Ottomans. Between 1430 and 1434 Hunyadi accompanied King Sigismund to Italy, as a knight of the court. During his stay he served the Milanese duke Filippo Maria Visconti and acquired knowledge of modern strategy and explosive weapons. Here he became a friend of the condottiere Francesco Sforza.

In 1434 Hunyadi returned to Hungary with the king and accompanied him in his campaign in Bohemia. Here again Hunyadi broadened his military experience through exposure to the Hussites' unusual tactics. From 1439 he held several major dignities of

Hungary: ban of Severin, voivode of Transylvania, and count of the Székelys and of several counties. This early phase of his leadership coincided with the reign of the Jagiellonian King of Hungary, Ulászló (Vladislaus) I (1440–1444; also King of Poland [1434–1444], where he was known as Vladislaus III or Władisław III). During this period Hunyadi defeated a smaller army under Ishaq Bey, commander of the Ottoman-occupied Serbian town of Smederevo (1441), and the plundering army of Mezid Bey; he then destroyed the army of Şihabeddin, the Ottoman beylerbey of Rumelia (the Ottoman name for the southern Balkans in 1442). After these victories Hunyadi ventured the so-called Long Campaign deep into the Ottoman Empire, as far as the Balkan Mountains (1443–1444).

Although he could not gain a decisive victory, the impact of these achievements was so marked that from that point he was regarded as one of the most important pillars of the war against the Ottomans. Hunyadi was nevertheless defeated in most of his major military campaigns that followed (Varna, 1444; Kosovo, 1448). After the battle of Varna, in which King Ladislas I was killed, Hunyadi worked to secure his own political influence in the kingdom. In 1446 he was elected governor for the imprisoned Ladislas Postumus, an office created for the first time in the history of Hungary. When King Ladislas returned in 1453, Hunyadi was appointed Chief Captain of Hungary, which ensured his authority for life. His second son, Mátyás Hunyadi, was elected to the Hungarian throne in 1458. Although János Hunyadi was a remarkable commander who kept the cause of Hungary always in view, his political ambitions aroused the enmity of the barons of Hungary, who increasingly withheld their cooperation. The consequences became evident in 1456. During the Ottoman siege of Nándorfehérvár (Belgrade) the king and the barons abandoned him. Thus the most important victory of his career, a successful defense that forestalled the Ottoman advance for more than sixty years, was achieved essentially with his own resources.

Hunyadi was one of the most efficient commanders of the anti-Ottoman wars. His effectiveness derived from a well-organized army, which he divided into small, easily controllable units, with the cavalry playing a large role. His Italian and Bohemian experience taught him the significance of firearms, and he made extensive use of Hussite-style war wagons. He also employed significant numbers of mercenaries, who from his time became an important element of the Hungarian army.

[*See also* Hunyadi, Mátyás; Kosovo Polje, Battle of (1448); Nándorfehérvár (Belgrade), Siege of; Ottoman Armies and Military Methods; Pipo of Ozora; Sigismund of Luxemburg; *and* Varna, Battle of.]

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HUNYADI, MÁTYÁS

(23 February 1443–6 April 1490), King of Hungary (also known as Matthias I Corvinus (as the family coat-of-arms shows a raven [corvus in Latin] with a golden ring in its beak). The second son of János Hunyadi was born in Kolozsvár (present-day Cluj-Napoca, Romania). Mátyás came to the throne, not yet fifteen years old, in January 1458 as a result of a compromise between his supporters and those of the former Habsburg king, Ladislas V.

The young king started his reign quite energetically: he removed his uncle and supporter Mihály Szilágyi from the regency and sent him to lead the defense of the borders against the Ottoman Turks. Until 1465 Mátyás followed the example set by his father, and led his troops personally to war. (Szilágyi was subsequently captured and executed by the Turks.) Although reluctant to engage the Ottomans in full-scale battles, he led the army in successful skirmishes and sieges (as at Jajce, Bosnia, in 1463–1464). From 1467 he concentrated his attention on financial and administrative reforms, and afterward on wars against Bohemia and Austria. In the latter

engagements he predominantly deployed his newly-formed mercenary "Black Army" (a name that surfaced only after the king's death), whose upkeep placed a heavy burden on his realm. This force consisted of Bohemian, Hungarian, Polish, and German mercenaries, perhaps some of them arrayed in black armor. The army possessed heavy cavalry, light cavalry (among them hussars), heavy infantry, artillery, and river warships. Realizing that Hungary alone was unable to counterbalance the Ottoman threat, Mátyás aimed at obtaining the Bohemian crown, and later the duchy of Austria. Some sources suggest that he also wanted to become the Holy Roman Emperor, following the course of King Sigismund of Luxemburg.

Some of Mátyás's Hungarian subjects mistrusted such far-reaching schemes; they accused the king of underestimating the Turkish threat and several times organized plots to overthrow him in favor of a pretender (such as Duke Casimir Jagiello of Poland, a son of King Casimir IV). To suppress such criticism, the king successfully besieged and took the castle of Šabac in Serbia in 1476, while his barons Pál Kinizsi and István Báthory, dealt a devastating blow to an Ottoman army that was pillaging and looting in Transylvania in 1479. In his western wars the king was partly successful. He could not obtain the Kingdom of Bohemia, for the Bohemian estates elected Wladysław II Jagiello to the throne in 1471. But Mátyás did manage to occupy the whole of Lower Austria. He took Vienna in 1485 and made it his residence until his death. Vienna was the scene of a famous military parade where witnesses counted no fewer than twenty thousand cavalry and eight thousand infantry.

As Mátyás had no legitimate heir, he attempted, in his last years, to secure his crown for his illegitimate son, János Corvinus. In this he was unsuccessful. He was succeeded by the Jagiellonian Ladislas II (known as Ulászló II in Hungary). Nevertheless, Mátyás's reign was one of the finest in Hungarian history. He was a great patron of arts and culture. One of his lasting achievements was the Bibliotheca Corviniana in the castle of Buda, the largest contemporary library north of the Alps. The library contained about twenty-five hundred codices, most of them manuscripts, but some printed books as well. His other spectacular contribution to culture was his Renaissance palace of Visegrád, near Buda.

[*See also* Black Army of Hungary; Hungarian Defense System; Hungary *subentries on* Sources (1300–1526), Narrative (1300–1526), *and* Historiography (1300–1526); *and* Hunyadi, János.]

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HUSSARS

As early as in the tenth century in the Balkans, Byzantine armies employed soldiers known as *khossarios* or *khonsarios* who were armed with light weaponry; they were used in reconnaissance, marauding, and plundering maneuvers. Hungarian sources refer to a "hussar" (*huszár*) for the first time in 1432, as a light cavalryman rendering service in the forts of the southern borders. In 1481 in a letter to Gabriele Rangoni, the bishop of Eger, the Hungarian king himself used the Latinized expression *husarones* as a synonym for light cavalry.

Until the late fifteenth century the word "hussar" referred mainly to a Serbian light cavalryman, fighting usually with lance and shield and without using armor, who substantially differed from the traditional Hungarian mounted bowman of the time.

As early as in the beginning of the sixteenth century the royal hussars became a typical group of court soldiers of the Hungarian king.

The name "hussar" was most probably developed in the Balkans from different words of similar meanings, including the Latin *cursor* or *cursarius* (robber, pirate, marauder), the Greek *chossia* (trap), and the Bulgarian *chonsa* (robber). The old theory that the word is derived from the Hungarian word *húsz*, meaning "twenty," is definitely wrong.

[*See also* Cavalry; Hungarian Defense System; *and* Hungary, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1526).]

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I

Iberia

[*This entry contains nine subentries, on Iberian sources from 500–1100, 1100–1300, and 1300–1500; an overview of Iberian military history from 500–1100, 1100–1300, and 1300–1500; and on Iberian historiography from 500–1100, 1100–1300, and 1300–1500.*]

Sources (500–1100)

Any discussion of Iberian sources during the period 500–1100 must begin with the acknowledgment that there are significant gaps in coverage and problems of reliability with those sources that do exist. The period begins in the aftermath of the disintegration of Roman administration of Spain and the recent establishment of a Visigothic kingdom. Some material survives from the Visigothic period, but mostly in the form of law codes, hagiography, and records of the ecclesiastic councils of Toledo. The upheaval caused by the Muslim invasions beginning in 711 led to the further degradation in historical coverage by Christian sources. Arabic histories during the period from the arrival of Muslim forces in Iberia until 1100 are more abundant, and represent a very different historiographical tradition. Further, much Arab material was deliberately destroyed following the Christian reconquest of the peninsula. The Latin chronicles and annals from this period that survive have problems of reliability and objectivity. Nevertheless, source material for the period 500–711, though not bountiful, is not totally lacking. Fortunately for the student without Latin or Arabic, much of the early material concerning political-military matters exists in English translation, at least abridged or in excerpt form. Much pertinent material has been translated and published in collections. In addition to published works available in any good research library, many translations, either in their entirety or excerpts, have been posted online by different associations such as the ones listed in the bibliography.

Sixth-century Visigothic sources on Iberia include the *Chronicle* of John of Biclaro, which correlates Visigothic and Byzantine events beginning with the death of Justinian in 565 and ending in 590 with the fourth year of Reccared's reign. Among the works of the polymath Isidore of Seville, the *History of the Kings of the Goths* commences with the account of the origin of the Visigoths as a people and runs to 625. Julian of Toledo wrote a history in or around 680 of one of the Visigothic kings; namely, the *History of Wamba* that details the years 672–673. Given the paucity of any kind of literary source, historians have also found valuable sources for information on society and town life during this period in Iberian hagiography such as the seventh-century *Life of Saint Aemilian* and *Lives of the Fathers of Merida.*

The records, or canons, of the seventeen councils of Toledo held during the Visigothic period from 527 to 702 provide a great deal of information on their rule. The *Liber iudiciorum,* the Visigothic law codes dating to 654 during the reign of Recceswinth, also sheds light on Visigothic administration. To these accounts of Visigothic activities in Iberia, there may be added non-Visigothic material such as the *History of the Wars* written by the Byzantine historian Prokopios (c. 500–565), on Justinian's attempt to reconquer much of the original Roman Empire. To this, of course, should be added Gregory of Tours's *History of the Franks,* a major source for the period of Leovigild's reign (569–586).

The arrival of the Muslims in 711 heralded a sea change in Iberian historiography. No contemporary Arabic account of the Muslim conquest survives except as copied into much later histories. Indeed, although Arabic histories for the early period of Muslim Spain are problematic, they survive to a far greater extent than the Latin sources and contain much more detail. The accuracy with which those sources have been transmitted by their later copiers, however, is a source of major concern. The earliest Muslim account is found in Ibn 'Abd al-Hakam's ninth-century *History of Africa,* which includes a discussion of the conquest of Spain. A century later there followed the anonymous *Akhbar Majmua* (Collection of Anecdotes) and the *Ta'rikh Iftitah al-Andalus* (History of the Conquest of al-Andalus) by Ibn al-Qutiya (who was allegedly a descendant of the next-to-last Visigothic king, Witiza). These accounts cover the period of Muslim domination dating from before the arrival of the Umayyad dynasty until after the emirate was established in Córdoba. Abu Marwa ibn Hayyan, a compiler of earlier histories, wrote his *Muqtabis* during the late eleventh century. Another eleventh-century account is the personal memoir of the last Zirid king of Granada, 'Abd Allah ibn Buluggin, who was deposed by the Almoravids. The African Ibn 'Idhari wrote his *Al-Bayan al-Maghrib* about the conquest of western North Africa and Spain in around 1300. One of the best known Arab historians of early medieval Spain, though he wrote at a much later date, is the seventeenth-century author Ahmad ibn Muhammad al Maqqari, best known for his *History of the Islamic Dynasties of Spain.*

By contrast, the anonymous Christian *Chronicle of 754,* also known as the *Mozarabic Chronicle,* was written by someone who may well have had firsthand knowledge of the Muslim conquest. Its commentary on the Muslim arrival in Spain was preceded, however, by a Burgundian source, the *Chronicle of Fredegar.* The few additional, nonhagiographical early Christian sources dating from shortly after the Muslim conquest are Asturian and Leónese and include the anonymous *Prophetic Chronicle* written about 883 that mistakenly, if optimistically, predicted an early end to Muslim rule in Spain. The *Chronicle of Albelda,* which runs from the seventh to the tenth centuries, provides information on the Kingdom of Asturias during the early reconquest. The *Chronicle of Alfonso III* of Asturias (866–910) was perhaps written by the king himself and details events concerning the very early reconquest through the reign of Alfonso's father, Ordoño I (r. 850–866). Alfonso's chronicle is continued by the *Chronicle of Sampiro,* which provides coverage through King Alfonso V of León (r. 999–1027). The *Historia Silense* continues coverage of León from 1037 to 1072. Beginning in the tenth century, town charters or *fueros,* together with surviving royal and ecclesiastical correspondence and records of treaties, begin to provide primary source evidence in addition to the annals and chronicles, though these are less generally accessible except as excerpts published in collections or provided online. The *Lives of the Martyrs of Córdoba* by St. Eulogius of Córdoba provide a Christian perspective on life under Muslim rule.

[*See also* Gregory of Tours.]

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Historia silense. Edición crítica e introducción by Justo Pérez de Urbel and Atilano González Ruiz-Zorrilla. Madrid, 1959. This contains all of the four-part history, which includes the *Chronicle of Alfonso III* and the *Chronicle of Sampiro.* A partial English translation (not including the above-mentioned chronicles) is in *The World of El Cid: Chronicles of the Spanish Reconquest*, translated and annotated by Simon Barton and Richard Fletcher, pp. 9–64 (Manchester, U.K.: Manchester University Press, 2000).

St. Eulogius of Cordoba. *The Martyrdom of Isaac de Tábanos (851).* Excerpt translated in *Christians and Moors in Spain*, vol. 1: *AD 711–1150*, edited by Colin Smith, pp. 42–47. Warminster, U.K.: Aris & Phillips, 1988 (reprinted with corrections, 1993). For more of the *Lives* written by Eulogius in Latin, see the *Patrologiae cursus completas, series Latina* (Paris, 1844–1864).

David C. McDaniel

Sources (1100–1300)

This article explores the various kinds of sources available for the study of Iberian history in the period 1100–1300. These include various types of legal documents, including compilations of laws, as well as chronicles and other histories.

The underpinning of primary documentation for the study of the Iberian Peninsula in the High Middle Ages varies widely between the region's different realms. In both Portugal and Castile documentary sources are skimpy for the medieval centuries and begin to fill out only for the later decades of the fifteenth century when both states were propelled into international prominence with the establishment of colonial empires. The principal medieval collections in Portugal are those of royal and local administrative networks, as well as vast number of documents that chronicle its overseas enterprise. Few of the Castilian depositories contain any medieval collections of note. By far the greatest collections of medieval documents in the Iberian Peninsula are those maintained in the great depositories of the Crown of Aragon, which rival those of England in their number and scope.

Chronicles and Professional History. As in other European realms, history writing in the Iberian states of the High Middle Ages was carried out by both private individuals and courtiers who penned chronicles and memoirs. As with such literature in northern Europe, both clerics and laymen wrote history of each sort.

One of the greatest events in Portuguese history—the conquest of Lisbon in 1147 by Afonso I Henriques (r. 1139–1185) with the help of a crusading force that was passing by on its way to the Holy Land—was memorialized by one of the greatest chronicles of the twelfth century, *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi* (The Conquest of Lisbon), but this work was written by a northern European author, not by a Portuguese. The *Chronica Gothorum* (Chronicle of the Goths), a Leonese annal of the same period, provides the most important, near-contemporary description of Portugal's first king, Afonso I Henriques. Large-scale chronicle writing by Portuguese authors had to wait for two centuries when writers memorialized the emergence of the Aviz dynasty and the era of great explorations.

Castile. Without doubt the record of chronicle literature and professional history writing in Castile is the most expansive of that of any of the medieval states of Christian Spain. Lay and clerical authors of the twelfth century retell the glorious victories and ignominious defeats of Castilian monarchs locked in a life-and-death struggle with the peninsula's Muslim population. Two works by ecclesiastical authors, *Historia Compostelana* (History of Compostela) and *Historia Silense* (History of Silos), discuss the *gestae* (deeds) of eleventh- and twelfth-century Castilian leaders. The *Historia Compostelana*, the work of several clerical authors, describes the career of Archbishop Diego Gelmírez (c. 1068–1140) of Santiago de Compostela against a backdrop of political history represented by the reigns of Alfonso VI (r. 1065–1109), Urraca (r. 1109–1126), and Alfonso VII (r. 1126–1157). The *Historia Silense*, composed by a monk of the Castilian monastery of Santo Domingo de Silos, principally focuses on the reign of Fernando I (r. 1035–1065) and the early years of Alfonso VI.

In the *Liber chronicorum* (Book of Chronicles), written before 1129, Bishop Pelayo of Oviedo compiled works of earlier chroniclers beginning with those of the great Visigothic writer Isidore of Seville (d. 636) and ending with his own treatment of Castilian history in the early twelfth century. The *Crónica Najarense* and the *Chronica Adefonsi imperatoris* review in some detail the reigns of Alfonso VI and his son, Alfonso VII, as well as their relationship with the frontier hero Rodrigo Díaz de Vivar, "El Cid." The colorful events of El Cid's military career were the subject of the early-twelfth-century *Historia Roderici* and a four-thousand-line poem, the *Cantar de mío Cid* (Song of My Cid), written in approximately 1140 to celebrate the deeds of the mercenary leader. Many of the great Castilian chronicles of the twelfth century that deal extensively with Díaz's life and military career have been translated into English by Simon Barton and Richard Fletcher in the invaluable collection *The World of El Cid: Chronicles of the Spanish Reconquest.*

By the thirteenth century, professional historiography joined chronicle writing as a form that attempted to delineate a national history for the kingdoms of Castile and León. A trilogy of Latin works all penned before 1250—the *Crónica Latina de los reyes de Castilla* (Latin Chronicle of the Kings

of Castile) by an anonymous author, the *Historia de rebus Hispaniae* (History of the Spanish Matters) by Rodrigo Jiménez de Rada, and the *Chronicon mundi* (World Chronicle) by Lucas de Tuy—all began the process of fashioning a Castilian identity that the royal polymath Alfonso X (r. 1252–1284) brought to new heights. As part of his plan for systematizing many branches of knowledge, Alfonso instructed his courtiers to write a history of Spain based on both original research and earlier works in Latin and the vernacular. Though the massive project was completed only to 711, it was added to and revised in the fifteenth century. Castilian chronicle writing underwent a renaissance of sorts in the last decades of the thirteenth century and the first years of the fourteenth with the publication of royal *crónicas* dedicated to the reigns of Alfonso X, Sancho IV (r. 1284–1295), and Fernando IV (r. 1295–1312).

All these works, even those dealing with universal history, focus on the primal conflict between Christianity and Islam that was the Spanish *Reconquista*. Despite the theological overlay of their worldview, the works describe in great detail Iberian warfare during the High Middle Ages and follow with very colorful narration of the sieges of castles and towns—the most prominent type of Christian combat in the peninsula at the time.

Aragon. The eastern realms of the peninsula produced a similar historiographical record but to a lesser depth. As in Castile, many of the annals and chronicles in the Crown of Aragon were written by clerics. The most important of these was the *Gesta comitum Barcinonensium* (Deeds of the Counts of Barcelona), which was written under the auspices of the monks of Ripoll, a monastery north of Barcelona famed for its great library and musical attainments. This work, originally written in Latin, went through several redactions in that language until Jaime II (r. 1292–1327) called for a Catalan edition that appeared only in 1310. Influenced by the historiographical efforts of the Castilian court of Alfonso X, Pedro IV of Aragon (r. 1336–1387) commissioned a general history of Aragon down to his own day. The *Crónica de San Juan de la Peña*, written in Aragonese and divided into thirty-nine chapters, used earlier historical works to trace the reigns of Aragonese monarchs from the eighth to the fourteenth century. Though considered of minor importance by modern scholars, this balanced treatment of the Barcelona rulers was considered one of the greatest works of Aragonese historiography until the early modern period.

One of the most important historical treatments of medieval Aragonese military affairs was a section of the great chronicle of Genoa written by the twelfth-century author Caffaro de Caschifellone. Published under the title *The Capture of Almería and Tortosa*, Caffaro's work is an exciting rehearsal of the events of the joint campaigns of the king of Castile and León Alfonso VII (r. 1126–1157) and the ruler of Barcelona Ramón Berenguer IV (r. 1131–1162). Supported by a huge Genoese fleet, Alfonso won Almería in 1147 and Ramón Berenguer won Tortosa in the next year.

The greatest historical works of the era, the so-called Four Pearls of Catalan historiography, were written or at least dictated by two Aragonese sovereigns—Jaime I (r. 1214–1276) and Pedro IV (r. 1336–1387)—and two courtiers, Bernat Desclot (d. 1289) and Ramón Muntaner (1265–1336).

The first of these works, the *Llibre dels fets* (Book of Deeds), was dictated in two stages by Jaime I, "the Conqueror," and stands as one of the few autobiographies of a medieval ruler. Made up of 566 chapters, the *Llibre* follows the king's conquests of the Balearics, Valencia, Jativa, and Murcia. It so solidified Jaime's reputation that Pedro IV, "the Ceremonious," produced a similar résumé of personal achievement in his *Crónica* of the late fourteenth century. The six books of Pedro's work follow the many military adventures of the king, but they do so in a much drier and more academic way than the adventure tale of his great-great-grandfather does.

The other two principal chronicles recording the political and military accomplishments of the Aragonese monarchs of the High Middle Ages were written by courtiers who saw many of the events they wrote about. Bernat Desclot, a retainer of Jaime I and Pedro III (r. 1276–1285), penned his *Chronicle of the Reign of King Pedro III of Aragon* between 1285 and 1288. Its ninety-six chapters trace in great detail

the life of the chivalric warrior Pedro the Great, focusing especially on the rebellion of the Valencian Muslims (1275–1277), the Sicilian Vespers (1282), and the French crusade against Aragon (1285).

Ramón Muntaner, a merchant, royal official, and mercenary, was extremely well-qualified to write a description of Aragon's emergence as a Mediterranean power because he had been intimately involved with much of it. The 298 chapters of the *Chronicle of Muntaner*, written in Catalan between 1325 and 1326, trace the War of the Sicilian Vespers (1282–1304) and the initial accomplishments of the Catalan Company that served as a Byzantine mercenary unit before going into business for itself. Muntaner's style, like that of another conquistador, Bernal Díaz, celebrates victory far from Iberia, but in an intensely personal way.

Very little Arabic historiography remained in Andalusia during the High Middle Ages. Small passages of such medieval history writing were preserved in the general works of two North African polymaths who lived and wrote much later: namely, the *Muqaddimah* of the fourteenth-century historian, philosopher, and sociologist Ibn Khaldun, and *The History of the Mohammedan Dynasties in Spain* of the seventeenth-century historian al-Maqqari.

Legal Documents. In addition to the important information on Iberian warfare that chronicles and annals reveal to the modern scholar, an equally significant font of such knowledge can be gleaned from the law codes and books of jurisprudence of medieval Spain. The fundamental law of Catalonia, the *Usatges of Barcelona*, was written in the twelfth century though attributed to the eleventh. It is essential for understanding the relationship of lords and vassals, the summoning of armies, and the garrisoning of castles in high medieval Catalonia. The *Customs of Catalonia between Lords and Vassals* by the thirteenth-century Barcelona canon Pere Albert is extremely informative concerning the varied set of customs about all aspects of castle tenure that formed one of the bases for Christian Spain's general set of fortress rules, the *Costum d'Espanya*. Surely the greatest Iberian law book of medieval era was Alfonso X's *Siete partidas*. Though covering all aspects of human law, this masterwork is of prime importance to military historians because of its coverage of commanders, armies, castles, war at sea, and ransoms. The multivolume collections of Catalan and Castilian parliaments—the *Cortes de los antiguos reinos de Aragón y de Valencia y principado de Cataluña* and the *Cortes de los antiguos reinos de León y de Castilla*—contain extremely varied information on the formation and maintenance of Iberian armies during the High Middle Ages.

[*See also* Alfonso VI of Castile; Alfonso VII of Castile; Almería, Siege of; Catalan Company; Catalan Expansion in the Mediterranean; Jaime I of Aragon; Jaime II of Aragon; Muntaner, Ramón; Pedro IV of Aragon; Sicilian Vespers, The; Tortosa, Siege of; *and* Urraca.]

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Donald J. Kagay

Sources (1300–1500)

Primary sources from the Iberian Peninsula for the period 1300–1500 include archives, chronicles, and printed documents. Wherever possible, easily accessible editions of chronicles, in either Spanish or English translations, have been listed in the bibliography. In both the text and the bibliography,

Islamic writings are usually identified by their well-known short titles.

Archives. Archival research into Spanish state documents of the Middle Ages, those that might be expected to cast the most light on military affairs, poses a fundamental problem: such sources are far more plentiful for some geographical regions than for others, a disparity that results primarily from differing royal policies with respect to document preservation. For example, starting around the twelfth century the eastern Crown of Aragon began to organize a system of royal archives that today endows the region with one of medieval Europe's finest collections of state documents. Barcelona's Archivo de la Corona de Aragon (ACA), where much of this material is preserved, contains scores of *legajos* (files, bundles of papers) replete with primary sources useful for studying Aragon's medieval military history. There are also significant repositories in Valencia and Zaragoza.

By contrast, Castilian monarchs did not establish a central repository until late in the Middle Ages. Royal documents continued to travel with a peripatetic court, necessitating a periodic "lightening of the load," by either destroying or abandoning those documents no longer considered worth carrying. Despite several fifteenth-century attempts, it was not until the early sixteenth century that the Catholic monarchs Fernando and Isabella finally established the Archivo General in the castle of Simancas and that the preservation of Castilian state papers began on a regular basis. Ironically, one of the first acts after establishing this archive was to burn recent documents not considered fit for preservation. In addition is the problem that on at least one occasion—after Enrique II seized the throne from his half brother Pedro I in 1369—there seems to have been a conscious culling of documents that might have shown the previous reign in a better light. Consequently the collection of state and diplomatic documents housed at Simancas achieved its full value only with the coming of the Catholic Monarchs late in the fifteenth century.

Nevertheless there are several other Castilian archives containing a wide variety of medieval documents that military historians may profitably consult: in particular the Archivo Histórico Nacional (AHN) and the Real Academia de la Historia (RAH), both located in Madrid. Legislation creating the Archivo Histórico Nacional in 1866 designated it the *archivo público general del reino* (general public archive of the kingdom) and placed it among five major archives for research into medieval and early modern Spanish history. Of the AHN's fifteen sections, the ones most likely to contain documents illustrative of medieval military history include the Osuna section, housing the papers of many of Spain's greatest families, and the section of military orders. Another of the five major archives is the Real Academia de la Historia: established in 1738, it houses the Colección Salazar y Castro, compiled by Spain's leading genealogist, Luis de Salazar y Castro (d. 1734).

Two other major Iberian repositories containing medieval documentation are the Portuguese national archives in Lisbon—founded in 1378 and still known by its medieval name, the Torre do Tombo—and the archives of Navarre, located in Pamplona. Useful documents can also be uncovered in municipal and ecclesiastical archives throughout Spain, increasing numbers of which have been coming into print in recent decades.

Chronicles. For studying the military history of late medieval Iberia, a considerable number of contemporary or near-contemporary chronicles are available. Chronicles from Castile and Aragon, Portugal, Granada, and Navarre are discussed below.

Castile and Aragon. The fourteenth-century historiography is dominated by four chroniclers, two Castilian and two Aragonese. On the Castilian side the most famous is the nobleman Pedro López de Ayala (c. 1332–1407). During five decades of service to the Castilian crown, Ayala functioned as warrior, diplomat, and royal official. He fought and was captured at two of the great battles of the age (Nájera and Aljubarrota) and witnessed a third (Roosebeke). In later years he became not only a noted poet but

also the leading chronicler of late medieval Spain, producing accounts of the four monarchs under whom he had served: Pedro I, Enrique II, Juan I, and Enrique III. The final chronicle remained unfinished at the time of his death in the Basque country monastery where he spent his closing years. The most ambitious and most controversial of the works, the *Crónica de Pedro I*, provides our best narrative of the War of the Two Pedros, the free company intervention, the campaign and battle of Nájera, the Castilian civil war, and the decisive battle of Montiel in 1369 that transferred the crown to Enrique II. Ayala's *Crónica de Juan I* is a major source for the Portuguese war of succession and the battle of Aljubarrota. Neither as well known nor as talented, Ayala's predecessor, Fernán Sánchez de Valladolid, wrote the *Crónica de Alfonso XI*, a work dealing with all but the last half-dozen years of one of the century's greatest warrior-kings. This chronicle is especially important for its detailed treatment of the famous siege of Algeciras (1343–1344).

On the Aragonese side, Ramón de Muntaner (1265–1336), a swashbuckling soldier and royal official, recorded his extensive military experiences from the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries when Aragon was establishing its Mediterranean empire. He was followed by King Pedro IV, "the Ceremonious" (r. 1336–1387). Consciously emulating his ancestor, Jaime I, "the Conqueror" (r. 1214–1276), Pedro became one of the few medieval monarchs to play a major role in drafting a chronicle of his own reign. In the sixteenth century the greatest Aragonese historian, Jerónimo Zurita, said of Pedro that "he ruled for over fifty years and was always at war." As a result, Pedro's chronicle is a detailed if somewhat self-serving account of Aragonese fighting, not only against Castile but also around the Mediterranean, and in particular its subjugation of Sardinia.

Several non-Iberian chroniclers are also noteworthy for their coverage of Spanish military events of the century. Jean Froissart, the principal European chronicler of the century, follows northern interventions on the peninsula in the 1360s and 1380s, and the *Life of the Black Prince* by the anonymous Chandos Herald centers largely on the 1367 expedition to Castile of Edward the Black Prince, son of England's Edward III.

The fifteenth century in Castile is a period rich in chronicles and similar writings, produced by various authors, sometimes from quite different perspectives. The earliest in subject matter are Fernán Pérez de Guzmán's *Generaciones y semblanzas*, a collection of short sketches of leading figures from the reigns of Enrique III and Juan II, and *El victorial*, which tells of the late-fourteenth- and early-fifteenth-century deeds of Pero Niño, written by his standard bearer, Gutierre Díaz de Gamez.

For the long reign of Juan II (r. 1406–1454), a period when most of Castile's military activity was directed inward, there is first and foremost the *Crónica del serenísimo príncipe Don Juan, segundo rey deste nombre en Castilla y en Leon*, penned over the course of his reign by several different authors, not all of whom are known. Later, in the early sixteenth century during the reign of Carlos I, this chronicle's first major editor, Lorenzo Galíndez de Carvajal, attributed its incipience to one of his own converso forebears, Alvar García de Santa María, and named Fernán Pérez de Guzmán, with whom the chronicle is often associated, as only its final redactor. Other major historical writings from the period include the *Crónica del halconero de Juan II*, written by the king's falconer, Pedro Carrillo de Huete, and its reworking by a major political player of the period, Bishop Lope de Barrientos, under the title *Refundición de la crónica del halconero*. There are two important chronicles of individuals who played a significant role during the reign of Juan II: the *Crónica de Don Álvaro de Luna*, one of the most powerful royal favorites in Spanish history, and the *Hechos del condestable Don Miguel Lúcas de Iranzo*. On a military level the chronicles of Juan II's reign deal primarily with the many clashes between the crown and the nobility, but they also contain some information about several attempts to reignite the *Reconquista* that met with minimal success. The chronicles' most noteworthy differences arise from how their authors viewed the leading figure of the period, the constable Álvaro de Luna.

The tradition of multiple royal chronicles advancing disparate views continued into the controversial reign of Juan's son and successor, Enrique IV (r. 1454–1474), known by his unfortunate sobriquet "the Impotent." As in the case of Juan II, military action during the reign of Enrique IV largely took the form of conflict between the crown and the nobility. An attempt early in the reign to resurrect the *Reconquista* was even less successful than those undertaken by Enrique's father. The works of two chroniclers are of particular value because they set forth opposing views of their subject. On the one hand is Alfonso de Palencia, who, despite being the king's official chronicler, despised his subject and painted most of his activities in the worst possible light. Palencia ultimately became a staunch supporter of Fernando and Isabella in their drive to win the throne away from Enrique's daughter, Juana. On the other hand is the king's chaplain and favored chronicler, Diego Enriques de Castillo, whose account of the king, though less sophisticated than that of his rival, is far more sympathetic. His chronicle is not only a useful corrective to Palencia, but also supplies information found in no other source. Unfortunately its value is marred by an event beyond the author's control: in 1467, at the height of the civil war between Enrique and his half brother Alfonso, Enriques de Castillo was captured along with his papers at Segovia. Although his clerical status saved his life, it did not save his chronicle, which was destroyed. Thereafter he was forced to rewrite the first thirteen years of the reign largely from memory, which accounts for certain lapses in the text.

A third major chronicle of the reign of Enrique IV, entitled *Memorial de diversas hazañas*, was compiled by Mosen Diego de Valera, who became a significant figure in the reign of the Catholic Monarchs. The various accounts were to an extent reconciled in the early sixteenth century by Lorenzo Galíndez de Carvajal. The illegitimate son of a churchman who took his mother's name, Carvajal was a university-trained legist who rose to a position on the royal council under Fernando and Isabella and later served their grandson, Carlos I. During these years Carvajal functioned as a royal historian and conducted the first major compilation and editing of the traditional chronicles. His *Crónica de Enrique IV*, lifted from the primary accounts, is more detailed than Castillo's and more balanced than Palencia's.

The chronicles that deal with the reign of the Catholic Monarchs Fernando and Isabella at the close of fifteenth century are almost uniformly favorable to their subjects. Given the military activities undertaken by Fernando and Isabella—including the civil war that brought them to power, the continuing fight to curb the nobility (much more successful in their reign), the war for Granada, and eventually the expansion of military activity beyond the peninsula into Italy—these accounts are the richest of the century for military historians. They include Palencia, who, despite losing the queen's favor, continued writing until the end of the Granadan war; Fernando del Pulgar, who became the principal chronicler of the period after Palencia's star waned; Andrés Bernáldez, whose chronicle took on increasing importance following the war for Granada; Alonso de Santa Cruz, who writes about events from 1491 until the death of Fernando in 1516; and Antonio de Lebrija, who produced an unfinished Latin chronicle of the reign that was largely an expansion of Pulgar's work. Other valuable sources include Pulgar's *Claros varones de Castilla*, brief biographies of notable figures similar to Pérez de Guzmán's earlier work, and the extensive collection of letters written by the humanist Peter Martyr d'Anghiera following his arrival from Italy late in the fifteenth century.

Despite an overwhelming lead in archival documentation, chronicle production for fifteenth-century Aragon lagged well behind that of Castile. For this period the writings of another Italian transplant are of particular importance. Lucio Marineo Sículo ("the Sicilian") was a humanist professor from Palermo who moved to the University of Salamanca and taught there for more than a decade before being summoned to court by Fernando to serve as both chaplain and royal chronicler. As royal chronicler Marineo not only wrote about the early history of Aragon, but also produced extensive accounts documenting the fifteenth-century reign of Fernando's father, Juan II, and the reign of Fernando himself.

Other fifteenth-century sources include a chronicle of Juan II written by another royal historian, Gonzalo García de Santa Maria, who was a member of Spain's most famous converso family, and Gauberto Fabricio de Vagad's *Crónica de los reyes de Aragon.*

By far the most important work dealing with medieval Aragon and its military history is not, strictly speaking, a primary source. The *Anales de la Corona de Aragon* was written late in the sixteenth century by the nation's greatest historian, Jerónimo Zurita, who functioned as royal chronicler during the reign of Felipe II and who made extensive use of the kingdom's rich documentary record. Another key work, very widely cited by historians of Aragon, is the *Aragonensium rerum commentarii* (Commentaries on Aragon), produced by Zurita's successor as royal chronicler, Jerónimo de Blancas, whose writings are better known for their stylistic attributes than for painstaking research of the sort conducted by his predecessor.

Portugal. The third Christian Kingdom of Iberia to develop a substantial chronicle tradition was Portugal. Though some scholars point to the anonymous *Crónica geral de Espanha de 1344* as an early precursor, the first chronicler officially appointed by the crown, in 1434, was Fernão Lopes, a man of fairly humble origins who rose to become keeper of the royal archives (the Torre do Tombo) and a leading royal secretary. Lopes was commissioned by Duarte I to write an account of all ten reigns since the foundation of the monarchy early in the twelfth century. Though only the last three are extant—the chronicles of Pedro I, Fernando I, and João I, covering the years from 1357 to 1411—their attention to detail and careful search for historical causation lead many scholars to rank them among the finest historical works of the late medieval period. Although these chronicles, written from a Portuguese perspective, cover almost the same time period as the writings of Pedro López de Ayala, their author was working almost half a century later and was therefore not an eyewitness as Ayala had been. When drafting the chronicles, Lopes had extensive access not only to royal documents in the archives, but also to a slightly earlier Portuguese *Crónica de comdestabre* (a history of Nuno Álvares Pereira, winner of the battle of Aljubarrota) and to the four chronicles of Ayala. Military historians can use Lopes's work to investigate the Portuguese role in the wars of Pedro I of Castile, the subsequent invasions of Portugal by the Trastámaran monarchs Enrique II and Juan I, the battle of Aljubarrota, and the establishment of the Aviz dynasty. An abbreviated English translation of Lopes is available under the title *The English in Portugal 1367–87: Extracts from the Chronicles of Dom Fernando and Dom João.*

During his short reign, King Duarte I (r. 1433–1438) displayed a literary temperament not only by appointing Lopes as royal chronicler but also by undertaking a work of his own on chivalry, one that embodied instructions on horsemanship, jousting, sword fighting, and even wrestling. Thanks to a 2005 translation, the rather strangely titled *Livro da ensinança de bem cavalgar toda sela* (The Art of Riding on Every Saddle) has become readily available in English.

Although still active in the 1450s, Lopes breaks off his chronicle of João I's reign in 1411, more than two decades before the king's death and four years before his most notable accomplishment, the conquest of Ceuta. The second royal chronicler, Gomes Eanes de Zurara (Azurara), replaced Lopes in the 1450s and, in finishing the *Crónica de Don João I*, provided the major account of that expedition; this work is often referred to by its alternate title, the *Crónica da tomada de Ceuta.* Another source for the Ceuta campaign was written some four decades after the event by Antoine de la Salle, a French author with military forbears who had actually participated in the attack as a young man.

Zurara's work constitutes our principal source not only for Ceuta, but also for the subsequent conflict between Portugal and the Muslim principalities of North Africa (in particular the disastrous attack on Tangiers in 1437), for the military career of Prince Henrique o Navegador (Henry the Navigator), and for Portugal's expansion down the west coast of Africa.

For an account of events that took place in the opening decades of the fourteenth century, including

the Portuguese role in repelling the last invasion of Spain by a Muslim army from North Africa, historians must turn to several later works. The most significant of these were chronicles of the Portuguese kings produced by the third royal chronicler, Rui de Pina, who wrote around the beginning of the sixteenth century. In drafting his account of Portugal's earlier kings, Pina may have borrowed extensively (and without attribution) from the lost chronicles of Fernão Lopes; on the other hand, his undoubtedly original works on more recent monarchs—Duarte I, Afonso V, and João II—supply a considerable part of our information concerning Portuguese military affairs in the later fifteenth century, including Portugal's unsuccessful intervention in the civil war that brought Fernando and Isabella to power. In addition there are the last two royal lives contained in a fifteenth-century manuscript entitled *Crónica dos Sete Reis*, rediscovered during the 1940s. During the early decades of the sixteenth century several chronicles touched on the expansion of the previous century, as well as on the individuals who had promoted it, including a life of Manuel I, "the Fortunate" (r. 1495–1521), by Damião de Góis, and the *Décadas da Ásia* by João de Barros.

Granada. A great deal concerning the military history of Granada in its final two centuries can be learned from Christian chronicles, especially from those written by Castilian authors. At the same time both Granada and the neighboring Islamic states of North Africa produced a substantial literature of their own, and although many of the works written during Granada's twilight decades were lost after its fall, those that do remain must be consulted by historians seeking to write a balanced account of military events. Principal Arabic sources for Granadan history in the period from 1300 to 1500 include the prose works of Ibn al-Khatib, a fourteenth-century royal official who rose to become grand vizier and left prolific writings; Ahmad Mukhtar ʿAbd al-Fattah ʿAbbadi, who produced a lengthy account of the most significant Granadan ruler of that century, Muhammad V, a ruler whose very successful reign stretched over nearly four decades in the late fourteenth century; and Ibn Abi Zar, whose *Rawd al-qirtas* (Garden of Pages), despite dealing primarily with the dynasties of North Africa, contains valuable material on Granadan history.

The most famous historian to provide information about Granada in this era was Ibn Khaldun, some of whose extensive writings treat, among many other things, military strategy. Scion of a prominent Tunisian family that had fled from Andalusia after the Christian conquest of Seville, Ibn Khaldun forged a significant political career that began around the mid-fourteenth century and continued into the fifteenth. Not only did he work for a number of North African rulers, but for a time he also became an influential figure in Granada, where he served under Muhammad V and came into contact with Ibn al-Khatib. His most significant historical works include an autobiography and the *Muqaddimah* (Prolegomena).

Working at much the same time, the Granadan author Ibn Hudayl produced historical writings, including one that examines the militant aspects of jihad and that is not infrequently cited in modern treatments of the topic. For the closing decades of the kingdom's history, in particular for the war that led to its demise, the principal Arabic source is an anonymous work entitled *Kitab nubdhat al-ʿasr fi akhbar muluk Bani Nasr*, probably composed by a refugee who had fled to North Africa following the Castilian conquest. In addition there is a treatise written by Hernando de Baeza, a translator serving one of the last rulers, who not only used Arabic sources but also witnessed the kingdom's final days. The last major Arabic source that must be mentioned is the *Nafh al-tib*, written in the first half of the seventeenth century by a highly itinerant North African author, Ahmad ibn Muhammad al-Maqqari (or Makkari). Despite its late date of composition, al-Maqqari's book incorporates extensive writings from many earlier authors, a number of whose works are no later extant. Since the nineteenth-century rise of Orientalism, a great part of this surviving Arabic literature has appeared in Spanish, Portuguese, and even English translations.

Navarre. Lagging far behind any of the other medieval Spanish kingdoms in chronicle production was the small state of Navarre. One historian of medieval Navarre summarizes its chronicle tradition as "being justly called the poorest on the Iberian peninsula." Navarre's principal late medieval chroniclers—the Príncipe de Viana, Garci López de Roncesvalles, and García de Eugui—appear far down the list of peninsular writings during this period. Consequently when studying medieval military history, for Navarre a scholar is more dependent upon outside primary sources than for any other place.

Printed Documents. One of the great strengths of Spanish historiography over the centuries has been the printing of documents, not only in collections, but frequently as appendixes to monographs. This tradition began at least as early as the late seventeenth century, as seen in the extensive family histories produced by Luis de Salazar y Castro that contained either an extensive appendix or an entire volume devoted to supporting documentation. Royal records by reign, diplomatic papers, the records of the medieval legislative assemblies (*cortes*), municipal records, papers from cathedral archives, Inquisition records—such documents are available in printed editions. Among them, no small number have a military application.

Although published decades ago and therefore dated in respect to finding recently printed chronicles or source collections, Benito Sánchez Alonso's three-volume *Fuentes de la historia Española e Hispanoamericana* (3d ed., 1952) can still prove remarkably useful in tracking down medieval source material.

[*See also* Froissart, Jean; Muntaner, Ramón; *and* Pedro IV of Aragon.]

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L. J. Andrew Villalon

Narrative (500–1100)

The history of the Iberian Peninsula experienced three political realities over a six-hundred-year period: the Visigothic reign, which ran from the fall of the Roman Empire until the Muslim invasion at the beginning of the eighth century; Islamic rule in Spain (al-Andalus), which began in 711 and reached its apex between the eighth and eleventh centuries;

and the Christian kingdoms and counties, which arose in the far north of the Iberian Peninsula (along the Cantabrian and Pyrenees mountain ranges) as small insular pockets of resistance to Islam.

The Visigothic Realm. The presence of the Visigoths dates back to the second decade of the fifth century, when during the migration from the Danube River basin toward the west, this set of barbarian tribes reached the Roman province of Hispania. The Romans employed them in military expeditions against the other Germanic tribesmen (Alans, Vandals, and Suevi) who had also invaded the Iberian Peninsula. As a result of treaties signed with Rome, the Visigoths initially settled in the south of France, around Toulouse. The progressive weakening of the Roman Empire during the second half of the fifth century, however, along with Frankish expansion into southern Gaul and the resulting Visigothic defeat at the battle of Vouillé (507), forced the migration of the Visigoths into Hispania, where they created the Kingdom of Toledo.

Over the next two hundred years, the Visigothic monarchy would encounter several military challenges in consolidating their position and in achieving the unification of the entire Iberian Peninsula. In the first place, they undertook several lengthy campaigns in the mid-sixth century to integrate the ancient Roman provinces that still remained outside Visigothic control. Baetica, the region of Hispania that reached farthest south, was the largest of these Roman regions that still remained independent.

After carrying out these conquests, the Visigoths had to ward off attacks by the Byzantine Empire in the southeast section of the Peninsula. Following the general reunification plans devised by Emperor Justinian I (527–565), the Byzantines occupied the modern-day regions of Murcia and eastern Andalusia beginning in the year 554. Their presence forced the Visigoths to undertake protracted military campaigns to dislodge the Byzantines. They had accomplished this feat by 625.

The Visigoths also fought in the northeast section of the Peninsula (Galicia and northern Portugal), against the Suevi, a Germanic tribe that had established counties in the region at the onset of the fifth century and then had expanded southward by the middle of the sixth century. This forced the Toledo monarchy to wage a war that lasted until 585 when the Suevi were completely conquered and eradicated as a people. Meanwhile, in the northern part of the Peninsula along the Cantabrian mountain range, a few pockets of settlements (Cantabrians and Basques) that had remained untouched by Roman conquest retained their independence for many years. The Visigoths, while establishing several garrisons along the frontiers of this region and conducting a number of campaigns, never fully subjugated them. Besides these Iberian conflicts, the Visigoths repeatedly fought with the French rulers to maintain control over the province of Septimania, a part of Gallia Narbonensis (the modern-day region of Languedoc-Roussillon around Narbonne in southeastern France).

The greatest peril to the stability of Visigothic rule, however, did not emanate from foreign populations or states; the danger resided within. The tumult of the nobility in opposition to the monarchs was constant and resulted in assassination, the overthrow of the monarchy, or outright civil war. External enemies (Byzantines, French, and Hispano-Romans) took full advantage of this instability to weaken Visigothic rule even further. The internal conflict and struggle between a monarchy that sought to reinforce its power against the ever-increasing might of the aristocracy explain the success in the year 711 of the Muslims, the Visigoths' final external enemy. In their expansion into North Africa, Arabic forces, supported by a faction of the Visigothic nobility, crossed the Straits of Gibraltar, and were victorious in the battle of Guadalete against the last Visigothic king. This would quickly end Visigothic rule in Toledo.

To carry out military initiatives on various fronts, the Visigothic state relied on a structural organization headed by the king who served as general in battle and commander of the army. The kingdom was divided into several provinces, each overseen by a duke responsible for financing, recruitment, and command of the troops. A "count of the army" was

appointed to oversee the forces recruited in the different cities.

The Visigothic army was apparently organized with an internal decimal unit system, headed by several hierarchical ranks. The smallest units consisted of groups of ten men commanded by a *decano* (doyen); a *centenas* (unit of one hundred), or ten units of ten men, headed by an official called a *centenario*; and a *quingentario* commanded a group of five *centenas* (five hundred men or fifty units of ten men*)*; and a *thiufado* headed up a corps of a thousand men.

When battling their more permanent adversaries (in the Septimania region of the Peninsula and in the northern Cantabria region against the French, Byzantines, Cantabrians, and Basques, respectively), the Visigoths created several border defenses known as *limes*, which were similar to those of the Roman Empire. These *limes* consisted of a string of fortresses and walled cities equipped with permanent garrisons that served as defensive positions for the Visigothic territory from outside attacks and as springboards for invasions of enemy territory.

Initially, only people of Visigothic origin in Toledo were obliged to serve in the royal army. However, during the seventh century this duty was extended to Roman subjects, both slaves and freemen. This theoretically allowed the monarchy to rely on a potentially large number of troops. The army, however, was comprised of members of the aristocracy, both Gothic and Hispano-Roman, who bore allegiance to the king. These upper-class soldiers received royal favor in the form of land or other material gain in exchange for their own military service as well as the recruitment of their own private armies (made up of *bucelarios,* or warriors kept by the nobility, and peasants who worked their expansive lands).

Over time, the Visigothic monarchy lost its strength and effectiveness in summoning its subjects for military duty. During the second half of the seventh century, kings such as Wamba and Ervig had to pass laws that punished those subjects (especially the secular and ecclesiastical nobility) who did not mobilize when faced with foreign invasion or internal uprising. The growing dependence of the Visigothic monarchs on the private armies of the nobility, and the weakness of royal authority over the latter (a phenomenon derived from the feudalism of Gothic society), explains the Visigothic military's inability to fend off the Muslim invasion of 711.

Islamic Spain (al-Andalus). The Visigothic defeat in the battle of Guadalete (711) not only brought on the fall of the Toledo regime, it also triggered a radical historical turn for a greater part of the Iberian Peninsula, which splintered off from the Latin-Christian orbit of influence and entered a new civilization, as part of the Islamic sphere. Of al-Andalus's almost eight centuries of political existence, the first three hundred years, between the eighth and eleventh centuries, represent its moment of greatest political, military, economic, and cultural glory.

The military-political evolution of al-Andalus during this time was both complex and volatile, but four distinct periods can be identified. During the first (711 to 756), the Peninsula remained unified under the Arab empire and was governed by the Umayyad Caliphate in Damascus. During these initial decades, the Muslims conquered the vast majority of the Iberian Peninsula both politically and militarily. Following soon after the battle of Guadalete, Muslim troops, largely comprised of Berber contingents from North Africa, gained control over the main Hispano-Gothic cities of Seville, Córdoba, Mérida, Toledo, Zaragoza, and Barcelona. Though occasionally meeting military resistance, they were very often able to bring these populations under political rule by means of concessions, including a commitment to respect the lives, property, and religious beliefs of those conquered in exchange for tribute and the acceptance of Islamic political rule.

Barely eight years after the initial crossing of the Straits of Gibraltar, the Muslims had come to dominate almost the entire Peninsula with the exception of a few northern mountainous regions along Cantabrian and Pyrenean ranges. In these areas, indigenous populations, including the Asturians, Cantabrians, and Basques, who had been brought under Visigothic control, were able to escape Islamic domination. Once political-military control

had been established in most of the Peninsula, the conquerors settled in Visigothic Spain's cities and countryside. The Arabs divided this land between themselves and the Berbers, who were not as favored in the allotment of territory. These divisions were the cause of many initial conflicts among the Arab groups settling in Spain.

During the second phase of Andalusian history (756–929), Spain ceased to be a province of the eastern Arab empire and became an autonomous Muslim state known as the Umayyad Emirate with its capital in Córdoba. ʿAbd al-Rahman I (r. 756–788) established a new state in Córdoba and began to impose military rule over all his Arab and Christian rivals in the Peninsula.

This new regime had to take on a diverse set of military challenges. Undoubtedly, the most significant were brought on by the heterogeneous nature of Andalusian society and the resulting clashes between the different sociocultural groups. Many population groups in Muslim Spain were subjugated or discriminated against, eventually rebelling against the aristocratic rule of the Umayyads. The most important of these were the Arab clans that were not Umayyad, the Berbers, and above all the *mudajares*, Hispano-Goth descendants who had converted to Islam. Coupled with this internal strife, the *mozarabes* (mozarabs), Christians living under Muslim rule, were also a source of conflict. All these forces competing for power resulted in perennial instability.

Time and again, the Cordoban military machine had to be applied to repress the incessant armed uprisings. The most important of these took place in regions that bordered the Christian kingdoms of northern Iberia. During the second half of the ninth century and into the first two decades of the tenth century, rebellions and civil uprisings in the Peninsula's Islamic heartlands and within the border regions began to undermine the emirate of Córdoba.

Despite the internal conflicts of this period, the Cordoban rulers also launched frequent campaigns against the small Christian kingdoms and counties in the north of the Peninsula, plundering the countryside, cities, and monasteries. These small Christian states, however, were sufficiently powerful to pillage Andalusian territory on their own and in alliance with Muslim groups that had risen in rebellion against the emirate.

The rise to power of ʿAbd al-Rahman III (r. 912–961) in 912 changed this fluid state of affairs. He directed a hard-line military policy that finished off the Muslim rebels and renewed his military initiatives against the Christian territories in the northern part of the Iberian Peninsula. At the battle of Valdejunquera in 920, he soundly defeated a Christian army commanded by Ordoño II of León (r. 914–924) and Sancho I Garcés of Navarre (r. 905–925) and pillaged Pamplona. Al-Andalus was thus pacified, and in the year 929 ʿAbd al-Rahman proclaimed himself caliph (the political and religious leader of the Islamic community of al-Andalus), with his capital at Córdoba. This initiated a new phase in Andalusian history that lasted until 1031, and was undoubtedly the most brilliant era in the history of Muslim Spain.

During the greater part of this period, the superior political and military organization of the caliphate was unquestionable. With the exception of a significant defeat at the hands of the Christians in the battle of Alhandega (939), the caliphate was generally victorious over the Christian kingdoms and counties of the north (León, Castile, Navarre, and Catalonia), which were long subordinated by military force, alliances, and the payment of tribute. However, despite the frequency and success of destructive Muslim military campaigns into Christian realms, these expeditions did not win the Muslims a significant amount of territory. Moreover, commercial interests (namely, control over gold routes from sub-Saharan Africa) influenced the caliphate's expansion in the Maghreb with the conquest of several North African cities such as Ceuta, Melilla, and Tangiers.

At the end of the tenth century, the situation changed drastically. Al-Mansur (c. 938–1002) took political power as vizier in Córdoba in 978, thus making the caliph insignificant. For the most part, his absolute rule was based on the strength of his army and the prestige conferred upon him by military

campaigns against the Christian territories. In these expeditions, he was able to destroy and pillage cities such as Pamplona, Barcelona, León, and Santiago de Compostela, as well as countless towns and religious parishes. Despite these successes, he failed to expand Islamic control within the Peninsula. Completing some fifty-seven armed expeditions over a quarter century, al-Mansur mounted military operations several times a year. These were carefully prepared from a logistical and financial standpoint and allowed for the organization of a great number of troops—some authorities estimate that the troop levels rose to as high as fifty thousand cavalry and almost thirty thousand infantry. Justifying them as holy wars, his descendants continued these campaigns into the first decade of the eleventh century. In the meantime, however, the internal situation of Córdoba had become untenable and degenerated into a civil war. During this unstable period, different elements of society, including Arabs, Berbers, and the Slavic palace slaves who had come to dominate administration of the caliphate, were pitted against each other. The situation was worsened by the presence of Christian mercenaries in the capital who were loyal to none and sold their services to the highest bidder.

As a result of this crisis, the Caliphate of Córdoba dissolved and al-Andalus between 1031 and 1090 was divided up into many Muslim petty kingdoms (known as *taifa* principalities). The weaknesses of these new monarchies, the continued conflicts among them, and the growing power of their neighboring Christian territories, which took full advantage of the situation to attack and impose heavy tribute known as *parias*, had grave military consequences for al-Andalus. The *taifas* suffered destructive attacks that impoverished them. They lost significant territories to the Christians, who in turn commenced a period of expansion capped by the conquest of Toledo in 1085. In order to put a halt to the encroaching Christian advances, the Andalusians sought help from the North African tribes that had just established the Almoravid dynasty. This African intervention, however, did away with the *taifa*s, which were destroyed and annexed by the Almoravids, thus putting an end to the most brilliant period of the history of al-Andalus.

The military structure of the Muslim states on the Peninsula witnessed important changes over time. Initially, the army that conquered al-Andalus was tribal in nature. The Arabs and the Berbers, though never as numerous as early estimates of two hundred thousand troops said, were unified and obedient. They were always available to contribute to military service when called upon, in exchange for land or tributes paid them by the conquered populations.

Since their allegiance was more to their own interests than to those of the state, the tribal structure of the military organization proved a threat to political stability. It was for this very reason that the emirate and caliphate introduced several reforms for the organization of a nonpermanent army recruited from the entire population of subjects: Arabs, Berbers, and *mudajares*. A permanent and professional force, made up of foreigners, including North African Berbers, Christian Hispanics, and other Europeans, was also created. This mercenary army was backed by a strong guard of slaves of European and African origin that served the rulers. The changes made by al-Mansur were thus especially critical, since they represented the organization of a large army of North African mercenaries and the demilitarization of the broader Islamic society. All these contingents made up the regular army, which was increased by "volunteers" who offered themselves to the battle cry of holy war, known as the *jihad*.

The ultimate responsibility for the military fell on the emir or caliph, who relied on a governor-judge known as a *cadi*, as well as on other officials who commanded the army and military operations. A specialized officer for army administration was charged with the recruiting and paying of wages to the soldiers.

Islamic territories bordering the Christian kingdoms had a particular organization characterized by strong military rule. They were divided into three provinces, known as Upper, Middle, and Lower Marches or *marcas*. The respective capitals of these frontier zones were Zaragoza, Toledo, and Mérida. Fortifications were developed along these frontier

provinces, as well as over the rest of the Islamic territories, playing a strategic military role. The larger Andalusian cities were protected by walls within which a citadel known as an *alcázar* was built. This structure served as the seat of political power. Innumerable castles and watchtowers of all sizes were built throughout the remainder of the territory to secure the roadways and protect the population in the event of attack.

The coastline was also secured with garrisoned watchtowers and naval bases, the most important of which was situated at Almería on the Mediterranean and was built to hold back pirate and Viking attacks. Naval squadrons were occasionally used in offensive operations for pillaging and conquering lands.

Christian Kingdoms and Counties (Eighth to Eleventh Centuries). The Muslim victory over the Visigoths in 711 and the military campaigns carried out during the subsequent decade led to Muslim dominance over almost the entire Iberian Peninsula. Not all territories, however, were equally subjugated. In the mountainous far north of the Peninsula from modern-day Asturias to the Basque country along the Cantabrian cordillera—an arid land of impoverished peoples (Asturians, Cantabrians, and Basques) who did not experience Romanization—the Muslims did not settle but required only tribute. To the east, and along the Pyrenean mountain valleys (between modern-day France and Spain), most of the population remained marginalized from Islamic rule, which was largely restricted to the southern plains.

The lack of interest shown by Muslim rulers toward these peripheral regions, which were difficult to access and held little economic promise, allowed these isolated pockets to cluster into small independent political centers that eventually came to differ greatly from one another. In the far western Kingdom of Asturias, situated in the heart of the Cantabrian mountain range, the indigenous peoples of the area, who had always refused subordination to the great states of Rome, the Visigoths, and finally to the Muslims, united with Visigothic nobility, who had sought shelter from Islamic attacks in this region, and established a Christian resistance against the encroachments of al-Andalus. The Asturian victory of Covadonga (722), though little more than a skirmish that was won by Don Pelayo, the Visigothic *caudillo* or political-military leader, marks the mythic beginning of the Spanish Reconquest. It was not until the mid-eighth century, however, that the Asturian kingdom was consolidated both politically and geographically when it took advantage of the internal Muslim conflicts to expand westward to Galicia and eastward toward the Basque country.

Farther east, along the Pyrenees Mountains, the circumstances under which the new Kingdom of Navarre, as well as the counties of Aragon and Catalonia, came into being. They differed somewhat, but had a common underlying thread: Carolingian intervention. When the Islamic presence in the Peninsula posed a threat to the southern border of the Carolingian Empire, in the late eighth and early ninth centuries Charlemagne attempted to conquer or ally with the people of the Pyrenean valleys in order to strengthen his own position. This allowed for the consolidation of several polities. Some, such as Navarre and Aragon, quickly freed themselves from Carolingian dominance, while others, such as Catalonia, long remained under Frankish control.

During the ninth and tenth centuries, the political and military histories of these realms were very complex owing to internal disputes, the alliances and conflicts between them, and their shifting connections with or attacks on the Carolingians to the north and the Muslims to the south. However, their destiny was undeniably marked for the most part by their relations to Islam, given the strength of its political-military power throughout the Peninsula.

Faced with Islamic power, the position of these kingdoms and counties would oscillate between two extremes. On the one hand, when the Muslim state mechanism was solid, the Christian polities were frequently subjected to strong military pressure and their people suffered destruction brought on by annual military raids conducted against them by armies from Córdoba during campaigns such as those of Abd al-Rahman I, and the caliphs Abd al-Rahman III and al-Mansur. Faced with the

unquestionable superiority of Muslim might, the Christian rulers were obliged to bow to political and tributary rule.

On the other hand, when the Andalusian state entered into crisis during the mid-eighth century, the second half of the ninth century, and the first decades of the eleventh century, the Christian states took advantage to free themselves from tributary obligations and to carry out military incursions into Muslim territory while allying themselves with Muslim rebels. They also occupied themselves with expanding their realms southward by incorporating new territories. For example, Asturias was able to expand rapidly across the Cantabrian ranges to the Duero Valley because of an internal crisis in the emirate of Córdoba during the final decades of the ninth and first two decades of the tenth century. Thus began the Christian colonization of these vast territories. By the same token, the Kingdom of Navarre and the counties of Catalonia were also able to expand southward, though to a lesser extent than their Asturian neighbors.

The great turn of events in the political-military relations between the Christian states of the north and Andalusia would spring from the final crisis of the caliphate of Córdoba during the first decades of the eleventh century. The internal struggles for power between the Muslim factions would allow Castilian and Catalan contingents from the north of the Peninsula to sell their military services to both sides. This deepening of the internal divide between Islamic factions brought bountiful economic gains to the Christians. When the caliphate disappeared definitively in 1031, and al-Andalus was divided into small *taifa* principalities, the Christians from the north would adopt a more aggressive military stance based on threats, economic extortion, and warfare. These normally culminated in significant annexations of Muslim territory. Castile and León (heirs to the Asturian throne) brought their borders down to the Valley of Tajo with the conquest of such large cities in the western half of the Peninsula as Coimbra (1064) and, above all, the ancient Visigothic stronghold of Toledo (1085). Meanwhile, the military advances of Navarre and Aragon were less expansive, but they did reach the valley of the Ebro River and its capital city, Zaragoza. Along the Mediterranean coast, the Castilian nobleman Rodrigo Díaz de Vivar, known as *El Cid Campeador* (champion-hero of the epic poem known as *Cantar de Mio Cid*), conquered the city of Valencia. At the end of the eleventh century, the Christian realms were thwarted by the intervention of a large North African contingent of the Almoravid Empire. They suffered defeat at the battle of Zallaqah in 1086, costing them Valencia and other localities in the Valley of Tajo. However, the historic change that arose in the Peninsula in this century marked the political and military predominance of the Christian realms that from then on would prove irreversible.

The military organization of these kingdoms was fairly simple. They did not rely on a permanent army or a military administration that would guarantee their logistics or financial support. Troops were united temporarily for a given campaign and then would disperse after the expedition was over. Kings or counts were directly responsible for their recruitment and command, though they occasionally delegated military leadership to trustworthy officers. Although all free men theoretically had an obligation to serve in the army, a substantial portion of the forces were supplied by noble vassals, who would be granted compensation in land, money, arms, horses, or equipment in order to sustain and arm themselves. The nobles, in turn, would maintain and arm their own troops.

During the first centuries of this period, the infantry may have played a predominant role, since they were indispensable for battles in the mountainous regions of the north and in the defense of fortresses. However, in time and with the increased frequency of offensive campaigns, the cavalry took on a greater role and in the eleventh century began to make use of heavy arms and equipment, such as long lances, shields, chain mail, long stirrups, and tall saddle trees. The increased need for security within the frontier zones required the construction of fortifications to protect the border populations and to establish a reconnaissance system. The number

of fortresses grew so great that they gave names to whole regions, such as Castile, "land of castles," and Catalonia, "the land of castellans."

The most notable military phenomenon was the intense militarization of entire societies. The pressure from neighboring Muslims and the failure of Christian rulers to hold off frequent invasions forced every individual to become a warrior whether he lived in the countryside or the city. War became a part of daily life and a means of social mobility; the peasant was able to rise to the rank of knight and the city dweller to that of a nobleman by the simple possibility of owning a horse and fighting as a knight who became a member of the *caballería villana* (town cavalry). Entire Christian societies on the Peninsula developed a lifestyle that grew up around and was organized for war and was prepared to sustain protracted military engagements despite the weakness of the central powers. This perhaps was the key to Christian success on the Iberian Peninsula.

[*See also* Al-Andalus; Alfonso VI of Castile; Alfonso VII of Castile; Clavijo, Battle of; Covadonga, Battle of; Díaz de Vivar, Rodrigo; Guadalete, Battle of; Justinian I; Mansur, Abu 'Amir al-; Pelayo; Ramón Berenguer I; *and* Zallaqah, Battle of.]

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Narrative (1100–1300)

At the beginning of the twelfth century, Spain was a patchwork of states, both Christian and Muslim. The violent interaction of these polities largely

constituted the political history of the Peninsula throughout the Middle Ages. When the twelfth century commenced, Islamic rulers still controlled the larger portion of Iberian lands, but by the dawn of the fourteenth century, the tables had been turned and Christian rulers controlled most of the Peninsula's territory, leaving a sole Muslim enclave intact: the Naṣrid Kingdom of Granada.

Spanish Political Configuration (1100–1300). Without doubt, the Muslim states of Spain underwent the greatest changes during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries but in fact had already gone through significant metamorphoses after the initial Muslim conflict of Spain (711–718). With the breakdown of the Umayyad caliphate of Córdoba in the eleventh century, Islamic Spain splintered into a number of mini-states (*taifas*) centered on Iberian cities. In order to survive, these small, weak jurisdictions engaged in many expedients, including the payment of tribute (*parias*) to neighboring Christian states. With the national advances that brought about the Castilian capture of Toledo (1085) and the constant raiding pressure maintained by marcher lords such as Rodrigo Díaz de Vivar, "El Cid," Spain's Muslim leaders were hard-pressed to hold back the Christian onslaught and looked to Africa for help from the Almoravids (*al-murabitun*), a fanatical sect that had come to dominate North Africa during the eleventh century. Largely subsuming the *taifas*, the Almoravids would eventually rule Andalusia and keep the Christians invaders at bay until the late twelfth century. The worldly image of their rule eventually spawned another North African religious sect, the Almohades (*al-muwahhidin*), that had conquered most of Morocco and Andalusia by 1163. These new zealots on the Iberian scene not only rapidly defeated their coreligionists, but also dealt Castile stunning blows at Zallaqah (1086) and Alarcos (1195) and seemed poised to take back great strips of Christian territory. This was not to be, however, for in 1212 an international Christian force dealt the Almohades a stunning blow at Las Navas de Tolosa (1212). This ushered in a whirlwind of Christian conquest that by 1250 had wrested much of Andalusia from Islam and left only Granada to carry on the fight.

All of the Christian realms of Iberia sprang from scattered parties of Visigothic survivors who solidified their positions against the Islamic conquerors in the foothills of the Asturian and Pyrenean mountain ranges. From the eighth to the eleventh centuries, their principal accomplishment was survival in the face of a much stronger Muslim enemy. With the fall of the caliphate of Córdoba, these mini-states took the initiative against the scattered Muslim principalities that remained. At the dawn of the twelfth century, the principal Christian enemies of the *taifas* were Aragon, Castile, Catalonia, León, and Portugal.

Catalonia emerged from the "Spaniards" (*hispani*) who took refuge on the French side of the Pyrenees after the Islamic conquest and began taking back territory along the Catalan littoral to Barcelona and below with the help of Charlemagne (r. 769–814) and his son, Louis the Pious (r. 814–840). Aragon sprang from the large central Pyrenean empire created by Sancho III "the Great" of Navarre (r. 1000–1035). These small states, containing populations speaking different languages and with different types of rulers, were linked when the Aragonese queen, Petronilla of Aragon (1136–1173), married the count of Barcelona, Ramón Berenguer IV (r. 1131–1163). The result of the union was the Crown of Aragon, an amalgam of realms that maintained their own laws, languages, and independence, but were now tied to the will of one ruler.

León sprang from the mountainous Kingdom of Asturias and by the tenth century had become an independent realm, but one under the political shadow of Córdoba. From the twelfth century, however, León emerged as the most important of Iberia's Christian realms and a prime agent of reconquest activity. Castile began life in the tenth century as a county bounded by the Cantabrian mountains and the town of Burgos, whose counts were originally appointed by the Leonese kings. The region passed from a county to a kingdom in 1029 when conquered by Sancho III of Navarre. Though Castile's first kings came from the Navarrese royal family, the Castilian dynasty quickly plotted an independent course throughout the eleventh

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and twelfth centuries that focused on the conquest of Muslim lands south of the Tagus and Duero rivers. Though linked by marriage to León several times during this period, the union of Castile to León became permanent under the reign of Fernando III (r. 1217–1252) and the Castilians quickly became the senior partners in this arrangement because of their realm's increasing size and wealth.

Like León, Portugal was an outgrowth of Asturias and began its existence as a frontier county that came under Leonese control in the eleventh century and moved toward independence in the next century under the leadership of the French adventurer, Henry of Burgundy (r. 1093–1112). During the long reign of Henry's son, Afonso I Henriques (r. 1128–1185), Portugal became an autonomous kingdom that expanded southward with the conquest of Muslim lands. By the thirteenth century, this narrow band of territory had grown to include the great port city of Lisbon and the fertile southern lands of the Algarve.

Castilian and Leonese Reconquest Campaigns. The great reconquests of central Spain accomplished by the monarchs of Castile and León between 1100 and 1300 started with the glorious conquest of Toledo in 1085 and the all-but-immediate response by the Andalusian Muslims and their African coreligionists, the Almoravids. While these soldiers of the Prophet were kept at bay by marcher lords such as El Cid, it was the Christian monarchs of central Spain who eventually mobilized the manpower and resources of their clergy, nobles, and townsmen in renewed wars against the African invaders.

Alfonso VII of Castile (r. 1126–1157) established a reconquest record that would serve as a model for the next century. Spending the first decade of his reign in sparring with Andalusian and African troops below Toledo, he solidified his power by building a string of fortresses that dominated the no-man's-land above Islamic territory and by making strategic alliances with neighboring *taifas*. After repeated raids deep into Andalusia throughout the 1130s, Alfonso moved to expand his own lands with the conquests of Oreja, Coria, and Mora between 1139 and 1143. With the collapse of Almoravid power in southern Spain in the 1190s and the emergence of another set of *taifas*, Alfonso and his fellow rulers of Christian Iberia attempted to push their advantage ever farther southward. The prospect of easy victory in Andalusia was stymied, however, by the arrival of another wave of African zealots, the Almohades.

With Alfonso VII's death in 1157 and the minority of his young grandson, Alfonso VIII of Castile (r. 1158–1214), the reconquest initiative of Christian realms was replaced by the determined expeditions of the new Almohad caliph, Abu Ya'qub Yusuf (r. 1163–1184). With the inherent disorganization of Andalusian political institutions, the Almohad caliph spent much of his reign in fighting his fellow Muslims, many of whom were allied to the Castilian king. With the accession in 1184 of a new caliph, Abu Yusuf Ya'qub al-Mansur (r. 1184–1199), however, the Almohades proclaimed holy war (jihad) against Iberia's Christian rulers. Shocked with this sad turn of events in the Latin East and Spain, Pope Celestine III (r. 1191–1198) preached crusades throughout the early 1190s against the enemies of the Cross of Christ. In Spain itself Alfonso VIII organized a large-scale resistance against an Almohad army, encountering them on 19 July 1195 at Alarcos on the Guadiana River. The battle proved a Christian disaster, gravely tarnishing the Castilian king's martial reputation for years to come.

With this defeat, Christian monarchs such as Alfonso IX of León (r. 1188–1230) once more began to fortify their border posts while actively soliciting aid from the papacy and other European rulers. With the pontificate of Innocent III (r. 1198–1216), the war against Almohad dominance of Spain was once again formally tied to crusading institutions with the promise of indulgences for any Christians who would take up the Cross and fight in Spain. As a result a large number of Aragonese, French, Leonese, and Navarrese knights and city militias joined a sizable force under the command of Alfonso VIII of Castile. The command structure of this polyglot force was eventually amplified to include Pedro II (Pere I) of Aragon (r. 1196–1213) and Sancho VII of Navarre

(r. 1194–1234). Leading his army south from Toledo, Alfonso VIII quickly encountered a huge Muslim force commanded by the Almohad caliph al-Nasr (r. 1199–1213) on 16 July 1212. Shortly after the two sides had taken up their battle formations on the plain of Las Navas de Tolosa (al-'Iqab in the Arabic sources), the Christian front lines charged the Almohad center. When the Muslim army held and seemed ready to drive back its Christian foe, Alfonso VIII drove forward the Castilian rear guard and won the day. Though al-Nasr escaped, the days of the African dynasty were now numbered and Castilian reconquest was on the verge of a massive advance that would push Christian control to the Sierra Nevada within three decades.

As the Almohad caliphate dissolved into a succession crisis that led to an internecine struggle between African and Andalusian Muslim authorities, Castilian and Leonese leaders bided their time until the accession of the great warrior-king Fernando III of Castile, who was destined to lead a number of crusades that knifed deeply into Andalusia. Following up on the more conscribed campaigns of Alfonso IX of León in Extremadura during the 1220s and 1230s, Fernando slowly extended his conquests down the Guadalquivir River through the early 1230s. With this base firmly secure, he moved on the old caliphate's capital, Córdoba, and conquered it in 1236. Solidifying his hold on the region's huge Muslim population, the Castilian monarch then began extending his control toward the Mediterranean with victorious assaults between 1240 and 1248 on Ecija and Seville. Alfonso X (r. 1252–1284) finished his father's work in 1262 and 1263 by driving to the mouth of the Guadalquivir with the conquests of Niebla and Jerez.

Despite these rapid Castilian conquests, the conquerors long constituted a minority in lands still dominated by a Muslim majority, now known as *mudajares*. Cognizant of the very real threat of invasion from the Nasrid emirate of Granada and from the Merinid Kingdom of Morocco, Fernando III and Alfonso X attempted to better control their new Muslim subjects by moving them from the large Andalusian cities into the countryside and allowing the Moorish nobility to retain many of its former privileges. Even with these precautions, however, Alfonso weathered a serious *mudajar* revolt that took two years (1264–1266) and the aid of his Aragonese father-in-law, Jaime I (r. 1214–1276), to put down. A decade later in 1275 a Merinid sultan, Abu Yusuf, took advantage of Alfonso's absence from the kingdom to land an expeditionary force on the southern coast and mount holy war against the Castilian infidel. Though this threat soon subsided, Alfonso and his successors became fixated on the control of the Straits of Gibraltar as a means of protecting their national security from African invasions. Despite this, the threat of sudden Muslim attacks would remain of paramount importance for Castilian sovereigns for the next two centuries and effectively lay out the background for the Catholic kings' final assault on Granada (1481–1492).

Aragonese and Catalan Reconquest Campaigns. The rulers of Aragon and Catalonia had engaged in separate wars against their Muslim neighbors since the ninth century, but at the same time had carried out a far more effective campaign of resettlement of unclaimed territory that stretched along the northern bank of the Ebro River. During the illustrious career of the caliphate's great military leader, al-Mansur, in the late tenth century, many of these frontier farmers and pastoralists were driven off their lands, and, even worse, the great port city of Barcelona was sacked. With the dissolution of the caliphate in the early eleventh century, the counts of Barcelona went on the offensive, and by the end of the century had pushed southward beyond the Llobregat River and toward the Ebro.

In these campaigns, they won Ayerbe, Barbastro, Huesca, and Manzón by force of arms and encouraged the settlement of even more land by promising tax exemptions, privileges, and individualized law codes (*fueros*, *usatges*) to the hardy souls who homesteaded land on the dangerous frontier with Islam.

With the sudden appearance of the Almoravids in the late eleventh century, much of this land as well as territory conquered by El Cid in Valencia was again lost and African and Andalusian troops

put the Aragonese and Catalan southern borders under intense pressure. When the fanatical tone of the invaders began to soften amid the ample allurements of al-Andalus, Christian rulers, clergy, and nobles, like their coreligionists in Castile, renewed military operations against the Islamic frontiers. The Aragonese king, Sancho Ramirez I (r. 1063–1094), and his sons, Pedro I (r. 1094–1104) and Alfonso I (r. 1104–1134), began the slow process of investing the great fortress cities of Zaragoza and Tudela. They also raided along the Mediterranean coast toward Tortosa.

Alfonso, nicknamed "the Battler," viewed Spain as only one of several theaters of holy war in which Christians might fight against adherents to Islam, and thus carried out all his campaigns as mere parts of this crusading whole. Following the example of his father and brother, Alfonso solidified his positions around Zaragoza and Lérida before slowly extending his control to the banks of the Ebro. To gain Zaragoza (a prize coveted by Christian rulers since the time of Charlemagne), the Aragonese king and his clergy appealed to Pope Gelasius II (r. 1118–1119) who responded by promising a full indulgence to anyone who participated in the assault on Zaragoza. With a large force of Spanish and southern French knights, the Battler invested the city in the fall of 1118. After bringing Zaragoza to the point of surrender through the effective use of heavy artillery, the Aragonese completed his great victory on 18 December after soundly defeating an Almoravid relief force. For the next half decade, Alfonso pushed his advantage to the south and west of Zaragoza with the conquest of Borja, Tarazona, and Soria. During the same period, he moved to facilitate the fulfillment of his second objective—the taking of Lérida—by the temporary conquest of Fraga in 1122. Certain of his invincibility against the Almoravids, the Aragonese king mounted a huge raid into Andalusia that took him to the very gates of Granada. Though gaining no territory from this enterprise, Alfonso attained a favorable reputation in European circles for his skillful generalship and protection of a large party of *mozarabes* (Christians living under Muslim rule) which he eventually resettled in Aragon. For the rest of his life, the Battler fought to hold his conquests against powerful Almoravid incursions and to complete his conquests around Lérida. When fighting to take Fraga for a second time in 1133, the Aragonese king was severely wounded and died in the next year. Though briefly married to the Castilian queen Urraca, Alfonso died childless and left his realms to the Templars and the Hospitallers in the hope that they would continue his conquests. Though the terms of this controversial will were not carried out, they clearly set the stage for a new phase in the eastern Spanish *reconquista* when in 1137 Alfonso's niece Queen Petronilla of Aragon married Count Ramón Berenguer IV of Barcelona, merging in the process two realms and their reconquest efforts into one.

Even before the dynastic union of Aragon and Catalonia, the counts of Barcelona were busy in extending their control over lands between the Llobregat and Segre rivers. With an increased interest in crusading across Europe, troops and money from across the Continent began to filter into Spain to support the war on Islam conducted by the Peninsula's Christian rulers. Besides participation in actual military campaigns, Europeans aided in massive resettlement projects such as reclamation of the long-deserted city of Tarragona in the last decades of the eleventh century. The Italian merchant republics of Pisa and Genoa were also profitably engaged in harrying Muslim shipping across the Mediterranean. In 1113 the city council of Pisa took up the cross in a crusade enterprise against the Muslim outpost on the commercially enticing Balearic Islands. This expedition was broadened in the summer of 1113 when Pisan leaders joined with Count Ramón Berenguer III of Barcelona (r. 1097–1131) and unleashed a huge fleet against Ibiza and Majorca. Though the invasion, now firmly under the control of the Catalan count, had conquered the Balearic capital of Palma by the summer of 1114, this triumph proved short-lived as the islands were reclaimed in the next year by an Almoravid expeditionary force launched from the mainland.

With the fall of the Almoravid hold on Spain in the 1130s, the Christian rulers of the Peninsula sensed a



SHELLEY REID

window of opportunity that might quickly slam shut. In 1147 Alfonso VII of Castile and his vassal Ramón Berenguer IV pooled their military resources and, with the help of a large Genoese fleet, led a crusading army against the vital port city of Almeria. After a three-month siege, the city fell in October 1147, coming under the control of the Castilian leader. The Barcelona ruler utilized many of the same forces and even attained from the papacy a fresh crusade bull to move up the coast and invest Tortosa. The city on the Ebro delta fell in December 1148 and Ramón Berenguer, now free from feudal subservience to Castile, was determined to press his advantage up the river. Utilizing small mobile forces, he rapidly conquered Lérida, Fraga, and Mequinza in 1151. By the end of the decade, he held the entire Ebro river valley up to Alcañiz.

This series of reconquest victories, largely occasioned by the steady weakening of the Almoravids, was halted by the Almohad invasions in the late twelfth century. Though temporarily thrown on the defense by this new set of enemies, Ramón Berenguer's immediate successors, Alfonso II (r. 1164–1196) and Pedro II, were to conquer a swath of land below the Ebro that included the towns of Albarracín, Caspe, Montalban, and Teruel. Pedro led a contingent of Aragonese and Catalan troops in the crucial campaign that ended with a complete rout of an Almohad army at Las Navas de Tolosa. After this illustrious victory, the Aragonese sovereign was drawn into southern French affairs that would prove his downfall. Answering the call for support from his ally Count Ramón VI of Toulouse, Pedro and his Iberian troops were cut down at Muret (12 September 1213) by a northern French crusading army led by Simon de Montfort. Pedro's young son, Jaime I, was also a victim of this disaster, spending the next year in Montfort's custody. Only through papal pressure and the gathering military threat of the Aragonese and Catalan barons was the six-year-old prince freed and hailed king of Aragon and count of Barcelona in August 1214. Thus began the rule of one of the greatest reconquest warriors Spain would produce.

After spending his first years as king under the tutelage of the Hospitallers at Monzón and at the mercy of his ambitious and unscrupulous regents, Jaime began his military career at age seventeen in 1225 when he led a crusading force against the Muslim fortress of Peñiscola on the Valencian coast. Though unsuccessful in this first venture, the young king recognized how important the manipulation of the reconquest was to both his reputation and power. As a result, he engaged in almost constant campaigns between 1229 and 1238, during which time he won both the Balearics and the majority of Valencia. While he spent most of his mature adulthood in solidifying control over his new lands that still contained large Muslim majorities, Jaime was never far from the life of a campaigner. Thus in 1244 he conquered southern Valencia down to Jativa and in 1265–1266 aided his son-in-law, Alfonso X, in winning the Muslim enclave of Murcia. He planned to cap his military career in 1269 when he organized a crusade to the Holy Land that he was forced to abort because of bad weather and the lack of interest among his own subjects. When the *mudajar* population of Valencia rose in rebellion, Jaime, an elderly campaigner of sixty-eight, took to the battlefield once more, but was felled by disease and died on 27 June 1276. The Conqueror's son, Pedro III (Pere II) (r. 1276–1285), a chivalric warrior and poet in his

own right, put down the *mudajar* revolt, but soon realized there were no further neighboring Muslim territories in the Peninsula left for him to conquer. Instead, he turned his martial focus to North Africa and was then drawn into central Mediterranean military affairs. Thus, unlike Castile's reconquest, which would linger on for another two centuries, that of Aragon and Catalonia would end before the thirteenth century did.

Portuguese Reconquest Campaigns. Unlike the central and eastern Christian realms of the Peninsula, Portugal established its independence both in fighting the forces of Islam, and in breaking off from a Christian state that had maintained it as a frontier zone. From the late eighth century the far western lands of the Peninsula were linked to the Kingdom of León as a part of the province of Galicia. As Christian settlers occupied the largely vacant territory between the rivers Lima and Duero in the ninth century, the new province of Portugal (*territorium Portucale*) was born. In the following century, the slow Christian movement southward to the Mondejo River created yet another province, that of Coimbra.

This slow colonization, largely accomplished without warfare, was immediately halted in the late tenth century with the campaigns of al-Mansur, who regained much of the Portuguese littoral between Lisbon and Coimbra. With the fall of the caliphate of Córboba in the early eleventh century, the southern Portuguese coastline was divided between the *taifas* of Badajoz, Beja, Córboba, Coria, Merida, and Sevilla. Because of this division of Muslim power and the steady participation of both Iberian and French troops in the far-western reconquest, the dukes of Portugal during the eleventh century were able to regain much of the territory they had lost in the previous century.

During the "imperial" reigns of the Leonese kings Alfonso VI and his son Alfonso VII in the first half of the eleventh century, French involvement increased in campaigns that used Portugal as a staging point. French nobles such as Count Raymond of Amous (r. 1059–1087) and Duke Eudes I of Burgundy (r. 1079–1102) served in Castilian-Leonese armies fighting Almoravid forces. In 1090 Raymond led a large raid that temporarily won both Santarem and Lisbon from the weakened *taifa* of Badajoz. Gaining the approval of Alfonso VI, several of these French military men made a place for themselves in the Leonese court. Raymond of Amous, who was married to Alfonso's oldest daughter, Urraca, served as the governor of the provinces of Galicia and Portugal. His cousin Count Henry of Burgundy took Alfonso's second daughter, Theresa, as his bride and received as her dowry control over the area above the Minho River. In spite of their strong power base in Leonese court circles, neither of these French marcher lords exercised permanent influence on the western Iberian reconquest. In fact, Raymond lost Lisbon in 1094 and its dependent territory to an Almoravid expeditionary force. The dynastic effect of these two cousins, however, was considerable, with Raymond's son, Alfonso VII, serving as the next Leonese emperor and Henry's offspring, Afonso I Henriques, emerging as the founder of Portugal's independence from her Christian neighbors and the creator of a separate Portuguese reconquest with his defeat of a large Muslim force at Ourique in 1139.

As the Almoravids began to lose their hold on the Peninsula and west Africa and before the appearance of the Almohades, Afonso I attempted to expand his war on Islam as a means of gaining final political independence. He increasingly did so by manipulating northern European crusading fleets sailing down the Portuguese coast en route to the Straits of Gibraltar and the Holy Land. In 1141 the Portuguese king convinced a large fleet resting in a temporary anchorage at Oporto to aid him in an attack on Lisbon. Even though the flotilla was able to blockade all the maritime approaches to the city, Afonso's land-based investment of the capital never fully blocked its lifeline to its fertile hinterland. The crusaders eventually fell out with the Portuguese leader and deserted the Lisbon siege to go about their original mission of service in the Latin kingdoms.

In the years after this aborted attempt, Afonso tightened the noose around Lisbon by capturing Santarem in 1147 and forcing the Muslim ruler of Lisbon to pay an exorbitant annual tribute.

When Afonso learned of plans for the Second Crusade in the same year, he sent a delegation headed by his brother Pedro to Rome and petitioned the papacy for the use of some of the crusading funds raised for the Holy Land expedition to complete the capture of Lisbon. The northern fleet, made up of English, Flemish, German, and Scottish vessels and troops, anchored at Oporto in the middle of June 1149 after they had purified their mission with a pilgrimage to Santiago de Compostela. During this same period, the Portuguese king led an army southward to invest the Muslim capital once more. The crusading fleet again sailed from its anchorage, weighing anchor at Lisbon a few days later. After considerable disagreement between the crusading force and Afonso over the amount of compensation and plunder the foreigners would get if the Muslim capital was captured, the foreign troops finally agreed to join Afonso's assault on Lisbon. The siege of the city began on 1 July after the Muslim defenders of the city formally rejected the fairly mild surrender terms offered by the invaders. Despite the extensive use of counterweight artillery that battered the walls of Lisbon for five months, starvation and disease caused more damage to the defenders. The Muslim garrison finally called for negotiations and Afonso basically extended the same terms he had given when he first invested the city: the garrison would open the gates to the citadel which would be occupied by a force of three hundred men from both the crusaders and the Portuguese, the defenders and citizens would surrender their money and possessions to the smaller Christian force, and then they would be able to leave unmolested. When the city surrendered on 24 October 1147, Afonso quickly proved unwilling or unable to control his troops who "pillaged, broke open doors, . . . drove out citizens, . . . treated them with insults, . . . insulted maidens, . . . [and] even slew the aged bishop of the city" (*De expugnatione Lyxbonensis*). After this bloodbath, the crusaders almost routinely continued their journey to the Holy Land, where they were destined to be far less successful than in Portugal.

Even with the Almohad recovery of Andalusia and the Treaty of Sahagun (1158), which assigned the future conquest of the central and western parts of the Peninsula between the rulers of Castile and León, the Portuguese reconquest was not to end with the conquest of Lisbon, but was pushed forward at first by private rather than royal means. Raiders and parties of settlers from cities such as Santarem (which was reconquered itself once more in 1147) moved southward the frontier with the remaining *taifas* of western Andalusia (*al-Gharb al-Andalus*). The greatest reconquest figure of this era was the dashing adventurer Geraldo Geraldes "the Fearless" (*O Sem Pavor*), who, like El Cid in the previous century, conducted a private war on Islam, leading a sizable army of his own retainers. Rather than openly besieging Muslim walled towns and fortresses, Geraldo utilized stealth tactics by leading small parties of specially trained troops who used ladders to secretly scale the walls, kill the sentries, and then open the front gates to Geraldo and his comrades who had waited patiently in the shadows to commence the sack of the site. With the rapid conquest of Cáceres, Evora, and Trujillo in 1165 and Serpa in the following year, Geraldo emerged as an important figure on the western Andalusian frontier whose success alarmed both Afonso I and the Leonese ruler Fernando II (r. 1157–1188). After capturing the town of Badajoz in 1169, Geraldo called for help from the former monarch in investing the town's citadel, a feat well beyond his normal secret tactics. Alarmed by this Portuguese success, the Leonese king sent a relief force that restored the city to its Muslim leader, capturing both the Portuguese king and the adventurer in the process. They quickly bought their freedom, but for Geraldo this cost him the surrender of the small principality he had won in the last few years. Disgusted with the turn of events in the western half of the Peninsula, he campaigned in the eastern half, making several ephemeral conquests in both Valencia and Murcia. He was soon drawn back into western Andalusian affairs with the conquest of Beja in 1172. This brought a rapid military response from both the Leonese and Portuguese kings that eventually drove Geraldo to an alliance with the Almohad caliph. This pact, though bringing the adventurer a lucrative Moroccan administrative post, would

rapidly cost him his life, the victim of Almohad court intrigues.

The final phases of the Portuguese reconquest occurred during the rise and fall of Almohad power in the Peninsula. Under Afonso I's successor, Sancho I (r. 1185–1211), Portuguese raiding across the Tagus and Guadiana rivers brought Portuguese control to the Atlantic. These conquests brought at least temporary Portuguese control to Muslim strongholds such as Alcacer do Sal, Evora, and Silves. The Almohads reclaimed many of these sites in the 1190s, but after the signal Muslim defeat at Las Navas de Tolosa in 1212, the Guadiana River basin was once again open to Portuguese arms and the monarch, Sancho II (r. 1223–1245), was quick to respond with the reconquest of Cacela, Mertola, Moura, and Serpa between 1232 and 1238. The last piece of the Portuguese reconquest, the southern lands known as the Algarve, was won between 1240 and 1249 by Afonso III (r. 1248–1279) with the conquest of Abufeira, Faro, Odemera, Maneique. With its peninsular ambitions slacked, Portugal, like the Crown of Aragon, directed its energies beyond the Spanish scene, thus laying the foundations for its subsequent maritime empire.

Warfare between Christian States, 1100–1300. While Portugal had reached its independent status through long struggle with its Leonese and Castilian neighbors, the subsequent relations of these western Iberian states were largely peaceful between the twelfth and fourteenth centuries. The connection of the Crown of Aragon and Castile, on the other hand, was one that slowly soured during this period, and by the thirteenth century was marked at best



Crusaders. A boat leaves for the Crusades. Illustration from a manuscript written in Galician for Alfonso X, thirteenth century. BIBLIOTECA MONASTERIO DEL ESCORIAL, MADRID, SPAIN/GIRAUDON/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

by distrust and at worst by extremely destructive border warfare. The marriage bonds between the two countries, originally designed to bring their ruling families closer together, often served to spark hostilities. While the Iberian realms of central and eastern Spain had no marital ties at the highest level through the twelfth century when Aragonese rulers looked as far afield as southern France and Hungary for mates and Castilian sovereigns largely relied on Navarre and Portugal for their queens, this changed dramatically in 1249 when Jaime I married his beloved daughter, Violante, to Alfonso X of Castile. This relationship and the national ties it represented began a dynastic pipeline of sorts between the Aragonese and Castilian courts. Thus, the most troublesome denizens of these households, the royal princes (*infantes*), used the new quasi-familial relations that came with such marriage relations to conspire against siblings while relying on at least covert support from his royal in-law in the neighboring realm. Such international conspiracies were often facilitated by such great noble families as the Haros and Laras who held great influence in both Castile and Aragon. The most important of the overmighty siblings during the late thirteenth century were Alfonso and Fernando, the so-called *infantes de la Cerda*. At the death of their father, Fernando de la Cerda, in 1275 the *infantes* should have been the direct heirs to the Castilian throne, but were dispossessed by their uncle, Sancho IV (r. 1284–1295). To right this wrong, the princes sought help from Jaime I's successors, Pedro III, Alfonso III, and Jaime II. These Aragonese rulers hoped that by supporting the successful candidate for the Castilian throne, they might exercise powerful influence over the Castilian kingdom itself. In the reign of Sancho's son, Fernando IV (r. 1296–1312), Juan Manuel, the grandson of Alfonso X and marcher lord of Murcia, added his voice to this princely cacophony. As a result of these dynastic tremors, peaceful relations among Aragonese and Castilian rulers became less and less tenable as the thirteenth century passed.

Besides this background of familial troubles, the two realms were pushed toward military solutions to their differences because of the vast strips of land the Christian rulers had won from Spanish Islam between 1230 and 1250. Though the Aragonese and Castilian sovereigns had attempted to establish boundaries for these new acquisitions through a series of treaties between 1151 and 1244, the actual possession of the new lands spawned increasingly serious disagreements between the neighboring Christian states. Ironically, the catalyst that transformed these chronic disputes into war sprang from an attempt at military collaboration against a common enemy. Thus, with the massive *mudajar* uprising in 1264, Jaime I came to the aid of his son-in-law Alfonso X by leading a large army into Murcia and winning the Muslim enclave in less than three months. While Jaime surrendered to Alfonso all the Murcian territory, a great number of his Aragonese and Catalan troops remained in Murcia. While many of them received land in reward for their service, they still chafed under Castilian rule. As a result, the Valencian-Murcian frontier became an ungovernable zone, replete with cross-border smuggling, rustling, and blood feuds.

Despite declaring himself an agent of peace who planned to reconcile Fernando IV and his powerful relatives, Prince Juan and the *infantes de la Cerda*, Jaime II was soon tempted by the instability of the Castilian realm to engage in a conspiracy with the princes that he hoped would extend his control over Murcia. Having abrogated the peace treaty he had finalized with Sancho IV and broken off relations with Sancho's young son Fernando IV, Jaime led an army into Murcia during the spring of 1296. Since his other conspirators simultaneously invaded Castile from other directions, the Aragonese king met only light resistance in his Murcian invasion. As a result, Jaime's army had captured all the major fortresses and towns north of the Segura River by June. These included Alicante, Elche, Elda, Guardamar, Murcia, and Novelda, all of which were rapidly garrisoned with Jaime's troops. After mounting two further expeditions in the next eight years, Jaime decided to content himself with the victories of the first year's campaigning season, formalizing his gains with the Treaty of Torrellas (1304). Though the territory



Pedro III of Aragon (1239–1285). The fatal wounding of Pedro III during the French invasion of Catalonia, November 1285. Illustration from the *Chronicle of France or Chronicle of Saint Denis*, MS Roy 20 C VII, fol. 20v, fourteenth century. © BRITISH LIBRARY BOARD. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

above the Segura was thus made Valencian territory, it remained a wild, separate March that the sovereigns of Aragon and Castile would fight over again during the fourteenth century.

Warfare between Iberian and Foreign Christian States, 1100–1300. While the Christian states of the Peninsula had suffered repeated Muslim invasions, they would not suffer an attack from coreligionists until the eve of the fourteenth century. Turning to the Mediterranean as a zone in which to test his chivalric prowess, Pedro III became the ruler of Sicily in 1282 and, in doing so, made a powerful enemy in Charles of Anjou, the island's former ruler. Though Charles died before he could take revenge on the Aragonese interloper, Philip III of France (r. 1270–1285), bolstered by an excommunication of Pedro issued by the French pope Martin IV (r. 1281–1285), led a crusading army across the Pyrenees in the summer of 1285. After winning Gerona in September, the French supply line was cut by a signal Catalan naval victory that forced Philip to retire. He died at Perpignan in October. Though ineffectual, the French expedition highlighted a Pyrenean invasion route that would become well-used in succeeding centuries.

[*See also* Al-Andalus; Alarcos, Battle of; Alfonso I of Aragon; Alfonso VI of Castile; Alfonso VII of Castile; Alfonso VIII of Castile; Alfonso X of Castile; Charlemagne; Charles of Anjou; Díaz de Vivar, Rodrigo; Fernando III; Fraga, Siege and Battle of; Geraldo the Fearless; Jaime I of Aragon; Las Navas de Tolosa, Battle of; Louis I, Emperor; Mansur, Abu Yusuf Ya'qub al-; Montfort, Simon (IV) de; Muret, Battle of; Pedro III of Aragon; Sancho III Garcés; Zallaqah, Battle of; *and* Zaragoza, Siege of.]

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Donald J. Kagay

Narrative (1300–1500)

Late medieval military activity involving the five Iberian states—Castile, the Crown of Aragon, Portugal, Navarre, and Granada—centered on a number of themes that this article will first mention briefly, then explore in greater detail:

1. The much-slowed completion of Castile's *Reconquista*, culminating in a successful war of conquest against the Muslim Kingdom of Granada (1481–1492) conducted by the Catholic Monarchs Fernando and Isabella.
2. A mid-fourteenth-century conflict between Castile and Aragon, later dubbed the War of the Two Pedros (1356–1366) for its principal antagonists; despite Castilian military success throughout most of the war, it ended in Aragonese victory.
3. A Castilian civil war (1366–1369) that grew out of this conflict between Castile and Aragon and that ultimately placed on the Castilian throne an illegitimate branch of the royal family, known as the Trastámaran dynasty.
4. The Portuguese war of succession (1383–1385) that culminated in the battle of Aljubarrota and the establishment of the Aviz dynasty by the winning claimant, João I.
5. The invasion of Castile in 1386 by the English Duke of Lancaster, John of Gaunt, in pursuit of a claim on the throne that had come to him through his marriage to Constanza, daughter and heir of Pedro I, "the Cruel."
6. Involvement of the Iberian kingdoms in western Europe's most significant and enduring conflict of the period, the Hundred Years' War (1337–1453).
7. Periodic revolts staged by the fifteenth-century Castilian aristocracy throughout the reigns of Juan II (r. 1406–1454) and his son Enrique IV, "the Impotent" (r. 1454–1474), leading on one occasion to full-scale civil war (1465–1468).
8. The Castilian succession crisis of 1474–1479 that brought to power the Catholic Monarchs and made possible Fernando's late medieval military reforms.
9. Expansion outside Iberia undertaken by Aragon, Portugal, and Castile.

***Reconquista* and the War for Granada.** By the end of the thirteenth century the *Reconquista*, a centuries-long movement to reconquer the Iberian Peninsula from Islam, was largely complete. In the east the Crown of Aragon had overrun both Valencia and the Balearic Islands; in the west Portugal had taken the Algarve. By doing so, both kingdoms had completed their part of the endeavor. What remained to be done was left to the largest of the Spanish states, the Kingdom of Castile. Following the thirteenth-century advance across the Guadalquivir Valley and into Murcia, the Castilian reconquest slowed to a crawl during which long periods of equilibrium alternated with brief flurries of activity. As a result an Islamic presence in the far south, centered on the mountainous Kingdom of Granada, survived for another two centuries.

The last serious Muslim threat from North Africa came at the end of the 1330s with the invasion of Castile by the Marinids under their sultan, Abu al-Hasan ʿAli (r. 1331–1351). In 1339 the combined naval forces of Castile and Aragon defeated a Marinid fleet in the Strait of Gibraltar, despite which al-Hasan's army reached the peninsula and besieged Tarifa in the far south. The following year a Christian army led by Alfonso XI of Castile (r. 1312–1350) and Afonso IV of Portugal (r. 1325–1357) raised the siege and crushed al-Hasan's forces at the battle of Rio Salado.

Surviving documentation from Alfonso XI's reign, though relatively sparse, suggests that one reason for the victory at Rio Salado is the various measures he took to increase royal access to reliable military forces and to pay those who served in his wars. Alfonso accomplished this primarily through a more efficient exploitation of modes of recruitment and taxation that had been put in place during reigns preceding his own. At the same time, however, the king also initiated several reforms that were largely his own. The most visible was his creation of the Order of the Band (Orden de la Banda), a royal order of chivalry similar to the English Order of the Garter and the French Order of the Star. Probably of greater significance in the long run were changes he made in an income-based form of military service known as *caballería popular* involving the inhabitants of Castilian towns and cities. What had formerly been voluntary in several regions now became compulsory throughout the kingdom. Alfonso also made use of a system of military indentures not unlike what was developing in England at the same time. He placed increased reliance on relatively untapped sources of revenue, worked to have the church issue crusading bulls for his wars against the Muslims, and even sold off pieces of the royal patrimony when the need arose. Thanks to such measures, Alfonso enjoyed a career marked by notable military successes.

In 1343–1344, in one of the most famous sieges of the Middle Ages, Alfonso XI took the port city of Algeciras. In 1350 he would have reconquered nearby Gibraltar, recently retaken by the Muslims as a result of the carelessness of its Castilian castellan, had the plague not descended on his army, killing many of the besiegers including the king himself, who became Europe's highest-ranking victim of the Black Death.

Following Alfonso's death, his only surviving legitimate son and successor, Pedro I (r. 1350–1366/69), radically reoriented Castilian military policy, first allying himself with the Nasrid ruler of Granada, the last Muslim stronghold in the far south of the peninsula, then initiating a ten-year war against Aragon that became known as the War of the Two Pedros (1356–1366). This bitter conflict and its lengthy aftermath, which included a civil war for the Castilian throne and the protracted struggles of its winner, Enrique II (r. 1366/69–1379), to establish his new dynasty, derailed the *Reconquista* for decades. Not until the beginning of the fifteenth century did another significant advance occur. In 1410, Prince Fernando of Castile, uncle of the infant king, Juan II, launched a successful attack on the Kingdom of Granada, in the course of which he seized a number of places along the frontier, including the town of Antequera, a victory that supplied his sobriquet, Fernando de Antequera. His campaign ground to a halt shortly afterward, however, when the last king of the Aragonese royal house of Barcelona died without a direct heir, putting the crown of that kingdom into play. As one of the major contenders, Fernando transferred his efforts to becoming king of Aragon, an end that he achieved by the terms of the Compromise of Caspe in 1412.

Throughout the fifteenth century Castile conducted a desultory border war against Granada, as the two traded raids into one another's territory. While commanding forces along the frontier in the late 1430s, the great warrior poet Iñigo López de Mendoza, first Marqués of Santillana, enjoyed a measure of success, only to see this canceled by renewed struggle between Castile's aristocratic factions—struggles of the sort that repeatedly erupted during the reign of Juan II (r. 1406–1454). At the beginning of the next reign, Enrique IV launched yet another short-lived attack on the Muslim kingdom. Despite some initial promise, this too was abandoned when aristocratic factionalism broke out once again,



Battle of Nájera, 1367. Illustration from *Froissart's Chronicle*, MS Fr 2643, fol. 312v, fifteenth century. BIBLIOTHÈQUE NATIONALE, PARIS, FRANCE/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

eventually giving rise to outright civil war. During these many decades the Kingdom of Granada managed to survived, in part because of its isolated, mountainous location, in part because of the reign of several talented rulers such as Muhammad V (r. 1354–1359, 1362–1391), but mainly because of the internal struggles consuming its larger neighbor to the north.

This stalemate ended with the marriage in 1469 of Fernando of Aragon and Isabella of Castile, both members of the house of Trastámara, a dynastic union that ultimately led to the unification of the peninsular states with the exception of Portugal. Because of repeated provocation by the reigning Granadan monarch, Abu al-Hasan 'Ali (Muley Hacén), adding Granada to their fledgling state soon became a major goal of the Catholic Monarchs. In 1462, Abu al-Hasan's predecessor had tried to buy off Enrique IV by turning over to Castile the fortress of Gibraltar and agreeing to pay an annual tribute; when Abu al-Hasan came to the throne four years later, however, he discontinued payments, believing that Castile, in the throes of rebellion by Enrique's great nobles, was in no position to retaliate. While Castile was going through a civil war between rival claimants to the throne, Granadan policy became increasingly aggressive, culminating in 1481 in a surprise attack on the frontier fortress of Zahara. This supplied Fernando and Isabella with their casus belli for the Granadan war (1481–1492).

Three principal factors sealed the fate of Islam's final stronghold on the Iberian Peninsula: (1) fatal divisions within the Nasrid ruling house, (2) a substantial improvement in the Castilian military establishment, brought on by increased reliance on infantry forces supplied by the towns through a newly established urban league (the Santa Hermandad), and (3) a massive deployment of artillery by the Castilian monarch. Within a matter of months after the war's outbreak, King Fernando began to build up

Catholic Monarchs. Isabella I of Castile (1451–1504) and Ferdinand II of Aragon (1452–1516) enter Granada following the Granada War (1481–1492). Wooden relief by Felipe Vigarny, sixteenth century. CAPILLA REAL, GRANADA, SPAIN/ THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

one of the finest artillery trains in Europe. Ultimately it was his guns that reduced in record time some of the hardest walls to attack in all of Europe, leading one historian to call this "the cannon conquest of Nasrid Spain." One by one Granada's mountain strongholds succumbed to the new weapon; by 1489 only the city itself and a little surrounding territory remained to the new king, Boabdil. In 1491 the Catholic Monarchs initiated a siege of the city that lasted for months. When their original siege camp, Santa Fe, burned down, Isabella demonstrated her unshakeable resolve to push through to a successful conclusion by rebuilding it in stone. On 2 January 1492, Castilian forces occupied the palace fortress of the Alhambra, thus ending the *Reconquista*.

Despite a generous treaty that allowed Muslims to retain their property, their religion, and their laws, heavy-handed attempts by the Archbishop of Toledo and a leading royal adviser, Francisco Jiménez de Cisneros, to convert this conquered population led less than a decade later to a second war for Granada that dragged on for several years (1500–1502). The Catholic Monarchs used this unsuccessful revolt as a means of renouncing their own treaty, and on 11 February 1502 Fernando and Isabella issued an edict requiring all Muslims throughout Castile either to convert or to leave the country. The militant zeal of the *Reconquista* later found its sequels in Spain's attacks on Islamic territories in North Africa and, across the Atlantic, in the conquest of the New World.

The War of the Two Pedros (1356–1366). The War of the Two Pedros became the most protracted struggle between Spain's Christian kingdoms to occur in the later Middle Ages. Fought between Castile and Aragon, the war was named for the contemporary monarchs of these two kingdoms: the Castilian monarch Pedro I and his Aragonese contemporary Pedro IV, "the Ceremonious" (r. 1336–1387), known in the county of Catalonia as Pere III. This bitter conflict grew out of a relatively minor naval incident. In 1356 the Aragonese monarch dispatched a flotilla, commanded by the royal adviser Francés de Parellos, to aid the French in their struggle with England. When stopping over in the Castilian port of San Lúcar de Barrameda, the flotilla seized two Genoese ships that were also in port and refused to surrender them, despite an order to do so issued by Pedro I, who was currently residing in the neighboring city of Seville. When a Castilian fleet assembled by Pedro I was unable to overtake the malefactors, he turned it eastward against the Balearic Islands. Offers of reparation by the Aragonese monarch and a vigorous papal intervention to head off conflict came to nothing when Pedro I demanded extensive territorial concessions as the price of peace. In response to Aragon's refusal to meet these demands, the Castilian monarch declared war.

The conflict, divided into two fairly equal periods by the short-lived peace of Terrar (1361), might have been dubbed "the war of Castilian aggression." On almost all occasions Pedro I's forces, with some aid from other Iberian states, seized the initiative, and although Castile did not win every encounter,

it won enough of them to absorb territory lying along the common border between the two states. Military activity fell into several categories. First, and most frequent, were raids aimed at devastating enemy territory. Known in Spanish as *calvagadas*, they were comparable to the French *chevauchées*. A fairly similar tactic involved coastal raiding. Though directed primarily against the Kingdom of Valencia and the neighboring Balearic Islands, on rare occasions ships of Castile and its allies ranged as far north as Catalonia. In what was the war's most spectacular campaign, in 1359 a Castilian fleet of 128 ships, including contingents from Granada and Portugal, sailed far up Spain's eastern coast. Pedro I, who commanded in person, threatened Barcelona, besieged Ibiza, destroyed Alicante, and challenged an Aragonese fleet in the Balearics to come out and fight. Having decided that the city of Venice was aiding the enemy, he seized a Venetian ship and made an unsuccessful attempt to cut off the Flanders galleys on their return journey into the Mediterranean.

Throughout the conflict, siege operations constituted the most fruitful form of military activity. For the most part these were directed against Aragonese holdings near the frontier, stretching all the way from Alicante on the coast diagonally northwestward toward the region west of Zaragoza. Treachery helped Pedro seize two of his most important prizes: Tarazona in 1357 and Calatayud five years later. Both events occurred after he had signed a truce or treaty, only to turn around and violate it at the first opportunity. Largely missing from the conflict were any significant battles. On most occasions, when it looked as if the two sides might meet in the field, one or the other backed away. From the start, encounters that did take place tended to be small and indecisive. Even during the war's largest operation—the naval campaign of 1359, when Barcelona was threatened and the fleets came within two leagues of one another—no general engagement ensued.

By 1366, Castile had added considerable territory in the areas west of Zaragoza and south of Valencia, seizing substantial places like Calatayud, Tarazona, and Alicante, as well as many smaller town and villages. Despite this, in a stunning eleventh-hour reversal, Aragon actually won the war, a victory thanks entirely to foreign intervention. Late in 1365 both France and the Papacy came to the aid of the beleaguered Aragonese, and together the three lured onto the Iberian Peninsula thousands of mercenaries—who had been thrown out of work by the lull in fighting between England and France resulting from the treaties of Brétigny and Calais (1360). Banded together into so-called free companies, these battle-hardened veterans from the north, including such leading figures as the future constable of France Bertrand du Guesclin and the Englishman Hugh Calveley, immediately shifted the military balance, invading Castile and forcing its monarch to flee south to Seville, from which he crossed into Portugal. Meanwhile Castilian garrisons not actually dislodged by the companies had withdrawn from Aragon, permitting Pedro IV to reoccupy at leisure all of the lost territory, rewarding those places that had most strenuously resisted capture, and punishing those that had surrendered to the enemy with unseemly haste. At this point the conflict simply petered out; no formal peace treaty was signed officially ending the war.

Civil War for the Castilian Throne (1366–1369). The War of the Two Pedros, which came to an end in 1366, immediately metamorphosed into a civil war for the crown of Castile. The contenders were Pedro I and his illegitimate half brother Enrique, Count of Trastámara, who had supported Aragon throughout the conflict. As early as 1362, Enrique had signed a number of secret protocols with Aragon, the most important drafted at Monzón. By their terms, Pedro IV agreed to support Enrique's bid for the Castilian crown in return for extensive territorial compensation along the border.

The civil war began with the 1366 invasion of Castile by Enrique's forces and the free companies. At Calahorra, the first Castilian town along the line of march, Enrique assumed the crown. This was followed several weeks later by his coronation at Burgos, the old capital of Castile. When Pedro I declined to make a stand against Enrique in the north, but instead fled south to Seville, a massive defection to Enrique's side occurred throughout

the kingdom. This in turn forced Pedro to continue his flight by sea into Portugal. Traveling north through that country, he briefly reentered the Castilian province of Galicia, then took ship for the English territories in southern France, where he appealed to his English ally Edward the Black Prince, at the time serving his father, Edward III (r. 1327–1377), as prince of Aquitaine.

Having obtained royal authorization to help Pedro, the prince mounted a sizable military expedition and in spring 1367 entered Castile by way of Navarre. On 3 April his army won a crushing victory at Nájera. But Enrique escaped and, with aid from the French crown, rebuilt his shattered army. Meanwhile Pedro, through his battlefield brutality and failure to pay what he had promised, alienated the English, who evacuated the peninsula in the autumn, just as Enrique was returning for a second try. The civil war dragged on for another eighteen months, eventually centering on Enrique's protracted siege of Toledo, the major city in central Spain. In May 1369, hearing that Pedro was bringing a large army from Seville to raise the siege, Enrique and Bertrand du Guesclin—the latter once again on loan from France—quickly moved south to intercept. In a dawn attack they routed Pedro's army, much of which fled southward, leaving the defeated king and a few of his followers to seek sanctuary in the nearby castle that gave its name to the battle, a place called Montiel, belonging to the military order of Santiago. A few days later, while trying to escape a tightening siege, the Castilian king was captured and almost immediately stabbed to death by his half brother, the usurper.

For several years fighting continued as Enrique II struggled against unreconciled supporters of the former monarch and neighboring kingdoms hoping to profit at Castile's expense; by the early 1370s, however, he had managed to establish on a firm footing the Trastámaran dynasty that continued to rule Castile and later Aragon, too, until the sixteenth century (1369–1516/1555).

The Portuguese War of Succession (1383–1385). The most significant Iberian conflict of the late fourteenth century occurred when Enrique II's son, Juan I (r. 1379–1390), tried to make good his claim through marriage to the Portuguese throne. With the death of Fernando I of Portugal in 1383, the crown passed to his only daughter, Beatriz, for whom a marriage to the Castilian king had been arranged. The fact that this would endanger Portuguese independence raised considerable opposition to the match, opposition that came to center around an illegitimate member of the old royal family, João, master of the military order of Aviz. With the aid of his general Nuno Álvares Pereira, João launched a military resistance. In response, Juan I entered Portugal in 1384 and, despite losing the initial battle at Atoleiros, besieged Lisbon by land and sea. Although Juan's army enjoyed initial success in its attack on the Portuguese capital, an outbreak of the plague forced him to abandon the siege and return to Castile.

When the Portuguese *cortes* declared João king in April 1385, Juan immediately dispatched a new expeditionary force that met defeat at the battle of Transcoso in May. During the summer the Castilian king gathered a far larger Castilian army reinforced by French contingents for a second attempt to take Lisbon. Although vastly outnumbered, Portuguese forces moved in August to block the Castilian line of march. Their army was strengthened by the arrival of English bowmen raised by John of Gaunt, Duke of Lancaster and son of Edward III of England. The numerically superior but overconfident Castilians met a crushing defeat at the battle of Aljubarrota, leaving large numbers of dead on the field and their king in flight. Despite continuing border clashes, Aljubarrota placed João I (r. 1385–1433) and the Aviz dynasty (1385–1580) that he had founded firmly on the throne and secured Portuguese independence for the next two centuries.

The Duke of Lancaster's Invasion of Castile (1386–1388). Following their victory at Aljubarrota, the Portuguese turned the tables on Castile, aiding their recent benefactor the Duke of Lancaster in his bid for the Castilian throne. After the death of his first wife in 1369, Lancaster married Constanza, daughter of Pedro I, who had been left in English custody in 1367 and who had inherited her murdered

father's claim to the Castilian throne. The pair produced a daughter, Catherine. Military and political events in both England and France prevented the duke from pursuing his wife's claim for almost two decades. Having aided Aviz and Pereira in repelling the Castilians, he returned briefly to England, then sailed for the Castilian port of La Coruña in July 1386. Within months John of Gaunt had overrun most of the northwestern province of Galicia and negotiated an alliance with the Portuguese by marrying his eldest daughter, Philippa, to the new Portuguese king.

In the face of his defeat in Galicia and the new Anglo-Portuguese alliance, the Castilian monarch Juan I offered a compromise with the duke based on a marriage between his dynasty and the House of Lancaster. Tasting victory, the duke rejected the offer, and in spring 1387 he renewed his campaign to conquer Castile. The military situation now deteriorated as the English army fell victim to disease while wandering around northern Castile in what amounted to a prolonged *chevauchée*. Stripped of his gains in Galicia, Lancaster decided to accept the compromise offered by his enemy a year earlier: he transferred any and all claims to Castile to his daughter, Catherine, who then married the Trastámaran heir to the Castilian throne, Juan's son, Enrique (soon to become Enrique III). In 1389 the duke withdrew from the peninsula for the third and final time.

Iberian Involvement in the Hundred Years' War. Intermittently in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, the great struggle raging in northern Europe spilled over across the Pyrenees. During the opening decades of the conflict, several Iberian kingdoms signed diplomatic pacts with one or another of the major belligerents, though there appears to have been no actual military involvement prior to the mid-1350s. In 1356 the Aragonese squadron of galleys that touched off the War of the Two Pedros was on its way to aid the French navy in the Bay of Biscay. Early in the 1360s the free companies began to operate against the northern lands of the Crown of Aragon. Although the Aragonese managed to turn back a filibustering expedition in 1362, three years later these same companies returned, this time at the invitation and in the pay of the Aragonese monarch Pedro IV. Within months they reversed the course of the War of the Two Pedros and placed Enrique II on the Castilian throne.

As a result of the expedition's success in placing a pro-French monarch on the throne, the English now felt the need to intervene. In 1367, despite being officially at peace, England and France fought what amounted to a surrogate war in Iberia, during which France supported Enrique II and England, with some reluctance, supported the deposed monarch, Pedro I. Although Anglo-Gascon forces won the battle of Nájera and restored Pedro to the throne, in the end it was the French-backed Enrique who won this struggle, after which he brought Castile into the conflict on the French side. Enrique's victory was accomplished with military assistance from Franco-Breton forces commanded by Bertrand du Guesclin, a leading figure of the Hundred Years' War, who remained in Castile until his ally's victory at Montiel. Afterward Du Guesclin was recalled by the French king Charles V (r. 1364–1380) to assume the office of constable and command French forces in the next round of the conflict. The constable's experience in Spain may have been a major factor in his future decision to avoid any set-piece battles with the English and to adopt instead a highly successful strategy of rapid strikes and small encounters.

Under the Trastámaran dynasty the principal Castilian contribution to the Hundred Years' War came at sea. In 1371 a Castilian fleet commanded by Admiral Ambrogio Boccanegra played a major role in defeating the English at the battle of La Rochelle, thereby helping to reestablish a major French naval presence on the Bay of Biscay. Another famous intervention, one that became the principal subject matter of the Spanish chronicle *El victorial*, occurred in 1405–1406 when galleys commanded by Pero Niño operated along the English Channel with considerable success, seizing English shipping and conducting cross-Channel raiding against England's southern coast.

Struggle between Castile's Aristocratic Factions. Much of the significant military activity in fifteenth-century Castile grew out of fighting between noble factions. The majority of such events during the reign of Juan II of Castile (r. 1406–1454) involved opposition to the long-standing royal favorite Álvaro de Luna, who survived serious challenges in the late 1420s and early 1440s only to fall from power when his royal patron had him beheaded in 1453. The situation was complicated by several members of the Aragonese branch of the House of Trastámara, known as "the Infantes of Aragon," who intervened repeatedly in Castilian affairs in hopes of profiting from the disturbed state of the kingdom. Castile's most significant battle during the first half of the fifteenth century, Olmedo in 1445, was simply part of this ongoing crisis.

During the reign of Enrique IV (r. 1454–1474) aristocratic opposition descended into outright civil war when one noble faction deposed the king in absentia and swore allegiance to his half brother Alfonso, Prince of Asturias, son of Juan II's late second marriage to the Portuguese princess Isabella. Outright civil war ended in 1468 with Alfonso's early death and Enrique's promise made at Toros de Guisando (1469) to transfer the succession away from his acknowledged daughter, Juana (whose sobriquet "la Beltraneja," deriving from serious doubts concerning her legitimacy, alludes to the nobleman Beltrán de la Cueva), to Alfonso's sister (and Enrique's half sister), Isabella. For the next five years the rivalry continued to smolder as supporters of Juana and Isabella positioned themselves for the succession struggle certain to erupt upon Enrique's death. In 1469, Isabella gained a critical ally when she married an Aragonese prince, Fernando, in opposition to Enrique's wishes. The groom had become heir to Aragon's throne when his elder half brother, Carlos of Viana, Juan II of Aragon's son by an earlier marriage, died suddenly in 1461. Many contemporaries believed Carlos to have been poisoned either by his father, with whom he was locked in a deadly quarrel, or by his stepmother.

The Castilian Succession Crisis (1474–1479). With Enrique IV's death in 1474, Castile entered its last civil war of the Middle Ages. The Castilian nobility divided more or less down the middle on whom to support, either Enrique's half sister, Isabella, or his daughter, Juana, whose paternity had been widely questioned. Whereas Isabella had the support of Aragon, nobles backing Princess Juana enlisted the Portuguese king Afonso V (r. 1438–1481) by promising him Juana's hand in marriage. The decisive battle of the conflict occurred in 1476 at Toro and ended in a complete rout of Juana's forces. Nevertheless the war dragged on until the Treaty of Alcáçovas was signed in 1479, by the terms of which the Catholic Monarchs, Fernando and Isabella, were recognized as legitimate rulers of Castile.

At the end of the fifteenth century and the beginning of the sixteenth, Fernando initiated a number of reforms that ultimately transformed the Spanish army into one of the dominant and most widely feared military forces of the early modern period. These changes involved (1) conversion of a cavalry-based army typical of medieval Spanish warfare into one increasingly composed of infantry, a significant segment of which was armed with handheld gunpowder weapons (harquebuses), (2) recruitment of military professionals to take the place of the feudal host of past centuries, (3) reorganization into military units of a uniform size and composition, (4) reform of the officer corps to render it more professional and less feudal in nature, and (5) establishment of an artillery arm to rival what the French had successfully deployed in the final stages of the Hundred Years' War. Aside from the king himself, the military reforms of this period are most closely associated with a trio of men who have come to be thought of as the founding fathers of the early modern Spanish army: the theorist and first colonel of infantry Gonzalo de Ayora; the royal secretary, military engineer, and captain of artillery Francisco Ramírez de Madrid; and Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba, called "the Great Captain," whose victories in the conquest of Naples (1502–1503) marked the first appearance of this new force on the international scene. Thereafter the Spanish military

machine, centered on its infantry units known as *tercios*, became a dominant presence in European warfare for more than a century and a half.

Military Activity Overseas. A final source of military conflict affecting the kingdoms of late medieval Iberia grew out of expansionary movements on the part of Aragon, Portugal, and Castile.

Aragon. Iberian expansion beyond the peninsula began as early as 1229 when the Aragonese monarch Jaime I, "the Great" (r. 1214–1276), seized the island of Mallorca from the Moors. Much of the impetus for this and later exercises in Aragonese imperialism came from the county of Catalonia, centered on the great port city of Barcelona, whose maritime activities most benefited from expansion. In 1282, Jaime's successor, Pedro III (r. 1276–1285), took advantage of the Sicilian Vespers, an uprising of Sicily's inhabitants against Angevin rule, to seize control of the island. Although accomplished with surprising ease, this seizure led to a war pitting the Crown of Aragon against the Angevin dynasty, which still ruled the Kingdom of Naples and was aided by the Capetian monarchy of France and by the Papacy. Although this war largely petered out in 1285 when most of the major players suddenly died within a few months, endemic hostilities in southern Italy continued for another two decades.

The Aragonese movement eastward resumed in 1302 when a treaty with France ended the fighting in Sicily and threw a sizable force of Catalan mercenaries out of work. These men banded together into the Catalan Company, which took service in the Byzantine Empire's war against the Ottoman Turks in return for territorial concessions in Greece. This led to the creation of the duchies of Athens and Neopatria; these survived as eastern outposts of the Aragonese state until they were overrun by the Turks in 1388. Also in the fourteenth century the crown added Sardinia, second largest island in the western Mediterranean, to its widening empire. In 1297, in an attempt to make the Aragonese surrender Sicily, the Papacy had ceded Sardinia to Jaime II (r. 1291–1327). A generation later Jaime's son, Alfonso IV (r. 1327–1336), undertook its actual conquest (1323–1324). Throughout the long reign of Pedro IV (r. 1336–1387), intermittent conflict continued throughout the overseas holdings as Aragon strove to retain and strengthen its hold on both Mallorca and Sardinia, the latter often receiving aid and encouragement in its struggle from the nearby city of Genoa.

Early in the fifteenth century Pedro IV's two sons died without heirs. This brought to the throne of Aragon a new royal line, the Trastámaran dynasty that had ruled Castile for nearly half a century. In 1412 representatives of Aragon, Valencia, and Catalonia met at Caspe and selected as their new king Fernando de Antequera, uncle of the reigning Castilian monarch. His son, Alfonso V (r. 1416–1458), was the king who initiated Aragon's final expansion of the later Middle Ages, the conquest of the Kingdom of Naples. In return for military assistance, in 1420 Alfonso was adopted and named heir to the Naples throne by its notorious queen, Joan II. Leaving his Iberian lands to be ruled by his wife, his younger brother Juan, and a series of vice-regents, Alfonso spent the rest of his life first securing and then enjoying his inheritance.

In 1442, after two decades of fairly constant struggle, Alfonso finally defeated his French rival for the Neapolitan throne, after which he took up permanent residence in his new capital. There he established a magnificent court peopled with prominent artists and writers, compiled one of the finest libraries in Europe, and engaged in the political and military activities of Italy. Upon his death in 1458, Alfonso, widely known in Italy as "the Magnanimous," passed the Aragonese crown, including Sicily, to his brother, Juan. Meanwhile Naples, Alfonso's by right of inheritance and conquest, went to an illegitimate son, Ferrante. Not until early in the sixteenth century did the Kingdom of Naples fall back under the control of what was by then the Spanish crown.

Portugal. With the conclusion of its own *Reconquista* in the thirteenth century and the establishment of the Aviz dynasty in the fourteenth, Portugal in the fifteenth century began looking outward. In 1415 the first Aviz monarch, João I, led an attack on the North African port city of Ceuta,

across the Strait of Gibraltar from the Algarve, an event that many historians regard as the symbolic beginning of Europe's age of expansion. After having helped direct the occupation of the conquered city, in 1419 a younger son of the monarch, who became known as Henry the Navigator (Henrique o Navegador; 1394–1460), assumed the governorship of the Algarve. In 1420, from his headquarters in the castle of Sagres and the nearby port of Lagos, he began to dispatch annual expeditions down the west coast of Africa. In 1439 one of these finally rounded Cape Bojador, until then a psychological barrier to exploration. Nine years later Henry established the first permanent Portuguese trading post (factory) on Arguin Island. During the 1440s discovery of gold in West Africa, as well as an expanding trade in African slaves (known euphemistically as "black gold"), made it clear to Portugal that profits could be made from the movement.

As the Portuguese continued to push south, they concentrated their efforts on exploration, establishment of minor coastal outposts, and commerce with local inhabitants (the major source of both their gold and their slaves). To accomplish even these limited ends, military force—and in particular, Portugal's rapidly developing navy—proved necessary as a means of both overawing larger native populations and protecting Portugal's monopoly of the West African coast from potential interlopers. At the end of the century, Portuguese commitment of military force to the expansionary movement increased enormously after Vasco da Gama's successful first voyage to India (1497–1499). Da Gama returned to Portugal convinced that force would be necessary to tap into the Far Eastern trade that for centuries had been dominated by Arab merchants. Although he initiated full-scale hostilities with his 1502 naval victory over the Arabs, a slightly later clash between Portuguese and Arab fleets at Diu in 1509 came to symbolize the triumph of Western naval technology that had been evolving during the closing centuries of the Middle Ages.

Castile. Before the close of the fifteenth century, Castile's only overseas expansion involved the Canary Islands, the one Atlantic group not controlled by Portugal. Although these islands were visited by Europeans at least as early as the opening decades of the fourteenth century and were claimed by Castile in the 1340s, it was not until late in the century that their subjugation began. In 1393, Fernán Peraza and the Count of Niebla, pursuant to a royal license conferred by Enrique III, mounted an expedition against the islands, seizing a number of the local inhabitants and claiming the land for Castile by right of conquest. Throughout the fifteenth century, despite repeated local uprisings and competition from both the Genoese and the French led by Jean de Béthencourt, Castile managed to retain its hold on the Canaries. By the 1470s the islands had been thoroughly subjugated. As part of the Treaty of Alcáçovas in 1479, Portugal recognized Castilian sovereignty.

The Canary Islands became a critical jumping-off point for the Spanish voyages to the New World that began with the epic first voyage of Christopher Columbus in 1492. Columbus's brutal activities in the Caribbean, especially during his second visit (1493–1494), set the stage for Spain's military conquest of the Americas during the early modern period.

[*See also* Alfonso V of Aragon; Alfonso XI of Castile; Algeciras, Sieges of; Aljubarrota, Battle of; Antequera, Siege of; Band, Chivalric Order of the; Catalan Company; Ceuta, Siege and Battle of; Edward the Black Prince; Enrique II; Fernando de Antequera; Granada, Siege of; Hundred Years' War; Jaime I of Aragon; Jaime II of Aragon; John of Gaunt; La Rochelle, Naval Battle of; Montiel, Battle of; Muhammad V; Nájera, Battle of; Pedro I of Castile; Pedro III of Aragon; Pedro IV of Aragon; Salado, Battle of; Sicilian Vespers, The; Toledo, Siege of; Toro, Battle of; *and* Zahara, Sieges of.]

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L. J. Andrew Villalon

Historiography (500–1100)

Iberian historiography for the period 500–1100 CE includes the Visigothic, Byzantine, and Carolingian conquests in Spain, as well as the Muslim conquests and the Christian Reconquest. The majority of the works discussed below are relatively recent, but a few older works are included because they remain the best (or only) treatment of the material.

General. Before discussing distinct topics between 500 and 1100, it is useful to consider the original sources upon which the modern historiography is based, general surveys that encompass the entire period under discussion, and maps.

The primary sources for the period are discussed briefly elsewhere, but the best comprehensive examination in English of the medieval sources of Christian Spain is Peter Linehan's *History and the Historians of Medieval Spain* (1993).

Of the many general surveys of the period, three stand out as being particularly useful: Joseph F. O'Callaghan's *A History of Medieval Spain* (1975), Bernard F. Reilly's *The Medieval Spains* (1993), and Roger Collins's *Early Medieval Spain* (1983, revised in 1995). O'Callaghan provides the most comprehensive treatment (some 728 pages in the 1983 paperback edition), with useful genealogical diagrams and an extensive bibliography. Reilly's work, on the other hand, at one-third the length, is a more digestible survey, albeit with a scanty bibliography. Collins's book is more tightly focused (Reilly and O'Callaghan continue to the late fifteenth century) and provides an excellent bibliography. All three of these surveys examine political, social, economic, and military issues and are outstanding for obtaining a broad background on the period.

There are many historical atlases available, though many shortchange the Iberian Peninsula. The best in English for military history are Jonathan Riley-Smith's *The Atlas of the Crusades* (1990) and Nicholas Hooper and Matthew Bennett's *Cambridge Illustrated Atlas of Warfare: The Middle Ages* (1996). By far the best, if not available everywhere, is Fernando García de Cortázar's *Atlas de historia de España* (2005).

Visigothic Iberia. Recent interpretation of Visigothic history has tended toward an emphasis on continuity with the late Roman Empire, against which and, later, for which the Visigoths fought. Still, many of the weaknesses displayed by the Visigoths combating Roman forces continued until they were at last vanquished by the Muslims in the early eighth century. Yet although the seventh-century *History of Wamba* by Julian of Toledo details Visigothic campaigns, army organization, and siege warfare, Visigothic military affairs in Iberia from 500 to 711 are not well represented by modern monographs. Only Dionisio Pérez Sánchez's *El ejército en la sociedad visigoda* (The Army in Visigothic Society, 1989) focuses primarily on the topic. Visigothic military campaigns are obviously important in all works dealing with the period, but only in the broader sense. For details on Visigothic military organization and tactics during this period, one is left with a few pages in more general works or the odd article. Moreover, because important aspects of Visigothic political and military organization predate the arrival of the Visigoths in Spain, Herwig Wolfram's *Geschichte der Goten* (1979; English trans., *History of the Goths*, 1988) provides useful information on their military organization from the fourth century CE. Similarly, Peter Heather's *The Goths* (1996) and *The Visigoths from the Migration Period to the Seventh Century* (1999) explain Visigothic political and military organization. Arther Ferrill's *The Fall of the Roman Empire* (1986) explores Visigothic military development during the late fifth century from the viewpoint of the Romans.

The classic monograph on the Iberian Visigothic era remains E. A. Thompson's *The Goths in Spain* (1969), though an updated treatment of this period is provided by Roger Collins's *Visigothic Spain, 409–711* (2004). Both authors address military issues as well as politics and religion in Visigothic society. Thompson's work is organized along topical lines, whereas Collins's is chronologically organized. Excellent also, though focused exclusively on neither the Visigoths nor Iberia, is Guy Halsall's *Warfare and Society in the Barbarian West, 450–900* (2003). The book is important because it places the military events, tactics, and weapons of Visigothic Iberia into the larger context of post-Roman military history. Halsall's book includes Carolingian campaigns conducted in Iberia, which are also treated by Bernard S. Bachrach in several of his publications. For warfare between the Visigoths and Byzantines, see Jocelyn N. Hillgarth's *Visigothic Spain, Byzantium, and the Irish* (1985). John Haldon's *The Byzantine Wars* (2001) is only partially focused on Visigothic Spain, but it has more military emphasis. Alberto Ferreiro provides a comprehensive list of titles covering all Visigothic topics in his *Visigoths in Gaul and Spain, AD 418–711* (1988).

Muslim Iberia. Most of the literature dealing with specific Muslim military topics during this period is focused on events in the Middle East, though organization, tactics, and weapons were later relevant to the Muslim conquest of Iberia and to the subsequent caliphate. Though old, the best treatment of Muslim fortifications is still K. A. C. Creswell's article "Fortification in Islam before 1250" (1952). Robert Elgood's *Islamic Arms and Armour* (1975) is a compilation of chapters by different authors, including A. Rahman Zaky's "Medieval Arab Arms" and David Nicolle's "Arms and Warfare in Classical Islam." Nicolle's contributions to Muslim military topics also include *The Armies of Islam* (1982) and *Armies of the Muslim Conquest* (1993). David Ayalon's *Islam and the Abode of War* (1994) addresses such topics as military reform under the 'Abbasid caliph al-Mu'tasim (r. 833–842). John W. Jandora's article in *Studia Islamica* (1986) explores, as its title indicates, "Developments in Islamic Warfare: The Early Conquests." The use of slaves in Islamic armies is addressed in Daniel Pipes's *Slave Soldiers and Islam* (1981). Perhaps the most up-to-date and accessible general survey on Muslim military matters up to 936 is Hugh Kennedy's *Armies of the Caliphs* (2001).

No bibliography of the historiography of Muslim Iberia would be complete without mention of the work of one of the twentieth century's towering historians of medieval Spain, Claudio Sánchez-Albornoz's classic *La España musulmana: Según los autores islamitas y cristianos medievales* (Muslim Spain According to Medieval Islamic and Christian Authors, 1946). Five more recent works in English provide a sound background for understanding Muslim military operations in Spain. The early Muslim period is examined in Roger Collins's *The Arab Conquest of Spain, 710–797* (1989) and in 'Abdulwahid Dhanun Taha's *The Muslim Conquest and Settlement of North Africa and Spain* (1989), both of which focus on the military events of the eighth century. They both use Arabic primary sources, but Taha's bibliography and source analysis are much more comprehensive and have the additional attraction of providing the perspective of an Arab scholar.

Broader histories of Muslim Spain are Richard Fletcher's *Moorish Spain* (1992) and Hugh Kennedy's *Muslim Spain and Portugal* (1996). Both contain much information on Muslim military strategy, tactics, and even logistics while including social and cultural aspects of Muslim rule in Iberia. David Wasserstein's *The Rise and Fall of the Party-Kings* (1985) is a more narrowly focused examination of the aftermath of the disintegration of the caliphate of Córdoba.

Christian Reconquest. The vast literature on the Spanish Reconquest is best considered from two perspectives: general political-military histories and more detailed examinations of specific issues. One of the best brief surveys of the military history of the Spanish Reconquest remains Derek Lomax's *The Reconquest of Spain* (1978), in which Lomax examines each campaign and invasion from 711 until the capture of Granada in 1492. Bernard F. Reilly's *The Contest of Christian and Muslim Spain* (1992) is more narrowly focused in time but broader in scope. The first few chapters of Reilly's book concentrate on political and cultural history, but later chapters include much military history. Joseph F. O'Callaghan's *Reconquest and Crusade in Medieval Spain* (2003) examines the political-military history of the Reconquest, arguing cogently that it was as much a crusading activity as the campaigns in the Holy Land were. This point of view is not accepted by all historians, and Marcus Bull's *Knightly Piety and the Lay Response to the First Crusade* (1993), though not strictly a book about Spain, provides a useful counterargument in its second chapter, titled "The French Military Contribution in Spain 1064–c. 1130 and Its Bearing upon the Popular Ideology of the First Crusade."

From a more specialized perspective, Roger Collins addresses the formation of the new Christian kingdoms in the north of Iberia in his chapter "Spain: The Northern Kingdoms and the Basques, 711–910" in *The New Cambridge Medieval History* (1995). The subject of the depopulation and repopulation of the no-man's-land along the Duero River frontier between Christian and Muslim territory is examined in Claudio Sánchez-Albornoz's

magisterial *Despoblación y repoblación del Valle Duero* (1966). The eleventh-century epoch of El Cid is represented by several excellent works, first of which is Ramón Menéndez Pidal's venerable *The Cid and His Spain*, translated by Harold Sunderland (1934). Richard Fletcher's *The Quest for El Cid* (1989) is more accessible. One of the more recent is F. Javier Peña Pérez's *El Cid Campeador: Historia, leyenda, y mito* (The Cid: History, legend, and myth, 2000). The role of urban militias for frontier defense and as components of military power available to the monarch is examined in James F. Powers's *A Society Organized for War* (1988). The most detailed examinations of specific military campaigns are Spanish works. Ambrosio Huici Miranda's *Las grandes batallas de la Reconquista durante las invasiones africanos* (The Great Battles of the Reconquest during the African Invasions, 1956) is still one of the best, based on Christian and Arab sources. Francisco García Fitz's *Castilla y León frente al Islam: Estrategias de expansión y tácticas militares, siglos XI–XIII* (Castile and León before Islam: Strategies of Expansion and Military Tactics, 1998) is another, more up-to-date treatment, though it mostly ignores Christian-on-Christian conflict and, though later than our period of consideration (1100), the campaigns by the Crown of Aragon.

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Historiography (1100–1300)

The historiography of Iberian military affairs in the central Middle Ages is a subject that can barely exist outside the broader historiographical debates that have been ongoing throughout the twentieth century. Iberian historical studies have long been divided into schools that centered on two scholarly titans, Claudio Sánchez-Albornoz (1893–1984) and Américo Castro (1885–1972). Sánchez-Albornoz, a historian, viewed Spain and its national character as a cavalcade of peoples, languages, and cultures that was shaped by the accomplishments of the Peninsula's Roman and Visigothic civilizations. Castro, a philologist, looked on the Iberian cavalcade itself as the secret to understanding a Spanish character that was formed as a consequence of almost constant military, linguistic, and cultural conflict. Though Hispanicists have increasingly distanced themselves from this dichotomy, its bare outlines are still visible in scholarship on Spanish military affairs that tends to view martial developments in the Peninsula as the result of national or European causes.

Spanish Scholarship. Studies of Spanish military matters of the central Middle Ages have been severely affected by two political events of the twentieth century: the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) and the death of Francisco Franco (1975). Until the mid-twentieth century, historical centers across the Peninsula explored its medieval past, in general, and its seven-hundred-year-old reconquest, in particular. Regional and national scholars such as Jaime Caruana Gómez de Barreda, Antonio

Duran Gudiol, Ambrosio Huici Miranda, José María Font Rius, José Goñi Gaztambide, Julio González, José María Lacarra, Ramón Menéndez Pidal, José Antonio Maravall, Ferran Soldevilla, and Antonio Ubieto Arteta (among many others) produced many document collections and monographs concerning the reconquest from its origins in the ninth century to its great successes during the thirteenth. The influential works of this "great generation" of Spanish historians focus on such influential military figures of Castile as Alfonso VIII (1158–1214) and Fernando III (1217–1252); of Barcelona as Count Ramon Berenguer IV (1131–1162); and of Aragon as Jaime (Jaume) I (1214–1276). Their scholarship also delineated the Crusade foundation that underlay all of the reconquest expeditions; minutely discussed the era of great battles in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, in which Iberia's Christian monarchs threw off Almohad dominance; and explored the new frontier environment between the Christian states brought about by the rapid capture of so much Muslim land.

Many of these works were published under the auspices of Spain's principal academic organization, the Concejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC), and its many research centers. Though this support and the publications springing from it have continued down to the present day, the number of Iberian scholars devoted to the study of the Peninsula's medieval military developments decreased markedly after the death of Franco and have been largely replaced by students of Spain's recent past. Despite this historical paradigm-shift, important works on military history in medieval Spain have appeared recently in international journals, Spanish popular history series, and essay collections targeting an English- or French-speaking audience. Important examples of the first class are: Salvador de Moxo's article on the Castilian-Leonese nobility in the High Middle Ages, Carmela Pescador's lengthy study of popular militias in medieval Castile, Enrique Rodríguez-Picavea's treatment of the territorial administration of Iberian military orders in the High Middle Ages, and María Teresa Ferrer i Mallol's discussion of Catalan medieval military organization. Illustrative works of the second class include: David Garrido i Valls's volumes on the thirteenth-century conquests of Murcia by Aragonese sovereigns in the Catalan series Col·lecció Bofarull and Episodis de la Història and José María Lacarra's biography of Alfonso the Battler appearing in the Colección Básica Aragonesa. Important articles on medieval military affairs that have appeared in essay collections edited by American, British, and French scholars since the late twentieth century include the works of Carlos de Ayala Martínez, Francisco García Fitz, Manuel González Jímenez, Miguel Ángel Ladero Quesada, and José Manuel Rodríguez García.

American and European Scholarship. As the number of Spanish scholars focusing on Iberian military affairs slowly declined during the last decades of the twentieth century, the number of similar researchers in Europe and North America steadily increased. This increase is due to the development of first-rate academic centers at Fordham University in New York City, the University of Minnesota, the University of Toronto, and the University of California at Los Angeles that focus on medieval Spain and to the effect of scholarly organizations such as the American Association of Research Historians for Medieval Spain, the North American Catalan Society, the Mediterranean Studies Association, and the Society for Spanish and Portuguese Historical Studies. Besides bringing Hispanicists together, these groups advance Spanish studies with annual conferences and publication of proceedings. English-speaking Hispanicists researching the military history of medieval Spain have an outlet for their research in such important academic publications as the *Journal of Medieval Military History* and the *Journal of Military History*.

While much of the fighting style, strategy, and general basis of warfare adapted by Christian Spain owed much to its age-old enemy, Spanish Islam, very little modern scholarship has delved into this Muslim way of war during the High Middle Ages. Instead, most of monographs on the history of al-Andalus appearing since the mid-twentieth century have followed the well-trodden path of political history laid out so expertly in the works

of Reinhart Dozy, Charles DuFourcq, and Évariste Lévi-Provençal. Even those more recent works that deal with Andalusian military matters of the Middle Ages do so only as a part of wider treatments focusing on the interaction of Muslim and Christian populations of the era. Thus both Robert I. Burns and Thomas F. Glick have discussed in some detail the frontier districts that separated Muslim Hispania from Christian Iberia as zones that influenced matters of both strategy and fortification on both sides of this rugged border. In a 1995 book, Glick explored these connections more fully to delineate the transitional stages that marked a Spain dominated by Islam to one controlled by Islam.

Since the 1980s a number of works have continued the exploration of the effect an all-but-constant war had on both Muslim and Christian societies. James Brodman and Jarbel Rodríguez have produced studies on the process of ransoming Christian captives from their Muslim captors, either through the Order of Merced or through more circumspect and private means. Robert Burns has followed this process back to its prophylactic stage in a 1995 study on safe-conducts issued by thirteenth-century Aragonese monarchs to their Christian, Muslim, and Jewish populations, whether in the Crown of Aragon or throughout the Islamic world. Even with these attempts at reaching across frontiers, the relationship of Christian to Muslim in medieval Spain was informed by a deep-seated antipathy. Donald Kagay has discussed this mottled bond in a 1999 study on the image of the Muslim in the medieval Crown of Aragon.

Even with these varied approaches to the complex social and legal connections of the Peninsula's Christian realms to their Muslim neighbors, the military history of al-Andalus has yet to be written. Hugh Kennedy is the author of a superlative 2001 treatment of Muslim Spain's political history and he has also written extensively on military matters in the Islamic heartlands.

Much of American and European scholarship on medieval military matters in the Peninsula has, since the mid-twentieth century, concentrated on the *reconquista*, the leading military undertaking of the Iberian Christian states during the Middle Ages. The most complete and far-ranging treatments of the reconquest are Charles Bishko's extensive article in the multivolume *History of the Crusades* (1975), Marcelin Defourneaux's 1949 study on the French participation in Aragonese and Castilian campaigns against Spanish Islam, and Derek Lomax's general history of the subject in 1979. The most interesting and controversial discussion of the reconquest in the early twenty-first century was Joseph O'Callaghan's 2003 exploration of the Crusade aspects of the campaigns mounted by Christian states of Iberia throughout the medieval period. Echoing the earlier work of Robert Burns on the many crusades of Valencia, O'Callaghan traces the theory of crusading warfare and ties it expertly to each of the reconquest campaigns in medieval Spain.

Using the Aragonese and Castilian reconquest as a historical backdrop, a great number of works since the last quarter of the twentieth century focused on various topics associated with this struggle. Theresa Vann set the stage for many other reconquest studies in a seminal article that analyzes the Iberian Christian borderland with Islam as a "society organized for war." The greatest of the studies on the immediate societal effects of the reconquest are Robert Burns's connected monographs on the crusader Kingdom of Valencia. His massive *Diplomatarium* of this complex development had run into four volumes in the period 1985–2007. Bernard Reilly followed Julio González in producing studies concerning two Castilian rulers, Alfonso VI (1092–1109) and his daughter, Urraca (1109–1128), as actors in the reconquest. James Powers brought the focal point of reconquest research down to the local level with a detailed study of the operation of municipal militias that held the frontiers and served in large royal campaigns against Islamic Spain. Paul Chevedden produced an important article on the great artillery innovations that underpinned the conquests of Jaime I. He is also the author, with Robert Burns, of a 1999 study of the surrender treaties negotiated between Jaime I and the Muslim rulers and tribal leaders of Valencia.

Though the reconquest reached its culmination at approximately the same time in the thirteenth century in both Portugal and the Crown of Aragon, the latter state fashioned an extra-Peninsular military history much earlier than the former. The basic study of the complex event that propelled Aragon into Mediterranean importance, the Sicilian Vespers (1282), remains Steven Runciman's classic. The principal works on the Aragonese-Angevin maritime rivalry that grew out from the Vespers are Joseph Strayer's article on the French crusade against Aragon (1285) and Lawrence Mott's on the struggle of Aragonese and French navies across the Mediterranean between 1282 and 1302. The expeditions of Catalan mercenaries to Greece in the early fourteenth century have been thoroughly studied by Robert Burns and Alfonso Lowe. The significance of Aragon's expansion into the Mediterranean has spawned a bitter academic conflict between J. Lee Shneidman, who proposed the "empire" theory, and Jocelyn N. Hillgarth, who vigorously opposed it.

Portugal's medieval military history has remained the least studied of the Peninsular states. Besides the classic works of Carl Erdmann and Charles David, the only relatively recent work on the western realm's emergence is José Mattoso's 1988 treatment of Portuguese national origins down to 1325.

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Donald J. Kagay

Historiography (1300–1500)

Late medieval Iberian military history can appear haphazard. Outside of the Peninsula, researchers' interest has relegated it to a secondary place of interest, except when events like the Hundred Years' War intrude. Research into Spanish military events has been left to a relatively small number of researchers. The work of some, like Peter Edward Russell, Elena Lourie, Julian Bishko, Joseph F. O'Callaghan, and James Powers, remains highly influential, perhaps too much so. Yet the perception among many English and American military historians still is of Iberia as a historical lacuna.

Within Spain, on the contrary, there has been no such lack of coverage. For those with the language skills, the steady stream of military history research has never abated, especially since the 1990s. However, the Spanish academic and research community is highly divided and regionalized. In one aspect, this is advantageous, for it has led to the production of many good localized studies. Unfortunately, on the other hand, works with a global or even national perspective tend to be the exception.

Serious research into Spanish medieval military history stretches back to the nineteenth century. The many conflicts then stimulated interest in the history of the Hispanic armed forces. Even though these researchers such as Francisco Barado, J. Arantegui y Sans, and José Almirante laid a foundation for future studies, their principal focus was finding in medieval armies the precursor to modern ones. Their work was permeated by a characteristic disdain for the Middle Ages as a period of stagnation, perhaps tempered by admiration for the medieval knight's romantic image. In a nationalist vein, Spanish historians stressed the importance of the reconquest in the creation of national character, while dismissing Jewish and Muslim cultures as foreign. In general, they fell into the contradiction of arguing that the reconquest impeded the consolidation of a Spanish feudal system, specifically in Castile, while at the same time stressing the knight's dominance. Medieval Spanish forces were characterized as dominated by heavy cavalry that would later be displaced by infantry and technology such as gunpowder artillery.

Despite some excesses such as their belief in the existence of one Spanish nationality and the

omission of regional, cultural, and political differences, they succeeded in establishing two influential key themes. The first was the entrenchment of the reconquest as a dominant process in shaping Castilian territorial and cultural identity. The second was that the constant presence of a hostile Muslim frontier gave the Iberian Peninsula a unique character whose clearest expression was found in the long-lasting urban militias. Spain was thus a society different from and more broadly militarized than the rest of Europe.

The Reconquest. Even though the reconquest remains central in Spanish military historiography, it is no longer viewed as a singular, unified process. This brings up several issues. The first is related to chronology. The first half of the thirteenth century, especially after Las Navas de Tolosa (1212), saw the great Castilian southern expansion, leaving only a much reduced Muslim Granada. Despite that, the period from 1300 to 1350 constitutes the last phase of that great expansion, even if the territorial gains were small. Thus, the first half of the fourteenth century formed an extension of an earlier process. Second, the reconquest stalled during most of the fourteenth century, due to the *Guerra de los Dos Pedros* (War of the Two Pedros) between Castile and Aragon and the Castilian civil war between Pedro I (r. 1350–1366/69) and Enrique II of Trastamara (r. 1366/69–1379), and into the fifteenth century. Rather than a continual, monolithic progression, the reconquest occurred in spurts, with the last being the Granadan conquest. Third, reconquest and crusade have often been seen as synonymous, even though the relationship between the two is much more complex. Yet the important place of the reconquest within Iberian ideology and propaganda is undeniable.

The most important modern authors on the reconquest and the era of warfare spawned from it are: (1) Derek Lomax, whose *The Reconquest of Spain* is the best treatment of this topic in English, (2) Joseph F. O'Callaghan's ongoing project in delineating how the reconquest and the crusade both overlapped and remained separate in medieval Spain, and (3) the various articles of Antonio Gutiérrez de Velasco, Maria Teresa Ferrer i Mallol, and Donald Kagay and L. J. Andrew Villalon on the War of the Two Pedros. Because the latter war was so intertwined with the Hundred Years' War, several articles relating to it can be found in the two volumes on that subject edited by Villalon and Kagay.

A good sense of the military structures of the Peninsula in the fourteenth century can be gained from Nicolas Agrait's study of Castilian military reform from 1312 to 1350. For the problems of financing war in this era, Donald Kagay's study of the Crown of Aragon in the War of the Two Pedros provides a valuable case study. The important roles of foreign mercenaries and interventionary forces are treated in Peter Russell (1955) and Kenneth Fowler (2001). The last-mentioned topic connects to the late-fourteenth-century war of Portuguese independence, which culminated in the decisive battle of Aljubarrota, which is important to broader medieval military history particularly because of the excavations of the battlefield. The fullest treatment of the battle is a recent book in Portuguese by a team headed by João Gouveia Monteiro, but Monteiro's shorter treatment in the *Journal of Medieval Military History* will be ample for most readers.

The Christian-Muslim Frontier. The existence of the frontier with the Muslims, however, remains one of the most important themes. This is understandable since one can debate the use of the reconquest construct, but there was an actual physical frontier in southern Iberia. Yet even this has to be qualified. First, the period from roughly 1275 to 1350 has been labeled the *Guerra del Estrecho* (War for the Strait) in which Castile fought and defeated Morocco and Granada for dominance of the Strait of Gibraltar. In this particular case, researchers such as Miguel Manzano Rodríguez, Francisco García Fitz, and Manuel Rojas have been able to delve into the issues of defense networks, diplomacy, tactics, and grand strategy. Although it may be an open issue at the popular level, Spanish specialists, like their counterparts elsewhere, have demonstrated the existence of grand strategy during the Middle Ages and moved on.

Even as the reconquest stalled, frontier conflict and coexistence continued. As expected, historians of Castile, Portugal, Navarre, Valencia, and

Catalonia have paid considerable attention to border issues. Frontier warfare and coexistence were constant concerns among all, often exploding into serious armed conflicts. Along with the ever-present frontier forces, the other important area addressed by Iberian historians is the use of castles and fortifications to create defensive webs along the frontiers between the different realms. The longest was the one along the Castilian-Granadan border, with warfare consisting of raids and difficult sieges rather than battles.

The principal works on the conquest and resettlement of frontier regions such as Alicante, Castile, and Murcia are those by Manuel González Jiménez, Juan-Manuel del Estal, and Juan Torres Fontes.

It is also important to note that because Granada was surrounded by Castile from 1300 to 1492, the other Christian kingdoms were forced to direct their attentions elsewhere. Navarre, the weakest and the constant target of intrigues, was mostly concerned with survival. Portugal, when not engaged in direct conflict with Castile, concentrated on securing its borders and then looked to the Atlantic as its area of expansion. Aragon-Catalonia, after conceding Murcia to Castile, set its sights on the Mediterranean. It conquered the Balearics, invaded Sardinia, and established the so-called Catalan Company that carved out its own kingdom in Greece. In spite of the distance, the Crown of Aragon established a true Mediterranean empire.

The most important recent authors dealing with Portuguese and Aragonese territorial advances during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries are: (1) Peter Russell, *Prince Henry 'the Navigator': A Life*; (2) Alfonso Lowe, *The Catalan Vengeance*; (3) Antonio Arribas Palau, *La conquista de Cerdena por Jaime II de Aragón*; and (4) J. N. Hillgarth, *The Problem of a Catalan Mediterranean Empire, 1229–1327*.

Finally, this was a period of change for the Spanish military forces. One tendency has been to credit Alfonso XI (r. 1312–1350) with having revolutionized military practice. Even so, the changes were evolutionary, showing the culmination of earlier developments. Another has been to continue emphasizing the urban militias even though their composition and significance were much changed from earlier. In this sense, the driving idea is that Spain was different from the rest of Europe, though the recruitment and funding mechanisms tend to be similar. Another important issue was the adoption of gunpowder artillery, along with the creation of artillery corps in the fifteenth century. However, the use of gunpowder weaponry proved difficult to harness for the Christians until the unification of Castile and Aragon under the Catholic Kings. It would then be a deciding factor in the fall of Granada.

The principal authors dealing with military developments in Castile and Aragon during the last century of medieval history in Spain are: (1) the several articles and monographs by Miguel Angel Ladero Quesada on military developments of the Granada war; (2) Maria Teresa Ferrer i Mallol, "La organización militar de Cataluña"; and (3) Weston F. Cook, "The Cannon Conquest of Nasrid Spain and the End of the Reconquista." In English, one can also consult the doctoral dissertations of Paul Stewart and Barbara Holmgren Firoozye.

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Nicolás Agrait

ICE, BATTLE OF THE

See Peipus, Battle of Lake.

IMMUNITY FROM WAR

The need for immunities in wartime, which suggests an appreciation of the difference—moral, physical, and practical—between armed men or soldiers and the unarmed (*inermes* in Latin), emerged toward

the end of the first millennium of the Christian era with the advance of armed forces, mainly from the east of Europe, with the decline of royal and princely authority, and with the fragmentation of territory that coincided with the breakdown of the Carolingian world. The invasions, characterized by prolonged periods of raids aimed at securing prisoners and booty, showed the vulnerability of those who had no means of defending themselves against the attackers. In Europe itself, local rivalries and feuds, encouraged by the decline of effective temporal power, particularly in Francia (the lands of the Franks), led to much conflict characterized by wanton destruction wreaked on the lands of an enemy and on its populations. Steps were needed to put an end to this.

Into this vacuum stepped the church, its clergy frequently victims of violence, its lands ravaged, and its moral standing threatened. In 989 at a local council held at Charroux, near Poitiers, it was decided to try to limit private war through the application of spiritual sanctions, such as anathemas and excommunication, against those breaking into churches, injuring the clergy, and robbing the poor. Some years later, in 1027, this approach—the *Pax Dei*, or Peace of God—was replaced by another, the *Treuga Dei*, or Truce of God, at the Council of Toulouges; this truce banned fighting on certain days and during certain seasons of the year. In about 1140, reflecting the slowly growing movement to control the incidence of war and violence, Gratian in his *Decretum*, or great collection of canon law decisions, included several canons forbidding attacks on clergy and undefended noncombatants. In 1179 Canon 21 of the Third Lateran Council formally promulgated such protection to Christendom as a whole.

It is clear that between the twelfth and fifteenth centuries an awareness of the need for recognized immunity from the violence of war was increasingly coming to be regarded as important. What began as "spiritual" protection became, by the thirteenth century, protection provided by canon law, based on the notion that the granting of immunity to certain groups helped promote the public good. By this time the distinction between "soldier" and "noncombatant" was becoming better defined. War, it was argued, should be limited to fighting between armed men. The unarmed should be treated with respect, and their lives, if not always their property, should be spared. So the list of those protected from acts of war grew longer, to include the rural populations (who worked the land for the common benefit), merchants (on whom trade depended), pilgrims (often distinguished by the badge that they wore), women, and students traveling to study in the growing number of centers of learning, as well as ambassadors and heralds. Truces protected those within a certain area for a particular period of time. Safe conducts protected the holder against acts of war but were only as effective as was the power of the grantor to see their terms observed.

The value of an immunity was enhanced by advances in thinking regarding the "just" war, which maintained that those engaged in war must act in a "just" manner toward all those with whom they had contact. So far as possible, war's violence should be limited to those recruited and armed to carry it out. Those occupied in peaceful occupations from whose activities society as a whole benefited should be protected from war. The same went for ambassadors and the heralds who often worked with them. Both had functions to perform in the maintenance of contacts between warring parties, which merited immunity for those who carried them out. The white wand carried by the herald served as an outward sign of the immunity granted to him on the grounds that he worked for peace and for the benefit of society as a whole.

What this meant was that those not actively giving help or succor to an army should be respected by its enemies. But as times changed, so the issue became more complex. As the task of defending developing societies fell increasingly on formally constituted armies, the role played by those not actively taking up arms also assumed a greater importance. The paying of taxes to support an army at war, the manufacture of arms, or the growing of food: were not those acts furthering war, albeit indirectly? If so, should those involved be given immunity from the violence of war? Put briefly, could the noncombatant be

entirely isolated from war? Was it not legitimate to destroy the enemy's crops to undermine morale and reduce his ability to pay taxes to support a war? It was becoming increasingly difficult to view the matter of immunity in simple, straightforward terms. As the writings of the canonist Honoré Bouvet demonstrate, the issues were no longer clear-cut.

Yet when viewed over centuries, the definition and recognition of immunities were a huge advance. Endeavoring, in the search for efficiency, to impose order and control on their soldiers, rulers tried to insist that the rights of those with immunities also be fully respected. Military discipline was tightened, through the setting up of special courts and through the publication of ordinances of war, such as those issued by Richard II and Henry V of England, in an attempt to win hearts by insisting on a stricter observance of the laws of war, in particular those involving immunities. Accustomed as they were to wartime "atrocities," such as the burning and looting of property, chroniclers and others who reflected public opinion were happy to recognize the effective control exercised by certain commanders over their soldiers and to give them credit for it. Still, the problems created by the recognition of certain immunities could not be separated from the way that war was fought at a particular time or from the weapons then in use. That the problems were recognized, however, was part of the solution to the difficulties that such immunities created.

[*See also* Heralds and Heraldry; Just War, Just Motive; Laws of War and Just Conduct of War; Noncombatants in Armies; *and* Peace and Truce of God.]

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INCENDIARIES

Although we know that all ancient civilizations used fire in their wars, it was the substance now known as "Greek fire" that was one of the first controllable and effective incendiaries. Possibly invented by Kallinikos of Heliopolis, it was used by the Byzantine fleet against Arab attacks on Constantinople between 671 and 678 CE. It was probably made from undistilled petroleum and squirted out under pressure much like the material in a modern flamethrower, but little is known about it in detail and references are few, confirming the belief that it was kept a closely guarded secret.

In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries crusaders encountered a weapon that they called "Greek fire," but now the liquid was held in glass or earthenware containers that were thrown by hand or by trebuchet-like machines. That it was being used extensively in the Middle East is evident from a report in 1168 that twenty thousand barrels of a flammable liquid, probably some form of petroleum, were used to burn down the city of Cairo. Though it is not always clear, there is evidence that burning mixtures composed of resins, oil, asphalt, and lime were also used.

Whether the crusaders brought knowledge of these incendiaries back to Europe is uncertain, since there is little evidence for incendiary devices in Western Europe before the so-called *Feuerwerkbücher* (fireworks books) of the fifteenth century. These contain many recipes for burning mixtures and illustrations of various devices, including fire arrows, fire barrels, fire rings, and incendiary balls. They differ fundamentally from the earlier incendiaries, however, as they are based on exploiting the property of gunpowder when it is highly compressed or mixed with other ingredients.

Although there are contemporary recipes and illustrations, there is little evidence for the actual use of incendiaries in warfare in this period. Contemporary illustrations do show incendiary devices being used by both besiegers and the besieged in attacks on fortifications; "twenty-five *fusees* to throw Greek Fire" are recorded as having been taken to the siege of Chinon in 1412. Although it is clear that many types of incendiary devices were produced over the later medieval period—some thrown by hand, particularly from walls, and others fired from cannon, longbows, or crossbows—no incendiary weapons survive from before the seventeenth century, making them difficult to study.

[*See also* Greek Fire; Gunpowder; Treatises, Byzantine; *and* Weapons, *subentry on* Byzantine.]

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INDAGO

Indago (Latin, plural: *indagines*; Hungarian: *gyepü*) is a term referring to a special defensive system of the frontiers of a tribal confederation or a (nomadic) state. The *gyepü* derives from the Hungarian word *gyep*, meaning the uncultivated, uninhabited land that separated different areas. Documentary evidence shows the existence of uninhabited territories in the fifth to ninth centuries between the lands of the Huns and their neighbors, between the Franks and the Avars, between the Patzinaks and the Khazars, and between the Patzinaks and the Slavs. After the Landtaking, that is, the settlement of the Hungarian tribes in the Danube Basin in the late ninth century, no forts in the strict sense of the word were erected, but according to nomadic custom, a no-man's-land, called *gyepüelve* ("the land over the gyepü"), was established along the frontiers of the nascent state. The earth was scorched over an area of a two days' march. In the eleventh to twelfth centuries the *indagines* consisted of logs, ditches, and hedges, which blocked the routes leading to the kingdom and impeded any enemy incursion. The defense of the *indagines* was entrusted to light mounted troops (Latin: *sagittarii*; Hungarian: *lövők*) raised from among the military auxiliary peoples (especially Szeklers and Pechenegs/Patzinaks) who joined the Hungarians during their migration, and to a group of castle folk called "guards" (Latin: *speculatores*; Hungarian: *őrök*), whose main task was obviously reconnaisance. Despite a lack of documentary evidence, the traces of this defensive system can be explored primarily with the help of toponyms (e.g., Oberwart and Unterwart in Austria, or Őrség "guardsmen" in western Hungary).

[*See also* Auxiliary Peoples, Military; Avars; Hungary, *subentry on* Narrative (500–1000); Huns; Khazars; Patzinaks; *and* Szeklers.]

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INFANTRY

Soldiers who fight only on foot—as opposed to cavalrymen, who are able to fight from horseback—are termed "infantry." Cavalry service in the Middle Ages was the norm for the well-off for two simple reasons: (1) horses are expensive to purchase and to maintain, and (2) medieval soldiers almost always had to provide their own equipment, including mounts. Both the common folk of the countryside and the mass of the urban militias served as infantry. Hence medieval armies often comprised more infantry

than cavalry, although because of their relative lack of armor and martial skill, the foot soldiers were often of little value in battle—beyond providing a hedge behind which the cavalry could form up and wait for the right time to charge. Yet men on foot were very important in the conduct of siege warfare—which was much more common than open battle—and could contribute to the work of devastating enemy territory.

The main infantry weapons were spears, pikes, bows, and crossbows, although a variety of other arms were used. In particular, heavy striking weapons, such as Danish axes or halberds, were often interspersed with longer polearms in the front rank; the heavy striking weapons could hit hard against charging horsemen checked by the polearms. With some exceptions, medieval infantrymen before the fourteenth century were typically unarmored or very lightly armored, although they were often provided with wooden shields. The rising wealth of society meant that in the late Middle Ages, some foot soldiers, particularly those drawn from urban levies, were better protected—for example, with mail hauberks or jacks made of many small iron plates. Even before then, some well-armed professional infantry soldiers were highly effective, but their numbers were relatively small.

Historical Survey. Some of the Germanic invaders of the western Roman Empire in the fifth and sixth centuries used effective cavalry. But because their military system was based on the idea that every man was a warrior, naturally their armies were based on infantry. Agathias wrote of the Franks, for example, that "they do not serve on horseback. Fighting on foot is their national custom, and they are very good at it." Yet by the middle of the ninth century, wars were fought primarily by cavalry. It was then that the vassals developed as a class through the rise of the feudal system: the principal free men served on horseback, and the common people held an inferior position. This state of affairs greatly influenced the military role of ordinary people, and nearly everywhere in western Europe the foot soldiers declined in military importance. The vassals, who served as armored cavalry, were in fact living on the labor of the rural population, and the more powerful they became, the less chance there was of making useful foot soldiers out of the peasants.

But there were a few exceptions. The most conspicuous were the foot soldiers of the Anglo-Saxons. Their housecarls (huscarls) and thanes (thegns), who had social and economic status comparable to that of knights, moved about on horseback but fought on foot. They had the necessary sense of unity and the means to arm themselves properly, in contrast to poor peasants on the Continent. After they had been defeated at Hastings by William the Conqueror in 1066, however, good foot soldiers also disappeared. (The knights and sergeants who replaced them were cavalrymen, although when the tactical circumstances called for it, they were willing and able to fight well on foot.) Other examples of effective infantry on the European continent include the men of the autonomous peasant republics in Friesland, in the Dithmarschen, and among the Stedinger on the Weser. The last were defeated in 1234 at Altenersch, and they were completely subjugated by the archbishop of Bremen and his allies. Italian and Spanish townsmen of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries also sometimes proved effective foot soldiers, as did the Catalan *almugavars* who served in the War of the Sicilian Vespers and then under Roger de Flor in the Catalan Company. Those Catalans were among the very best infantrymen known to history; the most famous examples of peasant foot soldiers, however, come from Switzerland.

Swiss Foot Soldiers. In the second half of the thirteenth century the inhabitants of the Swiss valleys had become rich enough to buy their freedom from serfdom, and this was followed by a quick fusion with the free inhabitants. The principal economic activity in this region was cattle raising. In these mountain valleys with little fertile soil, the common meadow formed a strong bond among the inhabitants. In such a small area the able-bodied men could be assembled in a few hours. Relatively protein-rich diets and the prosperity that came with expanding trans-Alpine trade—allowing for the

purchase of some crossbows, helmets, and armor—contributed also to the effectiveness of these men as soldiers.

The freight traffic over the Gotthard pass to Italy and France brought the peasants not only extra profits but also, through the peasants' contact with the merchants, exposure to new ideas. The peasants were also in constant touch with the north Italian cities, and they well understood the struggle of those communities for freedom and independence, as well as the role of communal militias in warfare. There was too little fertile soil in the forest cantons to support a rapidly expanding population. This led not only to the seizure of other valleys from the monasteries in the surrounding area but also to military service as mercenaries in Italy and in the neighboring districts. Soldiers from Schwyz and Uri fought for the abbot of Saint Gall in 1252 and for the baron of Vatz ten years later. In Italy they learned tactics from the foot soldiers from the communal armies. The soldiers of the forest cantons even seemed to enjoy fighting, just as contemporary nobles often did. Their remarkable talents in this direction were put to work in their powerful drive for independence. Their native ferocity and lust for gain made them very aggressive warriors with an indomitable offensive spirit. They began to be highly regarded after their victories in the pass of Morgarten (1315) and at Laupen (1339), and they reached the peak of their fame with the series of defeats they inflicted on Charles the Bold of Burgundy in the late fifteenth century.

Friesland. In Friesland, just as in the Swiss cantons, there was a *universitas* or defensive community, which was upheld by a solemn oath taken by the peasants. These free peasants were occupied in cattle raising, trade, and shipping, and in Friesland, just as in Switzerland, they had always had the right to bear arms. Through the general rise in the standard of living in the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries, the free peasants had considerably improved their armament. The Frisians also liked fighting, and the virtual political independence of these countries, with the unhindered development of the social and economic life of the free communities, had greatly contributed to the population's fighting potential.

The terrain was not favorable to knightly armies on account of the mountains and damp valleys in the Swiss cantons and the marshes in Friesland. Because of the peculiar geographical situation, the Frisians, like the Swiss, did not have powerful neighbors to fear. The crumbling of the imperial might, and the favorable political situation in the Holy Roman Empire, helped them toward autonomy; in Friesland and Switzerland, the power of the central authority never became strong. A true knightly class never existed; at least, what there was of such a class never gained much strength. Dithmarschen was in a similar position. Hence the infantry of the region was able to defeat the nobility of Holstein at Oldenwöhrden in 1319 and in the Hamme pass in 1404.

Welsh Foot Soldiers. Foot soldiers from Wales also became famous. The lightly armed fighters from southern Wales were probably the most renowned. Their speed and flexibility, as well as the accuracy of their bows, were extolled.

The Welsh provided mercenaries for the kings of England. In the first battle of Lincoln in 1141, Welsh soldiers fought against King Stephen and were "daring rather than skilled in the handling of weapons." They fought for the barons of the Welsh marches in their conquest of Ireland. In his wars against the Scots, Henry II used light soldiers from Wales. On the European continent these soldiers aided Henry against his sons, and in 1188 they helped him fight against Philip II Augustus. In addition King Richard had Welsh soldiers in his army when he fought the king of France. In the revolt of the barons against Henry III, Llywelyn of Wales sent Simon de Montfort many Welsh troops. After the late-thirteenth-century conquest of Wales by Edward I, Welsh archers were often a large component of English kings' infantry forces.

South Wales was the cradle of the famous longbowmen. The men of Gwent and Morgannwg (Glamorgan) excelled as archers. Gerald of Wales described seeing the head of a Welsh arrow that had pierced an oak door four inches thick.

The bows from Gwent were not made of horn, ash, or yew, but of unpolished elm, which looked very rough. These elm bows were stiff, broad, and powerful—good at long or short range. Gerald strongly recommended that archers should always cooperate with knights in expeditions into Wales and Ireland, where the terrain was so difficult for knights that lightly armed men were particularly useful. In their wars against the Welsh and the Scots, the English kings found the best combinations of archers and men-at-arms in the battles of Dupplin Moor (1332) and Halidon Hill (1333). Their English longbowmen became some of the best archers known to history, and they contributed greatly to the series of French disasters during the Hundred Years' War from Bergerac (1346), Crécy (1346), and Poitiers (1356) to Agincourt (1415) and Verneuil (1424). By this time soldiers were being paid, and it is noteworthy that a foot-archer's wage was only a quarter the cost of a mounted man-at-arms.

Scottish Foot Soldiers. The Scots were mostly lightly armed soldiers who wore short kilts and carried spear and shield or a broad sword. Their ferocity was not always to their advantage, as appeared at the battle of Northallerton (also known as the battle of the Standard, 1138) when they successfully demanded the right to attack first. With the cry "Albanach! Albanach!" they stormed the "iron wall" of the English battle lines but were repulsed.

In 1296, Edward I of England successfully invaded Scotland and passed through the Highlands. At Scone he removed the sacred stone on which the kings of Scotland had been crowned for centuries and sent it to Westminster. The Kingdom of Scotland was annexed to the Kingdom of England. In July 1297 the Scots under William Wallace defeated the weak English garrison on 11 September near Stirling Bridge. Wallace had taken up his position on a steep wooded height, about two hundred yards behind a stream over which there was a narrow bridge. The English commander, John de Warenne, seventh Earl of Surrey, advanced over the bridge and marched on the enemy, even though Sir Richard Lundy had advised him to cross the river at a shallow spot. When the English vanguard and some of the foot soldiers had crossed the stream, Wallace suddenly launched a counterattack with the Scottish pikemen. One unit gained control of the bridge and another attacked the English vanguard, who were either trampled underfoot or flung into the river. It was a resounding victory for the Scots. After this the Scots even made raids into Cumberland and Northumberland.

In the following year King Edward I of England came back from Flanders and marched out against the Scottish rebels with a large army. He won a great victory at Falkirk on 22 July 1298. Once again Wallace had chosen a favorable site on a hilltop, with a wood close behind his army. But this time, making use of infantry of his own, Edward's tactics were adapted to defeat the Scottish infantry. The Scottish pikemen again proved able to withstand direct cavalry charges, but after the English used archery to break up their formations, the horsemen were able to break into the schiltroms and massacre the Scots. This costly defeat still did not end the Scottish resistance, and at Bannockburn in 1314 the Scottish infantry inflicted the worst defeat suffered by a royal English army since Hastings.

Assessment. Although historians such as Bernard Bachrach and Bryce Lyon have argued that medieval infantry was never markedly inferior to cavalry, their thesis cannot be sustained. Considering that high medieval commanders normally brought large numbers of foot soldiers to the field, infantry was clearly important. Nevertheless the frequency with which they left the infantry behind and conducted operations with all-mounted forces shows which of the two principal combat arms they considered truly indispensable. From the late thirteenth century on, infantry rose in importance and began to equal, and then surpass, the horsemen.

[*See also* Armies, *subentry on* Organization; Armor, Body; Cavalry; Mercenaries; *and* Recruitment.]

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J. F. Verbruggen

INFANTRY, MOUNTED

Horses can give their riders important advantages, both at the tactical level (in actual combat) and at the operational level of war (as armies march through the theater of war). A mounted man could travel farther and faster over the course of a campaign and had an even bigger edge for shorter movements of up to a hundred miles or so. More miles per day meant more opportunities to spread devastation during ravaging operations. Even an inexpensive horse could serve for these purposes. To fight effectively from horseback as a cavalryman, however, took special skill and a specially trained and very expensive warhorse (one that might typically cost five to ten times as much as a basic riding horse). Moreover, some very effective weapons, including two-handed axes, longbows, and crossbows, were not suited to mounted combat.

Medieval cavalrymen—those trained, equipped, and mounted to fight from horseback—often chose to dismount and fight on foot when tactical circumstances required. Mounted infantry, on the other hand, were soldiers who used horses only for transportation and not for fighting. Anglo-Saxon thanes, for example, seem to have been in this category—though some argue they were cavalrymen—and the Vikings they fought often mounted themselves on plundered horses, but rarely if ever fought from horseback. Perhaps the most famous and effective mounted infantry of the Middle Ages were the archers who drew their longbows in the service of the English monarchs of the Hundred Years' War. The example they provided is one reason that the standing compagnies d'ordonnance created in France, Burgundy, and Brittany in the middle to late fifteenth century included large numbers of mounted infantry.

[*See also* Cavalry; Compagnies d'Ordonnance; Thane (Thegn); *and* Vikings.]

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ISAAC I KOMNENOS

(c. 1007–1060), Byzantine emperor (1057–1059). Isaac I reigned for only two years: crowned on 1 September 1057, he abdicated on 21/22 November 1059. Born around 1007 into an army family and motherless since infancy, Isaac was entrusted to the tutelage of the emperor, Basil II, by his ailing father, a senior commander. Isaac was, with his brother John, lodged in Constantinople's Stoudios monastery while training for the cavalry. Isaac was assigned to various commands, including the Byzantine province known as "Iberia," in northwest Armenia, and the former Armenian realm of Vaspurakan, east of Lake Van; both regions had been annexed by Byzantium earlier in the eleventh century. A courageous field commander and avid huntsman, he was highly respected in Byzantium's eastern provinces. By 1055 he was commander in chief of the eastern forces; although dismissed by the empress, Theodora, he stayed loyal to the state. At Easter in 1057, Isaac went

with Katakalon Kekaumenos and other top generals to the court reception of Theodora's successor, Michael VI Stratiotikos, expecting to receive higher court titles. Instead, Michael lambasted them, without a good word even for Isaac, their leader. Remonstrations were rebuffed, so the shocked generals swore vengeance before returning to their various bases or provincial homes.

Plans were, however, ill-coordinated and the blinding of one general suspected (correctly) of complicity made the other conspirators fearful. Isaac, well connected both in military circles and with leading families in Constantinople, was acclaimed emperor on June 8. Kekaumenos, after some hesitation, wholeheartedly committed to Komnenos and set about winning over regiments quartered in northeast Asia Minor. In a pitched battle near Nicaea, the loyalist army initially prevailed on the right wing and Isaac, in the center, prepared to flee. The day was saved by Kekaumenos's breakthrough on the left wing and sack of the enemy encampments: demoralized, many loyalists were killed or captured. Inside the capital an uprising broke out, instigated by Komnenos's sympathizers, but fanned by Patriarch Michael I Keroularios. Michael Stratiotikos stepped down, and Isaac was ferried across the Bosporus to Constantinople, and crowned by the patriarch in Hagia Sophia.

Emperor Isaac proclaimed his own martial prowess through coin designs portraying him with sword unsheathed, provoking criticism that he claimed to owe the throne not to God's grace but the sword. He sought to increase tax revenues while cutting expenditures on dignities and, even, on the army, raising the risk of further rebellions. Isaac assumed personal command of operations to the north of Constantinople, having—according to Michael Psellos, the courtier and leading intellectual who wrote an eyewitness account of Isaac's coup d'état and reign—halted Turkish raids on the eastern provinces. In 1059 Isaac led a massive expedition against the Hungarians, who were colluding with Pecheneg invaders. The Hungarians, overawed, agreed to terms and the Pechenegs scattered, leaving their tents to be ransacked.

Isaac's victory was, however, a hollow one, such warfare being asymmetrical. On their way back from the Danube, Byzantine troops suffered heavy losses from a snowstorm; subsequently, many were drowned in a swollen river. While out hunting soon after his return to Constantinople, Isaac fell ill and nominated another well-connected commander for emperor, Constantine X Doukas. Isaac became a monk in the Stoudios monastery, dying in 1060. Isaac's bullheadedness in attempting reforms registered the magnitude of the fiscal and strategic problems facing Byzantium, under pressure from Normans in southern Italy, as well as from nomads and Turks.

[*See also* Katakalon Kekaumenos.]

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ISAAC II ANGELOS

(1156–1204), Byzantine emperor (1185–1195). Isaac Angelos, son of Theodora, the sister of John II, came to power as the candidate of aristocrats opposed to Andronikos II, who were shocked into action by the fall of Thessalonika to the Normans. Isaac was charged first with the recovery of Thessalonika and the restoration of Byzantine control in the western Balkans. This he achieved, through the victory of his general Alexios Branas at the battle

of Strymon. However, matters worsened swiftly as a Vlach-Bulgar rebellion led to the emergence of a new, "second" Bulgarian empire north of the Balkan mountains, in 1185–1186. The Serbs also looked to free themselves and in this were aided by the passage of the Third Crusade through the northern Balkans in 1189. Niketas Choniates, our main source for Isaac's reign, is well informed on these events since, at that time, he was governor of the city of Philippopolis. Choniates notes that Isaac was first commanded to restore the city's walls in preparation for Frederick I Barbarossa's arrival, but later instructed to demolish them to prevent the Germans from using the city as a fortified encampment.

In the aftermath of the crusade, Isaac returned to the Balkan mountains, from which the Vlachs and their Cuman allies launched unremitting assaults. Isaac was unable to engage them in pitched battle, and withdrawing in haste, he led his army into an ambush in a narrow defile. Many men and pack animals were crushed by rocks thrown down upon them. The emperor barely escaped to Berrhoia, and the defeat seems to have affected him deeply. He entrusted future campaigns to relatives who frequently betrayed him, making bids for power following the slightest success. Meanwhile, the Vlachs and Bulgars made unprecedented advances. Whereas previously they had attacked villages and fields, now they advanced against cities. They captured Anchialos, took Varna by force, and advanced on Sardica, where they razed the greater part of the city. Bulgaria was never recovered, and in 1195, Isaac was overthrown by his own brother, Alexios III Angelos.

[*See also* Frederick I Barbarossa.]

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Paul Stephenson

ISABELLA I OF CASTILE

See Catholic Monarchs, The.

ITALY

[*This entry contains nine subentries, on Italian sources from 476–1000, 1000–1300, and 1300–1493; an overview of Italian military history from 476–1000, 1000–1300, and 1300–1493; and on Italian historiography from 476–1000, 1000–1300, and 1300–1493.*]

Sources (476–1000)

The Italian Peninsula has always maintained a high degree of culture and a strong capacity for the transmission and reproduction of Roman literary models. Even for the early Middle Ages, therefore, there are sufficient narrative sources, even if, as in the other regions of Europe, the majority of these do not provide detailed information on the organization of armies or on strategies and tactics.

Literary Sources. For the Roman-Barbaric ages, the succinct *Getica* (History of the Goths) by Jordanes is useful for the reconstruction of events of war. The writer Flavius Magnus Aurelius Cassiodorus prepared letters for King Theodoric the Great (r. 474–526), which frequently contain orders to local officials with regard to preparing military campaigns, guaranteeing the defense of the territory, organizing the sending of reinforcements and new supplies to troops garrisoned in bordering areas, and maintaining discipline. Though not a very satisfying source from the point of view of the history of tactics and the conduct of campaigns, it is a rich source for the reconstruction of military administration and the functioning of the chains of command.

In his military narration of the Greco-Gothic War (535–554), the Byzantine chronicler Prokopios of Caesarea is extremely detailed, following the best classical tradition. Prokopios worked with first-hand sources and supplied a great quantity of reliable reports both on the organization of armies and on the developments of battles, even if at times his

personal sympathies influenced his judgment on the individual commanders.

In Lombard Italy there was an interruption in the production of written documentation; from the end of the sixth century to the middle of the seventh contemporary testimonies are almost completely absent. The principal source for the period is the *History of the Lombards*, composed by the monk Paul the Deacon after the Frankish invasion (774) to convey the glory of the Lombard kingdom, by then vanished. It is difficult to evaluate the credibility of Paul the Deacon for the older periods, for which he based his work mostly on oral traditions that are impossible to verify. He narrates, for example, a long siege of Pavia by King Alboin between 569 and 571, the plausibility of which has been recently put in doubt, considering that it seems to have come from a literary reproduction of the campaign of Theodoric against Odoacer at Ravenna. Starting with the second half of the seventh century, however, Paul's narration is more assured and credible, not to mention rich enough in detail to both illuminate the conduct of military operations and supply clues on the organization of forces. Unfortunately the work ends with the reign of Liutprand (r. 712–744). Since Paul considered Liutprand the apogee of Lombard power, he neglected the final thirty years of the state and the crucial period of military and political conflict with the Franks.

Another source for the situation in Italy straddling the sixth and seventh centuries are the letters of Pope Gregory I (the Great, r. 590–604), which contain information both on the organization of the defense of territories that remained Byzantine and on the operations of war against the Lombards.

For the years following the descent of Charlemagne in Italy there are several interesting minor works. Andrea da Bergamo, an author who lived toward the middle of the ninth century, on whom there is very little information, set himself to continue the work of Paul the Deacon and narrated the events of northern Italy from 567 to 887. Even if of modest literary value, his work is credible enough at least for the events that were contemporary to him and is rich in reports on the war campaigns of Holy Roman Emperor Louis II. The Lombard historiographic tradition continued also in the south, especially in the work of Erchempert, a monk at Montecassino toward the end of the ninth century, who recounted with much validity and many details the history, including military, of the principality of Benevento between 774 and 889 (the Latin texts of Bergamo and Erchempert can be consulted in Berto, 2000).

For the ninth century, in addition to the chroniclers of the German region interested in the life and undertakings of Otto I and Otto II, the works of Liutprand of Cremona (*Antapodosis* and *De rebus gestis ottonis magni imperatoris*) are indispensable. Liutprand, bishop of Cremona from 962 until his death in 972, was a trusted courtier of the kings of Italy and of the Germanic emperor, for whom he was also ambassador to Constantinople. He therefore learned many first-hand details and, even if rich in anecdote, his succinct accounts of military operations are credible and useful.

Paul the Deacon, his northern and southern successors, and Liutprand of Cremona distinguish themselves in the panorama of narrative sources as authors of "general" histories that regard an entire state or population, following the classical model. Centered on monasteries and cathedrals, there also flourished a large quantity of narrower narrations, official annals, lives of saints, and apologetic or edifying texts that can supply a large quantity of detailed information, even if always filtered through the heavy mediation of ecclesiastical writers.

Normative Sources. If for the strategic and tactical aspects of military campaigns it is necessary to exploit the scarce information supplied by literary sources, to study military structures and the organization of armies, normative sources are of great utility, and are available in large number starting from the seventh century for Lombard, Carolingian, and post-Carolingian Italy.

The edict of the Lombard king, Rothari, which appeared in 643, established severe penalties for those who did not present themselves upon a call to arms by the king or his representative, the duke. The subsequent laws of Liutprand, Ratchis (r. 744–749),

and Aistulf (r. 749–756) add other important information, especially on the forms of border protection, mobilization, and possible exemptions. In particular, the so-called military laws promulgated by Aistulf in 750 detail an army based on the participation of the people, but organized based on a census, which provided that combatants had to equip themselves in a manner proportional to their wealth.

In the Carolingian empire, there were numerous laws that pertained only to Italy, which constitute the so-called Italic Capitularies. The first normative text that regards the military institutions of Italy is dated to 829, and relates the extension to the peninsula of the system of "*paganti*" (those who paid, i.e., provided the equipment and the supplies to those going on campaign) and "*partenti*" (those who departed). Other laws of this collection are important for the organization of military campaigns, the maintenance of public order, and the hierarchies of command, and also, from an ideological point of view, to show the privileged relationship between the sovereign and the freemen who composed his army. In southern Italy, similarly, the princes of Benevento, Arechis II (r. 758–787) and Adelchis (r. 853–878), had a significant normative production that, from the point of view of military organization, placed itself in perfect continuity with that of the Lombard Kingdom of Pavia.

In central-northern Italy, the decline of monarchic power in the second half of the ninth century brought with it the end of the production of laws. The principal form of written documentation produced by the royal court thus remained the diplomas, privileges released in favor of the nobles, ecclesiastic entities, or communities that made requests for these. These texts are useful especially to study the progressive spread of armed retinues and private castles.

Other Documentary Sources. Supplementary information of great interest can also be supplied by private papers, the oldest of which, for Byzantine Italy, date back to the sixth century (papyruses from Ravenna) and for Lombard Italy to the middle of the seventh century. Their availability grows notably for the Carolingian and post-Carolingian periods. These texts can be utilized to study the social profile of combatants, the relationships between patrons and their armed supporters, and the construction and spread of fortifications. For example, the rich charters of the southern abbeys of Farfa and Montecassino give a great deal of information about the building of new castles in Latium in the ninth and tenth centuries and about the rise of new families of professional knights.

Material Sources. As for many other areas of the history of the early Italian Middle Ages, a fundamental contribution to our understanding of military matters has been supplied by archaeology. Given the scarcity of information supplied by written sources and the unreliability of iconographic evidence, excavations of tombs represent the principal source of the knowledge of weapons and equipment, especially for the sixth and seventh centuries. The excavations of the Lombard tombs of this period have provided a great deal of information. Unfortunately, from the eighth century, because more secure and functional instruments developed to evidence the status of family groups, the practice of entombing objects with the deceased rapidly declined, so it is impossible to extract useful information from the tombs of the late Lombard age and the Carolingian and post-Carolingian periods.

Archaeological excavations have also supplied a fundamental complement to the written documentation with regard to the diffusion of castles and other public and private fortifications. Thus various realities not perceptible from the mere analysis of written sources have been brought to light. Archaeological research has, for example, identified the existence of numerous fortresses founded from the time of late antiquity, which were works of the population and intended for the self-defense of rural communities, and which were backed by more systematic construction projects promoted by public powers, such as the Gothic kings and then the Lombard kings, intended for the protection of the territory and the control of the routes of access to the principal cities. For the post-Carolingian period, excavations have subjected to verification shifts in the human environment prompted by the founding of new castles, inducing a fuller articulation on

the regional scale of the theory of "encastlement" formulated by Pierre Toubert.

[*See also* Charlemagne *and* Lombard League.]

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Sources (1000–1300)

The types of sources available for the history of the Italian Peninsula for the period 1000–1300 are very much influenced by the political divisions of the region. These were the Kingdom of Sicily, which comprised the whole southern part of the peninsula, subject to the strong Norman-Swabian monarchy; the Papal States, or Patrimonium Sancti Petri (Patrimony of Saint Peter); and the Kingdom of Italy, which was part of the Holy Roman Empire, where the weakness of central power allowed the development of autonomous cities.

Narrative Sources. After the year 1000 the production of historical works spread throughout all of Italy. Already by the eleventh century, even if most chroniclers were still ecclesiastics, the authors demonstrated a lively participation in the public life of the time and a marked attention to military matters, which began to be attentively described. In northern Italy two Milanese writers stand out in this respect: Arnulf and Landolfo Senior, whose accounts of the civil conflicts that erupted in Milan from the Pataria revolts are rich in detail, including military detail. The same can be said, for central Italy, both of Donizone, the biographer of Matilda of Canossa, and also of the author of the history of the monastery of Subiaco (*Chronicon Sublacense*). In the south those who wrote of the Norman conquest, such as William of Apulia and Geoffrey Malaterra, especially stand

out: even if almost exclusively focusing on the deeds of the commanders and their following of knights, these writers offer a detailed and credible narration of the wars conducted against the Lombards, Byzantines, and Arabs.

From the twelfth to the thirteenth century an outright cultural revolution occurred in the cities of northern Italy. Starting in this period, chronicles and annals no longer were monopolized by clerics and monks, but were composed increasingly by laymen of culture, often judges and notaries, members of a city's ruling class. This group had direct experience in war, and many of them participated as urban knights; they narrate with vivid realism and a certain richness in detail, even if their descriptions of battles almost never have enough detail to answer all the questions of modern scholars. The long period of war between the Italian municipalities and the emperor Frederick I Barbarossa (r. 1155–1190) is described in detail not only by German historians such as Otto of Freising and his continuator Rahewin, but also by the two chroniclers from Lodi, Ottone and Acerbo Morena, and an anonymous successor of theirs, and by a Milanese writer traditionally referred to as Sire Raul (for the works of Ottone and Acerbo Morena, their anonymous successor, and Sire Raul, see Franz-Josef Schmale). One significant episode of this war, the long siege of Ancona by imperial forces in 1172, is related in detail in Boncompagno da Signa's *Liber de obsidione Anconae* (Book of the Siege of Ancona).

The interurban conflicts that took place in the course of the thirteenth century and the wars between the municipal coalition led by Milan and Frederick II and his allies are narrated by a great number of citizen authors, among whom the following stand out: Giovanni Codagnello of Piacenza, who wrote the *Annales Placentini Guelfi*, and his anonymous political rival, the author of the *Annales Placentini Gibellini*; the Paduan Rolandino; and the Franciscan friar Salimbene da Parma. Though he lived in the first half of the fourteenth century, the Florentine historian Giovanni Villani wrote a detailed and well-documented history of both Tuscany and the whole of Italy in the thirteenth century, paying great attention to military campaigns and battles.

In Italian municipal annals writing, Genoa stands out. Here the authors of urban chronicles worked in the service of the city and had the duty of drawing up the official history of the community. Initiated by Caffaro at the end of the eleventh century, the *Annali Genovesi* were continued without interruption until the end of the thirteenth century, offering a documented and detailed narration of both combat operations on land and, especially, the maritime campaigns conducted by the fleet of Genoa.

In the south the writing of history remained, as was the tradition, mostly the prerogative of ecclesiastics. There was no lack, however, of high-profile writers, often close to the court and therefore quite well-informed on political and military events: examples include Romualdo da Salerno (in Franz-Josef Schmale), writing in the second half of the twelfth century, and Riccardo da San Germano, writing in the first half of the thirteenth century. Romualdo in particular also had important diplomatic appointments in the north and supplied details of great import concerning the conflicts between the municipalities and Frederick Barbarossa, in addition to detailed narrations of the wars fought by the forces of the Norman kingdom. In the last decades of the thirteenth century, southern Italy was the theater of the war between the Angevin kings of Naples and the kings of Aragon. The Catalan writers Bernat Desclot and Ramón Muntaner provide much information about the conduct of military operations in Sicily.

Public Documentation in the Kingdom of Sicily. Under its first king, the Norman Roger II, the Kingdom of Sicily, proclaimed in 1130, was distinguished for the strength of its central government, including a well-developed bureaucracy. All this was reflected in an early ability to produce and conserve administrative documents. In the military area, in addition to the usual productions—such as the *Assise di Ariano* of 1140, which contains numerous provisions concerning the organization of the defense of the territory—the great *Catalogus baronum* (Catalog of Barons) stands out above all. Compiled in 1150–1152

and then revised in 1167–1168, this was a detailed ledger of all the royal vassals, of the lands they held, and of the contributions they owed. In 1,442 chapters the *Catalogus* describes all the forces available on the continent (not including the Sicilian fiefdoms, equal to roughly 8,620 horsemen and more than eleven thousand auxiliaries).

Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II, who in 1198 became the king of Sicily, maintained and perfected the Norman administrative apparatus. Only a small part of the documentation has survived, but what survives enables us to reconstruct the outlines of an attentive and ordered military organization. The laws contained in the so-called *Liber Augustalis*, which was produced at Melfi in 1230, provided detailed regulations for the mobilization of forces, the maintenance of public order, and the upkeep of fortresses. A register of letters of the royal chancellery from the end of the 1230s and other epistolary collections conserve numerous missives directed at organizing military campaigns, narrating victories, justifying defeats, and motivating combatants, giving us an unedited point of view that is different from that of the chronicles. An investigation in 1240–1241, incomplete in its treatment of Calabria and Sicily, has provided us with the ledger of roughly 250 castles belonging to the state and their garrisons, allowing for a detailed examination of the defense of the royal territory.

The destruction of the State Archive of Naples by the German army in October 1943 unfortunately caused the loss of almost all the documentation of the Angevin period, in particular the exceedingly rich series of registers of missives sent by the royal chancellery. Of what has survived, a painstaking project by Neapolitan archivists has made available some thousands of letters—often dedicated to the organization of military operations, the defense of the kingdom, or the mobilization of troops—that supply a great amount of information, even though not always systematic, on the armed forces of the kingdom of Charles of Anjou and his successors (see *I registri della cancelleria angioina*).

Urban Records. In the course of the twelfth century the cities of north-central Italy likewise developed increasingly sophisticated apparatuses of government that, especially beginning in the thirteenth century, produced a large number of administrative writings, many of which deal with the management of armies and war. Unfortunately their conservation is not consistent. As a result there are some areas that are very well documented (Bologna, Perugia, Siena), and others, though very important, for which the public documentation is almost completely lacking, like Milan.

Most of the municipal archives conserve collections of diplomatic acts, often transcribed in the "books of rights" (*libri iurium*). These collections contain a great number of treaties between cities or with communities and lords of the countryside, and they provide knowledge of the military provisions of these agreements and the commitments assumed by the subject localities with respect to their overlords. The collections of city laws (statutes) are also of great interest. Some, like those of Verona, describe in a detailed way the forms of mobilization of the army and also several aspects of its battlefield order (see *Gli statuti veronesi del 1276*). Almost all of them supply information on the payment of combatants, the rights and duties of knights, the administration of spoils, the conservation of arms, and the defense of the most important garrisons.

A more analytic examination is provided by serial and administrative documentation. The registers of deposits and withdrawals—the most famous of which are the so-called Sienese *Biccherna*, conserved from the 1230s (see *Libri dell'entrata e dell'uscita della repubblica di Siena detti del Camarlingo e dei quattro provveditori della Biccherna)*—permit a close study of the costs of war, the service of mercenaries, the maintenance of fortifications, and other more minute information on the provision of troops, the sending of spies, the acquisition of banners, and so on. A more purely military documentation is represented by the so-called *venticinquine* of Bologna, which are lists of men fit for combat organized by parish, conserved and systematically updated starting in the second half of the thirteenth century until the first decades of the fourteenth century. Finally, the registers of justice offer a large amount

of information on resisters, deserters, and spies, not to mention the crimes that were committed during military campaigns.

On the act of mobilizing city armies, a great amount of documentation was produced, intended to ascertain the presence and absence of those called to fight, to record outlines of the principal decisions of commanders, and to manage the volume of resupply and the acquisition of equipment, among other things. Unfortunately such a volume of papers, which in the case of major campaigns gave work to dozens of notaries, does not survive except in a few isolated fragments; usually the papers were destroyed once a war was over. Only one example of these archives of war has been conserved in satisfactory condition: the so-called *Libro di Montaperti*. This contains the documentation of the Florentine army against Siena in 1260 and was saved by the Sienese as a war prize after the disastrous defeat inflicted on their enemies at Montaperti.

Other Written Sources. Italian civilization of the High Middle Ages was a civilization permeated by written culture. Especially within the cities, unpublished sources able to supply perspective on the conduct of war and the administration of armies multiplied from the twelfth to the thirteenth century. From this perspective notarial registers, in which the detailed acts drawn up by the notaries working in the city were conserved, are of great importance. These could contain contracts relating to the sale of weapons, armor, and horses, the construction of ships, the maintenance of fortifications, the ransom and freeing of prisoners, the supply of wagons and baggage, and the hiring of soldiers for military expeditions, whether to substitute conscripted citizens, to defend castles, or to serve aboard ships. Not much used by Italian historiography, these sources have not yet fully revealed their possibilities.

Italian literary production, unlike that of Provence, gave little attention to themes of war. There are no songs of war or epics, and reference to military practices is used almost exclusively to supply metaphors for political or amorous works. An exception is historical poetry, which narrates in an almost chronicle-like style certain events. An example is the *Serventese dei Lambertazzi e dei Geremei*, which describes in much detail the fighting between the Guelfs and the Ghibellines that took place in Bologna in 1274.

[*See also* Arabs; Byzantine Empire, *subentries on* Narrative (900–1204) *and* Narrative (1204–1453); Charles of Anjou; Frederick I Barbarossa; Frederick II; Montaperti, Battle of; Muntaner, Ramón; Norman Conquests, Norman Expansion; Otto of Freising and Rahewin; Robert Guiscard; *and* Roger II.]

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Sources (1300–1493)

Through the course of the fourteenth century, the political map of Italy became progressively simpler, with the emergence of diverse lordships larger than cities that ended up absorbing lesser municipalities little by little. The new political system was formalized in the middle of the 1400s, when the Peace of Lodi ratified the division of the peninsula into five larger states (the duchy of Milan, the republics of Venice and Florence, the Papal States, and the Kingdom of Naples); several intermediate powers, such as the duchy of Savoy and the Republic of Genoa; and various city-states and smaller lordships, often tied to the greater powers through relationships of dependence. The attention of research therefore shifts to the documentation produced by the greater territorial lordships and the regional states that derived from these.

Public Documentation and Diplomatic Papers. Through the course of the fourteenth century, the greater lordships were generally unable to establish particularly efficient administrative apparatuses and continued to count on those of the individual municipalities of their subjects. Therefore, there are no documentary collections significant enough

to report the military politics of the Visconti, della Scala, Carraresi, or other ruling families. To research such topics, it is necessary to search within the archives of the individual cities involved. Here, in particular, it is possible to find, usually in abundance, the letters that the lords sent to their local representatives, which not infrequently contain decisions of a military character, relevant to the mobilization of troops, the maintenance of fortifications, the payment and quartering of mercenary units, and more.

An exception to this is the county of Savoy (a duchy from the fifteenth century on), which had a solid and well-established government apparatus and produced a notable amount of administrative documentation. The registers of military expenditures at the state archive of Turin begin in the 1330s and continue for the entire succeeding century, whereas the costs and requirements of the defense of the territory and its fortifications are supplied by the rich series of the *Conti di castallana*, which registered the spending of local officials. The republics of Florence and Venice continued to use city chancelleries without interruption in the period from 1000 to 1300. Also, the Kingdom of Naples had a large administrative tradition that was expressed in the conservation of dozens of registers of royal missives. However, these were all lost in the destruction of the state archive of Naples in 1943. Lastly, available documentation of the troops used by the Papal States is very scarce.

The progressive stabilization of the political framework in the 1400s enabled the establishment of a dense network of diplomatic relations among the states of the Italian peninsula. An instrument of these relations was a dense circulation of emissaries, legates, orators, and ambassadors and a similarly dense traffic of letters among the various capitals. This enormous mass of papers of all types comprised, in addition to the official missives exchanged between governments, a large amount of informal writings, such as secret instructions sent to ambassadors, rumors and gossip gathered by these ambassadors, and even true and proper reports forwarded by spies and informators. Although these provide much military information. The movements of the condottieri (commanders) were followed at every step, the negotiations between this and that power were observed, and attempts were made to evaluate the forces at the disposal of various states—to analyze the training, equipment, and motivation, and to examine the state of fortresses—in sum, to analyze the weak points of the defensive apparatuses of both allies and rivals. For the first time, a systemic mass of information of this type was made available to scholars. The largest documentary cache of this type, starting in 1450, the Sforzesco collection, is conserved at the state archive of Milan. Also important is the correspondence of the dukes of Mantua and Ferrara, as well as Lorenzo the Magnificent, informal lord of Florence, which are all conserved in the archives of their respective cities. All of these collections have been subject to editorial initiatives, often little coordinated between one and the other, and the vast majority of the documents conserved therein remain unpublished.

The correspondence of the lords often directly related to the condottieri in their service or with whom they intended to enter into a relationship. Such letters can allow a quite direct approach not only to the description of military campaigns or individual operations, on which they often supply candid details, but also on the very personalities of the commanders, from which arise their culture, interests, and ways of behaving.

Other Documentary Sources. Within Italian society of the late Middle Ages, the use of writing was very widespread. Consequently, the sources available to provide a more complete understanding of war and the soldiers who fought are numerous. Only a small portion of such documents has been thus far exploited. Notarial cartularies and registers of deposits and withdrawals from lending banks have proved useful in studying the local roots of soldiers and their continual need for money; they often went into debt acquiring weapons and mounts. The collections of several ecclesiastic authorities have in turn evidenced the religiosity of mercenaries, who at times benefited churches and convents or even founded chapels dedicated to

the saints of their places of origin. Land registries and fiscal inquiries are useful both in studying the assets of combatants and in valuing the impact of military campaigns on the territory and the cost of sackings and devastations. Lastly, the archives of individual subject cities with their registers of the letters of lords, records of municipal councils, and lists of spending are indispensable in learning the role of communities in actions of war in the supplying of funds and auxiliary troops, as well as the guarantee of the defense of local fortifications.

Also noteworthy is an exceptional discovery in the 1970s, when at Arezzo the archive of the company of mercenary troops of Micheletto Attendolo was found. These exceptional documents, which have been studied by Mario Del Treppo, enable the understanding in detail of the internal functioning of a great mercenary unit. There has been for some time promise of a published edition; however, it has not yet appeared.

Literary Sources. In fourteenth- and fifteenth-century Italy, from north to south, there were many lay chroniclers writing histories about their towns or castles, frequently filled with details about military campaigns involving the region, not only the great wars between the major powers of the peninsula, but also local conflicts between the lesser lords of the campaigns. Many of these texts are edited in the fundamental collection of Italian writers collected in the eighteenth century by Lodovico Antonio Muratori, the *Rerum Italicarum Scriptores* (Writers about Italian Arguments). Muratori's work has been partially renewed in the first half of the twentieth century, in the *Rerum Italiacarum Scriptores, Nuova Series.*

It is impossible to describe every text published in this collection, but some authors are particularly important for the amount of information they provide about military campaigns, the political environment, strategies, tactics, and equipment. Starting with the fourteenth century, the influence of humanistic culture drastically changed the manner in which chroniclers and historians narrated events of war, inducing them, following the example of classical literature, to supply greater particulars on strategic operations, centering their attention especially on the choices and actions of commanders. The most significant example of this is found in the work of Florentine Giovanni Villani (d. 1348), his brother and continuer, Matteo (d. 1363), and Matteo's son, Filippo. Strengthened also by their involvement in Florentine magistratures, they offered detailed and credible narrations of the principal armed events that took place in Tuscany and the rest of Italy from the end of the 1200s to the second half of the 1300s. The Villanis' *Cronica*, which ends in 1363, provides much information on the mercenary companies that operated in Italy in the fourteenth century, especially the German Great Company and the English White Company.

The notary Pietro Azario of Novara supplies other rich evidence, this time centered on northern Italy. Mostly based on personal experience, he reconstructed in a detailed manner the principal wars fought by the Visconti of Milan from 1340 to 1370, giving attention not only to the mercenary forces but also to the citizen armies that still operated in Lombardy in the middle of the century. For southern Italy, another notary, the chronicler Domenico da Gravina, in his *Chronicon de rebus in Apulia gestis (1333–1350)* (Chronicle of the Events in Apulia, 1333–1350), as eyewitness, gives us a detailed report of the civil war between the Neapolitan and the Hungarian branches of the Anjou dynasty. The war is very interesting because it saw the employment of Neapolitan feudal knights, peasant infantry, German mercenaries, and Hungarian light cavalry.

In the 1400s, historians stopped participating directly in state or city governments or, in any case, steered clear of military campaigns. Their narration of these events is often detailed but based on second-hand sources or, simply put, in the mold of the classical model. The *Florentine Histories* of Niccolò Machiavelli, on which many legends on the conduct of war in Italy in the 1400s are based, are an exemplary case. Other works, of persons more involved on the battlefield or with ampler access to documentation, are certainly of great importance. These include fundamental writings such as those of the Venetian writers, including Cristoforo da Soldo and

Marin Sanudo. Cristoforo da Soldo lived in the first half of the century and wrote a highly detailed history of the wars between Milan and Venice and the battles between the great mercenary companies of Francesco Sforza and Micheletto Attendolo. At the beginning of the sixteenth century Marin Sanudo employed both his personal experience and archival papers to write his books: *Vite dei Dogi* (The Lives of the Dogi), *Commentari alla guerra di Ferrara* (Comments on the War against Ferrara), *La spedizione di Carlo VIII in Italia* (The Campaign of Charles VIII in Italy), and the *Diari* (The Diaries). These are very rich in dates and information on the wars that took place throughout the whole of the 1400s and the beginning of the 1500s.

Very important, especially for the second half of the fifteenth century, was the blossoming of the military memoir, with the writing of first-hand accounts of military campaigns by the men who had themselves participated in the campaigns. The biographies of the principal condottieri of the fifteenth century, such as Giovanni Simonetta's *The Life of Francesco Sforza* or Vespasiano da Bisticci's *Lives of Illustrious Men*, are obviously full of information about the conduct of the war. Also not to be ignored, especially for the second half of the 1400s, is the contribution of foreign historians and diplomats who supplied an external and sometimes critical look at the Italian military world, such as Philippe de Commynes (a Frenchman who followed King Charles VIII in his Italian campaign of 1494–1495), whose letters and historical works are very rich in items in this sense.

Another consequence of the diffusion of new cultural models was the flourishing, unknown beforehand, of military treatises. The first example, from the beginning of the 1300s, was *Les Enseignements* of Theodore Paleologue (Paleologi Teodoro), Marquis of Montferrat, a prince of Greek origin. In this work, Theodore brought together many experiences he had on the battlefield, providing precious testimony of the actual varieties of the conduct of war. More abstract and theoretical, on the other hand, are the works from the 1400s of Guarino Veronese, Leonardo Bruni, Roberto Valturio, and Antonio Cornazzano, even if in the last of these examples the modern condottieri are well evaluated. The production of these culminated in Machiavelli's *The Art of War*, in which he proposed modeling the forces of the Florentine republic on the old Roman army.

Material Sources. Finally, it is noted that, especially starting with the 1400s, a direct understanding of many material aspects of military life is possible, thanks to the conservation of a large number of artifacts. Up to the fourteenth century, surviving weapons and armor come mostly from archaeological excavations, and their state of conservation is often precarious. In contrast, in the 1400s, the equipment and armor, often of very high quality, exist in great number in museums and private collections. Therefore, scholars may directly verify the efficacy and encumbrance of arms and armor and, consequently, better understand how these could have been used on the battlefield.

In the same way, the surviving architectural material is much more plentiful and better conserved compared with that of the preceding centuries. Thanks also to the abundance of administrative sources, the studies of castles, city walls, and fortresses have provided a sizable contribution to the understanding of the art of fortification of the Renaissance, with particular attention to that phenomenon of great importance, the birth of bastioned-trace architecture (see Hale).

[*See also* Commynes, Philippe de *and* Machiavelli, Niccolò.]

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Translated from the Italian by Joe Jackson

Narrative (476–1000)

The political unity of Italy during the early Middle Ages existed only within the brief period of the Roman-Germanic reigns of Odoacer and Theodoric and the reconquest of Justinian. Starting with the Lombard invasion of 568, the peninsula was split between Lombard territories and lands that remained Byzantine. Charlemagne's arrival in 774 definitively affirmed the separation between central-northern Italy, made up of the Kingdom of Italy, which was part of the Carolingian and then the Ottonian empires, and southern Italy, divided between the Lombards and Byzantines, to which were added in the ninth century the Arabs, who conquered Sicily. All of these political entities had unique ways of organizing their own armed forces and of conducting war, so the treatment of warfare in this era will be structured chronologically and geographically to illustrate the differences between the diverse states that coexisted in the current-day territory of Italy.

Roman-Germanic Armies. The fall of the Roman Empire with the overthrow of Romulus Augustulus by Odoacer in the year 476 did not mark the end of imperial military organization. Odoacer was a military commander, rebellious against the emperor and especially his general commander (*magister militum*), Orestes, since he sought for his men a distribution of lands in Italy following the norm known as *hospitalitas*. This provided that soldiers of barbaric origins garrisoned in a particular territory would receive either a part of the land or of the revenues it generated, and in the course of the fifth century this was utilized in many western provinces, but never in Italy. After clearing Romulus Augustulus off the throne, Orestes and his warriors—a federation of minor Germanic peoples—stationed themselves on the peninsula, seeking amicable relations with the emperor of Constantinople and the Roman aristocracy.

In the summer of 489 the Ostrogothic people, under the leadership of Theodoric, entered Italy on the mandate of Zeno, the emperor of the east, with the assignment of overthrowing the reign of Odoacer. The Ostrogoths were roughly 120,000 people, of whom one-fifth were fighting men. Traditionally, the Ostrogoths fought on horseback, and at the heart of the army was a nucleus of six thousand men, the *saioni*, who comprised the personal guard of Theodoric. The war between the Germans of Odoacer and the Ostrogoths lasted roughly four years and was characterized from the start by several large battles fought for control of the principal river crossings in northern Italy and long sieges of Pavia (where Theodoric took refuge in the spring of 590) and Ravenna (where Odoacer shut himself away from the fall of 590 to the beginning of 593). Faced with his inability to obtain the submission of Ravenna, the former imperial capital, the Gothic commander concluded an agreement with his rival, but in March 493, Odoacer was betrayed and killed at a banquet so that Theodoric could assume full control of Italy. It took another five years, however, for the court of Constantinople to accept the situation and send him the insignia of command.

After the conquest, the Ostrogoths garrisoned themselves in Italy, mostly in the central-northern regions, following the norm of *hospitalitas*. Like the other Germanic nations, they established an army of the people in which all free men had to bear arms. From the followers of the king (*comitatus*) came the officials, called *comites* (counts), destined for the military government of the territory. The provincial counts (*comites provinciales*) governed and defended the principal border areas such as Dalmatia or Provence, often accompanied by dukes (*duces*), while counts of the city (*comites civitatum*) led the urban garrisons. There were also the commanders of the mobile army, who carried the title of "renowned men" (*viri inlustres*). The *saioni*, finally, were the closest collaborators of the king. They could act as plenipotentiaries and they relayed his official local orders. They oversaw the mobilization of the troops and took care of their provision and resupply, in addition to watching over the counts and dukes so that they did not rebel against the sovereign.

Settled in Italy, the Ostrogoths inherited a substantial part of the logistical administrative apparatus of the old Roman army. Soldiers received annual pay and drew free supplies of provisions from the state (*annona*). Horse farms and state weapons factories were actively maintained to supply quality equipment and warhorses to the troops. The principal unit at the disposal of the Gothic commanders was the heavy cavalry, provided with armor and spears, but infantry and archers efficaciously complemented the cavalry, even if the information we have on them is scarce. The infantry was probably equipped with spears, swords, and round shields but, conforming to the practices of late antiquity, lacked armor. The most significant military episode during the reign of Theodoric was the battle of Arles in the year 508, in which the Ostrogoths defeated a Frankish-Burgundian army and took possession of Provence, demonstrating excellent logistical ability in moving the army outside of Italian confines. Following their success against the Franks, the Ostrogoth kingdom emerged as the principal military power of the west and placed under its protection both the Visigoths of Spain and the Vandals of Africa.

After the death of Theodoric (526), the kingdom entered into profound crisis due to conflicts of succession. In 535 the troops of the empire of the east, roughly ten thousand men strong, principally belonging to the guards of the palace (*scholae palatinae*) and led by the general Belisarios, attacked Italy with the goal of restoring imperial authority. Belisarios landed in Sicily, which he took without conflict, and occupied Rome itself with a sweep of the hand while a land army invaded Dalmatia. The new Gothic king, Vitigis (r. 536–540), was able to mobilize all his available resources and besiege Belisarios in Rome from February 537 to March 538. In the course of the operation, however, the limits of the Ostrogothic forces were revealed: they didn't have at their disposal either an effective artillery train or the ability to construct sophisticated assault machinery. Frontal assaults to the walls were all deflected with heavy losses, and in the end the siege was withdrawn.

Following this the war moved on, with the two armies dispersed throughout the whole Italian territory engaging in a great number of minor conflicts. Imperial forces, however, increased, while those of the Ostrogoths were wearing thin. Thanks to massive enlistments of Barbarian contingents, Belisarios's successor, Narses, could deploy more than twenty-five thousand men, with which he inflicted on the Ostrogoths the decisive defeat of Busta Gallorum, in April 552, where the Gothic king Totila (r. 541–552) died. In the battle the greater organization of the Byzantine army played a decisive role. In addition to heavy cavalry, the Byzantines deployed mounted archers and heavy, armored infantry, which were revealed to be fundamental against a Gothic army that had resorted to relying on its cavalry alone, declining interaction with archers and other combatants on foot. The final Ostrogothic resistance was in the end squashed two years later at Casilinum. Thus Italy was brought back into the hands of the empire.

The Lombards. After Justinian's reconquest, with new emerging powers threatening the empire in the east and in the Balkans, Italy was virtually dismantled. At least four large duchies were set up, which watched over the northern borders, and perhaps attempts were made to enlist contingents of *limitanei* (border troops), but the available soldiers were very scarce, and the new organization was still being developed when in 568 new invaders, the Lombards, burst in.

The Lombards were a population of roughly 100,000 people, counting men, women, and children. They descended into Italy, exploiting an exceedingly favorable political moment brought about by the power conflicts that divided the court of Constantinople, and initially they met no resistance. The Byzantines were able to hold only the coasts of Veneto, Romagna, Liguria, and Campania, as well as Rome, Apulia, Calabria, Sicily, and Sardinia. In the north a Lombard kingdom was founded with Pavia as its capital, while other invaders moved south, where the duchies of Spoleto and Benevento were born, de facto independent states.

Unlike the Ostrogoths, the Lombards had not had prolonged relations with the Romans. They were in fact a warrior people of the tribal tradition whose king, Alboin, was merely a war leader. Their principal economic activity up to the end of the seventh century was represented by raids inflicted on bordering territories. Personal freedom was directly linked to the right and duty to bear arms, so much so that the term used to indicate a freeman (*arimannus*) was normally translated into Latin as "member of the army" (*exercitalis*). The assembly of the people was the assembly of the army. One participated in it armed and manifested consent by noisily beating shields with spears, a ritual referred to as *gairethinx*. The kingdom did not have at its disposal a fiscal apparatus, so it was not possible to pay and equip soldiers, who had to maintain and arm themselves by their own means. Archaeological excavations of numerous warrior burials show that, at least for the richest, individual arms had changed since the late Roman age. The *spatha*, a double-edged sword almost three feet (one meter) long, came to resemble shorter models (*semispatha*) and knives of war with only one edge (*scramasax*). The points of spears evolved from the narrow-pointed form in use in the sixth century to a larger one in the shape of a laurel leaf in the seventh. Discoveries of arrowheads

are very scarce, usually found in the more modest tombs, demonstrating the low prestige of the bow.

Starting with the second half of the seventh century, the state of the Lombards saw a profound transformation that brought about the decreased importance of tribal customs and the increased weight of Roman tradition, which was still alive in Italy. In particular, the kingdom assumed a more precise territorial configuration, with defined borders that were delimited along the entire arc of the Alps by a series of fortified barriers (*chiuse*) and castles that blocked the principal passes. With the first legislative volume, the Edict of Rothari, which appeared in 634 on the eve of a military campaign that brought about the conquest of the Ligurian coast, military service obligation was limited to only one male member per family. A network of officials composed of dukes, administrators of the royal court, and pubic representatives (in addition to the king himself) indicated generically as judges was created to manage the mobilization of the army. There also existed other personages invested with the duties of a military nature, but we know only their titles, not their precise functions or areas of action. Probably, many of them led the local components of the army, as cities and other territorial circumscriptions had their own structurally autonomous contingents. The kingdom's defense strategy in fact provided that in the case of the breaching of the Alpine *chiuse*, every city or castle had to offer autonomous resistance, carrying out strikes against adversaries but avoiding as much as possible conflicts in the open battlefield.

The ethnic separation between Lombards and Romans was progressively eliminated, so that by the beginning of the eighth century, all those who resided within the confines of the kingdom were considered Lombards, whatever their descent. However, social differences became increasingly relevant, and were reflected also in the types of participation in the army, as the so-called "military laws," which emerged with King Aistulf in 750, demonstrate. They provided that different levels of wealth corresponded to different levels of equipment. The wealthiest, large landowners and merchants, would have had to fight wearing armor and bringing with them several horses. Those who owned at least forty *jugers* of land (roughly one hundred acres/thirty hectares) and less prosperous merchants had to have a horse, shield, and spear; the rest merely a bow and arrow.

The army depicted in the dispositions has little in common with the primitive Lombard model, based on more or less egalitarian participation of all adult males. In the conception of the king, faced with the threat of the Frankish warriors of Pepin the Short, the core of the Lombard force had to be combatants provided with horses, divided into heavily armed units formed by the biggest landowners and wealthiest merchants, and lighter units that were also well equipped with warhorses, shields, and spears. In any case, a fraction of them probably had to dismount during battles to be utilized as infantry. The mass of freemen was relegated to a secondary role, as the fact that they were equipped with bows and arrows and not bladed weapons or pole arms demonstrates; they would not have been able to hold the field without the aid of better-equipped combatants.

The Byzantine Territories. Faced with the Lombard threat, the territories that remained Byzantine were each in their turn profoundly reorganized, with the aim of guaranteeing their defense. The civil administration was suppressed, and all powers were concentrated in the hands of military governors. At the head of the imperial lands in Italy was placed the exarch, an official position instituted in 584 by the emperor Maurice and installed in the former imperial capital of Ravenna. This figure was supreme commander and governor general, and seven grand districts depended on him, which were maintained by dukes or *magistri militum*. These were Istria, Veneto, the self-referential Exarchate (which included Romagna, part of Emilia, and Apulia), Pentapolis (the coast of the Marches), Rome, Naples (under which was also Calabria), and Liguria. Sicily, which did not fear the Lombards, who lacked fleets, held on to a civil governor, the praetor, while Sardinia was aggregated with the province of Africa.

The strategy of the troops of Constantinople was at its heart based on defense. Fortified borderlines

did not exist, but there were instead numerous castles distributed throughout the territory. Near the principal cities of Ravenna, Rome, and Naples, there were substantial reserve forces gathered, aided also by two fleets that were based at Ravenna's port of Classe and at Cagliari. The other cities and large villages had their own militias intended for self-defense, led by local officials called tribunes or counts (*comites*). Military service was tied to the possession of land and involved all landowners, large and small, in the immediate protection of the territory and inhabited locales. In case of aggression, local militias had to defend the urban walls and castles, while mobile contingents counterattacked and attempted to wipe out or repel the invaders.

The mobile army was composed of both locally enlisted divisions and units originating from other regions of the empire. At Ravenna, between the end of the sixth century and the beginning of the next, there were "units" present composed of Goths enlisted in Crimea, Armenians, Avars, Dacians, and Slavs, but also a "Ravenna unit" and other divisions whose names recalled diverse cities in Italy, some of which were already occupied by the Lombards, such as Milan, Rimini, and Verona. If necessary, religious figures were also called into combat, so that the clerics of Ravenna formed one of the divisions (*bandae*) to which the custody of the city walls was entrusted.

In the Byzantine territories, unlike in Lombard Italy, the custom of providing soldiers with regular pay, integrated with extra bonuses, was preserved. The empire was not, however, always able to keep up payment with the necessary regularity, so mutinies and even true revolts were not rare. Funds were often procured by local churches, which could then distribute their lands to the militaries that provided the defense of the region. The members of the army, therefore, only theoretically depended on their sovereign in Constantinople, while in effect they responded to the pope, the patriarch of Ravenna, or other bishops, who controlled the landed wealth that supported them.

The seventh century was a period of great difficulty for the empire, which had to first confront the Persian threat and then the Arabian threat. The Italian territories remained practically abandoned to themselves. From this emerged a second wave of Lombard expansion, as much in the north, where King Rothari subdued Liguria in 644, as in the south, where in the same years the dukes of Benevento took possession of a large part of Apulia and Calabria. Difficulties were then added when in 727 Constantinople affirmed the iconoclastic doctrine (the movement opposing the cult of sacred images), to which the Italian church was strongly averse. The armies of Rome and Ravenna aligned themselves in defense of their prelates and did not hesitate to clash with the contingents sent by Constantinople to arrest them. The Lombards quickly profited from this climate of conflict and in 751 troops led by Aistulf conquered Romagna without too much difficulty, forcing Ravenna to surrender. Although the intervention of the Franks under Pepin the Short obligated Aistulf to retreat, Ravenna was handed over to the pope, and the imperial presence in northern Italy was thus eliminated.

As a consequence of the new crisis, the "theme system," which had already been adopted in the Asiatic and Balkan territories of the empire, was introduced in the surviving Byzantine regions of Italy. This process began with Sicily, threatened by the Arabs settled in Africa, which was organized as a theme between 692 and 695 and placed under the command of a *strategos*, whose jurisdiction extended also to current-day Calabria.

Starting in 880 the Byzantines were able to shift to the offensive and sent an army of roughly thirty-five thousand men (thematic troops and Slavic mercenaries) to the south of the peninsula, which in a six-year campaign succeeded in sweeping away the Arab positions in Calabria and Apulia and imposing imperial hegemony on Benevento and Salerno. Also in Italy the government of the themes was entrusted to an imperial *strategos*, who had both civil and military duties. These officials were rotated after three or four years of service at the most. At their side as direct subordinates were the *tourmarches* (commanders of a *tourma* or regiment) to whom the custody of principal strategic locations

was entrusted. A complex network of functionaries, assigned to the administration of justice, tax collection, financial management, and local defense, completed the defined apparatus of the government of the territory.

The Carolingian Conquests. In 774, upon the pressing solicitation of the pope, the Frankish king Charlemagne moved with his entire army to conquer the Lombard kingdom. Following their custom, the Lombards did not give battle in the field. After Charlemagne succeeded in passing the fortifications of the Susa valley, King Desiderius, abandoned in large part by his nobles, shut himself away in Pavia and after nine months of siege, surrendered. Thanks in part to the internal divisions that undermined his adversaries' capacity for resistance, Charlemagne had central-northern Italy in his hands without having to face even one battle on the field. Two years later there was a vast rebellion in the northeast regions of Italy, during which Frankish forces found themselves in serious trouble. The Franks and Lombards clashed in the battle of the Livenza River in March 776, with uncertain outcome. Charlemagne, in any case, though forced to give concessions to the rebels, returned to reign undisturbed in northern Italy.

Following the conquest, the vassalage system was imported into Italy; vast expanses of lands, especially ecclesiastic lands, were given to Frankish nobles in exchange for military service on horseback. The imported military institutions accompanied the Lombard institutions but did not replace them. It is even possible that the example of the Lombard peoples' army spurred Charlemagne to revitalize the analogous Merovingian tradition in the first years of the ninth century. An "Italic army" under the orders of Charlemagne's son Pepin participated in 787 in the war against Tassilo of Bavaria. It was most likely composed of Frankish and Lombard warriors side by side. Pepin, between 806 and 811, led Italian forces on several campaigns intended for the conquest of Dalmatia and the lagoon of Venice, which were defended effectively by the Byzantines.

The earliest detailed information on the Italic armies during Frankish domination is supplied by the capitulary issued in 825 by Lothair I, son of Louis the Pius, to mobilize an expedition against the Saracen pirates who had stationed themselves in Corsica. The text, following the classic Carolingian model, provided that both freemen and vassals and the clients of the sovereign and his counts and marquises were all held to serve. The royal vassals were divided in turn among those who lent direct service to the king and resided in the palace (called *austaldi*), those who lived on the means of their property, and the holders of royal benefices. The royal vassals, who by definition had the means to do so, were all obligated to provide military service, as were the vassals of counts, bishops, and abbots. As to the freemen who were not vassals, the capitulary introduced to Italy the system of putting small landholders into groups that had already been in use in Francia for some time. This provided that "freemen of second rank" who were not able to equip themselves for service would have had to associate with others in the same situation to supply one armed man. The poor were exempted from every obligation.

After the death of Charlemagne (813) and his son Louis the Pious (840), the unity of the Carolingian empire declined, and the Kingdom of Italy (as the kingdom of the Lombards was officially renamed from 843) was entrusted to the emperor Lothair I. Shaken by internal conflicts, western Europe found itself exposed to new offensive waves by the adjoining populations. Italy was no exception and fell victim to incursions by the Hungarians from the northeast and Saracens from the south.

A response was attempted during the long reign of Louis II (r. 855–875), who dedicated much attention to strengthening the apparatuses of the military and the government. In 866 Louis put forth an exceptional effort to mobilize a great army and conquer southern Italy, unifying the peninsula under his crown. The detailed capitulary on the "expedition at Benevento" (*Consititutio de expeditione Beneventana*) describes the mobilization of the army in detail. The cutting edge of the forces was provided by the public vassals, who were obligated to serve without exception, following the counts and bishops, who were also required to join the army with all of their

own dependents. To guarantee mobilization an exceptional organizational effort was made, dividing central-northern Italy into military districts, within which royal emissaries were to ensure that all fulfilled their obligations. The role of the common freemen, however, was minimal; only those who possessed substantial means were obliged to take part in the war, with the by then well-established system of those who paid and those who served. Most of the men would have remained in their homeland, to formally ensure the defense of the territory. There were also many people too poor to be required to lend any service.

In spite of careful preparations, the expedition of Benevento was an utter failure. It was formally directed against the Arabs, who had stationed themselves at Bari, and in effect brought about the capture of the city in 871 after four years of campaign. The Lombards, however, resisted the Frankish invasion. The princes of Benevento and Capua formed a coalition with the Duke of Naples and were able to capture Louis II. After this humiliation, the emperor did not attempt any further military undertakings. Louis's death without heirs (875) led to a period of anarchy and civil wars, in the course of which the public military apparatuses ended in collapse.

The Age of Anarchy: The Kingdom of Italy. Straddling the ninth and tenth centuries, seven sovereigns succeeded to the Italian throne: Charles the Bald (r. 875–877), Louis II (the Stammerer; r. 877–879), Louis III (r. 879–882) and Carloman (r. 879–884), Charles the Fat (r. 876–887), Guy of Spoleto (r. 889–894) and his son Lambert (r. 892–898), and Berengar of Friuli (r. 898–924). Of these only two, Charles the Fat and Guy of Spoleto, died natural deaths in possession of the crown, while Lambert perished in a hunting accident that probably masked a murder, and the others disappeared in exile or fell in battle. All of them, additionally, had to face repeated attempts at usurpation that were sometimes unsuccessful, sometimes successful. Hence, no one local dynasty was able to come out with stable possession of royal power.

Such weak sovereigns were no longer able to protect either the security with respect to external enemies or the social stability of the kingdom, in which large landowners and aristocratic families had assumed what was by then uncontrollable power. They installed substantial groups of armed supporters on their territorial holdings, linking themselves to these groups through vassalic oaths, and thus were able to arrange autonomous and substantial military forces that permitted them to play a principal political role in disputes for the crown. The sovereigns in turn lost the possibility of mobilizing forces of freemen, who were increasingly attracted toward dependence on local powers. By the end of the ninth century the production of laws that, with their constant references to the army, had represented a permanent call to the guardianship that the sovereign had to carry out for the entirety of his own subjects and the armed service they had to render him, ceased. The Italic kings thus lacked a "national" based on public obligation, and instead based their power on their own personal supporters and their capacity to negotiate, one by one, the support of other nobles and their followers. This system failed to provide an efficacious defense against Hungarian incursions by land and Saracen incursions by sea in search of spoils, thus obligating the population to resort to the protection of local powers, gathering within the fortifications that they had begun to erect. In this manner royal power was drastically weakened, while the military capacity of the aristocracy grew, based on the availability of strong cores of mounted combatants and on the control of a good number of castles.

The long but turbulent reign of Berengar of Friuli represented from many points of view the definitive moment of crisis for the military and governmental structures of the kingdom. From 888 to 898 Berengar struggled with Guy and Lambert of Spoleto for the control of the Italic crown in a series of clashes, momentary agreements, and resumed conflicts. After the death of Lambert, Berengar remained the sole sovereign, and in that role, in 899, he was able to mobilize several thousand cavalry drawn from all of central Italy to confront a serious Hungarian incursion that had reached the point of threatening Pavia. For the first time the royal forces were able to expel

the invaders and follow them toward the east, but when they counterattacked at the Brenta River, the royal cavalry was taken by surprise and destroyed.

This was the last attempt to call an army on a more than local scale. From that moment, Berengar, to defend the throne from his numerous rivals, had to base himself principally on his own armed supporters and on the support of the same Hungarians who, after having defeated him, fought as his mercenaries in exchange for an annual tribute. Having become emperor, in 915 Berengar also was able to promote a vast coalition among the powers of the kingdom, the Byzantines, the Lombards, and the pope, that brought about the destruction of the dangerous base established by the Arabs at the mouth of the Garigliano River, in Campania. In any case, the episode remained isolated, the product of a specific initiative and not of a coherent imperial policy.

During the reign of Berengar the number of castles constructed by local powers to protect their lands and their peasants grew at a staggering rate. The oldest private fortresses had already appeared in the Carolingian period, but it was Berengar who first had to concede a large number of permits for construction with the end of obtaining the political and military support of the large aristocratic families, intent on reinforcing the control of their lands. In the northern regions, there was an increasing distribution of castles in the course of the tenth century, though this did not necessarily become a factor of radical change in the structures of power. In Latium and Abruzzo in central Italy, by contrast, the research of Pierre Tourbert and his students has brought to light how this phenomenon between the ninth and eleventh centuries profoundly remodeled the settlement network and modified the social and political structures, with the disappearance of isolated homesteads in the countryside and subsequent birth of lordships centered around castles, whose owners began to exercise jurisdictional powers over the local inhabitants.

A vast uprising of nobles against Berengar was set in motion toward 916 by the Marquis Berta of Tuscany, Adalbert, Marquis of Ivrea, and Lamberto, archbishop of Milan. The Hungarians in the service of the king were able to surprise and defeat the force of the assembled rebels near Brescia. However, Berengar's opponents assembled themselves around a new pretender to the throne, Rudolf II, Duke of Burgundy. Berengar's and Rudolf's armies clashed in July 923 at Forenzuola d'Arda, near Piacenza, in an exceedingly bloody battle that, according to some estimates, saw the deaths of fifteen hundred horsemen. The outcome was indecisive, but Berengar chose to retreat to Verona, where he was betrayed and assassinated. He was succeeded to the throne by Hugh of Provence, a nephew of Rudolf. After Berengar's death the conflicts for the throne recommenced. Hugh, unable to earn the support of the Italian nobility, retreated to his native Provence in 946, leaving as *de jure* sovereign his son Lothair, who was in fact a puppet in the hands of Berengar II, Marquis of Ivrea.

A tentative response to the dissolution of royal power arose with the taking of power by Otto I of Saxony, King of Germany, who in 951 was able to descend into Italy without resistance and place the kingdom under his protectorate. On the wave of success begun by his victory in 955 at Lechfeld against the Hungarians, in 961 Otto again crossed the Alps and in 962 removed the weak king of Italy, Berengar II of Ivrea, and was nominated emperor, thus reuniting the German and Italian crowns. Otto I (r. 962–973) and his son, Otto II (r. 973–983), were protagonists of an ambitious attempt at reinforcing the structures of government of the kingdom and aspired to subdue Lombard and Byzantine southern Italy, but all in all they achieved little success.

Indeed in Italy, the military force of the Ottos remained tied to the German troops that followed them, since the new sovereigns were never able to be certain of their ability to enlist substantial groups of armed men within Italy. The support of the nobles and bishops, even though they were nominally royal functionaries, was continually being renegotiated, and there were ever-present risks of shifts in alliance and betrayal. Even the income from taxes, during the preceding decades of anarchy, had largely been appropriated by local powers that used these resources to establish their own bands of armed

supporters. The emperors' presence on Italian soil did permit the mobilization of a part of these forces, but when they returned to Germany, their control over the territory drastically decreased.

This situation did not prevent the Ottos from undertaking an ambitious Mediterranean political agenda, directed toward the subjugation of the Lombard and Byzantine south and the unification of the peninsula under the German aegis. The forces available to the western emperors revealed themselves, however, to be insufficient. Otto I conducted a long and difficult campaign against the Byzantines from 968 to 971, in which he found himself first defeated under the walls of Bari and then, after eastern troops arrived to besiege Capua, victorious at Ascoli Satriano, in 969. In 971 he reached a peace agreement that guaranteed the status quo and was ratified by the marriage of Otto II and the Greek princess Theophano. Otto II readopted the expansionistic politics of his father but was heavily defeated by the Arabs in the battle of Cotrone on 13 July 982, and in his turn had to abandon his own ambitions, to then mysteriously die the next year.

Otto II's heir was his son, Otto III, only four years of age. Having obtained the imperial crown in 996, he adopted a decisive political outlook of reinforcement of imperial power in Italy, even through a tight collaboration with the papacy, but his early death on 23 January 1002 interrupted the experiment and brought an end to the Saxon dynasty.

The Age of Anarchy: The South. In southern Italy, the Lombard duchy of Benevento remained autonomous after the conquest of the kingdom by Charlemagne. In the course of the ninth century, the state was divided into the three principalities of Salerno, Capua, and Benevento, all endowed with a homogenous military organization, based principally on the service of mercenaries, enlisted thanks to the abundance of funds that were at the disposal of the sovereigns of the rich southern territories. In particular, the Lombard princes in the middle of the ninth century made intensive use of hired Arabs, compensated in gold or assignation of lands. The legacy of the tradition of service by the collective of freemen that had distinguished the Lombard kingdom was the mobilization of the population of the villages and towns for the custody of the walls.

Also in the Byzantine territories a significant change was registered. As in the rest of the empire, starting in the 960s new border precincts were instituted, larger than the themes, called *ducati* or *catepanati*, whose governors commanded mobile troops, comprising hired infantry and horsemen. Southern Italy was one of the first regions reorganized in this way, since from 956 to 969 the themes of Langobardia and Calabria were included in the Catepanato of Italy, which reunited current-day Apulia, Calabria, and Basilicata. The professional forces were divided into *taxiarchie*—divisions on foot of around a thousand men, half of which was heavy infantry and the rest archers and scouts—and *tagmata*, units of variable strength, centered around armored cavalry. Locals, however, fought as lightly armed auxiliaries called *konteratoi*, whose principal duty was the defense of the city walls and other fortified locations. As mentioned above, thanks to this reorganization, Byzantine troops were able to validly resist the expansionistic attempts of Otto I and Otto II and to reaffirm their superiority over the greater part of the south of the peninsula.

The rather lengthy war fought against the Arabs from 827 to 965 for the supremacy of Sicily, however, represented a serious defeat for the emperors of the east, ending with the Islamic conquest of the island and the birth of the Emirate of Palermo. The conflict was characterized at first by bitter clashes at sea and on land, then by a long series of sieges on the last fortresses remaining in Byzantine hands along the eastern coast of the island. The army of the emirate was composed of conscripts mobilized by the governors of the districts (*giund*) into which the territory was divided. The armed soldiers were compensated with payment of a wage and the assignation of territorially based revenues, called *iqta'*. Unlike in other Islamic states, in Sicily the financial resources of the emir were not sufficient to combine such forces, which as a whole were poorly equipped, with mercenary forces. It was instead possible to appeal for the aid of volunteers who rushed in from

northern Africa both to fight the holy war against the Christians and to gain wealth in the form of plunder. In the course of the tenth century the Arabs of Sicily were also able to occupy part of Calabria but had to then confront several heavy Byzantine counteroffensives, which reduced them to a defensive position.

At the threshold of the year 1000 in the south, the situation seemed to have reached a reasonable equilibrium. The three areas of Arabic, Byzantine, and Lombard influence were quite defined and appeared stable, notwithstanding the repeated attempts to reconquer Sicily by the empire of the east. The status quo was, however, disrupted by the Normans, called in as mercenaries by the Lombard princes and appearing for the first time in 999.

The year 1000 in the political and military history of Italy represented a true turning point. In the north, after the extinction of the Saxon dynasty, royal power saw a new period of crisis, from which profited, among others, the cities that presented themselves as the new principal actors in the economic, social, and military life of the region, thanks to their demographic strength that allowed them to put into action large militia armies. In the south, the Normans affirmed a model of a centralized state with a strong feudal army. These two models of military organization would profoundly change the face of war and the battles in Italy in the high and late Middle Ages.

[*See also* Belisarios; Berengar; Casilinum, Battle of; Charlemagne; Charles the Bald; Cotrone, Battle of; Justinian I; Lechfeld, Battle on the; Lothair I; Louis I, Emperor; Louis II of East Francia; Maurice; Narses; Otto I; *and* Pepin the Short.]

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Translated from the Italian by Joe Jackson

Narrative (1000–1300)

The political and military history of Italy in the Central Middle Ages was unstable, violent, and maddeningly complex. Probably no other period of European history experienced such constant and widespread warfare, resulting in a highly fluid territorial map. A reasonably clear division may be drawn between the politico-military features of the south and those of central and northern Italy, although events in one theater frequently impinged on those in the other. These two regions will be considered separately in this article, despite the fact that it is often impossible to draw clear lines between the two.

The sources of violent conflict in Italy were manifold, but four in particular stand out. First, the contest between the popes and German emperors for predominance in Italy was a disruptive force, although pope and emperor rarely found themselves directly at odds militarily. Second, two waves of military intervention in the south of the peninsula, both originating in France, had a lasting influence on Italian politics: the Norman incursions that began in the mid-eleventh century and then the Angevin invasion of the second half of the thirteenth century. Third, armed conflict between neighboring Italian cities, fighting for territory, resources, and prestige in the tightly packed geopolitical arena, was nearly constant. Finally, the most intractable source of violence in Italy in the Central Middle Ages was the internal factional conflict that plagued cities across the peninsula. The wars in Italy nearly always had their origins simultaneously in more than one of these sources of conflict. It made for a complicated nexus, in which there was precious little peace.

The Italian Communes and War. The period 1000–1150 was marked by the assertion of independent political authority by the many urban centers

of northern and central Italy. The new millennium witnessed the revival of agriculture in northern Italy and this, along with expanding commercial connections, allowed Italian cities to expand into large, rich municipalities. The German emperors found themselves progressively unable to assert their authority over the old *regnum italicum*, whose residents were less and less likely to regard themselves as imperial subjects. The declining footprint of imperial authority after the millennium was partly a result of the extended absences of the emperors from Italy. After Henry IV's (r. 1084–1106) final Italian incursion, which, despite several imperial successes against Matilda of Tuscany, including the siege of Mantua in 1090, ended in failure in 1097, the emperors were rarely resident in the peninsula. The symbolic authority of the emperors was also adversely affected by the ongoing squabbles with the popes over investiture. The decline of the military, fiscal, and judicial infrastructure of the *regnum italicum* saw a host of local and regional sources of power flow into the vacuum. By 1150 across Tuscany and Lombardy there were dozens of such communal governments, boasting similar institutions with high rates of political participation.

The de facto autonomy of these cities is seen clearly in the independence of action they demonstrated in waging war. The claim to a monopoly of force, in policing, imposing justice, and above all waging war, was an important component of communal *libertas*. They assumed the right to gather booty and ransom, take prisoners, and conclude treaties with cosignatories near and far. They engaged in their own diplomacy and espionage.

The chronicles of the period tell of nearly ceaseless war between these burgeoning communes, rooted in territorial contest and enduring intercity rivalries. From an early date, communes sought to expand their territorial reach into the surrounding countryside, in order to secure food sources and supply routes, to reap the benefit of new taxes and tolls, and to gain access to human capital, for war and for labor. Such moves inevitably brought communes into competition and conflict with like-minded neighboring cities. Often, the military flashpoints would be the so-called *borghi nuovi*, newly founded settlements, frequently no more than garrisons planted in strategic locales, intended to be markers of a commune's territorial ambition and defensive emplacements on the periphery. Rivalries developed between contesting cities, and leagues and alliances of towns emerged. In Lombardy, for example, the rivalry between Milan and Pavia that spanned the twelfth and thirteenth centuries saw the other towns of Lombardy regularly pick and switch sides. A similar pattern can be seen in Tuscany, where the vicious enmity between Florence and Siena, along with their respective surrogates, regularly resulted in war between the two neighbors.

Conflict was so frequent because wars were so indecisive, a function of the great political fragmentation of the region and the high incidence of coalition warfare. The communes that emerged in the eleventh and twelfth centuries were organized to fight wars, used most of their tax revenue on military expenditure, and glorified war in their civic art and literature. Communal propagandists repeatedly emphasized the military capacity of a city's people and traded in a range of martial imagery to celebrate the city. Most cities adopted and displayed a *signa bellica*, a symbol that incorporated the imagery of war: trumpets, weapons, flags, and banners. The most important recurring military symbol employed by the communes was the *carroccio*, the war chariot first used in Milan in 1039; to lose a *carroccio* in battle was a disaster.

Urban chroniclers rarely hesitated to praise the strength and height of a city's walls, which were militarily functional but also a source of competition with neighboring communes. Cities spent large amounts on the upkeep of their walls and the burden was felt across the population.

The importance of such corporate martial symbols is a reminder that in the medieval commune, the sense of *campanilismo*, or shared local feeling, was rooted in self-defense, military service, and enmity for rival communes. Internal consolidation was encouraged by hatred of external enemies; the forging of the commune was in many ways a product of war and foreign relations.

The level of military obligation demanded of citizens in the Italian communes was considerable and required a sizable administrative and fiscal apparatus. Cavalry (the *milites pro commune*) formed the core of a commune's offensive force, although it came to be supplemented by crossbowmen in the thirteenth century. Cavalry service was generally demanded from all those who could afford it, usually based on the fiscal registers of the *estimo* assessment. In the merchant cities of Italy, this meant that quite large numbers of non-nobles were required either to serve in the cavalry or provide able substitutes. Some individuals who qualified might be excluded because of their personal ambition or association with a suspect faction. The extent and duration of cavalry service differed from locale to locale, as did the levels of remuneration and compensation for losses.

The infantry was drawn from the remainder of the population and might include all adult men under seventy. Republics emphasized militia duty and cast it as a patriotic service, imposing penalties for evasion. The organization of the infantry was customarily by neighborhood and led by local commanders. We learn from the Book of Montaperti, which catalogs the Florentine mobilization for its 1260 battle against Siena, that nearly all men were called for service. The obligations of military service also covered garrisoning in the *contado* (countryside) and not infrequently conscript labor for the construction and repair of city walls and fortifications.

Mercenaries always made up a portion of these communal forces, but toward the end of the period they frequently replaced civic militia. It was largely the technical and specialist demands of warfare that drove the demand for mercenaries. In addition, there is evidence in the thirteenth century of increased incidence of resistance to military service among the population. Initially, the mercenary forces raised were local, but as time passed, they were recruited from beyond the territorial reach of the commune. Communes employed "constables," usually feudal aristocrats from the *contado*, to raise a body of soldiers or a constabulary. Some sent recruiting agents far afield and eventually foreigners, especially from France and Germany, were employed in communal armies. Mercenary cavalry were also recruited, especially from the 1250s onward. The cavalry of the Guelph alliance in the final decades of the thirteenth century, for example, was made up almost entirely of foreigners, from France and Provençe primarily, but also with members from Spain and Germany. Wars between communes were thus no longer merely about the *campanilismo* of citizen armies. Armies became mixed bodies of mercenaries and local militia.

The employment of mercenaries required permanent regulatory bodies. It also required new laws and customs regarding the employment of mercenaries: standardization of contracts, pay scales, stipulations regarding horses, armor, and weaponry. By the beginning of the fourteenth century the *condotta*, the mercenary contract, was a standard feature of Italian warfare.

The general thrust of these changes was that the burden of military service was gradually commuted from personal duty to cash payment. The nobles continued to engage in military service, but for the rest militia service was now avoided through the remittance of money, both directly through substitution fees and indirectly through taxes. As Philip Jones has put it: "Military service was turning into a financial obligation—or in contemporary language from an *onus personale* into an *onus reale* or *mixtum*" (p. 390).

The Imperial Challenge. The intercommunal violence of medieval Italy was leavened by the repeated attempts of the Holy Roman emperors to restore their authority there. By the time Frederick I Barbarossa launched his campaigns in the middle of the twelfth century, towns elected their own leaders, ran their own judicial systems, gathered their own tax revenue, policed their own borders, and sent out their own ambassadors. Barbarossa wished to turn back the clock and restore the imperial authority exercised by his Ottonian predecessors. Barbarossa proved to be remarkably persistent in efforts that lasted over three decades. Much of his concern had to do with recouping lost tax revenue:

one of his chroniclers described Italy as "a garden of delights."

Hohenstaufen policy in Italy sought above all to divide and conquer. Emperors extended knightly privileges to nobles who allied with them and provided troops, and even supported popular parties when it proved advantageous. In 1153, in a treaty of mutual support with the pope at Constance, Barbarossa declared his intentions of confirming his feudal rights over his Italian underlings, as well as his designs on driving the Normans from the southern kingdom. In his first expedition into Italy, Barbarossa styled himself as the peacemaker, proclaiming his desire to settle the bitter differences between the cities of Lombardy. Instead, he managed to antagonize the most important Lombard city, Milan, as his troops looted the Lombard countryside. He proceeded to Rome for his coronation in June 1155 and promptly left Italy without meeting any of his stated goals: settling Lombardy, pacifying Rome, and evicting the Normans.

In his second Italian foray, Barbarossa decided to reclaim Lombardy as a part of his own personal domain. Accomplishing this would require Barbarossa to effect a radical attenuation of Italian municipal self-government. After defeating a Milanese-led alliance in 1158, which included a siege of Milan itself ended by a treaty in September, he felt emboldened to make a series of demands at the Imperial Diet of Roncaglia, where he insisted on the right to appoint agents of imperial authority (usually the *podestà*) throughout the old *regnum italicum* and demanded that the communes meet military obligations and pay an array of imperial dues, including tolls, a poll tax, and judicial fees. There was no way that the communes would accept such demands. To them, Barbarossa's attempts at *renovatio* looked like conquest.

In any event, the peace did not last and Frederick launched a new Italian campaign in 1159, laying siege to the city of Crema, which surrendered after fierce fighting in January 1160. Following the exertions of this victory, however, much of Frederick's army melted away, and the emperor was forced to rely on Italian allies. Frederick was now determined to crush Milan, taking to heart the saying "Take Milan and you have taken all." In the spring of 1160, the Milanese army pushed back Frederick's reduced force at Quinto Romano, causing him to retreat to Pavia. In August a Milanese army put the emperor to flight at the battle of Carcano, where the Milanese were besieging the strategically located castle. This victory, however, was a pyrrhic one for Milan and in May 1160, Frederick invested the city. Frederick offered the city unacceptably harsh terms, and the Milanese held out grimly until their surrender in May 1162, at which time Milan was subject to a brutal sack and largely destroyed.

Barbarossa's reassertion of imperial authority had a significant impact on communal identity. A widespread identification of *libertas* with opposition to imperial tyranny soon emerged. It is important to note, however, that the opposition to Barbarossa was far from universal. Some Italian cities, including Genoa, Pavia, and Lodi, all mortal enemies of Milan, chose to ally with Barbarossa. But what might seem like Barbarossa's greatest success, the destruction of Milan in 1162, was in fact a colossal miscalculation. The harshness of this action hardened the resolve of his opponents, who moved to form a political and military league to resist imperial pressure. In the immediate aftermath of the razing of Milan, for example, Barbarossa's agents carried out confiscations, dictated forced labor and new taxes, and took hostages as a pledge for good conduct. Formerly friendly cities such as Piacenza chose to join the antiimperial Lombard League when it was formed several years later. Even those cities that allied with Barbarossa were able to extract significant concessions and privileges from him. Genoa in 1162, for example, was exempted from imperial taxation and granted expanded self-government, thus slipping farther outside Barbarossa's orbit.

Barbarossa returned to Italy in 1166. In response, the first Lombard League was formed in 1167 and received the support of the deeply antiimperial Pope Alexander III (r. 1159–1181). Piqued by the papal opposition, Barbarossa marched straight to Rome, overwhelmed a Roman army that came out to face him,

and drove Alexander out of the city. But a deadly epidemic struck the emperor's army and the pope moved to excommunicate anyone who opposed the Lombard League.

The formation of the Lombard League demonstrated that these communes were willing to put aside their own substantial differences in the face of a common threat; it also made success for Barbarossa considerably less likely. The League, known as a *societas* by contemporaries, was primarily military and diplomatic in nature. Much of its activity consisted of negotiation over members' contributions to the League's armies and garrisons. The League also oversaw the reconstruction of the city of Milan and pooled its resources to resist a number of imperial sieges of important cities.

The military potential of the League was fully demonstrated when Barbarossa returned to Italy for the final time in 1174, with a largely mercenary army. His force destroyed a number of Lombard cities, but failed to take the fortress town of Alessandria (built purposely to impede the approaches to Lombardy used by Barbarossa and named provocatively after Barbarossa's archenemy Pope Alexander III). He negotiated another peace with the League at Montebello in April 1175, but resistance continued. The army of the League defeated the imperial army in the only major pitched battle of the struggle at Legnano in May 1176.

By 1183 it was clear that Barbarossa's efforts had failed; the Italian cities had defeated him politically, diplomatically, and, most important, militarily. In subsequent years Barbarossa was forced to compromise with the northern communes and to deal with them as with sovereign equals. When a formal peace did come at the Treaty of Constance in 1187, it represented a humiliation for Barbarossa. None of his demands at Roncaglia were put into effect. The *status quo ante* was essentially restored and the communes were effectively allowed to rule themselves. Barbarossa's actions over three decades, which Philip Jones has called "a self-defeating mixture of savagery and acquiescence" (p. 338), had ended up doing far more to strengthen the communes than the empire.

The Lombard League that faced Barbarossa proved to be a model for future alliances between cities. After the Peace of Constance, emperors retained sufficient prerogatives that complaints could still be heard about imperial tyranny, and cities from time to time form new leagues to face down imperial aspirations, as during Otto IV of Welf's (r. 1198–1215 dep.) ill-fated invasion of Italy in 1210. Like the first Lombard League, such alliances dealt with the military obligations of coalition warfare, the length of the campaigning season, the division of resources and costs, and the composition of the army. Decisions on these matters were made at so-called *parlamenti*, gatherings of representatives of the component members.

Imperial pressure on northern Italy was renewed in 1225–1250 by Frederick II, who was both Holy Roman Emperor (r. 1215–1250) and king of southern Italy and Sicily (r. 1215–1250). In the early years of his reign as emperor, Frederick II focused on reestablishing royal control over his southern domains. He reaffirmed royal privileges and nullified concessions made since the death of King William II (r. 1166–1189). He also waged a military campaign against the Muslims of western Sicily in 1221–1223. By 1225 he had brought the southern kingdom largely under his authority. By this time, however, tensions were growing once again between the emperor and the northern Italian communes. A new Lombard League blocked the Alpine passes to German forces, greatly complicating Frederick's plans to go on crusade to fulfill a promise he had made to Pope Honorius III (r. 1216–1227). Honorius eventually brokered a peace between Frederick and the communes in March 1227, and Frederick finally went on crusade the following year, having been crowned as king of Jerusalem in March 1229.

Frederick's stay in the Holy Land was brief, however, for he soon received news of an invasion of his southern Italian kingdom by the new pope, Gregory IX (r. 1227–1241), who wished to rule the kingdom directly himself. Frederick was able to restore control quickly upon his return, and at the peace of San Germano and Ceprano in 1230, he had his

Venetian Victory. The Venetian fleet defeating Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa's troops, twelfth century. Fresco by Aretino Luca Spinelli, 1407. PALAZZO PUBBLICO, SIENA, ITALY/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

excommunication lifted in return for acknowledging papal suzerainty over the kingdom.

An uneasy peace continued for the next five years, but gradually the differences between Frederick and the communes (who could now count on Pope Gregory's support) led to war. In 1235 Frederick crushed a revolt in Germany by his son Henry and in its aftermath was able to secure the support of the German princes for a campaign against the Lombard League. On this occasion, Frederick II launched his efforts from southern Italy, rather than from Germany. His goal was nothing less than rule over the entire peninsula. The campaigns of Frederick II were fundamentally contests between the monarchy of southern Italy and the Guelph-aligned republics of the north. They proved no more successful than those of Barbarossa had been. The opposition to the emperor was again led by Milan, this time supported by the popes. Gregory IX excommunicated Frederick in March 1239, preached the crusade against him, and even convened a general council to explore deposing him. Frederick sought better relations with Innocent IV (r. 1243–1254), but Innocent charged Frederick with heresy, sacrilege, and violation of church liberties.

The emperor enjoyed some early success, but the collective opposition of the communes halted and then reversed imperial gains. As in the struggle with Frederick I, some Italian towns supported the emperor, although there were few consistently Ghibelline (i.e., pro-imperial) cities. When Frederick II was able to take a city, it was often because the Ghibelline party had betrayed the city to him; the surrender of the starving city of Faenza after a six-month siege in 1240–1241 is a notable exception. His sieges otherwise were mostly failures, most ignominiously at Parma in 1247–1248, during which the entire imperial treasury was lost. In general, Frederick II's cavalry was superior to that of his Italian adversaries but the nature of warfare gave it little opportunity to demonstrate its supremacy. League generals avoided decisive engagements, pursuing strategic maneuver and entrenchment. The only major pitched battle of Frederick II's Italian wars occurred at the battle of Cortenuova in 1237, where imperial forces were victorious. But like his grandfather before him, Frederick II squandered any good will by exacting harsh terms, which ended up prolonging the war. The final decade of Frederick's wars dragged on inconclusively in a bloody stalemate, recorded by chroniclers with horror. The death of Frederick II in 1250, of dysentery while on campaign, spelled an end to imperial operations in the north of Italy.

In the aftermath of the death of Frederick II, the imperial connection with the Sicilian kingdom was severed and very little imperial administrative infrastructure was left in Italy. Despite desultory efforts by emperors in the fourteenth century, the residue of imperial influence was little more than the dispensation of titles and the enduring name of Ghibelline attached to certain urban parties. In the end, the efforts of the Fredericks made little or no difference in the ability of the emperors to assert their authority in Italy.

The role of the papacy was comparable—it, too, was seeking to assert its own temporal sovereignty over parts of Italy and was a partner in antiimperial coalitions. Many communities understandably regarded the popes as petty tyrants seeking to snuff out their independence. Throughout the Central Middle Ages the papacy sought not only to limit imperial influence in Italy but also to reassert control over the papal states in the center of the peninsula. This process of territorial consolidation was fitful and incomplete. Popes in the eleventh century initiated a process of encastellation across the papal lands. Initially, the castles were concentrated in Lazio, but in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries popes established fortifications in the northern and southern reaches of the papal state as well. By 1300 popes had established a papal state in central Italy, but like the emperors, their claims to political leadership of the peninsula were hollow. The papal state itself had largely become a protectorate of Angevin rulers, with the freedom of action of the popes deeply circumscribed by their dependence on French support.

The warfare practiced in the campaigns of northern and central Italy differed little from that seen

elsewhere in Europe. There were few pitched battles during this long period of conflict, as defense had largely mastered the attack. Most engagements consisted of siege or maneuver, as commanders were reluctant to commit their armies to the dangers of open warfare. The strength and ubiquity of fortresses across Italy, the most encastellated region of Europe, choked offensive activity. There were very few sieges that ended in a successful assault; when a place fell, it was almost invariably due to hunger or treachery. Sieges were dispiriting, costly, and time-consuming and the besieging army often suffered as much or more than the defenders. It was the necessity to invest so many fortresses that, as much as any other factor, ground down the war efforts of the emperors in Italy in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. And when the emperors did succeed in destroying castles or urban citadels, their adversaries invariably rebuilt them.

While the infantry of Italy probably compared favorably to that elsewhere in Europe, Italian cavalry was inferior to the German and French units against which it fought, one of the reasons for the rise in the employment of foreign cavalry in the thirteenth century. It was the actions of Lombard footsoldiers that decided the battle of Legnano in 1176 against Barbarossa and made possible the defeat of Frederick II some sixty years later.

Italian infantry, especially troops from maritime republics, became highly skilled in the use of the crossbow. This led to their employment in warfare in the early campaigns of the Crusades, most notably the Latin conquest of the Syrian coast. Italian mercenary crossbowmen would later be found at notable battles such as Courtrai (1302) and Sluys (1340).

Internal Violence. In truth, the majority of organized violence perpetrated during this period was not between cities but within them. Medieval Italian communes were often at war with themselves. The warfare in the streets and in the *contadi* of Italy's cities was a contest of party, faction, and family. In the simplest terms, violence was a function of the powerful men of the community pursuing dominance by intimidation. Their efforts were inevitably opposed by fellow magnates. One side or the other would enlist the popular elements of society in the name of stopping the excesses. When the popular party assumed power, as it did in many cities in the thirteenth century, it often systematically sought to crack down on the violence of the magnates, fining or exiling the grossest offenders, banning the carrying and brandishing of weapons, and limiting the display of aristocratic insignia. For example, when a regime of the *popolo* assumed power in Florence in 1293, it excluded magnates from positions in the government and instituted the office of the gonfalonier of justice, designed to crack down on noble violence.

The violent noble rivalries are an indication that the urban communes of Italy were not as divorced from the feudal competition typical of the rest of Europe as they might first seem. Landowning, with all of its knightly aspects, remained an important source of power in Italy. War and martial imagery were intimately bound up with communal identities, and the ethos of chivalry and knighthood were also pervasive.

As elsewhere in Europe, this noble military class had a keen sense of its own social position and expressed it eagerly and brutally, including in its pitiless contempt for social inferiors. Traveling with a military retinue, such men regarded themselves as above the law. What was different in Italy was that the knightly class was not necessarily defined by the identifiers seen elsewhere in western Europe. There were many men wealthy enough to be bound to cavalry service who were not noble in the strictest terms. These men, by virtue of their wealth, influence, and cavalry service, became noble by reputation and served as *milites pro commune*.

Noble identity, of course, extended to whole families and kinship groups. Although communal oligarchies offered high levels of political participation, it was a truism that there were too few influential offices for all the major families to hold important positions at the same time. As a result, families formed clans, or *consorterie*, to protect their interests. These associations offered mutual protection and support against rivals and also served to

mediate disputes between clan members. They also created the fault lines along which urban violence occurred.

The emergence of mutually antipathetic clans was often rooted in longstanding family rivalries and resentment. They were often linked with competition for financial and economic advantage within the commune. In addition, clans often reflected secondary associations with papacy or empire. The expeditions of Barbarossa in Italy were highly polarizing inside many Italian cities. Antiimperial magnates often made common cause with the papacy against imperial influence. The famous associations of Guelph and Ghibelline first emerged as specific party designations in the 1240s; by 1250 the labels were widely used across north and central Italy. Whatever straightforward association there might have been between Guelphism and the papacy and of Ghibellinism and the empire was soon muddied beyond any easy categorization, especially after the final defeat of Conradin Hofenstaufen by Charles of Anjou in 1268; parties soon became strictly about the exercise of power. Guelphs generally favored governments that were republican and decentralized, while Ghibellines preferred monarchy and Italian unity under the Empire. From the mid-thirteenth century onward, some Guelph parties created links with the *popolo*, the prosperous non-noble elements seeking to assert their own political influence. Such an alliance was formed in Florence, for example, following the Ghibelline seizure of power after their victory at the battle of Montaperti in 1260. Guelphs also tended to be more favorably inclined to Angevin interests in Italy. In the cities of central and northern Italy where Guelphs triumphed in the late thirteenth century, following the defeat of the Ghibelline cities by Florence at the battle of Campaldino in 1289, the Guelph party inevitably then itself splintered, as happened in Dante Alighieri's Florence in 1295–1300.

The architectural embodiment of such intracommunal violence was the urban fortified towers, which started appearing on the skylines of Italian cities toward the end of the eleventh century. These towers were declarations of family power and identity, and were designed to intimidate rivals. Daniel Waley calls such towers "quasi-military domestic architecture." Violence and vendettas between *consorterie* inside the cities were often centered on these towers. Chronicles tell of fighting in and around such towers, even of siege artillery being used in the city streets and of engagements between rival towers on the upper levels. The destruction of towers and noble palaces served to deprive rivals of physical refuge and to humiliate them symbolically.

Communal governments, aware of the provocative symbolic nature of noble towers, issued regulations regarding their construction, seeking to constrain their height and control the provocation that they caused. Such statutes were part of a broader effort on the part of the commune to control this rampant noble violence. Other legislation sought to limit the size of noble retinues and *consortorie*, to ban oaths of loyalty, and to prohibit the public display of noble insignia and brandishing of weapons.

War and the Weakness of the Communes. The endemic violence of the communal period of Italian history is a reminder of the shortcomings of communal rule. The greatest failure of the republics was their inability to produce stable regimes. There has been more than a whiff of romanticizing in the historiography of the medieval Italian communes and republics. As Daniel Waley has stressed, however, the medieval Italian city-state was in fact a dead-end, rather than an antecedent for the modern nation-state; it conferred no political posterity. Many in Italy disliked republicanism intensely, associating it with chaos and avarice. The ambition of clans, families, and individuals was at the root of the disorder that plagued the medieval commune. It is telling that Milan, which had taken the lead in the defense of liberty against the emperors, also led the way in the creation of the principate, a reaction against the intractable party violence that racked the city.

Such systemic disorder led directly to the emergence of new lords across Italy, the so-called *signori*, and the decline of the communal regimes toward the end of the period. More often than not, the *signore* was a nobleman of notable lineage, who might have held high office or been a constable responsible

for raising a commune's army. He had often distinguished himself by his military ability. The seizure of power was opportunistic, but it was also often welcomed as a step toward ending communal violence and disorder. After amending or abolishing civic statues that limited his authority, before long all of the levers of governmental power would be concentrated in the *signore*'s hands.

Around the year 1300, in what Trevor Dean has called "a sort of permanent revolution," unstable communes across northern Italy yielded to lordships. Such changes could be violent or relatively bloodless. In multiple cases, the *signori* emerged out of a clash between the *popolo* and the nobility. Of course, not all republics became despotisms. Venice, Genoa, and Florence built oligarchical regimes rather than principates.

Nearly everywhere they achieved lordship, the *signori* deliberately cultivated the courtly and chivalric trappings of the feudal aristocracy. The association of the political authority of the lords with military power was constantly reinforced—through the cultivation of military reputations, castle building, and the use of martial imagery. Like the communes before them, the *signori* sought to legitimate their regimes by associating them with war and military success.

The Normans in the South. The political and cultural changes in the south of Italy were profound. In 1000 much of southern Italy was still regarded as Byzantine, Sicily was a Muslim island, and old Lombard cities such as Salerno, Capua, and Benevento were effectively independent. By 1300 all of southern Italy was part of one of two Latin Christian kingdoms. The most important actors in forging these changes were the Normans, whose intervention in Italian affairs is one of the more remarkable episodes in medieval history. By the 1040s Norman warriors had established themselves in the region as mercenaries, fighting for whoever was willing to pay them. The Norman story in Italy began as one of brigandage; Robert Gillingham has described the typical Norman strategy. It involved seizing a castle, using it as a base of operations, and terrorizing the surrounding countryside. In 1041, Normans in conjunction with some northern Italian allies seized Melfi and then consolidated their position in Apulia after defeating a sizable Byzantine force at Cannae, not far from the coast at Barletta. It was the sons of Tancred de Hauteville (980–1041), Robert Guiscard (1015–1085) and Roger de Hauteville (1031–1101), who established the Normans as a political force in southern Italy in the second half of the eleventh century.

The pressure of the Normans in the south proved irresistible. The popes opposed the Normans at their peril. In 1053 Pope Leo IX organized a coalition of Byzantine and Lombards and personally led his army against Robert Guiscard, who was able to unite the disparate Norman lords in the region. The papal army, which included a Swabian contingent, was defeated at the battle of Civitate in June 1053. Leo was captured, the first of several disastrous episodes of high medieval popes leading their own military campaigns, and was forced to recognize the territorial conquests of Robert and Richard of Capua. In return for these land grants, the Normans pledged to support and defend the papacy. Just as importantly, the pope gave the Normans permission to undertake the conquest of Sicily. Because of Seljuk pressure in Anatolia, the Byzantines were no longer able to assert their presence in southern Italy, and the Normans took advantage of this. Robert, now duke of a powerful state in Apulia and Calabria, seized the towns of Reggio, Brindisi, and Taranto in 1061. Roger de Hauteville led the bulk of the campaign into Sicily. Over the next thirty years the two brothers would systematically conquer southern Italy. The important Byzantine center at Bari fell after a three-year siege (1068–1071), followed by Amalfi in 1073. In Sicily, a focus of Norman attention was Palermo, by far the island's largest town. Robert and Roger undertook a three-month siege in 1064, but had too few men and inadequate naval support. The two brothers renewed their efforts to take the town in 1071. This time they had sufficient forces to invest Palermo by land and sea. At the end of a five-month siege, the city was stormed successfully in January 1072. Still, it took twenty years for the Normans to complete their conquest of the island.

It was a slog, as the size of Norman forces committed remained small and Muslim strongholds proved difficult to take. Roger, who was now in charge of the Sicily campaign, was repeatedly called back to the mainland to deal with rebellions there and he himself regularly faced disputes among the Normans in Sicily. Roger finally felt able, in 1086, to launch a combined sea and land assault on Syracuse. He himself commanded the fleet that defeated the naval force led by the emir Ibn el-Werd; the town itself held out another four months before surrendering. The whole island was in Norman hands by 1091.

Flush with his Italian successes, Robert felt strong enough to lead two campaigns against the Byzantine Empire. In 1081 he placed Dyracchium (Durazzo) in Albania under siege. At first he was thwarted by naval defeat at the hands of the Venetians, but he managed to take the town the following year after defeating a Byzantine force. Subsequent Norman gains in Macedonia and Thessaly were quickly reversed when Robert was forced to return to Italy to face the incursion of the Holy Roman Emperor Henry IV. The latter of Robert's two Byzantine campaigns, launched in the fall of 1084, was far less successful. Following a hard fought naval victory against a joint Venetian-Byzantine fleet off Corfu, much of Robert's force was stricken with an epidemic in the bitter winter cold. Robert himself fell ill and died at Cephalonia in July 1085, bringing the Norman campaign in Albania and Greece to an abrupt halt.

The Normans exerted an important influence on the investiture controversy. Without Norman protection, popes could not have opposed the emperors so persistently. Still, the popes remained wary of the Norman presence in Italy and sought to limit their influence. In 1084 Pope Gregory VII (r. 1073–1085) appealed for Robert Guiscard's aid when the Emperor Henry IV marched on Rome. Robert left his ongoing siege of Dyracchium (Durrës), as mentioned above, rescued Gregory, allowing him to escape to Salerno, and drove off the imperial army. The Normans, however, proceeded to sack Rome pitilessly, and Gregory died in humiliation at Salerno. By the end of the century the two brothers had transformed the political map of southern Italy. The Normans were ruthless conquerors but also took care to preserve institutions they thought might be useful—Sicily was gradually Latinized with the migration of Lombards from the mainland, and the kingdom became one of western Europe's most politically and culturally influential centers. Norman power in practice, however, remained decentralized, with several Norman lords sharing power.

This began to change with Roger II (1095–1154, King of Sicily 1130), who succeeded his father Roger in 1101. Roger II would dominate Norman affairs in Italy for the next half century. After he reached his majority in 1112, Roger began to consolidate the various Norman territories of southern Italy. In 1127 he laid claim to both the mainland and island holdings. Roger dealt with a series of revolts among his nobles—tensions between the monarch and barons would become a trademark of the southern kingdoms—and in one of these he suffered an ignominious defeat to the rebellious Robert of Capua and Rainulf of Alife at the battle of Nocera in 1132. Roger was even ousted briefly by an alliance of barons and the Holy Roman Emperor Lothair (1075–1137, King of the Germans 1125, Holy Roman Emperor 1133) in 1137. But by 1140 Lothair was dead, and Roger had defeated and captured in battle Pope Innocent II (r. 1130–1143), another unsuccessful warrior pope. Innocent reconciled with Roger, who had supported the anti-pope Anacletus II, and reluctantly confirmed him as king of Sicily.

Under Roger's successors, William I (r. 1154–1166) and William II (r. 1166–1189), the Norman kingdom remained unified but monarchical power waned. William I turned away papal and imperial invasions of his kingdom in the 1160s. William II largely kept the peace in Italy, but his forces engaged in military operations across the Mediterranean. He fought against the Muslims in Egypt, Tunis, and Majorca, and contributed a fleet to the Third Crusade in 1189. He also launched an attack against the Byzantine Empire in 1185, which led to the seizure of Dyracchium and Thessalonike and an unsuccessful march on Constantinople. More importantly for the long term, in 1184 William II negotiated a marriage between Roger II's daughter and Henry, the son of

the Holy Roman Emperor, Frederick Barbarossa. It was through this marriage that Henry would later claim the throne of southern Italy and Sicily. In 1194 Henry marched on Palermo, removed the Norman child-king, and had himself crowned king. The Norman phase of southern Italy's history had come to an end, and the Hohenstaufen period had begun. Henry's heir was Frederick II, who was crowned king of Sicily at age three in 1198. His lengthy minority was turbulent, and much of it was spent subduing his German lands. Frederick returned to his Italian kingdom in 1220, intent on a path that would lead him into conflict with much of the rest of Italy.

The Angevins and Italy. The demise of the Hohenstaufen imperial project in Italy with the death of Frederick II coincided with the emergence of another potential hegemon: France. In the second half of the thirteenth century French dominion penetrated every part of Italian territory. Starting with Charles I Anjou (1226–1285, King of Sicily 1266), a new political landscape emerged, whereby France became the heir to empire in Italy. In a curious turnabout, the designation Guelph came to signify alignment with the French, who now encouraged the imperial designs of the House of Anjou, in conjunction with the papacy.

By the 1260s the popes had for some time been making committed efforts to undermine Hohenstaufen rule in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies and hunted around for a suitable pro-papal candidate. In 1265 Pope Clement IV (r. 1265–1268), confirming a proposal made by his predecessor Urban IV (r. 1261–1264), offered Charles of Anjou the Kingdom of Sicily and a sizable grant of money, and declared any campaign to claim the throne a crusade against an enemy of the faith. Charles was only too happy to take up the pontiff's offer and he mustered an army, made up almost entirely of French and Provençal troops, for an invasion of the southern kingdom with the intention of displacing Manfred (r. 1258–1266). He arrived in Rome in 1265, and at the battle of Benevento in 1266, Charles's army was victorious and Manfred killed. Charles then claimed the southern kingdom as his own.

The transfer of land and power to French and Provençal nobles that occurred in the South after Charles's victory created a well of discontent among the baronage. In 1267 Sicily and the Muslim community at Lucera revolted against Charles. Charles moved south in early 1268 and undertook a siege of Lucera, which he broke off when he received news that Manfred's sixteen-year-old successor Conradin (1252–1268) had launched an invasion to exploit dissatisfaction with Charles and restore Hohenstaufen rule. Conradin led a force of German knights, augmented by Italian mercenaries and Spanish men-at-arms under Henry of Castile (1230–1304). Henry seized Rome, and managed to turn back an Angevin relief column. Conradin's army, however, was caught in the Abruzzi by Charles while seeking to cross the Apennines into the southern kingdom. At the battle of Tagliacozzo, Charles won a hard-fought victory. Conradin fled back to Rome, but was captured and executed a few weeks later while trying to escape by sea. By 1270, Lucera, too, was back in Charles's hands.

Naples now became the capital of a new Angevin kingdom in southern Italy, as power moved away from Sicily. Charles's Neapolitan realm was only part of a vast Angevin patrimony that stretched from France through Italy to the Latin Kingdom of Constantinople, carved out of the old Byzantine Empire. With it came enormous military commitments: in a few short years, Charles found himself on crusade in Tunis and in Egypt, on campaigns in Burgundy, Flanders, and Sardinia, and fighting against the Byzantines in the East. It all proved too much to manage with any real authority. Angevin control over Sicily proved short-lived. The harsh government of Charles of Anjou and the resentment of many Sicilians at seeing the center of power in the kingdom shift to Naples led the uprising that began in March 1282 in a series of events in and around Palermo. The subsequent War of the Sicilian Vespers ended up creating two rival kingdoms. Peter III of Aragon (1240–1285, King of Sicily 1282) was invited by the Sicilian parliament to take the crown of the island kingdom, and after his landing at Trapani in August 1282, he met little resistance in subduing it

the island. Charles II of Anjou found it impossible to dislodge the Aragonese from Sicily and died in 1284 while planning a counteroffensive.

The success of the House of Aragon in establishing itself in Sicily was greatly aided by the remarkable exploits of the admiral of Aragon, Ruggiero di Lauria (1245–1305). In 1283, di Lauria's naval force, though outnumbered, destroyed most of Charles of Anjou's fleet, which was mustering for an assault on Sicily, at the battle of Malta. In 1284 di Lauria lured the Angevin fleet commanded by Charles of Salerno out of its anchor in Naples and defeated it in deep water, capturing all of the enemy vessels. The Aragonese naval superiority in the War of the Sicilian Vespers was confirmed by further victories of di Lauria at the battle of Las Hormigas (1285), the battle of the Counts (1289), and the battle of Cape Orlando (1299).

The two southern kingdoms had patrons outside Italy, in the Houses of Anjou and Barcelona. The recurrent baronial instability, along with the willingness of the extra-Italian patrons to act on their ambitions, meant that warfare became endemic in southern Italy in the ensuing period. Although the War of the Sicilian Vespers ended in 1302 with the Treaty of Caltabellotta, confirming that the kingdom would be divided, for the next two centuries the south became Italy's most violent area, so much so that David Abulafia has called the period of disorder a "two hundred years war."

The Venetian-Genoese Naval Antagonism. In the eleventh and twelfth centuries, Italian merchants played an increasingly prominent role in Mediterranean trade. The Venetians led the way, and inevitably its war galleys soon followed, as seen in the role they played in the Fourth Crusade of 1204. After 1250, the predominant role of Venice in the eastern Mediterranean was challenged by the Genoese. The Genoese had begun their maritime expansion later than Venice and had focused naturally on the western Mediterranean. But the opportunities that opened up in the east in the wake of the Crusades drew in Genoese galleys and by the mid-thirteenth century, the Genoese were established at ports such as Acre and Tyre. This brought the two maritime states into conflict, whereas before their rivalry had been tempered by their mutual suspicion of the other significant Italian maritime power, Pisa.

The first Genoese-Venetian naval conflict was touched off by a series of squabbles around Acre in 1257. A Venetian war fleet under Lorenzo Tiepolo then forced its way into the harbor and burned the Genoese ships anchored there. When the Genoese fleet arrived in 1258, the Venetian force sailed out to meet it and destroyed half of the enemy's ships. Soon the Venetian position in the East was at risk once again, however, when the Latin emperors in Constantinople, installed since 1204, were deposed by the Greek claimant Michael Palaiologos. Michael was supported in his efforts by Genoa, which deployed its fleet to prevent a Venetian attack on Constantinople. It was not until 1263 at the battle of Settepozzi that the two again engaged in large numbers; the result was a decisive Venetian victory. The Genoese avoided battle for the next two years, but could not evade a Venetian attack at the battle of Trapani, off Sicily, in 1266, at which thousands of Genoese sailors died seeking to swim to shore.

Venice was thus victorious in all the major engagements of the first Venetian-Genoese war, but overall its position was little improved. Genoese raids on Venetian shipping continued, and Venice had lost its privileged trading position in Constantinople. Peace came in 1270 only when King Louis IX of France threatened to confiscate Genoese ships in France if they were not made available for his planned crusade.

Over the next two decades, while not at war, Venice and Genoa eyed each other warily. Genoa continued its naval and commercial expansion and crushed Pisan sea power at the battle of Meloria in 1284, thereby confirming Genoese supremacy in the Tyrrhenian Sea. The Venice-Genoa contest in the Mediterranean would continue into the fourteenth century.

[*See also* Bari, Siege of; Benevento, Battle of; Charles of Anjou; Civitate, Battle of; Cortenova, Battle of; Crema, Siege of; Dyrrachium, Siege of (1081);

Frederick I Barbarossa; Frederick II; Genoese-Venetian Wars, *subentry on* First War: Legnano, Battle of; Lombard League; Lucera, Siege of; Milan, Sieges of; Norman Conquests, Norman Expansion; Palermo, Sieges of; Robert Guiscard; Roger I; Sicilian Vespers , The; *and* Tagliacozzo, Battle of.]

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Paul M. Dover

Narrative (1300–1493)

In the year 1300, Italy was a cultural notion, rather than a political unit. In the central Middle Ages, Italy had essentially been divided into two kingdoms, the Holy Roman Empire in the north and the Sicilies in the south, separated by the patrimony of Saint Peter (the papal states) in the center of the peninsula. Following the death of the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II in 1250, the long imperial absences in northern Italy unleashed political energies and fragmentation. In the south, the political unity wrought by the Norman conquests of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, which had created the *Regnum siciliae*, was torn apart by the War of the Sicilian Vespers starting in 1282. Throughout much of the thirteenth century, Italian politics had remained very much a question of the empire: the north was still part of the imperial unit, while the Kingdom of Sicily in the south was ruled by the Swabian branch of the imperial family. But the inability of the Hohenstaufen emperors to assert their hegemony and the advent of the House of Anjou in the southern kingdom radically altered this dynamic. The opening decades of the fourteenth century witnessed the last concerted efforts of medieval emperors to assert their authority over northern Italy, culminating in the expedition of Emperor Louis IV (Lewis of Bavaria) in 1327–1329. With direct imperial influence largely at an end, central and northern Italy became a patchwork of variably autonomous communes, lordships, and ecclesiastical states. The absence of imperial authority led not only to political fragmentation but also to considerable strife both within and between Italian states in the decades that followed, strife that Petrarch scorned as madness in his *Italia mia*.

In the long term such disorder would paradoxically make the period one of territorial consolidation, whereby regimes conquered and absorbed smaller polities while strengthening internal administration



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and reducing the temperature of factional conflicts. The rise of such "regional states," as they have been termed by Giorgio Chittolini, is perhaps the most important political development of this period, and one that was largely complete by the end of the fifteenth century.

Warfare was central to this process. Armed conflict between the many mutually competitive and contentious states and towns of Italy had been commonplace in the central Middle Ages. The financial and military pressures produced by these conflicts had important repercussions for

communal government in Italy in the years around 1300. The general trend was that communes proved insufficiently strong to cope with the cocktail of internal and external challenges facing them. It became common during times of crisis for individuals to emerge, prominent figures who secured "special powers" for the purpose of settling factional conflicts, giving continuity to governance, and providing for communal defense. In many cases, these individuals would then secure hereditary rights for their family, often confirming them with a compact for imperial or papal investiture. Most such *signori* (lords) were local strongmen hailing from old aristocratic families who could boast a significant territorial base and a strong military retinue whose service was indispensable to the security of the state—such was the route to power of lords such as the Visconti in Milan (granted an imperial vicariate in 1311), the Este in Ferrara (a papal vicariate from 1329), and the Malatesta in Rimini (a papal vicariate in 1355).

The Growth of the Mercenary Companies. The nearly incessant warfare between the towns of Italy created opportunities for lucrative and near-permanent employment for men of war. Until the end of the thirteenth century, militia companies still formed a large part of the armies in Italy. But by 1300, the knights of the militia levies, men wealthy enough to provide their own armor and steed in return for communal privileges, became a significantly less attractive option. They were by definition amateurs, many of them were deeply committed to the factional conflict that wracked Italian cities, and their battlefield role was undermined by the increased use of infantry weapons such as the steel crossbow. It became clear that many militia felt that they had an insufficient stake in the fate of their communes to die for them. While militia might still be employed in short campaigns, communes increasingly turned to professional mercenaries for extended conflicts. Communes in Italy had long used mercenaries to augment civic levies of militia and to man permanent garrisons in territories seized by expansion in the frequent wars. The rise of the *signorie* (lordships) in Italy further encouraged the use of mercenaries, as did the relative weakness of the pope and emperor, both of whom hired mercenaries as they sought to rebuild their sovereignty. The large number of potential employers in Italy, the great wealth of the peninsula, and the long campaigning season, were all attractions that drew in mercenaries from across Europe to the peninsula in the opening decades of the fourteenth century, leading to the creation of the organized mercenary companies that came to dominate fourteenth-century warfare in Italy.

Such companies, who described themselves as "societies," acted as collectives, usually under the leadership of a single, charismatic captain. The captains would negotiate contracts for their companies with states or alliances of states. By the second decade of the fourteenth century, these companies were a prominent feature of the Italian political landscape. A preference in hiring non-Italian companies soon became evident. Italian companies were often feared more and hated less than foreign ones. They were more likely to be compromised by factional commitments and were less easily bought off than non-Italian companies. Thus in the first half of the fourteenth century, the leadership and rank and file of the companies operating in Italy were largely non-Italian. These groups tended to build themselves around specific nationalities. Germans were particularly well represented—more than seven hundred German cavalry leaders have been identified as active in Italy in the period 1320–1370, with as many as ten thousand German men-at-arms. The most celebrated German commanders were Werner of Urslingen (c. 1308–1353) and Konrad of Landau (d. 1363), who, along with the Provençal Montreal d'Albarno (1303–1354), commanded the Great Company, which for some twenty years during the mid-century terrorized cities in Italy, taking huge monies in spoil and ransom, including a staggering 500,000 florins after its victory at the battle of Meleto in 1349. After about 1360, free companies from the ongoing conflicts of the Hundred Years' War in France began to find their way into the Italian theater. Many of these soldiers were English and Breton.

Initially, at least, companies would be hired primarily for short terms, when a commune or prince wished to supplement the fighting power of its army. Under such conditions, in which the commune would dismiss the company following the closing of the campaign season, it became very difficult to disband them. The companies were money-making ventures, and most of the profit was realized in booty and extortion; there was a distinctly entrepreneurial quality in their blackmail. Growing to great size, these bands ended up acting as states in their own right, but with no fixed abode, and supported themselves through the serial extortion of Italian towns. Companies conducted their raiding and depredations with considerable forethought and planning; itineraries were chosen for maximum profitability. Such was the *modus operandi* of the most famous of these companies, that of John Hawkwood (1320–1394), composed largely of English expatriates. For several decades, Hawkwood's men raised huge quantities of cash by blackmailing vulnerable communes and *signorie*. But Hawkwood was also known for rapidity of maneuver, his handling of infantry, and the organization and discipline of his troops. His service was in great demand, and at one time or another he served Pisa, Padua, the pope, Milan, and Florence. It was for Padua, in 1387 at the battle of Castagnaro, that Hawkwood perhaps best demonstrated his great tactical ability in defeating the forces of Verona.

Such tactical victories were few and far between, however, as wars in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries tended to be long, drawn out affairs that involved a great amount of maneuver and few large-scale direct engagements. The shovel was as important as the pike, as huge amounts of earth were moved in the construction of field fortifications. Commanders tended not to seek pitched battle unless they could assure considerable numerical advantage at the point of attack. Such circumspection meant that armies in the field were there as much to apply economic and political pressure as to deliver military blows. Often the hope was that the threat of military action might encourage rebellion or sow internal discord amid the factionalized landscape of late medieval Italian politics. When pitched battle did occur, it was bloody and intense, but generally short, such that overall casualty rates remained low.

This style of warfare also emphasized the importance of holding strategic fortified towns and citadels, and thus much of the military activity consisted of prolonged sieges. Indeed, warfare in this period was characterized by its nearly incessant nature—low levels of violence were expected even in times of peace.

War and Politics in Northern Italy in the Fourteenth Century. The social and economic crisis brought about by the arrival of the Black Death in Italy in 1348–1349 coincided with an extended period of political and military strife in the peninsula. For a hundred years, from about 1340, the political and military history of northern Italy was dominated by the expansionist aspirations of the Visconti dynasty in Milan. Matteo I Visconti (r. 1294–1322), who built up his lordship in the Po Valley, transformed his state into an aggressive power, taking advantage of the political vacuum present in northern Italy. The Visconti became imperial vicars in Milan and de facto leaders of the Ghibelline party in Italy. The Visconti's efforts at expanding their territorial base outward from Lombardy waxed and waned, but the Visconti threat remained a constant in Italian geopolitics for over a century. Starting with the reign of Luchino Visconti (r. 1339–1349), Milan was led by a series of competent and ambitious rulers who sought to expand Milanese territory. Luchino defeated his rival for rule in Milan, Lodrisio Visconti (c. 1280–1364), at the battle of Parabiago in 1340 and then extended Visconti rule eastward, taking the city of Parma in a war of 1344–1346. His successor, Giovanni (d. 1354), who was also archbishop of Milan, pressed Visconti claims beyond Lombardy, succeeding in making himself lord of Bologna. Wars followed between Milan and Florence in 1351–1353, between Milan and the papacy in 1362–1364, between Milan and a combination of the papacy and Florence in 1369–1370, and between Milan (now allied with Florence) and the papacy in 1375–1378. Only some of the territorial gains of the Visconti in these conflicts

proved permanent, but their successes demonstrated all too clearly to the rest of Italy the dangers of Milanese expansionism.

The Florentine republic acted as the regional expansionist power in central Italy. Florence sought to assert its control over all of Tuscany, absorbing Prato, Pistoia, and Arezzo in the fourteenth century. Repeated efforts at taking Siena and Lucca met with failure, including a crushing defeat at the hands of the lord of Lucca, Castruccio Castracani (1281–1328) at the battle of Altopascio in 1325. Pisa was finally taken in 1406, and Florence acquired a major Tyrhennian port at Livorno in 1414. Florence was also motivated by the desire to counter the ambitions of the popes, who sought to consolidate their control over territories in central Italy. Until 1375, Florence usually allied with the papacy but abandoned this alliance in fighting the War of the Eight Saints (1375–1378) against the popes. The war saw Florence placed under the interdict, as the Florentines incited rebellion in the Papal States, forcing Pope Gregory XI to return to Italy from Avignon. It also saw forces in papal service carry out the notorious massacre of Cesena (1377), which forever blackened the reputation of John Hawkwood. The war was inconclusive, but Gregory's return to Italy, and his death there, helped precipitate the Great Schism. Florence's primary rival throughout this period, however, remained Milan, and this rivalry was a chief fault line in Italian politics for one hundred years.

The high tide of Visconti expansion came under the irrepressible Giangaleazzo Visconti (r. 1378–1402, duke from 1395), who, while exhibiting the ambition and brutality typical of his family, was also a temperate and shrewd intellectual. Sometimes known as the "Count of Virtue," his aspirations were limitless, as evidenced by his poisoning of his uncle Bernabò Visconti in 1385 to gain control of the entirety of the Visconti inheritance. His dynastic ambitions can be seen in his marriage to Isabelle of Valois, the sister of King Charles V of France, and the betrothal of his daughter, Valentina, to Duke Louis I of Orleans, the brother of the French king. In 1395, he secured the title of Duke of Milan from the emperor.



Giangaleazzo Visconti (1351–1402). Painting attributed to Giovanni Ambrogio de Predis (c. 1455–c. 1508). PRIVATE COLLECTION/PHOTO © BONHAMS, LONDON, UK/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

Giangaleazzo was a prince of prodigious organizational capacity and military skill, and he had a senior general to match in Jacopo dal Verme (1350–1409). As Giangaleazzo expanded his territory, absorbing other Italian lordships, he styled himself as the defender of Italian liberty against barbarian intruders. In 1385–1388 his forces advanced into eastern Lombardy and the Veneto, absorbing Verona and partitioning the possessions of the Scala in Padua with Venice. Giangaleazzo's attempts to negotiate spheres of influence with Florence failed, and tensions between the two remained high. From 1390 until his death in 1402, Giangaleazzo was nearly always at war, and the duke maintained the upper hand throughout. Florence led the league aligned against Giangaleazzo and, employing Hawkwood,

was initially quite successful in holding back the Milanese tide. But ultimately much of Tuscany and Umbria fell before Giangaleazzo's advance. In conjunction with the French king, in 1394 he took Genoa, which would remain in the hands of the French. Giangaleazzo established himself as lord of Pisa in 1399 and Perugia in 1400, and beat back a German incursion at the battle of Brescia in October 1401. Much of Umbria and Tuscany soon fell, as did Bologna in 1402. Florence was now nearly completely surrounded. It looked as if all of Italy outside the Kingdom of Naples and the lands of the pope might fall under Visconti domination. In the end, the Florentine republic was saved by the sudden death of Giangaleazzo from plague, in his military camp just outside Florence. In a pattern by now familiar in the history of the duchy, the death of the duke saw his lands splinter apart, as his son and heir, Giovanni Maria, dominated by Giangaleazzo's condottiere Facino Cane (1360–1412), proved incapable of consolidating his gains. The newly conquered provinces of the Visconti were quickly snatched up by opportunistic regional lords.

War in the Southern Kingdoms in the Fourteenth Century. The complex military conflicts between a diverse array of seignorial, republican, and communal regimes in northern Italy, played out across a patchwork political landscape, contrast with the largely monarchical struggles of the Italian south. Here the two dominant themes were the dynastic weakness of the Kingdom of Naples and the ongoing efforts of the popes to reassert their temporal authority over the nominal lands of Saint Peter.

The triumph of Charles of Anjou in Naples in the 1260s had introduced a new era in the political history of the Italian south, connecting it with the broad-ranging territories and ambitions of the Angevins and with French politics more generally. In addition, for almost a full century, the popes consistently relied on the support of the House of Anjou to pursue their own ambitions.

Until the middle of the fourteenth century, French interests were represented by the Guelph League, made up of varying states who otherwise had little in common, but who tended to be sympathetic to the papacy and to the House of Anjou that ruled in both France and Naples. The War of the Sicilian Vespers, from 1282, had threatened the Angevin hold in southern Italy. More than twenty years of war not only divided the ruling class of the southern kingdoms, it also resulted in the creation of two political units, with Sicily severed from the mainland polity. This gave a foothold in Italy for the House of Aragon, when the island kingdom passed to Pedro III, creating an enduring link to Spanish politics. Although with the accession of Federico of Aragon in 1296 the Sicilian throne would become separated from the Spanish branch of the house (formally at the Treaty of Caltabellotta in 1302), the Aragonese success in dividing the Angevin kingdom in southern Italy provided a new dynamic in Italian politics and supplied a renewed identity to the Ghibbeline opposition to French influence.

Robert the Wise (King of Naples, r. 1309–1343) undertook five separate attempts to reconquer the island of Sicily, each of them unsuccessful. These fruitless efforts, along with an aggressive foreign policy to the north, largely at the bidding of the popes, had ruinous financial repercussions, which were left for Robert's heir, his granddaughter Joan I (Joan of Anjou; Queen of Naples, r. 1343–1382). In the years to come, the authority of the Neapolitan crown was weakened by a series of difficult dynastic episodes, and by the complicating features of the House of Anjou's international commitments. Joanna's accession in 1343 was a disputed one, challenged by both the Hungarian branch of the House of Anjou and by the duke of Dyrrachium. Her turbulent reign saw the authority built up by Robert quickly dissolve. Joan's marital life was a farrago and none of her four husbands produced an heir. Joan's husband, Andrew (Duke of Calabria), was murdered in 1345, prompting an invasion of Naples by his brother, King Louis I (the Great) of Hungary, two years later. Queen Joan fled to Avignon, but Louis proved unable to secure his own rule in Naples, and Joan was called back to rule once more. The kingdom then once again descended into

bitter civil war. Joan was able to assert a tenuous hold on the crown, but her nomination of the count of Provence, Louis I of Anjou, as heir, along with her support for the Avignon papacy following the schism, prompted another Hungarian invasion in 1381, during which she was murdered by an ally of the Roman pope Urban VI, Charles of Dyrrachium (King of Naples as Charles III, r. 1381–1386; King of Hungary as Charles II, r. 1385–1386). Charles then seized the crown for himself. Charles's successor was his son Ladislas of Anjou-Dyrrachium (King of Naples, r. 1386–1414; King of Hungary, r. 1390–1414), who struggled to expel Louis from his kingdom. Ladislas was succeeded by his sister Joan II (r. 1414–1435) in 1414, and the Angevin crown once again found itself in crisis, as she went back and forth over whom to nominate as her successor. Joan initially settled on Alfonso V of Aragon (r. 1416–1458; King of Naples as Alfonso I [r. 1442–1458] and King of Sicily [r. 1416–1458]), who had become king of the island kingdom in Sicily in 1416. Near death, Joan renounced this choice, naming instead Louis III of Anjou, a selection that then fell to Louis's brother René I upon Louis's death. Alfonso, however, refused to give up his own claim. Alfonso dedicated significant resources to the conquest of the mainland kingdom, using Sicily as his base. He laid siege to Naples in 1441, taking the city after six months. From that point forward he exercised effective rule over a reunified Kingdom of Naples. French claims to the Neapolitan inheritance, however, remained a destabilizing feature of political life in the south and would lead directly to the invasion of Charles VIII in 1494.

As the preceding narrative suggests, Italian politics was closely connected with pan-European concerns and rivalries. The popes were keen backers of the Angevin cause during the War of the Sicilian Vespers and the link between Angevin power in the south and the papacy remained strong in the course of the fourteenth century. The movement of the papacy to Avignon by Clement V (r. 1305–1314) in 1309 did nothing to diminish these linkages. The Avignon popes remained deeply committed to securing the papal states in Italy militarily and politically, in part because they knew they would eventually have to return the papacy to Rome. They sought to undermine or overthrow the various lords who had established themselves in the many papal vicariates of central Italy. Pope Clement V had this in mind when he encouraged the expedition of the Holy Roman Emperor Henry VII into Italy in 1310. The emperor reached Milan, but soon recognized the huge difficulties in brokering an agreement between the Guelph and Ghibelline parties. Clement eventually broke with Henry when the emperor threw in his lot with the Ghibelline side. Henry died in Italy, just outside Buonconvento, in 1313, a demise famously lamented by Dante in the *Divine Comedy* as the death of Italy's potential deliverer.

Clement's successor, Pope John XXII (r. 1316–1324), undertook a far more direct approach to returning the papal states to obedience, launching his own war against the enemies of the Guelph party in Italy. Employing the spiritual weapons of excommunication and the interdict and military forces under the leadership of Bertrand du Poujet (1280–1352), these efforts were a complete failure. Pope Innocent VI (r. 1352–1362) launched an even more concerted effort to restore papal authority between 1353–1363 under Cardinal Gil Albornoz (1310–1367), a former crusader against the Moors, from Castile. Albornoz achieved some success in bringing order to the papal holdings, including the recapture of Bologna. Albornoz's gains were limited by the opposition of Bernabò Visconti, and the cardinal restored papal authority only after conceding considerable autonomy to the lords of the vicariates, such as the Malatesta in Rimini and the Montefeltro in Urbino. The uncertain and contested nature of papal authority in central Italy remained a source of political and military conflict into the fifteenth century.

Naval War in the Mediterranean. The fourteenth century also saw the climax of the ongoing naval struggle in the Mediterranean between Venice and Genoa. By 1300, the Genoese had established a strong position in the Aegean and around the Black Sea. Venice, which doubled the capacity of its ship-building arsenal in the early fourteenth century, settled on a new strategy of friendship with the Byzantine emperors, who saw protection by Venice

as a lifeline in the face of Turkish expansion. The Venetian-Genoese rivalry was particularly pointed in the Black Sea. After the Mongol Khan of the Golden Horde evicted all European traders from Tana in 1343, Genoa allowed Venetian trade to pass through the Genoese fortress port of Kaffa. But when Venice resumed trade through Tana a number of years later, Genoa claimed that the action violated a mutual agreement and started seizing Venetian ships. This sparked the Third Venetian-Genoese War.

In the wake of the Black Death, both sides had difficulty manning their galleys and faced discipline problems among the mercenaries that they employed. Venice sought additional manpower by forming an alliance with the king of Aragon, who provided Catalan sailors, and by using Greeks supplied by the Byzantine emperor. Venetian attempts to force the straits and destroy the Genoese settlement at Pera in 1352 were repulsed in the bloody and chaotic battle of the Bosphorus, fought in the midst of a winter storm. Shortly after, the Byzantine emperor decided to make peace with Genoa, allowing them to rebuild and strengthen their position at Pera.

Venice's Aragonese ally was primarily interested in the conquest of Sicily and a joint Venetian-Catalan fleet defeated a Genoese one at the battle of Alghero in 1353. But a new Genoese fleet was soon wreaking havoc in the Adriatic and Aegean before taking refuge at the Genoese port on Chios. The Venetian admiral Nicolò Padani could not initially get the Genoese to fight off Chios, but at Porto Longo, near Modon, in 1354, the Venetian fleet wintering there was seized by Paganino Doria in a stunning Genoese victory. Despite the Genoese triumph, the subsequent settlement of 1355 was a mild one, as the new Visconti rulers of Genoa were eager for peace.

Open war between Venice and Genoa broke out again in 1378. This final war between the maritime rivals posed a real existential threat to the Republic of Venice. Dalmatia was now in the hands of the king of Hungary, who allowed the Genoese to use the ports there as bases. Venice was threatened in the Adriatic itself, and at the end of 1378 a Genoese victory off Pola in Istria made clear the gravity of the threat. In conjunction with its allies, the king of Hungary and the Carrara in Padua, Genoa closed the ring around Venice, seizing all ships coming in and out of the lagoons. Invasion of Venice proper was a real possibility when in August 1379 a Genoese-Paduan force stormed the town of Chioggia, just to the south of Venice.

In desperate straits, Venice sued for peace but was rebuffed. The Venetians managed to blockade the Genoese force at Chioggia by sinking obstructions in all the waterway approaches. In early 1380, a Venetian fleet under Carlo Zeno returned to the Adriatic from the Aegean and now it was the Genoese fleet that was hemmed in. At the climactic battle of Chioggia in June 1380, the Genoese fleet was defeated and Chioggia recaptured. Genoa was driven out of the Adriatic for good. Although the Treaty of Turin the following year gave little advantage to either side, the Venetians could consider the War of Chioggia a hard-won victory.

War and Politics in the Fifteenth Century. The passage from the fourteenth to fifteenth centuries marks an important dividing point in Italian politics and military affairs. In geopolitics, the role of foreign powers in Italian military and political affairs diminished. As we have seen, the Holy Roman Emperors, their efforts to restore imperial authority having failed, could assert only minimal influence. The French kings were also significantly less intrusive than they had been at the beginning of the fourteenth century. The political isolation of Italy was by no means total, but compared to the repeated ultramontane incursions of the preceding century and the Italian wars of the sixteenth century that would embroil much of Europe, the fifteenth century was one in which Italians largely controlled their own political destiny.

A parallel development was the gradual ossification of Italian territorial boundaries. The demise of Giangaleazzo Visconti and his imperial project saw the states of Italy settle in to borders they would largely maintain across the early modern period. Milan was now almost exclusively a Lombard state. Savoy and Florence expanded into their Renaissance borders, the latter finally taking Pisa after a siege

in 1406. The popes, while still struggling to exercise effective control over their dominions, ruled over an increasingly well-defined papal state. The process of territorial consolidation that created *signorie* across the north and central regions of Italy would now be formalized with the granting of papal and imperial diplomas of recognition: Giangaleazzo became duke of Milan in 1395, Amadeus VIII duke of Savoy in 1416, Borso d'Este the duke of Modena/Reggio in 1452 and then of Ferrara in 1471. The replacement of the communes of the Middle Ages with the regional states of the Renaissance was now largely complete.

One of the states that grew into its early modern borders in this period was the Republic of Venice. Venice's rapid creation of a *terraferma* state is one of the more remarkable developments of fifteenth-century Italian politics. While Venice had long exerted considerable economic and diplomatic influence over neighboring mainland territories, especially in those adjoining the Po River, such an important waterway for Venetian commerce, at the outset of the fifteenth century the republic's only significant mainland holding was in the Trevigiano. From time to time in the course of the fourteenth century, Venetian arms intervened in mainland affairs. In the main, however, the Venetians preferred to employ diplomacy and subsidy rather than force, as when they supported the della Scala in Verona against Padua in 1386—unsuccessfully in this case, as the Paduans won a convincing victory at the battle of Brentelles. This reluctance to get involved in Italian land conflicts was due in part, of course, to the republic's considerable commitments to their extensive empire *da mar* in the eastern Mediterranean. Largely to insulate itself from potential threats from Milan to the west, however, Venice sought to extend its mainland presence in Italy significantly in a very short period of time. Venice became a fully fledged military power on land, and hired condottieri for mainland service in large numbers for the first time. Between 1404 and 1428, several major cities in the Veneto, Romagna, and Lombardy were conquered by Venice, including Padua (after a lengthy siege in 1405), Verona, and Bergamo. The need to protect these newly acquired territories led to the billeting of permanent forces across the *terraferma*, making Venice, rather counterintuitively, one of the pioneering states in the development of permanent military institutions.

The Conduct of War in the Fifteenth Century. When we look at the conduct of war, we see that the end of the fourteenth century saw the extinction of the foreign companies. The great disorder of the communal period gradually began to attenuate along with political consolidation, especially in the north of the peninsula. The polities that emerged were larger, more centralized, and able to draw on sufficient resources to resist the depredations of the companies. These governments also now sought to provide for their permanent and year-round defense. A gradual process saw the appearance of extended and carefully managed military contracts given to experienced mercenaries, who came increasingly to be associated with service to a particular state. The condottieri, no longer under the control of the companies, increasingly found themselves instead under the control of the state.

In the decades that followed, wars in Italy were now largely fought by Italians, led by Italian condottieri. The victory of Alberico da Barbiano over the Breton companies at the battle of Marino in 1379 was an indication of the waxing Italian military fortunes and the eclipse of the foreign domination of Italian arms. This process of Italianization was a protracted one, as figures such as Hawkwood remained prominent for some time, but by the turn of the century, the transformation was largely complete.

The new contract system, staffed largely by Italian captains, emerged in the context of an extended contest for prominence among the newly consolidated territorial states in Florence, Milan, and Venice. These states looked to employ talented and experienced captains drawn from outside of their newly acquired territories, and frequently offered them contracts that lasted longer than a single campaigning season. The Venetians, concerned with the defense of their recently established *terraferma* state, built a permanent mainland army that required a significant military administrative apparatus, the employment of supervisory officials, and

a regular pay regime. The Visconti and Sforza dukes in Milan, too, oversaw the creation of sizable permanent forces, although, unlike in Venice, the ducal army drew much of its numbers from feudal levies.

The Italian condottieri who emerged as the military elite of the fifteenth century often boasted companies that were highly organized and near permanent. Many of the prominent captains of the first half of the fifteenth century were connected to one of the two "schools" of condottieri associated with Braccio da Montone (1368–1424) and Muzio Attendoli Sforza (1369–1424), respectively. Association with one or the other of these two skilled captains became the defining military fault line of the next generation. These groupings had much to do with genealogies of personal relationships and webs of military patronage, creating a sense of identity and belonging; they were, according to one of their historians, "flexible organisms." Certain operational and tactical approaches also came to be associated with the schools. Braccio, for example, introduced an innovation whereby lances were divided into bands no larger than thirty men, among which auxiliary infantry were distributed, allowing for the reinforcement of the front lines with fresh troops.

The mercenaries of the fifteenth century have in general received a bad press, especially from Renaissance humanists, who lamented their cowardice, fickleness, and unreliability. Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527) described the soldiery of this period as "disunited, thirsty for power, undisciplined and disloyal . . . they avoid defeat just as long as they avoid battle; in peacetime you are despoiled by them, and in wartime by the enemy" (*The Prince*, Book XII). Such judgments are of course exaggerated, and jaundiced by Machiavelli's own passionate advocacy of a civic militia. For all the humanist complaining about mercenaries, in fact, the foremost complaint was that there were never enough of them. It was now customary for an Italian state, upon the death or retirement of a condottiere, to seek to retain his troops in the composite companies into which they had formed—in essence, to retain the best troops. States competed for the services of the most highly regarded captains. This elite of condottieri would enter the military-political competition under the right conditions. A good number of them would acquire sizable territorial bases of their own: Braccio da Montone was made lord of Perugia (following his victory at the battle of Sant'Egidio in 1416), Alessandro Sforza (1409–1473) the lord of Pesaro, and the Venetians set up Bartolomeo Colleoni (1400–1475) in Malpaga. Such opportunities for the acquisition of territory, however, became increasingly rare: the example of Francesco Sforza (1401–1466, Duke of Milan from 1450) becoming lord of a major state like the Duchy of Milan was *sui generis* in the fifteenth century.

War in Northern Italy, 1402–1453. In the first half of the fifteenth century, the primary cause of war in northern Italy was once again the territorial ambitions of Visconti Milan. The death of Giangaleazzo Visconti, as mentioned above, had seen his newly conquered state fall apart, but the accession of the Duke Filippo Maria Visconti (r. 1412–1447) meant a resurgence in Milanese ambitions. The new duke systematically set about to reconstitute the Visconti state. Filippo Maria employed his condottiere, Francesco Bussone (known as Carmagnola; c. 1385–1432), to bring Lombardy securely back under his control. Carmagnola enjoyed notable successes in Milanese service at the siege of Bergamo in 1419 and against the Swiss at the battle of Arbedo in 1422. For the next three decades, Milan would once again be the most dangerous expansionary power in Italy.

The primary antagonists of Filippo Maria during this struggle were Venice and Florence. In 1419, the duke forged an agreement with Florence that demarcated separate spheres of influence, but already by 1423, he was intervening in the Romagna, part of the agreed-upon Florentine sphere. The war that followed would draw in Venice (in 1425), which now had significant mainland possessions to protect. The primary theater of the war was Lombardy, and the forces of the two republics aimed at the reduction of the fortresses at Brescia and the surrounding countryside; Brescia surrendered late in 1426. After a series of inconclusive maneuvers and engagements, the Venetian army, now with Carmagnola at its head, lured the Milanese army into an unwise

attack on well-prepared defenses at Maclodio in 1427. The resulting defeat forced Filippo Maria to come to terms at Ferrara the following year. He ceded Brescia and Bergamo to Venice and pledged not to invade Florence again.

Momentarily relieved of the menace from Milan, the Florentines sought to settle scores with Lucca, which had allied with the Visconti in the recent conflict. The campaign was a comical disaster. The architect Filippo Brunelleschi was engaged to execute a plan to break through Lucca's walls by diverting the Serchio River. In the event, it was only the Florentine military camp that became waterlogged. Lucca sought defensive assistance from Milan and Filippo Maria dispatched the skilled condottiere Francesco Sforza to deliver the city. Sforza's intervention was successful, and the war between Milan and Florence renewed. Once more Florence recruited Venice as an ally. This war also came to an inconclusive end in 1433, with the peace essentially reaffirming the settlement of 1428. One of the most notable outcomes of the war was that the financial stresses caused by the Lucca war in Florence led directly to the rise inside Florence of the Medici family.

The peace again proved to be short-lived. War recommenced before the year was out, this time with the center of operations in the Romagna. War in northern Italy continued off and on for the ensuing twelve years, The new war between Florence and Milan was closely related to a parallel conflict between Pope Eugenius IV (r. 1431–1447) (allied to Florence) and Alfonso (sympathetic to Milan). Once again, in 1435, Florence found an ally in Venice, now with Erasmo da Narni ("il Gattamelata") (1379–1443) as commander, and once more the war was indecisive. Francesco Sforza commanded the Florentine army with Niccolò Piccinino (1386–1444) in charge of the Milanese forces. Sforza, however, was soon lured into changing sides again when Filippo Maria offered him his daughter Bianca Maria in marriage, a plum for which Piccinino had also been hoping.

In 1439, Piccinino invaded Tuscany and was turned back by a Florentine army under Neri Capponi at the battle of Anghiari. Two years later Francesco Sforza changed sides, and until 1445 the war was largely a duel between Piccinino and Sforza, the chief representatives of the Bracceschi and Sforzeschi schools of condottieri, respectively. Their contest was undertaken primarily in the Romagna and Anconan Marches. This passage of the war ended with victories for Sforza at Montelauro and Montolmo in 1444, and with Piccinino's death the same year.

Despite the death of Piccinino, the period of 1444–1453 in Italy was one of nearly uninterrupted warfare. By now, there was an important new element in Italian military affairs. Alfonso had successfully concluded his conquest of the southern kingdom and he now sought to assert his influence in central Italy. The forces of the Bracceschi, supported by Alfonso, Pope Eugenius IV, and Filippo Maria Visconti, continued to fight against the forces of Venice and Florence, commanded by Francesco Sforza. In 1446, these forces failed a final time to take Cremona from Sforza. Filippo Maria then decided that his best course of action was to call Sforza back into his service. Bracceschi commanders were furious with the move, rightly pointing out that Sforza's primary occupation was with securing the ducal succession for himself.

Filippo Maria Visconti died in 1447. It marked the end of the Visconti dynasty and uncertainty about the line of succession, and the many competing claims threw Italian politics into confusion. Inside Milan, the so-called Ambrosian Republic was declared—a republic that would see no peace in its short, three-year life. In the Milanese *contado*, there was once more chaos, as Venice moved in from the east and the Duke of Orleans from the west. Alfonso was preparing to press his own claim to the ducal seat. In charge of Milan's tenuous defense was Francesco Sforza, who, through his marriage into the Visconti family, had his own claim on the Milanese inheritance. The Orleanist threat was repulsed when a Milanese army under Bartolomeo Colleoni defeated a French army at the battle of Bosco Marengo in October 1447. At the battle of Caravaggio, in September 1448, Sforza managed a clear victory over a Venetian force that was nearly twenty thousand strong; it provided the Ambrosian Republic a brief reprieve. It was a battle at which

nearly all the major condottieri of the subsequent generation took part: Ludovico Gonzaga, Ercole I d'Este, Sigismondo Pandolfo Malatesta, Bartolomeo Colleoni, and Federigo da Montefeltro. But it soon became evident that Sforza was only biding his time, and a month later he deserted the Milanese cause for Venice, in order to be able to better press his own Milanese claim. He was successful in doing so in 1450, when he entered Milan at the head of his army. Francesco Sforza's accession as duke marked a turning away from the Visconti tradition of expansionism. Aware of the tenuous nature of his claim to the ducal title, he preferred to pursue order and balance within the Italian system. Thus one of the most destabilizing elements in Italian politics was removed.

Sforza's conflict with the Bracceschi, now led by Niccolò Piccinino's son, Jacopo, would continue for three more years. Jacopo gathered the remaining republican, anti-Sforza forces and allied with Venice (who had turned against Sforza) and Alfonso. The war that followed took place mostly in Lombardy, representing the final attempts of Venice to augment its territorial holdings in the area. Piccinino became supreme commander of Venetian forces in May 1453, following the death of Gentile da Leonessa, but only a few weeks later news arrived in Italy of the fall of Constantinople. Both Milan and Venice now felt it was necessary to end the war as soon as possible—Sforza to solidify his hold on the Milanese duchy, Venice to face the renewed Turkish threat in the Mediterranean—these factors, combined with general exhaustion caused by so many years of war, led to the Peace of Lodi in April 1454.

The peace at Lodi established a modus vivendi between the two states, with Venice recognizing the Sforza claim to the duchy, and Milan making nominal territorial concessions in Lombardy. The Peace of Lodi also deliberately left open the possibility of other states joining in the compact, a recognition that a lasting peace would need the participation of the other Italian states. By February 1455, with the reluctant adherence of Alfonso, the league was made "universal," in the parlance of the day. Pope Nicholas V (r. 1447–1455) was the nominal leader of this "holy" league, which comprised the five major Italian powers (Milan, Venice, Florence, Naples, and the papacy), as well as most of the second-rung states. The Italian League has often been mischaracterized as a sort of proto–League of Nations. While it did seek to maintain the political and territorial status quo inside Italy and had mutual-defense clauses built in, the League exercised little power apart from the will of the individual states to act according to the spirit of its provisions. And yet for the next forty years, while the Italian League proved inadequate to keep the peace absolutely, it was a constant point of reference for statesmen, and the balance that it aspired to maintain remained an ideal that helped prevent the emergence of a new hegemon in Italy.

The Age of the Italian League, 1454–1494. The half-century after the creation of the Italian league is often considered a distinct epoch in Italian political history. For the next forty years, Italy was the most peaceable region of western Europe, until the invasion of the French king Charles VIII in 1494 unleashed wars so disruptive that they must be considered the beginning of an altogether new era of Italy's military history. The relative peace of the second half of the fifteenth century resulted from a number of factors: exhaustion after several decades of nearly ceaseless war, an acknowledgment among the five primary powers of Italy that they had reached the affordable limits of their territorial expansion, and the relative geopolitical balance that resulted.

This balance was a tenuous one, and the political atmosphere of the peninsula remained suspicious and tense. The Italian League, it must be said, did not really work as intended: rivalries between states persisted, there were wars that resulted in territorial change, and the envisioned holy alliance against the Turks never materialized. What wars there were did not become large-scale conflagrations not because of the mechanisms of the League but instead because the formation of a military league within Italy was always balanced with the formation of a counter-league of opposing states. In general, Venice and Milan found themselves on opposing sides, a continuation of their long-standing antagonism; so too did Naples and the papacy, as the popes

fruitlessly sought to assert their influence over their nominal feudal vassals to the south.

Much of the political and military tension in the post-Lodi period was rooted in disputes over smaller states within the system. These towns and territories became the focus of contests for dominance and influence. Thus, Pope Paul II (r. 1464–1471) went to war with Milan and Naples in 1468–1471 over the succession of Roberto Malatesta in Rimini, nominally a vicariate of the papacy. The turbulent Republic of Genoa was repeatedly a focus of conflict, as sovereignty shifted between Milan and the king of France, and Medicean Florence contested with Genoa for control over Pietrasanta and Sarzana. Florence also went to war with neighboring Volterra in 1472. The War of Ferrara (1482–1484), in which Venice attacked the duchy of Ferrara over commercial and territorial disputes, was the bloodiest and costliest such conflict in the period. It saw fighting in a number of different theaters, involved all the major powers of the peninsula, and threatened to widen beyond the boundaries of Italy, as the contestants appealed to foreign parties in France and the empire. The war ended in the summer of 1484 with the Treaty of Bagnolo, negotiated secretly between Milan and Venice, and against the wishes of the duke of Ferrara and the Pope. Venice was allowed to keep significant territories occupied along the Po River. The war left the belligerent states exhausted and their treasuries depleted.

Another theme of wars in this period was the close relationship between internal factional instability and external conflict, as states sought to foment rebellion inside rival polities. Thus Venice supported the efforts of the Bergamo-based condottiere Bartolomeo Colleoni in 1467 at the head of an army of Florentine exiles who wished to oust the Medici from their position of strength inside Florence. A counter-league of Milan, Naples, and Florence formed to face this threat, and its army defeated Colleoni at the battle of Riccardina in July 1467. Another attempt to wipe out the Medici family was engineered in 1478 by Pope Sixtus IV (r. 1471–1484) and Federigo da Montefeltro, the lord of Urbino (r. 1444–1482, duke from 1474), in the form of the famous Pazzi Conspiracy. The subsequent Pazzi War, in which the forces of the pope and the king of Naples threatened Florence itself, was a close-run thing for Lorenzo de' Medici; only by offering concessions to Ferdinand I, king of Naples (r. 1458–1494), which peeled Naples away from the anti-Florence alliance, did the Medici regime manage to survive. Another such example is the Neapolitan Barons' War of 1485–1486, during which the pope Innocent VIII (r. 1484–1492) exploited noble discontent with Ferdinand and encouraged their rebellion. The subsequent war was both a civil war within the Kingdom of Naples and a conflict between pope and king, fought largely on papal territory, and during which the king himself encouraged the restless Roman nobility.

Despite the relative peace in Italy in the second half of the fifteenth century, the notion that Italy was sealed off from the political squabbles of the rest of Europe was largely illusory. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the southern kingdom, where the Aragonese claim to the throne continued to be contested. As late as 1460, John, the Duke of Anjou, invaded the Kingdom of Naples, staking his claim to the Angevin inheritance. The subsequent war of Neapolitan succession was a finely balanced struggle, reflecting the divided loyalties of the Neapolitan aristocracy. Nobles with Angevin sympathies rebelled against Ferdinand upon his accession in 1458 and in the immediate aftermath of John's landing, Ferdinand's position looked tenuous. Ferdinand's army was badly mauled at the battles of Sarno and San Fabiano in 1460, and Aragonese victory was assured only with the diplomatic and military support of Francesco Sforza, the new Duke of Milan, and of Pope Pius II (r. 1458–1464). Ferdinand's victory at the battle of Troia in 1462 largely sealed his victory, although the danger from John, Duke of Anjou, did not fully subside until a combined Neapolitan and Catalan fleet destroyed the Angevin navy in 1465.

Throughout the period of the Italian League, Italian actors were all too willing to entertain the possibility of foreign intervention in Naples in the service of their own intra-Italian rivalries. Pope Paul

II openly courted René of Anjou in the pope's squabbles with the king of Naples. Venice entertained the duke of Lorraine, who inherited the Angevin claim, in February 1480, in a move clearly directed at Ferdinand. Pope Innocent VIII and Ludovico Sforza, regent of Milan (1479–1494, Duke of Milan 1494–1499), also appealed to French interests in their disputes with King Ferdinand. This dangerous game came to fruition with the invasion of Italy by King Charles VIII in 1494, undertaken primarily to press Charles's claim to the southern kingdom. The long and costly period of warfare that followed in the so-called Italian Wars, ended up involving nearly all the continental European powers; the relative peace and isolation of Italian political and military affairs were at an end. The political transformation of the Italian scene over the course of the later Middle Ages was now complete: from a papal/imperial bifurcation at the beginning of the period, Italy had now been incorporated into the system of the European monarchies and all of the accompanying rivalries.

The Ottoman Threat in Italy. One more important feature of the Italian military scene in the fifteenth century remains to be discussed: the threat to the peninsula from the Ottoman Turks. The Turkish capture of Constantinople in 1453 had been an important factor in forging the Peace of Lodi and the Italian League within two years, and the prospect of Ottoman involvement in Italy remained a point of reference throughout the second half of the fifteenth century. Turkish advances in the eastern Mediterranean at the expense of Venice and across the Adriatic in Dalmatia meant that the threat was both more geographically proximate and more immediately menacing. Terrifying tales of Turkish advances caused considerable consternation, and popes renewed their call for crusade, with varying degrees of seriousness; Pius II died in Ancona in 1464 waiting for his crusading fleet to assemble, while Paul II sought to bring about a "universal peace" of Italian states by appealing for a crusade against the Ottomans. Divisions among the Italian states rendered such attempts stillborn. The Turkish threat was most keenly felt by the Republic of Venice and the Kingdom of Naples, those states with the most extensive Mediterranean interests. The Turkish capture of Árgos in 1463 prompted an effort by Venice to maintain a large Italian army in the East, during the long period of open warfare with the Turks that followed, lasting until 1479. This idea was supported by Pope Pius II and his inducements to crusade. Venice sent a force of over five thousand infantry and fifteen hundred cavalry to the Morea under Alvise Loredan. In the end, the relatively small numbers of Italian troops that served in the empire *da mar* could not prevent the fall of the vital Venetian colony of Negroponte (Euboea) in the summer of 1470, an outcome that was at least as strategically important as the fall of Constantinople seventeen years earlier, and which occasioned deep concern across Italy.

By 1471, the Turkish presence in the Adriatic constituted a real menace to Venetian *terraferma* territory. In 1473, Venice faced an invasion around Friuli, and for the next five years Venetian forces were deployed in the field against the Ottomans. The Venetian army managed to avoid the loss of any significant territory, but the one major encounter, in 1477, left the Venetian force badly bloodied.

The most serious, and celebrated, military incursion of the Ottomans into Italy was at the Apulian port town of Otranto in 1480. While the seizure of Otranto may very well have been intended by Sultan Mehmed II as the first step of an invasion of Italy, the operation remained limited; the news of Mehmed's death in late 1481 assured this. Still, it was a terrifying shock and talk of a march on Rome was rife, with Pope Sixtus IV making plans to evacuate the city. The siege, carried out largely by Neapolitan forces, lasted until September 1481; much of the town was leveled and the Turkish garrison put to death.

After Otranto, the immediate land threat to Italy subsided, as the new sultan turned his attention away from the central Mediterranean in the short term. But the threat remained keenly felt and Venice went to war again with the Ottomans in 1499 (lasting until 1503). Just as the Italian Peninsula became the primary theater in the dynastic struggle between Habsburg and Valois, the sixteenth century would also see the fight against the Ottomans played out

on a much larger stage. Thus Italian political and military affairs would be, in the century to come, on the front line not only of a great contest for pan-European supremacy, but also of a Mediterranean contest between Latin Christendom and the Islamic Ottoman Empire. Italy would remain an important laboratory for the development of military institutions and practices, especially in areas such as gunpowder weaponry and fortifications, but the course of Italian political life would now largely be determined outside of Italy.

[*See also* Alghero, Siege and Naval Battle of; Altopascio, Battle of; Arbedo, Battle of; Attendoli, Muzio; Bergamo, Siege of; Bosco Marengo, Battle of; Braccio da Montone and the Bracceschi; Brescia, Fight near (1401); Bussone, Francesco; Caravaggio, Battle of; Castagnaro, Battle of; Castruccio Castracani; Cesena, Massacre at; Chioggia, Battle of; Condottieri; Constantinople, *subentry on* Siege of (1453); Genoese-Venetian Wars, *subentry on* Third War; Hawkwood, John; Leagues, Italian Military; Maclodio, Battle of; Marino, Battle of; Meleto, Battle of; Otranto, Sieges of; Parabiago, Battle of; Piccinino, Niccolò; Porto Longo, Naval Battle of; *and* Visconti, Giangaleazzo.]

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Historiography (476–1000)

Although studies on the military history of medieval Italy have increased in number and improved in quality, this trend only marginally applies to the study of the early Middle Ages, since most of these studies concentrate on the 1400s and, in lesser measure, on the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The most recent Italian overview of medieval warfare (Settia, *Rapine, assedi, battaglie* 2002) includes various examples preceding the year 1000, but as it is organized by subject and not according to chronological order, it does not allow one to pinpoint in a coherent way the specific characteristics of the age.

A Starting Point: Spoleto, 1967. The necessary starting point for an analysis of the recent Italian historiography relevant to the early Middle Ages is the large international conference that took place at Spoleto in 1967, dedicated to military organization in the early Middle Ages. The conference was the product of an initial rebirth of interest in military history, which the most recent research within the Anglo-Saxon, French, and Flemish areas no longer saw as confined to the simple reconstruction of campaigns and battles. The meeting had a high scientific profile, with the participation of prestigious scholars from the whole of Europe, but unfortunately, and perhaps because of the new political context born from the student movements in 1968 and years after, for almost two decades, there was no space to be found for the topic in any subsequent meetings at Spoleto.

At the conference in 1967 there were papers presented on Europe as a whole, several of which brought the Italian situation into the picture—for example, François-Louis Ganshof on Carolingian armies and Karl-Ferdinand Werner on the forces of the Kingdom of Germany and the Ottonian Empire. Even though these works had a lasting influence on successive Italian research, they did not specifically focus on the peninsula. On the other hand, a certain number of contributions were dedicated to the Italian situation. Given the scarcity of new research, for a long time these texts represented the only references available to Italian scholars. It is therefore worthwhile here to retrace their steps.

Armies and Societies: Lombard and Carolingian Italy. The most substantial article among those published in the conference proceedings was by Ottorino Bertolini on the military organization of the Lombard kingdom. Bertolini's text, even if strong, was the product of a moment of transition in the research on the Lombards and today is unanimously considered to be outdated because it was still dependent on antiquated research methods.

The seventh and the eighth centuries in effect represent the age for which Italian historiography has demonstrated the greatest vitality and capacity for innovation in the study of military institutions and conduct of war. The fundamental starting point is still *I liberi del re* (1966), the study of Giovanni Tabacco that brought to light how mention of the *arimanni* (free men of the Lombard age) in the documentation of the central centuries of the Middle

Ages cannot demonstrate the survival of the putative Germanic "military colonies," as earlier scholars had believed. The *arimanni* were instead descendants of groups of men who asserted a relationship of direct dependence on the king, with particular privileges and honors. Tabacco's fine-tuning was indispensable in erasing the idea of a Lombard Italy organizationally divided into the military precincts of the *arimannie*, *sculdascie*, or *centene*, drawn up by the historians of the first half of the 1900s and based on a casual use of sources, which combined information obtainable from the documentation of the seventh and eighth centuries with information extrapolated and at times contrived from events centuries later, church dedications, adventurous etymology applied to toponymy, and simple local traditions.

Proceeding from Tabacco, Stefano Gasparri (1986) went deeper into the role of the aristocracies in the Lombard armies and of the first Carolingian age. From the end of the seventh century, Lombard texts reveal the ever-increasing role of relationships of personal dependence, which were expressed in the concept of *fidelitas*. The supporters close to the king, important landowners, and public functionaries assumed prominent influence in the last decades of the life of the kingdom. The transition to the government of the Franks, starting in 774, and the introduction of vassalage therefore do not represent a traumatic shift in Italian history; rather, they simply caused an acceleration and systemization of a process already in motion.

For the late Carolingian age, the topic had already been confronted at the same Spoleto conference by Tabacco in his contribution on the military organization of the Italic kingdom between the ninth and ten centuries, in which he examined the progressive crisis of the system of military service owed by freemen to public officials who worked in the name of the king, and the transition to one whereby armed service was supplied by followers and vassal dependents of local potentates. The role of armed service in the definition of the social hierarchies was one of the topics that attracted the most attention from Italian scholars, also in the broader syntheses of general history dedicated to the centuries of the early Middle Ages. This long tradition of research may receive new stimulus from the breakthroughs brought about by Anglo-Saxon historiography on the Pippinid, Carolingian, and post-Carolingian armies, and on Charlemagne's attempt to revitalize the tradition of armies of the populace after a long period of aristocratic dominance, perhaps based on the Lombard model (see, for example, Reuter 1990 and Halsall 2003). The reception of such topics, though, has so far been rather limited, and new research based on Italian documentation intended to dig deeper and discuss this hypothesis is lacking.

Goths, Lombards, Arabs, and Byzantines. Returning to the conference at Spoleto in 1967, the absence of talks dedicated to the Ostrogoth kingdom and the armed forces of King Theodoric the Great is striking. Another important meeting at Spoleto, held in 1993 and dedicated to Theodoric the Great and the Goths of Italy, hosted a talk by Aldo Settia on the fortifications of the age, but no contributions were dedicated explicitly to military organization or forms of warfare. On the whole, while the Roman army of late antiquity has enjoyed notable attention by Italian scholars, the same cannot be said of the Romano-Germanic kingdoms. In the absence of specific research, any understanding must be based on the pages, fortunately rich and abundant, dedicated to the Ostrogoth army in broader works, such as those of Herwig Wolfram (1988) and Peter Heather (1996), in which military organization and forms of combat are given good treatments. An important text by Halsall, *Warfare and Society in the Barbarian West* (2003), dedicates to Ostrgoth Italy important pages on the survival and changes in Roman military organization that, however, have still not found due resonance in Italian historiography.

Even in other areas, research on Italian topics must remake itself within the general frameworks provided by international scholars. The Byzantine army was the subject of an important paper at Spoleto by Agostino Pertusi, but Italian historiography, with the exception of the study of Giorgio Ravegnani on the army of Justinian (2009), has not systematically pursued the subject. Recently, the biggest developments have been made in general

studies on Byzantine armed forces, but these do not seem to have inspired new research in the peninsula. On the developments of the ninth and tenth centuries, when Byzantine territories were reduced to only southern Italy, it is still necessary to return to the work of Vera von Falkenhausen, from 1978, which can be integrated with several pages from Jean-Marie Martin and Ghislaine Noyé (1988). For Byzantine subjects, as for the Lombard principalities of the south, there is still a lack of systematic research fully taking advantage of the abundant local documentation. Also lacking are studies on Arab Sicily, for which one must still refer to the paper presented by Francesco Gabrieli at Spoleto in 1967.

Since the 1990s, Italian historiography has concentrated above all on the role of warfare, military clienteles, and castles in the formation of the social hierarchies and in the political life of the peninsula. Much attention has also been paid to the influence of warfare on the physical environment, with the proliferation of private fortresses and castles, which has been the subject both of individual and of collective research. Less attention has been paid to military institutions and the organization of armies, or to the anthropology of war. Purely tactical aspects have been virtually neglected, with the exception of a brief volume by Pierandrea Moro (1994) dedicated to the principal battles of the sixth to tenth centuries. Lastly, a systematic reflection on the sources and methods of analysis is lacking. Research by English and American scholars since the 1990s could supply an innovative problematic framework and new directions for Italian scholars of the early Middle Ages, but their reception has remained rather limited.

[*See also* Byzantine Empire, *subentries on* Historiography (500–900) *and* Historiography (900–1204); Franks, Carolingian, *subentry on* Historiography (751–899); *and* Germany, *subentry on* Historiography (911–1024).]

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Paolo Grillo
Translated from the Italian by Joe Jackson

Historiography (1000–1300)

The historiography of Italian warfare for the communal period (1000–1300) has traditionally stressed its positive aspects. Scholars have depicted the era as one of widespread use by states of native forces and the predominance of infantry over cavalry. These practices reflected a strong native fighting spirit, which was in turn linked to the rise of popular regimes, particularly in north and central Italy. Nineteenth-century military historians such as Ercole Ricotti and Giuseppe Canestrini emphasized the virtues of the communal age in contrast to the "decadence" of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, when indigenous armies gave way to "hired" forces and the local infantry was replaced by mercenary cavalry. This transformation, as they saw it, set the stage for foreign invasion and the military disasters of the sixteenth century. Canestrini associated the full emergence of communal militias with the triumph of the Lombard League against Frederick I at Legnano in 1176. The League, composed of the combined forces of numerous northern communes, demonstrated the effectiveness of local arms, particularly the worth of the infantry, which was credited with making the victory possible. The defeat of Frederick and subsequent Treaty of Constance in 1183 brought greater autonomy to the cities and more direct involvement by their citizens in local government, which encouraged still-broader participation in communal armies.

The details of this idealized portrait have, however, come under increasing scrutiny. Scholars such as Daniel Waley have shown that mercenaries were widely used during the communal period, even by small communes such as Fiesole and Pistoia. They have further examined the composition of forces, emphasizing their often diverse nature and the role of various components in field, giving more attention to developments in southern Italy and other regions outside the large northern republics. They have reexamined the role of the Hohenstaufen rulers Frederick I and Frederick II. And they have looked more closely at the role of technology and weaponry, while gradually reevaluating that of the infantry, giving greater attention to actual practice.

Armies and Military Organization. Military forces took different forms in various parts of the peninsula. Some general observations help to distinguish northern from southern practice.

The North. A key feature of Italian armies in this period was that they were made up of communal levies from both the city and the countryside. Many states retained the early medieval Lombard idea of universal military obligation. Scholars are reasonably well informed on this subject owing to extant legislation, mostly from the thirteenth century. In Milan men from the ages of seventeen to sixty-five were recruited for service; in Florence from fifteen to seventy. Soldiers came from both the city and the surrounding countryside, or *contado*. Within the city, troops were recruited usually according to subdivisions and neighborhoods.

Scholarship since the 1980s has enabled us to develop a fuller and better-contextualized understanding of the communal armies of the period. It has illuminated the various types of soldiers who composed them, as well as details of organization

of the armies of various states. One of the principal contributors to this literature has been Aldo Settia. The fourteen studies in his *Comuni in guerra* analyze subjects ranging from the treatment of war in the *Cronica* of Salimbene di Adam to developments in military technology and engineering (crossbows, siege engines, war wagons) to examinations of the armies of Milan, Vercelli, and Venice. One of these articles, "Infantry and Cavalry in Lombardy (11th–12th Centuries)," which can serve as a sample of the whole, is available in English translation.

Settia emphasizes the importance of infantry, but substantial attention has also been devoted to the study of the cavalry, with reference to its social as well as military aspects. (In Italian, the same word, *cavallerìa*, serves for "cavalry" and "chivalry.") Jean-Claude Maire Vigueur, in a major work on the subject, has examined the "citizen cavalry" of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, which was often composed of the richest inhabitants of the city—merchants as well as landed lords—who in return for their services gained exemptions from taxes and free use of communal pastures, in addition to a share of profits from the ransom of enemy prisoners and compensation for damages suffered while on campaign. The cavalry itself was, however, a more heterogeneous group, including also light cavalry known as *berrovieri*, a term later associated with internal state police forces, whose status did not reach that of knights. These troopers are examined in one of Settia's studies in *Communi in guerra.*

Armies possessed other diverse elements including sappers and pioneers (*guastatori*), who mined under fortifications and cleared roads; stonemasons and carpenters, who serviced trebuchets and built field fortifications; and *vetturali,* who helped transport food and materials; and musicians and doctors. The significance of the pioneers was enhanced by the growing role of large-scale field fortifications in thirteenth-century warfare in Lombardy, a development studied by F. Menant among others.

One of the most distinctive elements of medieval Italian warfare was the prominent role of the *carroccio*, which has been studied in depth by H. Zug-Tucci. The *carroccio,* an ox-drawn cart containing flags and symbols of the commune, was an important part of communal armies: the emblem of the commune, of civic pride, with both secular and religious meaning. It was a symbol of military and political and civic power. In the field it was a rallying point for armies. Its departure from the city involved a civic ceremony. It was protected by infantry, and thus emblematic of the military importance of the common citizens. The Bolognese *carroccio* in the thirteenth century was protected by fifteen hundred infantry. The *carroccio* of Pavia had a long banner with a white cross on a red background as well as a wooden tabernacle to use for the celebration of mass before battle. Its capture was a disgrace and was used for ritualistic insult.

Perhaps the most dramatic wars in Italy of this period were the ones involving Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa, who received Milan's *carroccio*, a token of the city's submission, after his siege of 1161–1162. These conflicts have recently been given a thorough examination by Holger Berwinkel. The title of Berwinkel's book, *Verwüsten und Belagern* (To devastate and to besiege), reflects what has become the general understanding among scholars of how war was fought in this period and this region.

Southern Italy. Southern Italy in the year 1000 was divided among Byzantine, Lombard, and Muslim rulers. Over the course of the eleventh century, new players on the scene—the Normans—came to dominate the whole area, including Sicily. With them came new military structures that synthesized local traditions with feudal structures, and an increased emphasis on heavy cavalry. Partly because of the connection with the near-contemporaneous Norman Conquest of England (as evident in the work of David C. Douglas, R. H. C. Davis, and J. J. Norwich), this topic has been relatively well covered in Anglophone historiography since the 1960s. The principal work in English on the subject is G. A. Loud's *The Age of Robert Guiscard* (2000); readers of Italian can also see E. Cuozzo's book on Norman military organization.

The military structures and practices developed in the wake of the Norman conquests underwent another set of significant changes following the

arrival in the south of Emperor Frederick II, who as grandson of Roger II also held the title king of Sicily. Frederick's presence encircled the Papal States and posed a grave threat to Tuscany and the papacy. It helped stoke Guelf-Ghibelline rivalries throughout the peninsula. The consequent developments in military matters have been examined by P. Pieri, R. Greci, J. Göbbels, and most fully by G. Amatuccio.

Frederick's armies were arranged on a grand scale, relative to those of his Italian contemporaries, and included a mixture of elements: troops from allied cities in north and central Italy, German vassals from beyond the Alps as well as southern Italy, and even contingents of Muslim archers from the city of Lucera in Apulia. P. Pieri has devoted a short study to the last group. Frederick also created in southern Italy a network of castles and fortresses to defend the region. He attempted more generally to systematize his army, including introducing reforms with respect to finance, and proposing a royal chamber to help pay for the production of arms and armor for soldiers at the expense of the state. He waged war without the traditional pause for winter. His presence in Italy, which ended with his death in 1250, brought almost continuous war.

Mercenaries. Nearly all of the armies of this period contained mercenaries, and their role (particularly the role of mercenary cavalry) grew over time. Scholars adduce many reasons. The infantry, according to Mallett, was in any case primarily defensive, its strength dependent on numbers. Mallett stressed the role of political and economic factors in the expanding use of mercenaries. He saw Italy's increasing commercial wealth in the thirteenth century as facilitating the use of mercenaries, and thereby encouraging aggressiveness among states that could now send employees rather than citizens off to fight. The political disintegration of Italy in the second half of the century, following the death of Frederick and the end of Guelf leagues, along with intense factional rivalries within states, made wars more continuous. Mallett also argued that developments in the art of war, including the introduction of the crossbow and the increasing use of armor, made professional troops (who could better afford the proper equipment and the requisite training) more desirable.

The participation of outside powers brought many foreign mercenaries to Italy. Both Hohenstaufen rulers, Frederick I and II, relied on German soldiers, who often remained after the campaigns of their imperial masters ended and hired themselves out to individual communes. Charles of Anjou, brother of the king of France, who had been invited by Pope Clement IV to take the throne of Naples, further increased the role of foreigners in Italian warfare. The Angevins Charles I (1260–1285) and Charles II (1285–1309) built on the military reforms of Frederick, but also made heavy use of French and Provençal soldiers and military ideas. Charles I's military system has been analyzed in a monograph by J. Göbbels.

Sicily revolted from Charles I in the Sicilian Vespers of 1282, which ultimately severed the more prosperous Sicily from Naples. Sicily was thereafter ruled by Peter III of Aragon, who added Catalan mercenaries to the military melting pot that Italy had become. The conflict between Aragonese and Angevin interest would last two centuries and greatly reduce the region's prosperity. Although Steven Runciman's work on this conflict remains fundamental, it should be supplemented by reference to Lawrence Mott's more recent studies, which though focusing on the military efforts of the Crown of Aragon, nonetheless deal with a war fought mainly in Italian waters and with Italian ships and sailors.

Charles of Anjou's arrival in Italy had helped revive the recourse to *taglie*. Central and northern Italy and various towns accepted his military protection, and banded together against Ghilbelline threat. The Tuscan Guelf league was formed in response in 1281, uniting Florence, Lucca, Pistoia, Prato, and Volterra against Pisa. It lasted in one form or another for twenty years. In Florence, Guelf popular governments undermined the traditional role of the nobility as warriors. These developments encouraged long-term employment of mercenaries in ever-larger contingents. Commanders involved in the Guelf league, such as the Catalan Diego de la

Rat, became the prototype of the mercenary captain of the fourteenth century. Mallet and Waley have examined these developments as precursors to the great age of the condottieri that followed.

The Conduct of War. Scholars agree on the basic outlines of the conduct of war. The title of Aldo Settia's overview of medieval warfare, *Rapine, assedi, battaglie* (Devastation, sieges, battles), sums up the basic elements in order of the frequency with which they occurred. Communal armies were mobile, but participated in few battles in the field. War was generally conducted by maneuver within *territorio incastellato*, or fortified territory. (The collection of essays edited by R. Comba and A. Settia, *Castelli: Storia e archeologia*, provides a useful overview of the encastellation of Italy in this period and of developments in fortifications afterward; other work on castles and military architecture is too extensive to deal with here). As in later years, states waged wars of attrition, burning harvests and buildings throughout the countryside. The raids, reminiscent of the *chevauchées* in France, sometimes culminated in the siege of a castle or fortified city, which was the next most typical type of offensive campaign. Armies were usually contracted for the short run. Sieges, by contrast, were long term, and extant armies were not large enough to encircle castles or cities. Sieges thus required military engineers and large numbers of infantry, as Settia and others have emphasized. Case studies of siege operations from the eleventh century now include analyses of the sieges of Bari (1068–1071) and Salerno (1076–1077) by Bünemann and Mailler, respectively.

Although relatively rare, field battles were important when they did occur. The sources for the battle of Montaperti in 1260 are extraordinarily detailed and have been much studied over the years without being exhausted, as demonstrated in the 2009 volume edited by E. Pellegrini. The battle of Campaldino in 1289, which involved the poet Dante, has also been the subject of a particular study—this one in English, by Herbert Oerter.

Cavalry played a key role in the latter battle, on both sides, evidence of the traditional view, held for example by Pieri, that infantry was losing its importance to the cavalry in the thirteenth century. However, the work of Aldo Settia, based on careful examination of chronicles, shows numerous instances of infantry success in the field and of coordinated activity among the infantry and cavalry contingents. Scholars have noted also the important role played by crossbowmen in Italian warfare. Crossbowmen were crucial in the naval battles of the thirteenth century, had some success against horsemen on land, and were recruited both within the state and from the outside. They were garrisoned in fortresses. Studies of the Veneto by G. M Varanini show the critical role of crossbowmen in garrisoning more than thirty forts in the region, constituting a significant number of men permanently under arms.

The study of the conduct of war, or even of military structures and their social implications, was for a long time unfashionable among historians of high-medieval Italy. As the number of post-1980 works noted here suggests, that attitude has changed, especially in Italy. The publication in Italian of two major surveys of warfare written by scholars specializing in this period, Aldo Settia (2002) and Paolo Grillo (2008), is a remarkable development. Still, the body of scholarship on the subject remains somewhat thin compared to what exists for England, France, or Spain. There are rich opportunities for further research, and for bringing the fruits of past work to an Anglophone audience.

[*See also* Britain, *subentry on* Historiography (1000–1300); Germany, *subentry on* Historiography (1125–1250); *and* Iberia, *subentry on* Historiography (1100–1300).]

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William Caferro

Historiography (1300–1493)

The historiography on Italian warfare for the period from 1300 to 1493 has focused on two main interconnected themes. The first is states' use of mercenary soldiers. The second, derived from the former, is the decay and "decadence" of native Italian martial institutions, which rendered the peninsula militarily "backward" with respect to the emerging nation-states of northern Europe and left it prey to the French invasion in 1494 and the subsequent Habsburg-Valois or "Italian Wars." Recent scholarship has revised this portrait, placing greater emphasis on the social, economic, and political context of military developments, but the essential equation of Italian warfare with mercenaries and backwardness has remained.

Machiavelli and His Influence. The terms of discussion may be traced back to the work of Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527) in the sixteenth century. Machiavelli forcefully condemned contemporary Italian military practice, above all the use of mercenaries, whom he depicted as "useless," "unreliable," and ultimately "dangerous." Machiavelli stated his opinions most conspicuously in *The Prince* (Books 12 and 13), *The Art of War* (Book 1), and *The Discourses* (Book 2, discourse 20). He advocated the use of native armies on the ancient Roman model, with emphasis on strong citizen infantries.

Machiavelli's statements have reverberated through the ages and influenced the study of warfare beyond medieval and early modern Italy. However, his work had a profound effect on Italian historiography. It served as a starting point for the studies of nineteenth-century Italian military historians, who, impelled also by nationalistic sentiment of the *Risorgimento*, saw the military decadence and use of mercenary ("foreign") soldiers in the earlier period as a precursor to the modern lack of national unity in Italy and its subjugation by foreign powers. This was the motivation of Ercole Ricotti (d. 1883), a lieutenant in the corps of engineers of the army of Piedmont, who authored the first modern study of medieval and Renaissance Italian warfare (*Storia delle compagnie di ventura in Italia*), a two-volume work published in 1844–1845. Ricotti was not a professional scholar but came to the subject by means of a personal passion for history. He focused his attention squarely on mercenaries and their brigades, which he called *compagnie di ventura* (companies of adventure), a term that has endured, applied nowadays mostly to the larger, more autonomous bands of the fourteenth century. Ricotti began his history with the invasion of the peninsula by the Lombards in the sixth century and traced military events to the sixteenth century and the Italian wars. He, like Machiavelli, saw the latter as a calamity that was the result of the lack of adequate native armies, which had already begun to pass out of existence in the thirteenth century. Ricotti's work was followed in 1851 by a monumental article by Giuseppe Canestrini, dedicated to Ricotti, that focused more specifically on the transition period from the thirteenth to sixteenth century, when the native *milizia dei communi* were replaced by the *compagnie di ventura* and condottieri. Canestrini expanded on Ricotti's ideas with extensive use of archival material, much of which he included in lengthy appendices. He brought to light the specific details of military organization, including the terms of employment of mercenaries (*condotte*), the means of their recruitment, and the

military leagues (*taglie*) formed by cities to protect against their peacetime raids.

The work of both Ricotti and Canestrini was highly nationalistic in tone. They emphasized the evils of the mercenary system and the benefits of native armies. They were especially critical of foreign mercenaries from outside of Italy, but both authors ultimately blamed the Italian states themselves—their moral failings—for the situation. The two stressed above all the evolutionary nature of the mercenary system, sketching out its distinct phases of development. Mercenaries came into widespread use in the late thirteenth century, owing largely to the involvement of foreign powers, the Angevins and Aragonese in southern Italy and German emperors in Lombardy and central Italy. They developed by the fourteenth century into large bands or companies, numbering several hundred men and sometimes more, led often by foreign captains (for example, the Englishman John Hawkwood). In the last decades of fourteenth century the companies disappeared, replaced by powerful individual captains, the condottieri, who dealt directly with employers. The key figure in the transition was Alberigo da Barbiano (d. 1409), whose career also signified a new phase of the mercenary system in which native Italian mercenaries dominated the local scene. Barbiano was followed by other notable captains such as Braccio da Montone, Muzio Attendoli, Bartolomeo Colleone, and Federico da Montefeltro—the last lord of his own state at Urbino. The fifteenth-century condottieri were often accomplished men, but the recourse to their service left Italy unprepared for the descent of the French national army in 1494.

Twentieth-Century Scholarship. The nationalism of Italian scholars elicited a response from their German counterparts. The historian Karl Heinrich Schäfer took issue with the depiction of German mercenaries in Italy, seeing them not as foreign oppressors but as "heroes," often lords and men of distinction or of noble extraction, who offered much-needed service. In a multivolume work derived from exhaustive research in Italian archives (*Deutsche Ritter und Edelknechte in Italien während des 14. Jahrhunderts*, published 1911–1940), Schäfer provided new information on the service of German soldiers in Italy, including detailed lists of the names and places of origin of the men. Meanwhile, another German scholar, Willibald Block, rebutted Machiavelli's famous statement that battles involving mercenaries were "bloodless" affairs owing to their lack of martial spirit. Looking closely at the sources, Block showed that Italian wars were in fact very deadly. For instance, he demonstrated that the battle of Anghiari (1440), which according to Machiavelli claimed the life of one man who fell from his horse, involved numerous casualties.

Piero Pieri's *Il Rinascimento e la crisi militare Italiana*, first published in 1934 and revised and reissued in 1952, initiated a new phase in the study of Italian warfare. Pieri gave close examination—the most extensive to date—to Italian military institutions and practices in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the era of the French invasion and Italian wars. Pieri followed earlier scholars in stressing the evils of the mercenary system and the lack of native infantry. Further, Pieri systematically attempted to explain the latter, which he linked closely to the social, political, and economic fabric of Italy. In this way he connected military events to the broader history of Italy. Pieri's treatment of the French invasion and Italian wars remains a basic source for scholars.

Pieri's work did not, however, initiate a spate of new studies on war. His career coincided with the fascist era and World War II, which served as a brake on work in the field in Italy. Scholarship during the war years focused mostly on local studies, often of individual battles and condottieri, derived from archives, which increased the available information but avoided interpretation. The Anglophone literature meanwhile lagged far behind. As in Italy, there was interest in battles and individual condottieri. But, the literature was largely popular in nature, focused on the personalities and "individuality" of the famous mercenary captains. The latter reflects the influence of Jacob Burckhardt, who famously depicted the condottieri as the embodiment of his "Renaissance man." The interpretation established a close connection in English-language literature

between great individual figures and the Italian wars, a connection that remains influential.

Reinterpreting the History of Italian Warfare. It was nevertheless within the Anglophone academy that a major reinterpretation of Italian war took place in the 1970s and 1980s. A group of English historians, led by Daniel Waley, Michael Mallett, and John Hale, returned to the archives and undertook detailed studies of Italian military organization from 1300 to 1550. Waley examined extant contracts (*condotte*) and traced the evolution of mercenary service in the armies of the city of Florence from the late thirteenth to the early fourteenth century. He demonstrated in a more precise manner the mechanism by which the mercenary system developed. Most important, he showed that the system was not all-encompassing, that states continued to use native forces alongside mercenaries, and that these remained important to the practice of war. Mallett's *Mercenaries and Their Masters*, published in 1974, sought, like Pieri, to contextualize the study of war. Mallett situated the mercenaries in terms of the society they served, exploring their numerous aspects, from recruitment and pay, to tactics and the practice of war, to camp life and even the cultural activities of the soldiers. Along with Hale (who focused primarily on the sixteenth century), Mallett reconstructed the military organization of the city of Venice. He emphasized the development there by the mid-fifteenth century of permanent forces that remained on the payroll in times of peace and war, bringing Italian practice more into line with developments up north. Hale's own pioneering studies examined the evolution of fortifications in Italy from 1450–1550, particularly the development of the angle bastion, a major innovation in military engineering associated with the use of more effective cannons. Hale's work would have great importance in debates regarding the military revolution.

The studies created new terms of discussion and inspired numerous publications. Mallett's *Mercenaries and Their Masters* was translated into Italian in 1983. It joined the influential work already underway by Mario del Treppo, who offered an "inside look" into the mercenary band of Micheletto Attendolo through close examination of the extant account books of its treasurer in the archive of the Fraternità dei laici in Arezzo. The material allowed an unprecedented view of the financial and social bonds that held together the mercenary band. William Caferro, meanwhile, explored the economic and political impact of military expenditures on the city of Siena in the fourteenth century. Louis Green examined the diplomatic and military policies of Lucchese lord and mercenary Castruccio Castracane. John E. Law investigated the careers of lords of Camarino, native Italian mercenaries, who fought in Italian armies over several centuries. Stephan Selzer reevaluated the activities of German mercenaries, presenting a more three-dimensional portrait of the social, political, and economic world they inhabited. Similar consideration has been given to English mercenaries, most notably, John Hawkwood, the most successful captain of the fourteenth century, who maintained close ties to his English home and represented his king as diplomat on numerous occasions.

Much of the recent work has, however, focused on the fifteenth century. Scholars view the period as one of increase in the scale of warfare and of important innovations and experimentation. The native captains Muzio Attendolo "Sforza" and Braccio da Montone, opponents at the battle of L'Aquila (1424), are key figures, leaders of the so-called schools of military practice, the *sforzechi* and *bracceschi*, which were in reality more like factions in support of the captain. But, many of the major condottieri of the fifteenth century belonged to these factions, which influenced the way they waged war. The scale of war increased in part as a result of the full-scale involvement of Venice on the mainland, the attempts by Alfonso the Magnanimous to solidify his hold on the Kingdom of Naples after assuming power in 1421, and the Ottoman threat from outside of Italy.

Scholars have traced increases in the size of local armies and beginnings, particularly in Venice, Milan, and Naples, of more permanent forces (Mallett, 1974; Mallet and Hale, 1984). They have examined changes in the nature of service of their condottieri, their "domestication," and greater tendency to offer

long-term service to states. Military historians have likewise studied changes with regard to cavalry service, the introduction of larger individual units and more structured chains of command, as well as growing reliance on light cavalry, which provided greater maneuverability and flexibility in wars, particularly against the Ottomans. There has also been significant interest in gunpowder, the increased use of firearms (Hall, 1997), and introduction of specialist handgun infantry units, such as *schioppetieri* companies in the Venetian and Milanese armies.

Maria Nadia Covini has stressed the connection between military organization and state development. She has demonstrated how taxes and the general maintenance of armies in Milan led to the transfer of economic resources that was critical to political consolidation of that state. Franco Cardini in several influential studies has illuminated the cultural world of soldiers, most notably knights. Several recent studies have looked at issues of ethnicity and economy, the latter stressing not only how states paid for war but also how the soldiers themselves used their money.

The scholarship remains uneven. Research into the fourteenth century lags behind that of the fifteenth century, and indeed even that of the communal period, which has seen much recent important work. The fourteenth century remains a prehistory to the events of the fifteenth century and the eventual French invasion and Italian wars that brought on the decline of the peninsula.

[*See also* Condottieri; Hawkwood, John; *and* Mercenaries.]

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J

Jaen, Sieges of

Jaen had long occupied the interest of the Castilian monarchy and had first been besieged in the twelfth century. Located 210 miles (338 kilometers) from Murcia to the east, 94 miles (151 kilometers) from Córdoba to the west, and close to the key Muradal Pass in the Sierra Morenas to the north, Jaen's strategic position was vital to the control of Upper Andalusia. With its strong walls, citadel, and numerous springs, the city maintained a large garrison, proving itself no easy target for Castilian conquest. Nonetheless, Fernando III (r. 1217–1252) intended to exploit the victory of his grandfather, Alfonso VIII (r. 1158–1214), at Las Navas de Tolosa (1212), by gaining control of the upper Guadalquivir River valley. The disintegration of Almohad leadership resulted in competition among a number of petty princes for power, and created diplomatic opportunities for Castile. Thus Fernando undertook four sieges of Jaen between 1225 and 1246 to achieve this end.

Allied with al-Bayasi, his vassal and the Muslim governor of Baeza, Fernando brought a substantial army of military orders, nobles, and urban militias, and besieged Jaen in June 1225. He used no siege engines to accelerate his efforts, and surrounding the city proved insufficient to force its surrender, since he controlled few of the supporting towns and castles in the vicinity. In July the Castilian king withdrew to raid elsewhere in Andalusia. In the next year al-Bayasi, who had given Fernando the rights to Jaen, was killed by his fellow Muslims.

Fernando returned to invest Jaen (24 June 1230), and made a more determined effort to force the walls. He utilized trebuchets although apparently no siege towers. Numerous armed clashes with the garrison punctuated the siege, but after three months, the Castilian king became discouraged. Then word came that his father, King Alfonso IX of León (r. 1188–1230), had died in late September, causing Fernando to terminate the siege and depart for León to claim the kingdom. While this removed much of the pressure on Jaen for several years, it meant that when Fernando returned, he would have the full power of the recombined kingdom of León-Castile behind him.

The final campaign to take Jaen was launched in 1245, lasting into 1246, and is usually counted as two separate sieges. By 1245 Fernando had captured numerous towns and castles in the vicinity, depriving the city of its infrastructure of regional defense. Córdoba had fallen in 1236, and Murcia to the east was now garrisoned by Castilian troops. After devastating the fields and orchards, the Castilians besieged Jaen (8 August 1245) and built a fortified base camp near the walls. Fernando was on site intermittently for the next several months

issuing documents there, and then renewed his grip in January 1246. Ibn al-Ahmar, ruler of Granada and founder of the Nasrid dynasty there, fearing his city would be next, offered his vassalage to Fernando, surrendering Jaen to protect the remainder of his kingdom. In late March Fernando entered the city as the population withdrew without further resistance.

[*See also* Alfonso VIII of Castile; Fernando III; Iberia, *subentry on* Narrative (1100–1300); *and* Las Navas de Tolosa, Battle of.]

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JAIME I

(1208–1276), King of Aragon-Catalonia (1214–1276). Called "the Conqueror" by later chroniclers, Jaime I stands as one of the great figures of Spain's reconquest history. As the only son of Pedro II (Pere I) of Aragon (r. 1196–1213), Jaime became an orphan with the death of his father at the battle of Muret (12 September 1213). Held in custody for almost a year by the victors of the battle, the young prince was freed through the diplomatic pressure of the papacy and then acclaimed king at Lerida in August 1214. While he was kept at Monzón under the tutelage of the Templars, his realms were administered by three commissioners headed by Sancho of Roussillion. During these formative years Master Guillem de Montrodon of the Temple and Archbishop Asperec of Tarragona apparently instilled in Jaime a muscular Christianity that underpinned all his later military endeavors.

During the decade after the young king's removal from Monzón in 1217, he faced a serious baronial insurgency made even more dangerous by widespread feuding. Stemming this social conflagration, Jaime promised both largesse and threats of military action and the teenaged sovereign, who found that he had a natural affinity for warfare, acted to solve or at least ameliorate the problem of his fractious nobility by diverting their destructive energies against neighboring Muslim states.

Jaime commenced his many campaigns against Spanish Islam in 1225 when he invaded Valencia after taking up the cross as a crusader. Though unsuccessful in his first military venture, a siege of the heavily fortified castle of Peñiscola, the Aragonese king learned the invaluable lesson of endowing his expeditions into Muslim Hispania with an aura of crusading. In fact, the papacy granted each of his campaigns against Spanish Islam a crusading bull that he could count on for a great deal of unfettered money as well as manpower from across Europe. Thus in his most important expeditions Jaime commanded armies of thirty thousand men for up to a year. Even with his war chest filled by papal support, Jaime learned through hard experience that he could raise and support such large armies only through the backing of his parliaments (*cortes*). In his later years, however, he found these institutions extremely stingy paymasters who had little interest in supporting his martial efforts.

With these national and international means of support in place, Jaime unleashed a whirlwind of conquest that brought under his control the *taifa* states of the Balearic Islands and Valencia between 1229 and 1238. After consolidating his administration of these new lands, which retained a largely Muslim population, and bringing them under the centralizing influence of Roman law, he spent the next two decades in extending his control down the Valencian littoral, conquering Jativa in 1244 and Murcia (in conjunction with his son-in-law) in 1265–1266. Though the last years of his life were filled with more defeats than triumphs—an aborted Holy Land crusade and a number of rebellions among his Muslim subjects and his barons, including a bitter feud between his sons Pedro and Ferran Sanchis—Jaime never retired from the life of a warrior and died on



Jaime I (1208-1276). Jaime I (*center*) sits surrounded by his knights in Catalan armor. Detail from a mural from the former Palacio Reale, Barcelona, c. 1285. Museu Nacional d'Art de Catalunya, Barcelona. PHOTOGRAPH BY ROEL RENMANS

campaign on 27 July 1276. He left behind the reputation of a daring soldier who advanced Christianity's position against that of Islam more than any other European ruler of the time.

Thanks to Jaime I's autobiography, the unique and highly revelatory *Book of Deeds* (*Llibre de Feyts*), the Aragonese king's image as a military leader is extremely clear. Though hardly captivated by the concept of death, he viewed cowardice on the battlefield as a fate worse than death, since the shame incurred by such actions remained after death and tainted one's reputation. In real terms, Jaime's military behavior was couched in a simple code of chivalric honor that fashioned his relationship with Christian, Muslim, and Jew alike. Despite this idealist bent of character, Jaime was extremely practical and possessed great cunning that served him well as both commander and negotiator. His fierce temper, which had turned more than one battle in his favor, brought him occasional domestic woes as in 1246 when he was excommunicated and suffered formal humiliation for having his confessor's tongue cut out. Even as he measured himself and others by personal prowess in war, the king grew fascinated with the many forms of mechanical artillery that were appearing on contemporary battlefields and increasingly saw this technology as essential for gaining the edge that would bring final victory.

[*See also* Alfonso X of Castile *and* Muret, Battle of.]

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JAIME II

(1264–1327), called "the Just," King of Sicily (1285–1296), and of Aragon (1291–1327). Jaime II was an accomplished commander with a keen grasp of all military matters. His grand strategy, pursued from the moment he assumed the throne, aimed at expanding Aragonese territorial and political influence and the crown's authority. To accomplish this, he commanded or organized military campaigns against Sicily, Murcia, Almería, and Sardinia. In the case of Sicily, Jaime II dispatched navies to conduct raids against his brother Fadrique, who had been crowned king of Sicily. In this case, the Aragonese monarch's intention was not to conquer, but to punish. In this way he secured Aragonese royal influence over an independent Sicily for many generations.

He then turned his attention to the frontier with Castile. In this campaign, Jaime II showed he was an astute diplomat and military planner. First, he secured alliances with the Portuguese, the French, and Alfonso de la Cerda, pretender to the Castilian throne, to isolate Castile. His strategy was to invade Castile from three fronts. He also recruited an army of one thousand knights and many foot soldiers, with which he occupied Murcia, Alicante, Alhama, and Lorca. Jaime II also displayed a great ability to adjust to changing conditions and chose to end the conflict by treaty, keeping some significant gains, when it was clear that it had stalemated. Yet not everything he touched turned to gold. In 1309 he marshaled his forces again for a combined operation with Castile against Granada. The plan called for concurrent siege operations in Algeciras (Fernando IV) and Almería (Jaime II). His organizational skills were on display as he coordinated an armed march from Valencia through enemy territory, with the arrival of the bulk of his host and materiel by sea. Nevertheless, the hasty preparations left his forces undersupplied and vulnerable to internal dissent. As if lifting the siege were not enough, after pillaging Almería's environs, his army faced a difficult ten-day home punctuated by shortages and constant Muslim harassment. After this military disaster, Jaime II turned his attention away from Granada and toward the Mediterranean. By letting his kingdom's *almogaveres*, the Catalan Company, leave in search of opportunities, he not only averted any potential problems arising from idle soldiers in his dominions, but also kept them—and by extension the lands they conquered—under Aragonese influence.

Jaime II's final campaign was the conquest of Sardinia, for which he managed to raise an army composed of eleven hundred heavy and light cavalry, two thousand crossbowmen, and a large infantry contingent. He then gathered a fleet of fifty-three galleys and twenty-five other ships to transport these effectives and their supplies, which among other things included over fifteen thousand metric tons of grain. This impressive logistic effort, though it stretched Jaime II's realms to the financial breaking point, and sound strategy succeeded. The Aragonese conquered Sardinia through a series of marches and specifically the long siege of Cagliari. It was this final conquest that cemented both Jaime II's reputation as a distinguished military commander and Aragon's important Mediterranean presence for decades to come.

[*See also Almogaveres and* Catalan Company.]

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Nicolás Agrait

JAMES, SAINT

See Santiago.

JANISSARIES

See Ottoman Armies and Military Methods.

JEAN DE BUEIL

(1406–1477), admiral of France and Count of Sancerre. Jean de Bueil was a French aristocrat and military man who was trained by some of the most famous knights and was one of the most prestigious military leaders of the last quarter of the Hundred Years' War. His legacy to the field of medieval warfare is significant not only because of his illustrious achievements as a soldier but also because of his contribution as an author.

Jean de Bueil lived in Maine and Anjou, where the front line moved back and forth along the Loire River and where peasants and clergy had accepted English authority. Local lords had fled to the territories that remained under Charles VII's influence. In such territories, the knights' only preoccupation was fighting and survival. Jean de Bueil often fought alongside La Hire, who contributed to his military education, and waged not only conventional warfare, but also used all resources available to bring war to his enemies. He distinguished himself among the nobles of Maine as he relentlessly dedicated his life to knightly enterprises, raids and battles, from the battle of Verneuil in 1424 until the end of the Hundred Years' War. Jean de Bueil's fame grew with the siege of Orléans. His name was associated with Joan of Arc; Jean, Comte de Dunois; Gilles de Raiz; and all the other knights who followed "the Maiden." He took an active part in the battles of Rouvray (12 February 1429) and Patay (18 June 1429). The latter marked the beginning of a series of victories for France. He led forces in the reconquest of Normandy and Gascony. His military abilities and skills at leading men into battle earned him the titles of lieutenant and adviser to the dauphin for the 1444 campaign in Switzerland, captain of Cherbourg, admiral of France in 1450, and ambassador to Savoy and Italy.

Jean de Bueil fell into temporary disgrace after Louis XI was crowned. During this time of "forced" retirement, between 1463 and 1465, he wrote *Le Jouvencel*, one of the most successful works of the end of the fifteenth century. *Le Jouvencel* is a semi-autobiographical roman à clef, which tells the story of a poor young man who becomes a knight and rises to the highest levels of power. The work is divided into three parts, which mirror the three evolutionary stages in the career of the hero and his increasing responsibilities: rising through the ranks, commanding small forces, and leading armies and nations. Jean de Bueil describes tactics, subterfuges, weapons, and everyday life with many vivid touches that open a window on contemporary concerns and practices. *Le Jouvencel* is both a didactic tool and a criticism of the new military age and of the politics of the fifteenth century. The work aims at educating the new generation of knights and military leaders. But, after having successfully led many campaigns, fallen out of favor at the court, and witnessed the building of a new army in which he was no longer needed, Jean de Bueil also wished to expose the shortcomings of the French nobility.

[*See also* Charles VII of France; Dunois, Jean, Count of; Hundred Years' War; Joan of Arc; La Hire; Orléans, Siege of; Patay, Battle of; Rouen, Siege of (1449); Rouvray, Battle of; *and* Verneuil, Battle of.

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Matthieu E. Chan Tsin

JEAN DE VIENNE

(1341–1396), Lord of Rolans (near Besançon) and admiral of France. Jean de Vienne first saw military action against the Great Companies in the 1360s when he served under Bertrand du Guesclin, with whom he is often compared. A skilled naval commander, an intimate of the French king Charles V, and a highly capable administrator, Jean de Vienne revitalized the French naval effort in the Hundred Years' War.

After a brief period as vice admiral, on 27 December 1373 Vienne replaced the Count of Narbonne as admiral of France. With the encouragement of Charles V, Vienne developed the French naval base at Rouen, the Clos de Galées, modeled on the naval arsenal at Seville. Under his command French maritime forces grew in efficiency and size.

Using these resources, Vienne led a major offensive immediately after the expiration in 1377 of the truce of Bruges. He commanded a force of thirty-five royal vessels, eight Castilian galleys, and five Portuguese galleys in a series of devastating naval raids on the south coast of England from Rye to Plymouth. Departing on 24 June 1377 (three days after Edward III died), the force swept through the Channel ports, looting and burning. A second offensive followed in August during which Vienne extracted a ransom of one thousand marks from the people of the Isle of Wight. Unable to repeat his success against walled towns such as Southampton and Winchelsea, Vienne returned to France to join an assault on English-held Calais, which might well have fallen but for deteriorating weather conditions.

Vienne conducted further raids in 1380, capturing Jersey and Guernsey. The raids of the late 1370s and early 1380s caused a great deal of political, military, and economic damage to the English war effort: *chevauchées* were prevented from launching, and the horrors of the Hundred Years' War were brought to home shores. After a brief interlude following Charles V's death in 1380, Vienne became involved in two serious attempts to invade England. The first of these aimed to land two forces in Britain simultaneously, one commanded by Vienne in Scotland, the other commanded by Olivier de Clisson on the south coast of England. Vienne arrived at Leith on 1 June 1385 with a force of thirteen hundred men-at-arms and 250 crossbowmen. He led a Franco-Scottish raid into the Borders but was driven back by Richard II at the head of a substantial English army. Vienne soon returned to the West March and plundered Cumberland. The full-scale invasion failed, however, in part because Clisson's invasion force was delayed until too late. In 1386–1387, Vienne assembled yet another invasion force at Harfleur, with perhaps as many as thirty thousand troops. The plan failed when Clisson fell into the hands of the Duke of Brittany. Charles VI's illness and growing tension in the Valois court curtailed the French naval effort. Vienne's final campaign was not on sea but on land: serving as one of Jean de Nevers's councillors during the Nicopolis Crusade (1396), he died at the battle of Nicopolis.

[*See also* Great Companies; Guesclin, Bertrand du; Hundred Years' War, *subentry on* Naval Raids on England; *and* Nicopolis, Battle of.]

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David Green

JEAN DE VILLIERS

(c. 1380–1437), Lord of L'Isle-Adam and marshal of France. Born in Paris, Jean de Villiers was the grandson of Pierre I of Villiers, Lord of L'Isle-Adam, who

had borne the sacred oriflamme banner of Saint-Denis. He thus belonged to a family in which military service was a tradition. Having participated in the defense of the city of Harfleur against the English in 1415, and having offered his services to the count of Armagnac, he finally joined the cause of the duke of Burgundy in 1417. He then served faithfully, for twenty years, the dukes John the Fearless and Philip the Good; he also used his sword in the service of the duke of Bedford, regent of France for King Henry VI, between 1422 and 1435. During this period he twice assumed the office of marshal of France: first between 1418 and 1422, nominated by the Burgundian party, and again between 1432 and 1435, nominated by the duke of Bedford. In fact, the latter was eager to give one of the great lords of France, such as L'Isle-Adam, a primary role in the military system of the double monarchy of France and England. In 1430, the duke of Burgundy chose Jean de Villiers as among the first members of the Order of the Golden Fleece.

His military skill was evidenced on many occasions: in the guerrilla war that he led against the English on the Normandy border in the summer of 1419; in fights against the troops of the dauphin, Charles of France, in Brie and in Champagne in 1420; and in the Hainaut, Holland, and Zeeland expeditions led by the duke of Burgundy between 1425 and 1428, during which campaigns he took part in the battle of Brouwershaven (February 1426), where he bore the banner of Duke Philip. But it was, above all, the military operations centered around Paris that brought him fame. He particularly distinguished himself when he succeeded in taking the city from the Armagnacs in a surprise nighttime attack on 29 May 1418. He was also the main defender of Paris, of which he had been named captain when Joan of Arc attempted an assault on the city on 8 September 1429. Finally, he was one of the main actors in the reconquest of the city by Charles VII (recently reconciled with the duke of Burgundy) on 13 April 1436. It is interesting to note that this specialist in the capture of cities and in street fighting was killed in Bruges (22 May 1437), the victim of a riot.

[*See also* Harfleur, Siege of.]

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Bertrand Schnerb
Translated from the French by Johanna M. Baboukis

JEAN D'ORLÉANS

See Dunois, Jean, Count of.

JEAN LE BEL

(c.1290–1370). Biographical information on Jean le Bel is scarce. He was born in Liège around 1290. Before 1313 he became canon of Saint-Lambert of Liège. Although he was in a position of religious authority, in 1327 he took part in a military expedition in Scotland in the company of John of Hainaut, Lord of Beaumont, and John's nephew by marriage, Edward III of England. After this military campaign, Jean le Bel returned to the Low Countries where he continued his ecclesiastical life. He began to write his chronicle shortly after 1352.

Jean le Bel was encouraged to write a chronicle by John of Hainaut. Jean le Bel undertook it because he was disappointed by the style of some of his precursors, who concentrated on poetic rhyme rather than historical veracity in their writing. Jean le Bel did not have access to written sources; therefore, his reliance on firsthand oral accounts produced an original work. In addition, Jean le Bel placed great emphasis on presenting the facts rather than making interpretations when he was unable to uncover the truth. For example, in his chronicle regarding the standoff at La Flamengrie-Buironfosse (1339), he chose to present the arguments of each camp's claim to victory. He also attempted to keep an objective view of historical events. One such example was his praise of Edward III being counterbalanced by his inclusion

of an account of the king's (alleged) rape of the countess of Salisbury in 1342. His analyses were, however, influenced by his noble background, which at times led him to interpret the events in a skewed way. Jean le Bel is, however, much more reliable and objective than contemporaries such as Froissart—except, that is, where Froissart copied his text from le Bel, as he did for much of the early part of his chronicle.

Le Bel's chronicle focuses on events that took place between 1326 and 1361. These included many military actions, such as the wars between Scotland and England; some episodes of the *Reconquista* of Spain; the revolt of the county of Flanders; the war of succession of the duchy of Brabant; the war of succession of the duchy of Brittany; the civil wars in Liège; and the beginning of the Hundred Years' War.

Although Jean le Bel provided accounts of military actions, he wrote very little about strategy, tactics, or diplomacy. His accounts of battles are often short and without analysis. In this, Froissart is more informative. On the other hand, the depiction of the hardships that he endured during the expedition of 1327 and the details that he gave about the Scots and their manner of fighting represent the most interesting chapters of his chronicle. Contrary to many other sources, Jean le Bel informs us about the daily life of the warrior and not simply a recounting of his glorious feats of arms. Jean le Bel is thus a vital source for all those interested in the military history of the fourteenth century.

[*See also* Edward III of England *and* Froissart, Jean.]

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JEAN II LE MEINGRE

(1366–1421), called "Boucicaut," marshal of France (1391) and grand constable of the Byzantine Empire (1399). The son of the marshal of France of the same name, this late representative of the knight-errant race and occasional poet appears to have been more of an adventurer than a great military leader. Known for his skill in tournaments and praised for his courage in combat, observance of chivalric values, and his honesty, he was nicknamed "the Brave," while Christine de Pizan dubbed him the "mirror of chivalry." She sang his praises in these terms: "Neither Caesar, the Great Emperor, nor the Alexander the Great Conqueror, bettered him in arms, nor surpassed him in deeds of valor." However, he is much less well known for his victories, which were by and large inconsequential, than for his military disasters in the battles of Nicopolis and Agincourt.

His apprenticeship in arms began at the age of ten in the French court, where he became a loyal supporter of the future Charles VI. Already renowned for his valor and boldness, Le Meingre was knighted on the eve of the battle of Roosebeke, at the age of sixteen.

In pursuit of his chivalric ideal, he wandered into distant lands seeking to do valiant deeds. On two occasions—in 1385 and 1390—he journeyed to Prussia, where he distinguished himself in battle assisting the Teutonic Knights. In 1387 he traversed Italy, reached Constantinople, passed through the Near East, and sojourned in Egypt. In 1399—still inspired by a chivalric spirit—he founded the Order of the White Lady with the Green Shield, whose mission was to come to the aid of endangered and forlorn noble ladies.

His merits having been acknowledged early on, at the age of twenty-five he was appointed marshal of France by Charles VI, who put his skills as a warrior and diplomat to good use. In 1396 Le Meingre took part in the crusade against the Turks, during which his impetuosity was the predominant cause of the disastrous battle of Nicopolis. After several months in France, and other feats of arms against the English, he was sent to defend Constantinople,

under siege at the time by Ottomans. He managed to repel the aggressors, who had cordoned off the city, and was named grand constable of the Byzantine Empire by Manuel II Palaiologos.

In 1401, dispatched to Italy as the governor of Genoa to put an end to local uprisings, Le Meingre distinguished himself by his bold initiatives. He remained in Italy for ten years, where he had a few military successes, yet never truly managed to stabilize the situation. Ultimately defeated, he lost control of Genoa.

Upon returning to a France that was in the full throes of civil war, he pledged his sole loyalty to the king and made various efforts to restore peace between the various political parties. While serving as captain general in Languedoc, he was recalled in August 1415 to help defend the country against Henry V's invasion. At Agincourt, drawing on his lesson from Nicopolis, Le Meingre urged those in command to avoid a pitched battle, but his advice was not heeded: the French cavalry's charge was a bloody disaster, during which he was taken prisoner. He remained a captive in England until his death in 1421.

In the final analysis, Le Meingre's successes in life were very mixed, but this simply reflected the difficulties he encountered in striving to reconcile the chivalric ideal with the military necessities of his time.

[*See also* Agincourt, Battle of; Chivalry; Henry V, Emperor; *and* Nicopolis, Battle of.]

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Translated from the French by Carol Macomber

JERUSALEM, CAPTURE OF (614)

The city of Jerusalem, a major symbolic center for Christianity and, from 451, seat of one of the five patriarchates of the church, was the object of a Persian attack in 614, as Sasanian forces swept through Syria southward into Palestine and en route toward the Roman province of Egypt. The siege is reported to have been bitterly resisted, but eventually the city was taken, with great loss of life and considerable destruction, and then handed over to the Jews.

Initially, the Persian commander, Shahrbaraz, offered terms, but when these were rejected, his forces built siege towers and other engines, and began a bombardment of the city's defenses. After some three weeks, and the failure of a relieving force raised locally to challenge the besieging army, the walls were breached, and with the assistance of a substantial force of Jews—who had been excluded from Jerusalem since the time of the emperor Hadrian—the city was entered and sacked. A massacre of the civilian population ensued, permitted by the Persian commander as a reward to his Jewish allies, and attributed by later Christian writers as well as by a purported eyewitness, the monk Antiochos, to their anger and hatred of the city's Christian population. A contemporary account purports to enumerate the number of corpses buried afterward, by the location where they were found, with the total reaching 66,509. Many churches were looted and destroyed, and enormous booty taken to Persia. The True Cross was carried off in triumph by the Persian commander to Ctesiphon and recovered only in 629, after the emperor Herakleios had defeated the Persians and forced a withdrawal of their armies from the occupied eastern Roman provinces in Egypt, Palestine, Syria, and Mesopotamia. The sack of the city was seen by many as a divine punishment visited on the Christians for their sins.

[*See also* Christianity.]

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JERUSALEM, SIEGE OF (1099)

The capture of the holy city of Jerusalem after a siege of six weeks (7 June–15 July 1099) was the culmination of the First Crusade, fulfilling the goal proclaimed by Pope Urban II at the Council of Clermont on 27 November 1095.

The march across the Anatolian plateau and the long siege of Antioch had taken a heavy toll among the crusaders, their horses, and pack animals, but further south the Muslim cities and emirates of the coast offered little resistance. When it arrived outside Jerusalem on 7 June 1099, after turning inland at Ramla, the army had been reduced to a strength of around ten thousand to twenty thousand (including many noncombatants), although it had obtained many remounts by purchase or as tribute. The city was under the control of the Fatimid caliphate of Egypt, whose forces had seized it from the Seljuk (variant Saljuq) Turks the previous year. As the crusaders approached, the governor, Iftikhar al-Dawla, expelled most of the native Christian population from the city, doubting their loyalty; the Muslims and Jews remained. The Fatamid garrison consisted of four hundred elite cavalry plus Sudanese and other infantry who probably amounted to no more than a tenth of the crusader strength.

Situated in the Judaean highlands about thirty-six miles (fifty-eight kilometers) east of the coast, Fatimid Jerusalem roughly corresponded to the area of the present-day Old City. It was well protected by circuit walls and elevated fortifications such as the Tower of David on the western wall and the large temple area in the southeast. The steep ravines formed by the Kidron and Hinnom valleys meant that it was unfeasible to launch any assault against the eastern and most of the southern sides of the city, while the sloping ground on much of the western side made the use of siege machinery impractical there.

The siege was a race against time, since the crusaders knew that a large Fatimid relief army had been dispatched from Egypt. The forces of Godfrey de Bouillon, Tancred, Robert of Normandy, and Robert of Flanders took up positions opposite the northwestern sections of the walls, while those of Raymond of Saint-Gilles occupied the small area of



SHELLEY REID

level ground between the southeast corner of the city and the church of Mount Zion outside. An initial assault on 13 June failed mainly because insufficient siege ladders were available, and the lack of usable timber bedevilled the army for the duration of the siege. More problematic was the shortage of food and water. Although the city was well supplied from springs and cisterns, crusader foraging parties had to travel long distances to obtain sufficient water to keep the army supplied.

A breakthrough came with the arrival of six Italian ships at Jaffa on 17 June. Their crews and dismantled vessels were escorted to Jerusalem by an expedition drawn from Raymond's contingent, fighting off local Muslim forces on the way. The ships' timbers and wood that had been collected locally were used to construct ladders, mangonels, battering rams, and most importantly, two mobile siege towers that were tall enough to overlook the walls. On the night of 9–10 July, one of the towers was wheeled from Godfrey's camp opposite the northwest walls to a new position on level ground facing the easternmost section of the northern wall, where the defenses were weaker. While Raymond's men attacked from their own tower at the southeast, the rest of the crusader army launched a series of furious assaults on the new position on 13–15 July. The northern tower, commanded by Godfrey, offered sufficient protection from the hail of arrows, stones, and Greek fire that was thrown against it, and on Friday 15 July 1099 the knights in its uppermost story, led by Lethold of Tournai, were able to clamber onto the ramparts, followed by dozens of their comrades who spread out and opened the Gate of Jehosaphat to the east.

As the crusaders rushed in, most of the garrison retreated in confusion into the Tower of David, and after surrendering on terms to Raymond of Saint-Gilles, they were allowed to withdraw to the coast. Most of the remaining inhabitants were massacred indiscriminately; a few were ransomed or enslaved. Although much of the killing of the first day can be explained by the frenzy of combat, a more systematic slaughter occurred over the following two days: with the prospect of a Fatimid attack any day, the crusaders carried out a cold-blooded elimination of a populace that they feared might rise up against them. Jerusalem remained in Christian hands until 1187.

[*See also* Crusades, *subentries on* Sources (1095–1183), Narrative (1095–1183), *and* Historiography (1095 –1183); Fatimids; *and* Godfrey of Bouillon.]

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JEUFOSSE, SIEGE OF

In 852–853 two Viking chieftains, Sigtrygg and Godfrid, invaded the Seine with their fleet and set up winter camp on an island opposite Jeufosse (Fossa Givaldi). The *Chronicle of Saint Wandrille* reports that a site upstream of the island was "besieged" by the combined forces of Charles II, "The Bald," and Lothair I. The textual problem in this passage of the *Chronicle of Saint Wandrille* is how to translate "*obsident.*" Generally, this Latin verb means "they besiege," but more specifically it denotes "they blockade." If the verb is translated as "blockade," it suggests barriers in the water; this would explain why, as the chronicler reported, the Vikings, upon encountering Charles and Lothair, did not attempt to pass, but retreated down the Seine to Jeufosse, where they spent the winter of 852–853. Without such barriers across the river, the width of the river would have easily allowed them to pass the forces on the banks to reach more lucrative raiding targets in the vicinity of Paris. These obstacles may have

been a log boom, chains, or—less likely because of the time needed for construction—wooden pilings driven into the riverbed. Moreover, the large number of boats required for a pontoon bridge probably would not have been available in this remote area on such short notice. The easiest way to create obstacles with little planning was the construction of a log boom by cutting down trees and lashing them together with rope or chain across the river.

This 852–853 operation provides the first example of the defensive combination of lining of river banks with guards and a barrier across the river. The importance of this siege near Jeufosse lies in its relationship to other operations that served as precursors to the 862 bridge repair that resulted in Charles the Bald's decision to build a fortified bridge at Pont-de-l'Arche in 862. That decision was not made randomly but was grounded in previous operations. To defend the Seine around Paris against an invasion by Lothair I in 841 Charles the Bald positioned forces at strategic points along the river. In 845, in response to the Viking invasion of the Paris area, Charles lined the banks with troops. The concept was further developed in 852–853 with a blockade by Charles and Lothair I of a site upstream from Jeufosse, which combined guards on the banks with barriers in the river. Finally, in 854 bishops Burchard of Chartres and Agius of Orléans defended the Loire with the twin components of the fortified bridge, riparian guards and a fluvial barrier. The *Annals of Saint Bertin* specified that the bishops successfully used river vessels to block access by the Vikings. These two operations served as precedents for the operation of 862, in which Charles successfully stopped an advance of the Vikings on the Marne with the combination of a hastily repaired bridge and forces on the banks. This operation directly inspired Charles the Bald's decision in 862 to build a fortified bridge on the Seine.

[*See also* Charles the Bald *and* Lothair I.]

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JINETES

Derived from "Banu Zanata," the name of the Berber tribe that provided jihad warriors to the kingdom of Granada, *jinetes* (*jinete/s* in Spanish; *jenetus* in Latin; *jenet, genet* in Catalan) became a generic term for Muslim-type light cavalry in the Iberian kingdoms. Granada's light cavalry was heavily influenced by Berber fighting tactics, which were adopted by Christians wanting to match the Muslims' speed in combat. At the end of the thirteenth century, the term *jinetes* was used in the royal registers of the Crown of Aragon to denote mounted Muslim mercenaries recruited from Granada and North Africa. The same type of cavalryman was employed in Castile around the same time. Later these mounted companies came to include Jewish, Muslim, and Christian knights. They were paid a salary by the king and were granted another sum of money for their horses. Companies of *jinetes* were employed for about a century in Aragon, and until the fifteenth century in Castile. They served as the king's bodyguard and participated in royal campaigns as light cavalry. They specialized in feigned retreats and ambush tactics (*tornafuye*). Their weapons included a short straight sword called a *jineta*, a light spear, Moorish-style spurs, leather shields (*adargas*), and a distinctive saddle, harness, and short stirrups that permitted the rider's legs to be bent, all of which increased the horse's speed and maneuverability.

Soon the term *jinetes* was extended to denote light horsemen in general. With the military reforms undertaken in the *cortes* of Guadalajara in 1390, Castile's armies came to include fifteen hundred Andalusian *jinetes*. They were given land worth fifteen hundred *maravedís* to maintain two horses and their weapons, and they could be called to battle all year round. The lance (*lanza*), a small unit of cavalry,

was composed of three to five people, including one *jinete*.

[*See also Caballeros Villanos.*]

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Ana Echevarria

JOAN OF ARC

(c. 1412–1431), military leader and French patron saint. Joan of Arc was born around 1412 in Domrémy in eastern France, a part of France loyal to the Valois king Charles VI but surrounded by Burgundian territory. She was of wealthy peasant stock, one of five children, and as a child she was marked out as someone with a particular devotion to the church. From the age of thirteen, she later claimed, she had experienced visions in which she was visited by Saints Michael, Catherine, and Margaret, who told her to drive the English out of France and bring the dauphin, the future Charles VII, to Reims for his coronation.

In 1428, through the good offices of a local garrison commander, Robert de Baudricourt, Joan was introduced to the dauphin at Chinon. At this time the English were in the ascendant in the Hundred Years' War and were laying siege to the city of Orléans. Joan was allowed to travel with the relief army and arrived outside the city on 29 April 1429. The French commander, Jean d'Orléans, initially forbade her from taking part in the relief, but Joan was nonetheless present at most of the action. Her bold leadership dramatically transformed the French position. She led in person the final assault on the English stronghold known as "La Turelles"—where she was wounded by an arrow in the neck—and after the relief of the siege of Orléans, Joan participated in the capture of the English-held towns of Jargeau and Beaugency. During the siege of Beaugency, Joan made peace with Arthur de Richemont, the constable of France, thereby greatly strengthening the French position.

On 18 June, Richemont led the French to a crushing victory over the English at the battle of Patay. Joan's own role in the battle is obscure, but she was certainly present with the army immediately before and was instrumental in urging Richemont and the other French leaders to join battle with the English. Previous generations of scholars thought that Joan acted principally as a boost to French morale, but more recent assessments have stressed her tactical knowledge and military abilities, such as her skill in the deployment of gunpowder artillery. In any case Joan demonstrated an uncanny sense of survival that unnerved her companions-in-arms. She allegedly survived a blow to the helmet by a cannonball at the siege of Orléans, and the duke of Alençon claimed that she saved his life there by warning him of an imminent artillery strike moments before his position was hit. Equally, the English were deeply afraid of "La Pucelle" ("The Maiden"), whose intervention they variously attributed to both God and the Devil.

In return for the stunning victory at Orléans, the dauphin granted Joan joint command of the French army alongside the duke of Alençon. She was present throughout the series of sieges in early July that included the capture of Burgundian-held Auxerres and Troyes, scene of the 1420 treaty that had disinherited the dauphin in favor of Henry V of England. Once again, at the siege of Troyes her outspoken intervention at the dauphin's war council was instrumental. Joan was placed in command of the siege, and she led the assault on the town walls

in person. At the cathedral in Reims on 17 July, the dauphin was crowned Charles VII of France, with Joan by his side.

Joan's military career continued after the Loire campaign. In August and September she led the unsuccessful French assault on Paris, suffering a wound to the leg with a crossbow bolt, but the following month she captured the town of Saint-Pierre-le-Moûtier. The failure to capture Paris cannot be attributed to Joan, but it did diminish her status in the eyes of the king, who dismissed her closest supporter, the duke of Alençon. In April 1430 she arrived at Compiègne to defend the town against an Anglo-Burgundian siege. During a skirmish on 22 May, however, she was captured by the Burgundians. She remained in Burgundian captivity—making several unsuccessful escape attempts—until the end of the year when she was bought by the English for the enormous sum of ten thousand *livres tournois*. On 9 January 1431 she was put on trial for heresy in Rouen, the capital of English Normandy. Found guilty of wearing men's clothes and armor and not knowing what the Church Militant was, Joan was sentenced to burn at the stake. Joan first abjured, then recanted her abjuration, and was finally executed on 30 May. In 1456 a papal court declared her innocence. She was canonized in 1920, becoming one of the three patron saints of France.

[*See also* Charles VII of France; Hundred Years' War; Orléans, Siege of; *and* Patay, Battle of.]

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JOHN

(1167–1216), King of England from 1199 until his death. Despite the attempts of revisionist historians to rehabilitate John's dreadful reputation, he remains entrenched in his reputation as militarily inept, along with the likes of Edward II and Richard II. It is not that he was wholly without skill in matters of war (though he was limited); it was more that his gross ineptitude in the political sphere, so vital to the success of warrior kings, negated any gains that he made. Thus at Mirebeau in 1202 he won a great victory against his rival for the throne, the teenaged Arthur of Brittany: he swept upon the enemy forces as they tucked into their breakfast of pigeons while besieging the castle there; as John boasted gleefully in a triumphant letter back to England, he "got the lot." However, his harsh mistreatment of many of the Norman prisoners and the almost certain murder of Arthur lost John the support of crucial allies against King Philip Augustus of France; when Philip began his full-scale invasion of the duchy in 1203, many lords deserted John. His fleeing back to England rather than leading the duchy's defense did not help matters, nor did his abandoning the vitally important besieged castle at Château-Gaillard after a failed relief attempt.

John's loss of Normandy in 1204 was the biggest catastrophe of his reign and, in military terms, its defining moment. With only Aquitaine remaining of the Angevin Empire in France, John devoted the rest of his reign to winning back his lost territory. This meant taxing England heavily to fund his campaigns. The combination of his arbitrary and cruel government and the costly failures of his expeditions (with exceptions in Ireland and Wales) eventually pushed the country into open rebellion. This led not only to the Magna Carta in 1215, but also to a nearly successful French invasion of England in 1216, led by Prince Louis of France. Louis set himself up in London and ruled one-third of the country for a year. John declined engaging the French in battle for fear of disloyalty among his own men—a revealing factor that also contributed to his defeat by Louis at the encounter at La-Roche-aux-Moines in 1214

(this left him of little help to his coalition imperial allies, who were defeated soon after at Bouvines). Instead, John embarked upon major raids on horseback (*chevauchées*) in his own country. He did this with some skill, targeting the estates of the rebels and using ravaging as a clever diversionary strategy. Some historians have praised him for this not uncommon burst of energy, but as one of his biographers astutely observed, a Richard I or Philip Augustus would have gone instead for a decisive victory, tackling the toughest objective by besieging London, where the rebels were based. A telling judgment of John as a military commander was that only after his death did the tide turn against the French, who were eventually chased out of England the following year. John's soubriquet of "Softsword" is apt.

[*See also* Bouvines, Battle of; Britain, *subentry on* Narrative (1000–1300); Château-Gaillard, Siege of; *and* Rouen, Siege of (1204).]

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JOHN I TZIMISKES

(c. 925–976), Byzantine emperor (r. 969–976). John I Tzimiskes was of Armenian origin, a member of the Kourkouas family, known for its successful general John Kourkouas, whose siege of Edessa in 941 resulted in the recovery of the Holy Mandylion. The term "Tzimiskes" perhaps comes from an Armenian word for "shoe" and the sobriquet has been compared to "Caligula" ("little boot"). John was a nephew of the emperor Nikephoros II Phokas, the brother of his mother. His early military career is not well documented: he took Samosata in 958, and Leo the Deacon has the general Marinos say of him that by 963 he was second only to Nikephoras Phokas in the eyes of the soldiers. When Phokas became emperor, he appointed Tzimiskes Domestic of the Schools (i.e., commander-in-chief), and at the time of the assault on Tarsos in 964 Tzimiskes commanded the left wing, while the emperor commanded the right. At some point thereafter the two men had a falling out and Phokas dismissed and rusticated Tzimiskes. The resulting bad feelings were a major factor in Tzimiskes' murder of Phokas in 969.

On becoming emperor himself, Tzimiskes focused on two major efforts: subduing the Rus' leader Sviatoslav and expanding Byzantine control in Syria. After diplomatic negotiations with Sviatoslav failed, Tzimiskes dispatched Byzantine forces to the Bulgarian border to prevent Rus' incursions. They succeeded with a significant victory at Arcadiopolis in 969. At about this time Tzimiskes also formed the special cavalry regiment of the "Immortals" as his personal guard. In the spring of 970 he led Byzantine forces against the Rus' and besieged the Rus' at Preslav in Bulgaria. Leo the Deacon provides a detailed description of the siege, which included an initial battle in which the Byzantines advanced with a clamor of trumpets, cymbals, and drums; after an indecisive engagement a charge by the Immortals, spears held before them, drove the Rus' behind the walls. In the subsequent assault on the walls the Byzantines used bows, antipersonnel stone-throwers, slings, and javelins to drive the defenders from the battlements, and at Tzimiskes' order they set up ladders to scale the walls. The emperor's personal encouragement was decisive in the subsequent scaling operation, and after a further battle to take the royal palace Preslav fell. Tzimiskes then took a series of other cities and finally defeated Sviatoslav at Dorostolon.

Tzimiskes' other military efforts focused on Mesopotamia and Syria, where he personally led expeditions against the Abbasids in 972, 974, and 975. Conflicts among the sources on both details and chronology make description of these expeditions difficult. In an extant letter of Tzimiskes to the Armenian king Ashot III, the emperor indicates that his intent was to recover the Holy Sepulcher and that he reached Palestine. This is not possible. He did however reach Damascus in 975 and

took Beirut. He died on 11 January 976 shortly after his return to Constantinople from Syria, most likely of typhoid. Leo the Deacon describes him as a man of exceptional courage, daring, and strength, an expert archer, horseman, and athlete.

[*See also* Arcadiopolis, Battle of (970); Dorostolon, Battle of (971); *and* Nikephoros II Phokas.]

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JOHN II KOMNENOS

(1087–1143), Byzantine emperor (1118–1143). The career and achievements of John Komnenos, the eldest son of Alexios I Komnenos, are obscured by a relative absence of sources. John became heir to the throne in 1092, and succeeded in 1118, despite an attempted coup by his sister, the historian Anna Komnene, and his mother, Irene Doukaina. John was systematically eliminated from Anna's *Alexiad*: he is mentioned only five times, each time with disdain or hostility. A fuller, although far from complete picture of John's reign is painted by the works of John Kinnamos and Niketas Choniates. From these histories we learn that John entrusted military commands to relatives, the *sebastoi*, but put civil affairs into the hands of more obscure men, such as John of Poutze, who centralized the administration of the army and navy, commuting service for cash payments in maritime districts.

John took personal command of the imperial forces, and campaigned extensively in Anatolia and lands further east, capitalizing on his father's successes. He fought wars against the Danişmendids and captured the strongholds of Kastamon and Gangra (now Çankiri) after 1134. He restored Byzantine authority in Cilicia in 1137, and in the following year accepted the homage of Raymond of Poitiers, the French ruler of Antioch. His subsequent drive into Syria ended with an unsuccessful assault on Aleppo. In the west John was more circumspect, campaigning against northern nomads (probably Cumans) in 1122, and twice against the Hungarians between 1127 and 1129. For most of the 1130s John was allied with the German rulers Lothair III (r. 1125–1137; Holy Roman Emperor from 1133) and Conrad III (r. 1138–1152). In 1136 Byzantine troops took part in Lothair's campaign, which pressed into Norman-occupied southern Italy as far as Bari. Relations with Conrad were even better, and from 1140 were destined to be cemented by the marriage of John's fourth son, Manuel, to Conrad's sister-in-law, Bertha of Sulzbach. Thus, John was free to concentrate his attention and resources on his eastern campaigns, and it was in Cilicia in 1143 that he was killed in a hunting accident. By then his two eldest sons, Alexios and Andronikos, had also died, and the succession was disputed by the two younger sons: Isaac, who had returned to Constantinople, and Manuel, who had been with his father and thus in command of the imperial army. Manuel succeeded.

[*See also* Byzantine Empire, *subentry on* Narrative (900–1204); Conrad III; Lothair III of Süpplingenburg; *and* Manuel I Komnenos.]

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JOHN OF GAUNT

(1340–1399), Duke of Lancaster and Aquitaine, styled King of Castile and Léon. As a son of the warrior-king Edward III and son-in-law and heir of the great soldier and immensely wealthy magnate Henry of Lancaster, John of Gaunt (so named for his birthplace, Ghent), was destined for leadership in war. His martial experience began under the expert guidance of Edward, the Black Prince, at a sea battle in 1350, followed by campaigns in northern France and Scotland in 1355–1356. John captained his first retinue on the Reims campaign of 1359–1360. The lull in the Hundred Years' War did not stop him from seeing combat, and he joined the Black Prince for the invasion of Castile in 1367. John was praised for leading the army's vanguard through the Pyrenees and in the decisive battle of Nájera.

When war with France resumed in 1369, John, given the age of his father and the ill-health of the Black Prince, played a principal role in directing military operations. He personally led large expeditions: to France in 1369, the dramatic but ineffective "great *chevauchée*" from Calais to Bordeaux in 1373, and a naval blockade of Saint-Malo in 1378. He also participated in the siege and sack of Limoges in 1370, campaigned in Scotland in 1384, and disagreed with Richard II over his military advice on the royal expedition of 1385. His second marriage, to the heiress of Pedro II of Castile, led John to invade that kingdom in 1386. This *chevauchée*, although on the face of it focused on recovering the crown from the usurping Trastamaran dynasty, was perhaps aimed at gaining an advantageous negotiated settlement. He left Spain without territorial gain, but considerably richer.

Although John's military career was extensive and his record demonstrated solid competence as a commander, he never gained the kind of reputation enjoyed by his father and eldest brother—partly because by the time he began to exercise independent command, England's enemies usually refused battle. The chronicler Froissart greatly praised his diplomatic abilities but reports John as saying "I enjoy hearing of deeds of arms, though I am myself no good knight."

[*See also* Edward the Black Prince; France, *subentry on* Narrative (1328–1483); *and* Iberia, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1500).]

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JOHN OF LUXEMBOURG

(1296–1346), crowned 1310. John of Luxembourg died on 26 August 1346 as a follower of the French king Philip VI at the battle of Crécy. By that time, he was totally blind, so his death had little impact from a military and tactical viewpoint. The blind king is said to have ordered his followers to lead him into the thick of the battle, because he wanted to use his sword and not flee. This deed was the culmination of a splendid knightly career, in the view of certain of his contemporaries. Death on the battlefield was the fulfillment of the knightly ideal of bravery, the result of a struggle for honor. In the light of modern research, the significance of this death in battle shows many more facets. In one view, the blind king, whose affliction was said to have prevented

him from governing successfully, was motivated by suicidal intentions.

The circumstances of his death reveal a few aspects of John's life that help to evaluate him clearly as a military leader. For one thing, his personal competence in military matters is undisputed: the king took part in many campaigns (in Bohemia, Austria, Italy, Lithuania, and France, among others) and tournaments, and was seriously wounded several times. The writings and thoughts of his court poet, Guillaume de Machaut (1300–1377), confirm the king's reputation as a knight; they depict him, in the stylized knightly ideal, as generous, brave, and militarily successful. John had some life-threatening experiences as soldier and officer in his youth, fighting at the side of King Louis IV against the Habsburg Frederick the Fair at Esslingen (1316) and Mühldorf (1322). Although the battle of Esslingen was inconclusive, John must have distinguished himself personally, for he was knighted as a result of his performance in this battle. Mühldorf was a total triumph for Louis and John; John commanded the right wing and thus contributed to their victory. From 1340, John was totally blind, which surely limited his capabilities as a commander. Ultimately it is difficult to evaluate John as a military leader or to separate the knight himself from the knightly ideal.

[*See also* Crécy, Battle of; Louis IV, Emperor; Mühldorf, Battle of; *and* Philip VI of France.]

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JOHN SKYLITZES, CHRONICLE OF

Around the turn of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, John Skylitzes, a Byzantine senior judge who held top office in Constantinople in the 1090s, wrote his *Synopsis of Histories*, addressing primarily the milieu of his employer, Alexios I Komnenos (1081–1118). Byzantium had recently lost most of Asia Minor and Syria, and suffered revolts from Slavic-speaking populations in the Balkans, while across the Adriatic were the pugnacious Normans. Soldierly virtues were at a premium, together with background data on relevant military and political history. Skylitzes catered for this interest through recounting emperors' reigns from 811 on. He eventually took his story up to the reign of Alexios's predecessor, Nikephoros III Botaneiates (1078–1081); the section from 1057 onward follows Michael Attaleiates' *Chronicle* closely, and Skylitzes probably added it to a first version of his work that ended in 1057. Other sources of Skylitzes include Genesios's account of Michael III's reign (842–867) and, most extensively, the work known as "Theophanes Continuatus," which recounts imperial deeds for much of the ninth and earlier tenth century. Comparison of "Theophanes Continuatus" with Skylitzes' text reveals a "cut-and-paste" technique, with Skylitzes sometimes incorporating entire sentences from his source. Subject matter of lesser interest such as religious history and encomia of civilian emperors is condensed, whereas coverage of rebellions, regime change, and operations in Byzantium's borderlands is quite full. Skylitzes edits more actively his sources from the mid-tenth century onward, the era of military expansionism and then failure. He collates diverse materials to brief his readers about the three major assailants on mid-eleventh-century Byzantium: the Pechenegs, Turks, and Normans. Among Skylitzes' hypothetical sources are an account of the military rebellions against Basil II in the 970s and 980s and the memoirs of the mid-eleventh-century general Katakalon Kekaumenos. Skylitzes refashioned his sources into fairly digestible prose, concluding stories with stock phrases and saws, a style of instruction popular with Byzantine middlebrow officeholders.

Although an armchair strategist, and apt to muddle chronology when using different sources for the same event, Skylitzes shows serious interest in how campaigns unfolded. He sometimes describes minutiae of tactics or offers rival explanations for

disasters. Thus, he provides avowedly alternative accounts of the Anchialos debacle: (1) the Byzantines, initially victorious, panicked at the sight of the riderless horse of their general, Phokas, which had bolted while he was washing from a spring; (2) instead of liaising with the Byzantine army as instructed, Romanos Lekapenos sailed off to seize the throne; Phokas, having initially routed the Bulgarians, withdrew to camp to learn more about Lekapenos's movements; mistaking withdrawal for flight, his army broke up. Skylitzes recounts defeats and inconclusive warfare at least as often as victories, noting that the outcome of John I Tzimiskes' battling against the Rus' on the Danube in 971 was unsure almost to the last, and indicating that Basil II's final subjugation of the Bulgarians in 1018 owed as much to diplomacy and luck as to battles or sieges. Reviewing defeats and betrayals served practical ends: Skylitzes was writing when "barbarians" were at Byzantium's gates and past feats in the empire's service deserved recollection.

[*See also* Anchialos, Battle of (917); John I Tzimiskes; Katakalon Kekaumenos; *and* Romanos I Lekapenos.]

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JOINVILLE, JEAN DE

(1224/25–1317). A noble lord from Champagne, Joinville became a friend of the saintly King Louis IX of France, whom he accompanied on crusade to Egypt and the Near East from 1248 to 1254. The countess of Champagne, Jeanne de Navarre, later asked him to write "a book of the holy words and the good deeds of our king saint Louis," and in 1309 Joinville completed his *Vie de Saint Louis* (Life of Saint Louis), which he dictated in French. Jeanne had died by this time, and Joinville presented his work to her son, the future Louis X of France, with the hope that the saint-king's descendants might learn from his example. Joinville's work is idiosyncratic as a medieval saint's life, and this might in part explain why the *Vie* seems to have passed into obscurity for many decades after its completion.

The idiosyncrasies that may have been off-putting to people in the fourteenth century help make the *Vie* a fascinating historical source, for military matters among others. Saints' lives were not usually written by laymen, for example, and they did not tend to linger on "distinguished knightly deeds and impressive feats of arms." The authors of most saints' lives do not feature in the stories they told, but Joinville is the central figure in the section of the *Vie* recounting Louis's first crusade, and for this reason among others it has been suggested that he may originally have written it as an independent work, although this cannot be proven.

The *Vie* holds a wealth of anecdotal information for the military historian; the following examples of topics it touches upon could be multiplied many times. Joinville observed the logistical demands of Louis's crusade in the form of stockpiles of provisions and the expense of refortification work. He had to provide for his own needs and raise funding, organize transport, and arrange his crusading household. Joinville was curious about how his ship's hold was sealed and got to see expert divers at work. We know about the swords he took into battle and his headgear. He describes the properties of Greek fire and a journey made to buy horn and glue for making crossbows. Joinville was also interested in the military techniques and culture of other societies. He had heard how the Egyptian sultans trained and organized their elite bodyguard, about Cuman warriors, and Mongol armies. The crusade army Joinville describes was diverse; knights dominate, but alongside them are crossbowmen, engineers, physicians,

and tradesmen, among many others. Women and children traveled with the army and sometimes appeared on the battlefield.

The *Vie* is a complicated and sometimes problematic source. Joinville's numerous digressions make its chronology hard to follow and he also makes occasional factual errors (giving the wrong date for the crusade fleet's departure from Cyprus and landing at Damietta in 1249, for example). In his crusade account he relied on what he had seen himself or heard from his companions, and since he was not a member of the king's inner circle of military advisers, his understanding of the overall planning and execution of the campaign was limited. His descriptions of combat are likewise told from his own perspective, making it hard to follow the overall progress of major engagements such as the landing at Damietta in June 1249 and the battle of Mansurah in February 1250.

His telling of these events has a chaotic quality, suggesting how confusing and frightening combat could be for the individual soldier. At Mansurah, Joinville suffered intense fear: set upon by the enemy from close quarters and with his companions severely wounded, Joinville's only recourse was to pray. But he also experienced intense exhilaration: reprieved from his earlier danger, he saw the king resplendent on the battlefield, witnessed impressive feats of arms, played his own part in holding the field for the crusaders, and survived to escort Louis from the battlefield. Joinville's highly personal tone allows the *Vie* to come into its own as a source for medieval experiences of war.

[*See also* Louis IX of France *and* Mansurah, Battle of.]

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JOUSTS

See Tournaments and Jousts.

JUSTINIAN I

(c. 482–565), Byzantine emperor from 527 to his death. Born in Dardania to a family of Romanized Thracians, Flavius Petrus Sabbatius Iustinianus began his military service in the imperial guard of Anastasios. He was suddenly promoted to commander of the guard and next, in 520, to *magister militum* (high commander of the Roman field army) by the new emperor, his uncle Justin I. After 521, Justinian was de facto Justin's partner in rule. On 1 April 527 he became co-emperor, and after Justin's death on 1 August later that year, he became sole emperor.

The main goals of Justinian's military policy were the recovery of the lost western territories (*restauratio imperii*) and the containment of the rival Persian power. For the first goal he took advantage of various pretexts: in 533 he battled the Vandal kingdom in North Africa after the dethroned Vandal king Hilderic appealed to him for help, and beginning in 535 he advanced against the Ostrogoths in Italy after a usurper killed the Ostrogothic queen Amalasuntha. On the eastern front the strategy involved both the preservation of a strong borderland, supported by fortresses like Dara, and also the consolidation of Byzantine domination over Armenia by several administrative changes applied between 528 and 536. The overall size of the Byzantine army was at most one hundred and fifty thousand, and an expeditionary force usually had fifteen to twenty thousand soldiers. Available manpower was reduced by a series of plague epidemics (in 541–543, 555, 558, and 560–561), and the large budget surplus inherited from Anastasios was exhausted in 527, diminishing resources for the army. Justinian did

not personally lead his armies. The main commanders were Belisarios, Narses, Sittas, Germanos, and Ioannes.

Justinian strengthened the fortification system along all the endangered frontiers and in some interior regions, continuing the work initiated by Anastasios. Because troops were directed mainly to the western and eastern theaters, the Danubian frontier was somewhat neglected. Although many fortifications were restored or built, the local garrisons were weak and unable to repel raiders such as the Slavs and Kutrigurs. A major strategic point, Sirmium, was conquered by the Gepids in 536. Justinian tried to prevent such attacks from the north by alliances with rival barbarians including the Utigurs, the Antae, the Lombards, and finally the Avars. Even the Gepids were made allies against the Ostrogoths in 539. This policy of divide and rule failed because its final result was the appearance of a new power in the area, the Avar khaganate.

The first war during Justinian's reign was launched in 527 by the Persian emperor Kavadh I in Mesopotamia and Armenia. The Byzantines won at Dara in June 530 but suffered a major defeat at Callinicum (19 April 531). Nevertheless the new Persian ruler Chosroes I (Khosrow I, Khosrow I) agreed to a peace in 532. The eastern frontier was secured for a while—at the price of a great tribute paid to Persia. This state of peace allowed Justinian to start his first offensive, that against the Vandal kingdom, beginning an ostensible plan to restore the empire of old. The expeditionary force led by Belisarios occupied the kingdom in 533 in a fast campaign. The plan continued with the war against the Ostrogoths in Italy, which started in 535 and ended in 540 with the conquest of Ravenna. The region north of the Po remained under Ostrogothic rule. At the proposal of the Ostrogoths, Chosroes I broke the peace in 540. In a large offensive he invaded Syria and Lazica, a region on the eastern Black Sea shore. In Italy the new Ostrogothic king Totila rebelled in 541.

Because Justinian I had to fight with diminishing forces on three fronts—Italy, the East, and also Africa, where the Berbers made many inroads—the second Ostrogothic war (541–554) was more difficult. In the first ten years the Ostrogoths prevailed. The Byzantine recovery came after the campaign started in 551 by Narses, who won the battles of Taginae, Mons Lactarius, and Casilinum. The Byzantine power was thus consolidated in Italy. In 552 part of Spain was also conquered.

The war with Persia had two phases after 540. In the first the operations were concentrated mainly in Mesopotamia with no decisive result. Chosroes I agreed in 545 to make a truce for five years, but not to include Lazica. The second phase of the war was, therefore, the fight for Lazica, and it lasted until 557. In 562 a fifty-year peace treaty recognized the Byzantine possession of this strategic region. At the end of Justinian's reign the expansion of the early Byzantine Empire had reached its greatest extent, but the continuous state of war had weakened the empire, especially at its Danubian frontier.

[*See also* Anastasios I; Belisarios; Byzantine Empire, *subentry on* Narrative (500–900); Carthage, Battle of; Casilinum, Battle of; Dara, Battle of; Narses; *and* Taginae, Battle of.]

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JUST WAR, JUST MOTIVE

The classic just-war theory that prevailed for much of the Middle Ages and beyond consisted of three major components: just cause, proper authority, and right intent. These aspects crystallized by the time of Gratian's *Decretum* (c. 1140), a collection of canon

law, but their roots can be traced back to Augustine (354–430) and even to antiquity. Right intent, or just motive, often became the most vulnerable element in the legitimization of warfare, since commentators frequently noted that in actual practice soldiers were largely seeking personal gain.

Augustine viewed war as a punishment from God to eradicate great sin. Still, because of its violent and destructive character, it needed to be fought morally, for the good of others and the improvement of society. It had to be conducted in the interests of the enemy, with love as the motive, an ideal that many early Christian writers (Tertullian, Origen, Cyprian) believed impossible. The early medieval requirement of penance for any shedding of blood is a reflection of the Christian belief that one can hardly demonstrate the gospel of love to others while doing them physical harm.

After the turn of the second millennium, in the Peace of God and Truce of God movements, with their concern with random violence and the amerciable harm done to innocents, namely, the clergy and other noncombatants, the Church tried to channel martial activity into more holy causes based on proper authority. In Causa 23 of the second part of the *Decretum*, the canonist Gratian declared that war is licit only if the motive is love of one's enemy and a desire for peace, which would prevent excessive violence and personal vindictiveness. He was thus one of the first to connect the *jus ad bellum* (right to make war) with the *jus in bello* (law of war).

Peter of Salins and other decretalists who followed sought to strengthen the feudal contract and its lines of obligation, both in lay and clerical terms. They held that one could fight if the cause were just and under a proper authority, even if the intent (e.g., avarice) was not. During the crusades the papacy further championed just cause and proper authority over right intent, and the introduction of plenary indulgences muted many of the moral apprehensions that remained over the shedding of blood. Thomas Aquinas (1224/25–1274), however, challenged this view and insisted that a just motive was still required, even in holy wars. In the same vein, Franciscans such as Roger Bacon (c. 1220–1292) rejected forced conversions, stressing that love is the only way to reach the heathen.

Subsequent theologians rejected the strict legalisms of the canonists, especially the decretalists, and based their beliefs more on Aristotelian logic and ethics. Insisting that all wars promote the common good, and hence have a just cause, Aquinas focused on the right-intent component of the just war. He also left the determination of whether war was just to the warrior, noting that simply following a proper authority did not exonerate the fighter from culpability before God.

Easy absolution and pious intent broke down moral inhibitions. By the early fourteenth century it was no longer necessarily a grievous wrong to kill with a less-than-pure motive. Such incongruities between rationales for war and how it was being practiced became the basis for critiques of late-medieval warfare. The growing concern over inequities such as injury to noncombatants and the excesses of plundering expeditions led to greater interest in the emerging *jus armorum* (law of arms).

Honoré Bonet (c. 1340–c. 1410), Christine de Pizan (1363–c. 1434), and Nicholas Upton (1400?–1457), among others, tried to create a law of arms that clearly distinguished legitimate war from pillage and robbery. The Hundred Years' War (1337–1453) greatly disillusioned many English clerical writers about true adherence to right intent, including the Dominican John Bromyard, Bishop of Armagh Richard Fitzralph, and Bishop of Rochester Thomas Brinton. Much criticism came in reaction to the disastrous Norwich Crusade of 1383, which was led by a bishop to assist English business interests in Flanders, and so scarcely exhibited proper intent according to prevailing just-war theory. The most scathing skepticism about just motivations for war may have come from John Wyclif (1330–1384). In a series of works he lambasted the Church establishment, the "clerical possessioners," who out of a greed that demonstrated a clear lack of love toward their enemies, enthusiastically went to war. Wyclif and others, including the heretical Lollards, held that

until clergy no longer owned and administered real property, such propensities for violence would continue to corrupt the Church and compromise its spiritual function. By the sixteenth century Erasmus and other Christian humanists questioned whether any war could be fought with charitable intent and thus found the whole idea of a just war seriously compromised.

[*See also* Christianity; Crusades; *and* Laws of War and Just Conduct of War.]

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Ben Lowe

K

Kalka, Battle at River

The Kalka is a small river flowing into the Sea of Azov, and it is the site of the first battle, which took place on 31 May 1223, between the princes of the Kievan Rus' and the Tatars (Mongols). Several accounts of the battle exist, all derived from a description written in Halych; these include the *Ipat'ev Chronicle* and the *First Novgorod Chronicle*, both of which incorrectly date the battle to 1224.

The Cumans had fought against the Mongols after the latter appeared along the lower Volga and Don rivers. After a bad defeat they turned to the princes of the Rus' for help. In late winter or early spring of 1223, the Rus' elders (*starshinstvo*) convened a council (*sovet*) in Kiev. The princes of the southern Rus'—the lords of Kiev, Chernigov, and Halych—attended, although the actual grand prince of the Rus', Iurii II of Suzdal, did not participate. Several younger princes (*mladshie*) of the southern region came to the meeting; the text names only a few, including Danylo of Halych, whose bravery at the battle is described extensively. The council decided to support the Cumans, some of whom were ready to embrace Christianity.

The campaign started in April, when the armies of Kiev, Chernigov, and Smolensk gathered at the island of Var'ag in the Dnieper, which lay some miles away from the river's southernmost waterfall and marked a point where it was possible to cross. This was the normal gathering-place for the Rus' armies in their campaigns against the steppe peoples. After the troops had crossed the river they were joined by warriors on horseback from Putivl, Trubezh, and Kursk, and by the Cumans. The Halych soldiers used ships to reach the sea on the Dniester and then joined the others after a voyage up the Dnieper. When disembarking they caught sight of and easily defeated a smaller Tatar group. They moved across the steppe for eight days and crossed the river Kalka, where they defeated the Tatar sentinels. The Tatars began to flee, followed by the united troops of the Rus' and the Cumans. The text gives no evidence of an encircling attack, but it is clear that the Tatars used that typical nomadic stratagem, which was understood by neither the Cumans nor the princes of the Rus', many of which were killed as a result. The *Novgorod Chronicle* relates about ten thousand casualties in the joint army of Cumans and the Rus'. Four prominent Rus' princes fell, as did five or six lesser-known ones.

Despite their victory, the Tatars did not invade the territory of the Rus' again for fifteen years. The death of the princes led to changes in the leadership of the Rus' principalities. The Cumans allied themselves with the Carpathians and the Hungarian kingdom. The latter supported early Christian missions to the Cumans, leading to the foundation of the Cuman diocese of Milko in 1227.

[*See also* Cumans; Mongols; Sit', Battle at the River; *and* Slavic Lands, *subentry on* Narrative (1000–1300).]

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KARLSTEIN, SIEGE OF

The impregnable castle of Karlstein (Czech: Karlštejn) was built by Emperor Charles IV as a residence about sixteen miles (twenty-five kilometers) from Prague in the mid-fourteenth century and is named after him. It was meant to be the repository for the imperial crown jewels. After the outbreak of the Hussite wars the jewels were transported to Prague for Sigismund of Luxembourg's coronation in 1420. Thereafter Sigismund had the jewels transported via Hungary to Nuremberg, and they were never returned. However, Catholic Church institutions did deposit their treasures in Karlstein. After the siege of Zatec (1421), the Hussites decided to capture Karlstein. Besides the treasures stored there, they also had other reasons for capturing it. The castle was a strategic site of the Catholic party located near Prague and had a large garrison. Its captain, Zdeslav Tluxa of Burenice, provided support and protection to Catholic troops. He also sent news about events and the movement of the Hussite army in Bohemia to the court of Prince Elector Friedrich of Hohenzollern, a principal opponent of the Hussites.

Shortly after the arrival of Korybut (Sigmund Korybutowicz), nephew of Jagiełło, King of Poland, and the future Czech king, Prague troops along with the Polish army besieged Karlstein on 20 May 1422. Besiegers were armed with heavy bombards; in spite of this the fortification system was not seriously damaged and attempts to capture the castle with the use of infantry failed as well. Hussites allegedly tried to force the surrender of the defenders of Karlstein by using trebuchets to throw corpses and barrels full of dung into castle wells, but they never hit the target.

Karlstein Castle. Founded by Holy Roman Emperor Charles IV (1316–1378) in 1348. PHOTOGRAPH BY FRANCESCO FORBINO

At the Imperial Diet in Nuremberg (4 September 1422) support for Karlstein was on the agenda. Requests for military support and for additional supplies kept coming from the castle. Bavarian and Saxon armies were gathering in a disorganized way and too late. The Karlstein garrison, exhausted from the long siege and starved out, called a truce for one year with the Hussites on 8 November 1422. The Hussites, who were equally exhausted, never repeated such a large-scale attempt to capture the castle.

[*See also* Sigismund of Luxemburg; Slavic Lands, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1500); *and* Žatec, Siege of.]

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KASTRIOTI, GEORGE

(1405–1468), known also as Skanderbeg or Iskander bey (in Turkish), national hero of the Albanian resistance against Ottoman expansion. Born to a noble family in Krujë (or Kruja), George (Albanian: Gjergj) Kastrioti was taken to Murad II's court as a hostage. He converted to Islam and became a successful military officer in the Ottoman army, achieving several victories in Europe and Asia Minor over the enemies of the Ottomans. On 28 November 1443 he switched sides with three hundred other Albanians during the winter campaign of János Hunyadi. He returned to Krujë and managed to capture the fortress from the Ottomans through an ingenious trick, forging a letter in the name of the sultan, which instructed the commander to hand over the castle to him. He abjured Islam and raised the flag of Albania showing a double-headed eagle. He thus became the leader of Albanian resistance against the Ottomans.

Kastrioti fought a guerrilla war based on hit-and run tactics using the mountainous terrain to his advantage. Until his death, he continued the war with a force of about twenty thousand men. He won thirteen battles and lost only two, both due to betrayal. In the summer of 1444 he defeated the troops of Ali Pasha at Vaikal, killing eight thousand Ottomans and capturing two thousand. This was the second time that a Christian military leader was able to crush a substantial Turkish army in a set-piece battle.

With this victory, Kastrioti gained international fame. He achieved further victories in 1445 and 1447. He could not participate in the second battle of Kosovo Polje in 1448, because Dan II of Walachia and George Branković of Serbia, both vassals of the sultan, blocked his path to the battle. In June 1450 he successfully defended the castle of Krujë against Murad II himself. After suffering a defeat in 1455, Kastrioti gained a glorious victory in 1457 over Isa beg Evrenoz at Ujebardha. In 1461 he made peace with the Ottomans; in 1466 Mehmed II besieged Krujë, but just as with his father, he did so in vain. Kastrioti managed to lift the siege. Later that year the sultan initiated a campaign to subdue the whole of Albania. Kastrioti contracted malaria during it and died on 17 January 1468.

George Kastrioti was a brilliant general and a skillful diplomat who secured the support of several states for Albania, especially the Kingdom of Naples. Pope Calixtus III appointed him captain general of the Holy See and gave him the title "Athlete of Christ." The Ottomans finally managed to crush Albania only ten years after his death, but sporadic resistance persisted until 1500.

[*See also* Hungary, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1526); Hunyadi, János; Kosovo Polje, Battle of (1448); Romanian Principalities; *and* Ujebardha, Battle of.]

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KATAKALON KEKAUMENOS

(d. after c. 1060), senior Byzantine military commander from Armenian army family; died a monk. By 1040 Katakalon was defending the key fortress of Messina against Muslim attack: his stratagem, of sallying forth while the besiegers relaxed, succeeded in slaying their drunken leader. In 1043, as military governor on the lower Danube, Katakalon inflicted heavy losses on the Rus foraging there after their expedition against Constantinople. He became governor of Ani (in Armenia) and soon faced incursions from Seljuk Turkish raiders, but fellow commanders preferred a defensive strategy to Katakalon's proposed counteroffensive. When the Byzantines did engage the Turks at Kapetrou in eastern Asia Minor (September 1048), Katakalon's cavalry wing broke through, but the central formation's failure obliged him to abandon his pursuit. Katakalon was equally critical of Byzantine strategy after the eastern army was routed at the battle of Diakene (Bulgaria); his Pecheneg captor nursed him, gravely wounded, back to health.

Although given command of the strategic center of Antioch, Katakalon was dismissed immediately after Emperor Michael VI's accession in 1056. He and other senior generals requested promotion at Easter 1057, but were insulted and sent away; Katakalon was a ringleader of the eastern armies' subsequent revolt. He was largely responsible for their victory near Nicaea over forces still loyal to Michael VI. Having brokered Michael's abdication and Isaac Komnenos's accession as emperor, Katakalon received the senior title of *kouropalates* and a top military post, only to fall from grace again and become an embittered monk. A memoir emphasizing Katakalon's courage and generalship was utilized by John Skylitzes.

[*See also* Adrianople, Battle of (1050); Byzantine Empire, *subentries on* Narrative (900–1204) *and* Historiography (900–1204); Constantinople, *subentry on* Rus Attacks (860, 907, and 941); Isaac I Komnenos; John Skylitzes, Chronicle of; Seljuks; *and* Slavic Lands, *subentry on* Narrative (1000–1300).]

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KATAPHRAKTOI

The term derives from the Greek *kataphrassô*, meaning "to cover up," and refers to a heavily armed soldier mounted on an armored horse. Such soldiers were reportedly used by the Sarmatians fighting the Romans in the first and second centuries C.E. and by the Parthians before them. Roman armies evolved their own such heavy cavalry units, named either *catafractarii* or *clibanarii* (from a Persian term) during the third and fourth centuries, and they seem to survive into the late sixth and early seventh century. The so-called *Strategikon* ascribed to the emperor Maurice (r. 582–602) describes a type of cataphract cavalry armed with bow and lance, and with heavily protected horses. The heavy and medium cavalry panoply shows marked steppe influence, as well as the influence of Sassanian cavalry tactics and arms—an early seventh-century bas-relief in Persia at Taq-i-Bostan shows King Chosroes II in armor remarkably similar to that described for the heavy cavalryman of the *Strategikon*, with the horse protected by what appears to be a lamellar skirt of metal or leather plates; there is a great deal of fragmentary archaeological and pictorial evidence to support the picture described in the same source. Such heavy cavalry do not seem to be typical of either Byzantine or Arab forces again, however, until they reappear in the ninth and tenth centuries, most particularly in the very heavily armed cavalry called *kataphraktoi* in several sources of the period, deployed in a wedge-shaped formation and including both archers and mace-carrying soldiers. The mid-tenth-century heavy cavalryman is described in several sources and was protected by a lamellar *klibanion*, with splinted arm-guards, sleeves, and gauntlets, the latter from coarse silk or quilted cotton. From the waist to the knee, he wore thick felt coverings, reinforced with mail; over the *klibanion* was worn a

sleeveless quilted or padded coat (the *epilorikon*); and to protect the head and neck, an iron helmet with mail or quilting attached and wrapped around the face. The lower leg was protected by splinted greaves of bronze. Offensive weapons included iron maces with a 3-, 4-, or 6-flanged head, the *paramêrion* (probably a saber), and the standard sword or *spathion*. The mace was a particularly favored weapon for the heavy cavalry and heavy infantry. The horses were also armored, their heads, necks, and front, flanks and rear being protected with felt quilting, boiled leather lamellar or scale armor, or hides.

Such troops were extremely expensive to maintain and, in fact, do not appear in the sources for Byzantine forces during the eleventh century, perhaps because it was found cheaper to employ heavily armored Normans and Franks on a short-term mercenary basis rather than maintain an imperial standing force of such soldiers. Western heavy cavalry became a key part of the imperial armies during the later eleventh and twelfth centuries, and as the traditional Byzantine style of equipment was replaced by western armor, so the term *kataphraktos* lost any specific technical meaning it may have had. Where Byzantine units of heavy cavalry were recruited, they were armed with a western-style panoply.

[*See also* Armor, Body; Cavalry; *and* Weapons, *subentry on* Hand-to-Hand.]

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KENEZII

The Kenezii (Latin; Slavic: Kniaz, Knyaz) is a privileged social category found among the Slavs and Romanians. Their status varied from region to region, even among the same people, ranging from the ruler of a country (the princes of Kiev, Vladimir, and Moscow) to the leader of a village (in Romanian society).

In Walachia the name is documented from the thirteenth century, when it was used for some local leaders next in rank to the voivodes, a position that probably reflects their original status. After establishing the Walachian state, the Kenezii formed a social class along with the boyars, and they managed to keep that status. In Moldavia, their status was slightly different, that of leaders of villages subject mainly to the ruler, but in some cases even to boyars. The Kenezii in both Romanian Principalities therefore performed military duties primarily under the voivode's banner, led by *pârcălabi* (castellans or county leaders). In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, references to the Kenezii reflect a period of decline, and there are no accurate accounts of their original status and role in society. They completely disappeared from the Romanian Principalities during the sixteenth century.

In the Hungarian kingdom the Kenezii had a special social status because of their orthodox faith, being ranked between nobles and bondsmen. In Hungary they had important tasks in the colonization of the Romanians and later in leading these newly founded settlements. They began to perform regular military duties especially from the fifteenth century, when orthodoxy ceased to be a major obstacle to their advancement.

[*See also* Boyars; Hungary, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1526); *and* Romanian Principalities.]

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KEPHISSOS, BATTLE OF

The duchy of Athens, held for a century by the De la Roche family until its extinction in 1308, passed then to a member of the Brienne family, Walter (or Gautier) I de Brienne. This ambitious warlord sought northward expansion into Thessaly, where the independent Greek regime was in disarray and the lands had been ravaged by foreign invasion. To that end Walter made the imaginative if dangerous decision to hire as mercenaries Thessaly's erstwhile ravagers themselves, the so-called Catalan Grand Company. Consisting of Catalonian, Aragonese, and other professional soldiers, they had been assembled by Roger de Flor, under whom they fought in Sicily's Aragonese-Angevin wars until the Peace of Caltabellotta (1302) had made them unwelcome. In 1303 the eastern Roman emperor Andronikos II Palaiologos engaged the company as mercenaries against the aggressive Ottoman Turks in northwestern Asia Minor in 1304. When Roger was murdered (1305), the outraged Catalans went on a rampage, plundering through Thrace (1305–1308), then on into Thessaly (1309). Only briefly pacified, they gladly agreed to serve Walter when asked. For six months the Catalans stormed back into Thessaly, seizing some thirty fortresses for their employer.

Walter now made a fatal mistake. From the mercenary ranks he pulled some 200 horsemen and 300 foot soldiers, paying them bountifully, but he ordered the remaining Catalans—by then about 3,500 knights and 4,000 infantry—to leave without pay, on pain of expulsion. Enraged, with nowhere else to go, the defiant Catalan Company withdrew to winter in Thessaly. Dreaming he might sweep through Thessaly and Thrace after destroying the Catalans, Walter mustered a huge force, numbering between 3,000 and 6,500 horse plus 8,000 foot soldiers, and including numerous vassals and allies, the cream of Greco-Latin chivalry.

Outnumbered, the tough, resourceful Catalans chose the battlefield, a site beside the Kephissos (Cephisus) River, near Lake Copais, not far from the ancient battleground of Chaeronea. They amplified the floodplain, already marshy from spring thaws, by digging channels to admit more water under a thin cover of grass and moss, disguising their trap. On the morning of 11 March 1311, Walter contemptuously allowed the Catalans he had retained to rejoin their brethren. Personally leading his grandly mail-clad warriors in the traditional Latin cavalry charge, he and his Franks quickly were caught in the thick mud and crowded on top of each other into massed immobility. The Catalans, skilled with javelins and missiles, massacred the huddled Frankish knights, while the Catalan cavalry slaughtered the Frankish infantry. Walter himself was among the first killed, followed by a number of other distinguished nobles, leaving the Frankish aristocracy of Greece irretrievably devastated. The Catalans marched unopposed to Athens itself and established themselves as its masters, holding the duchy under various titular lords *in absentia* until their expulsion in 1388. A feeble and futile attempt to recover Athens (1330–1331) was made by Walter de Brienne's son, Walter II, but his descendents maintained a fictional title to the principality. Walter II himself went on to a brief career as the infamous duke of Florence (1342–1343), and then to death at the Battle of Poitiers (1356).

[*See also* Catalan Company *and* Flor, Roger de.]

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KHAZARS

The seminomadic Turkic Khaganate of the Khazars that dominated the Pontic Steppe between the Dnieper and the Ural rivers and the Northern Caucasus from the seventh to the late tenth century ruled a conglomerate of various peoples (Slavs, Alans, Bulgars, Finno-Ugrians, and Turks). By the 680s, with the collapse of the Western Turkic Empire, they overran the Old Great Bulgar state and entered into alliance with the Byzantines against the Sassanid Empire and the Arabs. First, they led marauding invasions against Georgia and Armenia; then, with the upper strata adopting Judaism, they consolidated their state and built a large commercial network. They were able to withstand both the Arab expansion in the Caucasus and any Asian warriors attacking the Volga frontier until the late ninth century, when they were finally overwhelmed and absorbed by the Rus', the Patzinaks (Pechenegs), and the Oghuz.

The Khazars' military institutions are recorded by tenth- and eleventh-century Arab-Persian historian-geographers, including Gardezi, Ibn Fadlan, al-Bakri, Ibn Rustah, Ibn Hawqal, and al-Masaynudi. In a dual kingship the sacred, spiritual *khagan* was "senior king and nothing more," but "all business and authority is in the hands of the *iša*" (*ishad, qaghan-beg, yilig*). The "military chiefs" (*beg/bek*) were completely obedient to him. He had absolute power over the military machinery and kept strict discipline: if the king "dispatches troops, they can on no condition turn back." "If defeated, the commanders (*quwwad*) with their families are sold as slaves."

Their mass levy numbered 40,000 light horse-archers with composite bows. A salaried force of 10,000–12,000, divided into regiments of 1,000, "were obliged to mount up with" the *iša*, half being Muslim Khwarazmian "mercenaries serving permanently" [*arsiya/ors*], half "put forth by taxing the wealthy in proportion to their wealth." The *iša* had "his own troops," and the *khagan* "4,000 palace guards." The overall manpower with auxiliaries may have run over 50,000–60,000, the core being a regular, standing army of 10,000 heavily armored men.

The Khazars lived a seminomadic, partly urbanized way of life. They evolved a sophisticated military establishment, differing from other Turkic steppe hordes. The elite "white Khazar" office-holding aristocracy (*tarkhan*) formed a superior—Persian-influenced—heavy cavalry, equipped with "thick cuirasses and good coats of mail," lamellar or scale armor, lances, round wooden shields, sabers, battle-axes, and conical iron helmets. They had an advanced system of intelligence and reconnaissance with scouts who preceded the army, and a system of communication signals using flags, pennants, candles, and flares (*nafatha*). The Khazars were noted for their encampment "palisades": everyone was "to take along a sharpened peg to be implanted in a circle around the army. Then a shield is hung from each." In siege warfare they used artillery (catapults, ballistae). They had "substantial and strong" regular garrison forces under military-administrative officers (*tudun*) along trade routes (e.g., to Caspian ports) and in frontier fortifications, protected by a zone (*indago*) of "trenches, ramparts, and ditches." The *Hudud al-'Alam* lists ten massive strongholds of limestone and baked brick. The frontier fortress of Sarkel, called "a staunch bulwark against the Patzinaks" by John Skylitzes, was located at the Don crossroads of the Silk Road and built by Byzantine architects. It had four towers and two gates, garrisoned with hundreds of men.

[*See also* Auxiliary Peoples, Military; Hungary, *subentry on* Narrative (500–1000); *Indago*; *and* Patzinaks.]

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KINGS AS MILITARY LEADERS

The relationship between medieval kingship and war has yet to undergo systematic investigation, despite its significance from the points of view of constitutional history and military history. Nonetheless, it is clear that war represented an important field of activity for medieval rulers. In numerous medieval works of history, great value is placed upon an immediate and personal connection between the king and the waging of war. It is often reported that he himself took up arms against his enemies and killed great numbers of them. The king appears as a strong warrior, displaying such classic soldierly virtues as courage, bravery, and strength. This stylized praise of one's own king often accompanies a disparaging characterization of the opposing ruler, whose contribution to the fight is depicted as less impressive or even cowardly. Yet this heroic image of medieval kings must be tempered by various observations and considerations of historical reality. In the course of the Western European Middle Ages, hardly any kings fell on the battlefield. Exceptions to this observation in German history are King Adolf of Nassau, who died in battle at Göllheim in 1298, and Antiking Rudolf of Rheinfelden, who died of wounds sustained at the Elster River in 1080. Each died fighting against a rival for the crown, which might explain their willingness to take exceptional risks. Royal victims of battle were thus more the exception than the rule. This is partly explained by the king's specially protected position, his retinue and excellent armor often being described. Military necessity also demanded a leader with a good overview, rather than a king on the front lines. The medieval period had a clear understanding of military leadership and tactical overviews. A king leading an army could exercise these responsibilities only from the commander's hill, of which many instances are attested. For example, Edward III oversaw his troops fighting at Crécy from a windmill. Finally, political considerations also made it desirable for a king to keep himself out of the danger of battle: whatever his protection, he still risked being killed, wounded, or captured. Thus there is an obvious discrepancy between the heroically fighting kings of historiographical and literary reports and the rulers acting in a militarily sensible way.

War was an inseparable part of medieval kingship. Every king waged at least one war. In the Carolingian annals, a year without war was exceptional and required explanation. In the Middle Ages, kings had to prove themselves publicly on the battlefield. In a society of warrior lords, the right to rule depended on soldierly strength. Such prowess served not only to legitimize one's rule on a theoretical basis, but also to enforce it by military means. The consequences of this understanding of kingship for both the exercise of rule and the conduct of war require further study.

[*See also* Crécy, Battle of *and* Edward III of England.]

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Martin Clauss

Translated from the German by Johanna M. Baboukis

KINIZSI, PÁL

(c. 1430/32–1494), one of the most talented and famous generals of King Mátyás Hunyadi and an outstanding figure of anti-Ottoman wars in the late fifteenth century. Although we have no indisputable evidence concerning his origin, in contrast with former assertions, namely that he came from Bihar county or was one of the Romanian kenezii in the hinterland of Temesvár, present-day Timişoara, Romania, latest research suggests that Pál Kinizsi was born into the family of a lesser noble in Abaúj

county (northeastern Hungary) in the early 1430s. His father was Antal Kinizsi, after whose death his mother married Balázs Magyar, King Mátyás's faithful general. This new situation greatly promoted Kinizsi's military career, who thanks to his extraordinary physical strength, his bravery, and his ability rose rapidly. Although he could neither read nor write, he, owing to his perspicacity and ruthless cruelty, was promoted to one of the most important military positions of the realm: in 1479 he became count of Temes (*comes Temesiensis*), and soon afterward captain general of the lower parts of Hungary. In these positions Kinizsi controlled at least eleven counties in southern Hungary in the 1480–1490s, and had his seat in Temesvár. His military career began in 1468, when, together with Balázs Magyar, he participated in King Mátyás's Moravian campaign. From 1468 Kinizsi fought together with Balázs Magyar in Mátyás's service. Their cooperation and friendship culminated in 1472 in a mutual agreement of inheritance, according to which Kinizsi became an heir and co-owner of the landed estates belonging to Balázs Magyar. Soon afterward Kinizsi married Magyar's daughter, Benigna, a sitution which further strengthened their relations. In 1474 during the siege of Breslau (present-day Wrocław, Poland) Kinizsi was one of the leaders of the light mounted cavalry that cut off the reinforcements of the Polish-Bohemian troops. On 13 October 1479, Kinizsi, together with Stephen Bátori, voivode of Transylvania, annihilated at Kenyérmező (today Câmpul Pâinii, Romania) the biggest Ottoman army that invaded Hungary during King Mátyás's reign. Kinizsi and Bátori not only defended together the southern borders of Hungary, but after Mátyás's death, in 1491, they were the commanders of the royal army that recaptured the Transdanubian part of Hungary. King Mátyás liked Kinizsi very much, granting him several estates and elevating him into high positions. Mátyás believed that after his death Kinizsi would support John Corvinus, his natural son, whom he considered his heir to the throne. Kinizsi, however, became the supporter of Wladislas II, and crushed Corvinus's army at Csontmező (1490). It was also Kinizsi, who, in 1492, annihilated the remnants of Mátyás's Black Army.

[*See also* Black Army of Hungary; Hungarian Defense System; Hungary, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1526); *and* Hunyadi, Mátyás.]

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KLOKOTNICA, BATTLE OF

In 1224 Theodore Komnenos Doukas, ruler of the Despotate of Epiros (1215–1230), took Thessalonike from the Latins and was crowned emperor. In the course of his march toward Constantinople he had to confront both the Latins and his rival to the Byzantine imperial legacy, John III Vatatzes, emperor of Nicaea. Therefore, Theodore had enlisted the support of the Bulgarian czar John Asen II (r. 1218–1241). Yet the aspirations of the latter to impose his influence in Constantinople made Theodore turn against his Bulgarian ally.

Theodore summoned a large army of "Romans and Italians," which passed by Adrianople and marched along the upper course of the river Hebrus (Maritsa). John did not expect such an attack and was able to oppose it only with a much smaller force, including a thousand Cumans.

The two armies clashed on 9 March 1230 along the river Klokotnica (northwest of Khaskovo, Bulgaria). John, who had hung Komnenos's written oath on his standard, led his men in person. The sources suggest that the Cuman cavalry made a surprise attack on the Byzantine camp while the Byzantine cavalry was engaged in battle with the Bulgarians. Ultimately Komnenos's men were encircled and routed by the Cumans. Theodore Komnenos himself was taken

prisoner, along with many of his relatives, high-ranking officers, and nobles. All their belongings were seized by the Bulgarians. Quite unusual in such an instance was the behavior of John, who freed many of the ordinary soldiers. The victory helped John occupy all of western Thrace, Macedonia, and even northern Albania.

John Asen II founded in Turnovo (Veliko Turnovo, Bulgaria) a church dedicated to the Forty Martyrs of Sebasteia, on whose feast day the battle occurred. He also set up a marble column bearing a commemorative inscription.

[*See also* Byzantine Empire, *subentry on* Narrative (1204–1453) *and* Cumans.]

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KNEZES

See Kenezii.

KNIGHTHOOD AND KNIGHTS

The popular modern image of the knight is of a nobleman on horseback, dressed in full armor with lance in hand, riding to seek adventure, do battle with evil, and rescue damsels in distress. Although this idealized image was projected by knights' own epic and romance literature from the twelfth century on, it represents the aspirations of knighthood rather than the reality of knights.

All knights were warriors, but not all warriors were knights. Typically, knights were skilled professional or semiprofessional warriors who fought in armor on horseback and whose preferred weapons were the sword and the lance. In practice, they might fight on foot, be semiarmed or armed with a bow or axe, or take little active part in military activity. Their fighting skills gave them social status, but such status differed according to ancestry, military reputation, and wealth.

The concept of the knight as a distinct elite group of warriors began to emerge in the eleventh century. The words used to designate members of this group indicate that the origins of this class lay with the armed and mounted servants who formed a lord's entourage, or *comitatus*. The Latin word used for a knight from the eleventh century on was "miles," which in classical Latin meant a soldier and by the tenth century a servant. Most vernacular terms for a knight meant "horseman" (*chevalier* in French, *caballero* in Spanish, *Ritter* in German), although in English the word "knight" originally designated a servant.

In his study of nobility in the Mâconnais district of eastern-central France during the tenth and eleventh centuries, Georges Duby deduced that a fundamental change in the meaning of *nobilitas* (nobility) came about in the Mâconnais district between 971 and 1032 owing to a breakdown in public authority. Previously "nobility" indicated innate virtue. However, as a authority came to rely on military capacity rather than hereditary right, anyone who was a skilled warrior and could exert authority in effect became noble. By 1032 warriors were proud to call themselves *milites*, knights, because knights had military skill and could exert authority in the local area. The terms "noble" and "milites," Duby concluded, were interchangeable in the Mâconnais district by 1075.

Elsewhere in Western Europe this development occurred later, and not always because of a breakdown in law and order. In Normandy and England, for example, authority did not rest solely on the sword, yet the role of knights expanded, and by the mid-twelfth century nobles had began to call themselves knights. One reason for this was that as warfare became more



Knights. The dubbing of a knight on the battlefield. Illustration from *Lancelot du Lac*, MS Fr 343, fol. 79, thirteenth century. BIBLIOTHÈQUE NATIONALE, PARIS, FRANCE/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

specialized, knights rose in social status. New fighting techniques that required daily training could be learned only by those with the leisure time to train on a daily basis, in short, nobles. Moreover, as church attitudes toward violence changed and certain sorts of warfare became theologically acceptable, the warrior rose in status, provided he fought for the right cause. Kings and other rulers made increasing use of knights as administrators. Finally, the growth of the knightly ethic increased the status of warriors. Epic poetry and romances from the twelfth century on set out various standards of behavior appropriate to knighthood (*chevalerie*, anglicized as "chivalry"), and these standards were recognized by all who called themselves "knights," even though they disagreed over some details. These standards combined martial ethics, such as fighting loyally for one's lord and refusing to flee from conflict, and social ethics, such as defending the poor and weak of society and enforcing justice.

Knights regarded knighthood as a separate order in society. Knightly status became a sort of institution, with its own literature, ideals of behavior, and rituals, such as the tournament and the ceremony of dubbing into knighthood. Initially, dubbing was simply a ceremony in which the lord presented his warriors with weapons and armor, but during the twelfth century the ceremony expanded to include a blessing of the new knight's sword. In time, dubbing ceremonies became more complex, including, for example, a prior all-night vigil in church for aspirants to knighthood.

As the defining characteristics of knighthood developed, the numbers of those entering this elite class of men declined. By the mid-thirteenth century in England and northern France, warriors of lesser means could no longer afford to undergo the public ritual that would make them knights. The social expectations of knights and the public responsibilities that they were expected to take on exceeded their means. Knighthood became an exclusive caste, limited to those who were descended from knights and had the means to maintain the status.

[*See also* Chivalry; *Comitatus*; Epic Poetry; *Familia Regis*; Household Knights; Nobility; Romances; *and* Tournaments and Jousts.]

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KONRAD VON LANDAU

(d. 1363), Swabian count and mercenary. The counts of Landau formed a highly respected lineage in Swabia and were closely related to the House of Württemberg. Konrad von Landau started his military career within the retinue of Werner von Urslingen in 1348. As for many other soldiers of fortune of his generation, the wars of Naples served as his training ground. He remained a subcommander within the Great Company. By 1354, he nevertheless was promoted to the position of a second-in-command of the company alongside Fra Moriale. After his partner was executed in August 1354 in Rome, Landau remained for the nine years until his death the captain-general of the Great Company.

Although the majority of his followers were German, there were also substantial Italian, French, Spanish, and Hungarian elements in his company. Landau joined forces at various times with another German captain, Haneken Bongard.

At the height of its fame, Landau's company consisted of several thousand men, chiefly armored cavalry. Landau gained a great reputation as a mercenary commander. The Italians called him "il conte Lando." His most remarkable achievement was to form a lasting organization out of men of different origins and with ever-changing interests. The structure of the company itself was corporate. Decisions were made by common consent: the booty was divided, and contracts were signed not only by the captain-general but also by several hundred subcommanders. There was little continuity in the contingents. Most of their members were the brothers, nephews, friends, and local followers of the Swabian counts. Prominent German condottieri of the fourteenth century such as the Counts Lutz and Eberhard von Landau, Hartmann von Wartstein, and Konrad von Aichelberg were either relatives of Landau or had started their own careers as military commanders after serving in his retinue.

The Great Company fought under many banners and very often changed allegiance. The biggest profits were made with successful terror campaigns in central Italy. Although much feared, the Great Company was not unbeatable. On 25 July 1358 the Company was defeated in a humiliating way by the army of Florence in Val di Lamone. Landau was wounded and as a consequence he retreated for some months from the Italian scene to his home in Swabia. There he invested some of his war profits. This setback, however, was only temporary. In 1359 Landau once again tried to invade southern Italy and was again opposed by a Florentine army at Campo delle Mosche. Thereafter he chose to stay in northern Italy in the service of the Visconti. While fighting for Milan, he faced the English White Company, which by that time was more advanced with regard to combat tactics and formations. Landau was killed on 22 June 1363. He very likely died a wealthy man. His coat of arms is still visible in the church of San Giorgetto in Verona.

[*See also* Great Companies.]

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KOSOVO POLJE, BATTLE OF (1389)

Before 1389, Serbia was a weakened, but still independent, entity fighting fiercely against her Ottoman enemy. Sultan Murad I, aiming to destroy Serbian independence and make Serbia a vassal of the Ottoman Empire, arrived in the defenseless Serbian capital Priština on 14 June 1389 marching from the east. The field of Kosovo Polje lay in a strategically

important position five kilometers (three miles) to the northwest; from there the Turks could launch an invasion to conquer the whole territory of Serbia. The Serbs, with an army of between twelve thousand and twenty thousand troops, took up positions there under the leadership of Prince Lazar. The Ottoman army probably numbered between twenty-seven thousand and forty thousand regular and irregular warriors, including about two thousand janissaries. Prince Lazar commanded the Serbian center, Vuk Branković the right wing, and Vlatko Vuković the left wing. On the Turkish side Sultan Murad took up a position in the center behind his janissaries; Bayezid (Baybars), the sultan's elder son, led the right wing, while the sultan's younger son, Yakub Celebi, commanded the left.

On 15 June the battle began with the attack of the Serbian heavy cavalry, consisting of a few hundred warriors in plate armor. The onslaught caused disorder in the Ottoman left wing, but the center and the right held. The counterattack of Ottoman light cavalry and infantry managed to restore the situation, but could not break the Serbians. When the right wing, under the command of Bayezid "the Thunderbolt," swept away the Serbian left, a general massacre ensued. The battle was lost for the Serbians, who suffered heavy casualties, including Prince Lazar himself. The Turks also paid heavily for the victory. They did not attempt to pursue the fleeing Serbians, and they did not ravage the territory of Kosovo, perhaps because they had plans for it.

Kosovo Polje was the only Christian-Ottoman battle in which a sultan died. Murad I was killed on the battlefield either by Miloš Obilić (or Kobilić), a Serbian nobleman who had pretended to be dead and attacked the sultan with his sword when he passed by, or (more probably) by one of the twelve Serbian warriors who had broken through during the initial attack of Serbian heavy cavalry. In any event, Bayezid allegedly had his younger brother killed on the battlefield to avoid a succession conflict, and became sultan himself. As a result, Serbia became a vassal of the Ottoman Empire. It was a turning point in Serbian history.

[*See also* Baybars I; Kosovo Polje, Battle of (1448); Ottoman Armies and Military Methods; *and* Slavic Lands, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1500).]

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KOSOVO POLJE, BATTLE OF (1448)

After his defeat by the Ottomans at Varna in 1444, János Hunyadi managed to consolidate the Hungarian realm, and in 1446 he was elected regent for the young King Ladislas V. The new regent energetically organized an offensive campaign against the Ottoman Empire. The strategic aim was to seek out and destroy the Ottoman forces in a pitched battle, with the help of the people of the Balkan states. Absorbing the lessons of the earlier campaign, Hunyadi prepared an army consisting of heavy and light cavalry and substantial infantry and artillery forces, numbering about thirty thousand troops in total. The Christians crossed the Danube on 28 September and headed south toward Niš and Kosovo in order to join their forces with the Albanian George (Gjergj) Kastrioti (Skanderbeg). Sultan Murad II summoned his troops to Sofia, where he managed to raise a force of at least fifty thousand. In the absence of reliable sources it is impossible to reconstruct the troop movements in detail, but the Ottomans prevented the Hungarian force from linking with the Albanians and managed to force the Christians to accept battle in Kosovo Polje (Kosovo Field), the very place where the Turks had defeated the Serbians in 1389. Skirmishes began on 16 October, and the next day the two armies moved into battle positions.

The full-scale battle started 18 October with the onslaught of the Christian right- and left-wing forces, followed by that of the center. The Ottomans sought to withstand the attack by using artillery,

arrow storms, and even burning camels to bewilder the horses of the Christians. Unable to stop the Christian onslaught, the Ottomans yielded in the center to flee from the heavy cavalry, but without panicking, so they managed to break the cavalry attack's momentum, then counterattacked from both sides and surrounded the Christian troops. In the ensuing melee the Ottomans overpowered the Christians, some of whom fled the field. During the night the surviving Christians regrouped in the *wagenburg*, behind the former battle lines. The two sides exchanged fire for the rest of the night with guns and arrows, but as day broke the Turks broke into the *wagenburg* and after a desperate fight rolled up Christian infantry. The losses were about ten thousand on each side.

Unlike the defeat of Varna, the second battle of Kosovo Polje was a decisive setback for the Hungarians, as this was the last time they engaged in a full-scale battle in Ottoman territory. Though János Hunyadi managed to escape once again, he was taken captive by George Brankovic, despot of Serbia, who released him only in December following serious threats from the Hungarian barons. The battle clearly demonstrated that, against the Ottomans, the traditional Hungarian army—the main striking force of which consisted predominantly of heavy cavalry—had no chance of success; light cavalry and infantry would need to be increased, along with the quality and quantity of firearms. The Hungarian state did not possess the necessary financial means to create such an army.

[*See also* Hungary, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1526); Hunyadi, János; Kastrioti, George; Kosovo Polje, Battle of (1389); Ottoman Armies and Military Methods; *and* Varna, Battle of.]

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KOURKOUAS, JOHN

(c. 895–post 946), Byzantine general of Armenian stock, staunchly loyal to Romanos I Lekapenos, who was appointed army commander-in-chief ("domestic of the schools") in 922, while still under thirty. Kourkouas exploited the Abbasid caliphate's internal disarray to raid their strongholds in the Euphrates Valley and Armenia, greatly assisted by local Armenian notables such as Melias. He targeted key Muslim attack-bases at Melitene, ravaging its hinterland and disrupting trade, and at Theodosioupolis (Erzurum), which he isolated by building a nearby fortress. Kourkouas' aim was not major territorial gains; rather he sought to knock out troublesome centers and help amenable Christian Armenian princelings.

In 940 Kourkouas's initiatives provoked a member of the powerful Hamdanid ruling family based in Mosul, Saif al-Dawla, to intervene in Armenia. Fortunately for Byzantium, Saif was distracted by the power struggle in Baghdad, and Kourkouas seized the opportunity to ravage the approaches to Edessa (Urfa), inducing its citizens to come to terms in 944. The surrender of Edessa's famed *mandylion*, the cloth bearing the miraculous imprint of Christ's features, exposed the caliph's impotence, but it was more a symbol of Byzantine resurgence than a signal of further territorial ambitions. Aptly compared with Belisarios, Kourkouas gained for his sedentary master an aura of expansion. He is credited with having doubly benefited Byzantium, by not only stemming the Muslim raids deep into Asia Minor but also extending imperial borders as far as the Euphrates and even the Tigris, although the Byzantine sources exaggerate the number of town and fortresses (more than one thousand) captured. After twenty-two years of loyal service, Kourkouas was dismissed in 944, a sign of his master's loosening grip.

[*See also* Belisarios *and* Romanos I Lekapenos.]

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KRAK DES CHEVALIERS

The Krak des Chevaliers, or "Castle of the Knights," lies in modern Syria, approximately twenty miles east of the Mediterranean coast, in the Gap of Homs, along the sole road connecting Antioch and Beirut. Rising 2,100 feet (650 meters) above the surrounding plains, the site was recognized early on for its strategic importance. The earliest known fortifications there began in 1031 when the emir of Homs built what was to be known as Hosn al-Akrad, or the "Castle of the Kurds." It acquired this name because its original occupants were a Kurdish military colony. Little survives today of the original castle, but the additions made by the crusaders, the Knights Hospitaller, and later the Muslim occupants, were considered by T. E. Lawrence ("Lawrence of Arabia") to be "perhaps the best preserved and most wholly admirable castle in the world."

The knights of the First Crusade passed along this route in 1097 as they journeyed from Antioch to Jerusalem. One of the key leaders of the crusade, Raymond IV of Toulouse, captured the fortress in 1099. Focusing more on the area's walled cities, he did not immediately establish a permanent garrison on the site. Jerusalem fell to the crusaders later that year, at which point they began expanding the territory around their newly established Crusader States of (from north to south) Edessa, Antioch, Tripoli, and Jerusalem. Appreciating the necessity of controlling the roads connecting the new states, Tancred of Hauteville, later Prince of Galilee, sought to reoccupy the Krak in 1102, but failed in his attempt. After a successful siege in 1109 he began improving its defenses. Three years later he transferred ownership of the castle to the counts of Tripoli.

In 1142, responding to the regional threats that would shortly lead to the advent of the Second Crusade, the castle's custodian, Raymond II, Count of Tripoli, transferred its control to the Order of the Knights Hospitaller, who could better man and maintain its defenses. It was during their tenure as its



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

Krak des Chevaliers. View of the Hospitaller crusader castle from the south. PHOTOGRAPH BY PAUL F. CRAWFORD

wardens that most of the structural improvements were made. At its peak, the stronghold housed two thousand knights.

The Krak is well-defended on the west, north, and east sides by difficult terrain. Its south face, therefore, has the strongest manmade fortifications. The inner courtyard holds a 130-foot-long hall, surrounded by a chapel, a square keep, and three semicircular towers and a circular tower. This wall is surrounded by an outer wall of a dozen towers, which is, in turn, surrounded by an outer ditch. The walls still bear examples of machicolations of various types unique to the Krak. The castle is built of large stone blocks. Its most formidable defense is the steeply sloped stone wall on the south and west faces. Eighty feet thick and eighty feet high, it was known to the Muslim attackers as "the mountain." The fortress itself is resistant to undermining, as it is built on top of stone, rather than earth.

The castle endured attacks by man and nature alike. Regional Muslim rulers, typically the emirs of Aleppo, attempted brief sieges of the Krak des Chevaliers in 1115, 1163, 1167, 1207, 1218, 1229, 1252, and 1270. The great Saladin himself sat outside its walls for a month in 1188 but found the defenses too formidable and withdrew. Earthquakes proved somewhat more successful at reducing the fortifications. The Hospitallers had to repair damage from quakes in 1157, 1169, and 1201.

The Krak des Chevaliers finally fell to Muslim attacks in 1271 due to a combination of devastation and deceit. The 1270 assault against the Hospitallers had failed to breach the walls, but the attackers did destroy the crop of grain growing outside the fortress's walls. As a result, when Sultan Baybars I's combined forces from Egypt, the Grand Master of the Assassins, and the emirs of Homs and Saone again besieged the Krak on 3 March of the following year, the castle's stores of food had been critically depleted and the situation became desperate. The Muslim forces eventually succeeded in reducing some of the exterior defenses. Even so, the knights continued to maintain their resistance until on 8 April they received a letter from the Grand Master of their order at Tripoli, instructing them to surrender the fortress to Sultan Baybars. They complied and received safe passage to the coast. The letter was forged but probably only hastened the siege's eventual outcome and spared some loss of life.

Under the sultan's control, the castle's defenses were improved to include the rebuilding of the walls and towers his men had destroyed in the assault, as

well as the construction of a large square tower on the south side and a reinforced gate tower. The fortress, today under Syrian governmental control, is well-preserved. One of the most thorough examinations of its structures was completed by T. E. Lawrence, when as a graduate student at Oxford he undertook a three-and-a-half-month self-guided tour of crusader castles.

[*See also* Baybars I; Crusader Castles; Saladin; *and* Tancred.]

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KROISSENBRUNN, BATTLE OF

On 12 July 1260 on the bank of the Morava River in Austria, a few miles from Dürnkrut, King Béla IV of Hungary was defeated by King Otakar II of Bohemia. The Hungarian Árpáds and the Czech Přemyslides had long been engaged in a war of inheritance over Austria and Styria. For his campaign King Béla mobilized all his dynastic allies, principally King Danylo of Galicia; Bolesław V, prince of Kraków; and Leszek the Black, duke of Sieradz-Łęczyca. The Hungarian host, proverbially "led by nine rulers," was a polyglot mixture of heavily armored Hungarian, Croatian, and Polish noble men-at-arms; light cavalry troops from the counties; Cuman and Sekler (Székely) nomadic-type mounted archers; and Slavic light cavalry from Russia, Poland, and Hungarian vassal territories in the Balkans. Otakar assembled his allies and vassals: Czech-Austrian nobles; Duke Ulrich III von Spanheim of Carinthia; Otto III of the house of Ascania, margrave of Brandenburg; the Silesian Piast dukes Władysław I of Opole and Henryk III the White of Wrocław. They were "in full iron, armed to the teeth, even the horses were clad in iron."

The sources exaggerate the numbers, putting both forces in the region of 30,000–35,000 men. It is unlikely that Béla had more than 15,000–20,000 men, or the Czechs more than 20,000–25,000. First Prince Stephen and the Cumans enticed the Czech vanguard into feigned flight. They then dispatched rotating teams of horse-archers who harassed the Czechs. Finally, a contingent laid in ambush emerged to strike the disordered Bohemians in the rear and crushed them. Yet King Béla did not seize the opportunity to join the combat with the main body of his army, but instead lingered for days, waiting for the prearranged day of battle as the code of chivalry dictated. When the main engagement began, the Czechs, their army re-formed, withstood Béla's assaults in an orderly fashion. The Cumans took to flight, disordering the Hungarian front lines that had just crossed the river. Otakar swooped down and overwhelmed the stampeding Hungarians. Thousands were trampled to death in the confusion. Most of the army was held up on the far bank and suffered heavy losses, reportedly amounting to half the army's strength. As a consequence of the defeat, Béla was forced to cede Styria to Otakar.

[*See also* Auxiliary Peoples, Military; Béla IV; Cumans; Dürnkrut, Battle of; Přemysl Otakar II; *and* Szeklers.]

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KRÜCKEN, BATTLE OF

After successful fights with the Prussian tribes in Pomezania and during fights in Pogesania, the Teutonic Order (Teutonic Knights) organized a looting expedition to the more easterly region of Natangia (present-day Kaliningrad Oblast) in 1249. Units from nearby Elbląg (German, Elbing), Chełmno (German, Kulm), and Balga took part. The Knights not only plundered Natangia but also massacred numerous Prussians during their campaign; they then retreated. Because the Natangians occupied the roads, the Knights had to redirect their march: they proceeded toward Krücken, a village near the castle of Kreuzburg (present-day Slavskoe, south of Kaliningrad). There, in November 1249, the Natangians surrounded the Knights and both sides paused.

Prussian numbers grew as support arrived from distant areas. Seeing the Natangians' superiority, the Knights' commanders decided to negotiate. The continuation of Peter of Dusburg's *Chronicon terrae Prussiae*, our only available source on Krücken, gives the conditions of agreement, although not very clearly. To prevent deceit, the pagans took four knight-brothers as hostages, including Marshal Heinrich Botel. The rest of the Knights were probably to be allowed to depart after depositing their weapons. These conditions did not please John, deputy commander of Balga, who was in favor of attack, but he was ignored. Once the hostages were in the hands of the Natangians, the pagans broke the agreement and attacked the Knights, some of whom were murdered after the battle. The *Chronicon* states that fifty-four Teutonic knights and all the other participants in the expedition died but that Marshal Botel survived. The battle of Krücken was one of the biggest defeats of the Teutonic Order during their Prussian expansion and temporarily halted their conquests there. The next major expedition against the Natangians was organized in 1251. Fighting continued in Natangia until 1253, when the western portion of its territory was captured by the Knights.

[*See also* Baltics, *subentry on* Narrative (500–1300); Crusades, *subentry on* Narrative (1180–1245); *and* Orders, Military, *subentry on* Northern.]

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KULIKOVO, BATTLE OF

One of the largest battles in the history of Russian-Tatar military encounters took place on Kulikovo Pole ("Snipes' Field") in 1380. In 1362, Dmitrii Ivanovich (later called Dmitrii Donskoi) ascended the princely throne of Moscow. During his reign the authority and power of the Principality of Moscow increased considerably. In 1378, the forces of Prince Mamai, Tatar warlord of the Golden Horde, took Nizhni Novgorod, but Dmitrii stopped the Tatar cavalry at the Vozha River (a tributary of the Oka) and won the battle. Mamai, who wanted to avenge this defeat, succeeded in getting Grand Prince Władysław Jagiełło of Lithuania and Prince Oleg of Ryazan to stand by his side. Meanwhile, Russian troops arrived in answer to Dmitrii's call and assembled near Moscow at Kolomna. The Russian church supported Grand Prince Dmitrii and urged him into battle against the "pagan" Tatars. Indeed, Dmitrii personally received the blessing of Sergius of Radonezh, who would later be canonized as a saint of the Russian Orthodox church.

The allied Russian forces moved southward and, after crossing the Don, met up with the Tatar forces on the field of Kulikovo along the Nepriadva River. By this time the Lithuanian troops were drawing near, and the Russians, quite understandably, did not want to wait until they arrived. On 8 September 1380 the great battle began. According to the Russian chronicles, which give detailed accounts of the battle but certainly exaggerate the figures, there were several hundred thousand people on both sides; a more likely estimate would be 80,000 Russians and 125,000 Tatars. The battle lasted for more than four hours. Despite the hard resistance of the Russian troops, the Tatar army managed to break through their lines, threatening them with encirclement and destruction. At this moment the Russian ambush regiment

unexpectedly attacked the back of the Horde's cavalry, which drastically changed the situation. The Muscovite warriors launched a counterattack, and Mamai's army was finally forced to withdraw. Mamai himself escaped to the Crimea, where he was soon assassinated.

The Russians, victorious again two years after the battle on the Vozha, had this time beaten not just one Tatar group but a large and united force of the Golden Horde. Kulikovo was the biggest Russian victory against the Tatars since the former's defeat on the Kalka in 1223. The battle of Kulikovo had a great psychological impact on the Russian people. The heroes of Kulikovo proved for the first time that the Tatars were not invincible. The Tatar state revived after the defeat, and the Russians had to wait a hundred years before they could actually free themselves from the so-called "Tatar Yoke." Nonetheless, Russian national consciousness attaches a symbolic meaning to Kulikovo and links the resurrection of the nation to this date. But Russian power after Kulikovo remained limited: two years after the battle, Tokhtamysh Khan devastated his unruly vassal, Moscow.

[*See also* Golden Horde; Kalka, Battle at River; Mongols; *and* Slavic Lands, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1500).]

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KULM, BATTLE OF

This battle, which took place on 18 February 1126, was the final act in the conflict of succession to the duchy of Bohemia that arose following the death of Duke Vladislav I in 1125, as Otto II of Moravia-Olomouc attempted to supplant the elected successor, Duke Sobeslav I. Otto II appealed to the German king, Lothair III, who consequently led a Saxon army in February 1126 to his assistance. His march through the Erz Mountains was made difficult by the weather, which alternately brought snow and thaw. In order to avoid the border defenses, a reconnaissance troop under the command of Otto II scouted the way. Sobeslav I, who held his numerically inferior forces at camp near the fortress of Kulm, was informed of the advance of Lothair's army and was able to ambush the reconnaissance troops in a disadvantageous position, the exact location of which is uncertain. In the ensuing battle, the Saxons suffered considerable losses, among them Otto II himself, while margrave Albrecht "the Bear" and Count Ludwig of Lohra were captured. Lothair III managed to regroup his remaining forces on a hill, presumably near Nollendorf (Naklířov), but was quickly encircled and forced to capitulate. A truce was negotiated by Henry of Groitzsch, a nephew of Sobeslav fighting in Lothair's army, obliging the German king to accept Sobeslav's pledge of allegiance and to recognize him as Duke of Bohemia. In return, the captives were released and Lothair was able to withdraw to his lands, taking with him the dead.

The reports of the numbers of troops involved and the casualties as related in the historical sources cannot be confirmed. The only information as to the size of the armies seems improbable, citing the strength of Lothair's army at three thousand men and that of the Bohemian troops at twenty thousand. The sources give varying accounts of the size of the scout troop under Otto II, ranging from 200 or 270 up to 500 men. In addition, the true number of casualties remains unclear. One Czech source records only three mortalities on the Bohemian side against five hundred from Lothair's army.

[*See also* Germany, *subentry on* Narrative (1125–1250) *and* Lothair III of Süpplingenburg.]

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Translated from the German by Duane Henderson

KUNOVICA, BATTLE NEAR

The anti-Ottoman coalition of European rulers in the 1440s culminated in the two successive crusades in 1443–1444 led by the Polish-Hungarian king Władysław III Jagiełło and János Hunyadi, voivode of Transylvania from 1441.

The first of these two operations, known as the "Long Campaign," can be divided into three periods. During the first period, between October and December 1443, the Christian army, consisting of 25,000 Hungarian, Polish, Czech, and Romanian warriors, crossed the Danube as far as Sofia and sacked it. The second stage was marked by unsuccessful attempts to break through the passes of Haemus (Stara Planina, or Balkan Mountains) and attack the Ottoman capital of Adrianople.

During the last stage of the Long Campaign the Christian army retreated from Haemus to Buda between the end of December 1443 and February 1444. Though chased by the Ottoman troops, the crusaders did not draw back in panic, but organized well in battle array. Thus they gave battle to the Turks twice in succession, and were victorious both times: at the pass of Trayanovi Vrata (or Zlatiški Pass according to some scholars) on 12 December and at Melstica (a fortress in the gorge of Dragoman) on 24 December 1443.

After the latter battle the Turkish troops, commanded by Turahan *bey*, made a last attempt to block the retreat of the crusaders, on 2 January 1444 in Kunovica Pass on the Bjala Palanka-Niš road. Since the main body of crusaders had already passed through Kunovica, the Turks attacked the rear guard, composed of Serbian warriors led by George Brankovic. Getting word of the attack, the Hungarian and Polish cavalry forces (one thousand and five hundred men, respectively, according to one of the sources), with Hunyadi and Władisław at their head, turned back and entered the battle. According to a Czech witness (cited by Jireček), the fighting continued all day long and was renewed four times with great ferocity. After being defeated, the Turks did not withdraw in panic, but rather took new defensive positions in the neighboring mountains. The crusaders attacked them incessantly, employing the psychological effect of drumbeat and trumpet signals. At evening the Turks finally withdrew from the battlefield, leaving their tents, food, and clothes. Many noblemen among them were killed, others were taken prisoner. As testified by Hunyadi himself and the Ottoman chronicler Hoca Sadeddin Efendi, one of the prisoners was Mahmud *bey* Çelebi, a brother of the great vizier and husband of the sultan's sister.

The battle of Kunovica was the last fighting in the course of the Long Campaign, since the total defeat of the Turkish army there made Sultan Murad II abandon further pursuit of the crusaders. The united European forces led by Władysław and Hunyadi were thus able to return Buda (2 February 1444) before their troops were totally exhausted. This allowed them to take advantage of their success to organize the second crusade in 1444.

[*See also* Hungary, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1526); Hunyadi, János; Ottoman Armies and Military Methods; *and* Slavic Lands, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1500).]

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KYUSTENDIL, BATTLE OF

See Velbužd, Battle of.

L

La Forbie, Battle of

In the early 1240s both the Christian and Islamic-held territories in the Levant were torn by internal division. Since 1229 the governance of the Kingdom of Jerusalem had been contested between the representatives of its absentee ruler, Emperor Frederick II, and a baronial faction led by the Ibelin family. In the Islamic territories of Egypt and Syria, infighting broke out after the death of Sultan al-Malik al-Kamil, nephew of Saladin, in 1238. This occurred when his eldest son, al-Salih, who had been excluded from the succession, took power in Egypt. The rulers of the city-states of Syria including Damascus and Homs did not acknowledge his rule, causing a fragmentation of Islamic authority.

In 1243 the civil conflict in the Kingdom of Jerusalem ended with the capture of the emperor's last outpost at Tyre. One of the key issues in the latter stages of the war had been the question of whether to sign a treaty with al-Salih in Egypt or his opponents in Damascus and Homs. Formerly, the imperial faction had advocated an agreement with Egypt but, with their defeat, the Ibelins were in a position to form their own treaty with Damascus.

Into this fraught political arena entered the Khwarazmians. The Khwarazmians were a central Asian Islamic people whose remnants had been forced to flee west by the Mongols. For al-Salih, this migration created an opportunity to yoke the Khwarazmians' strength (estimated by Ibn al-Furat to be approximately ten thousand cavalry) to his political ambitions. Accordingly, he sent out messengers who offered them lands in Syria in return for a treaty of mutual cooperation. The Khwarazmian leader Baraka Khan agreed. En route to his rendezvous with the Egyptian forces at Gaza, Baraka Khan turned aside to assault Christian-held Jerusalem, where on 23 August 1244 he massacred the inhabitants.

For both the Damascenes and barons of Jerusalem, the advent of the Khwarazmians posed a major threat and they agreed to unite their forces and march south to face their enemies. On 17 October 1244 the two opposing armies met near Gaza at a village called Harbiyya. The Christian-Damascene leaders drew up their battle line with the Christians on the right flank. In the battle that ensued, the Damascenes and their allies from Homs and the castle of Kerak, holding the center and left wing, collapsed and fell back in the face of the enemy assault. This allowed the Khwarazmians to encircle the Christian forces on the right and to destroy them. According to Ibn al-Furat, the Damascene ruler blamed his defeat on his decision to fight under the Christian cross. The Christians suffered enormous casualties and only a handful of survivors reached

safety in Ascalon. The field forces of all three main military orders, the Templars, Hospitallers, and Teutonic Knights, were virtually annihilated. The Khwarazmians took advantage of the chaos and surged north to pillage the fertile lands outside the Christian capital at Acre.

For the remaining Christian defenders, this defeat provoked fears that the Kingdom of Jerusalem would collapse, just as it had after Hattin in 1187. Nevertheless, although the scale of the battlefield defeat was comparable to Hattin, the short-term consequences were not nearly so grave. The cities of Tiberias and Ascalon surrendered, but the remaining cities of the kingdom stood firm and in time the attacks of their Muslim enemies diminished. Even so, the Christian forces assembled at La Forbie were the result of decades of rebuilding and the local rulers simply did not possess the depth of manpower to replace such losses. Only the military orders could recover swiftly because—albeit at great expense—they could draw on their reserves in western Europe. Furthermore, Jerusalem had been lost for the second and final time.

For al-Salih, this was a great victory and the following year he took control of Damascus, yet he was never to capitalize on his achievements because in 1249 he was killed during the crusade launched by Louis IX into Egypt. As for Baraka Khan and his Khwarazmians, they were evidently deemed to be too unruly and were forbidden entry into Egypt by al-Salih and later destroyed by Ayyubid troops.

[*See also* Crusades, *subentries on* Sources (1180–1245), Narrative (1180–1245), *and* Historiography (1180–1245) *and* Mansurah, Battle of.]

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LA HIGUERUELA, BATTLE OF

In November 1430 King Juan II of Castile and his constable, Alvaro de Luna, initiated a military campaign against the Kingdom of Granada. They did not set out to obliterate the Muslim realm; instead, they sought to undertake an expedition of a propagandistic nature, to increase their own prestige.

After several small-scale operations, in May 1431 Castilian troops entered the Kingdom of Granada, laying waste to the Vega, the region closest to the capital. At the end of June another incursion, this time of larger scale, headed by Juan II and Alvaro de Luna, brought the Castilian army to the vicinity of Granada. At a three-mile distance from the city, they set up a base camp on 29 June, enclosed by protective wooden stakes.

Several minor skirmishes ensued in the days that followed, but finally, on 1 July, a Muslim army made up of all men fit to take up weapons (five thousand knights and no less than two hundred thousand foot soldiers, according to some exaggerated chronicles) left Granada and attacked the Castilian detachment of two thousand men-at-arms. At midday, Alvaro de Luna ordered the remaining army to divide itself into several units in order to support the imperiled detachment, and he himself led the vanguard and two wings of twenty-five hundred knights. The cavalry's charge broke the central corps of Granada's army, which then began to retreat within the walls of their city, with the Castilians in hot pursuit, lasting until nightfall.

His complete victory, however, did not prompt Juan II to exploit his army's success. The battle thus had no strategic consequence, since the economic problems and internal divisions among his ranks rendered improbable the possibility of defeating the monarch of Granada or the conquering of any territory.

[*See also* Granada, Siege of; Iberia, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1500); Setenil, Sieges of; *and* Zahara, Sieges of.]

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Translated from the Spanish by Daniella Sforza

LA HIRE

(d. 1443). Étienne de Vignolles, called La Hire ("the Wrath") because of his unpredictable temper, was born in Gascony. Despite his non-noble birth, he rose to be one of the leading French captains of the later Hundred Years' War by virtue of his professionalism, personal prowess, and ruthlessness. His principal skill, however, was maintaining his army in the field by banditry and pillage. Vignolles had joined the service of the Dauphin, later Charles VII, by 1418, and in 1421 he was captured by the Burgundians. He was soon released and was present at the battles of Baugé and Verneuil, and in October 1428, along with Jean, "the Bastard of Orléans" (later comte de Dunois), he led the French effort to relieve the siege of Orléans. In April the following year he was among the French captains who met Joan of Arc at Blois, and was by her side when she entered the city on 29 April. He commanded the vanguard at the French victory at Patay on 18 June and, after attending Charles VII's coronation at Reims, he was appointed captain general of Normandy and baillif of Vermandois. Later that year he was again captured and ransomed by the Burgundians while attempting to free Joan of Arc from captivity in Rouen. Once released, in May 1435 he won an important victory over the Earl of Arundel at Gerberoy, but was himself routed by the lords Talbot and Scales at Ry the following year. Despite the peace of Arras, he continued to raid Burgundian-held territory in Artois and around Caux, and in 1437 he was again captured at Beauvais. After his release, he entered the service of René of Anjou and participated in the siege of Harfleur and of Pontoise, and, in his last action, was present at the battle of Tartas in 1442. He died at Montauban on 12 January 1443 in the presence of Charles VII.

[*See also* Dunois, Jean, Count of; Harfleur, Siege of; Joan of Arc; *and* Orléans, Siege of.]

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David Grummitt

LAJOS I OF HUNGARY

See Louis I of Hungary.

LALAKAON, BATTLE OF

The battle of Lalakaon was fought in 863 between imperial and caliphal forces at a location near the river Lalakaon (probably modern Şehirmeydanı Çayı) in the border region between the *themata* of Paphlagonia and Armeniakon, where the commander of the imperial *tagmata*, Petronas, with a substantial army, surrounded an invading column under Omar, emir of Malatya (Melitene). Petronas had a total of thirteen different units, which had marched by separate routes to meet near the point at which the action took place. The *themata* of Thrakesion, Thrace, and Macedonia, together with the four imperial *tagmata* under Petronas's direct command, approached from the west; those of Anatolikon, Opsikion, and Cappadocia, along with the smaller corps from the *kleisourai* of Charsianon and Seleukeia from the south; and those of Koloneia, Paphlagonia, Armeniakon, and Boukellarion from the north. The forces arriving from the south had earlier fought with the emperor—who seems to have returned to Constantinople—and these now effectively blocked Omar's route home. In spite of the advice of his officers that he should abandon any thought of fighting and make good his own escape, Omar was determined to fight and battle was joined. The greatly superior imperial forces, which must have outnumbered Omar's troops by at least three to one, fell on the invaders mercilessly, and Omar's force was virtually annihilated.

Omar himself was killed, and although his son with a small column managed to escape the trap, this force too was caught shortly afterward by the forces of Charsianon and destroyed.

This encounter, although involving relatively limited numbers of invaders, marked a substantial imperial victory, in both military and symbolic terms. It also showed that the imperial defensive strategy, combining flexible field forces with local defensive strong points, could succeed, when the armies were well led and adequate intelligence of enemy movements was available.

[*See also* Arabs; Byzantine Empire, *subentries on* Narrative (500–900) *and* Regiments; *and* Strategy.]

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John Haldon

LA LOIERA, BATTLE OF

See Genoese-Venetian Wars, *subentry on* Third War.

LAMBERT VON HERSFELD

(fl. 1070–1080), German historian, biographer of Saint Lull and historian of the monastery at Hersfeld. Lambert's *Annales* (Annals) remains an important, if sometimes controversial, source for the reign of Henry IV. Probably born in the 1120s, Lambert was educated at Bamberg and entered Hersfeld monastery in 1158, hoping to emulate its abbot, Meginhard. Soon ordained a priest, Lambert went on pilgrimage, ostensibly to Jerusalem, but returned to Hersfeld in a year and a day. In 1071, the monastery sent him to observe the reformed monastic rule at Saalfeld. He left Hersfeld about 1077, possibly to become prior (latter abbot) at Hasungen, where he died before 1085.

Lambert's stylistic achievement made him a favorite of the Humanists, but his works appear to have been controversial among his colleagues, and nineteenth-century critics challenged his accuracy. In the *Annales* he took on the even more difficult task of writing history in an apparently neutral voice for an audience with which he politically disagreed. (Hersfeld tended to support Henry IV while Lambert did not, although there is little evidence he was pro-Saxon.)

Since Lambert's *Annales* ends in early 1077, just before the election of Rudolf of Swabia as antiking, many of the famous military actions of the Saxon war lie outside his scope. Lambert does provide a description of Henry's victory at the Unstrut that is noteworthy for its presentation of the battle in the context of a full-fledged campaign. As historians develop a better understanding of medieval military organization and the technical language medieval writers used to describe it, criticism of Lambert for inaccuracy and using classical models too directly has faded. Coupled with a reevaluation of the actual capabilities of medieval military organization, the more sophisticated understanding of medieval military affairs achieved in recent decades should restore Lambert's importance as a source for military history.

[*See also* Henry IV, Emperor.]

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Edward J. Schoenfeld

LA MOLINELLA, BATTLE OF

The wake of a failed coup in Florence against the Medici regime in 1466 saw the creation of a defensive league involving Milan, Florence, Rome, and Naples.

Perceiving this alliance as a threat to their security, the Venetians decided to support the plan of the anti-Medici exiles secretly, thus provoking a change of regime in Florence through military action. To this purpose Venice officially dismissed from its service the renowned condottiere Bartolomeo Colleoni, who was hired by the Florentine exiles immediately afterward. Colleoni in turn enlisted a number of polities from Romagna, which was also fearful of Florentine and Milanese expansionism.

Colleoni took the field in April 1467 with seven thousand cavalry and six thousand infantry, conquering a number of Florentine strongholds in Romagna. The league responded by sending an army of seven thousand cavalry and thirty-five hundred infantry under Federico da Montefeltro to raid the territory of Astorre Manfredi, the lord of Faenza and one of Colleoni's associates. Colleoni rushed to relieve his ally, but after some desultory fighting and having failed to enter Florentine territory, he decided to retreat toward Bologna, with Montefeltro close on his heels. Eventually Montefeltro caught up with his foe between La Molinella and La Riccardina on the afternoon of 25 July, just as Colleoni had started to pitch camp. Montefeltro divided his cavalry into five squadrons, intending to attack frontally with four, while sending the fifth, made up of light cavalry, to strike the enemy's rear. Forewarned by his scouts of the peril, Colleoni hastily deployed his troops along the Idice stream, dividing his line into three squadrons of mounted troops and leaving a fourth, composed of elite soldiers, in reserve. Part of his infantry he allotted to the camp's defense, ordering the rest to support the cavalry.

The Venetian left struck first, only to be repulsed, allowing the league to reach the camp. Colleoni reacted by sending forward his mounted reserves together with a strong contingent of infantry, eventually managing to push back the assailants. Meanwhile Montefeltro with two squadrons forded the Idice to the south, forcing Colleoni's right under Manfredi to retreat toward the camp. As Manfredi's men fought desperately to stem the onslaught, Colleoni brought forward his artillery—light pieces mounted on wheels, firing shots said to be the size of a plum—keeping the attackers at bay by means of a murderous barrage. Eventually darkness put a stop to the fighting, although it continued by torchlight for some time. Montefeltro, who had lost two horses and had been wounded in the foot, retreated toward La Molinella, and Colleoni went to La Riccardina. Losses on both sides were severe: six hundred were killed, and overall the casualties totaled more than a thousand.

The manner in which artillery was used in the battle distinguishes La Molinella—inconclusive as it may have been—as a seminal moment in Italy's military history. Colleoni even earned the unfounded reputation of being the first to use guns in a field engagement.

[*See also* Artillery; Condottieri; Federico da Montefeltro; *and* Italy, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1493).]

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Niccolò Capponi

Landsknechte

Few soldiers ever walked the battlefields of late-medieval Europe in more extravagant fashion than the German *Landsknechte*. The creation of the *Landsknecht*, the most important development in warfare at the end of the fifteenth century according to Philippe Contamine, was a direct result of Maximilian I's (1459–1519) efforts to modernize Habsburg armies.

The term *Landsknecht* appeared around 1470 and comes from the German *land* (land, country) and *knecht* (servant). Such German mercenaries were thus called servants of the country to distinguish them from Swiss mercenaries—*Gebirgsknechten*, servants of the mountains.



Landsknechte. Battle scene showing *landsknechte* fighting with two-handed swords, halberds, and lances. Woodcut, c. 1550. DEUTSCHES HISTORISCHES MUSEUM, BERLIN, GERMANY/© DHM/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

In Upper Germany, there traditionally existed groups of men, known as *Knabenschaften,* who sometimes practiced private warfare, attacking merchants or herds for their own benefit or fighting for towns as mercenaries. When Maximilian I began to restructure his armies in order to uphold his claim to Burgundy and keep other territories under his authority, he had thus at his disposal many men he could use to rebuild the core of his infantry. However, it took Swiss captains to turn these "soldiers of fortune" into a formidable fighting force whose tactics and equipment were largely copied from the troops of the Swiss Confederation—troops that had inflicted brutal defeats on the armies of Charles the Bold (the previous Duke of Burgundy). The recruitment of *Landsknecht* troops was done in the fashion of the time. A lord interested in hiring *Landsknechte* would pay for the services of a known and experienced warrior to recruit and lead a certain number of men. A letter of appointment (*Bestallungbrief*) would be prepared naming the colonel, the size of the regiment, and the obligations of both parties. Men recruited to serve as *Landsknechte* were expected to be experienced, disciplined, and equipped for war.

By 1486, Maximilian had two regiments, each three to four thousand men strong, trained by a Swiss captain and skilled in Swiss tactics. However, while the Swiss greatly depended on cohesion for their success, *Landsknecht* troops could not rely on a common background or a sense of community to hold them together in battle. Because *Landsknechte* came from various regions, preexisting bonds of dialect and culture were limited. The organization of the *Landsknecht* regiment was meant to bring to the fighting force the cohesion the men lacked naturally. Typical *Landsknecht* regiments were composed of ten *Fähnleins* or companies. Each *Fähnlein* was

divided into *rotten* (platoons) of forty men. Each platoon was composed of common *Landsknechte* and *Doppelsöldner* (experienced soldiers who received double pay and who fought as crossbowmen and harquebusiers to screen and support the pike square). Officers of large formations were appointed by the colonel, but each *Rott* elected its own leaders from among the most experienced soldiers. Other officials such as the *Führer*, the *Gemeinwaibel*, and the *Furiere* were appointed to represent the interest of the *Landsknechte* and act as mediators with the high command.

Although their tactics largely derived from those of the Swiss, the *Landsknechte* were quick to diversify their weaponry and to adopt defensive and offensive formations that ensured maximum tactical efficiency. The main weapon of the *Landsknecht* was a pike some 14 to 18 feet (4 to 5.5 meters) long, used in phalanx formations. Within the battle formation, other men and sergeants carried halberds. These men would rush into any breach in the enemy line and fight at close quarters. Each man carried a short sword, called a *Katzbalger*. Some men carried the 66-inch (nearly 2-meter) *Zweihänder*, a two-handed sword used to cut down enemy pikes and breach enemy ranks. On the sides of the battle formation, *Doppelsöldner* fired on the enemy with harquebuses and crossbows. The strength of the *Landsknecht* formation was founded on well-trained pike squares supported by missile troops and on the strategic timing of the attack.

After the siege of the fortress of Stuhlweissenburg (Székesfehérvár) in 1490, Maximilian I made the *Landsknechte* swear an oath of allegiance and turned them into a de facto imperial force. However, the recognized successes of the *Landsknechte* in battle quickly placed these soldiers in high demand throughout Europe, which put them in direct competition with Swiss mercenaries. Mercenary *Landsknecht* regiments saw action at Ravenna (1512), Creazzo and Novara (1513), Marignano (1515), Bicocca (1522), and Pavia (1525), and in the Italian campaigns of 1526–1529 and 1536–1554. *Landsknechte* fought for the French king, for Spanish-imperial and papal forces, and for the German Empire. They sometimes found themselves on both sides of the battlefield.

Although the *Landsknechte* exemplified the cohesion required by late-medieval armies, their demise began by the second half of the sixteenth century because of the frailty of their allegiance and because of further developments in firearms.

[*See also* Armies, *subentry on* Organization; Charles the Bold; Germany, *subentry on* Narrative (1415–1493); Maximilian I; *and* Mercenaries.]

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La Roche Derrien, Siege and Battle of

In 1346, Brittany was torn by a civil war between two claimants to the ducal throne: John de Montfort, supported by the English, and Charles of Blois, nephew of the king of France. Blois aimed to occupy as much of his rival's territories as possible while the English were busy with the Crécy-Calais campaign, major operations in Aquitaine, and defense against a Scottish invasion. Blois's resources were so superior to those of Sir Thomas Dagworth—the lieutenant to whom Edward III and young Montfort had entrusted the conduct of the war in Brittany—that

he chose to conduct three sieges simultaneously: one each at Lesneven, Brest, and La Roche Derrien. On 9 June, however, a tiny detachment under Dagworth inflicted a stinging repulse on Blois's main field force at Restellou, apparently causing the collapse of the three sieges. The next spring, more cautiously, Blois concentrated on just one operation: the siege of La Roche Derrien, a small but well-fortified port on the north coast, garrisoned by eighty men-at-arms. He massed some forty-four hundred soldiers, not counting local infantry levies, encircled the location, and set up nine large engines, capable of casting stones of up to three hundred pounds. After enduring several weeks of bombardment and frequent assaults, Richard Totesham, the garrison commander, agreed to surrender unless relieved within eight days.

Dagworth, who could muster only around three hundred men-at-arms and four hundred archers, aside from local levies of limited value, nonetheless resolved to break the siege. Blois was ready for him, having entrenched his siege camps and ordered laborers to clear away all cover within a mile's radius, filling ditches and razing hedges. This may have been intended to prevent the English from using the ditches or hedges for a concealed approach but more likely was meant to deny them a favorable position for a defensive battle.

Given his severe numerical disadvantage, Dagworth decided to try a night attack, probably hoping to emulate Henry of Grosmont's success at Auberoche in 1345. The French army was stretched over lines some five miles (eight kilometers) long and was split into four segments by the Jaudy River and two creeks. Blois anticipated a predawn assault and that Dagworth would feint at one segment before striking hard at a different one; hence each of his separated forces was ordered to hold its own position if attacked, with only the larger body under his own command left free to move to aid its neighbors.

On the night of 19–20 June, after using servants and wagoners to create a distraction in the northeast sector, the English launched a vigorous attack on Blois's main division. The Breton lords in charge of the watch sounded the alarm only barely before Dagworth's men struck, and at first the English enjoyed substantial success. The weight of numbers told against them, however; eventually they were defeated, with Dagworth captured.

But then the retreating remnants of Dagworth's force met a late-arriving reinforcement of one hundred picked men-at-arms. The leader of this contingent rallied the troops and led them back to La Roche, where they found Blois's men—who believed the fight was over and won—unprepared. Once again the French suffered the effects of a surprise attack, and Dagworth was rescued. The French fought hard, however, and still with the benefit of numbers. Near daybreak Dagworth was captured a second time. At that point Totesham's men, including the town militia, poured out from the gates. Attacked for the third time, Blois's division began to break. Reinforced by rescued prisoners, Dagworth's Anglo-Bretons inflicted heavy losses on their enemies and captured Blois himself. The other Franco-Breton divisions, which in accordance with their orders had held their positions, were then apparently attacked and defeated one by one, the English benefitting from the morale effect of Blois's capture.

The French defeat was total. Nearly every banneret in the army was captured or killed; the overall death rate for the men-at-arms was reported at more than one-third. Although the civil war did not end, its tide turned strongly in favor of the Montfortians. "No men-at-arms ever accomplished such a fine feat as these Bretons and Englishmen," commented the chronicler Jean Froissart. "It should be attributed to their great prowess and skill at arms."

[*See also* Edward III of England.]

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Clifford J. Rogers

La Rochelle, Naval Battle of

On 23 June 1372 an English troop convoy commanded by John Hastings, Earl of Pembroke, and carrying some £20,000 in gold was defeated at sea off La Rochelle by a squadron of Castilian galleys led by Fernán Ruiz Cabeza de Vaca and Ruiz Díaz de Rojas. Pembroke had recently been appointed Edward III's lieutenant in Aquitaine (20 April 1372) with a commission to protect the borders of the former principality, especially Poitou, which were now under threat following the collapse of the Treaty of Brétigny (1360) and the reopening of the Hundred Years' War. Edward III also hoped at this point to retake the military initiative by leading a *chevauchée* (a destructive raid) through northern France, but Pembroke's defeat at La Rochelle and the subsequent blockade of the port forced a change of strategy. The battle also proved the significance of the Franco-Castilian alliance (formed in November 1368). Castilian galleys contributed a great deal to the French military effort and proved especially effective in expeditions in 1377 and 1380. John of Gaunt's Iberian campaigns were partly aimed at eliminating the Castilian threat to England.

Contemporary chroniclers differ over the course of the action and the size of the respective forces at La Rochelle, but it appears that no more than three English fighting ships (i.e., ships equipped with towers) protected perhaps seventeen troop transports. By contrast, the Castilian force included at least twelve galleys—all specialized fighting ships. The first exchanges began on 22 June in the approaches to the harbor of La Rochelle, but the tide separated the fleets when it turned at dusk. The encounter resumed the next morning when again the tide seems to have played a critical role; the English ships may well have still lay aground at low water while the Castilian galleys with their shallow drafts could pick off their targets one by one. The Castilians succeeded in setting fire to a number of English vessels by spraying oil that was then ignited with flaming arrows. All the English ships were burned or captured, as was the £20,000 in gold; Pembroke and a number of his men were taken prisoner. Again, chronicle accounts vary considerably concerning this: some suggest seventy were made captives, others put the total as high as four hundred with an additional eight hundred killed or drowned.

La Rochelle has often been painted as a disaster of the highest order for England, one that lost its control over the Channel. Certainly, the defeat was the first for the English at sea in the Hundred Years' War and its consequences were not only symbolic. Had Pembroke reached Aquitaine and recruited sufficient troops to mount an effective defense, he might have saved Poitou and Saintonge. The concept of "control of the Channel," however, is flawed given the resources and conditions of fourteenth-century naval warfare, and England continued to transport considerable forces to France (including to Calais in 1373, and to Brittany in 1375). Indeed, the battle stimulated English naval activity: numerous ships were constructed, and the 1370s and 1380s saw very substantial numbers of soldiers and sailors put to sea.

[*See also* Edward III of England; Hundred Years' War, *subentries on* Causes *and* Costs; *and* Naval Combat and Tactics.]

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David Green

Las Navas de Tolosa, Battle of

The battle of Las Navas de Tolosa (1212) constituted the great turning point in the conflict of Christian

and Muslim states in the Hispanic reconquest. Prior to this date, the Christians had lost every major battle when they took the field against an Islamic caliphal army. After Las Navas, the Muslims would never win a battle of this scale again in Iberia. The battle also pitted the full power of an expansive crusading Iberia against a puritanical Almohad empire holding southern Spain and North Africa, a conflict in which both sides drew in part on forces from outside the Peninsula.

The immediate background of the battle derived from the deterioration of an extended truce between King Alfonso VIII of Castile (r. 1158–1214) and the Almohades of the Muslim south. When Alfonso began to seize settlements and castles in La Mancha, the Almohades responded by capturing the strategic fortress of Salvatierra. With the loss of this castle, the Order of Calatrava lost its last holding in southern La Mancha, a fact that generated widespread Christian concern because of Calatrava's affiliation with the Cistercians. In addition, Alfonso utilized growing papal interest in conflict with Islam by sending emissaries to Rome, causing Pope Innocent III (1198–1216) to preach an indulgence-granting crusade for 1212 in Castile. In addition to the forces raised in southern France, Innocent pressed for a truce among the often bellicose Iberian monarchs, resulting in the contribution of warriors under the personal command of Pedro II (Pere I), Count-King of Aragon-Catalonia (1196–1213), and King Sancho VII of Navarre (1194–1234). The royal army, Castilian aristocratic forces, the military orders, and the municipal militias rounded out the domestic contribution. By May 1212, the largest Christian army yet assembled in Iberia gathered in Toledo, focused on regaining the strongholds lost to the Almohades in recent decades. Balancing contemporary and modern estimates of this variety of military contingents, something like one hundred thousand effectives proceeded southward during late June and early July. A somewhat larger force was gathering in Seville under the Almohad caliph, Muhammad al-Nasir (1199–1213).

King Alfonso's troops pressed south along the long-contested road through La Mancha, capturing the castles of Malagón (24 June) and Calatrava (1 July). At this point, disputes over booty combined with the July heat of the Guadiana Valley caused most of the trans-Pyrenean French to abandon the crusade, save only the contingent under Bishop Arnaud of Narbonne. Nonetheless, King Alfonso VIII and his Aragonese allies, newly reinforced by the arrival of King Sancho and his Navarrese army, drove toward Salvatierra. Encouraged by news of the French desertion, Muhammad al-Nasir also advanced from Seville. When this was reported to King Alfonso, he chose to bypass Salvatierra and march on Andalusia. Finding the Muradal Pass in the Sierra Morena Mountains occupied by Amohad forces, the Christian army found an alternative pass that led to the Mesa del Rey region. Muhammad promptly repositioned his own army in the southern foothills (*navas*) of the Sierra Morena to confront Alfonso's army.

The battle commenced on 16 July. Both sides appear to have resorted to a conventional arrangement of their troops consisting of a center and two wings, backed by a reserve force to be unleashed at the critical moment. Count-King Pedro of Aragon commanded the right, King Sancho of Navarre the left, and King Alfonso exercised overall command from the center. The Muslims, whose eagerness to engage suggests that they possessed the larger force, also added at the front a line of light skirmishers, formed of slingers, archers, and javelin hurlers. The Almohad skirmishers advanced toward the Christian vanguard, which responded to this provocation by charging and scattering their tormentors on the way to contact with the Muslim center. The left, center, and right of each side promptly joined the attack. The Almohad center began to fall back under this pressure, and in response Muhammad released his reserve. In time the Christians began to waver and some soldiers sought to flee. Concerned, Alfonso dispatched his cavalry to quell the flight and stiffen his lines. Thereafter the struggle for control of the battlefield lasted much of the day until the Christian left achieved envelopment and thrust toward Muhammad's camp and his red tent. The caliph panicked and abruptly chose to leave the battlefield.

Seeing this, the Almohad lines broke and dissolved into flight, and the Christians began to slaughter their disorganized foe. The carnage among the Muslims was terrible, estimated at sixty thousand dead, according to Bishop Arnaud of Narbonne.

[*See also* Alfonso VIII of Castile; Iberia, *subentry on* Narrative (1100–1300); *and* Salvatierra, Siege of.]

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LAUPEN, BATTLE OF

From the beginning of the fourteenth century, the town of Bern earned numerous enemies because of its territorial expansion, competition with the Habsburg-affiliated town of Freiburg im Üechtland near Bern, and its refusal to pay homage to the excommunicated emperor Louis the Bavarian. Several noble families, the bishops of Basel and Lausanne, and the town of Freiburg were among the coalition of the town's enemies. Negotiations failed, and Bern received letters of defiance from its enemies on Easter in 1339.

Bern's enemies went to war, raiding its territory. The Bernese tried to take revenge, attacking the nearby town of Aarberg on the 16 May 1339, but the attack failed. The Bernese then reinforced the castle and the town of Laupen. Starting on 10 June, the town of Laupen was besieged by the coalition army, reportedly comprising one thousand knights and sixteen thousand foot soldiers. In expectation of a Bernese attack, some of the besiegers moved to Wyden, approximately a thirty-minute march east of Laupen. On 22 June—on the eve of "the day of the ten thousand knights"—a relief force of about six thousand soldiers, probably under the command of Rudolf von Erlach, advanced toward Laupen. The Bernese force was supported by Swiss confederates from the forest cantons (Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden) and its other allies, Oberhasli and Solothurn. Near Wyden, the Bernese encountered their opponent, and both enemies formed up for battle. In the later afternoon, the cavalry of the enemy opened the attack, routing one of the three divisions of the confederate army, composed of Bernese troops. The Freiburger infantry and their allies pressed the other Bernese division hard. Horsemen attacked the third Swiss division, composed mainly of troops from the forest cantons,



Battle of Laupen. Illustration from the *Berner Chronik* by Diebold Schilling the Elder, 1483. Although this is a late-fifteenth-century image and the armor is different from what would have been seen at Laupen, Schilling's familiarity with Swiss fighting styles makes it valuable.

but the cavalry was unable to break the Swiss formation.

After a ferocious struggle, reportedly lasting almost two hours, the Bernese who had stood their ground managed to defeat the Freiburgers completely, with the aid of the advantages of terrain. The victorious Bernese then came to the aid of the confederates, who were beset by enemy knights. Struck on the flank and in the rear, the horsemen were slaughtered. In all, the Freiburgers and their allies are said to have lost fifteen hundred men. Losses among the cavalry were especially heavy. The nobility of what is now the western part of Switzerland never recovered from this bloodshed. Despite the crushing defeat, the war continued. The town of Freiburg tried to continue their guerilla warfare against Bern. The Bernese had great difficulty repelling the Freiburgian attacks, but in the spring of 1340, the Bernese troops got the upper hand, and Freiburg was hit hard by the burning of its suburbs. Thanks to the peace negotiations of Queen Agnes of Hungary, the widow of the Habsburg King Albrecht, peace was made on 9 August 1340. The result was the predominance of Bern in the region.

In his *Conflictus Laupensis* (Battle of Laupen), the Bernese chronicler Konrad Justinger celebrated the glory of this victory. More than a century later, in the battle against the Burgundian force under the command of Duke Charles the Bold, the Bernese Council chose the anniversary of the battle of Laupen to initiate the battle of Murten in 1476.

[*See also* Louis IV, Emperor; Murten, Battle of; *and* Switzerland, *subentry on* Narrative.]

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LAWS OF WAR AND THE JUST CONDUCT OF WAR

Like most areas of human endeavor, the practice of medieval warfare had its rules and regulations. On a practical level, matters such as the division of spoils within an army were governed by custom, while the agreement and maintenance of truces required a set of rules recognized by both sides. With the development of chivalric culture over the tenth and eleventh centuries, it became the norm to ransom defeated opponents rather than to kill them, and this too required regulation, in this case, of the treatment of prisoners. This gradually accumulating body of customary law spread with Francophile chivalric culture, became predominant throughout Western Christendom in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and so acquired a universal recognition.

The laws of war were never codified or put into treaty form during the Middle Ages. However, legal theorists produced various tracts on the conduct of war, providing these customs with a retrospective legal and intellectual justification resting on the theory of just war developed by Saint Augustine (354–430). Particularly influential was the *Treatise on War* written by John of Legnano, a thirteenth-century professor of law at Bologna. It provided the basis for the *Tree of Battles* by Honoré de Bouvet, a fourteenth-century French canon lawyer, whose work provided a simplified vernacular digest for laymen. This was in turn copied by the Frenchwoman Christine de Pizan for her *Book of Deeds of Arms and of Chivalry* at the beginning of the fifteenth century. Most soldiers, however, picked up their knowledge of the laws of war not from academic treatises but from their more experienced fellows; indeed, veteran soldiers were often called upon to provide judgments on disputes arising under these laws.

Types of War. Technically, late-medieval lawyers recognized four states of war, derived from Roman law: mortal war; public (or open) war; private (or covert) war; and truce. Mortal war meant that prisoners would not be ransomed, but enslaved or killed, and within Christendom, this meant death, as the enslavement of Christians was illegal. While the crusades were generally conducted as mortal

wars, within Christendom such warfare was comparatively rare, if only because of the financial and political advantages to be gained from taking prisoners. When it did occur, it was signified by flying a red banner. Thus, when the French unfurled the fire-red Oriflamme banner at Crécy, this indicated (to both sides) that they would give no quarter.

Public war was that conducted between sovereign Christian princes (rulers who recognized no superior lord). Flying the banners of the contending princes constituted a challenge to combat in a public war. Such banners also served to identify in whose name an army was fighting, an important consideration in an age of mercenary companies whose allegiance was not always immediately obvious. War cries such as "Saint George" or "Saint Denis" performed a similar function of identifying allegiance and signifying a public war fought in the name of a sovereign prince.

Private war was fought between lords who were not sovereign princes. Although participants were permitted to maim and kill each other, they were not legally entitled to take ransoms or spoil, or to burn or ravage each other's lands. Unsurprisingly, private war was frowned upon by the centralizing monarchies of the later Middle Ages. Ideological justification for this stance was provided by lawyers, who, following Saint Augustine, argued that only a war fought by a properly constituted Christian sovereign prince could be just. Consequently, the right of subjects to conduct private wars was increasingly curtailed as sovereigns sought to establish a monopoly on violence within their realms.

Finally, truces were also considered to be a form of war, as they constituted merely a temporary suspension of conflict and not its permanent cessation. Truces were supposed to maintain the military status quo. Hence, it was not permissible to build new castles, or even to repair existing ones, during time of truce.

In practice, these technical distinctions were open to debate and misinterpretation. In particular, the concept of sovereignty developed only slowly, leaving scope for argument as to whether a particular ruler could be considered sovereign. For example, the dukes of Burgundy and Anjou fought their wars as public wars, despite being subjects of the king of France. Nevertheless, these concepts had important legal consequences. A man who rode out and seized another to hold for ransom was committing a criminal act. However, if he did so with banners displayed in the name of a sovereign prince, and if his victim was a subject of a realm with which that prince was at war, then the same deed was not a crime, but a legitimate act of public war. Thus, despite the sealing of an Anglo-French truce in 1357, many of the English companies in France were able to continue their profitable careers of plundering and ransoming by immediately professing allegiance to the king of Navarre, who was also at war with the king of France but was not party to that truce.

Laws Governing Sieges. The conduct of sieges was also governed by well-established customs, providing a ready basis for surrender negotiations. A siege would be preceded by a formal summons to the defenders to surrender. If this was rejected, the start of the siege would be signaled by a shot from the besieger's siege engines or cannons. A town or fortress taken without first coming to terms could legitimately be systemically pillaged, and its male inhabitants slaughtered out of hand. Their lives and goods were considered forfeit for their refusal to obey the summons of a sovereign prince. Thus, although Jean Froissart (the contemporary Flemish chronicler of chivalric deeds) deplored the Black Prince's vicious sacking of Limoges in Aquitaine in 1370, the prince was acting entirely within his legal rights, for the city had been taken by storm. Hence, there was an obvious incentive for defenders to come speedily to terms. Yet captains who surrendered too readily, without putting up sufficient resistance, could be judged guilty of treason to their own princes. It was therefore common for agreement to be reached that the besieged garrison would surrender on a particular date, decided by negotiation, unless they were relieved before then. Besieged towns or fortresses subject to such agreements were considered to be under truce, and such agreements were usually backed up by taking hostages from the garrison, who could be hanged if the

garrison refused to surrender on the agreed date. The legal niceties of siege warfare could, however, be dispensed with in the case of a surprise attack, as any prior notification of a state of siege would rather defeat the purpose. In this case, it was legally sufficient for the attackers to give an identifying war cry once the attack had been mounted. Unfortunately for the defenders, it was rarely possible to come to terms in these circumstances, and towns taken by surprise could legitimately be sacked.

The division of spoils gained on such occasions was also governed by custom. Booty taken by members of a company of soldiers was typically shared among all the company by set proportions according to rank, although the precise allocations differed among different countries at different times. If the company received pay from their prince, then he too was entitled to a share, the amount again dependent on local custom.

Noncombatants. As the rules concerning plunder suggest, the laws of war were the product of a martial culture deriving largely from the customs of soldiers themselves. Although influenced in their development by Saint Augustine's writings on just war, these laws were not founded on any humanitarian concerns, and so offered little protection to noncombatants. Canon law held that all churchmen were immune from acts of war, although clerics who took up arms necessarily forfeited this immunity. Heralds too were immune, as they were considered to belong to the international order, owing allegiance not to sovereign princes, but to the wider order of knighthood. Theoretically, again under the influence of the church, other noncombatants such as merchants and peasants were also supposed to be immune, but with the important proviso that those who aided their sovereign in the conduct of his wars could not claim such immunity. Unfortunately, the widening scope of royal taxation meant that virtually the entire population of a realm could be argued to be making some form of contribution to their sovereign's war effort, willy-nilly, and so they could be considered a legitimate military target—the protestations of the church over the spilling of innocent blood notwithstanding.

Enforcement and Settlement of Disputes. Although the laws of war were universally acknowledged, owing to the very nature of war they fell outside the normal jurisdictions of courts, and enforcement remained haphazard at best. Disputes between members of the same army (over booty or prisoners, for example) were comparatively easy to deal with. In the first instance, they would be settled by a court held under the supervision of the army's constable, usually by the judgment of a panel of veteran soldiers whose long experience of war gave them the requisite knowledge of custom. Yet it was possible to appeal to higher authorities, and litigation could drag on for years.

Complaints of misconduct by enemies were much more difficult to resolve, but various mechanisms did exist. Disputes over breaches of a truce were commonly settled by representatives from both sides appointed to keep the truce (an example being the March days held by the English and Scottish wardens of the Marches), or they might be submitted to the arbitration of a mutually acceptable third party. In the case of ransoms, which were essentially private contracts between captors and their prisoners, it became common to settle disputes under international contract law. Once peace had been attained, other complaints might be pursued by appealing for redress to the opposing prince, though pursuing a case in a foreign country could prove a protracted and expensive process—and was often fruitless.

For a soldier, an obvious course for obtaining redress was to issue a challenge to a duel. Duels were only permissible under certain circumstances, and then only when all other legal avenues had been exhausted. Nevertheless, they were an effective way of settling a dispute, for they offered a definitive judgment. Perhaps equally important, a duel was also the most honorable way of proving a case.

In the last resort, observation of the laws of war depended on the honor of individual soldiers themselves. In chivalric society, where honor was a prime marker of social standing and personal worth, dishonor was an effective sanction. A soldier's breaking

of his word over a ransom agreement, for instance, was a deeply dishonorable act, inviting public obloquy from his own side as well as from his enemies. Such defaulters could be named and shamed by publicly displaying their arms turned upside down—a deadly insult impugning the honor of the entire lineage represented by those arms.

That considerations of honor were taken seriously is shown by the example of King John II of France, captured at Poitiers. He voluntarily returned to captivity in England when payments of his ransom fell into arrears and one of his hostages fled. In 1418 King Henry V of England had Jean d'Angennes executed as a traitor because he surrendered Cherbourg for a cash payment while it was still well supplied. What is particularly striking about this judgment is that d'Angennes was a Frenchmen, and he had surrendered the town to the English. Thus the laws of war could be implemented with a degree of impartiality at an international level. However, they acted primarily to protect the interests of soldiers. They did little to limit the devastating impact of war on civilians, nor were they intended to.

[*See also* Chivalry, *subentry on* Overview; Christianity; Discipline; Immunity from War; Just War, Just Motive; Mirrors of Princes; *and* Plunder, Division of.]

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LEAGUES, ITALIAN MILITARY

Military leagues were alliances, frequently contracted from the twelfth to fourteenth centuries, by which Italian states conducted wars and diplomacy. They involved a pledge by participating states of a share, or *taglia*, of troops for a joint army. The word *taglia* later became synonymous with the leagues themselves. Scholars have viewed them as critical to promoting the mercenary system in Italy—in particular, the widespread use of autonomous bands of men directly responsible to their captains.

The first and most successful league was the Lombard League of the twelfth century. It was formed by Lombard city-states—including Milan, Verona, Vicenza, Padua, Treviso, Brescia, Bergamo, Mantua, Cremona, Ferrara, Parma, Modena, and Bologna—to defend against the advances of the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa, the nominal overlord of the region. At Legnano in 1176 the league inflicted a humiliating military defeat on the emperor, which allowed the victors greater political autonomy.

The Lombard League passed out of existence with the Peace of Constance in 1183, but it was resurrected several times, including in the last years of the twelfth century and again in the first half of the thirteenth century. The advent of Charles of Anjou, the brother of the French king Louis IX, as ruler of Naples and Sicily in southern Italy in the second half of the thirteenth century occasioned a series of Guelph leagues. These were headed by Charles and the papacy, his ally, and included several Tuscan states, most notably Florence. Daniel Waley has interpreted these leagues, which remained in force from the last decades of the thirteenth century into the fourteenth century, as the central phase in the transformation of Italian armies from primarily native forces to primarily mercenary ones. The leagues gave mercenaries continuous employment and encouraged their formation in bands under individual captains. Waley has described the Florentine army at this time as less an expression of the city's power than a part of the "wide fabric of Guelph military policy."

The composition of the leagues varied. The Lombard League that opposed Frederick Barbarossa in 1176 consisted of perhaps three thousand cavalrymen and infantrymen. The Tuscan Guelph leagues of the 1280s had between fifteen hundred and twenty-five hundred cavalrymen. The league of 1310 included four thousand cavalrymen. Specific details, such as precise levels of infantrymen, are often difficult to assess. States usually agreed to remain allied for a set period of time. The league of 1310 was contracted for five years, at which point the participants reassessed the terms. Some leagues were specifically contracted for war, such as the Guelph league formed before the battle of Campaldino in 1289. Whether for immediate service or for longer-term defense, leagues had set rules and regulations, written down and signed by the agreeing parties. Though the terms differed, the alliances all involved the election of a joint commander of forces and the selection of a seat for the league, a city or town where future negotiations among the participants and the airing of disagreements took place. All members agreed not to make separate peace with the enemy.

The effectiveness of the league armies as fighting forces is unclear. The Lombard League gained a spectacular victory over Emperor Frederick, but the performance of later leagues was decidedly uneven. They often had internal discord and disagreement and were terminated before their stated duration. This was particularly true of the leagues of the fourteenth century. By the middle of that century, leagues were often formed for protection against bands of marauding mercenaries—which the alliance system had in fact encouraged. The leagues did little to stop the activities of the marauding companies and became more a means of diplomacy, which, contrary to intent, often widened suspicion among their members. The most ambitious league of the era, the 1366 league of Pope Urban V, with an army of three thousand cavalrymen and three thousand infantrymen and involving most of the major states in Italy, sought to eliminate marauding bands from Italy. In the end the participants, reluctant to offend soldiers that they might one day need, could only agree to ally themselves against future marauding bands that might arise. The league, contracted for five years, fell apart soon after the contract was signed.

The military leagues nevertheless constitute an important and as yet largely unstudied aspect of Italian military organization. They provide insight into the means by which states made war, as well as the political and economic issues arising from such activity.

[*See also* Condottieri; Lombard League; *and* Mercenaries.]

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LECHFELD, BATTLE ON THE

The battle on the Lechfeld took place on 10 August 955. In 954 the East Frankish kingdom was suffering a period of political crisis. The Hungarian mounted warriors known as the Magyars, who had been raiding wide areas of western Europe for more than sixty years, seized this opportunity and launched a great plundering incursion through Bavaria and Swabia

into the Rhine-Main region. Thence they went westward to Lower Lotharingia before veering south, entering the West Frankish kingdom and Burgundy, and finally crossing the Alps to return via northern Italy to the Carpathian Basin. All this was a bitter augur of the following year's invasion.

The Armies Converge. In the summer of 955 the Magyars changed their previous raiding strategy to focus on conquering the Bavarian city of Augsburg. Although some historians have argued that the Magyar army was very small, it could well have consisted of as many as eight thousand men. And it included great contingents of infantry and siege engines, as well as the excellent light cavalry characteristic of a nomadic people.

Meanwhile, from Saxony in the north, the German king Otto I moved rapidly to the Danube area. The German army concentrated at Ulm and crossed the Danube. The king then advanced to Reisensburg, and on the evening of 9 August he ordered the army to begin the march toward Augsburg, some forty miles (sixty-five kilometers) to the east. Charles R. Bowlus has convincingly demonstrated that the route chosen by Otto was through the Rauherforst, the woodlands west of Augsburg, and not—as was previously thought—through the open plains of the Lech north and south of the city. Of Otto's eight legions, each with an effective strength of a thousand, the first three, made up of Bavarians, formed the vanguard. The fourth consisted of Franconians under the command of Conrad the Red, Duke of Lotharingia and Otto's son-in-law. The fifth, the royal legion, was led by Otto himself: it was the reserve, consisting of heavy cavalry. The sixth and seventh units were Swabians under the command of their duke, Burchard II. The final legion, made up of Bohemians, had the task of protecting the baggage and implements.

The Magyars' plan was based on encirclement. Mounted archers would slip behind the German column and attack the rear as it proceeded through the forest of Rauher. The remainder of the Hungarian army was deployed near Westheim, in the Schmutter Valley opposite Ottmarshausen, where Otto's army would have to exit the woodlands. The objective was to trap the relief column between the hammer of the mounted archer forces and the anvil of the main body of the Magyar infantry. The plan was excellent, but it depended on two basic premises. First, timing and discipline were essential because the encircling force had to be patient; the attack on the rear could not begin until the entire German column, with the exception of the baggage train, had entered the forest. Second, the plan was designed to spread panic throughout the entire column as the men in the rear pressured those in front of them to rush forward to exit the forest. If this chaotic reaction did not occur and the Germans kept order, the tactic would fail, and the Hungarian army would be broken into two uncoordinated forces.

The Battle. The morning of 10 August, Saint Lawrence's Day, started auspiciously for the Magyars. The Bohemian legion was scattered by the mounted archers, and the rout spread to Swabian units. But the discipline among these Magyar forces broke down: they devoted themselves to taking captives and looting the baggage rather than to pressing their advantage by attacking Otto's main force in the rear. Otto ordered Conrad's Franconians to launch a counterattack. The duke freed captives, retook the enemy's booty, and drove off plundering bands of Magyars. With this partial victory for Conrad, the events that modern historians have usually considered the main battle began.

Otto deployed his army in terrain that was easily defensible, especially against mounted archers, with the forest of Rauher behind him and with sheer cliffs near the village of Hammel protecting his left wing. But if he wanted to relieve Augsburg, the king could not stand and wait; he had to make the first move. Otto did not—as some interpreters, notably Karl Leyser, have claimed—order his men to spur their horses headlong in a frontal attack against Hungarians, who were deployed in a crescent formation. According to Bowlus, the Magyar bowmen were deployed on a ridge near Westheim above the Schumtter, a small stream that separated the armies. Their infantry was arranged in the center of the formation, in front of the archers, with the thankless mission of absorbing or slowing any frontal charge by German heavy cavalry. The idea

was that once the Ottonian cavalry made contact with the infantry, the well-ordered formation of the heavily armed German horsemen would lose momentum and cohesion, allowing detachments of mounted Magyar archers to advance from the wings and encircle them.

But Otto was not a general to succumb to such a trap. Instead, he deployed his army in a flanking movement designed to force the Hungarians out of their crescent formation. German footmen began the action by advancing slowly in the center. As the infantry moved forward, Conrad's cavalry, posted on the left wing and protected on its flank by the cliff at Hammel, rushed to its left in front of that obstacle. These contingents tried to stay out of the range of the Magyar archers, while drawing them to their right and straightening out their crescent formation. So long as Otto's select forces were held in reserve, the mounted archers on the Hungarian left wing could not attempt to encircle the infantry, nor could they come to the assistance of their right wing. Meanwhile the horsemen in the royal legion under Otto's personal leadership cantered to the right behind the infantry, safely out of range of the archers. Then, after forcing the enemy formation to expand like an accordion, they turned, urged their horses through the zone of intense fire at a gallop, and attacked the Magyar left wing.

The king's forces suffered losses in completing this complex maneuver, but most of the men in the royal legion were able to clear the zone of heavy fire, rendered less dense because of the dispersion of the archers. Then the Germans directly assaulted the mounted bowmen on the Magyar left. In close combat, composite bows and light armor were no match for the swords and lances of the German heavy cavalry. After the royal legion made its breakthrough and the Hungarian left wing had fallen into confusion, Conrad's forces on the Ottonian left flank attacked the Magyars' right. The entire Hungarian army was in danger of envelopment, and the mounted archers had only two options: break off the action or perish to the last man. Thanks to Gerhard of Augsburg's report, we know that many of the Magyar archers retreated from the battlefield in good order, but they left the infantry to its bitter fate. Ultimately both sides had heavy losses.

Otto I and his men pursued the Hungarian mounted archers for no more than about seven miles (twelve kilometers), halting for fear of a feigned retreat. The Germans captured the enemy's camp, freed the prisoners, and then went to Augsburg before night fell.

Much about the battle remains in debate among historians. Although the Hungarians suffered heavy casualties on 10 August, it was really the additional losses of the followings days, as they tried to cross rivers swollen by late summer storms, that ultimately made Otto's victory near Augsburg on Saint Lawrence's Day so decisive.

[*See also* Augsburg, Siege of; Germany, *subentry on* Narrative (911–1024); Hungarian Raids; *and* Otto I.]

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LEGNANO, BATTLE OF

The battle of Legnano was fought on 29 May 1176 between the Lombard League of northern Italian cities and Frederick I Barbarossa, King of Germany and Holy Roman Emperor. It is widely viewed as one of great battles in medieval Italian history, treated in national terms as a victory of Italian native forces over those of foreign oppression. In military terms it is seen as a victory of infantry over cavalry. Giuseppe Verdi used it as the basis of his four-act opera *La Battaglia di Legnano* (1848–1849).

The campaign that led to Legnano began in September 1174, when Frederick crossed the Alps into Italy. It was his fifth trip, a continuation of his policy of bringing the prosperous cities of northern Italy more firmly under his control. In 1162 Frederick had inflicted a humiliating military defeat on the city of Milan, a center of opposition to him.

Frederick's offensive in 1174 began at Susa, a small town in Piedmont at the foot of the Alps. Frederick attacked and defeated it, and then advanced on Alessandria, a city established only recently by refugees from Milan, who had fled after Frederick's victory in 1162. Frederick did not succeed at Alessandria, which put up a spirited defense, and he retreated to Como to gather reinforcements. His army was joined there by a thousand men from the city of Como, and Frederick sent letters to nobles in southern Germany seeking further assistance. He obtained more troops, mostly cavalrymen, but his powerful cousin, Henry, Duke of Saxony and Bavaria (called "the Lion"), did not answer Frederick's call. This would have fateful consequences.

The number of men-at-arms is uncertain, owing to the terse nature of the chronicle accounts. Frederick amassed perhaps two thousand soldiers or as many as thirty-five hundred. What seems clear is that they were overwhelmingly composed of German cavalrymen. Lombard League forces, positioned at Borsano, near Milan, purportedly included 1,450 knights and 2,050 infantry or perhaps as many as four thousand men overall. Thus the league may have had a small advantage in overall numbers, and most surely an edge with respect to infantry, which included an elite unit known as the Company of Death, consisting, according to the historian Ercole Ricotti, of nine hundred well-armed soldiers, who took an oath to die rather than flee from the enemy.

From Como, Frederick planned to advance to Pavia, an allied city, hoping to gain still more recruits and a possible conjunction with his marshal, Christian of Mainz, moving northward from Apulia, for an eventual attack on Milan. However, an advance guard of seven hundred Lombard League cavalrymen sent to reconnoiter encountered Frederick's men north of Milan, touching off a brief battle, ultimately won by imperial forces. Frederick now decided on a full-scale attack against the whole of the Lombard League army.

The two sides met near the town of Legnano, approximately eighteen miles (twenty-nine kilometers) from Milan. The Lombard League army drew up into four cavalry lines, with the infantry at the rear, protecting the *carroccio*, an ox-drawn carriage with civic banners, symbolic of league unity. Frederick personally led an aggressive cavalry charge that pushed aside enemy resistance and broke through to the *carroccio*. The league infantry defended the *carroccio* with great fury and managed to hold off Frederick's forces long enough to allow the scattered league cavalry to regroup and rejoin the fight. They were accompanied by reinforcements from the city of Brescia. The counterattack was largely a stalemate, but in the fray, Frederick's personal guard was killed and he was knocked from his horse. Unsure of the fate of their king, Frederick's army retreated

to Pavia. Frederick, unhorsed but still alive, managed to escape the battlefield and joined his men at Pavia three days later.

The overall losses and casualties are unknown, but are believed to have been substantial on both sides. After recovering from his wounds, Frederick entered into negotiations for peace. The sides signed the treaty of Venice in 1177, in which Frederick acknowledged the legitimacy of Pope Alexander III and his sovereignty. A more comprehensive peace was made in 1183 (the Peace of Constance), whereby the emperor allowed the Lombard cities to freely elect their own officials.

Despite its reputation, the battle was not a decisive field victory, nor, strictly speaking, an instance of infantry beating cavalry. The success of the league owed to the combination of infantry and cavalry, the latter supporting the famed Company of Death. This allowed the league a stalemate, which in turn allowed a political victory, which ultimately had enduring consequences.

[*See also Carroccio*; Frederick I Barbarossa; Italy, *subentry on* Narrative (1000–1300); *and* Lombard League.]

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LEGNICA, BATTLE OF

The Mongol attack on Poland in 1241 was a supporting operation for the main blow of Batu Khan, the leader of the Golden Horde, on Hungary. The attack was supposed to be conducted by Ordu, Batu's brother, who was to lead one *tumen* consisting of ten thousand warriors. Before the main invasion, Mongol forces reconnoitered the areas of Kraków and Sandomierz in late 1240 and early 1241. Then, in conjunction with the attack on Hungary in March 1241, the Mongols invaded Poland for the last time. By various routes, passing westward through Sandomierz, Łęczyca, and Kraków after a few successful battles, the Mongol army set off to Silesia. The inhabitants of Wrocław abandoned the town in panic. The stronghold was protected by strong and well-supplied troops. But the Mongol army, having heard about the approaching army of Prince Henry II Pobożny ("the Pious") of Silesia and possibly about the approaching Czech army of Wenceslas I, turned away from Wrocław and set off to Legnica (Liegnitz), some fifteen miles (twenty-five kilometers) to the west, where Henry Pobożny was gathering his army.

Jan Długosz is the only chronicler who gives a detailed account of the ensuing battle, and the validity his fifteenth-century description is hotly debated. Many issues remain unexplained. The Mongol action, which made it impossible for the Polish and Czech armies to unite, encircled and trapped Henry Pobożny. Moreover it forced Henry, contrary to his previous agreement with Wenceslas I, to accept battle in the fields near Legnica on 9 April. Polish and foreign (including Mongol) sources reveal that out of the ten thousand Mongol warriors who entered Poland, some eight thousand fought near Legnica. Henry Pobożny's army was a bit smaller.

The exact site of the battle, along with the arrangement of the Mongol and Polish armies, is also debated. Długosz's account suggests that there may have been four troops in the first line of the Polish army and one in reserve, standing in the shape of the semicircle; or that four troops were in a checkerboard array, angled forward or diagonally to the Mongols; or that the Poles were arranged "in a fence" in three lines. Grand Master Poppo von Osterna and the Teutonic Knights are supposed to have participated in the battle, as are some Knights Templar serving under Bolesław Szepiołka, but both these claims have been questioned. The crusaders—volunteers from other countries together with the gold miners from Złotoryja (Goldberg)—were also under Henry's command. Another division consisted

of knights from Kraków and Wielkopolska (Greater Poland) under the command of Sulisław, brother of the governor of Kraków, who had been killed in an earlier clash with the Mongols. The third division consisted of the knights of Mieszko, Prince of Opole. The fourth, under the command of Henry Pobożny, was composed of knights from Wrocław and the best knights from Wielkopolska. There was also a small group of mercenaries.

Opposite them, according to Długosz, stood four Mongol divisions, which were, however, much larger in number. Common elements appear in numerous contemporary sources describing the clash: the battle was hard, at first the Christians were successful and the Mongols planned to escape, unexpectedly the Polish knights started to leave the battlefield, and Bolesław Szepiołka and Henry Pobożny were killed. In Długosz's view the battle was initiated by Bolesław Szepiołka's troop. This would have been typical of the Knights Templar. Encircled by three Golden Horde troops, Szepiołka suffered heavy casualties. Most of his warriors were injured by archers. When Bolesław Szepiołka and the knights from the first rank were killed, the troop started to withdraw. Then two other Polish divisions, Sulisław's and Mieszko's, joined the battle. Covered by crossbowmen, the troops started to break the formations of the Mongols, who began to flee. When the situation of the Mongols became critical and the success of the Poles seemed certain, however, Mieszko's troop started to withdraw. In Długosz's view some enemy saboteur signaled the retreat. The abandonment of the field by Mieszko and the knights from Opole exposed the Polish right flank, and this crisis forced Henry Pobożny to commit the reserve forces. Ordu took advantage of the chaotic situation by attacking with his reserve troops and using poison gases. This caused a panic and collapse in the Polish divisions. Many warriors died during the rout. Even Henry Pobożny's knights did not manage to break the formations of the enemy. According to one source Henry was captured and killed in a Mongol camp.

After the battle the Mongols cut off an ear from each of the slain so as to count the number killed. With Henry's head on a spear, they came to the stronghold of Legnica, demanding its capitulation. When the inhabitants refused, the Mongols plundered and burned the nearby villages. After the battle a part of the Mongol army probably withdrew with the injured, prisoners of war, and spoils so as not to burden the march toward Hungary. The prisoners and spoils were sent to Ruthenia via the lands of Sieradz and Sandomierz. After achieving the Mongols' primary objective—the protection of the actions in Hungary from Polish intervention—Ordu decided to withdraw. His main forces moved southeast along the Oder toward Racibórz, and then to the Moravian Gap. Having plundered Moravia, the force moved to Hungary via the Jablonica Pass (Tatar Pass); there it was joined by the main forces of Batu Khan, which managed to destroy the army of Béla IV in the battle of Muhi (11 April 1241).

[*See also* Béla IV; Golden Horde; Mongols; Muhi, Battle of; *and* Slavic Lands, *subentry on* Narrative (1000–1300).]

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LEO III

(c. 680–741), Byzantine emperor (717–741). Notorious as the originator of the first period of Iconoclasm, Leo III came to power by forcing the abdication of Theodosius III. He entered Constantinople as the *strategos* (general and military governor) of Anatolikon, the empire's most important province, and attained the throne by resisting the great siege set by the Umayyad commander Maslama, brother of three caliphs. He retained the support of the Bulgarian Khan Tervel, and later campaigned with the Khazars and Georgians as allies against the Arabs, ending their expansion into Asia Minor by his victory at Akroinon in 740.

Born in Germanikeia, in northern Syria, Leo is suspected of sympathizing with Muslim perspectives on idolatry, and regarding the Byzantine attachment to icons as a cause for divine punishment. Hence, he decided to remove an image of Christ from the palace gate in 726, and in 730 to ban icon veneration, both measures intended to forestall further Arab advances. Alternatively, it has been suggested that Leo's aim was to raise the status of the True Cross, under which Constantine I and Herakleios were believed to have fought.

Leo devoted much energy to the realm's defenses, levying taxes to repair Constantinople's land walls, and reconstituted the military provinces (*themata*) to defend better against assaults by land and, especially, by sea. Thrakesion, comprising the coastal lands of western Anatolia, was awarded a strategos before 741, and the new *thema* of Kibyrrhaiotai was created to supply a fleet to guard the southern coast. He may also have elevated Crete to the status of thema.

[*See also* Arabs *and Themata* (Themes).]

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LEO VI

(866–912), Byzantine emperor. Leo VI never led a military campaign and apparently had no personal military training. His reign saw a number of significant losses to the enemies of Byzantium. His generals, however, did have military successes, notably Nikephoros Phokas, grandfather of the later emperor of the same name. As a result scholars have differed in their estimations of Leo's foreign policy. Kazhdan and Cutler describe Leo's foreign policy as "more or less unsuccessful" (p. 1211) and list a series of military defeats at the hands of the Bulgarians and Arabs, notable among them the Arab sacking of Thessalonike in 904. Other scholars, particularly Karlin-Hayter and Tougher, present a more positive view. Leo's concern with military preparedness, however, would seem beyond doubt, given his authorship of a lengthy military manual, the *Taktika* (Tactical constitutions).

The *Taktika* provides substantial evidence of Leo's interest in the military and the need to respond to the specific threats Byzantium faced. While much of the material in the work is derived from earlier authors, particularly the *Strategikon* attributed to the emperor Maurice (c. 600), Leo clearly addresses contemporary concerns and has a practical purpose in compiling the work. In Chapter 18, "Battle Formations of Foreigners and the Romans" (patterned on a similar ethnographic section by Maurice), Leo states specifically that he has written the *Taktika* on account of the Saracens (Arabs), an

enemy not mentioned by Maurice but presenting a major contemporary threat, particularly at sea. He also urges his readers (generals) to improvise new techniques and devices and praises his general Nikephoros Phokas for so doing.

Leo, who also played a major role in the revision and elaboration of law codes, conceived his manual as a legally binding document to be scrupulously followed by his generals. He indicates in his introduction that the work is a *procheiros nomos* or "legal manual" and the twenty chapters are each called a *diataxis* (constitution). He indicates that he has examined the writings of previous authors on generalship and specifically observes regarding the Arabs that he has derived information from his father (the emperor Basil I), from his generals, and from books. The reference to conversations with his generals recurs, and it is possible that Nikephoros Phokas was his principal source of information. In Chapter 19, on naval warfare, he specifically indicates that he relied on information provided by his admirals, given a lack of written material. He regularly addresses an anonymous "general" in the course of the work. The chapters cover the following topics: (1) tactics and the general, (2) character of the general, (3) decision making, (4) structure of the army and officers, (5) weaponry, (6) armor, (7) drills, (8) military law, (9) on the march, (10) baggage, (11) military camps, (12) preparation, (13) the day before battle, (14) the day of battle, (15) siege craft, (16) post-battle operations, (17) sudden incursions, (18) battle formations of foreigners and the Romans, (19) naval warfare, and (20) military aphorisms.

While Leo paraphrases much of the material he derived from his bibliographic research, the most original parts of the *Taktika* deal with the contemporary Arab threat and the navy, the latter a reflection of concern with the former. In describing the enemies Leo includes discussion of their character, battle tactics, weapons, and methods of countering them. Specifically concerning the Arabs he indicates that they disliked rain and cold and that such conditions were favorable for a Byzantine offensive. He notes that in battle the Arabs maintained their formations with great discipline and hence ambush tactics were preferable to direct assaults. He says that they were armed offensively and defensively much like the Byzantines and focuses on their bows and particularly bowstrings, which are said to be sensitive to humid conditions. The Arab dependence on fast horses is said to be best countered with the use of poison arrows used specifically against the horses. The Arab use of camels, drums, and cymbals is said to call for specific training of the Byzantine horse to accustom them to these situations. Leo also adds with admiration that Muslim troops served readily and were supported and supplied by a willing civilian populace. He advocates that the Byzantines should have a similar readiness to fight for their faith against unbelievers.

With his authorship of the *Taktika* Leo initiated a renewed interest in military science, which can be seen in the numerous military manuals written in the tenth century.

[*See also* Arabs; Manuals, Military; Nikephoros Phokas; *and* Thessalonike, Siege of (904).]

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LE PUISET, SIEGES OF

The sieges of Le Puiset (1111 and 1112) give the military historian much to consider: an eyewitness account, details of tactics on both sides, the tangled dynamics between lords and vassals, and the strategic picture of alliances and rivalries across northern France.

In the abbot Suger's account, Theobald of Blois led a chorus of complaints against Hugh de Puiset's depredations. Sensing an opportunity, Louis VI the Fat ordered Suger himself to fortify the monastic estate of Toury as a forward base, while the king summoned Hugh to court. When Hugh refused to appear, Louis declared his fortress at Le Puiset forfeit. The castle was impressive, with an outer bailey covering nearly nineteen acres. Of wooden construction like most fortresses of the day, it had two enceintes and two mottes. One motte anchored the outer palisade's further reaches, while the interior motte and its donjon was the last refuge within the inner wall.

The siege was prosecuted vigorously. Even with some hyperbole, Suger indicates the violence via the speed with which combatants found their equipment unusable. Driven back inside the outer wall, defenders began breaking up homes so as to hurl roof beams on the attackers, while archers helped repel the king's troops by their sheer rate of fire. The fight around the gate then centered on efforts to fire the gate, using incendiary-laden wagons. On the opposite side of the castle, Theobald's forces attempted to surprise the garrison by climbing up a difficult stretch below the walls. They were seen, however, and a cavalry unit clearly designated to respond to such events rushed to the spot and threw back Theobald's men. A stalemate might have ensued, but a cleric present with the local levies rushed forward and managed to begin demolishing the palisade. Others then rushed up to help him, even as Louis's men forced the gate. The outer bailey was lost, and a much-reduced garrison withdrew into the donjon, not even attempting to hold the inner enceinte.

Hugh surrendered soon enough and was imprisoned, his castle demolished. Within the year, however, it became expedient to release Hugh on condition he never refortify Le Puiset. Now in alliance with Theobald, Hugh quickly broke his oath.

The second siege ranged across the countryside, with the rebels first attempting to take Louis's base at Toury. Abbot Suger sneaked into the three-story tower to lead the defense. When this attack failed, Hugh and Theobald fell back to Le Puiset, which they began rebuilding. Louis appeared with royal troops and local forces before the outer defenses could be set, but the defenders still benefitted from the old moat, which disrupted the success of Louis's initial onslaught. The king himself fought on foot and on a borrowed mount as he staved off a complete breakdown of his forces. A blockade-siege now ensued as Louis had first a counter-castle built on a motte within "a stone's throw" of Le Puiset, and then a second site by fortifying the ecclesiastical buildings at Janville. Seeing the end coming, Theobald used the excuse of being wounded to beg Louis's mercy and let him withdraw. The king agreed, and while Theobald was to trouble him later, his departure left Hugh in an untenable position. Once Hugh surrendered, Louis again destroyed the fortifications and filled in the wells.

[*See also* Louis VI of France *and* Suger of Saint-Denis.]

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LEVOUNION, BATTLE OF

Byzantine emperor Alexios I Komnenos (1081–1118) defeated the Pechenegs at the battle of Levounion in 1091 with the crucial help of the Cumans, thus ending Pecheneg advances into the empire.

In the 1070s Pechenegs had taken control of the region between the lower Danube and the Haemus mountains. Their defeat of Alexios at Dristra in 1087 allowed them to raid far into Thrace. Alexios sent Nikephoros Melissenos to Ainos on the Aegean coast of Thrace with orders to recruit Bulgarians and Vlachs for the campaign. Alexios brought about five hundred Frankish mercenaries who had been sent by

Count Robert of Flanders and a newly formed unit, the *archontopouloi,* recruited from officers' sons. A group of Cumans also had moved into Thrace, and Alexios managed to convince several of their commanders to ally with him against the Pechenegs. A reported forty thousand Cumans fought with Alexios. The numbers of Pechenegs arriving were thought to have outnumbered Alexios's army by an order of magnitude.

The battle took place near Ainos at Levounion. The Byzantine line formed a crescent with Alexios in the center, George Palaeologos on the right, Constantine Dalassenos on the left. The Frankish cavalry under Humbertopoulos was on the extreme right facing west. The Cumans were on the extreme left. The two cavalry units advanced more quickly than the infantry and surrounded the Pechenegs. Unable to break out of the encirclement, the Pechenegs suffered substantial casualties.

Anna Komnene (daughter of Alexios) describes a complete slaughter of women and children as well as fighting men in the battle. Survivors were enrolled in the Byzantine army and appear as Alexios's mercenaries in accounts of the First Crusade. The victory marked a turning point in Alexios's reign from an insecure first decade to a far more stable period of restoration.

[*See also* Alexios I Komnenos.]

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LEWES, BATTLE OF

On 22 June 1258 rebellious barons led by Simon (V) de Montfort, Earl of Leicester, forced King Henry III of England to sign the Provisions of Oxford, limiting the king's power. In 1261 a papal bull annulled the Provisions. Early in 1264, King Louis IX of France issued the Mise of Amiens, which supported Henry in his refusal to honor the Provisions. Armed conflict immediately broke out.

Simon's power was concentrated in the Midlands. Henry, with his brother Richard, Earl of Cornwall, and his son and heir Prince Edward, raised an army at Oxford at the beginning of April 1264. Each army first attempted to win by besieging the other's castles, but rather than attack the rebel-held capital, Henry marched south to secure the Cinque Ports. Simon rallied his forces to confront the king's army, and Henry moved to the stronghold of John de Warenne, Earl of Surrey, at Lewes in Sussex to await battle. Simon offered Henry terms but was refused.

The barons' army camped at Boxholt, northwest of Lewes, the night before the battle and attacked either east or south toward the town as the sun rose on 14 May 1264, having drawn under cover of darkness into battle formation atop a ridge overlooking the royal camp. Simon's men, their uniforms marked in crusader fashion with large white crosses, consisted of perhaps five hundred cavalry and five thousand infantry, and they faced a force two to three times larger. Simon divided his men into four battle arrays. Simon's sons led the first with John de Burgh and Humphrey de Bohun. Gilbert de Clare, Earl of Gloucester, was the leading figure in the second, and Nicholas of Seagrave and Henry of Hastings commanded the third, the Londoners. Simon and the constable of London held the reserve. The royalist army was made up of only three battle groups. The twenty-four-year-old Prince Edward led the right with John de Warenne and William de Valence. Richard of Cornwall commanded the left. Henry held the reserve.

There were seven key actions in the battle. The barons charged downhill against a hastily arrayed royal army. Edward quickly put the Londoners to flight and led the king's elite cavalry off the battlefield to pursue them for almost four miles. Clare attacked Richard in the center, forcing Richard to take refuge in a windmill for the remainder of the battle. Simon's sons attacked the king's division, and Simon committed his reserve in support. Henry distinguished himself, having two horses killed under him, but had to retreat to the priory where he had spent the

previous night. Edward returned from his pursuit and attacked Simon's trains, including his personal coach, mistakenly killing the royalist prisoners who had been secured inside it. Edward rallied the army and led a failed counterattack against the barons, but unable to manage a victory, he joined his father in the besieged priory. Simon secured Henry's surrender by threatening to execute the captured Richard. The fight ended after more than twelve hours, resulting in several thousand dead or captured.

The following day Henry and Simon signed the Mise of Lewes. Henry and Edward remained captive, and Simon forced the king to resubmit to the Provisions of Oxford. The scholar David Carpenter attributes the length and ultimate outcome of the Barons' War to Simon's inability to achieve a more complete victory at Lewes.

[*See also* Britain, *subentry on* Narrative (1000–1300); Edward I of England; Evesham, Battle of; *and* Montfort, Simon (V) de.]

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LICENSES TO CRENELLATE

A license to crenellate in medieval England was a royal warrant to fortify the applicant's residence, granted in response to his petition. Although first enrolled in the reign of King John (1199–1216), such licenses probably originated in an undocumented attempt by John's father, Henry II (1154–1189), to limit castle building in the aftermath of the mid-century civil wars. They were still occasionally being issued in the sixteenth century but died out around 1600.

Some historians have claimed that licenses to crenellate were sought mainly by "aspiring gentry" for status reasons; that they were relatively easy and cheap to obtain; and that they had little to do with defense. However, the exact concurrence of well-defined surges in applications with periods of instability and disorder suggests the opposite. Thus the first increase coincides with the Baronial Revolt (1263–1265); the second with the crop failures and cattle murrains of 1315–1322; the third with the overcrowding and gang violence of the 1330s and 1340s; the fourth with the Peasants' Revolt of 1381, and so on.

A very similar conclusion follows from mapping the licenses. If the interest of most petitioners had been in status alone, licenses to crenellate should have occurred more or less evenly across the country. Instead, they cluster in the more troubled regions: in the West Midlands and the Welsh Marches; in the north towards the Scottish Borders; and along the south coast as far west as Dorset. Because of repeated raids during the Hundred Years' War (1337–1453), it was primarily the coastal towns—and only exceptionally those inland—that applied for licenses to crenellate.

The final historical argument concerns the social status of the majority of applicants. Were they chiefly "socially emergent individuals," or did they include substantial numbers of the good and the great with no reason to seek further promotion? Again the evidence seems to favor the latter. A few otherwise unknown petitioners occur in the century before the Black Death (1348–1349). But the more usual applicant from the mid-fourteenth century—as before—was a high-ranking nobleman or prominent ecclesiastic, seeking protection from foreign raiders or disaffected tenants.

It matters little whether the danger was real or perceived. Either way, the license to crenellate never

lost its primary purpose as a formal recognition of the right of the individual to defend himself. It disappears only in the Tudor period, when the king's peace was effectively enforced.

[*See also* Castles, *subentry on* 1350–1500.]

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LIÈGE, SIEGE OF

Following their success at the battle of Brustem (1467), the Burgundian army marched to Liège. Charles "the Bold," Duke of Burgundy, was confident that the rebellion was at an end—that the Liégeois would surrender at the sight of his soldiers marching toward their city. This they did, shortly after the Burgundians arrived on 11–12 November 1467, no doubt fearing that resistance might produce similar punishments to those suffered by the Dinantais the previous year. In this they were correct, because Charles treated the Liégeois quite mercifully; he confiscated their remaining gunpowder weapons and ordered the destruction of much of the walls but took no lives.

Still, the rebellion was not over; negotiations dragged throughout the rest of 1467 and into 1468. The Liégeois would not give up their desire for sovereignty or recognize Louis de Bourbon as their prince-bishop. They also refortified their walls with a dirt rampart and sought to acquire new guns. In October 1468, Charles decided to answer the continued Liégeois resistance with military action.

By 26 October, his army had reached Liège. Along the journey there had been several occasions when the two forces exchanged blows. Surprisingly, in most of these, the rebels had gotten the better of the Burgundians. Still, the numbers of besiegers outside Liège were large, and the best hope the inhabitants had was to hold on until their opponents became fatigued or demoralized. They knew that surrender would bring severe retribution. In fact, they could not hold out for long.

The siege was over very quickly. Several times groups of armed rebels slipped out of the city to attack contingents of Burgundians—one attack even attempted to kill Charles and King Louis XI, who was at the siege to give the Burgundians his support—but they accomplished little. For four days and nights, Charles sat back and allowed his large gunpowder artillery train to bombard the Liégeois fortifications and habitations. That changed on the morning of 30 October, when he ordered his troops to assault the city walls. The attack took ten hours, the Liégeois initially faring well against the besiegers, using whatever weapons they could. One eyewitness claimed that the projectile fire from both sides was so thick that it darkened the sky while the noise from the gunpowder weapons made it impossible to hear.

Eventually the Burgundian soldiers broke through the walls, and fighting continued throughout the streets of the city. There was little concern for the citizens of Liège; even women and children were not spared. Gunpowder weapons were fired indiscriminately down the streets into houses and people. Contemporary sources claim that thirty to forty thousand Liégeois were killed. Once the fighting stopped, the pillaging began. Not even the churches were spared. Fire soon engulfed the city, with the center almost completely destroyed. This rebellion of the Liégeois had ended.

[*See also* Charles the Bold *and* Low Countries, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1479).]

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LIMOGES, SIEGE OF

The siege of Limoges, notable for its savagery, occurred against the backdrop of the Hundred Years' War, when the principality of Aquitaine rose in revolt against its lord, Edward, Prince of Wales (the Black Prince). The cause of rebellion was the imposition of heavy taxes to fund his wars in Spain. The French offered considerable support in the shape of troops and finances, and rebellion became all-out war, with Limoges, in common with many other towns, going over to France's side. Edward felt the betrayal particularly keenly, as Limoges had been held for him by Bishop Jean de Cros, a previously faithful close adviser and godfather to one of his children. The chronicler Jean Froissart claims that the Black Prince vowed "that he would attend no other business until he had won the city back and made the traitors pay dearly for their disloyalty." The rich capital of the Limousin, Limoges was of central strategic importance and an early objective of the English counterattack.

The siege began on 19 September and lasted only six days, a speed made all the more remarkable by the fact that its success was due to a rapidly excavated mine. Haste was essential as the French had armies in the region. The prince directed operations, even though he was ill and had to be carried about on a litter. His forces set up in the suburbs, which had been left unoccupied by the French. He had with him about thirty-two hundred men: twelve hundred men-at-arms, one thousand archers, and one thousand infantry. The numbers for the garrison under Jean de Vinemeur are less certain, augmented as they were by citizens; one estimate puts the total number of besieged at over three thousand, with five hundred of these actively bearing arms. Jean de Vinemeur is said to have reassured the citizens that his forces and artillery were more than a match for the English, who, he said, could not harm them by assaults. Edward's plan was, however, to go underground. The prince's miners, his "rough laborers" as Froissart calls them, quickly set to work, driving their mine under the city walls. French sources attest to a counter mine constructed on the orders of Jean de Vinemeur, resulting in a subterranean combat. On the morning of the sixth day the English mine was fired, much to the surprise of the defenders, and a great section of the wall tumbled into the moat, allowing the English to storm through the breach. Perhaps eighty of the garrison made a fighting retreat to a strongpoint near the cathedral, where Jean de Vinemeur and his lieutenants surrendered. Although Jean de Cros and the commanders were spared, the city itself was sacked ruthlessly, an act that has earned the siege notoriety. Froissart, writing in his pro-French phase, claims that "many more than three thousand persons, men, women, and children, were dragged out to have their throats cut." A modern estimate puts the figure at about three hundred. Whatever the real figure, the retribution was savage, and the city was completely razed.

[*See also* Edward the Black Prince.]

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Sean McGlynn

LINCOLN, BATTLE OF

The conflict between Stephen of Blois and the Empress Matilda over the English throne took a dramatic turn at the battle at Lincoln. King Stephen came to Lincoln in January 1141 to displace Ranulf, Earl of Chester, after his recent acquisition of the town. Secret invitations from the town's burghers to intervene doubtless helped shape his decision.

Unprepared for Stephen's offensive, Ranulf escaped by night over Lincoln's walls, leaving his family and garrison to Stephen's well-known mercy. The earl immediately sought help from Matilda's partisans, whom his father-in-law Robert of Gloucester headed militarily. Together, Ranulf and Robert gathered a sizable force of infantry, Welsh skirmishers, and "disinherited" knights. On 2 February, the combined forces of the two earls reached Lincoln.

Stephen was still besieging Ranulf's garrison in the castle, but the king abandoned that project when he saw the opportunity to remove most of Matilda's chief military might and talent. With a combination of the *familia regis*, contingents led by his chief earls, and mercenaries from the continent, Stephen was confident in his forces. He moved out of the city. Having multiple sources for this battle permits us to reconstruct the order of battle fairly well; mounted troops held the wings of both armies, while the center formations were each a mixture of infantry and dismounted knights. On the rebels' right, the Welsh ranged in front.

However, determining the actual course of the battle is nearly impossible because it unfolded quickly, and the sources all present agenda-driven narratives. Both wings appear to have closed first. Stephen's earls apparently hoped to score tournament-style victories and ransoms, but the "Disinherited" disabused them of that idea by fighting lethally at swordpoint. Soon, the king's nobles fled. On the other wing, William of Ypres and William of Aumale quickly dispersed the Welsh and then engaged Robert's forces. Ranulf turned his body of foot soldiers in support, and this proved too much for the two Williams, who also left the battle. Thus, the king remained with his outnumbered infantry. His personal valor was well attested; he used a Danish battle-ax, then a sword, until each broke. Likely concussed by a hurled stone, he was then captured. The victors then turned on Lincoln, pursuing the civic levies back into Lincoln and sacking the town.

For Stephen, his cause would have been lost but for the political and military initiative of his own queen, bolstered by the mercenaries who stayed loyal to her for his sake. Months later, after the Rout of Winchester, the queen was able to trade hostages for his release.

[*See also* Stephen of England.]

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LISBON, SIEGE OF (1147)

With the proclamation in 1096 of Urban II (r. 1088–1099) that Spaniards should not participate in the crusade to the Holy Land, but rather fight Islamic forces within the Peninsula, crusading and reconquest activities were recognized as being roughly equivalent for the residents of Christian Spain. Expeditions against the *taifas* that replaced the Caliphate of Córdoba, and against the Almoravid and Almohad zealots who held Spain in their grip through the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, thus all acquired the status of crusades, complete with crusading bulls and indulgences. Foreign knights, principally from Languedoc, Navarre, and northern France, ventured across the Pyrenees to take part in some of these ventures. Some few even remained in the Christian states of Iberia and emerged as important military and political leaders.

Portugal, in fact, had come into being through foreign influence. The French adventurer, Henry of Burgundy (Count of Portugal, 1093–1112), and

his son, Afonso I Henriques (Duke, then King, of Portugal, 1128–1185), had supervised the transformation of Portugal from a Leonese county to an independent state. Both men very quickly realized that war on the *taifas* of western Andalusia (*al-Gharb al-Andalus*) guaranteed both their political careers and the territorial existence of the land they ruled. Before the end of the eleventh century, their reconquest drive was marked by the capture of lands south of Santarém as well as of the great port city at the mouth of the Tagus estuary, Lisbon. Almoravid relief forces, however, quickly won back these cities and their hinterland. The Portuguese thirst for these strategic territories continued and, during the early 1140s, Afonso began to fashion a strategy designed to recover all these lost lands, especially the Muslim outpost of Lisbon.

To carry out his plan, Afonso utilized his country's geographical position as a stopping place for crusaders en route to the Holy Land to meet the looming threat of the Seljuk leader, Zenghi (1084–1146) against the Latin kingdoms. When such a crusading fleet anchored at Oporto in 1141, he convinced it to aid his drive against another infidel target—the rich port of Lisbon. Even though the crusaders kept their end of the bargain by blockading the maritime approached to the city, they eventually fell out with Afonso, who proved unable to seal off the city's hinterland. Even with this failure and the mistrust many of the crusaders reportedly felt toward the Portuguese king, an important precedent had been set.

With the fall of Edessa in 1145, Pope Eugenius III (r. 1145–1153) wrote the major sovereigns of western Europe calling for another crusade to relieve the endangered Latin kingdoms and keep open the pilgrimage route to Jerusalem. Getting wind of this papal project, Afonso sent his brother Pedro to Rome in order to divert some of the resources and manpower associated with the Second Crusade to yet another expedition against Lisbon. When a crusading fleet, consisting of over sixty vessels, anchored at Oporto in June 1147—and its English, Flemish, German, and Scottish troops fulfilled their pilgrim vows by traveling to Santiago de Compostela—the crusaders took up their agreed-on positions in the Tagus estuary. Afonso had already blocked all landward approaches to the city.

On 28 June, the investment of Lisbon began with a harangue of the Muslim defenders by the archbishop of Braga. When the garrison refused to do the right thing and return the city to its rightful owners that had been stolen some "358 years before," Afonso started full-fledged siege operations on 1 July. Almost immediately, the Christians captured a Muslim cemetery overlooking the walls of the city. Using this strategic spot as their headquarters, the crusaders withstood constant attacks from the wall in addition to Muslim sallies. As the weeks of siege passed, however, the Christians increasingly went on the offensive with heavy artillery, a siege tower, and wall mining. They damaged the garrison more deeply, however, by successfully cutting off resupply from land or sea. The attackers learned of the increasingly desperate situation inside Lisbon when they discovered Muslim dispatches and other letters in a small boat they had captured. By October, the Christian *mangonels* (counterweight artillery) had begun to take their toll on Lisbon's walls and a huge mining operation began near one of the city's principal gates (Porta do Ferro). On 16 October, after some two weeks of heavy labor, the Christian miners opened a breach in the city wall. Although the city seemed ready for the taking, a swift Christian victory was prevented by the fierce Muslim defense and national differences among the polyglot crusading forces. Three days later, however, the crusaders unleashed another assault on one of the city's principal towers by pushing a wheeled siege tower toward one of Lisbon's strongest barbicans. Despite being partially inundated by the tidal Tagus River on several occasions and enduring constant Muslim attack, the crusaders eventually captured a section of the city wall from their siege tower on 21 October. Realizing that their position was hopeless, the Muslim garrison surrendered three days later—24 October 1147.

According to the surrender treaty, Lisbon's entire population would be allowed to leave after surrendering their money and possessions to a small force

of crusaders and Portuguese whose duty it was to secure the city's citadel and circuit of walls. Such "a great multitude of people" left from the city's three gates, it seemed as if "all of Spain flowed" out of them. Afonso, however, proved unwilling or unable to carry out these terms and certain contingents of the crusading army began to sack the city. Moved more by the city's wealth than any agreement with its leaders, the German and Flemish units of the crusade army, "pillaged, . . . broke open doors, . . . drove out citizens and treated them with insults, . . . treated maidens shamefully, . . . secretly snatched away . . . the common property of all the forces, . . . [and] even slew the aged bishop of the city against all right and decency" (*De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, 177). Despite this doleful end to the Lisbon siege, Afonso's expedition would be the only victory associated with the Second Crusade, which otherwise proved a disastrous failure. The capture of Lisbon also led Portugal's reconquest into its final phase which would be completed in a little over a century with the capture of the Algarve.

[*See also* Geraldo the Fearless *and* Iberia, *subentry on* Narrative (1100–1300).]

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Donald J. Kagay

LISBON, SIEGE OF, AND THE BATTLE OF THE TAGUS (1384)

When Fernando I of Portugal died in October 1383, his son-in-law, Juan I of Castile, laid claim to the Portuguese throne. In December 1383 the Spanish army entered Portugal and advanced as far as Santarém, about fifty miles (eighty kilometers) northeast of Lisbon, where it made ready to besiege Lisbon, counting on the support of many nearby fortresses.

The defense of Lisbon, then a city of around thirty-five thousand inhabitants, was under the command of the Master of Aviz, João. The city was well fortified, with an ancient castle and a new surrounding wall some three miles (five kilometers) long, with seventy-six towers. There was a partial moat and a recent barbican, and the walls were equipped with bombards and hoardings filled with weapons. On the riverside, barricades were erected to prevent access to the river Tagus. The city was supplied with bread and meat—as well as with fish seized from six Castilian galleys—and all crops were destroyed in the surrounding area. With loans from the church and private individuals, an army of sixteen hundred men was raised and orders were given to assemble a fleet in Oporto to pierce the expected Castilian sea blockade.

After some skirmishes in the outskirts of Lisbon, the Castilians advanced upon the city on 26 May 1384. Their fleet arrived three days later. They set up their headquarters near the Santos monastery. The Castilians numbered fifteen to twenty thousand men, and the camp—supplied from both the fleet and the fortresses around Lisbon—was very impressive. The chronicler Fernão Lopes describes roads, craftsmen's workshops, tents filled with fabrics, weapons, and luxury products, prostitutes and money changers in the streets, medical facilities, and a well for drinking water. A stockade was constructed in the east.

The Castilian army had brought no siege engines (except ladders and small mantelets), and after a first frustrated assault they decided to mount a blockade in the hope that Lisbon would surrender through starvation or betrayal. Their attacks were conventional and spaced out. But the defense was well organized: the thirty-five gates were heavily guarded, and the wall was divided into sections, each with an alarm bell.

In the north the allies of the Master of Aviz assembled an armada with seventeen galleys—five or six



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large vessels (*naus*) and twelve smaller ones filled with armed men—which cast anchor at Cascais on 17 July. The Castilian fleet, consisting of some thirteen galleys and forty *naus* (or according to the chronicler Pedro López de Ayala, twelve *naus*), prepared for battle, concentrating on the northern bank of the Tagus between Belém and Santos. The Portuguese commander, preferring to avoid head-on combat, instead tried to pierce the blockade in order to supply the city. On the morning of 18 July, taking advantage of the high tide and westerly wind, his fleet reached Belém, forming three parallel columns. The Castilians tried to intercept them, but the wind was against them. Six Castilian *naus* captured three Portuguese ones from the first column, but the rest, escaping southward, managed to reach Lisbon.

The city began to starve, and the Master of Aviz was obliged to expel old people, women, and children. Then plague broke out at the end of March and, made worse by a hot and moist summer, devastated the Castilian camp, leaving as many as five thousand dead. In August, Juan I tried, unsuccessfully, to negotiate the city's surrender, but with so

many losses—including, according to López de Ayala, two thousand good fighting men—and the queen ill, the besieging army began to break up on 4 September. On 28 October the Castilian fleet also withdrew.

[*See also* Aljubarrota, Battle of *and* Iberia, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1500).]

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João Gouveia Monteiro

LIVERY AND UNIFORMS

After the end of the twelfth century and starting, it is commonly held, with the army of the Second Crusade, national badges in the form of colored crosses became the most basic piece of uniform, serving as a means of identifying individuals to their friends and of enforcing discipline by making soldiers recognizable.

From their inception, members of the order of the Knights Templar and of the Hospitallers wore their monastic mantle into battle over their armor. This served to reinforce their religious status by emphasizing links with monasticism.

Among secular knights there was more individuality, but in the twelfth-century protoheraldic period, it was common for knights belonging to the household of a great lord to carry his arms (heraldic device), though this practice was superseded as knights adopted their own arms. Thus the biographer of William Marshal recorded that Marshal carried the arms of his cousin William de Tancarville during the early years of his knightly career. Foot soldiers retained in a lord's household might receive a livery in the same way that its domestic members did. This was particularly true of royal troops. There are references in the wardrobe accounts of Edward I to the king's crossbowmen receiving cloth for livery. Soldiers' wearing a lord's devise accentuated his power and status.

Troops raised by towns, owing to their wealth and internal organization, were more likely to wear uniforms. Livery and badges were a part of their civic dress. It was inevitable that these symbols of communal membership should be worn also on the field. Wearing livery served to reinforce communal bonds and announced participation in the defense of the city and thus participation in the life of the community to which soldiers belonged.

[*See also* Banners; Heralds and Heraldry; Signals; *and* War Cries.]

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LOGISTICS AND TRANSPORTATION

The term "logistics" actually has many definitions, but a good working one would be: "the process of procuring, maintaining, and moving equipment, supplies, and personnel." This deceptively clean phrase does little justice to the difficult art of procuring, moving, and maintaining equipment, supplies, and personnel during wartime. The purpose of logistics in the medieval world was to ensure that a field army survived a campaign of normally sixty days or less, or that a garrison held out for multiple months if necessary, but not that soldiers of either force



Logistics. William I (1028–1087) lands in England with his army and equipment. Illustration from MS Roy 19 E VI, fol. 403, c. 1407. BRITISH LIBRARY, LONDON, UK/© BRITISH LIBRARY BOARD. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

would actually be comfortable during the campaign. There are few recorded incidents of field armies reporting prosperity as they marched, though garrisons might be well off for some time during a siege. In static warfare over fortifications or walled cities, the advantage clearly lay with the defense. Defending forces could, with sufficient warning of an enemy's approach, gather enough foodstuffs to allow them to hold out for months. Gathering up the resources of the surrounding area had the added advantage of denying them to approaching field armies. Unless a shortage of water occurred, the food supply failed, or the fortification fell by direct assault, the defenders had an excellent chance of waiting out any army trying to blockade or besiege them.

When the objective was not battle or besieging a fortification or town, much medieval warfare took the form of the *chevauchée*. This kind of mounted raid was made famous in the Hundred Years' War. In fact the raid, or *expeditio*, was a technique developed long before and was quite common before the fourteenth century. Logistically the chevauchée was predicated on mounted soldiers moving into the heart of enemy country; this forced the raiders to live off the land while purposely denying the enemy any resources that the raiders themselves did not consume.

Medieval field armies then, lived off the land. When armies could not sustain themselves off the goods and produce of their enemies, they had to trace a line of supply back along rivers and roads that was only as solid as the control they exercised over those routes. Supply via rivers and coasts was optimal, of course; ships do not need sustenance (though their crews do), and moving them or barges requires far less energy expenditure than moving supplies by animal or human power. Sailing ships can also be operated twenty-four hours per day by small crews, depending on wind and current. For example, Richard I was able to keep his army together during the march to Jaffa in 1192, during the Third Crusade, in spite of constant harassment by superior Muslim forces, because he was being supplied by sea. Every mile hauled on land invoked the law of diminishing returns—in a surprisingly short period of time pack or cart animals would consume their weight in grain, even if supplies and fodder were gathered along the way, so no supply line could be very long. For protracted campaigns most armies had to keep moving and foraging even if river or ocean transport was available. A besieging army would immediately send out foraging parties to collect any available food for men or animals. Within days larger and larger foraging parties were required, and these had to move in a constantly longer radius away from the siege as local resources were depleted. Inevitably local supplies failed. The lack of local resources and of a supply line meant that a field army's days were numbered in any given campaign season, and the army melted away soon after its soldiers consumed all available resources.

Every pound of fodder transported by draft or pack animals meant less would be available for the army.

Animals solely dependent on the feed they carry on their backs will consume it within ten days. A pack train whose animals graze for fodder but transport their own grain will consume everything they carry without replenishment within twenty-five days, assuming they carry nothing but grain. A pack train carrying human food, grain, fodder, and equipment, therefore, had to reach its objective quickly in order to be effective, unless supplies could be procured along the line of march.

In a sense all premodern armies were caught in a Malthusian trap: the desired objective must be considered against the ever-increasing needs of the porters, whether animal or human, plus distance plus weather plus time. That gave the advantage to whomever had to move the least and had the most time to gather supplies. It also meant a constraint on the size of armies, or at least on the density of armies, because the more men crammed into a given area, the faster they consumed the supplies. In harsh conditions a human can consume two or more gallons of water per day, while an ox or a horse might consume eight gallons or more. Water is so bulky that it made little sense to carry it beyond what men carried on their persons. Therefore, any protracted warfare would have to be waged in an area where armies could draw water from streams, lakes, or rivers. An army cut off from water quickly became ineffective. The army of the Latin kingdom was destroyed at the Horns of Hattin in 1187 partially because it attempted to reach Lake Tiberias after being cut off from water. While humans laboring or marching can operate on less than the optimum caloric intake of three thousand to thirty-six hundred calories a day for some time, animals cannot, and in any case neither human nor animal can last more than a few days without adequate hydration. An army of fifty thousand and its animals' nutritional requirements would require no fewer than a thousand vehicles to carry sufficient grain for five days if each wagon could carry eleven hundred to fourteen hundred pounds, the typical load range of medieval wagons. Those thousand vehicles would spread out over six miles in single file along the line of march. In any event, an army had to move or it would have quickly outstripped the capacity of any area to feed it.

Medieval armies were also severely constrained by the season. There was no point starting a campaign early because before the first harvest and spring birthing of animals little would be available. Wintering an army intact was almost impossible. Roman armies during the ancient period seldom campaigned during the months of December, January, and February owing to lack of resources. Even the most professional of armies, such as Julius Caesar's during the Gallic Wars, ceased campaigning and went into winter quarters. Caesar was forced, however, to disperse his cohorts over a wide area during the winter months so as not to run the danger of starvation by depleting local supplies. Medieval armies could do no better. Armies that wintered over at a siege usually suffered horribly, though if the besiegers kept up a blockade, they would be able to exploit the ripening grain in surrounding areas in the spring.

Transportation and Animals. As the Middle Ages began, people used the ox—as their ancestors going back to the Mesopotamians had—as their primary draft animal. What changed in the Middle Ages was the increased use of the horse, not simply in warfare and agriculture but in transportation. Oxen are sturdy, reliable, docile, and powerful. They do well on a diet of grasses and process protein more easily than horses or mules, though depending on how hard they are used they still require some grain to keep them fit. Oxen can pull the same amount as comparably sized horses. Horses actually have few tangible advantages over oxen. Since horses could move significantly faster than oxen, however, they could keep up with an army more effectively. Their greater speed and ability to work an extra hour per day caused medieval people to begin using them more, but only after certain technological advancements allowed their effective use.

Thus there were some important developments that eventually put medieval transportation ahead of its Roman antecedents. Many of these developments did not originate in Europe, and how they got there is unknown. Among the most important was

the change in the rig for harnessing horses. Because oxen had been used as draft and transport animals in the ancient world, ancient people had designed harnesses for their particular anatomy. But harnesses created for oxen tended to choke horses. The horse collar, first used in the Western world around 750, allowed the weight of a cart or wagon to be placed on the horse's shoulder blades instead of its neck, overcoming an age-old problem. The horse still suffered from other issues, however. Horses bred in Europe required more grain than oxen, and their hooves were far more prone to injury and rot. While the former problem could not be totally overcome, the latter was lessened as northern Europeans began to plant more oats; this proved to be a better grain for horses. Oats not only grow well in the heavy, wet soil of northern Europe, they tend to have protein contents higher than those of wheat or barley. The sensitivity of horses' hooves was minimized by the use of the iron horseshoe, which came into use in Europe around 950. The horseshoe provided protection against hard surfaces and on soft ground and allowed horses to dig in their hooves to pull loads. Even with these improvements of harness, grain, and horseshoe, horses are still prone to conditions such as bloat and other equine diseases. While horses can cover more distance during a day than oxen, a horse requires more rest time than does an ox. Still, over the centuries horses came to replace oxen in both civilian and military transport. The speed of travel of an army was dictated by its slowest members, typically the supply train. Oxen pulling carts can travel between nine and fifteen miles a day, while mules or horses might cover nineteen. These estimates represent the optimal that could be expected, because wagons constantly broke down and the animals required more rest after days of hard travel. So the medieval army, depending on the distance it had to travel, would most likely travel more slowly than these model distances.

Another development in land transportation was the gradual adoption of harnessing of animals in tandem, particularly horses. It is extremely difficult to hitch more than four draft animals side by side. The larger the animal, obviously, the harder it is. Harnessing in tandem, which the Romans typically did not do, increased an animal team's efficiency by distributing pulling weight more equitably, and had the added benefit of not taking up as much road width. The invention of the whiffletree in the central Middle Ages allowed the harnessing of the horse to a crossbar from a horizontal pole or tongue hooked to the front of the wagon. This equalized the stress that horses put on the cart or wagon and among each other as they took up a load. The greater use of the pivoting axle (which may or may not have been developed by the Romans) made it far easier to make turns, thus permitting more weight to be put on a wagon without worrying so much about shifting loads or spokes breaking during a turn.

Even the very best of Roman roads used during the Middle Ages were extremely hard on carts, wagons, and draft animals. All the moving parts of transport vehicles required frequent repair, since there was no suspension to dampen the shock of movement. Wheel hubs were placed directly on axles since bushings (let alone bearings) did not exist. This lack caused constant friction between wheel hub and axle, not only producing heat but also shortening both wheel and axle life. The only lubrication readily available would be olive oil or animal fat, which, when heated, would add a certain olfactory presence to an already aromatic assemblage—assuming lubrication was even available. Indeed, extra oil or fat was a luxury for any army dependent on the calories it could bring with them. Water thrown on the hub cooled it off without decreasing the friction. Without lubrication the squeak of wheels added to the considerable noise and also meant any wheel's days were numbered even on the best of roads, and hastened if roads were bad.

The most common alternative for military transport to carts or wagons was pack horses or mules. In many situations pack trains offered significant advantages over transport vehicles. Pack mules can go just about wherever a human can go, single file, over rough terrain. They can travel faster and farther than wagons. While obviously the animals have to be cared for, there is no equipment in need of constant

maintenance like the wheels and axles of a wagon or cart. Finally, pack animals take up less space than vehicles. The disadvantage is that pack animals transport much less than a team pulling a wagon or cart. Horses, mules, and donkeys (oxen would not work well as pack animals) carry an amount directly related to their size but can carry only about twenty percent of their body weight without suffering permanent damage. Mules, therefore, typically carry less than horses, though, in nutritional terms they also require comparably less, too.

Armies from the time of the Roman sieges through the Hundred Years' War and beyond commonly foraged for food on a daily basis as the only practical means of staying alive. This meant that a substantial amount of an army's manpower might, on any given day, be dispersed over dozens of miles trying to secure food enough for the next twenty-four hours. In certain places, as in the Middle East, crusader armies were almost paralyzed by their inability to procure food and especially water to sustain them as they coped with unfamiliar country in a region typically less abundant than what they were used to. These problems confronted Louis VII's army on the Second Crusade on its march through southern Anatolia and essentially destroyed the French army of the Baron's Crusade in the mid-thirteenth century as some of its leaders were captured during a botched cattle raid.

[*See also* Armies, *subentries on* Organization *and* Rates of Movement; Camps and Billeting; Hattin, Battle of; Horses; *and* Siege Warfare, *subentry on* Tactics and Technology.]

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Laurence W. Marvin

LOMBARD LEAGUE

The Lombard League was a union of northern Italian city-states against the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick Barbarossa, who was nominal overlord of the region. It went through several incarnations: the first in 1164–1183, another in 1185 and 1195, and the last in 1226–1250. It originally formed in response to Frederick's defeat of Milan in 1162 and his harsh treatment of the cities, notably the imposition of high taxes and interference in local politics. In 1164, led by Padua, several northern cities (Venice, Verona, Vicenza, and Treviso) joined a mutual military and diplomatic alliance, supported by Pope Alexander III, whose election Frederick had challenged. In 1167 the alliance was expanded to include the cities of Cremona, Mantua, Brescia, and Bergamo. At that point, a formal agreement was drawn up in the abbey of Pondita near Bergamo, an act that is taken as the true beginning of the Lombard League. Milan, Ferrara, Parma, Modena, and Bologna joined soon after. By 1168, the league had sixteen members, comprising much of northern Italy.

The league involved a mutual pledge among the signatories to protect local "liberties." To this end, each participant provided a *taglia* (share) of troops for a joint army. The members held regular meetings and agreed not to make separate treaties with Frederick. The league had its own seal and granted itself the authority to appoint local rectors and notaries. It established the town of Alessandria at the foothills of the western Alps to guard against the entry of Frederick into Italy. Although primarily military in nature, the league also had economic provisions, intended to promote cooperation among the members. It allowed reciprocal rights with

respect to tolls. Merchants were given free passage to carry their goods through allied territories.

The league's main purpose, however, was to counter Frederick's authority in Italy. It achieved its greatest success in 1176 at the battle of Legnano, where league forces defeated the emperor's army. The victory led eventually to the Peace of Constance (1183), in which the emperor formally recognized the jurisdiction of the cities over their own territories and granted them freedom to elect councils and enact legislation. In return, the cities swore fealty to the emperor, who retained important legal rights. After the conclusion of peace, the league passed out of existence. It has ever since been viewed as a symbol of a precocious Italian nationalist sentiment, treated by nineteenth-century Italian scholars as a precursor to the Risorgimento, which led to the unification of Italy in 1870.

The league was briefly revived in 1185 and again in 1195 against the emperor Henry VI. A more lasting version formed in 1226, in opposition to Barbarossa's grandson, Frederick II, who maintained a formidable presence in Italy that included possession of Naples and Sicily. The new alliance, called the Second Lombard League, came together shortly after Frederick's call for assistance for a proposed crusade to the Holy Land at a council held in Cremona. The cities ignored Frederick's request and, led by Milan, banded together, following the model of their earlier union against Barbarossa. The Second Lombard League included, among others, Brescia, Piacenza, Alessandria, Bergamo, Mantua, Bologna, and Faenza, but it was not as comprehensive as the earlier league. The important cities of Cremona, Parma, and Modena did not join, but remained loyal to Frederick II.

The Second Lombard League was more aggressive than the first, actively opposing Frederick II, where possible, in the field. Unlike his grandfather, however, Frederick had the support of the papacy, at least initially, and possessed a well-organized army, including German cavalrymen and Saracen archers from southern Italy, that allowed him to wage war almost constantly. In 1237 Frederick II, together with Ezzelino da Romano, Lord of Verona, inflicted a humiliating defeat on league forces at Cortenuova (Cortenova). Milan, however, held out, refusing Frederick's demand for an unconditional surrender. Frederick followed the victory with an unsuccessful siege of Brescia the next year. This gave hope to the league, and it soon gained the support of the papacy, which excommunicated Frederick in 1239. The league mounted an offensive in that year, retaking the city of Ferrara, lost to the emperor two years earlier, and seizing the port at Ravenna, a key strategic point from where the emperor supplied his armies.

The battles between the Lombard League and Frederick II continued for the next decade, with victories and losses on both sides. In 1349 league forces scored a major victory at Modena. Frederick died the following year, and the league dissolved.

[*See also* Cortenuova, Battle of; Frederick I Barbarossa; Frederick II; Henry VI, Emperor; *and* Legnano, Battle of.]

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William Caferro

LONDON, TOWER OF

London was founded by the Romans in the first century C.E. and by the third century had been enclosed by a defensive wall. After William of Normandy



Tower of London. The tower as surveyed in 1597. A. The Middle Tower; B. The tower at the Gate; C. The Bell Tower; D. Beauchamp Tower; E. Develin Tower; F. Flint Tower; G. Bowyar Tower; H. Brick Tower; I. Martin Tower; K. Constable Tower; L. Broad Arrow Tower; M. Salt Tower; N. Well Tower; O. The tower leading to the Iron Gate; P. The tower above the Iron Gate; Q. The Cradle Tower; R. The Lanthorn Tower; S. The Hall Tower; T. The Bloody Tower; W. White Tower; X. Cole Harbor; Y. Wardrobe Tower. Illustration from John Bayley's *The Histories and Antiquities of the Tower of London with Biographical Anecdotes of Royal and Distinguished Persons*, 1821.

conquered England in 1066, he built castles, nearly always of earth and timber, all over the country to establish a firm hold over the native English population. London required a castle to control its citizens. William decided to put it in the southeast corner of the old Roman walled area by the river, with the Roman wall enclosing it on the east and south sides and with timber and earth protection on the west and north sides.

In the middle of this enclosure was a large rectangular masonry structure, four stories high and subdivided by a longitudinal wall into two unequal parts, creating large rooms at different levels supporting the roof above. This is the "Tower," which has given

its name to the castle now called the "White Tower" because it was formerly whitewashed. It has pilaster buttresses on all four faces and a corner turret on the northeast containing the spiral staircase. There is an apsidal projection on the southeast corner that is the east end of a finely decorated Romanesque chapel with a gallery over its aisles. The size of this Norman keep is paralleled only by the keep at Colchester, probably designed by the same architect.

The Tower of London was probably conceived of as a palace for the king because its defensive features are limited to arrow slits or windows on the sides and the parapet, which could serve the same purpose or be used for dropping missiles to bounce off the battered base. Entry was by steps in a forebuilding up to the opening into the main hall of the palace.

From this kernel of the year 1100 the castle grew in stages to its full size by 1300, much as it is today. Its development, documented in annual Exchequer reports, reveals both the changing ideas on defense and also the demands made by expansion of domestic arrangements. Under Richard I (r. 1189–1199) the Roman wall was retained on the eastern side, but part of the wall on the south side was rebuilt in its western part as far as the corner where the round bell tower was erected. Under Henry III (r. 1216–1272) the Roman wall was demolished and an enlarged enclosure was formed with towers along it at regular intervals. A new great hall with ancillary buildings was erected against the new wall on the riverside. Under Edward I (r. 1272–1307), the builder of the great Welsh castles, a low wall was set in front of Henry III's towered wall. This made the castle concentric, with the inner wall overlooking and covering the outer wall. The outer wall formed the inner side of a great new moat fed from the Thames (still tidal at this point), controlled by sluices.

Edward I completely overhauled access to the castle, always a vulnerability in any castle. Access by boat from the river was now by Saint Thomas's Tower (Traitors' Gate), a new construction consisting of parallel walls projecting into the river with gateways at either end opening into the Bloody Tower, the old gateway leading directly into the outer ward of the castle. Access from the landward side was made very devious: first through a right angle by way of a circular barbican to two successive gatehouses on either side of the new moat over the sluices and then meeting up with the river entry at the back of Saint Thomas's Tower.

A formidable fortress had been created on classic lines of development, but the castle was never tested by siege. It was overrun by insurgents during the Peasants' Revolt in 1381 but not taken by storm. Its special relationship to the sovereign on the one hand and to the city of London on the other, together with its geographical position in the city, meant that a full-scale siege would have been difficult to mount. The Tower of London has been used as a mint, an armory, a national archive, a storage facility, and a prison.

[*See also* Castles.]

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Michael W. Thompson

LONGBOW

See Weapons, Missile.

LOTHAIR I

(795–855), King of the Franks 814–855, Holy Roman Emperor 817–855. The political life of Lothair I was shaped by the decision of his father, Louis I the Pious, to revise the so-called *Ordinatio imperii* (817), which had emphasized the leading political role of his eldest son, Lothair I, co-emperor since 817, vis-à-vis his younger brothers, Louis II the German (817–876) and Pépin I, King of Aquitaine (814–838). In 823 the father Louis had a young son named Charles

(later called the Bald) by his second wife, Judith. Louis's desire to give an adequate portion of the empire to this last-born son threatened the positions of the elder half-brothers. The period between 830 and 840 was filled with political struggle and civil wars, with changing coalitions almost every year. Lothair's supporters in the high Frankish nobility were victorious in the western part of the empire, at the frontier of Brittany, and the young emperor himself marched into the Rhône region and plundered the Burgundian city of Châlons. In 834, however, he had to submit to the combined forces of his father and his brothers Louis and Pépin.

After the death of Louis the Pious (840), in the period between 840 and 843, a new coalition developed: in his struggle for political supremacy the emperor allied himself with Pépin II, King of Aquitaine (838–848) against Louis the German and the young Charles (the Bald). In 840, Lothair rushed over the Alps from Italy and prevented the forces of Charles and Louis from uniting. In spring 841 Charles and Louis succeeded in crossing the Seine and Rhine rivers, respectively. Their armies met in northern Burgundy on 25 June, near Fontenoy. A bloody battle took place in which Lothair was decisively defeated. Lothair escaped to Aachen, organized a revolt against Louis in Saxony, and allied himself with Viking war-band leaders, giving to them the isle of Walcheren in Friesland. But Charles and Louis held strongly together and compelled Lothair to accept the treaty of Verdun, which sealed the division of the Carolingian empire, leaving him with only a third of what his father had held. Though Lothair spent the rest of his life in the northern part of his empire, he offered only halfhearted military resistance to the Normans, who were threatening the coasts.

[*See also* Charles the Bald; Fontenoy, Battle of; Franks, Carolingian, *subentry on* Narrative (751–899); Louis I, Emperor; Norman Conquests, Norman Expansion; *and* Vikings.]

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LOTHAIR III OF SÜPPLINGENBURG

(1075–1137), 1106 Duke of Saxony, 1125 German king, 1133 emperor. The reign of Lothair of Süpplingenburg exemplifies the various contexts in which German rulers had to employ military means. Lothair was faced with internal conflict in the empire against the Hohenstaufen at the beginning of his reign; with the assertion of his rights as feudal Lord of Bohemia; as Duke of Saxony, fighting the Slavs on the eastern frontier; and as emperor, leading his troops into Italy. The warlike energy and resolution that he displayed as the duke of Saxony in the conflicts with his Slavic neighbors probably contributed to his being elected king.

Lothair's ability as a military commander is highly praised in many historical sources, although the comparison with Julius Caesar made in a Saxon chronicle appears exaggerated, as Lothair's campaigns were by no means always victorious—as in the case of his intervention in Bohemia 1126, which resulted in defeat at Kulm—and sometimes required a considerable length of time to achieve success, as in the case of the prolonged struggle against the Hohenstaufen. His operations were carefully planned and avoided unnecessary risks. Besieging cities such as Speyer, Nuremburg, or Bari and Ancona, in 1137, Lothair's perseverance often proved decisive. When his opponents capitulated in *deditio* (a formal ritual of surrender), as in the case of Speyer, Lothair spared

them in order to de-escalate the conflict, but when they persevered in resistance, he punished them severely as an example to others, as in the case of Ulm, which was burned and plundered in 1134. When he captured the fortress of Bari 1137, by setting fire to the building through subterranean mines, Lothair showed the defenders, including a number of Saracens, no clemency. This proved to be an effective demonstration of power, causing numerous surrounding cities to surrender without a fight. Lothair enjoyed great authority among his troops and was able to suppress an uprising in his army in 1137, solely by appearing in person. As a manifestation of his deep personal religiosity, Lothair caused a daily mass to be read for his army while on campaign.

[*See also* Conrad III.]

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Julia Knödler

Translated from the German by Duane Henderson

LOUDOUN HILL, BATTLE OF

There are two versions of this battle, one in John Barbour's epic poem *Brus (Bruce)*, the other in a letter from the English court, written on 15 May 1307. Barbour writes that the English commander, Aymer de Valence, challenged Robert Bruce, then near Loudoun, to fight by Loudoun Hill on 10 May. Bruce accepted and surveyed the ground to choose his position at Little Loudoun. The road ran through a dry field with marsh on either side; along this he had ditches dug, their earth forming a long high ridge narrowing the passage on either side of the road, plus another three ditches in front (this was probably Barbour's misunderstanding). Bruce took his army of six hundred men behind this position, and Valence advanced with nearly three thousand men in two squadrons, the morning sun reflected on their shields (they came from the west). Bruce, on Loudoun Hill, mustered his soldiers behind the ditches where, with James Douglas in full cry, they bloodily repelled the first attack. They then followed the retreating men, who were thrown back on the second squadron, killing more than a hundred and frightening the rest into fleeing. Seeing this, Valence went back (eastward) to Bothwell.

The letter makes it clear that before the battle, Douglas was negotiating with the English and that Valence "retreated before" Robert, "without doing any exploit" (Barbour, p. 304); the English treasurer was in Ayr on 8 May and in Bothwell on 13 May, while Bruce retired to his refuge after the battle and by July was again a solitary fugitive. Valence's challenge seems a literary topos; the risky encounter was a trap planned by Bruce with the prospect of seizing the treasurer or his money. Valence, accompanying the treasurer from Ayr, quickly decided that retreat was better than valor. They reached Bothwell a day or two later.

[*See also* Robert I (the Bruce) of Scotland.]

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LOUIS I

(778–840), King of Aquitaine (r. 781–814), King of the Franks (r. 814–840), and Emperor of the West (r. 814–840). Compared with his father Charlemagne, Louis I (the Pious) gained pitifully little military prestige. This has much to do with his failures between 830 and 840, when he failed to overcome rebellions by his sons: the co-emperor Lothair I; Pépin I, King of Aquitaine; and Louis II (the German), King of East Francia. The most dramatic scene in this struggle was the situation on the so-called field of lies ("Lügenfeld") near Colmar in Alsace (833), when almost all Louis' troops left him behind, alone in his camp, and passed into the armies of his sons. The conflict between his sons and the old emperor lasted until the end of his reign. Although Lothair I imprisoned Louis, he never gave up his efforts to provide a portion of the empire to Louis's late-born son (by his second wife) Charles, later called "the Bald." In 838, the sudden death of Pépin of Aquitaine offered the welcome chance for Louis to establish a new apportionment of the different Carolingian realms.

The main period of his life as ruler (781–839), however, gives little reason to doubt the military abilities of Louis I. In about 826 to 828, the poet Ermoldus Nigellus praised the deeds of Louis in a poem dedicated to the emperor. Among other things, the poet describes the successful conquest of Barcelona, which was strongly defended by the Muslims in 801. In 809 to 811, the sources describe the emperor's successful expeditions against cities and regions dominated by Muslims or Basques. His numerous defeats in frontier warfare—for example, against the Norsemen, the Saracen pirates on the Mediterranean coasts, the Bretons (824), and Arab incursions in the Spanish march (827)—in fact resulted from totally changed circumstances, compared with those of his father. They should not be attributed to military incompetence.

[*See also* Charlemagne; Charles the Bald; Lothair I; and Louis II of East Francia.]

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Hans-Henning Kortüm

LOUIS IV

(1282–1347), crowned King of Germany in 1314, crowned Holy Roman Emperor in 1328. Louis is not considered such an outstanding strategist and military leader as his temporary ally, the English king Edward III, but as a commander he won two battles, which eventually secured him the kingship of the Holy Roman Empire.

As duke of Bavaria, before his reign as king, he defended his claim to the regency in Lower Bavaria at Gammelsdorf in 1313 against the Habsburgs Frederick the Fair and Leopold I. Louis commanded an army in which both nobles and townsmen fought. He profited from favorable circumstances; fog and rain prevented his opponents from determining how they would be attacked. Pivotal to the victory was his municipal infantry, which was able to cut off the enemy's escape route. Louis personally commanded his troops and fought along with them, thereby earning a solid reputation as a military leader.

Perhaps as a result of this victory, Louis became Luxembourg's candidate for election to the kingship after Emperor Henry VII died in 1313 (the kings of the Holy Roman Empire were elected by prince-electors). The election in September 1314 did not have a clear outcome. One faction of the prince-electors voted for Louis, another for Frederick the Fair. Who might legitimately wear the crown could be decided only on the battlefield, but it was more than eight years before Louis defeated his opponent at the battle of Mühldorf on 28 September 1322. According to

the writer Johann von Viktring, Louis won by the sword his right to rule.

Louis was a cautious military leader, not known for seeking battle. As duke, fighting at Gammelsdorf in November 1313, he had been actively involved in combat and is said to have motivated his soldiers (see the *Chronicle of Fürstenfeld*); after his coronation, though, he tended to act defensively. Leading up to 1322, there had been four opportunities to fight to resolve the dispute over the throne, but Louis avoided battles he did not believe he had a realistic chance of winning. Some contemporaries criticized him for his caution, but it was by no means unusual for military leaders in these times to fear the great costs and economic strains that followed a defeat, and therefore to avoid open battles when possible. A eulogy written at Louis's court around 1330 praises his chivalry and bravery but also notes that he would rather prevent three wars than start a new one himself.

Louis relied on God's succor when he had to fight a battle, and he accordingly attributed his victories primarily to the work and will of God and less to his own strength in combat or tactical skills. When Louis was forced into battle by Frederick the Fair in 1322, he did not act as a leader on the front lines (at least not in any recorded accounts of chivalric deeds), but instead directed his troops from the rear. He did not carry his regalia and was—unlike his opponent Frederick, who wore golden armor—inconspicuously dressed and equipped like an ordinary knight.

[*See also* Edward III of England *and* Mühldorf, Battle of.]

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LOUIS II

(c. 810–876), King of East Francia (r. 840–876). The third son of the Carolingian emperor Louis the Pious, Louis II was a ruler of the Kingdom of East Francia. Because Louis was the first one to unite the lands that eventually became the Kingdom of Germany, modern historians have dubbed him "the German." In truth, Louis never conceived of his kingdom as Germany, and he instead modeled his kingship on that of his famous grandfather, Charlemagne. Louis spent much of his career striving to reunite the Carolingian empire, a goal that drove the politics and warfare of his long reign.

In 817, Louis the Pious appointed his namesake king of Bavaria, whereas he assigned the lion's share of the empire to his eldest son, Lothair I. Civil war erupted on the death of Louis the Pious in 840, with Louis the German allying with his younger brother, Charles the Bald. During the civil war, Louis and Charles won several military engagements against Lothair, the most important of which was the battle of Fontenoy on 25 June 841. Louis and Charles ultimately compelled Lothair to agree to a three-way division of the empire, in the famous Treaty of Verdun of 843. This division recognized Louis's kingship over the eastern provinces of Bavaria, Alamannia, Franconia, Hesse, Thuringia, and Saxony, as well as the strategic Rhineland cities of Mainz, Worms, and Speyer.

Louis spent the remainder of his reign seeking to expand his borders over the Frankish heartlands to the west, while struggling to enforce tributary lordship over the Slavs to the east. Overall Louis showed himself to be a competent and cautious general who distinguished himself more through organization, cunning, and diplomacy than through tactical brilliance. On several occasions, Louis invaded the kingdoms of his brothers and nephews, including an unsuccessful attempt to seize West Francia in 858. In the east he repeatedly invaded the lands of rebel Slavic rulers, laid siege to their fortresses, and compelled them to pay tribute and render hostages. To sustain these frequent campaigns, Louis maintained traditional Carolingian military

institutions and practices, such as "universal" military service for all freemen with a minimum property requirement.

Louis's successes were mixed. Although some Slavic rulers paid tribute, others (especially the ambitious rulers of Moravia) frequently rebelled, and Louis's armies sustained defeats alongside victories. In the west, Louis failed to reunite the empire, although he did annex Alsace, Frisia, and eastern Lotharingia in the Treaty of Meersen (870). Louis died on 28 August 876 in the midst of ongoing conflict with Charles the Bald, and he was buried at Lorsch. According to his wishes, his three sons—Carloman, Louis the Younger, and Charles III (Holy Roman Emperor 881)—divided the East Frankish kingdom among themselves.

[*See also* Charles the Bald; Fontenoy, Battle of; Lothair I; *and* Louis I, Emperor.]

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Eric J. Goldberg

LOUIS VI

(1081–1137), King of France, crowned in 1108. The early Capetian kings were in many ways merely French territorial princes with a crown. Louis the Fat spent his reign consolidating his power over the barons of the royal principality while carefully expanding his theoretical overlordship in neighboring regions. At times he acted almost as a mercenary, taking sides in disputes between regional rulers without having control. Considered open and straightforward, Louis could be both loyal and ruthless. Active and athletic, he had a tendency toward obesity that was aggravated by a foot injury; by the time he was in his forties he was too large to ride a horse. His nickname seems to have been given him postmortem; his biographer Suger called him Louis the Glorious.

His campaigns against barons in Île-de-France often followed a pattern. Some subject would complain about another's misdeeds, Louis would summon the offender to his court, and when the baron did not appear Louis would launch a campaign against him, often destroying his castles and confiscating his lands. In this fashion Louis managed to reduce the power of his vassals, increase his own wealth, and over the course of his reign greatly increase royal power within his own lands. He used similar tactics to increase his control in Berry in 1108 and Auvergne in 1122.

At Louis's accession, Normandy had just fallen into the hands of Henry I, King of England, and Louis spent much of his reign trying to undermine Henry's authority or replace him outright. In 1109 he joined the counts of Anjou and Blois in a border conflict with Henry, but Theobald IV the Great, Count of Blois, defected, and after several years of inconclusive hostilities Louis was forced to accept Henry's control over Maine and Brittany. From 1116 to 1119 Louis instigated and supported a Norman rebellion against Henry in favor of William Clito, Count of Flanders and son of the deposed Robert Curthose, Duke of Normandy, which ended with Louis's crushing defeat at Brémule. Louis accepted the homage of Henry's son William the Aetheling for Normandy and made territorial concessions to Henry, but that became moot when William died in 1120. His death inspired another baronial revolt supported by Louis and Fulk V, Count of Anjou, in 1123, which also failed. Louis would remain at odds with Henry for the rest of Henry's life.

In 1124, Emperor Henry V moved east with an eye toward helping Henry I of England in Normandy and increasing his own power in Lorraine. Louis was able to raise a large army from much of northern France, and Henry was sufficiently intimidated to withdraw without a fight. Louis also intervened in Flanders after the murder of the count of Flanders, Charles the Good. Asserting his rights as overlord, he arranged for the election of Clito, and in a joint campaign with Clito defeated other claimants and captured and executed Charles's murderers. But control was fleeting; parts of Flanders soon declared

for another candidate, Thierry, Count of Alsace, and before the matter could be settled William was killed in combat. Louis was forced to accept Thierry as count, although he was able to get Thierry's homage.

[*See also* Brémule, Battle of *and* Henry V, Emperor.]

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LOUIS VII

(1120/1–1180), King of France, crowned in 1137. As the second son of the bellicose Capetian king Louis VI, Louis VII was originally destined for a career in the church. However, although never an outstanding general with a natural aptitude for warfare, he made the transition to the military sphere of kingship with reasonable success. He extended royal influence in France by a series of campaigns that increased the prestige and authority of the crown; in so doing he vitally prepared the way for the great conquests and victories of his son, Philip II of France. Louis's invasion of Champagne in 1142–1143 was noted for the brutality of its ravaging and ruthlessness: at Vitry, as many as fifteen hundred noncombatants were burned to death after taking refuge in the church.

Louis's separation from Eleanor of Aquitaine in 1152 has been much criticized for having led directly to the formation of the powerful, hostile Angevin empire when Henry, Count of Anjou, Eleanor's new husband, became Henry II, King of England, in 1154. The extensive Angevin lands overshadowed Capetian territory, posing a major geopolitical threat to Louis. However, Louis skillfully exploited the military potential in Angevin family divisions and contained Angevin expansionism; in 1159, Louis's role as Henry II's overlord for lands in France proved instrumental in saving Toulouse. Furthermore, by his own remarriage, Louis finally produced a son and dynastic heir in Philip, who removed the Angevin menace once and for all by his achievements in war. Louis's most famous military exploit was as joint leader (with Conrad III, King of Germany) of the Second Crusade (1146–1149). Although Louis had the good sense to rely heavily on the experiences of the Military Orders in Palestine, the crusade still proved disastrous: the French were defeated at Laodicea and, with the Germans, even more decisively during an ill-advised move against Damascus.

[*See also* Damascus, Siege of *and* France, *subentry on* Narrative (900–1328).]

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Sean McGlynn

LOUIS VIII

(1187–1226), King of France, crowned in 1223. Louis was a colorful military monarch, especially in contrast to his rather gray predecessors, Louis VII and Philip II (his father), in contrast with whom he appears positively as a chivalrous knight with a natural inclination for, and enjoyment of, the martial life. His tenacity, energy, and bravery earned him the soubriquet of "the Lion." He was instrumental in his father's great victory at Bouvines in 1214: by leading his half of the French army to defeat the larger forces of King John of England at La Roche-aux-Moines in July, he secured Anjou, thus protecting Philip's rear from the southwest.

Louis largely—and enthusiastically—took over the king's military operations following Philip's brush with death at Bouvines. In 1216 he invaded England at the request of rebelling barons. Here he achieved remarkable, albeit brief, success: for a time

he ruled over one-third of the country. Defeat of his forces at Lincoln in 1217 and the successful English interception of vital French reinforcements at the naval battle of Sandwich the same year compounded political problems, forcing him to come to terms at the treaty of Lambeth and withdraw to France. Here, as king, his campaign in 1224 successfully drove the English out of La Rochelle and easily conquered the region of Poitou. Louis's most famous military role is that of crusader against the Cathar heretics of Languedoc in southern France. His interventions there in 1215 and 1219 had only limited impact, but his full-scale expedition of 1226 met with outstanding success: when Avignon fell the region submitted with little further resistance; Languedoc was eventually absorbed into the Capetian domain. In November that year, while returning from the campaign, Louis died a typical soldier's death, from dysentery. The brevity of his three-year reign cut short his military achievements.

[*See also* Bouvines, Battle of; France, *subentry on* Narrative (900–1328); *and* Sandwich, Battle of.]

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LOUIS IX

(1214–1270), King of France from 1226 to his death. Saint Louis—he was canonized in 1297—cuts a curious figure in military history. To his contemporaries he was a *rex pacificus* (king of peace) who strove to heal divisions between Christians that might have led to war. But this image of Louis should not obscure that warfare, in the form of the crusade, was at least a major preoccupation of his adult life and, in the view of some historians, its overriding concern. The king of Christian peace was also a determined warrior for Christ. The martial Louis was depicted most vividly by his contemporary Jean de Joinville, the medieval chronicler and author of the *Life of Saint Louis*, who described the king on the field of battle at Mansurah in Egypt as the finest figure of a well-armed knight that he had ever seen, a man whose swordsmanship meant that he could single-handedly free himself from imminent captivity and inspire his flagging followers. The combination of extreme piety and zeal made Louis's military career distinctive and may in part explain the failure of his crusading projects.

Louis's Early Military Career and First Crusade. Louis's military career began conventionally and successfully: he led a royal army into Champagne in 1230 to suppress a baronial conflict and fought alongside his men in a victory over Henry III of England at Saintes in 1242. He never took up arms against a Christian again. His piety was evident before he took the Cross for the first time in 1244, but the commitment he made to crusading added new depth and focus to his spiritual and military life.

For four years Louis devoted himself to planning a major overseas campaign—what became the Seventh Crusade—and his achievements were remarkable. He conceived his task broadly: military success could be assured only if he made appropriate spiritual and moral as well as practical preparations. He therefore secured the prayers of religious, corrected abuses within the royal administration, and tried (unsuccessfully) to resolve conflicts within Christendom, all in the hope that the energies of the faithful might be focused on the crusade.

In more conventional military terms, Louis's preparations showed that he could both think on a large scale and pay meticulous attention to detail. His army was not the pan-European force that he had hoped for, but it was nonetheless large: he had between fifteen thousand and twenty-five thousand combatants with him when he landed in Egypt in 1249. He poured resources into the construction of the port of Aigues-Mortes so that the ships he had hired might sail from a location inside French territory and thus be completely at the disposal of his crusade. Vast quantities of provisions were accumulated in a supply depot on Cyprus; Joinville was amazed to see so many barrels of wine and so much wheat and barley. Louis's assiduousness in exploiting

Louis IX (1214–1270). Louis departs for the Crusades. PRIVATE COLLECTION/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

established sources of income and finding new ones meant that he was able to meet the great cost of his first crusade—1.5 million livres, six times the average annual income of the French crown—without burdening the royal treasury.

In its preparation Louis's Egyptian campaign was a landmark of medieval military history, but in its execution it was a devastating failure. The king demonstrated bravery and solidarity with his fellow knights: during the landing at Damietta he famously joined his men as they leaped into the sea to make their way ashore. But although Louis could be courageous in the moment, he has been seen as overcautious in strategic decision making. At two points in the campaign—upon his arrival in Cyprus and after the capture of Damietta—Louis chose to wait for reinforcements rather than strike ahead immediately. There were sound reasons for doing so, but in both instances the changing seasons meant that the crusaders' halt was protracted, leading to a loss of momentum, morale, and resources.

Joinville's admiration for Louis's knightly conduct at Mansurah has already been mentioned, but his account of the battle also depicts the king under severe strain as a military commander. The vanguard disobeyed Louis's orders to disastrous effect, and once the main body of his army reached the battlefield, Louis could react to crises only as they arose, stopping each time to seek advice. In the weeks after his pyrrhic victory at Mansurah, Louis lingered again. Realistically his army was incapable of further progress, but he determined to retreat only after his forces had been devastated by further assaults, disease, and famine. Strayer said of this decision, which led to the crusaders' capture, that "the piety of Louis overcame his generalship" (p. 501): Louis's sense of spiritual purpose impelled him even when his expedition had clearly failed.

That sense of spiritual purpose only intensified in the wake of the Egyptian debacle. On his release from captivity, Louis sailed to Syria, whence he informed the people of France that he had chosen to remain overseas "in our pity on the miseries and adversities of the Holy Land" (p. 113). He dedicated four years to refortifying Christian strongholds and settlements and securing the release of crusaders

still in prison. Louis pursued the possibility of an alliance with either Muslim Syria or Egypt that might have benefited the Latin East (that is, the Christian settlements in the Near East), but in the end this did not come about. His hopes for friendship with the Mongols, whom he saw both as potential converts to Christianity and also as possible allies, were also disappointed. Before his return to France in 1254, Louis established a garrison of one hundred knights at Acre to be maintained at his expense. This French regiment was an expression of his permanent commitment, in military as well as spiritual terms, to the Christian holy places.

Louis's Last Crusade. Louis's stay in Syria and his French regiment both made meaningful military contributions to the Latin East. The same cannot be said of his last crusade, that known as the Eighth Crusade. He took the Cross again in 1267, at a moment when the Christian settlements in the East were in dire straits. Once more Louis applied himself and his administration to the tasks of recruitment, financing, and logistics. But instead of sailing to the East, Louis's fleet on its departure in 1270 sailed via Sardinia to Tunis in North Africa. This destination was questionable if his primary aim was to lend military assistance to the Christian settlements. It does make sense, however, when viewed in light of the increasing importance to Louis of bringing non-Christians to the faith: he mistakenly believed that the Muslim emir at Tunis was ready to convert. What military use his army might have been put to will never be known: Louis and many of his followers died of disease soon after their arrival in Africa, and the crusade was abandoned. Even more dramatically than during his first crusade, Louis's piety had trumped all military concerns.

[*See also* Aigues-Mortes; Crusades, *subentry on* Narrative (1245–1500); France, *subentry on* Narrative (900–1328); Joinville, Jean de; Mansurah, Battle of; *and* Saintes, Battle of.]

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LOUIS I

(Lajos I, The Great), b. 1326, King of Hungary (1342–1382) and Poland (1370–1382). Louis was the third son of Charles of Anjou (Charles I of Hungary), and Elizabeth, sister of Casimir III, King of Poland, one of the most active and accomplished rulers of late medieval Hungary. A monarch who was respected even by his contemporary adversaries, Louis was deeply religious, a lover of justice, a patron of arts, a promoter of knowledge, and the only one of Hungary's sixty-odd rulers who has been awarded the epithet "Great." He is also famous for his chivalric virtues, his bravery, and his incessant military campaigns for dynastic, political, and religious reasons. With the exception of some Marxist scholars' labeling him as reactionary, imperialistic, aggressive, and unjust, King Louis's prestige was always great among Hungarian historians and reached its acme after Hungary's dismemberment in 1920 between the World Wars.

Although Bálint Hóman's portrait of Hungary as the "Empire of Three Seas" (the Adriatic, Baltic, and Black seas, of which the Baltic, in fact, never touched

the realm) is vastly exaggerated, it is undeniable that Louis—building on the foundations laid by Charles I and profiting from the situation in which he faced no serious opposition within the realm and in which his land and treasury seemed inexhaustible—made Hungary the most significant power in east-central Europe. From 1329 Louis was heir to the throne, and before 1338 he received the title of duke of Transylvania. He ascended the throne in 1342, inheriting a solid royal power. His biographer, Johannnes Apród of Tótsolymos, archdeacon of Küküllő, in his *Chronica Hungarorum* characterized him as "a wise and generous [ruler who] conducted many wars with success, regained much for his country, [and] excelled not only in the martial arts, but also in the arts and the sciences" (Vardy, p. 352). During his reign of forty years, Louis himself took part in sixteen campaigns, with thirteen more being led by his generals. With the exception of a Tartar raid in the mid-1340s in eastern Hungary, these wars were all fought on foreign soil. Although Louis failed in 1346 to recapture Dalmatia, in the peace of Zadar (1358) and that of Turin (1381), he forced Venice to renounce its claims to rule over the Dalmatian towns and islands. He led two campaigns to Naples (1347–1348, 1350) in order to retaliate for the death of his brother, András (Andrew), husband of Joan of Naples, and to obtain the Crown of Naples for the Hungarian branch of the Angevins. Although the Hungarians took Naples twice, Hungarian rule over the city and the Kingdom of Naples was impossible to sustain for a longer time. In 1345 Louis marched in person to Croatia, where the wealthiest barons submitted to him without resistance. He led, with considerable success, several campaigns to the Balkans in order to expand Hungarian influence there and to turn the rulers of Serbia, Bosnia, Bulgaria (Vidin), Walachia, and Moldavia into Hungarian vassals. Toward the north and the west, however, Louis pursued a peaceful policy. He supported the ambitions of the Polish king Casimir III in Galicia and Volhynia, twice joined his uncle's campaigns to Lithuania (1351, 1352), and sent troops there in 1353 and 1355. He did not, however, recognize the danger presented by the Ottomans in Europe.

[*See also* Hungary, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1526); Romanian Principalities; Slavic Lands, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1500); *and* Vidin, Siege of.]

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LOUIS OF BOURBON

(1337–1410), Count of Clermont-en-Beauvais. Louis II, one of the most active military commanders of his day and first cousin to John II, King of France, fought in numerous campaigns against the English in the Hundred Years' War. He often served alongside Bertrand du Guesclin and contributed to the dramatic improvement in French fortunes in the 1370s. His career demonstrates an awareness of the need for military professionalism alongside a delight in the chivalric ethic. In addition to being a founding member of the Company of the Star he founded the Order of the Golden Shield in 1367. Although content for much of his life to serve as a deputy to such figures as Louis I, Duke of Anjou and Count of Provence, and Jean de France, Duc de Berry, he established the complex of Bourbon lands in central France and became head of King Charles VI's council.

After his father's death at the battle of Poitiers (1356) Louis became John II's deputy-lieutenant in

Auvergne, Berry, and the Maconnais (spring 1359). He led skirmishes against English garrisons and may have been involved in the defense of Reims (1359–1360). Soon after, Louis's military career was put on hold when he was designated one of John's hostages after the signing of the treaty of Brétigny, and he remained in comfortable captivity in England until October 1366. Later he served with du Guesclin in a series of campaigns to recapture the principality of Aquitaine and held the office of King Charles V's lieutenant in Picardy and Caux (9 May 1370). Over the next three years he captured Usson, Poitiers, La Rochelle, Becherel, and Saint-Sauveur-le-Victomte.

In the later 1370s, he served as the king's lieutenant in Auvergne, Bourbonnais, and Forez before returning to court as a regent during the minority of his nephew, Charles VI. As such, and alongside many of the principal French magnates as well as the king, he fought with distinction against the Flemish at the battle of Roosebeke (27 November 1382). His attention soon returned to Gascony, and in several campaigns from 1384 he and the marshal, Louis of Sancerre, captured Taillebourg, Verteuil, and Saint-Séverin.

When Charles VI reached his majority, Louis became chief of the royal council. The new regime tended to favor peace with England, and because of the disturbance caused by soldiers at home various expeditions were planned to remove them from France. Among these was Louis's crusade to Tunisia (1390), which failed disastrously, though Bourbon returned a hero. As King Charles's insanity became evident after 1392, tension grew among the king's uncles. Bourbon played a mediating role until the assassination of the duke of Orléans forced him to declare his support for the Armagnac faction.

The subject of a chivalric biography and described by Christine de Pizan as "fair, joyful, festive, gentle in his manners, benign in his words, generous in his gifts, meritorious in his deeds," Louis combined military practicality with traditional knightly virtue. He died on 19 August 1410 and was buried at Souvigny.

[*See also* Crusades, *subentry on* Narrative (1245–1500); France, *subentry on* Narrative (1328–1483); *and* Guesclin, Bertrand du.]

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LOW COUNTRIES

[*This entry contains four subentries, on sources from 1300–1479, an overview of the military history of the Low Countries from 855–1300 and 1300–1479, and on historiography from 1300–1479.*]

Sources (1300–1479)

The chronicle of Jean le Bel, covering the period 1320 to 1360, is one of the best sources concerning the first phase of the Hundred Years' War. Jean Froissart incorporated much of Jean le Bel's text into his own chronicle, which extends to 1400. The edition of the Société de l'Histoire de France is the best, but the edition of Baron Kervyn de Lettenhove is also valuable for his many notes and documents concerning the Low Countries. Enguerran de Monstrelet continued the chronicle of Froissart until 1444, although with much less brilliance than those writing before him did. Finally it is Mathieu d'Escouchy who finished this tradition with a text presenting the events occurring between 1444 and 1467. These authors must be supplemented with local chronicles. The narrative sources are extremely numerous for the Low Countries, but their distribution varies greatly from one principality to another.

The chronicle tradition of Flanders is particularly rich. About fifteen Flemish and French chronicles cover the wars between France and Flanders at the

beginning of the fourteenth century. Among the most important of these is the *Annales Gandenses* (*Annals of Ghent*), which enables us to examine the evolution of the tactics of the French knights after their defeat at Courtrai in 1302. For the events that disturbed Flanders during the fourteenth century, one should consult Olivier van Dixmude, Jan van Dixmude, and the *Istore et chroniques de Flandre*, as well as the *Chronique rimée des troubles de Flandre en 1379–1380*.

The Brabançon chronicles are fewer in number. Jan van Heelu gave a detailed account of the battle of Worringen, one of the most splendid battle descriptions for the entire Middle Ages. This source provides the names of a great number of combatants and details the tactics of the knights, and as in all the texts in vernacular language, it is a priceless source that demonstrates the military vocabulary of the time. Lodewijk van Velthem offers the most detailed description of the battle of Courtrai. Jan van Boendale's *Brabantsche yeesten* tells of the reign of Jan III, Duke of Brabant (r. 1312–1355). Thanks to this source, along with the chronicle of Edmond de Dynter, secretary of the last dukes of Brabant, much is known about the Low Countries' wars of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.

The narrative sources concerning the principality of Liège are numerous, but few of them are useful for the military historian. Jacques de Hemricourt's *Traité des guerres d'Awans et de Waroux*, which describes a decades-long private war between two noble houses, and his *Miroir des nobles de Hesbaye* both show much about knighthood and the mentality of men-at-arms. Jean de Hocsem and the *Chronique liégeoise de 1402* report the political and military events of the fourteenth century.

For the fifteenth century we can consult the Burgundian chronicles of Georges Chastellain and Jean Molinet, both *indiciaires* of the dukes of Burgundy; the chronicle of Jean Le Fèvre, a herald; the writings of Jean de Haynin, an officer in the Burgundian armies; and the writings of Olivier de La Marche and Philippe de Commynes.

The majority of the administrative sources have been preserved at the Archives Générales du Royaume (Belgium) and the Nationaal Archief (Netherlands) and in the archives of various cities. The collections of charters contain treaties, letters of challenges, indentures, and so on. They supplement usefully the narrative sources and enable an understanding of the delicate problem of the strength of the medieval armies (see Wauters) and of the human and material losses of war (see Raadt). The feudal books should not be neglected: they allow us to identify many men-at-arms (see Galesloot and Poncelet). Fiscal accounts, general or local, reveal the expenditure caused by war and military operations. They enable us to follow the itinerary of the princes and to study the spending for troops and for supplies (see Balon, Boffa, Gachard, and Gaier). Some isolated documents offer exceptional detail on particular points. Thanks to some inventories, we know the composition of the defensive equipment of a high-ranking lord (see Prelle de la Nieppe) or of a city (see Zylbergeld) and the number of wagons provided by the abbeys (Gorissen). A great number of these archival documents have been published by Belgium's Commission Royale d'Histoire and in the Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatiën of the Netherlands.

[*See also Annales Gandenses*; Boendale, Jan van; Commynes, Philippe de; Froissart, Jean; *and* Jean le Bel.]

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Sergio Boffa

Narrative (855–1300)

At the death of Louis the Pious in 840, the Carolingian Empire was split between his three sons—Lothair I, Louis the German, and Charles the Bald—although their actual inheritances would not be decided for three years. The Low Countries initially became part of Lothair's settlement (Lotharingia), but when he died in 855, they were split between his two remaining brothers, Louis and Charles. At this time the inhabitants of the lands were a mixture of Franks, Celts, and Romans, although they had been governed for centuries by Franks, and their language seems to have been primarily Old German. That they would eventually be split into a number of different principalities, some speaking Middle Dutch and the others Middle French, was, as far as can be known from the few sources of the period, determined not by ethnicity or "tribes" but by political decisions made by national rather than regional leaders (kings over dukes or counts).

The County of Flanders, Ninth and Tenth Centuries. The first of those principalities formed was the county of Flanders. In 862 Charles the Bald awarded his northernmost territory, bordered by the sea and the Schelde River and descending well into modern France, to his son-in-law, Baldwin I, the Iron Arm. The specific reasons for Charles separating this territory, as *pagus Flandrensis*, from his larger land holdings are not known, although many historians have wondered if it was because the Carolingian king needed a strong "marcher" or border lord in place to defend the interior of his kingdom from both German and Viking incursions. The latter had been increasing during Charles's rule and no doubt would continue to do so unless a strong coastal and riverine defense of the kingdom could be established. That Baldwin was effective as a military leader can perhaps best be judged from the fact that by the time of his death, in 879, the county had become a patrilineal inheritance, with his son Baldwin II taking over as count and ruling until 918.

By this time Charles the Bald and Louis the German had also died, and their Carolingian successors, with cognomens like "the Stammerer," "the Fat," and "the Simple" revealing weaknesses in the physical body and intellect as well as in political and military leadership, were powerless and ineffective. Baldwin II and his successors, Arnulf I (r. 918–964) and Arnulf II (r. 964–988), all took advantage of these weak rulers, enlarging their lands to include the county of Artois to the south, the duchy of Aalst to the east, and the lordship of the Four Amts and Zeeland to the north. Most of these were gained without warfare, although when the counts of Flanders needed to, they did fight. They also involved themselves in other barons' wars against their royal and sometimes their ecclesiastical lords, and by doing so gained prestige and respect among their equals. Dynastic marriages between Flanders and other principalities also increased this prestige. When the kingdoms of Germany and France were organized in 911 and 987, respectively, the count of Flanders wielded significant influence in the naming of both kings.

The County of Flanders, Tenth and Eleventh Centuries. Throughout the High Middle Ages, Flanders remained the strongest of the Low Countries. Count Baldwin IV (r. 988–1035) maintained good relations with the kings of France—Hugh Capet, Robert II, and Henry I—whose vassal he was, and from whom he gained several lands in northern France, including the towns of Thérouanne, Fauquembergues, and Saint-Omer, previously held by the much weaker Count of Boulogne. However, they also remained close to the Holy Roman Emperor, Henry II. It was from him that Baldwin received the county of Zeeland, the town of Valenciennes, and

territories in Cambrai and Hainaut. There was also peace throughout his lands. By this time the threat of the Vikings had died out, and Baldwin's neighbors respected his might enough to leave him alone, and he in turn did not encroach on their borders.

However, his successor, Baldwin V, was much more bellicose. By the time he ascended to the throne as sole ruler in 1035, he had already co-ruled the county with his father for seven years after a rebellion against the sitting count almost brought the two to war. He also extended his county's boundaries by acquiring Lens from Boulogne early in his reign and the march of Antwerp by armed force in 1044. The latter prompted a war with Holy Roman Emperor Henry III, whose palace in Nijmegen Baldwin sacked in 1049. Henry responded by leading a large army against Flanders that crushed Baldwin's much smaller force and proved that, while the Count of Flanders was perhaps the strongest of the Low Countries' princes, in facing the great power of the German Empire, he was clearly unable to compete. Nevertheless, later, in 1054, the Flemings did stop an invasion of Henry III, largely by refusing to fight a battle against him. Baldwin had a much stronger relationship with the kings of France, Robert II and Henry I, his father- and brother-in-law, and when the latter died in 1060, he became regent for his nephew, King Philip I, until his own death in 1067.

Still, as powerful and bellicose as Baldwin V was, he refused to participate in the invasion of England by his son-in-law William the Conqueror, Duke of Normandy, in 1066. Undoubtedly, his advanced age played a role in this decision—by this time Baldwin was fifty-four or fifty-five—and he may have been suffering from the illness that would kill him the following year. It may also have been because of his friendship with the Godwin family, of whom the English king, Harold II, was a son. Baldwin's sister Judith was married to Tostig, another son, and Godwin and most of his family had stayed with Baldwin during their exile from England in 1051. Nonetheless, he did allow Flemings to participate in William's campaign, and several were among the victorious army and settled in England as lords following the battle of Hastings.

The Lotharingian Principalities. Before the eleventh century the other Low Countries principalities were neither as powerful nor as celebrated as the county of Flanders. Most did not formally come into existence until the eleventh century: Loon (c. 1040), Limburg (1065), Hainaut (1070), Brabant (1084, although not called a duchy until 1183), and Guelders (1096). All were created from the old Carolingian Kingdom of Lotharingia and generally date their existence as separate from the rest of Germany when Reginar or Régnier I, the Long Neck, rose up against Zwentibold, the hated king of Lotharingia, and overthrew him, although Reginar was not formally recognized as Duke of Lotharingia (then increasingly called by its French name, Lorraine) until later.

Reginar, like Baldwin I of Flanders, assumed his position because of his military abilities. He had a long career against the Vikings, having fought them frequently since 870, including perhaps at the siege of Paris in 886. He had also fought alongside Charles the Bald in his numerous wars against his brothers and nephews. Even though Reginar was well into his sixties by the time he was named Count of Lorraine, it was hoped that he would provide a military presence in the region. He did provide such; however, his son Giselbert did not. Despite marrying Gerberge, the daughter of King Henry, the Fowler, of Germany, he rebelled against the next king, Otto I, and with other rebels was defeated by him at the battle of Andernach in 939. The duchy went to Henry I, Duke of Bavaria.

By 959, after a succession of short-reigning dukes, Lorraine had broken into two parts, designated Upper and Lower according to the river system—which strangely made Upper Lorraine farther south and inland than Lower Lorraine. It was thus from Lower Lorraine that Hainaut, Brabant, and Guelders were formed a century later. By this time Lower Lorraine had become only a small, underpopulated duchy located in the hills and forests of the Ardennes, although it should be noted that the first two kings of Jerusalem, the famous First Crusaders, Godfrey and Baldwin of Bouillon, came from here. In 1190 Lower Lorraine became part of the duchy of Brabant.

The Counties of Frisia and Holland. The counties of Frisia (or Friesland) and Holland were founded in 896. The first Count of Holland and Frisia was Dirk I, who, had he not founded the important Abbey of Egmond, which kept historical annals, would probably not be known at all. Nor would his son and heir, Dirk II, be known had he not rebuilt that abbey in stone starting in 950. The ensuing counts—Arnulf I (r. 988–993), Dirk III (r. 993–1039), Dirk IV (r. 1039–1049), and Floris I (r. 1049–1061)—are known also by their relationship to this abbey and to the county of Flanders, to which they were tied by marriage and economic relations. When more is recorded about their reigns, it is from a decidedly German viewpoint, generally reporting the desires of either the emperor or the bishops of Trier, Utrecht, and Cologne to extend their lands or influence into the counties of Holland and Frisia and how, although the counts always put up a good fight, they were almost always defeated. So Count Dirk IV, after raiding the territories of the bishop of Utrecht, was killed in a short battle outside of Dordrecht in 1049, and his brother Floris I, after fighting a war against some of his Lotharingian vassals, was killed in a battle at Nederhemert in 1061. Only once was there a substantial victory by a count of Holland and Frisia, Dirk III, against an imperial foe, at Vlaardingen in 1018. In this battle an imperial army invading the counties at the behest of Emperor Henry II was lured into the bogs and marshes north of the fortress of Vlaardingen by the much fewer Dutch and Frisian troops (a difference of twelve thousand to thirty-five hundred men is generally accepted) who then easily annihilated them.

The Prince-Bishopric of Liège. The final prominent Low Countries principality, the Prince-Bishopric of Liège, was created in 985 when Notger, then bishop of the town, was accepted as the political as well as ecclesiastical leader of Liège and the surrounding countryside. From then until the end of the Middle Ages (the Prince-Bishopric was not formally dissolved until 1794) this principality played only a minor military role in the affairs of the region. What struggles it was involved in generally stemmed from the fact that, as they were celibate, every time a prince-bishop died, his heir had to be brought in from outside. On several occasions the Liégeois did not agree with those selected as their leaders and rose up against them. But, as the population was never very large, these rebellions were quickly and sometimes violently put down.

The County of Flanders. An inheritance crisis followed the death of Baldwin V's son, Baldwin VI, in Flanders in 1070. Baldwin VI's son Arnulf III was only a teenager, and his uncle Robert the Frisian desired his title and lands as Count of Flanders. Arnulf should have been safe, as he had the support of the King of France, Philip I; the Count of Boulogne, Eustace II; the Duke of Lower Lorraine, Godfrey of Bouillon; and Arnulf's mother, Richilde, Countess of Hainaut and Mons—all of whom provided a large number of soldiers, including several Norman knights who had been at the battle of Hastings. However, Robert won the battle of Cassel in 1071, where Arnulf was killed, and he ruled the county until 1093. Perceived as a usurper, though, Robert I was never accorded the prestige or respect that had been his brother's and father's, and the power of Flanders declined significantly.

His son Robert II, who had gone on the First Crusade and been important in the conquest of Jerusalem, restored some of this prestige, but once he returned from the Holy Land, he became embroiled in wars against Emperor Henry V, from whom he gained Douai and Cambrai, and King Henry I of England, whom he fought in Normandy; he was killed in 1111 fighting the rebellious Count Theobald IV of Blois. His heir, Baldwin VII, died eight years later, wounded in the battle of Bures-en-Brai, also fighting against Henry I.

The County of Flanders after the Murder of Charles the Good. The successor of Baldwin VII, his cousin Charles, became one of the most celebrated of high medieval rulers because the story of his life and murder in the Church of Saint Donatian in Bruges was detailed so well by Galbert of Bruges. From this biography, it can be determined that while the count, Charles, called "the Good" by Galbert, was well liked by his poorer subjects, he was not at all well liked by many of his nobles, who had been given a fairly free hand in Flanders while the two previous

counts fought in France. In particular, the influential Erembald family opposed Charles, and in 1127 they masterminded and carried out a plot to murder him while he was at prayer. What they hoped to gain by this is unclear as their complicity was well known, and once King Louis VI of France became involved, they were destroyed. Louis then selected William Clito, son of Robert II Curthose of Normandy, who was then imprisoned by his brother, King Henry I of England, to fill the vacant comital throne. But within a year all the major towns of the county—Ghent, Bruges, Saint-Omer, and Lille—had rebelled against him, preferring Thierry of Alsace instead. Civil war followed for more than a year, with William defeating the rebels at the battle of Axspoele on 21 June 1128 but then dying a month later, on 28 July, at the siege of Aalst from a wound given by one of his own soldiers. He was only twenty-five years old and left no children behind, so the king of France withdrew his forces from Flanders and Thierry gained the county.

Thierry I ruled until 1168. Surprisingly, given how he came to power, the county was quickly restored to peace and prosperity, undoubtedly because Thierry had been the candidate for count favored by the increasingly more wealthy towns. In fact, Flanders was so peaceful that Thierry was able to go to the Holy Land on numerous pilgrimages and crusades, where he met his second wife, Sibylla, daughter of Fulk, King of Jerusalem (and interestingly, the former wife of William Clito—their marriage had been annulled after less than a year). These were not successful, however, particularly the Second Crusade, where Thierry participated in the dreadful siege of Damascus in 1147, and when he returned in 1156 to participate at the failed siege of Shaizar.

His son and heir Philip also went on crusade, once in 1177 and again in 1190. Before and in between these ventures, Philip was active in military affairs, both against the Count of Holland, Floris III, to the north and the King of France, Philip II Augustus, to the south. Against Floris he was successful, even capturing and imprisoning the Dutch count until he could ransom his freedom, but against Philip II he was defeated and forced to surrender Vermandois, which he had acquired by marriage.

Flanders and Hainaut during the Reign of Baldwin VIII/V. Count Philip of Flanders died in 1191 while taking part in the siege of Acre. He was succeeded by his sister Margaret I, whose short reign ended upon her death in 1194. Her husband and the co-ruler of Flanders was Baldwin V, Count of Hainaut. Their relationship was, of course, not the first interaction between two Low Countries principalities. For example, William Clito had been supported by his father-in-law, Godfrey I, Duke of Brabant, who was with him when he was wounded at Aalst. Earlier, in 1102, Godfrey had also stopped the invasion of Cambrai by Count Robert II of Flanders, and in 1119 he had supported William of Ypres in a bid to become Count of Flanders after the death of Baldwin VII in place of Charles the Good.

The history of Hainaut had been especially entangled with that of Flanders. Richilde, the wife of Baldwin VI and mother of Arnulf III, who was killed at Cassel in 1071 by Robert II, had earlier been married to Herman of Mons, Count of Hainaut, and had brought the county into her marriage with Baldwin, a union that was intended to bring together the two principalities. However, despite his victory at Cassel, Robert had no claim on Hainaut, and it was inherited by Richilde's younger son with Baldwin VI, also named Baldwin, who ruled the county as Baldwin II until he disappeared in the First Crusade in 1098. His great-grandson was Baldwin V of Hainaut, the husband of Countess Margaret I of Flanders, and he ruled as count of both Hainaut and Flanders (as well as margrave of Namur) until his own death in 1195. He was also the father of Isabelle of Hainaut, the wife of King Philip II; two emperors of the Latin Empire of Constantinople, Baldwin (r. 1204–1205) and Henry (r. 1205–1216); and Yolanda, the regent of Emperor Peter II of Constantinople (r. 1216–1219) who had been captured and was imprisoned by the despot of Epirus, Theodore Komnenos Doukas.

Jeanne and Margaret, Countesses of Flanders. Besides being Latin Emperor of Constantinople, Baldwin V's son Baldwin was also Count of Flanders (as Baldwin IX) and Count of Hainaut (as Baldwin VI). After he was captured by the Bulgarians outside Adrianople in 1205 and later killed (although exactly

when and how is unknown), his titles were inherited by his five-year-old daughter Jeanne. Jeanne's mother had predeceased her father, leaving her an orphan, and she had a difficult childhood, shuttled between the guardianship of her uncle, Philip of Namur, and King Philip II of France, and then to Enguerrand de Coucy. Finally, in 1212 she was married to Ferrand of Portugal, only to be captured with her husband on their way to Flanders by her cousin, the future King Louis VIII of France, who extorted a large part of southern Flanders, including Saint-Omer, from her as ransom for their release. This, among other factors, provoked Ferrand, titularly Count of Flanders, to join a rebellion with Holy Roman Emperor Otto IV and King John of England against Philip II. In 1214 these rebels were soundly defeated outside the village of Bouvines. As a consequence, more of Flanders and Hainaut was lost, Ferrand was imprisoned in Paris for twelve years, and Jeanne ruled Flanders on her own.

Jeanne was not an effective ruler of Flanders and Hainaut. For the entire time she was countess, her realm was controlled by France. She could not please her subjects, whose economic power was lessened not only by the duties and taxes she and the king of France placed on them but also by famine that severely cut agricultural production throughout the region. Indeed, they became so demoralized that when Bertrand de Rains showed up in 1225 claiming to be Count Baldwin IX, escaped from the Bulgarians, the population as a whole supported him, despite the fact that he bore so little resemblance to Jeanne's father that no one who had known the count accepted this imposter. A popular uprising had to be put down by French troops called in to aid the countess. Jeanne also had significant disagreements with her sister Margaret, who became her only heir in 1244 when the countess died childless.

Margaret II was no better a ruler than Jeanne. This was mostly the result of the problems caused by her marriages. She married her first husband, Bouchard of Avesnes, in 1212 and had three children by him. Eventually, though, her sister Jeanne turned against the match and imprisoned Bouchard for two years, only releasing him on the condition that he and Margaret separate, with the marriage dissolved by papal decree. Margaret then married William de Dampierre in 1223 with whom she also had three children. The question of succession in the two counties remained unresolved, however, and in 1244 war broke out between Margaret's children by Bouchard of Avesnes and those fathered by William de Dampierre. Invariably, the king of France, Louis IX (Saint Louis), was forced to step in. His solution was simple although not entirely legal, as he had no suzerainty over Hainaut: he gave Hainaut to John of Avesnes, Margaret's eldest son by Bouchard, and Flanders to Guy, her eldest son by William. War again broke out in 1248 when Louis IX was on crusade and John of Avesnes believed that his mother and half-brother had no intention of allowing him to rule Hainaut. Assisted by William, Count of Holland, at the battle of Walcheren in 1253, he defeated Guy, who formally recognized Hainaut as his. But Margaret did not, and the following year she asked Charles of Anjou, brother of King Louis IX, to intercede in the struggle on her behalf. But he was wholly ineffective, nearly being killed in a conflict outside of Valenciennes. Again, Louis stepped in on the side of John of Avesnes; Hainaut remained in his hands. The two counties would not be reunited under a single ruler until the Burgundian dukes took control of the region in the fifteenth century.

The Battle of Worringen (1288). Just after Margaret had her difficulties in Flanders and Hainaut, another inheritance conflict was fought in the eastern Low Countries over the duchy of Limburg. In 1282 Duke Waleran IV of Limburg—who interestingly had supported John of Avesnes in his inheritance conflicts with Margaret and Guy twenty-five years earlier—died, leaving as his only heir Irmgard, the wife of Count Reinoud I of Guelders. When she died childless the following year, the question of Limburg's inheritance arose. Naturally, her husband declared his claim for the duchy, but so too did Walaran's brother, Adolf of Berg, who then sold his claim to Duke John I of Brabant. After several futile attempts to resolve the crisis diplomatically, in 1288 at Worringen the army of Guelders, allied with forces of the archbishop of Cologne, Count of

Luxemburg, and King of Germany, went to battle against an army primarily from Brabant and Loon. At the battle's end the Brabantese and Loonese forces had easily defeated the Guelders, Cologne, Luxemburg, and German forces, with Henry of Luxemburg killed, Archbishop Siegfried captured, and Limburg a part of Brabant.

The Urbanization of the Low Countries. Surprisingly, during all of the conflicts and instability of the thirteenth century the prosperity of the county of Flanders in particular and the entire Low Countries in general increased markedly. Even prolonged bouts of famine seemed not to slow the increase in prosperity. Primarily, this derived from the substantial rise of the towns. Ghent, Bruges, Ypres, Saint-Omer, Lille, Thérouanne, Valenciennes, Leuven, Antwerp, Dordrecht, Utrecht, Liège, Dinant, Huy, Tongeren, Douai, Cambrai, Tournai, and many others all grew in population and economic power during the period. Flanders, especially, but also Brabant, Hainaut, Holland, and even Liège, Namur, and Guelders, grew extremely wealthy, rivaling all areas of Europe except northern Italy. So wealthy did the towns become, in fact, that soon non-nobles became wealthier than the nobles, especially as the latter were still largely dependent on the agricultural revenues of peasants. Naturally, social conflicts arose, although these were not as significant as they might have been had so many of the Flemish, Brabantese, and Dutch nobles not participated on the side of the rebels who fought and lost at Bouvines; if they survived and were not imprisoned, financial punishments wiped out many of them. Others were so involved in the conflicts of the thirteenth century that they paid little attention to what was going on in the towns.

Most of this prosperity derived from the cloth-making industry, although it seems that many other occupations were also affected. Cloth from the Low Countries was valued for its durability, colors, comfort, and thickness. This was because the wool came from English sheep, whose coats were thicker than almost anywhere else in Europe. English wool had been traded abroad for centuries, but starting in the late twelfth century the demand for more wool for the Low Countries increased to a point that almost all English agricultural lands began to shift to the raising of sheep. Throughout most of the thirteenth century this did not present a problem, as England had very good relations with the separate Low Countries rulers and also enjoyed a fairly stable relationship with France. Midway throughout the century, though, that began to change as French and English relations turned more and more sour. At the same time the prosperous townspeople, primarily in Flanders, began to seek more sovereignty over their economic and political governance. At first this was ignored, Countess Margaret being powerless to do much of anything about it, although her confiscation of English merchant property in 1270 was met with violence. But as she began to relinquish the county's leadership to her son Guy, who finally became sole Count of Flanders in 1278—he had been co-ruler since 1246—it became more of an issue. Although he was certainly troubled by the attempt at more self-government by his urban subjects, Guy, not surprisingly, sided with his townspeople against French interests. Eventually, this led to an alliance with King Edward I of England and a planned attack against the two armies of French soldiers in Flanders. But Edward proved to be less than an ideal ally. His troops never turned out in sufficient numbers to have any effect, and when the Flemings decided to go it alone at the battle of Fumes in 1297, they were trounced by a French army led by Robert of Artois. Edward made a separate peace with French King Philip IV (the Fair) and left the area. In 1299 Guy de Dampierre and his son, Robert of Bethune (Robert III, Count of Flanders, following his father 1305–1322), were captured and imprisoned in Paris. Among the responses was the Brugge Matin of 1302, followed by the amazing victory of the Flemish townspeople at Courtrai later that year.

[*See also* Baldwin I (Iron Arm); Bouvines, Battle of; Cassel, Battle of (1071); Charles the Bald; Franks, Carolingian, *subentry on* Narrative (751–899); Lothair I; Louis I, Emperor; Louis II of East Francia; Vlaardingen, Battle of; *and* Worringen, Battle of.]

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Kelly DeVries

Narrative (1300–1479)

To summarize the military history of the Low Countries in the fourteenth and the fifteenth centuries is particularly difficult. Although the region was a homogeneous one located between the kingdoms of France and England and the Holy Roman Empire, it was made up of about ten principalities, each having its own history. Only the most important conflicts will be addressed, along with the process of unification of the Low Countries led by the house of Burgundy.

Principalities before the Advent of the House of Burgundy. At the end of thirteenth century the county of Flanders was at war with France. The French king Philip the Fair (Philip IV; r. 1285–1314) wished to impose his authority on this rich and powerful region. The fourteenth century began under the best auspices for the Flemings, who were victorious at Courtrai (11 July 1302) and again at Arques (4 April 1303). But these two victories were followed by the defeat at Mons-en-Pévèle (17 August 1304) and the Treaty of Athis-sur-Orges (23 June 1305), which allowed Flanders to keep its independence only at the cost of several territories.

The tensions that existed between merchants and nobles and between craftsmen and tradesmen were the source of many social riots in Flanders. The first of all these disturbances were the uprising of the maritime Flanders (1323–1328), which concluded with the battle of Cassel (23 August 1328), the revolt carried out by Jacob van Artevelde (1338–1345), and the uprising of the weavers of Ghent, Bruges, and Ypres (1359–1361). The most terrible uprisings began in 1379. The tradesmen of Ghent, commanded by Philip van Artevelde, the son of Jacob, seized control of most of Flanders. After the battle of Beversholtsveld (3 May 1382), Philip the Bold, Duke of Burgundy (r. 1363–1404) and the future Count of Flanders (r. 1384–1404), saw that his inheritance was in danger and pressed the French king Charles VI (r. 1380–1422) into sending his armies to Flanders. With this assistance the rebels were crushed at Roosebeke (Westrozebeke; 27 November 1382).

Brabant. John III, Duke of Brabant (r. 1312–1355), faced John the Blind, Count of Luxemburg (r. 1310–1346; he was also king of Bohemia), who was the architect of two broad coalitions against Brabant (1327–1332 and 1333–1334) that included the king of France, the Bishop of Liège, and the counts of Flanders, Hainaut, Luxemburg, Guelders, Jülich, Looz, and Namur. No military action of importance took place at this time because rather than attacking the strong army of Brabant, the coalition preferred simply to blockade the duchy.

John III died without a male heir, leaving his eldest daughter Joanna (r. 1356–1406) to succeed him. The Count of Flanders, who had married



Battle and Siege of Courtrai, 1302. Detail from the Courtrai Chest, fourteenth century. *Top*: Three men-at-arms decapitate a man at the town gates while an alderman offers the town keys to a group of knights. *Middle*: The castellan (*left*) is attacked by three men-at-arms and is eventually decapitated (*right*). *Bottom*: The banners of the Flemish army. © COURTESY OF THE WARDEN AND SCHOLARS OF NEW COLLEGE, OXFORD/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

another daughter of the duke, tried to benefit from the absence of a male heir. War erupted between the two principalities in 1356–1357. Although the Brabançons were defeated at Scheut on 17 August 1356, the Flemings were unable to maintain a military presence in the duchy.

From the second half of the fourteenth century, Brabant's primary enemy was Guelders. Several wars were carried out against the lords of this area who threatened Brabançon trade in the Rhenish areas. The first war of Guelders (1366–1368) is of little interest. The disastrous expedition of Jülich (1371) and the defeat of Baesweiler (22 August 1371), on the other hand, later had serious financial consequences. The second war of Guelders (1385–1390) resulted in Philip the Bold's increased influence in Brabant. The third war of Guelders (1397–1399) did not succeed in solving any problems.

Anthony of Burgundy, Duke of Brabant (r. 1406–1415), took part alongside his family in military operations against the English. When he received the duchy of Luxemburg in *engagère* in 1411, he undertook a long war against Huart d'Autel, a lieutenant of the emperor. Anthony desired the elimination of the last traces of Orléanais influence in Burgundy. He was killed with the French knighthood at the battle of Agincourt (25 October 1415).

The personality of John IV (r. 1415–1427), Anthony's son, caused many problems, and nearly a civil war. Philip of Saint-Pol (r. 1427–1430), his brother, was even named governor of Brabant by the estates in 1420. John IV found himself caught unsuccessfully in the war of succession of the counties of Hainaut, Holland, and Zeeland.

Hainaut. From the second half of the thirteenth century the house of Avesnes, which ruled in

Hainaut, was the adversary of the house of Dampierre, which ruled in Flanders. This is why John I of Hainaut (r. 1280–1304) and his son William I (r. 1304–1337) supported the king of France against Flanders. This fight ended with the death of Robert of Bethune, Count of Flanders (r. 1305–1322). One of the longest feudal quarrels that the Low Countries had ever known—it lasted from 1252 to 1322—was finally over.

In 1325 three hundred knights of Hainaut and Holland led by John of Hainaut, Lord of Beaumont, went to England to return the throne to Isabella of Valois, overthrowing her husband, the English king Edward II (r. 1307–1327). Soon thereafter, in 1327, the nobility of Hainaut were recalled to England to defend her son, the young Edward III (r. 1327–1377), against the king of Scotland.

William II, Count of Hainaut (r. 1337–1345), spent the eight years of his reign at war. While he fought in Prussia, the Frisians took the opportunity to rebel. The count, after having vainly besieged Utrecht over a period of six weeks, invaded Frisia but fell at the battle of Staveren on 27 September 1345. The death of the count caused a long period of disorder. From 1350 the cities and nobles were divided into two camps: the Hoeks ("Hooks") supported the count's widow, Countess Marguerite II of Avesnes (r. 1345–1356), and the Kabiljauws ("Cods") supported her son William III (r. 1356–1389), who was very impatient to reign.

The murder of Siger of Enghien on 31 March 1364 by William III's brother Albert of Bavaria (Count of Hainaut 1389–1404), who at the time was William's regent, started a terrible feudal war in Hainaut that saw interventions by the Count of Flanders, the Duke of Brabant, the pope, and the king of France (1364–1367). The fight against the Frisians monopolized most of Albert's own reign. His manner of ruling also revived the quarrel of the Hoeks against the Kabiljauws. Finally, he had to repress a revolt fomented by John of Arkel, one of the main leaders of the Kabiljauws.

The reign in Hainaut of Count William IV (r. 1404–1417), Albert's son, was a long series of continuous conflicts. The most important was the continuation of the fight against the lords of Arkel, which ended in 1412.

When William IV died, Jacqueline of Bavaria inherited the counties of Hainaut, Holland, and Zeeland (31 May 1417). John of Bavaria, brother of the late count, disputed the succession. The Hoeks decided to support Jacqueline, whereas the Kabiljauws supported John. At first Jacqueline profited from the support of her husband, the Duke of Brabant. When in 1422 he became tired of the war and decided to negotiate with John, Jacqueline fled Brabant. In 1423 she married Humphrey, Duke of Gloucester, a younger brother of England's Henry V. In October 1424 the Duke of Gloucester and his wife, followed by an imposing army, arrived in Hainaut. The Duke of Brabant, unable to counter this threat alone, requested the assistance of Philip the Good, Duke of Burgundy (r. 1419–1467). Their armies were victorious, and on 19 July 1425 the Duke of Brabant granted the Duke of Burgundy the administration of Holland and Zeeland.

Hesbaye. In 1297 a feudal quarrel erupted between the Awans and the Waroux, two noble families of Hesbaye. The conflict quickly extended to the entire nobility, which then destroyed itself systematically over nearly forty years. During this conflict the battles of Loncin (1 June 1298), Waremme (6 or 7 June 1313), and Dommartin (25 August 1325) took place. On 16 May 1335 the Paix des Lignages (Peace of Lineages) put an end to this terrible quarrel.

Liège. The fight among the powers in the principality of Liège was particularly complicated. The participants were the bishops, who tried to affirm their autocratic tendencies; the chapter of Saint-Lambert, which held partial authority and did not hesitate to oppose the bishop openly; and the cities, which more and more frequently intervened in the principality's policy matters. Also, from the fourteenth century onward the city and principality of Liège could not escape the social movements disturbing the Low Countries.

Conflicts were inevitable, and the reigns of the bishop-princes Thibaud of Bar (r. 1303–1312), Adolf de la Marck (r. 1313–1344), Englebert de la Marck (r. 1345–1363), Arnould of Hornes (r. 1378–1389), and

John of Bavaria (r. 1389–1418) were practically one uninterrupted period of violence and civil war. It was in the middle of these disorders that a series of peaces were established between the bishop and the county that later became the basis of the constitution of the principality of Liège. Within this tumultuous period the battles of Erbonne (27 May 1328), Waremme (2 June 1328), Hoesselt (25 September 1328), Vottem (19 July 1346), Tourinne (21 July 1347), and Othée (23 September 1408) occurred, as well as the two sieges of Maastricht (November 1407–January 1408 and May–August 1408).

Namur. The military history of the county of Namur during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries is not very rich, even though the rulers of Namur appear to have been particularly quarrelsome. John I, Count of Namur (r. 1298–1330), the son of Guy de Dampierre, Count of Flanders (r. 1278–1304), allied with the Flemings in their fight against the king of France. His military exploits earned him the title of governor of Flanders. In 1318 a quarrel between the inhabitants of Bouvignes-sur-Meuse (subjects of the Count of Namur) and those of Dinant (subjects of the bishop of Liège) led to war between Namur and Liège. This conflict, without much actual fighting, lasted four years before peace was concluded in 1322. This was not, however, the last fight between these two rival cities.

In 1335, Guy II (r. 1335–1336), who had become a vassal of the king of England, helped his suzerain in the war against the Scots. Although the English were victorious, the Count of Namur was ambushed and captured. Not long after he was released, Guy II died in a tournament held at Saint-Venant (12 March 1336).

Philip III (r. 1336–1337), the new count, sailed to the East. Landing on the island of Cyprus with his retinue, he committed such egregious excesses that the inhabitants of Famagusta ended up massacring him in September 1337. William I (r. 1337–1391) took an active part in the Hundred Years' War, resulting in his frequent absence from his native land. John III (r. 1418–1429) also had to deal with the rival cities of Bouvines and Dinant. In 1421 the count was forced to pay a large sum of money as compensation for the horrors that the inhabitants of Bouvines had inflicted on their enemies. The sum was so substantial that it led John III to sell his county to the Duke of Burgundy.

Luxemburg. The county of Luxemburg, later a duchy, appears only episodically in the military history of the Low Countries. As mentioned earlier, John the Blind was the leader of two broad coalitions against Brabant, and these two campaigns yielded no results. With the exception of the expeditions carried out by Anthony of Burgundy at the beginning of the fifteenth century in this principality, Luxemburg had no further involvement in the Low Countries. Because its seat of power rested in Bohemia, at that time the duchy was regarded as a territory of the Holy Roman Empire.

Guelders. Beginning in the second half of the fourteenth century, the duchy of Guelders was the main enemy of the duchy of Brabant. Several wars took place between the two. In addition to these conflicts, during the reign of Reginald III, Duke of Guelders (r. 1343–1361 and 1371), two enemy factions were formed inside the duchy: the Bronkhorsts and the Heeckerens. Civil war resulted when Edward (r. 1361–1371) attempted to usurp power from his brother Reginald III, whom he succeeded in capturing in 1361. When Edward died in the battle of Baesweiler (22 August 1371), Reginald was briefly duke again. With his death in December 1371, civil war ensued between Mechteld (Matilda), Duchess of Guelders (r. 1371–1379), and Willem van Jülich (r. 1371–1402). Later the death of Reginald IV (r. 1402–1423), which marked the end of the house of Jülich, again sparked civil war. The cities and nobility of Guelders supported Arnold of Egmont (r. 1423–1465 and 1471–1473), whereas the duchy of Jülich supported Adolf of Berg. The war lasted for more than twenty years, from 1423 to 1444, and exhausted the two parties.

Hundred Years' War. In 1336, King Edward III of England, planning an invasion of France, decided to launch his attack from the Low Countries. Because he could not rely on the assistance of Louis I, Count of Flanders and Nevers (r. 1322–1346), who was loyal to the king of France, Edward III sought other allies

in the region. Thanks to the strong support and diplomatic action of William I, Count of Hainaut, as well as Edward III's funding, many joined the English forces. The Duke of Brabant, the counts of Guelders, Berg, and Cleves, the Count Palatine of the Rhine, the Margrave of Jülich, the archbishop of Cologne, and the Lord of Fauquemont allied with England. The bishop of Liège and the counts of Flanders and Luxemburg, however, chose to support King Philip VI of France (r. 1328–1350).

From August 1336 the English placed Flanders under a hostile embargo, which brought Flanders to economic ruin. Louis of Nevers remained inflexible, however, and chose to sacrifice the well-being of his subjects rather than betray his suzerain. On 11 November 1337, English forces attacked the island of Cadzant and massacred the Flemish garrison charged with supervising the coast. This rather minor military encounter is important primarily from a historical standpoint, marking the opening of the Hundred Years' War in the northern theater. Later, in January 1338, Ghent revolted as a result of the economic hardships caused by the embargo. Under the leadership of Jacob van Artevelde, the revolt extended to all of Flanders. During the revolt, Louis of Nevers fled to France.

In July 1338, Edward III and his men disembarked in Antwerp. At that time the rulers of the Low Countries, except for the Duke of Brabant, were unwilling to carry a military campaign into France. The king of England waited more than a year before launching his attack. Then in September and October 1339 he devastated the Cambrésis, Vermandois, Soissonnais, and Thiérache. Edward III wished to defeat the king of France in a pitched battle, but the king of France avoided this. England did gain a great diplomatic victory on 3 December 1339 when the towns of Flanders recognized Edward as the true king of France and committed to helping him militarily. In exchange the embargo on wool was lifted; the towns obtained large subsidies and received a promise of help in the event of an attack by France.

In the early spring of 1340 the king of France retaliated. He threatened the borders of both Flanders and Hainaut, which forced Count William II of Hainaut to join the English camp without reserve. But on 24 June 1340 the French fleet was destroyed at Sluys, and later that summer Edward III landed on the continent. The English, supported by the dukes of Brabant and Guelders, the counts of Hainaut and Jülich, Jacob van Artevelde and his rebels, and volunteers from the county of Namur, besieged the city of Tournai. The siege lasted from July to September 1340 but failed. The presence of the Flemish rebels and their chief, Jacob van Artevelde, became a source of serious problems because Edward III did not have enough authority to maintain good relations among his allies.

During the siege of Tournai, in early September 1340, the French army established its camp halfway between Lille and Tournai. The vanguard, the men from Liège under the orders of Adolf de la Marck, camped near Tressin. An enemy troop made up of Brabançons and Hainauters patrolled the area. When the Liégeois foraged between Tressin and Baisieux, a scuffle ensued. After confused combat, the Liégeois defeated the Brabançons and Hainauters. This episode of the Hundred Years' War was unusual in involving men-at-arms originating only from the Low Countries.

On 25 September 1340 the truce of Esplechin suspended hostilities. The sympathies of the rulers of the Low Countries changed during the truce. In 1343 the Count of Hainaut, who had seen his territories devastated, made peace with the king of France. Reginald II, Duke of Guelders (r. 1326–1343), one of Edward III's most faithful allies, died on 12 October 1343. John III, Duke of Brabant, who would no longer tolerate the arrogance and power of Jacob van Artevelde, distanced himself from the English king. John III also hoped to take control of the lordship of Malines (Mechelen), a rich territory in Brabant. In 1347, in exchange for this territory, he joined the French camp. This change of alliance definitively weakened the position of the king of England in the Low Countries.

Meanwhile Jacob van Artevelde remained loyal to Edward III. He even offered the county of Flanders to Edward's son, the future Black Prince.

But in July 1345, Artevelde was assassinated. Flanders, because of its great need for English wool, stood by England. During the siege of Calais (September 1346–August 1347), the Flemings fought in the English camp and ensured a continuous supply for the army. But in 1349, Louis II of Male, the new Count of Flanders (r. 1346–1384), restored the authority of his title in his domains, and Edward III lost his last ally in the region. Consequently the Hundred Years' War was no longer waged in the Low Countries, with the exception of a few episodic events.

In 1379–1385 the county of Flanders was once more in full insurrection. This revolt gave the king of England a new opportunity to use the Low Countries as a base from which to attack the north of France—hence the zeal with which the king of France, Charles VI, helped the Count of Flanders quell the uprising. Their victory at Roosebeke (Westrozebeke; 27 November 1382) was a fatal blow to the rebellion. The English, who had not intervened earlier, sent the bishop of Norwich, Henry Despenser, to fight the followers of Clement VII, pope of Avignon. He landed in Calais in May 1383, seized the entire Flemish coast to Sluys, and in June besieged Ypres. A siege was raised with the arrival of a French army. After some skirmishes the English left the Continent. Finally, in 1388, Charles VI led his army against the Duke of Guelders, one of the last continental allies of the king of England. No feat of arms could animate this sad expedition, made to the great profit of Philip the Bold, Duke of Burgundy, and Joanna, Duchess of Brabant.

From the end of the fourteenth century the Low Country no longer served as a theater for the Hundred Years' War. Except for the dukes of Burgundy, the rulers of this region participated from time to time in the conflict, but their participation had only very minor effects on the unfolding of operations.

The Burgundian Conquest. The house of Burgundy obtained a foothold in the Low Countries when Philip the Bold became Count of Flanders in 1384. From that moment the house of Burgundy gradually extended its influence, taking total control of the Low Countries by the end of the fifteenth century. This process was not always carried out in a peaceful way. Some principalities voluntarily placed themselves under the protective wing of Burgundy, but others fought to keep their independence.

This fight grew more bitter beginning in 1397, when the house of Orléans also tried to gain influence in the region. Louis of Orléans concluded several treaties with the duchies of Luxemburg and Guelders. These initiatives, in a territory where John the Fearless, Duke of Burgundy (r. 1404–1419), was determined not to tolerate competitors, largely contributed to the assassination of Louis of Orléans on 23 November 1407. This crime did not free the Duke of Burgundy of his archenemy in France (the Dauphin, the future Charles VII), but it did remove a dangerous rival in the Low Countries.

The Burgundians' conquest of the Low Countries began in earnest in 1421 when Philip the Good purchased the county of Namur from John III. Deep in debt and without heirs, John III feared the threat from the Liégeois. To protect his domain it was better to sell the county to Philip, while retaining possession of it during his lifetime. Following the death of John III in 1429, the Duke of Burgundy peacefully gained possession of the county.

When Jacqueline of Bavaria and Humphrey of Gloucester entered Hainaut and threatened the Duke of Brabant, the latter requested the aid of the Burgundian duke Philip the Good. As a result Humphrey was defeated in April 1425 and returned to England to seek reinforcements, while Jacqueline was besieged in Mons. She capitulated, and the Duke of Burgundy kept her captive in Ghent. On 19 July 1425 the Duke of Brabant assigned the administration of Holland and Zeeland to Philip as a reward for his help. In August 1425, Jacqueline fled to Holland and once again took up arms, assisted by the Hoeks.

Initially the Burgundians suffered defeats at Alphen (21 October 1425) and Brouwershaven (13 or 19 January 1426), but then they were victorious at Zierickzee (1426), Zevenbergen (1427), the naval battle of Wieringen (September 1427), and the siege of Amersfoort (November 1427). As a result of the numerous Burgundian victories, Humphrey abandoned his support of Jacqueline, who then surrendered. On 3 July 1428, Philip the Good was officially



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recognized as governor and heir of Hainaut, Holland, and Zeeland. Later, in 1432, Jacqueline made one last attempt to recover her birthright. Philip the Good reacted firmly. Jacqueline's new husband was imprisoned and sentenced to death. In order to save him, Jacqueline agreed to surrender. On 12 April 1432, Philip the Good finally became Count of Hainaut, of Holland, and of Zeeland, and Lord of Frisia.

In 1430, Philip of Saint-Pol, Duke of Brabant (r. 1427–1430), suddenly died. Because the duke had no direct heir, Philip the Good was recognized by the estates as his successor. Louis of Hesse, as a descendant of the male line of Philip of Saint-Pol, made a claim to the duchy and raised troops in order to take it by force. After leading four hundred men-at-arms into the duchy of Limburg in September 1437, however, Louis was violently driven back to Aachen. After this, no one dared to challenge the authority of Philip the Good in the duchy of Brabant.

In 1435, Philip the Good persuaded Elisabeth of Görlitz, who was deep in debt, to sell her rights to the duchy of Luxemburg and to the county of Chiny. A great deal of fighting broke out in Luxemburg between the partisans and adversaries of the house of Burgundy. On 10 January 1442, Philip was named governor, but William of Saxony, brother of the elector Frederick II, had the legal means to dispute this nomination. William's men easily captured the town of Luxemburg and drove out Elisabeth. Philip the Good then seized Arlon and made this his base of operations. In August 1443 the Burgundians entered the duchy and met resistance in the towns of Thionville and Luxemburg. Under the cover of night, from 21 to 22 November, they seized Luxemburg by surprise. On 29 December 1443, William of Saxony gave up his rights for the sum of 120,000 guilders. The duchy of Luxemburg passed into Burgundian control.

Thanks to the favor gained by Philip the Good at the pontifical court following his crusade, in 1455 he obtained the bishopric of Utrecht from Pope Calixte III for his illegitimate son David. The canons, however, elected Gisbertus (Gijsbrecht) of Brederode to the bishopric. This posed a threat to Philip, because Gisbertus was supported by a powerful party, including the Hoecks in Holland. The Burgundians' expedition to the bishopric of Utrecht nevertheless proved a simple military undertaking. In 1456 the capital opened its gates, offering no resistance, and accepted its union with the remainder of the Low Countries.

In 1472, Philip the Good's son and successor, Charles the Bold (r. 1467–1477), became lord of the duchy of Guelders and the county of Zutphen. The death of Arnold of Egmond on 23 February 1473 enabled Charles to take possession of Guelders and Zutphen. The Gueldrois, however, desired to maintain their independence. Charles the Bold besieged Nijmegen over three weeks, and after the fall of that city he subdued the rest of the country. From that moment, except for the ecclesiastical principality of Liège, the Duke of Burgundy became the uncontested master of the Low Countries.

Under the House of Burgundy. Once under the authority of the dukes of Burgundy, the destinies of the principalities of the Low Countries became bound to that of their masters. The support of the principalities, however, was not always carried out with good will. If the nobility seems to have followed the dukes of Burgundy in their military adventures without objection, this was not always true of the cities. Although under the authority of the dukes, the large cities of the Low Countries, mainly Flanders, did not forget their individuality. The urban militias were no more inclined to help their natural lord in the fourteenth century than to follow a foreign prince to war in the fifteenth century. For example, the urban militia that agreed to help the duke failed him during the sieges of Ham (September 1411), Calais (July 1436), and Le Crotoy (December 1437). The Duke of Burgundy was then convinced that the urban militias, which had been quite formidable in the past, were no longer the answer for modern warfare. This was why, in the years to come, Philip the Good avoided having to resort to the use of their service. He was satisfied merely to request financial or material aid—which, however, was not always granted. Charles the Bold had to cope with the same problem. In 1473, for example, the Flemings, overburdened by taxes, balked when the duke requested that they provide diggers, carriages, and war machines.

The unreliability of urban militias was not the only problem emanating from the cities. Urban rebellions were frequent: for example, in Antwerp (1434), Bruges (1436–1437), Amsterdam (1445), and Dordrecht (1445). The most serious revolt started in 1451 when Philip the Good tried to establish a new salt tax in Flanders. The town of Ghent revolted, appointed captains, and sent its militia to occupy the castles of the surrounding area. In April 1452 the militia attacked the castle of Gavre and the town of Oudenaarde. The Duke of Burgundy counterattacked. He won at Rupelmonde (16 June 1452) and then, thanks to powerful artillery, seized the castles of Schendelbeke (June 1452) and Poeke (July 1452). After that, to deprive Ghent of any means of provisioning itself, he systematically burned the surrounding villages. Finally, engaged under the walls of Gavre, the militias were massacred (23 July 1453). The city now existed at the mercy of the duke.

All these problems seem of little importance when the tumultuous relations between the house of Burgundy and the principality of Liège are examined. The Liégeois had not forgotten the defeat that John the Fearless had inflicted on them at the battle of Othée (23 September 1408). Their hatred was transferred to John's son, Philip the Good, whom the Liégeois also regarded as an enemy.

The first open war began a few years after John's murder in 1419. In June 1430 when Philip the Good besieged Compiègne, the Liégeois in turn invaded the county of Namur and burned several localities. The unexpected death of the Duke of Brabant resulted in the Duke of Burgundy's acquisition of Brabant and Limburg. This sudden increase in the Burgundian power base forced the Liégeois to reconsider a war undertaken without sufficient preparation. With the confidence of the Liégeois shattered, their army quickly returned home. A truce that heralded a time of peace was concluded on 15 September 1431.

Although there were no open conflicts for years, intrigue and provocations were numerous. When Bishop John of Heinsberg (r. 1420–1455) abdicated in November 1455, Louis of Bourbon (r. 1456–1482), a nephew of Philip the Good, was chosen as a successor on 30 March 1456. The duke believed that the appointment would be a good opportunity to establish Burgundian power in the principality. Future events proved him wrong. The new bishop acted as a despot and quickly lost the sympathy of his subjects. Civil war ensued once more. Hopes quickly faded that Philip the Good would be able to take control of the principality peacefully.

In 1461, once Louis XI (r. 1461–1483) had become king of France, he hurried to conclude an alliance with the Liégeois. The latter were deceived: whereas the Liégeois believed that they had found a powerful ally, in reality they were being handled by a skillful politician ready to sacrifice them in his fight against the house of Burgundy. In 1465, during the War of the Public Weal, the king of France promised to place two hundred men-at-arms at the disposal of the Liégeois, asserting that he would invade the county of Hainaut while the Liégeois attacked the duchy of Brabant. Meanwhile Louis XI lost the battle of Montlhéry (16 July 1465) to Charles the Bold and hastened to negotiate with him. Subsequently he gave up his former allies to the wrath of the Duke of Burgundy. But on 30 August 1465 the Liégeois declared war on the Duke of Burgundy and then attacked the county of Namur and duchy of Limburg. The Burgundian army, back from France, won the battle of Montenaken (20 October 1465) and forced the Liégeois to surrender (22 December 1465).

The peace was short-lived. As soon as the threat of the Burgundian army began to wane, the enemies of Charles the Bold gathered again. The duke became furious. His army then besieged Dinant. After one week of intense bombardment, the city surrendered unconditionally and was subjected to atrocious plundering (August 1466). The Liégeois were again obliged to ask for mercy (10 September 1466).

Nonetheless the Liégeois did not give up fighting the Burgundians. On the night of 16–17 September 1467 the Liégeois devastated the town of Huy, the favorite residence of Louis of Bourbon. Charles the Bold reacted quickly. His men-at-arms crushed the Liégeois at Brustem on 28 October 1467 and established their camp near Liège, close to the abbey of Saint Laurent. The city capitulated and its

walls were dismantled. Louis of Bourbon was then reinstalled, and the Liégeois were stripped of their political rights.

When the war began anew between France and Burgundy, some rebels, supported by France, took control of Liège on 9 September 1468. The following day they captured Tongres, infuriating Charles the Bold. In negotiations with Louis XI, Charles forced the king of France to come and attend the execution of his allies. Tongres was retaken on 15 October, and the Liégeois were beaten at Lantin on 22 October. On the 26th the Burgundian army arrived at Liège. The fighting was brutal. During the night of the 29th a few hundred fighters from the nearby Franchimont castle tried in vain to seize the Duke of Burgundy and the king of France. The following day the Burgundians entered the city: it was systematically plundered, destroyed, and burned. The principality and town of Liège never again were a thorn in the side of the Burgundians.

[*See also* Arques, Battle of; Artevelde, Jacob van; Artevelde, Philip van; Baesweiler, Battle of; Bevershoutsveld, Battle of; Brabançons; Brustem, Battle of; Calais, Siege of (1346–1347); Cassel, Battle of (1328); Charles the Bold; Courtrai, Battle and Siege of; Dinant, Siege of; Hundred Years' War; Liège, Siege of; Mons-en-Pévèle, Battle of; Montlhéry, Battle of; Philip the Bold; Scheut, Battle of; Sluys, Naval Battle of; Tournai, Siege of; *and* Ypres, Siege of.]

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Sergio Boffa

Historiography (1300–1479)

Because the Netherlands and Belgium never had a very good reputation regarding military history, military historical accounts of these areas are scarce and often outdated. We must therefore begin by consulting the great national histories like the *Geschiedenis van Vlaanderen*, edited by Robert van Roosbroeck, and the *Histoire de Belgique* of Henri Pirenne. Several key monographs add additional military detail to the outlines provided in these histories, notably the work of Henry Stephen Lucas on the Hundred Years' War and the works of Fritz Quicke and Henri Laurent on the advent of the house of Burgundy in the Low Countries.

These can be supplemented with the old military history of Charles Terlinden and with the seminal work of J. F. Verbruggen, translated into English under the title *The Art of Warfare in Western Europe during the Middle Ages*. Although this study deals broadly with the Western world, the references to

the Low Countries are extremely numerous. The second edition of the translation, which includes the scholarly documentation, is far preferable the first but is not entirely complete.

Verbruggen is also the undisputed expert on the Flemish armies of the beginning of the fourteenth century and on the battle of Courtrai (also known as the battle of the Golden Spurs). Of all the battles that were fought in the Low Countries, this battle is without doubt the one that has received the most attention. The work of Verbruggen can be supplemented with the books of Frantz Funck-Brentano, Pirenne, V. Deprez, and David Nicholas; these books describe the many conflicts that agitated Flanders through the fourteenth century. The principality of Liège has been the subject of special attention by Claude Gaier. His researches should be supplemented by the study of Edouard Poncelet. The work of Sergio Boffa has been devoted to the duchy of Brabant; an article by Léon Zylbergeld offers additional material in this area. The military organization of the county of Namur is known to us thanks to the work of Joseph Balon and Jules Borgnet. No comparable work has been done for Hainaut, though limited information can be found in *Châteaux chevaliers en Hainaut au Moyen Âge*, the catalog of an exhibition on the castles and the knights of Hainaut, edited by Philippe Beaussart and Alain Salamagne, and in an article by Léopold Devillers. Ronald P. de Graaf studies the military tactics used in the county of Holland. His research is complemented by the work of H. M. Brokken, Marinus Jacobus Waale, H. P. H. Jansen and P. C. M. Hoppenbrouwers, and Antheun Janse.

Unfortunately the other principalities of the Low Countries have not received as much attention, and no synthesis of the military organization of the duchies of Limburg and Guelders or the counties of Looz and Luxemburg exists. The Burgundian armies, on the other hand, have been the subject of many works; Bertrand Schnerb is the principal specialist in this area. The works of Henri Louis Gustave Guillaume, Jules de La Chauvelays, Charles Brustem, and Richard Vaughan, though older, remain valuable.

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Sergio Boffa

LUCERA, SIEGE OF

The siege of Lucera was part of the war between Charles I, King of Naples and Sicily (called Charles of Anjou), and Conradin, Duke of Swabia (from 1262), the grandson of Frederick II, King of Germany and Sicily and Holy Roman Emperor. As Conradin prepared to descend into Italy in 1267, the Muslims of Lucera rebelled against Charles, waving the Swabian flag. The Muslim colony of Lucera had been established by Frederick II. It was populated by Sicilian Muslims who had been expelled from the island after a series of religious revolts in the early thirteenth century. Frederick had fortified the city with an impregnable fortress on a rocky outcrop. When Lucera revolted, Charles immediately besieged the city.

The siege, however, bore no fruit, and in the meantime, Conradin's army arrived in Italy. Charles was thus forced to delegate the leadership of the siege, obeying a summons to Viterbo from the pope, who named him vicar of Tuscany. From there, he went into Tuscany to slow Conradin's advance (Conradin was now in Pisa). But the alarming news that came from Sicily and the south led Charles to return to Lucera. He commanded operations at Lucera again until Conradin penetrated into the Regno (the Kingdom of Sicily) from the Abruzzi region and he made the decision to face Conradin's army. After the victory at Tagliacozzo (23 August 1268) he returned to besiege Lucera again.

Despite Conradin's defeat at Tagliacozzo, Lucera continued to resist until the city was finally forced by hunger to surrender on 27 August 1269. Charles ordered the Christians of Lucera executed, while the Muslims were merely dispersed. In a *sirventès* (a genre of Occitan partisan political poetry), a troubadour from Genoa named Galega Panzano reproached Charles for sparing the Muslims while proving merciless toward the Christians, writing, "only the unbelievers of Lucera got the truce and peace they wanted. They can shout aloud, 'Muhammad!'" After his victory, Charles added a new wall to the city with impressive towers at the corners, which is how Lucera now appears. Charles would later employ Muslim troops in his army. The Muslim colony of Lucera was finally abolished only in 1300.

[*See also* Charles of Anjou; Conradin; Italy, *subentry on* Narrative (1000–1300); *and* Tagliacozzo, Battle of.]

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Federico Canaccini

M

Machiavelli, Niccolò

(1469–1527), Italian philosopher, writer, and politician. Best known today as the author of the *Prince* and the *Discourses on Livy*, in his own lifetime Machiavelli was most famous for leading the revival of a Florentine militia, composed of troops from the countryside, and for his dialogue the *Art of War*, which quickly became one of the most widely circulated books in early modern Europe.

Apart from readings in history (mostly ancient), Machiavelli's experience in military matters consisted of service as second chancellor of the Florentine republic and secretary to Florence's war magistracy, the Ten of Liberty and Peace, to which he was elected in 1498. At the time Florence was engaged in wars with Pisa and Venice, and shortly afterward the republic faced civil war in Pistoia (1499–1502), an invasion by Cesare Borgia (1501), and the rebellion of Arezzo along with Cortona and the Casentino (1502). Machiavelli was responsible for drafting missives and coordinating the letter traffic of the executive councils with the republic's military commissioners in the field and with numerous territorial governors. The suspension twice in this period of the Ten of Liberty and Peace (perceived as antidemocratic) only enhanced the role of the chancery official assigned to defense matters. Machiavelli also went on diplomatic missions, notably to Cesare Borgia, whose success in establishing a loyal peasant militia in Romagna Machiavelli observed and learned from.

Many of Florence's problems in these years involved mercenary captains or troops sent by unreliable foreign rulers, most especially Louis XII of France. Largely on Machiavelli's initiative, in 1506 Florence established a militia in the parts of the dominion that were pro-Florentine to supplement (not replace) its mercenary forces. In view of the success of the rural militia, Machiavelli wrote that he hoped eventually to enroll inhabitants of Florence, too. As chancellor of the Nine of Militia, Machiavelli was active in recruitment, organization, and tactics. At its peak in 1512, the militia numbered five thousand infantry soldiers, with an incipient mounted force as well. The militia was given much credit for retaking Pisa in 1509, but it has often been unfairly blamed for the sack of Prato in 1512. Although some militia forces helped to defend Prato, most of the troops were nonmilitia, the commander was a mercenary, and Machiavelli was not personally involved.

Apart from a play and a poem, the *Art of War* (1521) was the only one of Machiavelli's works to be published while he was alive. With this work Machiavelli no doubt hoped to capitalize on the fame of his militia experience. Written in the form of a dialogue

between the mercenary captain Fabrizio Colonna and several young Florentines, the book is often misread as a superficial embrace of the style of warfare of antiquity. Machiavelli has been accused of neglecting gunpowder weapons, for instance, yet the *Art of War* recommends a generous ratio (for those days) of one gunman to six pikemen. Machiavelli was convinced, both by ancient example and by the success of the Swiss, of the importance of massed squares of pikemen in his preferred mode of offensive warfare, but in this he was far from alone. The *Art of War* discusses recruitment, training (including drill), supply, and tactics, including the use of religion in battle. There are interesting allusions to the threat posed to Christian Europe by the Ottoman Turks. When, at the dialogue's end, the question of the education and training of the commander is raised, Machiavelli coyly leaves the reader in suspense. He had already written the *Prince*, a quite didactic work on the subject.

[*See also* Diplomacy; Italy, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1493); Just War, Just Motive; Laws of War and Just Conduct of War; Manuals, Military; Plans, Military; *and* Theory, Military.]

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William J. Connell

MACLODIO, BATTLE OF

In 1426 a number of Italian states had created a league to stop Filippo Maria Visconti, Duke of Milan, from expanding his dominion in north-central Italy. In 1427 a Venetian army under Francesco Bussone, Count of Carmagnola, conducted some desultory operations against the Milanese in Lombardy, but the Venetian senate wanted Carmagnola to wage a more vigorous campaign. The senate angrily rebuffed the suggestion that the army move to winter quarters by September, and the count, his command at stake, decided to bring the enemy to battle. Accordingly, after conquering the Visconti stronghold of Montichiari, Carmagnola marched his army of twelve thousand cavalry and six thousand infantry toward the Milanese main force of eighteen thousand cavalry and eight thousand infantry encamped near Trenzano, a few miles from Maclodio. Arriving on the morning of 11 October 1427, Carmagnola deployed his army to the west of this hamlet, behind a bridge at the end of a causeway surrounded by swamps and canals. Executing a carefully studied plan, the count placed two thousand shooters in the woods flanking the elevated road near the bridge, and he ordered his sappers to build a parallel path to its right through the marshlands.

Informed of the Venetians' arrival, the Visconti commander Carlo Malatesta held a war council and, bowing to the impetuous advice of Niccolò Piccinino and Francesco Sforza, decided to attack. The Milanese right flank took up a strong defensive position on some dry ground in front of Trenzano, while Piccinino's forces occupied the causeway because the marshes to his left were unsuitable for cavalry. In the early hours of the afternoon, Carmagnola launched a small mounted attack along the causeway, but it was easily repulsed by Piccinino's superior forces. As the victorious Milanese advanced toward the bridge, Carmagnola's crossbowmen in

the woods subjected them to a withering fire, and massed Venetian foot soldiers surged forward. Recoiling toward Trenzano, Piccinino deployed west of the Milanese right flank, only to be hit in the side and the rear by the units that Carmagnola had sent under the command of Ranieri Montemelini along the artificial path. Conducting a fighting retreat, Piccinino left the Visconti right flank fully exposed to the Venetian assault, forcing Malatesta to surrender together with ten thousand of his soldiers after a sharp fight. A counterattack from Sforza slowed the victor's pursuit, allowing the rump of the Milanese forces to break loose.

Aside from prisoners, both sides suffered surprisingly few casualties. A few days later, following the custom of the time, Carmagnola released most of his prisoners, much to the chagrin of the Venetians. In any case the upcoming winter season canceled any chance of exploiting the victory, whereas Visconti's vast resources in matériel allowed him to field a fully equipped army of five thousand cavalry and two thousand infantry within weeks of his apparently crushing defeat.

[*See also* Bussone, Francesco; Italy, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1493); *and* Piccinino, Niccolò.]

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Niccolò Capponi

MAGNUS I OLAFSSON

(c. 1024–1047), King of Norway from 1035 to his death. The illegitimate son of King Olaf II Haraldsson (Saint Olaf), Magnus was brought up in the Kievan Rus'. He returned in 1035 or 1036 to be proclaimed king in western Norway, where the rule of Sven, son of Cnut the Great, had been unpopular. Sven retreated to Denmark to join his brother, the Danish king Harthacnut, and died there within the same year. After inconclusive struggles Harthacnut and Magnus Olafsson signed a treaty in 1038, assigning both the Danish and the Norwegian empires to the surviving party with male offspring. But after Harthacnut's death in 1042, this treaty was violated by Sven II Estridsson, son of Cnut's sister, who claimed the Danish throne. Sven II successfully defended his claim with the help of King Anund Jacob of Sweden. Neither Magnus Olafsson nor his successor Harald Hardrada managed to drive Sven from Denmark despite repeated attacks.

Magnus himself remained unpopular in Norway because he upheld the strict laws of Cnut's son Sven and because of his unsuccessful attempts to establish his kingship over Denmark (officially he had been proclaimed king of Denmark at Viborg in 1042). Only after growing unrest in Norway and repeated admonition by skalds did he alter his ways and earn the sobriquet "the Good" (in comparison to his previous unpopularity). In his last year he had to share power in Norway with his uncle Harald Hardrada.

Magnus's campaigns in Denmark were relatively successful, but of little durability. In 1043 he repelled the Slavic Wends at Lyrskov Heath, making him a popular defender of Denmark, and in 1047, with the help of a Swedish army under King Anund Jacob, he managed to drive Sven out of Zeeland. But Magnus died the same year, and his reign had few permanent consequences either in Norway or in Denmark.

[*See also* Harald Hardrada.]

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Rudolf Simek

MAKRY PLAGI, BATTLE OF

Following the reestablishment of the Byzantine Empire at Constantinople in 1261, Emperor Michael

VIII Palaeologus (r. 1259–1282) attempted to recover Byzantine power, first in the Peloponnesos.

After the Byzantine defeats at Prinitza (Olympia) and Mesiskli (Elis), their next great clash with the Franks took place in the spring of 1263 at Makry Plagi (meaning "broad hillside" in Greek), the most important passage between the central Peloponnesos and Messenia. The Byzantines acted strategically by taking possession of "the passes and all the defiles of the high ridge of Makry Plagi" (Lurier, p. 226). At the same time, Ancelin de Toucy, Lord of Mottola, carefully organized the Frankish troops in three squadrons: the first was led by him, the second comprised the Turkish mercenaries, and the squadron led by William II of Villehardouin, Prince of Achaea, formed the rear guard.

While climbing up the slope of Makry Plagi, the Franks were ambushed and routed by the Byzantines. The superior numbers of the latter were stressed in the *Chronicle of Morea* as the main reason for their initial success. Nevertheless, the knights returned to battle with "lances and swords," and even after the second Byzantine attack, they managed to turn back and fight. At the same time, the Franks received crucial support from the Turks, who routed and put to flight the Byzantine forces. Many Byzantine leaders, including the Grand *Domestikos* (perhaps Philes, rather than Constantine) and 354 high noblemen (*sevastes*), were taken prisoner, along with 5,030 lesser archons and soldiers. One of the prisoners, Makrinos, was probably exchanged for the brother of Ancelin de Toucy, Philip, imprisoned in Constantinople. Nonetheless, the disastrous defeat of the Byzantines in the battle of Makry Plagi did not put an end to the Greek-Frankish war that continued throughout the next decade.

[*See also* Prinitza, Battle of.]

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Rossina Kostova

MALASGARD, BATTLE OF

See Mantzikert, Battle of.

MALATESTA, SIGISMONDO PANDOLFO, AND THE MALATESTA CLAN

Upon the death of Pandolfo and Carlo Malatesta in 1427 and 1429, respectively, the sovereignty of the Malatestas ended up in the hands of the three sons of Pandolfo: Sigismondo Pandolfo, Domenico (generally known as Malatesta Novello), and Galeotto. The Malatestas' territory included Rimini, Cesena, Fano, and other lands that the Romagnol lords held with the title of papal vicars. Upon the death of Galeotto, Cesena went to Malatesta Novello and Rimini to Sigismondo Pandolfo. Both brothers, especially Sigismondo, chose military careers out of the necessity to defend the autonomy of their dominions.

Sigismondo was born in Brescia on 19 June 1417, son of a Lombard gentlewoman; his birth was then legitimated by his father. In 1435 Sigismond received an allotment of two hundred lancers from Pope Eugene IV and backed for several years a papacy that had just emerged from the tribulations of the Great Schism. In 1437 he was granted an even more advantageous allotment from the rulers of Venice, and after a defeat by Niccolò Piccinino, he returned to fight in central Italy, where he allied himself with a new contender, the count Francesco Sforza, who had become sovereign of the March of Ancona and a standard-bearer of the Church, and with the league between Venice and Florence. It is not possible here to enter into the dense narrative of events and innumerable undertakings attributable to the two



Sforza and Malatesta. Galeazzo Maria Sforza (1444–1476, *extreme left*) and Sigismondo Pandolfo Malatesta (1417–1468) beside him on a horse. Detail from the *Journey of the Magi* fresco by Benozzo Gozzoli (c. 1420–1497), Palazzo Medici-Riccardi, Florence, c.1460. PALAZZO MEDICI-RICCARDI, FLORENCE, ITALY/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

Malatesta brothers. It would be adequate, however, to say that, in an Italy dominated by five large territorial states, working within the unstable region of papal vicars, the lords of Cesena and Rimini sought to consolidate and extend their territories without exhausting their relationship with the pontiff, and to contend against the successes of their principal adversary, Count Federico of Urbino. Sigismondo Pandolfo augmented his fame as a captain and on 8 November 1443, at Monteluro, fared well against a band of famous captains united under the papal flag, among whom were his brother, Malatesta Novello; his long-term adversary, Federico da Montefeltro; and Niccolò Piccinino.

From 1444 to 1450, Sigismondo Pandolfo fought at the service of almost every Italian power, often finding himself forced to switch sides. More than adhering to a particular school of combat, Malatesta was the prototype of the prince-condottiere who had to reconcile the defense of his territories with militaries in the service of lords, cities, and states that were more powerful. Already allied with Sforza, he then received an appointment from the pope, from the duke of Milan, and from the king of Naples; he was attacked by the Sforza military in 1445; he fought with Milan in 1446, with Naples in 1447, with Florence in 1448 (occasionally in the same ranks as his rival, Montefeltro), and with Venice in 1449. It was not easy for a prince-condottiere to maneuver within such a mutable and treacherous diplomatic framework, and as Philip J. Jones, the principal scholar of the Malatestas, observed, Sigismondo Pandolfo was at times hindered by his unbending, impulsive, often imperious, and fickle character—he was on occasion disloyal for reasons of opportunism and self-interest—while his primary adversary, Montefeltro, was more skillful in political-military relations.

Nevertheless, around 1449 Malatesta reached the apex of success: Venice had bestowed upon him the title of captain-general and a company of two thousand horsemen and five hundred infantry. His appointments had allowed him to reconquer

various territories around Rimini and Senigallia. In return, he created an enemy in King Alfonso of Naples, who demanded of him repayment of a hefty sum, stemming from a contract that was not respected. When the Peace of Lodi was concluded in 1454 and the Italic League formed in 1455, the Aragonese king excluded Malatesta from the assembly of the Italian states, exposing him to the risk of diplomatic isolation. When Alfonso died in 1458, the debt was not canceled and the issue was entrusted to the arbitration of the new pope, Pius II, who required that Malatesta surrender a number of lands as payment. Malatesta refused, and the pope, who had developed a deep hatred for Malatesta, excommunicated him in 1460 and the next year dispatched his army to claim Malatesta's territories. Malatesta, who had meanwhile allied himself with Jean of Anjou, a contender for the throne of the Kingdom of Naples, at first reacted pridefully to the papal anathemas, and on 2 July 1461, at Nidastore, near Fano, defeated the papal forces commanded by the count of Urbino. It was also one of the first battles in which his legitimate son, Roberto (who had also adopted a military career), participated.

Increasingly exacerbated, Pius II subjected Sigismondo to a questionable canonical trial, sent his armies, and defeated him numerous times in 1462 and 1463. The Malatestas lost a good portion of their territories and had to agree that after their own deaths Rimini and Cesena would return to direct papal control. Isolated and repeatedly defeated, Sigismondo sought to revive himself materially and morally, and in 1464 turned to Venice, which was seeking a reputable commander to lead an undertaking against the Turks in Greece. It was a disastrous undertaking: after eighteen months of scarcity, disease, and inconclusive military events, Malatesta experienced more disappointments than successes. His absence invited Venetian and papal attacks on Rimini, and when he returned to Italy, both his health and reputation had been compromised, and his status weakened.

In his final years, Malatesta fought under the service of the new pope, Paul II, and fell ill while fighting at Norcia in the spring of 1468 and died on 9 October 1468 at Rimini, where he was buried. A condottiere of high reputation, he had a rough and inflexible character, and was not always adept at navigating the stormy seas of Italian diplomacy. On the other hand, he possessed a refined military knowledge, demonstrated, among other factors, by the construction of innovative fortifications and by the presence at his court of Roberto Valturio, author of a famous and well-regarded treatise on military engineering.

The true military successor to Sigismondo in the military and politics was his son, Roberto, born around 1441. He had long fought with the Duke of Milan, and while Sigismondo was in the Morea, he had unsuccessfully sought to obtain sovereignty of Cesena, left vacant by the death of his uncle, Malatesta Novello. Upon the death of his father, Federico da Montefeltro, whose daughter he had married, helped him realize his aspirations at Rimini. Because of papal opposition, a great war of succession erupted that concluded in 1469. Roberto received the sovereignty of Rimini and carried on the Malatesta dynasty for several decades. For Roberto, like his predecessors, a military career was the decisive factor in enabling him to keep together the territories and lordships he inherited from his ancestors. He died in 1482, haloed by military fame and the sobriquet "the Magnificent."

[*See also* Federico da Montefeltro.]

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Translated from the Italian by Joe Jackson

MALBORK, SIEGE OF

See Marienburg, Siege of.

MALDON, BATTLE OF

The battle fought at Maldon, Essex, in 991 CE between the forces of an unnamed Scandinavian invader (sometimes identified as Olaf Tryggvason, later king of Norway) and Byrhtnoth, an English ealdorman (governor), was commemorated in a contemporary poem. Although the original manuscript does not survive, it was copied before it perished in 1731, and it gives a unique insight into the military attitudes of the English at the end of the first millennium (Griffiths; Pollington, *English Warrior*, app. 3). Byrhtnoth had been a major figure in English political life for at least three decades. He was responsible for the administration of most of the eastern seaboard, and he was able to muster troops from across southern and eastern England to defend the land.

Although the opening and closing sections of the poem have been lost, it may be inferred that a Viking fleet ravaged eastern England during the summer of 991, as the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* relates. By early August, the fleet had moored in the river Blackwater and was threatening the important administrative center of Maldon. The poem tells of the disposition of the English forces along a tidal riverbank to contain the Scandinavians on an island (usually identified as Northey, which is linked to the mainland by a tidal causeway). In an exchange of messages, the Vikings asked for permission to cross to the mainland once the causeway was uncovered by the tide, to which Byrhtnoth agreed *for his ofermode*; this may mean "in his pride" or "in his excessive courage." The decision was ill judged, for Byrhtnoth was killed in the fighting, and some of his forces withdrew in disarray. A knot of warriors refused to flee, and the poem records that they encouraged each other to stand firm against the foe. Their stirring words are among the best-loved in Old English verse. The *Chronicle* states that the victorious Vikings went on to threaten London.

The battle was significant in several ways: the death of Byrhtnoth encouraged the king, Aethelred II, to buy the raiders off with money, which he raised through a new tax, the danegeld. The refusal of the English forces to flee demonstrates a common feature of Germanic heroic verse—the decision to die with one's lord and friends rather than flee to save one's life. In addition, the poem records acts of courage and cowardice by named individuals and is therefore a unique window into contemporary attitudes to warfare. It has been calculated that Byrhtnoth must have been in his mid-sixties at the time of the battle, and it is remarkable for a man of this age to have considered taking an active part in war.

The words of Byrhtnoth's friend, Byrhtwold, capture the spirit of the poem well, as the elderly warrior calls out to his companions: "Mind shall be the harder, heart the keener, courage the greater as our strength dwindles. Here our leader lies hewn down, the good man on the ground. May he always mourn who now thinks to turn back from this war-play!"

[*See also* Olaf I Tryggvason.]

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Stephen Pollington

MALORY, SIR THOMAS

(c. 1414–1471), English writer most noted for *Le Morte Darthur*, a lengthy prose version of Arthurian legend. The author, commonly identified as Sir Thomas Malory of Newbold Revel, was probably a Warwickshire knight who may have seen combat during England's Wars of the Roses. Perhaps jailed for alleged attempted murder, rape, and theft, Malory composed at least part of *Le Morte Darthur* in prison and completed the work between 1469 and 1470.

Following the French and English sources from which he adapted his version of the legend, Malory associated warfare with the beginning and ending of Arthur's reign. Young Arthur wars to subdue rebellious client kings and repel a Roman demand for tribute. Once established, he does not engage in warfare again until the end of his reign, when court tensions erupt into civil wars with his chief knight Sir Lancelot and his nephew Mordred.

Malory departed from his sources in several regards. He made his depictions of warfare more realistic, adding foot soldiers to Arthur's army, cannon to a siege of the Tower of London, *chevauchées* (the devastating mounted expeditions characteristic of the Hundred Years' War), battlefield pillagers, and the mass casualties of real fifteenth-century battles such as Towton. Malory also emphasized Arthur's abilities as a general. Malory's young king wins battles with Merlin's tactical advice but not with his magic, and Arthur's bravery in combat contrasts with the cowardice of King Mark of Cornwall, who leaves fighting to his nephew. Finally, Malory heightened justification for Arthur's wars. Increased references to pagan invasion and crusading heighten the justness of Arthur's wars, and Malory's Arthur is crowned Roman emperor, a point of national prestige.

Critics have traced links between the priorities of chivalric culture, in which knights achieved honor by combat, and the destructiveness of warfare, to which tensions caused by the unexpected outcomes of individual combat contributed. Generally considered an admirer of chivalry, Malory tended to sublimate this connection. Malory's idealized relationship between chivalry and warfare influenced cultural perceptions of the English gentleman and of England's imperial mission through to the twentieth century.

[*See also* Chivalry; Honor; Knighthood and Knights; *and* Roses, Wars of the.]

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MALTA, NAVAL BATTLE OF

This 1283 battle, which took place in Grand Harbour off Valletta, Malta, was the most important early engagement between the forces of Charles I of Anjou and Peter III of Aragon and Catalonia during the War of the Sicilian Vespers (1282–1302). Charles, supported by the papacy, and Peter, asserting the right to rule through his wife, Constance, the daughter of the late king Manfred of Hohenstaufen (r. 1258–1266), both claimed the throne of Naples. Peter had taken advantage of a revolt in Messina in March 1282 to expel Charles' forces from Sicily to the mainland. In May 1283 Charles collected a fleet in Marseilles, which was ordered to sail to Malta where Angevin and Aragonese land forces were also engaged. The Aragonese fleet under Ruggiero di Lauria (Roger of Lauria) set off in pursuit, arriving at Gozo three days after the Angevins reached Valletta.

The two fleets met on 8 June in Grand Harbour. The battle was well reported in contemporary chronicles, but the details of the numbers engaged, and of casualties and of vessels taken or escaped, differ widely from source to source. Only one chronicler, the Catalan Ramón Muntaner, is known to have had any experience of naval warfare. Both sides probably had around twenty galleys. Lauria brought his forces into the harbor at dawn and sounded all his trumpets; this roused the Angevin crews, who put out into the harbor in their galleys (which had been beached below the Castel San Angelo). Lauria is also described as cabling his galleys together to form a kind of floating fighting platform, but this may be a misinterpretation of the technical Catalan maritime terms used by Muntaner.

Both fleets began by loosing a torrent of missiles, with the expert Catalan crossbowmen doing great damage to the Angevin galleymen. The second phase of the battle featured Lauria's lightly armed and agile *almugavers* (foot soldiers) boarding and capturing Angevin vessels, on which many of the fighting men were heavily armored men-at-arms from the garrison of the Castel, less able to cope with the conditions on the galley decks. The Aragonese undoubtedly won a crushing victory, inflicting heavy casualties including killing one enemy commander.

Aragonese casualties amounted to around 288 men killed or wounded. Angevin losses were said to have been over thirty-five hundred, probably an exaggeration by Muntaner to increase the glory of Lauria's victory. Another chronicler states that 860 men were taken prisoner. At least one and possibly as many as seven Angevin galleys made good their escape from Grand Harbour as the battle drew to a close at dusk. The destruction of a good proportion of Angevin naval resources ensured Peter III's control of Sicily until his death in 1285. The Angevin loss of many experienced galleymen may also have helped the Aragonese to win further naval victories in 1285 at Rosas and Las Hormigas, when France attacked Aragon itself. The skills and fighting abilities of the Aragonese and Catalan crossbowmen and *almugavars* were clearly a crucial element in the success of Lauria's forces.

[*See also* Ruggiero di Lauria *and* Sicilian Vespers, The.]

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MAMLUKS

"Mamluk" is a term used to describe both military slaves in general, mostly of Turkish origin, in the Muslim world from the ninth century onward, and a state established by men of such provenance in Egypt and Syria from 1250 to 1517. The Arabic term *mamluk* (pl., *mamalik*) literally means "owned"; in the earlier centuries the term *ghulam* (pl., *ghilman*), "youth," was usually used for these slaves, but by the twelfth century this had been almost completely replaced by *mamluk*.

Military slavery existed in the central and eastern Muslim countries from the early ninth century onward. The future caliph al-Mu'tasim (r. 833–842), already in the time of reign of his brother al-Ma'mun (r. 813–833), established a large guard unit of several thousand Central Asian Turks who were most certainly slaves. In the following centuries, units of Turkish mamluks—who invariably functioned as mounted archers—often became the mainstay of Muslim armies from Egypt eastward. Even the Seljuks, who arrived in the Muslim world in the early eleventh century together with their nomadic Turkoman followers, soon set up a mamluk corps as the backbone of their military might. The importance of the mamluk units was continued in the various successor states to the Seljuks, not the least the Zengids and Ayyubids in Egypt, Syria, and east of

Mamluks. Two Mamluk swordsmen. Illustration from *Nihayat al-su'l*, a fourteenth-century Egyptian manual on horsemanship and military practice. © THE TRUSTEES OF THE CHESTER BEATTY LIBRARY, DUBLIN/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

the Euphrates. Units composed of Turks of slave provenance were the backbone of the Muslim efforts in these areas against the crusaders starting with the latter's arrival in northern Syria in 1097. Toward the middle of the thirteenth century, particularly during the reign of al-Malik al-Salih Ayyub (r. 1240–1249), the numbers of mamluks increased, in part because of their ready availability in the slave markets due to the Mongol invasions in the steppe regions north of the Black Sea and the Caucasus. These mamluks, particularly of the Bahriyya regiment, proved themselves against the Franks in the battle of Mansurah in the eastern Nile Delta in 1249. Soon afterward, a group of mamluks assassinated al-Salih Ayyub's son and successor, al-Mu'azzam Turanshah. Instead of picking a puppet-sultan from the Ayyubid family, as would have been expected, they elected one of their own, inaugurating what became known as the Mamluk Sultanate (and henceforth "mamluk" will be referred to with a capital M). After a decade of internal fighting and struggles with Ayyubid princes in Syria, the Mamluks under Sultan Qutuz defeated a Mongol force at 'Ayn Jalut in northern Palestine in 1260. In the aftermath of this victory, they gained control over most of Syria up to the Euphrates, which would remain the border of the Mamluk Sultanate until the Ottoman invasion in 1516.

The Era of the Sultanate. The slave experience of the Mamluks, certainly in the time of the sultanate, was not mainly one of humiliation and exploitation, but rather there was embodied in it the mutual loyalty of patron and client: in a sense a large artificial family was created far from the original family, tribe, and homeland of these youths from the Eurasian steppes. The Turks (and kindred peoples, such as the Mongols) were known for their hardiness, courage, horsemanship, and archery skills, traits that would serve them well as professional soldiers. It was hoped that the Mamluk, being uprooted from his native environment and isolated culturally, linguistically, and often physically from the local population, would remain faithful to his patron (*ustadh*) and to the other Mamluks (known as *khushdashiyya*; sing., *khushdash*) of this patron. The young Mamluks were generally

brought from their homelands by Muslim merchants, although it appears that the haulers via the sea were increasingly Franks, especially the Genoese. In the fourteenth century, the land route via Anatolia and the Caucasus seems to have become more important, not the least with the growing significance of Mamluks who were known as Circassians (*jarakis*). In fact, the second period of Mamluk rule is known already by contemporary sources as the Circassian "dynasty" as compared to the time of Turkish or Qipchaq rule (Qipchaq being the name of the Turkish tribes north of the Black Sea). In general, the Mamluk Sultanate was referred to at the time as the "Turkish state" or "dynasty" (*dawlat al-turk/atrak*). The Mamluk trainees underwent several years of training, including religious instruction, until around the age of eighteen, when they were officially manumitted and enrolled in the unit of their patron. In spite of their newly found "free" status, they still proudly called themselves Mamluks, keeping their Turkish names to help maintain their distinction from the civilian population. The sons of Mamluks were not considered part of this class, and were known as *awlad al-nas* ("the sons of the people [who count]"). Some of them were enrolled in the army, generally in the non-Mamluk *halqa* formation, even becoming officers, but only rarely of the highest rank.

Usually the sultans were chosen among the senior Mamluk officers, although some were the sons of a sultan; unlike the Mamluks in general, sons of sultans could theoretically inherit their father's title, although not necessarily their authority: in most cases, however, sultans of this type were mere puppet rulers, with the notable exception of al-Nasir Muhammad ibn Qalawun in his third reign (1310–1341). The main institution of the state was the standing army, which was divided between Egypt (mainly Cairo) and the major cities of Syria (in rough descending order of importance): Damascus, Aleppo, Hama, Homs, Tripoli, Safad, Karak, and Jerusalem. The backbone of the army was the Royal Mamluks, the mainstay of which were those Mamluks who had been bought and trained by the ruling sultan, but also including the Mamluks of previous rulers. Baybars had about four thousand personal Mamluks, while Qalawun's regiment was somewhat larger. Later sultans generally had smaller units. Officers (*umara'*, plural of *amir*) had their own private units of Mamluks, in accordance with their rank and the size of their *iqta'*, the land allocation over which one had the right to collect taxes (and by which an officer maintained his household and unit); these *iqta 'att* were not inheritable but, rather, were returned to the central government upon the holder's death, disgrace, or promotion (in which case he received a larger one). The ranks of officers were *umara* of ten, forty, or one hundred; the last mentioned also commanding theoretically some one thousand non-Mamluk *halqa* troopers during a campaign. In principle there were some twenty-four *umara* of one hundred in the Egyptian army, which together with the Royal Mamluks and *halqa* was probably about twice the size of the total Syrian army. At its height, the total military force of the sultanate may have been around forty thousand men.

The Mongol Challenge. After a turbulent decade from 1250–1260 the Mamluk army entered a period of growth and crystallization. This was both the result of the dynamic personality of the sultan Baybars (r. 1260–1277) and the need to meet the twin challenges of the Mongols and Franks (both those in the Levant and in Europe). The former was rightfully seen as the more dangerous, and the Mamluk leadership knew that the Mongol rulers across the Euphrates (known as Ilkhans) would do what they could to revenge the defeat at 'Ayn Jalut in September 1260, to conquer Syria and to eradicate the Mamluk regime. The army was expanded and ongoing training was initiated; a systematic foreign espionage service was established, along with proper communication networks, including horse relays and pigeon posts; and forts along the frontier and inland were repaired, expanded, and garrisoned. When there was a lull in their usually successful frontier war with the Mongols, the Mamluks launched attacks against the crusader castles and cities in Syria as well as the Kingdom of Lesser Armenia in Cilicia (a region in southeastern Anatolia). This policy was continued by Baybars' ultimate successor Qalawun (r. 1279–1290), who early on had to meet and defeat

a large Mongol army near Homs in 1281. Qalawun died before he could realize the long-held Mamluk dream of driving the Franks out of the Levant. This was completed only by his son al-Ashraf Khalil in 1291 with the conquest of Acre.

The war with the Mongols was to continue, however, even after the Ilkhans converted to Islam starting in the mid-1290s. The Mamluks suffered a setback in 1299, again near Homs, but subsequently were able to regain Syria and then defeat another Mongol army in 1303 south of Damascus (Marj al-Suffar). Through most of the next two decades there was intermittent fighting along the frontier, which came to an end with the official conclusion of the war with the Ilkhanids in 1323. In subsequent decades, there was a discernable decline in discipline and training of the army, a situation that came about to some degree as a result of the lack of a serious external enemy. The state was also increasingly plagued by conflicts among the senior officers, which at times broke out into open warfare. When Tamerlane invaded Syria in 1400, the Mamluk army withdrew from the country without a battle, because of political infighting. Luckily for the Mamluks, Tamerlane had no plans to stay in the country and they were able to reoccupy it without undue difficulty. In the fifteenth century, the readiness of the army declined more: economic difficulties in general meant a smaller army, with Mamluks who were brought at a later age and thus subject to less training and perhaps also less acculturation to Mamluk norms; this—as well as an often chronic lack of cash to pay the troops—helps to explain the general unruliness of the Mamluk trainees and troopers through the fifteenth century. The Mamluks were thus ill prepared to meet the challenge presented from the vigorous Ottoman Empire in the north, which in the second half of the fifteenth century was expanding into the territory of Turkoman principalities in southwestern Anatolia, previously an area of Mamluk influence.

[*See also* Baybars I.]

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For more information, see the Mamluk Online Bibliography, initiated and managed by the Middle East Documentation Center at the University of Chicago: http://www.lib.uchicago.edu/e/su/mideast/mamluk/.

Reuven Amitai

MANIAKES, GEORGE

(d. 1043), an ambitious Byzantine military commander, possibly of Turkic stock. Maniakes's military and organizational talents earned him key border

commands in Byzantium's expansionist heyday. By 1030 he was military governor of Telouch (northern Syria). His success in defending it from Arab raiders led to his command of towns in the Euphrates Valley farther east. Maniakes exploited this vantage point to annex Edessa (modern-day Urfa). In the mid-1030s he was appointed governor of the former Kingdom of Vaspurakan in southeastern Armenia. Named the supreme commander of Byzantine southern Italy by Emperor Michael IV, in 1038 he led a large expeditionary force including Varangians and Normans to reconquer Sicily from the Muslims. Maniakes captured numerous strongholds and towns in eastern Sicily, making a point of building citadels in the towns, to facilitate prolonged occupation. In 1040 he won a pitched battle against the Saracens at Troina. However, his humiliation of his fellow commander, the emperor's brother-in-law, cost him his post and he spent time in prison in Constantinople. Subsequently released, he was returned to southern Italy in 1042 to overcome Norman insurgents there. Although ruthless and scoring some successes, he failed to quash Norman operations and was summoned back to Constantinople. Maniakes's response to the recall was to get proclaimed emperor, marshal sizable forces, including some Varangians, cross the Adriatic to Dyrrachium, and march on Constantinople. The battle fought at Ostrovo (in Macedonia) in the spring of 1043 was tipping in his favor when he was killed, his army routed, and his head paraded through the streets of the capital.

[*See also* Varangian Guard.]

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MANSUR, ABU 'AMIR AL-

(938-1002), chief minister of Córdoba. Muhammad Ibn Abi 'Amir took the title al-Mansur bi-Allah (victorious with the aid of God) after winning campaigns against the Christian principalities of northern Spain. Born in 938 CE to a minor aristocratic family in Algeciras, al-Mansur (known to the Christians as Almanzor) studied religious law in Córdoba. Thanks to his intelligence and influence with the harem of Caliph al-Hakam II (r. 961–976), Ibn Abi 'Amir became the *qadi* (magistrate) of Umayyad Morocco in 973. After al-Hakam's death in 976, he became vizier (councilor) to al-Mushafi, the *hajib* (governor or chief minister) of Córdoba. The pair defeated an attempted coup by the Slavic palace guard against the adolescent Hisham II (r. 876–1009). On al-Mushafi's orders, Ibn Abi 'Amir publicly strangled the coup's instigator, Hisham's uncle. In the next year, he led an expedition across Christian Galicia, which gained him a strong military following, despite his lack of military experience. This support enabled him to overthrow al-Mushafi and assume the office of *hajib*.

As *hajib*, Ibn Abi 'Amir reduced the caliph to a figurehead and recruited a personal army made up of Berbers from North Africa and Spanish Christian mercenaries. In 981 he attacked León and defeated King Ramiro III (r. 966–984). Ramiro's successor, Bermudo II (r. 984–999), swore fealty to Ibn Abi 'Amir, who then took the title al-Mansur. In 985 he invaded Catalonia and sacked Barcelona; two years later he overran Coimbra in Portugal and Zamora in León.

Although his motives were more economic and political than religious, al-Mansur preached jihad against Christian territories. His most spectacular success was his raid in 997, using Christian soldiers, against the important pilgrimage center of Santiago de Compostella. His army swept through the city and razed the cathedral, sparing, however, the shrine of St. James. Some Christian accounts attribute al-Mansur's sudden death on the campaign in 1002 to the miraculous intervention of St. James as punishment for the destruction of Santiago. The Chronicle

of Silos triumphantly declared that "in the year 1002, Almanzor died; he was entombed in hell."

[*See also* Al-Andalus; *and* Iberia, *subentry on* Narrative (500–1100).]

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MANSUR, ABU YUSUF YA'QUB AL-

(c. 1160–1199), Almohad caliph. Abu Yusuf Ya'qub al-Mansur ("the Victorious") became Almohad caliph in 1184 after his father's death. His ambition to expand his Andalusian kingdom was thwarted by the revolts in North Africa perpetrated by the new Balearic Banu Ghaniyah ruler, 'Ali, and his Berber allies. In 1188 he finally subdued the city of Gafsa, which was under Berber control. The caliph then returned to Marrakech, where he discovered rumors that members of his family were conspiring against him. This drove him to travel to al-Andalus and execute the offending relatives. He then returned to Marrakech, where he stayed until 1190. Returning again to al-Andalus, the caliph tried to regain the city of Silves in Portugal, and was successful in forcing its surrender in 1191 after earlier vain attempts.

Peace reigned in the peninsula until the truce expired between Castile and the Almohades. At the suggestion of Pope Celestine III (r. 1191–1198), Alfonso VIII of Castile (r. 1158–1214) invaded Moorish territory, setting the stage for a resounding Muslim victory at Alarcos (northeast of Córdoba) on 22 June 1195. After this disastrous defeat for the Castilians, the caliph felt that Castile had been thoroughly weakened by both the recent loss at Alarcos and the subsequent quarrel between Alfonso VIII and his cousin, Alfonso IX of León (r. 1188–1230). This bitter dispute led to an alliance among Alfonso IX, Sancho VII of Navarre (r. 1194–1234), and the caliph. Supporting his new allies, Abu Yusuf in 1197 undertook his third and final Castilian campaign. After ravaging the Tagus Valley west of Toledo, he signed a ten-year truce with Castile. Exhausted and ill, the caliph returned to Marrakech in 1198, where he spent the rest of his days embellishing the city with magnificent construction projects. He died there in 1199 and was succeeded by his son Muhammad.

[*See also* Al-Andalus; Alarcos, Battle of; Alfonso VIII of Castile; *and* Iberia, *subentry on* Narrative (1100–1300).]

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MANSURAH, BATTLE OF

In December 1244 Louis IX of France took an oath to travel on a crusade to the Holy Land. He did not know it, but his timing was ideal for the defenders of the Christian Levant. In November 1244 the armies of the Kingdom of Jerusalem had suffered a crushing defeat at La Forbie. Consequently, for the surviving barons, the imminent arrival of a major royal army represented a chance to recover their enormous losses. Louis's strategy, like that of so many previous crusading operations in the eastern Mediterranean, was to invade Egypt. By taking this country, he would acquire the fertile lands of the Nile Delta and the trading ports on the north coast, which could then be used to fund the recapture of Jerusalem

(lost in 1244). Egypt was also the central hub of Islamic political power in that region, and its capture would therefore dramatically alter the balance of power in the Near East.

On 5 June 1249 the French army, with auxiliaries from the military orders and the leaders of the Levant, landed near the city of Damietta on the Egyptian coast. Their arrival provoked the evacuation of the city, which had been fully prepared and supplied shortly beforehand. The Egyptian sultan al-Salih was horrified; a key bastion of defense had been captured intact, creating an ideal invasion point.

In November the crusader army marched upriver toward Cairo, Egypt's capital. Louis's position became even stronger when al-Salih died during the crusaders' advance; his enemies were leaderless. Even so, the Muslim army determined to meet Louis at Mansurah, a town on the southern side of a major tributary of the Nile, the Bahr al-Saghir. This was a strong position because if the crusaders were to engage their foe and continue south, they would have to cross the water. To achieve that end, they attempted to build a causeway and defended it with a wooden castle and siege weapons. The missile duel across the Bahr al-Saghir was intense; the crusaders could not complete the crossing. On 7 February 1250 an Egyptian renegade (or Bedouin, according to some accounts) told Louis that he knew of a ford downstream. Louis seized the opportunity and ordered a dawn attack for the following day. The stage was thus set for the battle of Mansurah.

At first light, a large portion of the army crossed the Bahr al-Saghir and charged into the Muslims' camp, taking them completely by surprise. The commander Fakhr al-Din was killed and refugees streamed into the town to escape the advancing Christian army. Having won a notable victory, Louis commanded the cavalry to re-form, and the Templars advised that the Egyptian siege machines on the shores of the Bahr al-Saghir be attacked. The king's brother, Robert of Artois, however, disobeyed these instructions and led the vanguard in a direct attack on the town of Mansurah. Forcing their way through the crowds at the gates, several hundred knights and Templars entered Mansurah where they found themselves in a maze of alleyways. In this environment, the heavy cavalry could neither form into squadrons nor gain victory with a cavalry charge. They became separated and were destroyed by the mamluks, an elite group of Muslim slave soldiers, and missiles thrown from the surrounding buildings.

Louis then advanced with the rest of the army and occupied the site of the former Egyptian camp. In this sense, Mansurah was a victory for Louis, but it cost him the flower of his knighthood. Ibn Wasil, writing in the late thirteenth century, considered this encounter to be the turning point of the campaign. Louis IX saw things differently; he later claimed that it was the subsequent arrival of al-Salih's heir Turan Shah. Turan Shah launched ships on the Nile and blocked the army's supply line to Damietta. With food running low and fever breaking, the army attempted to retreat in early April. Nevertheless, only a handful reached Damietta and, under relentless attack, the majority of the survivors surrendered. The king was captured and many of the sick were slaughtered. Estimates of the Christian casualties incurred during this campaign vary, but the patriarch of Jerusalem suggests that by the end of March 1250 two-thirds of the army was dead; by mid-April the toll must have been far higher.

Before the battle, the crusaders had enjoyed considerable good fortune and were well positioned to seize Egypt. Although the encounter at Mansurah was only one element in their reversal of fortunes, it is hard not to see Robert of Artois's decision to enter Mansurah as a decisive moment in both the battle and the campaign. In this regard, he seems to have displayed the classic flaw of the heavy cavalryman—overconfidence.

[*See also* La Forbie, Battle of *and* Louis IX of France.]

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MANTUA, SIEGE OF

Emperor Henry IV returned to Italy for the third time in the spring of 1090. Unlike the campaign of 1081–1084, which centered on Rome, this expedition focused on the north. Henry's longtime opponent, Matilda of Tuscany, had just taken the teenager Welf V as her second husband. Welf V was the son of Welf IV, the dispossessed Duke of Bavaria, a bitter and long-standing opponent. The alliance threatened Henry's access to Italy via the Brenner Pass and thus his ability to influence Italian affairs, especially to aid his choice as pope, Clement III. Before leaving for Italy, Henry secured all of Matilda's maternal inheritance in the Lorraine, except the castle of Briey near Metz.

The size of Henry's following from Germany is not known, but in the earlier campaign he had relied for troops primarily on his Italian adherents, and they expected to be rewarded for their loyalty. Henry systematically moved against Matilda's positions. The first target was Mantua, effectively her capital. The small city, protected by walls about two meters thick and ten meters high and also by a ditch about three meters deep, occupied only twelve hectares on the highest part of a large island in the Mincio River. Matilda had garrisoned and supplied the city beforehand and was able to resupply it during the siege. Henry made frequent attacks, which were driven back by the defenders' sorties. These defenders presumably included Welf, whose capture would have been a great prize for Henry, as well as Bishop Ubald and Viscount Manfred. Welf, however, is not mentioned in the only description of the siege, the biography of Matilda written by the monk Donizone. By observing gender conventions in their brief comments, the German chroniclers effectively blamed Welf for the loss of Mantua. Meanwhile, the emperor negotiated the surrender of the castles of Ripalta (upriver) by 26 June 1090 and Gubernolo (downriver) later in the year. This obviously affected the commerce that was the lifeblood of Mantua and also Matilda's ability to resupply the garrison. On 27 June, Matilda and Welf issued a charter freeing the townspeople of several burdensome taxes. She apparently left the city shortly afterward and remained in the mountains.

After holding out for eleven months, Mantua surrendered in 1091 to a generous bribe of imperial privileges. Donizone writes that the negotiations took place on Holy Thursday, the day Judas betrayed Christ, and that Henry entered the city on Easter Sunday. Matilda's supporters left in boats, with their arms and possessions. The loss of Mantua was an economic blow, and it affected the morale of Matilda's party. Within the year, Henry was in possession of most of the territory north of the Po River.

[*See also* Canossa, Battle of; Italy, *subentry on* Narrative (1000–1300); *and* Sorbara, Battle of.]

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MANTZIKERT, BATTLE OF

In 1071 the Byzantine emperor Romanos IV Diogenes was defeated and captured by the Seljuk sultan Alp Arslan near the town of Mantzikert (also spelled Manzikert or Manazkert). One of the most famous battles of Byzantine history, the Byzantine defeat at Mantzikert is commonly taken as having opened the way for the conquest of Anatolia by the Seljuk (Saljuq) Turks. The battle, however, was far more a political than a military disaster. It took place between Khliat (Ahlat) and Mantzikert on either 19 or 26 August 1071. Although the superior mobility of

the Turks put the Byzantines at a disadvantage at several points in their engagement, the betrayal of several key commanders in the Byzantine army was ultimately responsible for Romanos's defeat.

After capturing Baghdad in 1055, the Seljuk Turks continued to expand their power into northern Syria, Armenia, and eastern Anatolia in the 1050s and 1060s. Romanos had campaigned against the Seljuks in 1068 and 1069. In 1071 he led a substantial army east. Poor intelligence led Romanos to believe that Alp Arslan had gone toward Iraq to raise forces. In fact, Alp Arslan had gone to Armenia, where he assembled his forces north of Lake Urmia. Apparently believing that the Seljuks would attack from the south, Romanos divided his forces at Theodosioupolis (Erzurum), sending perhaps half his army under the command of Roussel de Bailleul and Joseph Tarchaneiotes to secure Khliat on the northwestern coast of Lake Van. After encountering unexpected opposition, these commanders left the region without informing Romanos of the presence of a large Seljuk army.

Romanos took Manzikert and camped outside its walls, still unaware of the imminent arrival of Alp Arslan's main force. The next morning troops foraging south of the camp encountered Turkish warriors, and Romanos sent three increasingly large contingents against them that were either lured into ambushes or forced to retreat to camp. Romanos prepared his army for a general engagement, but the Turks had retreated. In the evening some of the Oğuz Turks in Romanos's army again encountered Seljuk Turks and fled back to the Byzantine camp, causing considerable panic among other troops who mistook the retreating Oğuz for a major Seljuk assault. The following morning some—but not most—of the Oğuz deserted to join the Seljuks.

After a day of unproductive negotiations, the Byzantine army assembled on Friday, arranged into three wings, with the emperor commanding the center. Some elite guards and the allied Turkish cavalry were placed in a rear guard. The Byzantines advanced to engage the Turks, who continually fell back. By evening the Byzantines had advanced several miles without succeeding in engaging the Turks in close fighting. At dusk Romanos ordered a retreat. The right wing panicked and began to rush back in disorder. The rear guard, under the command of Andronikos Doukas, withdrew immediately rather than covering the retreat of the main army. Doukas spread the rumor that Romanos had been killed, turning the orderly retreat into a rout. As the center and left undertook an organized withdrawal, the Seljuks attacked in full force, managing to get between the Byzantine wings and attack from all sides. Romanos was completely cut off from his camp and the rest of his fleeing troops and was captured the next day.

Alp Arslan released Romanos, but the family of Romanos's co-emperor, Michael Doukas, treated him as a rebel. The pro-Doukas forces captured and blinded Romanos in 1072.

[*See also* Byzantine Empire, *subentries on* Sources (900–1204), Narrative (900–1204), *and* Historiography (900–1204); Romanos IV Diogenes; *and* Seljuks.]

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MANUALS, MILITARY

Some classical Greek and Roman military writings were known to medieval Europeans, as were Byzantine works advising on the training and deployment of armies on campaigns, the logistics of supply, and the strategies of arraying for battle. The most famous and widely read military manual was the fourth-century work of the Roman writer Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus. Vegetius's *De re militari* (Concerning military matters; also known as *Epitoma rei militaris*) became exceedingly popular in the Middle Ages. Though based on secondhand material, it became the standard work on the art of war in western Europe for over a thousand years. Vegetius's theories influenced the training

and drilling of medieval fighting men. Perhaps more importantly, his preference for a defensive strategy of exhaustion (over an aggressively battle-oriented one) seems to have exercised a profound influence on many medieval commanders.

Other chivalric works on martial virtues and knightly conduct in war, while not related directly to either military strategy or personal martial instruction, were also popular. For example, Christine de Pizan's *Faits d'armes et de chevalerie* (Feats of arms and of chivalry), produced circa 1410, was based principally on the reworking of ancient authors, especially Frontinus, in addition to Vegetius. Christine also borrowed freely from Honoré Bouvet's *Tree of Battles*, a guide on laws of war for soldiers. Other notable works included Ramon Llull's 1274–1276 *Llibre del Ordre de cavalleria* (Book of the order of chivalry, translated by William Caxton in the late fifteenth century) and Geoffroi de Charny's *Le livre de chevalerie* (Book of chivalry).

While military works focused on large-scale operations, manuals of individual martial instruction were far more common. Such guidebooks for martial arts were produced both as study guides for students and as presentation works for noble patrons. The primary objective of such fight-lore was preparation for general self-defense and judicial combat. This more individualistic but lesser-known literary tradition is largely outside of, and separate from, military treatises and the chivalric tournament-book tradition (which includes works on the aristocratic martial sport of tournament jousting).

These "study guides" and "handbooks" of close-combat self-defense were not mere theoretical texts to occupy the idle time of nobles unlikely to actually engage in real combat. They establish that by the thirteenth century martial arts in western Europe were more than an "oral tradition" passed down from person to person. Despite their specialized vocabulary and occasionally cryptic images, they reveal their craft to be one of sophisticated and systematic skill. Many authors (or "masters of defense") of these works became widely traveled and highly regarded international expert instructors in arms. They produced hundreds of detailed, often well-illustrated, technical manuals on their fighting methods.

Most of this diverse literature reflects the skills of the knightly classes in unarmed fighting and the handling of weapons. The manuals typically cataloged techniques and described or illustrated core elements of armed and unarmed combat, usually on foot and either armored or unarmored. Typically, they outlined the use of numerous weapons, particularly the dagger and longsword, but grappling and wrestling techniques were also especially stressed as the vital foundation of all fencing. Like works on other arts and sciences of the time, these fighting treatises represented a body of indigenous knowledge presented in text and images that grew with each generation of teachers and students.

By the late thirteenth century the German school of fencing had developed a distinct tradition, documented in treatises called *Fechtbücher* (fight books). The martial arts literature contains many independent works, as well as numerous compilations and rewrites of earlier texts. The oldest known European fighting text is an anonymous monastic work on the German sword-and-buckler method of fencing, produced around the year 1295. The verses of the great Swabian master, Johannes Liechtenauer, as chronicled in 1389, were highly influential among German fencing masters for the next two centuries. Liechtenauer's martial-arts teachings were expanded upon by many others throughout the 1400s and early 1500s. The great treatise on "the art of fighting man to man," *Fior di battaglia* (Flower of battle), written circa 1409 by the fencing master Fiore dei Liberi da Premariacco, has come down to us as the primary example of Italian martial-arts teachings from the era. Several works in Spanish, Portuguese, and English are also known.

The popular modern prejudice that medieval fighting arts were based on little more than heavy weapons and strong blows, lacking any larger "art" or system of established principles, is largely the result of ignorance among eighteenth- and nineteenth-century fencing writers as well as modern historians who lack physical experience in the craft. Martial manuals, like their military counterparts, portray examples of highly developed and innovative medieval European fighting systems.

Though these systems differed in their comprehensiveness, their methodological teachings consisted of practical, efficient, no-nonsense fighting techniques founded on core principles and connected by larger concepts.

[*See also* Christine de Pizan; Geoffroi de Charny; *and* Vegetius.]

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MANUEL, JUAN

(1282–1348), Castilian military officer and writer. A towering figure in fourteenth-century Castile, Don Juan Manuel had vast political and military experience stretching from a failed operation at Algeciras (1309), through the virtual civil war during Alfonso XI's minority (1312–1325) and his rebellion against royal power (1333), to another siege of Algeciras (1342–1344). His concern for warfare, especially on the frontier, makes his writings an ideal source.

His principal contributions fall into two areas. First, drawing on foreign chivalric ideals, his vision of society organized Castile into three estates. He developed this in his *Libro de los Estados* (Book of the estates), *Libro del caballero y escudero* (Book of the knight and squire), *Libro enfenido* (Unfinished book), *Libro del Conde Lucanor* (Book of the Count Lucanor), and *Libro de Armas* (Book of arms). This division, not entirely applicable to Castile, identified warfare as nobility's fundamental characteristic. Second, as to military practice, Juan Manuel particularly stresses the qualities a commander must possess—intelligence, courage, honor, and, most importantly, caution. Military preparations varied according to the type of operation—mounted raids, marches, siege operations, or pitched battles—and included the proper recruitment of forces, assembling of supplies, and gathering of intelligence regarding the enemy and terrain. He also clearly distinguished between operations against Christian and Muslim foes. He explained that Muslim mounted tactics and maneuvers stressed speed over protection. The only exception was when they intended to offer battle when foot soldiers would be present. This discussion can be found in *Libro de los Estados* (Part I, chaps. 30, 69–72, 74–79, 86–87, 90, 92).

Juan Manuel's involvement in the complex Iberian diplomatic milieu can be traced in the great number of letters he sent to various monarchs, especially the Aragonese king. Many of these documents have been gathered in the documentary appendix of Giménez Soler.

[*See also* Alfonso XI of Castile; Algeciras, Sieges of; Chivalry, *subentry on* Overview; Iberia, *subentries on* Sources (1100–1300) *and* Historiography (1100–1300); *Romancero* Tradition; Strategy; *and* Tactics, Battle.]

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Nicolás Agrait

MANUEL I KOMNENOS

(1118–1180), Byzantine emperor (1143–1180). Manuel, the fourth and youngest son of John II Komnenos and his Hungarian wife, Piroska-Irene, was born 28 November 1118. He succeeded to the throne at the age of twenty-five, despite having one surviving elder brother, Isaac. He died 24 September 1180.

In his early years Manuel was committed to his father's policy of aggressive campaigning in the East. This required stability in the West, which was guaranteed by cooperation with Germany. His marriage in January 1146 to Bertha of Sulzbach, the sister-in-law of the German king Conrad III, sealed a Byzantine alliance with the Germans which lasted until around 1156. The professed common ambition of both imperial powers was to eliminate the Norman presence in southern Italy. After 1160 Manuel was increasingly preoccupied with the German king Frederick I Barbarossa (r. 1152–1190; Holy Roman Emperor from 1155), whose rhetoric promoted the notion of a unified Christendom under the suzerainty of the German "Holy Roman" emperor. Manuel responded with his own ecumenical rhetoric, which he backed up with grand gestures and actions. This had significant ramifications in the East, where Manuel forged alliances with both the Latins of the Crusader principalities (for example by his second marriage to Maria of Antioch at Christmas 1161) and the Turks (a treaty with the Seljuk sultan Kilic Arslan II in 1162). Manuel's grandest military gestures were the aborted assault on Egypt in 1167 and the march to Ikonion in 1176, both undertaken in support of the crusading princes and intended to bind them more closely to him. Both were unmitigated failures, and the latter resulted in the devastating defeat at Myriokephalon.

Manuel's achievements in the West were ambiguous. His preoccupation with Germany saw him advance the empire's frontier across the Danube and make inroads into Italy and Hungary through the strategic use of force and aggressive diplomacy. Meanwhile, however, smaller powers gained ground in the Adriatic and Mediterranean. Hungary made much progress in the northern Balkans, and the Venetians were able more freely to switch allegiance between Byzantium and Germany, while advancing their own interests in Dalmatia and the Holy Land. The Norman kings of Sicily, William I and William II, consolidated their authority in Sicily and Apulia. In the northern Balkans, regional and municipal potentates benefited from Manuel's largesse, without committing themselves fully to his cause. Soon after 1180 the semiautonomous regions of Bulgaria and Serbia became independent kingdoms.

We have two full narrative accounts of Manuel's reign, by the historians John Kinnamos and Niketas Choniates, which are by turns complementary and contradictory. However, the fullest account of Manuel's activities is contained in panegyrical orations. The so-called "Manganeios Prodromos" provides the largest dossier on events before 1160, presenting a rhetorical image that far outdoes even Kinnamos's eulogistic biography. Manuel's image as a conquering warrior owes much to the ideals developed by his father's image-makers, and he emulated and developed John II's triumphal processions through Constantinople.

[*See also* Frederick I Barbarossa; John II Komnenos; *and* Myriokephalon, Battle of.]

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Paul Stephenson

MANZIKERT, BATTLE OF

See Mantzikert, Battle of.

MAPS, NAVIGATIONAL CHARTS, AND ITINERARIES

Medieval world maps (*mappae mundi*) were not, on the whole, intended for practical, let alone

strategic, use. The most common sort, the tripartite (or T-O) maps, attempted to depict the known three continents schematically by inscribing a T into a circle, thus signifying the larger size of Asia (top) as compared with Europe (bottom left) and Africa (bottom right). This implies—by showing the ocean around these three continents—a view of the western half of the Northern Hemisphere (and not, as assumed in eighteenth- to nineteenth-century scholarship, a flat earth). Even large copies of medieval works such as the Hereford *mappa mundi*, the (now lost) Ebstorf map, or the fragmentary Cornwall map, with hundreds of textual notes, attempted to give a predominantly historical (and possibly hagiographical) worldview, rather than a contemporary political one.

The second most common type of map was even larger in its scale, showing not only the landmass but the whole Western Hemisphere, divided into either the five rough climatic zones or the seven *klimata* of antiquity. These maps had an almost exclusively astronomical function, but also helped to illustrate the speculations about the existence of a supposed southern continent by frequently marking a *terra australis habitabilis* as early as the twelfth century.

Maps of countries and locations were extremely rare during the early and high Middle Ages, apart from maps of Jerusalem and Palestine. However, by the fourteenth century there were maps like the Gough Map of England and Scotland, which, though far from accurate, could provide enough of a mental picture to be useful in strategic planning. The only relatively precise maps aiding travel and seafaring were Portolan charts, appearing from the late twelfth century. The majority of these concentrate on the Mediterranean, but some depict the North Sea or the Baltic. These maps, as is obvious from a compass-grid of varying detail, are intended to be used in combination with the magnetic compass. They show coastal outlines in hitherto unknown detail and attempt to show distances in the right scale, together with many textual notations giving the names of capes, bays, and harbors, but little detail is given to inland landmarks, thus mostly leaving the landmasses virtually blank. The practical usage to which these Portolan charts were put at sea means that their transmission was even rarer than that of the *mappae mundi*; there is no complete edition of known Portolan charts.

For practical travel by land, information was not provided by maps, rather by itineraries of varying detail. Ideally, these would (after a general outline of possible main routes) give day-by-day lists of towns in the correct order. These could be enhanced by relevant information concerning the towns' monasteries (no doubt important as a chance for overnight accommodation) as well as churches and reliques (important for indulgences). Only occasionally did they impart secular information, and then on the "quality" of the route. Most information given shows that they were intended mainly for pilgrims to Rome, Santiago de Compostella, or Jerusalem. Only rarely do texts preserve secular itineraries such as the Icelandic sailing instructions (thirteenth century) between Norway, Iceland, and Greenland. Itineraries, however, show a stronger tendency toward the vernacular languages than the maps, which tend to be kept in Latin.

Only with the advent of printing were itineraries translated into specialized route maps, such as the map showing roads and towns between northern Germany and Rome compiled by Erhard Etzlaub and printed in 1500 (and again in 1501 and 1515).

[*See also* Navigational Technology.]

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Rudolf Simek

MARCHFELD, BATTLE OF

See Dürnkrut, Battle of.

MARIENBURG, SIEGE OF

The siege of the chief fortress of the Teutonic Order followed from the victory of a Polish-Lithuanian army, led by the Polish king Władysław II Jagiełło, over the main body of the Teutonic Knights at Tannenberg (also known as Grunwald) on 15 July 1410. The grand master of the order, Ulrich von Jungingen, and the majority of the order's knights were killed; the only thing lacking for a conclusive victory for the Polish-Lithuanian alliance was the conquest of Marienburg. This castle was one of the most extensive fortified sites of the Middle Ages, with over 2,230 feet (680 meters) of walls. The fortress lay only about sixty miles (ninety-seven kilometers) from the battlefield, and was Jagiełło's next and crucial goal.

A decisive factor in the ultimate failure of the siege was that one of the order's knights, Heinrich von Plauen, was able to bring reinforcements to the fortress immediately after the battle: as early as 18 July, he arrived with two or three thousand men. Heinrich, who would soon be elected the new grand master of the order, organized the defense of the castle. He is also credited with the survival of the fortress. He had the city outside the castle walls burned down, so as to deprive the besiegers of means of support and provide an open battlefield. The besieging army was reinforced by two hundred sailors from Danzig and about fifteen hundred survivors of Tannenberg. On 26 July Jagiełło arrived with slightly under thirty thousand men, and the siege began. It ended on 19 September with the king's withdrawal. The besiegers had been unable to cut off the castle completely from the outside world. Heinrich was able to contact the Hungarian king Sigismund, who promised to assemble an army to relieve the castle. The knights also managed to get a great deal of money out of the castle, which they used to hire mercenaries. Jagiełło was too openly confident of victory; after supplies ran short and disease took a heavy toll on his men and, especially, their horses, his troops returned home. The alliance with the Lithuanians did not prove stable enough for a lengthy siege. In the end, the Tannenberg victors had no choice but to withdraw from Marienburg. Catastrophe was temporarily averted for the Teutonic Order.



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[*See also* Baltics, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1500); Grunwald, Battle of; Orders, Military, *subentry on* Northern Orders; *and* Sigismund of Luxemburg.]

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Martin Clauss
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MARINO, BATTLE OF

Marino was the conclusive battle in the war between rival popes that arose from the Great Schism (1378). It pitted a largely Italian mercenary army in the employ of the Italian pope Urban VI against a French and Breton force in the employ of the French antipope Clement VII. The Italian army consisted of the Company of Saint George, captained by the native condottiere Alberico da Barbiano. Clement's army contained the famous Breton mercenaries Bernardon de la Salle and Sylvestre Budes, and was commanded by the Frenchman Louis de Montjoie. Barbiano and the Company of Saint George routed Clement's forces. Urban hailed the victory in seemingly national terms as "Italy liberated from barbarians," a phrase he had emblazoned on the banners of Barbiano's army.

The town of Marino lay twelve miles (twenty kilometers) outside of Rome. In April 1379 Montjoie conducted a siege against the castle there. Barbiano and the Company of Saint George marched out from Rome on the morning of 30 April to relieve the siege. They set up camp not far from Marino, with a force of approximately 240 lances and an unspecified number of Roman infantrymen. Montjoie's army purportedly consisted of five hundred to six hundred lances. Barbiano moved directly on the enemy, advancing in two units, which the author of the *Cronaca Carrese* has called *squadre* (squadrons). The Bolognese mercenary Galeazzo Pepoli led the advance guard, and Barbiano took up position behind him.

Confident of his superior numbers, Montjoie advanced to meet the enemy. Montjoie arranged his force in three lines, the first led by him, the other two by Bernardon de la Salle and Sylvestre Budes, respectively. Montjoie attacked the advance guard of Galeazzo Pepoli, and initially did well in the fighting. But Alberico da Barbiano countered with an aggressive charge, bringing the full weight of his army against Bernadon de la Salle, whom he quickly captured, and then, in a second assault, against Montjoie, whose men gave a strong resistance but were ultimately defeated. Montjoie himself was captured, along with his banners. Estimates of the casualties differ, but it is generally believed that a third of Clement's army was killed or made prisoner.

The battle appears to have been an engagement primarily of heavy cavalry, as the sources make no mention of infantry. According to nationalistic Italian histories of the nineteenth century, Barbiano and the Company of Saint George were impelled to victory by "love of *patria*." Some even attribute to it the start of an indigenous national Italian militia. Most modern scholars dismiss such notions but do credit Barbiano with creating unusual cohesion in his army, possibly because of the recruitment of his men from his own lands in Cunio and the Romagna, where he was a member of the lesser nobility The battle was in any case a clear victory for Pope Urban, who forced his rival to beat an ignominious retreat back to France.

[*See also* Alberico da Barbiano.]

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MARQUE AND REPRISAL, LETTERS OF

Letters of marque were legal instruments through which private individuals, injured by either a foreign

power or its subjects, could gain compensation for their losses. They were designed to provide remedy for the king's subjects abroad, as well as for actions of foreigners in the realm and actions at sea where there was no clear sovereign jurisdiction. They provided a means of addressing the potential legal issues arising from the presence of foreign merchant communities. Legal action against foreigners was often difficult: as alien merchants they were not permanently based in the realm and could leave with their goods at any time. Indeed, in some legislation on marque, the process required the author of the fault to have first quit the realm. Letters of marque also provided remedy for subjects injured abroad, a guard against the potential partiality of foreign courts. Finally, it provided remedy for injuries committed at sea in times of peace or truce.

A holder of letters of marque was authorized to seize the property and goods not only from the debtor or author of the damage, but in theory from any subject of the same prince, up to the value of his losses, together with all reasonable costs incurred. In the vast majority of cases for which details survive, the seizure of goods was made within the realm of the issuing authority, under the supervision of royal officials. The idea of marque was founded on the legal assumption of collective responsibility of all those within the same jurisdiction and of the responsibility of the sovereign for the actions of his subjects. Marque was not, however, always applied on the scale of the kingdom or even the lord's domain. There are examples of marque being restricted to a realm, a county, or in some cases even an individual city.

Letters of marque in the Middle Ages were distinct from what may be termed privateering commissions. Under the terms of these commissions, an individual was authorized to arm and equip a ship at his own expense and to capture enemy shipping in time of war. He was recompensed by the retention of most of his prize. Such commissions later came to be called letters of marque, but the phrase in this sense does not appear in English documentation until 1702.

Such letters were often referred to in late medieval English documents as "letters of marque and reprisal." The term "reprisal" is applied in the strict sense of retaking; it does not possess the retaliatory connotations it later came to possess in the laws of war. Letters of marque were not an instrument of war: their application was restricted to times of peace and truce, for in the Middle Ages authorization was not required to seize enemy goods during wartime. As in just-war theory, denial of justice was an essential element. Letters of marque were to be resorted to only as an extraordinary legal process after the usual remedies of law had been exhausted.

[*See also* Private War.]

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Bryan Dick

MARSHAL

Most medieval rulers and magnates, at least in the second half of the Middle Ages, had two principal military officers in their service: a constable and a marshal. In twelfth-century England, Geoffey de Mandeville had a constable who commanded his infantry and a marshal who commanded his cavalry, but in later centuries the marshal usually ranked below the constable. The king of France normally had two marshals, as did the king of Castile from the time of Juan I (1358–1390). In England there was one hereditary earl-marshal, but it was also common for any army to have another, appointed marshal.

Marshals were usually professional soldiers, often drawn from the middling nobility, and the office might or might not be hereditary. Marshals were often given independent commands, but when serving in a royal army they had particular duties and functions. Typically (though there was variation from place to place), marshals had the honor

of leading the vanguard in battle and on campaign, and, in consequence, particular responsibility for managing the army's reconnaissance functions and overseeing the selection of campsites and allocation of lodgings. We know from pay records that in fourteenth-century France men-at-arms who arrived at the array individually or in small groups, rather than in larger units under their own bannerets, were often put under one of the marshals. In addition, the marshal was usually the chief disciplinary officer of the army, with oversight over sentries and watch duties and the various disputes that commonly arose on campaign over such things as plunder, disobedience, women, and gambling. The provost-marshals of modern armies have these origins. Similarly, marshals or their deputies were usually charged with maintaining muster (or service) rolls recording the discharge of feudal obligations. This might entail evaluating mounts, both to ensure that they were of adequate quality for proper service and to allow for *restauratio equorum* (reimbursement for lost horses), where that was offered. It also implied responsibility for preventing or punishing desertion.

As already noted, individual magnates normally had their own marshals. Geoffroi de Villehardouin (c. 1160–1212), for example, was marshal of Champagne before he became marshal of the Latin Empire of Constantinople. Similarly, large companies of mercenaries might have their own marshals, as did the military orders. The marshal of the Templars was the order's chief military officer, ranking next after the master. In some cases (as in English-held Calais) large garrisons had their own marshals.

As recompense for the exercise of his office, the earl-marshal of England was entitled (according to a fourteenth-century treatise) to all gelded beasts taken as booty; four pence per week from sutlers, barbers, prostitutes, and other camp followers; and all the silver vessels and valuable cloth in a town captured by assault. The marshal of Brabant's compensation was more generous: in addition to a daily contribution of meat and peas from sutlers, he got all the livestock captured by the army and a third of all ransoms. The French marshals seem not to have had similar entitlements, but in 1447 it was reckoned that the office of marshal of France produced an annual income of over 800 livres, from such sources as muster fees and fines generated in the marshal's court.

[*See also* Armies, *subentry on* Organization; Constable; Discipline; *and* Muster and Review.]

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MARSHAL, WILLIAM

(1147–1219), Regent of England. William Marshal epitomizes medieval chivalry, a fact recognized in his own life by Richard the Lionheart, no less, who said that he valued "his exploits more than all that the rest of us have achieved"; King Henry II recognized William's achievements by making him tutor-in-arms to his heir. His life was a remarkably eventful and long one, full of incident and drama, and notable militarily for the spectacularly successful career of a professional soldier rising through the ranks from lowly knight to the highest positions of power, from landless knight to regent of England. From an active and highly skilled combatant in his early days, William went on to become a leading general with the intelligence to operate in the concomitant political sphere with great astuteness. He made his fortune through his martial prowess on the tournament circuits across northern France, becoming tournament manager for the team of Henry the Young King in the 1170s. From this time onward, William remained a close associate of his English kings (Henry II, Richard I, John, and Henry III), riding out storms to become renowned for his loyalty to them.

The attributes of military ability, loyalty, and chivalry were recognized by his advancement. In 1189, while fighting for the dying Henry II against the king's sons, William unhorsed Duke Richard (a notable feat in itself) but spared his life; when Richard became king a few days later, he immediately raised William to the great baronage, granting

him lands across the Angevin Empire and giving him important roles in government; he became Earl of Pembroke in 1189. Like many barons, he had a troubled relationship with King John but again displayed his instinct for loyalty both politically and militarily. In the Normandy crisis of 1203, while John was demonstrating his lack of backbone and leadership, William headed a major relief force that attacked the French army besieging Château Gaillard. The well-planned combined land and river assault narrowly failed and although William fell quickly from royal favor (precipitated by his political accommodation with Philip II of France for the earl's French lands), he rose to influence again when John calamitously lost support during the rebellion of 1215. Unlike many generals in their old age, William basked in glory in his final years. When John died during the French invasion of 1216, leaving nine-year-old Henry III to succeed him, William reached the pinnacle of his career: from this year until his death in 1219 he was regent of England. With typical chivalry and loyalty, he is reported as accepting this great honor with a pledge to carry the young boy-king on his shoulders if that is what it would take to protect him. Although by now in his seventies, William rallied the royalist forces to victory over the French at the battle of Lincoln in 1217—his last active involvement in the field—and watched from the cliffs as his English fleet finally destroyed the French threat at the battle of Sandwich the same year. At William's funeral, his contemporary biographer recorded the Archbishop of Canterbury's praise for "the best knight in the world."

[*See also* Château-Gaillard, Siege of; John, King of England; *and* Lincoln, Battle of.]

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MASCULINITY

The theoretical underpinnings of medieval notions of masculinity can be traced in medical, scientific, and religious texts that purported to establish the innate superiority of the male over the female. Yet these allegedly "natural" characteristics were clearly contingent on a host of other factors, especially status and age. Becoming a man did not simply happen by default but was a social process, and for many men participation in warfare or knighthood was one of the key benchmarks of manhood.

Ideal masculinity was defined in terms of strength, action, bravery, and dominance. Derivatives of the Latin word *vir* (man), such as *viriliter* (forcefully, vigorously) and *virtus* (strength, bravery, virtue), were often cited as supporting evidence by contemporaries. There was a general sense that an able-bodied man should be prepared to fight if called upon to do so. Indeed, the ability to protect one's household and dependents was one of the criteria of manhood. The direct engagement of the majority of men in warfare decreased as the period progressed, but adult male subjects of many states were nonetheless often expected to practice military skills regularly. The popularity of wrestling and other rough games (such as football) also demonstrates that proving oneself physically in competition against other men was an important dimension of masculinity.

Fighting was man's work also because it excluded women on the grounds of both physical and moral weakness. Significantly, when women did participate directly in warfare, either as leaders or as combatants, they were typically described as having risen above their inherently inferior femininity and taken on manly qualities. In fact, such women were often standing in for absent men, but the point is that the trope underlines the intrinsic link between masculinity and fighting and suggests that gender identity was not linked to biology in any straightforward way.

There was a sense that military ability was inheritable, but in practice, training in the techniques and tactics of warfare was a crucial part of the upbringing and socialization of young noblemen.

In the early Middle Ages a nascent aristocracy formed from warbands, and its supremacy derived from the armed maintenance of order. Yet warrior status was not purely functional but became a measure of power and leadership, as evidenced by the inclusion of weapons in burials in order to signify political authority. Success in war was thus both confirmation of manhood and a measure of it. The emphasis on spiritual battle in early monastic writings was probably intended to make the religious life attractive to men who were used to perceiving their status and worth in terms of combat, and to allay anxieties that by giving up secular warfare they would no longer be real men.

Military prowess played a particularly significant role in the construction of an elite, secular masculinity, as evidenced by a variety of literary texts (mirrors for princes, romances, chivalric treatises) and accounts of the conduct of actual knights. Kings were expected to lead troops into battle and to win. Generally, those princes who were successful in war garnered a reputation as good kings and often an epithet describing their accomplishments and bravery (Richard the Lionheart, John the Fearless). Bad kings were frequently those who had neither the inclination nor aptitude for war, and their virility was often doubted as a result (e.g., Richard II and Henry VI of England). This was part of a wider tendency to equate failure on the military stage with a failure of masculinity. Cowardice in particular was deemed evidence of effeminacy, and for this reason, during recruitment to the Third Crusade, men apparently sent each other wool and distaffs, clearly implying that anyone who did not sign up was effectively a woman, with all the negative connotations this entailed. In a similar vein, the well-known Islamic accounts of women fighting in the crusader armies were probably intended, in part, to highlight the flawed masculinity of the Christians: what sort of men would allow women to fight alongside them?

Yet while cowardice was to be avoided, the properly masculine knight also had to eschew its opposite: foolhardy aggression. This weakness was evidently seen as a particular failing of the young warrior, eager for glory and reward. To progress to full manhood, a knight had to exercise patience and restraint. Indeed, self-mastery was crucial to the notion of hegemonic masculinity. This derived in part from classical medical ideas that a man should not indulge corporal appetites of any kind for fear of exhausting his manly essence. But this biological rationale was also modified in moral terms by the contention of mirrors for princes that to govern others, a man must first govern himself. This explains the emphasis on chastity in some of the more ascetic rituals surrounding the creation of a knight.

This version of knighthood, with its emphasis on temperance, can be linked to the Church's attempts to control violence and other aspects of aristocratic culture. Clerics often criticized knights for their lavish dress and sexual misconduct in gender-specific terms, castigating them as effeminate. A good example is provided by Bernard of Clairvaux's comparison of the chaste and unassuming yet brave and accomplished Knights Templar with secular knights in his "De laude novae militiae" ("In Praise of the New Knighthood"), probably written in the 1130s. But the very fact that clerics attempted to identify the qualities of display, aggression, and sexual excess as unmanly alerts us to the fact that they were evidently deemed a normal and desirable part of high-status manhood by many noblemen.

This form of masculinity was, by definition, only available to a minority of men. It was predicated not so much on an ability to dominate women, in a strictly patriarchal sense, as on an ability to dominate and govern other, subordinate men. Despite the premium placed on lineage, the valorization of these qualities involving personal strength, fortitude, and domination meant that such masculinity could be adopted by men of ability, such as John Hawkwood, not born to the role. Notwithstanding contrary statements about the innate nature of both nobility and gender and contrary attempts to inculcate the right sort of qualities in every young nobleman, character and personal ability clearly played a key role in the creation of the manly successful military leader.

[*See also* Chivalric Biographies; Knighthood and Knights; Mirrors of Princes; *and* Women as Combatants.]

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MAUNY, SIR WALTER

(c. 1310–1372), soldier in the Hundred Years' War. A man of the same chivalric disposition as King Edward III of England (r. 1327–1377), Walter de Mauny became one of the king's closest comrades in arms. Mauny's modern-day fame is due in large part to the writings of the chronicler Jean Froissart, who also hailed from Hainaut (in present-day France and Belgium), who loved to relate the kind of brave personal exploits for which Mauny became renowned.

Most of Edward III's leading soldiers and commanders were drawn from the ranks of the English nobility: men such as the Black Prince, Henry of Grosmont, and the Earl of Northampton. Mauny was unusual in that, as a man of foreign birth and relatively modest social standing, he came to occupy a major position of command during the civil war in Brittany in 1342. Edward III sent him there to support John de Montfort's claim to the duchy, against the rival bid of the French-backed Charles of Blois. Although Mauny's time in Brittany did not prove successful—he was never again placed in sole charge of one of the king's armies—he remained in favor at court and continued to contribute to Edward III's campaigns.

It was Mauny's audacity and courage that most appealed to Edward III and that captured the imagination of Froissart. He took part in the whole range of military activities that were available to soldiers of his generation, including land-battles (e.g., Dupplin Moor, 1332), naval battles (e.g., Sluys, 1340), and sieges (e.g., Berwick, 1333, and Calais, 1347). His career also reflects the shifting fortunes of chivalric warfare: he gained sizable sums from ransoms on more than one occasion but was himself captured in France and briefly detained in 1346. The many reckless actions attributed to Mauny reveal much about the importance attached by him (and by other fourteenth-century soldiers) to the pursuit of honor and martial glory.

[*See also* Berwick, Sieges of; Calais, Siege of (1346–1347); Dupplin Moor, Battle of; Edward III of England; *and* Sluys, Naval Battle of.]

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MAURICE

Byzantine emperor (r. 582–602). Maurice was born at Arabissus in Capadoccia (modern-day Elbistan, Turkey) in 539. After a civilian career in the service of Caesar Tiberius II Constantinus (r. 578–582), he was appointed chief of the imperial guard in 574, and subsequently commander of the eastern army and foreign mercenaries in 577. In the war against Persia, an army led by Maurice advanced far into Persian territory, in four campaigns between 577 and 582. The plan to reach Ctesiphon in 581, however, proved too ambitious.

Married to the daughter of Emperor Tiberius Constantinus, Maurice inherited power on 14 August 582. The same year, after a three-year siege, the Avars conquered Sirmium. This gave new impetus to the conflicts in the Danubian area, which lasted with some interruptions to the end of Maurice's reign. Because until 591 the main military effort was concentrated on the eastern front, the forces engaged in the Balkans were quite weak. Many cities along the Danube and inland were damaged, and the *limes* (frontier) was partially dismantled. The invaders even reached the vicinity of Constantinople and tried to conquer Thessalonike. After 591 the strategy of Maurice turned to the offensive. His target was to preserve control of the Danubian *limes* and, if possible, to fight in the territory of the Slavs and Avars, north of the river. Such was only achieved in 598 to 600, when the Avars recognized the Danube as a frontier, and when the Byzantine army defeated the Avars and Slavs in a series of campaigns carried out in the region between the Iron Gates and Singidunum. The rebellion of Phokas (November 602) ended this revival.

In the east, the war against Persia continued after 582. This became the principal concern of Maurice, whose strategic target was northern Mesopotamia. The initiative rested in most cases with the Byzantine army, which made several attacks in Persian territory. Having limited resources and fighting on two fronts, the emperor reduced payments for the soldiers, causing a mutiny in 588 that only ended a year later when his order was canceled. This incident reveals the parsimony that characterized the entire policy of Maurice toward the army, which led finally to his fall. In 590 Maurice agreed to help the legitimate emperor Khosrow II fight the usurper Vahram. This was viewed as a good opportunity to advance into Persia. After the victory, in the summer of 591, Khosrow offered Iberia and part of Armenia to the Byzantine Empire, as well as Dara, which had been captured from Vahram. The peace established between Maurice and Khosrow ended a long series of conflicts on the eastern frontier. This became the emperor's major achievement.

The military policy of Maurice also concerned the west where, in Spain, the last Byzantine possession (Córdoba) was lost in 584. Nevertheless, Maurice was able to consolidate his dominance in Italy and Africa through the creation of the two exarchates, conducted by officials who held both military and civilian power.

The brutal conduct of the emperor toward his soldiers and especially his avarice caused the mutiny of Phokas in the autumn of 602. On 23 November the rebels aided by a portion of the population in Constantinople dethroned and killed Maurice. Although the date of the text has been disputed, it is very likely that the emperor (or a contemporary) was the author of the so-called *Strategikon*, a military handbook that described the tactics applied in Maurice's wars against the Avars, Slavs, and other enemies.

[*See also* Phokas; Thessalonike, Siege of (586); *and* Viminacium, Battle of.]

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MAURON, BATTLE OF

On 14 August 1352, just east of the village of Mauron, the French army of Brittany under Marshal Guy de Nesle encountered a small English expeditionary force led by Walter Bentley. The *Chronique Normande* says Bentley's force comprised fifteen hundred men, including eight hundred archers, but Exchequer records suggest that his army might have been considerably smaller. Refusing an opportunity to surrender, Bentley deployed his heavily outnumbered force on a ridge with his dismounted men-at-arms

flanked by two wings of archers. A hedge protected their rear, but as Bentley's dispatch later noted, the ground "was upon the open fields, without woods, ditches or other defenses."

The marshal repeated the tactics he had used at Taillebourg in 1351. A strong force of cavalry under the lord of Hengest launched a flanking attack against the archers on the English right wing, who broke in panic and suffered heavy casualties. Meanwhile, the main body of French men-at-arms attacked on foot and, despite a difficult advance up the scrub-covered slope, drove the English men-at-arms back to the hedge. A French victory seemed imminent, but the English managed to rally, helped by the premature withdrawal of the French contingents under the lords of Hambuie and Beaumanoir. The archers on the English left wing, moreover, repelled an attack by French infantry, routed them, and may then have assaulted the exposed right wing of the main body of French men-at-arms. After bitter fighting, in which de Nesle himself was slain, the French were heavily defeated; more than five hundred men-at-arms were killed, including eighty-nine members of King Jean II's newly formed Order of the Star, who had vowed never to retreat. Nevertheless, the success of their cavalry attack at Mauron may well have influenced French tactics at the battle of Poitiers in 1356. Bentley, himself badly wounded, had thirty of his archers beheaded for fleeing in the face of the enemy.

[*See also* Poitiers, Battle of (1356).]

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MAXIMILIAN I

(1459–1519), King of the Romans (1486–1519), Emperor (1508). The only son of Frederick III, Roman emperor, and head of the Habsburg dynasty, Maximilian grew up in his father's territories, the eastern parts of today's Austria. At that time, nothing suggested that, under his rule and to a large part as a result of his actions, many political and military structures would be established that would dominate Habsburg, German, and European history for two centuries.

In 1477, Maximilian's political destiny and his intellectual development were abruptly and profoundly influenced when he and his father seized a unique opportunity. A few months after the death of Charles the Bold, Duke of Burgundy, Maximilian married Charles' only daughter and heiress, Mary, thus hoping to gain control of the numerous and rich Burgundian possessions. But Louis XI, King of France, tried to take advantage of the political situation, too. Maximilian had to defend his wife's and (after her death) his son's hereditary rights in several wars against France and also against the estates of the Low Countries. In the end, he successfully maintained for his son Philip the Handsome the larger part of the Burgundian principalities (Franche-Comté and most of the Netherlands), whereas the duchy of Burgundy was acquired by France. But when the quarrels concerning the Burgundian heritage were settled, conflicts with France were by no means at an end. In fact, a new theater of war emerged when the French king Charles VIII invaded Italy in 1494, and Maximilian tried to check his rival's ambition. Due partly to Maximilian's political initiatives, partly to pure chance, his grandson Charles V inherited the Spanish kingdoms and their colonies as well as the old Habsburg territories and the Netherlands. The Habsburgs became one of the most powerful dynasties of Europe and, automatically, France's permanent enemy. Thus Maximilian's military and political achievements created the geostrategic situation that determined European politics and warfare for the next 250 years: France and Habsburg, both supported by alliances with other powers, struggled for hegemony on the European continent.

In order to cope with France, Maximilian had to modernize thoroughly the financial and military structures of his inherited territories. He avidly

adopted much of what he learned in the richer and more developed Low Countries, thus creating in the old Habsburg principalities the kind of framework that characterized European states and armies until the end of the seventeenth century.

Military and Financial Structures. Above all, he established the infrastructure that was indispensable for military success. He levied new taxes and created a more effective financial administration. Moreover, he provided up-to-date military equipment and organization. He established gun factories and arsenals, where these guns and other weapons were stored in peacetime. His artillery adapted the technical innovations of the Burgundian guns. In Habsburg territories, he organized a cavalry force of noblemen (called Kürisser) who received a small salary in peacetime and in return pledged themselves to join his forces immediately when war broke out. Maximilian also raised an efficient, well-disciplined infantry force. These *Landsknechte* (lansquenets) were skilled and experienced mercenaries who employed contemporary infantry tactics: they fought in squares, most of them armed with pikes, some with handguns or two-handed swords.

All these measures were of limited scope because of deficient political structures. In most of the principalities of the Holy Roman Empire, the emperor had no power to influence the military organization. When he wanted the other German princes to support him, he had to ask them for help, claiming that he needed money or troops to defend the empire—and not to pursue Habsburg dynastic ambitions. Then the matter was discussed at the Imperial Diet; money or troops might be granted or not; and even if granted, they were often sent to him only in part, after long delay, or not at all. In his own Habsburg territories, the estates also had to consent when he wanted to collect taxes for raising troops. Thus, despite his financial reforms, Maximilian almost always lacked money, and therefore he was often unable to exploit his military successes or gain long-lasting political advantages.

Maximilian the Soldier. Maximilian not only concerned himself with military organization, but often led his army in person, thus spending a large part of his reign with his soldiers. He himself claimed that he had led no fewer than twenty-seven campaigns. Unfortunately, there is no thorough modern analysis of his wars. It is clear, however, that he was a skilled and daring tactician and strategist. He also displayed personal courage on several occasions. In the battle of Guinegate (1478), for example, he dismounted and fought on foot with his infantrymen, thus inspiring their courage. On other occasions, he demonstrated his chivalric spirit, taking part in tournaments or duels. However, the epithet "the last knight," often used to describe him today, stems only from a poem written in 1830. Moreover, it is wrong, for chivalric values continued to influence European noblemen for two hundred years. On the other hand, Maximilian was indeed called "father of the lansquenets" by his contemporaries, and this expression correctly reflects that he cared much for his soldiers.

Finally, Maximilian knew all too well that it was not enough to confront the enemy's forces successfully. News of victories had to be spread; setbacks needed to be embellished. Moreover, Maximilian was compelled to convince his subjects that their money was not spent in vain, and he had to justify his wars to the European public, just as his opponents tried to do. Maximilian skillfully used all means of propaganda, concerning his campaigns as well as his politics and his person. Famous authors, for instance, were paid to relate his wars and battles. His military glory thus outlasted the actual effects of his campaigns.

[*See also* Armies; Artillery; Charles the Bold; France, *subentry on* Narrative (1328–1483); Frederick III of Habsburg; Germany, *subentry on* Narrative (1415–1493); Guinegate, Battle of; Infantry; Low Countries, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1479); Mercenaries; Propaganda; Weapons, Hand-to-Hand; *and* Weapons, Missile.]

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MEDICINE, MILITARY

[*This entry contains two subentries, on Byzantine military medicine and an overview of medical treatment.*]

Byzantine Medicine

Byzantine military medicine mainly originates in Greco-Roman medicine and in Roman military medicine. The most important sources for Byzantine military medicine are the treatises of Byzantine physicians, hagiographic works, and archaeological finds. Along with the works of the most outstanding figures of classical medicine, Hippocrates and Galen, the works of minor authors who went beyond them were also transmitted. The early Byzantine physicians Oribasios of Pergamon (fourth century), Alexander of Tralles (sixth century), and Paul of Aegina (seventh century) were compilers who abridged and summarized the works of earlier writers. Michael Psellos in the eleventh century and Nicholas Myrepsos at the turn of the fourteenth made use of not only the theoretical treatises but also their own medical experience. Alongside experiential medicine, religion had a significant role, because diseases were ascribed to divine origins. The center of medicine was Constantinople, but until the Arab conquest Alexandria was an important center as well. Byzantium had an impact on the transmission of ancient medicine to the Arab world and the West.

In the early Byzantine period, military medicine, preserving the heritage that had evolved in the Roman army, enjoyed much higher standards than general medical care did. Prevention was given absolute priority, emphasizing arrangements for appropriate hygienic conditions, proper nutrition, and physical exercise. Camp baths were considered very important. A huge bath accommodating several thousand people has been excavated in Dorylaion, for example.

Dissection as a tool of medical education was prohibited, but military surgeons (more than general physicians) could acquire good knowledge of anatomy and therapeutics through the treatment of battle wounds. Military surgeons accompanying the armies, called *therapeutai* or *iatroi*, are recorded in several manuals. Prokopios mentions a physician named Theoktistos who saved Arzes, a bodyguard of Belisarios (*Wars* 6.2.16–18 and 6.2.25–29): when Arzes was hit in the face by an arrow, some physicians were reluctant to extract its head, but Theoktistos successfully operated on him and managed to prevent an infection. A certain Kutilas, however, whose skull was pierced by a javelin, died of the infection that followed its withdrawal. Oribasios of Pergamon and Paul of Aegina also describe wounds incurred on the field and their treatment.

Following the Roman patterns, a basic system of field medical care seems to have been preserved, with a small number of corpsmen—called *deputatoi* in Maurice's *Strategikon* and *skribones* in the *Taktika* of Leo VI—detached from each unit and positioned a short distance behind the front line to assist the wounded. These corpsmen consisted of both cavalry and infantrymen, the former equipped with an extra stirrup to carry the wounded on their horses. They received rewards for each life they saved. A tenth-century treatise states that after being attended on field, the wounded were taken on pack animals to the nearest military camp in Byzantine territory. The major military hospital was in Constantinople. John Kinnamos reports that when Emperor Manuel I Komnenos (r. 1143–1180) laid siege to the Hungarian-occupied fortress of Zeugminon (modern Zemun, Serbia), he had the injured carried off in warships.

[*See also* Armies, *subentry on* Organization; Byzantine Empire; Maurice; *and* Prokopios of Caesarea.]

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Péter Forisek

Medical Treatment

The provision of medical care for wounds and diseases among an army appears from a modern perspective to have been an essential strategy for any military commander in the past, but the limited survival of written sources for early medieval Europe means that very little textual evidence for military medicine survives. Fortunately, archaeological excavations have found good evidence for the surgical treatment of wounds during this period, suggesting that the care of injuries sustained during warfare was clearly regarded as important to soldiers. Excavations of village cemeteries in southern Germany dating from the sixth to the eighth centuries has demonstrated that, at a time when helmets were not widely worn, 10 percent of males had sustained skull fractures from sword wounds and other weapons. Seventy-six percent of such fractures had healed, showing long-term survival after the injury, and only 12 percent showed evidence of infection. Ten percent of these fractured skulls had undergone surgery in the form of trepanation, where sections of the skull bones around the fracture had been scraped or cut away. This suggests that in early medieval Germany there was a tradition of actively treating serious head wounds sustained during armed conflict and that most people survived the experience.

From the eleventh century onward much better written records from Europe survive. Examples of wound treatment can be found in chronicles, rhyming songs, letters, histories, wills, legal documents, and medical texts. We must not assume that all treatments found in medieval medical texts were actually in use at that time, however. Many operations were copied word for word from translations of classical Greek and Roman medical works, suggesting they had never been seen by the medieval author. Combining information in medical texts with all the other written sources gives us a more reliable understanding of what treatment was given to battle casualties and soldiers who fell sick on campaign. Medical authors of note for their discussion of wound treatment between 500 and 1500 include the Greek Paul of Aegina (mid-seventh century), the Italians Roger Frugard of Parma (fl. 1170), William of Saliceto (c. 1210–1277), Bruno of Longoburgo (c. 1200–1286), and Theodorich of Bologna (c. 1205–1298), the Spaniard Arnald of Villanova (c. 1235–1311), and the Frenchmen Henry of Mondeville (c. 1260–1320) and Guy of Chauliac (c. 1300–1368). From the twelfth century onward such authors were writing and teaching in universities of southern Europe, especially Italy. However, many less-educated medical practitioners could not read, would not have had access to such academic texts, and would have learned their trade as apprentices of their fathers. In the late twelfth century the role of the general medical practitioner (known in Latin as a *medicus*) began to be divided into the more specialized occupations of surgeon, physician, barber, bloodletter, and apothecary. It was the surgeons and barbers who did most of the work treating wounded soldiers.

Wound Treatment. The treatment of injured soldiers took place in a variety of settings: on the battlefield, in the houses of a nearby town, in a hospital, or, for those who could afford it, in a distant city renowned for medical learning. Simple treatments such as washing and bandaging a sword wound or extracting an arrow were often performed by the wounded man himself or his comrades. In armies with minimal medical preparations the injured would be transported by stretchers, on carts, or horseback, to a friendly town for treatment. However, some armies set up impromptu field hospitals during long sieges, built from the sails and timber of dismantled ships, as occurred in the English and German contingents of the Third Crusade at Acre in 1189–1191. By the early thirteenth

Medical Treatment. A surgeon visits a man with arrow wounds. Illustration from *Das Buch der Cirugia* by Hieronymus Brunschwig, 1497. PRIVATE COLLECTION/THE STAPLETON COLLECTION/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

century some Italian cities employed doctors to treat sick members of the population, and the doctors accompanied the army into battle as well. The earliest known example of this was Hugo of Lucca (c. 1160–c. 1258), who was contracted as doctor to the city of Bologna from 1214 to 1219. The order of St. John (also known as the Knights Hospitallers) was a religious order founded in the early twelfth century in the crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem; by the 1180s it ran a mobile field hospital transported on horseback, staffed with four surgeons who treated injured soldiers of the king of Jerusalem in tents. The more seriously injured were then transported back to the order's main hospital in Jerusalem for further care, and there is good textual and archaeological evidence that there were over one thousand beds available. The extent of medical care available in most armies would have been heavily dependent upon the wealth of the wounded soldiers. Kings and nobles took personal surgeons and barbers in their retinue, who could give their undivided attention to their employer and use the full range of surgical instruments and medicines they required. Poor foot soldiers were treated either by their comrades, or, if

they were fortunate, by the doctors who were hired by the army commanders. However, they would generally have to wait until after the nobles had been attended to, and they may have had to wait some days to be seen by a doctor if there were large numbers of casualties. Of course, it was not only men who performed wound care: there are examples of noblewomen and soldiers' wives tending to soldiers' wounds.

The kinds of wounds sustained by soldiers clearly depended upon the date and location of the battle, because weapons and armor varied widely between cultures and changed dramatically between 500 and 1500. In general, the complexity and efficiency of weapons increased over time, as did the strength of the armor worn and the variety of medical treatments employed to treat the wounded. Wounds on the skeletons of soldiers from medieval battlefields have been studied from a number of excavations such as Jacob's Ford castle (Israel/Palestine, 1179), Aljubarrota (Portugal, 1385), Visby (Sweden, 1361), and Towton (England, 1461). The most commonly found wounds were from arrows and swords, but injuries from maces and, in later times, the poleaxe were also present. Written sources, such as soldiers' accounts of their campaign and contemporary medical texts, recorded how such injuries were treated. Arrows were simply extracted by hand, or if problematic, by sliding tubes down the shaft to cover the barbs. They could be pulled out the way they entered the body, or pushed right through to come out the other side if the barbs prevented simple removal. Lance wounds were usually just covered with a bandage, but occasionally the wound would be enlarged and explored to control bleeding. Sword wounds were generally bandaged but sometimes sutured with waxed thread. Different medical authors recommended either washing wounds with vinegar or covering with a poultice. Bleeding from large arteries could be stopped by applying a cautery iron heated in a fire. Fractures in the limbs were splinted with parallel sticks over cloth padding, or with a plaster cast. Burns from Greek fire or boiling water were treated with ointments under a bandage. Skull fractures from maces or swords were left untreated if the soldier was unconscious or paralyzed, as the outcome was likely to be death anyway. However, if he was alert and able to talk, suggesting a less severe brain injury, it was recommended that the scalp be cut open and the skull fragments removed to ensure they did not damage the brain further. Despite mention in some surgical texts of how to repair abdominal wounds with lacerated intestines, there is little reliable evidence that such operations were actually undertaken during the medieval period. It is unclear whether pain relief was given for any of these procedures, and most medical historians agree that it was probably not widely used. However, there was reference to the use of opium by medical practitioners in the crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem during the late twelfth century, and the pain-killing combination known as dwale was in use in late medieval England to easy pain during surgery.

In conjunction with the treatment of the wound received, medieval medical practitioners also believed that the wounded soldier should be strengthened in order to improve wound healing. Dietary modification was employed, by encouraging foods thought to aid healing and forbidding foods that led to imbalance of the four humors (black bile, yellow bile, blood, and phlegm). Medicines could be administered, as pills, drinks, or enemas, which were likewise thought to optimize the humoral balance of the body. Bloodletting was also advocated for two reasons. Not only was it a standard technique for removing any unwanted humors thought to cause humoral imbalance, but it could also be employed in an attempt to stop heavy bleeding from a limb. The theory behind its use was that by evacuating blood from the opposite end of the body from the bleeding wound this should reverse the flow of blood away from the injury and so stop the blood loss. It remains unknown whether bloodletting, enemas, or wound poultices would have helped or hindered the healing process. It has been fashionable to claim that they did give benefit, but there is some modern clinical research on the effects of bloodletting that suggests the opposite.

Life Expectancy on Campaign. The likelihood of a soldier surviving an expedition might be expected

to vary depending upon wealth, social status, and military role. Nobles would be exposed to wounds in combat, infectious diseases during sieges, and malnutrition in severe famine, but they could afford good weapons and armor, and good food in normal circumstances, and could bring along their own personal medical practitioner. Accompanying clergy would be exposed to infectious diseases and malnutrition in severe famine but would not normally have suffered wounds, would normally eat good food, and would have the financial resources to pay for medical care. Foot soldiers would have had little armor and little food during times of famine; there was little they could do to prevent infectious disease, and they had limited access to medical care if wounded or sick compared with the nobles. Analysis of the outcomes of nobles and clergy mentioned in long, arduous campaigns such as crusades have allowed an assessment of the proportion that died from wounds as opposed to camp diseases. Studies of the First (1096–1099), Third (1187–1192), and Fifth Crusades (1217–1221) have found surprisingly similar results. During a two- to four-year campaign, 15 to 20 percent of nobles apparently died from wounds and a further 15 to 20 percent from infectious diseases and malnutrition. In total, about 30 to 40 percent of the richest and best-prepared participants seem to have died. We can only presume that a higher percentage of the poor foot soldiers died, but no reliable data for their outcome has survived.

Another role for the surgeon or barber included preparing the body of their lord or king for return home if they died in battle. This task was sometimes performed by the surgeon, and sometimes by the cook. In the twelfth to fourteenth centuries it was not at all unusual for a noble who died on campaign to be preserved and his remains transported back to the monastery or cathedral of his choice. One option was to remove the internal soft organs and pack the body cavity with salt and spices, but this was not very effective and the body would start to decompose after a few days. A less pungent alternative was to remove the heart and seal that in a container, and then boil up the corpse to separate the bones to take them home. Burial of different body parts in different religious locations was regarded as highly desirable in the medieval period. In this way clergy from several different institutions would all be praying for the soul of the deceased soldier, which was perceived as increasing his chance of going to heaven.

[*See also* Black Death *and* Disease.]

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Piers D. Mitchell

MELETO, BATTLE OF

The battle of Meleto was fought near the city of Naples on 6 June 1349 between rival branches of the Angevin family that ruled the region (known as the Regno, or Kingdom). It resulted in a decisive victory for the Hungarian Angevin forces.

The struggle that led to the battle began in 1345, when Andrew, the husband of the French Angevin queen of Naples, Joanna, was murdered. Andrew was the brother of Louis I (the Great), King of Hungary, who accused Joanna of the deed and descended into Italy to avenge it. He arrived in November 1347 and with the support of local barons defeated his opponents at Capua in 1348, entered Naples, and forced Joanna to flee to Avignon. The advent of the Black Death later that year compelled Louis to withdraw to Hungary; he left his army under the command of two German mercenary captains, Conrad Wolfhardt and his brother Ulrich.

After his departure, Louis gradually lost the support of the Neapolitan barons. In January 1349, Louis sent Hungarian reinforcements to Italy under the command of Steven Lackfi, the voivode (a local ruler or governor similar to a western European baron) of Transylvania. By the spring, Louis' army grew to about sixteen hundred cavalrymen with an unspecified number of infantry. The cavalry force contained mostly Hungarian and German mercenaries as well as a small contingent of Italian mercenaries. Among the captains were the Germans Werner of Urslingen and Konrad von Landau and the Provençal Montreal d'Albarno, all well-known men, who earned their reputation in part from their participation in marauding free companies.

The Neapolitan barons moved against Louis's army on the morning of 6 June 1349, amid rumors of disagreements between the Hungarian and German soldiers. The baronial force was well armed and outfitted, and, according to the Italian chronicler Matteo Villani (d. c. 1363), moved forward with chivalric splendor, dressed in the silk overcoats with gold belts and silver spurs emblematic of their knightly status. The army consisted of three thousand cavalry overall, captained by Roberto of San Severino. It included also a German contingent under the command of Johan von Asperg, the count of Sprecht.

The baronial army proceeded in a noisy, festive manner, which alerted the enemy to its approach. Louis's army rode out to meet them, toward the town of Meleto, four miles (6.5 kilometers) from Naples, and arranged itself in three lines. Konrad von Landau, at the head of the first line, led a cavalry charge against the barons, who despite their pomp and circumstance quickly fell into disarray and were surrounded. The king's army captured twenty-five barons and perhaps as many as a thousand men. The victors gained great treasure in spoils and ransoms. Werner of Urslingen was able to retire from Italy to his home in Swabia with the earnings he received.

The battle was a decisive victory for Louis's army, but it was inconclusive for the overall struggle between the French and Hungarian Angevins. A temporary truce was signed in August 1349, but the fighting continued, and Joanna eventually returned to Naples as part of a more lasting peace made in 1352.

[*See also* Konrad von Landau *and* Louis I of Hungary.]

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MELLRICHSTADT, BATTLE OF

In this battle, Emperor Henry IV prevented Rudolf of Swabia, the antiking, from combining his army in Saxony with rebel forces in Swabia. After a fierce action that saw both commanders flee the field, Rudolf retreated to Saxony, but Henry was unable to pursue.

After negotiations among Henry, the German nobility, and the papacy broke down, Rudolf advanced from Saxony while his supporters Berthold II of Zähringen and Welf IV advanced from Swabia. Henry deployed local Frankish forces to delay the Swabians, while using his main army and units from Bohemia against Rudolf. As the battle opened, several rebel churchmen broke off, forcing Rudolf's contingent to withdraw. However, the rebel unit under Otto von Northeim and Frederick of Sommerschenburg pressed the attack, driving Henry from the field. Although Rudolf rallied his contingent, he was unable to combine forces with Otto. Henry, however, joined the Bohemians and returned to combat, forcing Otto to withdraw. On the same day, the Swabian rebels defeated the Franks, but were unable to advance against Henry.

While the sources are not detailed, Mellrichstadt has the feel of a meeting engagement —victory went to the side (Henry's) that was able to unite its entire force. Henry demonstrated command ability by making an organized retreat with troops that had suffered an unexpected reverse (by Otto) after an apparent victory (against Rudolf). On the other hand, the defections among the rebels may have had less to do with lack of discipline than with the political situation. Negotiations were scheduled to resume in fall and involved more agendas than suggested by a simple division into royal/anti-papal and rebel/pro-papal sides —significantly, the churchmen who broke off included Cardinal Bernard, the papal legate to the earlier negotiations. Similarly, Henry's inability to follow up his victory resulted from logistic limits on medieval warfare. Henry's operational capabilities depended on the system of estates (*fisci*) that supported the royal court on its normal itinerary. A military campaign put great strain on the system's resources and it could not support a second campaign in the same area (Franconia) during the same season —the estates needed time to recover and grow or purchase new supplies. Strategically, Henry showed an impressive ability to coordinate a campaign by several forces (the king's army, the Bohemians, and the Franks) operating over considerable distances. It is a mistake to dismiss the Franks as peasants. Local forces raised to defend a region included persons of varying social rank and could have considerable military experience. Henry's Franks were seasoned enough to advance to the river Neckar in Swabia. The military importance of the bishops in Rudolf's army demonstrates the military and political role of the medieval German church. Numbers are problematic, but Henry may have held an overall advantage because Rudolf was advancing out of Saxony and thus likely did not have the Saxon local forces. Important royalist casualties included Count Eberhard; the rebels lost Werner, bishop of Merseburg, who was killed as the withdrawing churchmen were attacked by latrones (probably meaning scouting forces, not bandits).

[*See also* Henry IV, Emperor *and* Rudolf I.]

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MELORIA, BATTLE OF

The battle of Meloria was fought between the fleets of Pisa and Genoa on 6 August 1284 near the small island of Meloria in front of Porto Pisano, the port of Pisa. Rivalry between the two cities had erupted in 1282 over the sovereignty of Sardinia and Corsica. The immediate casus belli was the destruction by the Pisans of the Genoese quarter of Acre and new taxes imposed on Florentines—Genoese allies—doing business there.

Skirmishes began in August 1282 when Genoa sent a fleet against Pisa, leading to a subsequent counteroffensive in September in the harbor of Genoa. The Pisans, led by the Genoese traitor Natta Grimaldi, had destroyed certain Genoese ports, but during their return to Pisa a storm destroyed twenty-three of their galleys. In 1283, Genoa intercepted a Pisan convoy, capturing many sailors and an impressive cargo of silver. In May 1284 the Pisan count Fazio of Donoratico was captured near Sardinia, where more than fifteen Pisan galleys were taken back to Genoa.

After a Pisan attack in July, the Genoese returned the fight to Pisa and sent their entire naval force, an extensive fleet of 130 ships, against the more modest Pisan fleet of eighty ships. The Genoese, who hoped to draw their enemy out of Porto Pisano in order to fight a decisive battle, arranged their fleet in two lines. The first was composed of fifty-eight galleys and eight *panfili* (lighter galleys), with Admiral Oberto Doria at the center. To the right were the galleys led by Corrado Spinola and the ships of four of Genoa's eight "companies." To the left were Doria's galleys and the other four companies. The second line of twenty galleys, led by Benedetto Zaccaria, was placed beyond a small isle, not visible to the enemy but still close enough to strike in battle.

The Pisans, led by the Venetian podesta Alberto Morosini and two duumvirs, Ugolino della Gherardesca and Andreotto Saraceni, came out in a single body of eighty galleys and advanced to meet the first line of the Genoese, grappling with and boarding the enemy ships. But Zaccaria's squadron was able to decide the battle for Genoa by attacking the enemy's flank. This maneuver alarmed Ugolino, who abandoned the battle with his twelve vessels. The Pisan fleet was nearly annihilated: forty ships were taken and many destroyed, sixteen thousand Pisans reportedly died, and Morosini was captured. Dante later related in the *Divine Comedy* that Ugolino was suspected of treachery and starved to death with a number of his sons and grandsons.

Especially because it had already been crippled by Florentine and Luccan attacks, Pisa was never able to recover from this disaster. Two years later Genoa conquered Porto Pisano and filled the harbor with sand. Because of the defeat at Meloria, Pisa lost both its naval supremacy to Genoa and its land supremacy to Florence.

[*See also* Italy, *subentry on* Narrative (1000–1300).]

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MENDUM

See Restauratio Equorum, Restor.

MÉNFŐ, BATTLE OF

This battle was fought on 5 July on the plain of Ménfő, near Győr, between the troops of Emperor Henry III and Sámuel Aba, King of Hungary. When the son of the first Hungarian king died in 1031, Saint Stephen designated his nephew, Peter Orseolo, son of the duke of Venice, as his successor. The nobles were reluctant to accept Peter (1038–1041, 1044–1046) as their ruler, and in 1041 they drove him out of Hungary. Peter finally found shelter at the court of Emperor Henry III. The Hungarians elected a new king, Sámuel Aba (1041–1044), who was nephew or brother-in-law of Stephen. Since Henry III supported Peter, relations between the emperor and Aba were strained.

In 1042 Aba devastated a great part of Austria. In 1043 the emperor advanced as far as Győr, forcing Aba to sue for peace and renounce certain Bavarian territories obtained in 1031. Aba had turned out to be a violent and ruthless king; therefore many of his former supporters left him. When the emperor made another attempt in 1044 to acquire the Hungarian throne for Peter, that is why Henry was welcomed by most of the leading nobles.

The two most important, although not objective, sources relating the events in connection with the battle of Ménfő are the Hungarian *Chronicon Pictum*, a version of the fourteenth-century chronicle composition, and the *Annales Altachenses maiores*. Henry appears to have invaded the Hungarian border marches at Sopron, but he failed to cross the river Rábca, near Babót, because of floods and other obstacles. Then those Hungarians who were with the emperor and Peter led his army through the night to the ford of Árpás, where they crossed the Rábca at sunrise. King Aba met them with a great army at Ménfő in a mood of overweening confidence of victory. Henry had a smaller army, but the information provided by Radulphus Glaber (Henry: 6,000 men; Aba: 200,000 men) is evidently incorrect. Although sources state that before the battle a thin mist appeared and a violent whirlwind sent a terrible dust storm into the eyes of the

Hungarians, the real reason for Henry's overwhelming victory was the betrayal of those Hungarians who cast their banners to the ground during the battle and fled, causing a great confusion. Aba also fled from the battlefield but was executed soon afterward. Peter ascended the throne and became a German vassal. Henry, who had even acquired the treasury of Aba, sent the Hungarian royal insignia to Rome.

[*See also* Hungary, *subentries on* Sources (1000–1300) *and* Narrative (1000–1300).]

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